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Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal Intercultural Pragmatics
‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’Shanghai, 15-19 June 2008
Pragmatic Inference and Default Interpretations in Current Theories
of Discourse Meaning
Kasia JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge, U.K.
http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21
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Lecture 4
Principles of Default Semantics
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Default Semantics (DS, Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, forthcoming a, b) is a radical contextualist theory.
Objective: to model utterance meaning as intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee.
Where context and inference need not be employed, they do not figure in the construction of meaning.
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Going beyond contextualism:
DS does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively justified construct.
To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role among various carriers of information (contextualists’ mistake).
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(1) Child: Can I go punting?Mother: You are too small.
(A) The child is too small to go punting.(B) The child can’t go punting.
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(1) Child: Can I go punting?Mother: You are too small.
(A) The child is too small to go punting.(B) The child can’t go punting.
(2) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Mother: You are not going to die.
(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B2) It’s not a big deal.
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(1) Child: Can I go punting?Mother: You are too small.
(A) The child is too small to go punting.(B) The child can’t go punting.
(2) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Mother: You are not going to die.
(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B2) It’s not a big deal.
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DS takes as its object of semantic representation the primary, salient, intended meanings and hence allows for the B interpretations to be modelled.
Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted.
The representation of the primary meaning need not be isomorphic with the representation of the uttered sentence or with a development of that syntactic form. It need not constitute an enrichment/modulation of the proposition expressed in the sentence.
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The syntactic constraint of post-Gricean contextualism is rejected.
The kind of meaning that is modelled in the theory of meaning is the primary meaning. The primary meaning is the main message intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee.
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Experimental evidence:
Nicolle and Clark 1999Pitts 2005Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 & forthcoming
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Merger Representation
Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.
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Merger Representation
Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.
The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.
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Merger Representation
Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.
The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.
Merger representations have the status of mental representations.
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Merger Representation
Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger representations.
The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.
Merger representations have the status of mental representations.
They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, integrating information coming from various sources that interacts according to the principles established by the intentional character of discourse.
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Sources of information for :
(i) world knowledge (WK);(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS);(iii) situation of discourse (SD);(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS);(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and
culture (SC).
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SC
(3) A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.
(3a) A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week.
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WS – lexicon and grammar
SD – context-dependent inference
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WK
(4) The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and the lake froze.
(4a)The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and as a result the lake froze.
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IS
(5) The author of Cloud Atlas has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.
(5a) David Mitchell has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.
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world knowledge (WK)
word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
situation of discourse (SD)
stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS) about society and culture (SC)
Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ
merger representation Σ
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The model of sources of information can be mapped onto types of processes that produce the merger representation of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings.
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Primary meaning: combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
conscious pragmatic inferencepm
(from situation of discourse, social and social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm) Secondary meanings:
Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm) conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)
Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised version of Default Semantics
merger representation Σ
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Mapping between sources and processes
WK SCWD or CPISC SCWD or CPIWS WS (logical form)SD CPIIS CD
In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.
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Unresolved question:
What counts as effortful processing (CPI) vis-à-vis automatic utilization of knowledge of culture and society (SCWD)?
Assumption: utterance interpretation makes use of automatic, default interpretations which figure as salient and strong interpretative probabilities unless the context dictates otherwise.
But: it may never be possible to make generalizations on this matter, due to the interpersonal differences in assumed common ground.
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(3) A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.
(3a) A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week.
CPI or SCWD?
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There is a need to distinguish the two kinds of processes: the conscious, inferential one and the automatic, subdoxastic one.
Theoretical distinction: Model Addressee and Model Speaker
Levinson’s (2000) presumptive meanings & Recanati’s (2002, 2004) truth-conditional pragmatics retain the common intuition that the primary meaning is built both out of automatic, associative, unreflective components and conscious, inferential ones.
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Compositionality of Primary Meanings
Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): compositionality is not a necessary property of semantics; composition of meaning may simply reflect compositional reality. Meaning supervenes on the structure of the world.
Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to enriched, modulated propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ approach to compositionality.
DS: compositionality utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning.
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Merger representations are compositional structures.
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Compositionality is a necessary prerequisite for any theory of meaning.
Compositionality should not be seen as a methodological requirement on the syntax and semantics of sentences.
DS agrees with Jackendoff (2002: 293) that there is no ‘strictly linguistic meaning’.
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Global or local defaults?
The more ‘local’ the enrichments, the higher the likelihood that they have to be cancelled later on in discourse when more information becomes available. Frequent cancellation is not a satisfactory feature of defaults in that it is costly.
Grice’s global defaults vs. experimental evidence of incremental processing)
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Default and inferential interpretations are construed in DS as operating on a unit that is adequate for
the case at hand, ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.
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[1a] Defaults belong to competence. [1b] Defaults belong to performance. X
Merger representation is construed as a semantic representation;
[2a] Defaults are context-independent. X
[2b] Defaults can make use of contextual information.
Salient, short-circuited interpretations arise through repeated exposure to scenarios and to information about culture, society and physical world;
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[3a] Defaults are easily defeasible. X[3b] Defaults are not normally defeasible.
Frequent cancellation goes against the economy and thereby rationality of communicative behaviour;
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[4a] Defaults are a result of subdoxastic, automatic process. [4b] Defaults can sometimes involve conscious pragmatic inference. X
-- because of the very nature of what constitutes a default interpretation;
[5a] Defaults are developments of the logical form of the uttered sentence. X[5b] Defaults need not enrich the logical form of the sentence but may override it.
