THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN CONTRACT
LABOR PROGRAM, 19^2-1966
APPROVED:
Z W l V £ O m Major Professor
Minor Professor
the Departm^dx^f History
Dean of the Graduate School
TEE HISTORY 0? THE MEXICAN - CONTRACT
LABOR PROGRAM, 19^2-1966
THESIS
Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
By
Marion Beth Morris, 3. A-,
Denton, Tsia?
January, 19c?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1
II. WORLD WAR II PROGRAM: 19^2-19^7 9
III. THE EVOLUTION OP PUBLIC LAW 78 AND THE WETBACK CHALLENGE: 19^7-1955 ^3
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM: 1955-1964- . . . 79
V. THE POST-BRACERO ERA, 1964-1966: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 107
BIBLIOGRAPHY' 126
111
CHATTER I
INTRODUCTION
The seasonal movement of Mexican agricultural workers
to the United States has ebbed and flowed with the tides of
war, depression, and prosperity. Prior to the system of
contract labor which began In 19-!-2 and continued until 1964,
agricultural laborers had entered, the United States in
large numbers, especially sinc^ the turn of the twentieth
century. The first significant immigration occurred in the
period 191? to 1921. Prior to tne outbreak of World W&r I,
farmers borrowed Mexican workers f;» cm railxo&cl conpan5 es
which had imported them for temporary maintenance work.
With the shortage of agricultural labor which accompanied
the war, farmers and citrus fruit growers petitioned
Congress to allow large importations of Mexican workers.
Although the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1917
prohibited foreign contract labor, the Ninth Proviso of
Section Three of the Lot permitted the Commissioner of
Immigration, in cooperation with the Secretary of Labor, to
establish certain criteria under which -coinporaTy workers
could gain on trance to the country. noting under the
authority of the proviso, Secretary of Labor ¥. B, Wilson
on May 22, 1917, ordered the suspension of literacy tests
and. exemption from payment of the head tax for agricultural
workers. The modification of the immigration laws created
an influx of workers numbering approximately 73>000 during
the five-year period 1917 to 1921.
Although not so highly regulated as the World War II
program, this system represented the informal beginning of
the "bracero^ program. In order to obtain, workers, the
growers signed a contract with the United S.tates government
which specified the conditions of importation and re-
patriation. The employers arranged for housing, trans-C<
port-ation, and food, the cost of which was deducted from
2
the workers' wages. ' The initial entrance of workers was
only the vanguard for a stream of migrants that would.
increase in volume throughout the decade of the 1920's.
Some estimates maintain that as many as <0,000 workers were
admitted yearly along with an unknown number of "wetbacks,"
or persons illegally entering the United Scates from Mexico,"'
"Literally translated from Spanish the term "bracero" means "arms" and has been applied to day laborers. Since the inception of the Lexican farm labor program, the term refers to agricultural laborers in the United States.
2 "U. S., Congress, House, Committee of the Judiciary,
Subcommittee No. 1, Study of "Population and Immigration Problems, 83th Congress, 1st Session, 1963. pp. Zh-, 27, Hereafter cited as "Study of Population." See also, Ray N. Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore, "The Bracero in California," The Paci f ic Historical liev lew, XXXIT (August, 19637* 263.
-^"Study of Population," p. 27,
The trend of immigration reversed itself in the 1930's
as the abundance of seasonal jobs and high wages vanished
with the onset of the depression. Aliens still found
employment in the United States but in smaller numbers and
at decreased wages. Of the e.stimated 1,^-22,553 Mexicans
working on a year-round basis in the United States in 192^,
approximately 300>003 to ^00,000 returned to their homeland
during the depression. The exodus reached a peak of 155<3'+^
persons in 1931 > but dropped to 31,4-8^ by 1933 •
Repatriation of the Mexican workers who were displaced
by domestic labor created problems for both the United States
and Mexico. Although many returned voluntarily to Mexico,
wholesale forced deportation was not feasible since many of
the workers' children were American-born citizens. More
indirect yet equally effective methods were used to encourage
the unemployed workers to return to Mexico, In some cases,
they were threatened with the denial of relief allowances;
while in other instances, they were bribed with the offer
of free transportation to the border.
k Robert D. Tomasek, "The Political and Economic
Implications of Mexican Labor in the United States under-the Non-Quota System, Labor Program, and Wetback Movement," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1957, p. ^7. Hereafter cited as Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States."
^Ibid., p. 1^6.
k
Unless the workers received free transportation, the
Mexican government had to subsidize their return trip, since
the majority of them had experienced long periods of un-
employment and related economic hardships. The added
expenses created by the destitute migrants were a strain on
the Mexican national budget. Moreover, the situation in
the 1930!s influenced the attitude of Mexican officials
with respect to the World War II program. Part of the
hesitance with which the Mexican government approached the
later negotiations was directly related to the distresses
its citizens experienced as migrants to the United States.^
One of the interesting similarities between the early
immigration of workers to the United States and the contract
system developed in 19^2 is the areas of Mexico from which
the workers came. In both periods, the central plateau of
Mexico provided the largest number of migrants. Guanajuato,
Jalisco, and Michoacan were the principal contributors, with
fewer migrants coming from Sonera, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and
Nuevo Leon. States situated in the .coastal regions pro-
duced the smallest number of migrants. There were, however,
exceptions to the pattern of immigration, In the Imperial
Valley of California, approximately 50 per cent of the
immigrants originated in Mexican states with borders con-
tiguous to the United States, such as 3aja California.
°"Study of Population," p. 27
5
There it was estimated that only 35 per cent of the laborers
7
came from the central areas of Mexico.
The condition which prompted such large-scale immigration
of Mexicans to the United States, particularly during the
1920's, resulted from a combipation of factors, There was
the important "pull factor" of the prospect of higher wages
in the United States. If the Mexican situation had offered
more satisfactory living conditions, higher wages possibly
would not have been a sufficient inducement for a £eon to
leave his traditional environment and migrate to the United
States. But such conditions did not exist and their absence
contributed to "push factors,"
One would naturally think that a dense population
would be a push factor