-- following the rejection of the syntactic constraint;
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[6a] Defaults can all be classified as one type of pragmatic process. X
[6b] Defaults come from qualitatively different sources in utterance processing.
Default interpretations are classified in DS as (i) CD, pertaining to the source IS, and (ii) SCWD, where SCWD pertain to two sources: WK and SC (see Figs 1 and 2);
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[7a] Defaults are always based on a complete proposition.
[7b] Defaults can be ‘local’, ‘sub-propositional’, based on a word or a phrase. X
-- as a temporary methodological measure
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[8a] Defaults necessarily arise quicker than non-default meanings. Hence they can be tested for experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance.
[8b] Defaults do not necessarily arise quicker than non-default meanings because both types of meaning can be based on conscious, effortful inference. Hence, the existence of defaults cannot be tested experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance. X
-- logically following [4a] and hence in virtue of the very nature of what constitutes a default interpretation.
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Selected applications of DS
Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Parsimony of Levels (POL) Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity
First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002).
Recent applications: presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2005; forthcoming; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 and forthcoming).
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Languages:
English, Korean, Thai, Russian, French, German
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Definite NPs in English
(6) The architect of this church was an eccentric.
(6a) The architect of Sagrada Família (whoever he was) was an eccentric.
(6b) Antoni Gaudí was an eccentric.
(6c) Simon Guggenheim was an eccentric.
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Degrees of Intentions (DI) Principle: Intentions and intentionality allow for degrees.
Primary Intention (PI) Principle: The primary role of intention in communication is to secure the referent of the speaker’s utterance.
Jaszczolt (1999: xix)
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Fig. 3: Merger representation for the default reading of example (6)
x [Antoni Gaudí]CD (x) [[x]CD was an eccentric]WS
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Fig. 4: Merger representation for the referential mistake reading of example (6)
x [Simon Guggenheim]CPIpm (x) [[x]CPIpm was an eccentric]WS
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Fig. 5: Merger representation for the attributive reading of example (6)
x y [Sagrada Família]CD (y) [the architect of Sagrada Família]WS,CPIpm (x) [[x]CPIpm was an eccentric]WS
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Future-time reference in English
(7) Lidia will play in a concert tomorrow evening.(8) Lidia will be playing in a concert tomorrow
evening.(9) Lidia is going to play in a concert tomorrow
evening.(10) Lidia is playing in a concert tomorrow
evening.(11) Lidia plays in a concert tomorrow evening.
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(12) Lidia must be playing in a concert tomorrow evening.
(13) Lidia ought to/should be playing in a concert tomorrow evening.
(14) Lidia may be playing in a concert tomorrow evening.
(15) Lidia might play in a concert tomorrow evening.
(16) (doorbell) That will be the delivery man.
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ACCΔ ├ Σ
‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’
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Fig. 6: Σ for example (7), regular future
x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC
rf ├ Σ']WS,CD Σ' [x play in a concert]WS
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Fig. 7: Σ for example (10), futurative progressive
x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC
fp ├ Σ']WS, CPIpm Σ' [x play in a concert]WS
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Fig. 8: Σ for example (14), future may
x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC
epf may ├ Σ']WS, CD Σ' [x play in a concert]WS
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Present-time reference in English
(17) Lidia is playing in a concert now. (18) Lidia will be playing in a concert now.(19) Lidia must be playing in a concert now. (20) Lidia may be playing in a concert now.(21) Lidia might be playing in a concert now.
(22) Lidia will always play the piano when she is upset. (dispositional necessity present)
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Past-time reference in English
(23) Lidia played in a concert yesterday evening. (24) Lidia was playing in a concert yesterday
evening.(25) Lidia would have been playing in a concert then.(26) Lidia must have been playing in a concert
yesterday evening.(27) Lidia may have been playing in a concert
yesterday evening.(28) Lidia might have been playing in a concert
yesterday evening.
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Conclusions: Main advantages
Modelling of the main, intended meaning.
Psychology of utterance processing: no syntactic constraint on .
Pragmatic compositionality: accounting for the interaction of meaning coming from different sources.
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Future prospects:
Algorithm for the compositional interaction of lexicon, syntax, pragmatics (WS, WK, SD, SC, IS)
The default/inference boundary
Application to more types of constructions and to pragmatics-rich languages
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End of Lecture 4Thank you!
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References
van der Auwera, J. and V. A. Plungian. 1998. ‘Modality’s semantic map’. Linguistic Typology 2. 79-124.Carston, R. 2007. ‘How many pragmatic systems are there?’. In: M. J. Frápolli (ed.). Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati’s Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 18-48.Culicover, P. W. and R. Jackendoff. 2005. Simpler Syntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Davis, W. A. 2007. ‘How normative is implicature’. Journal of Pragmatics 39. 1655-72.Donnellan, K. S. 1966. ‘Reference and definite descriptions’. Philosophical Review 75. 281-304.Hamm, F., H. Kamp and M. van Lambalgen. 2006. ‘There is no opposition between Formal and Cognitive Semantics’. Theoretical Linguistics 32. 1-40.
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Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Jaszczolt, K. M. 1992. Belief Sentences and the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. D.Phil. thesis. University of Oxford.Jaszczolt, K. M. 1997. ‘The Default De Re Principle for the interpretation of belief utterances’. Journal of Pragmatics 28. 315-36.Jaszczolt, K. M. 1999. Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Oxford: Elsevier Science.Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Jaszczolt, K. M. 2007. ‘Variadic function and pragmatics-rich representations of belief reports’. Journal of Pragmatics 39. 934-59.
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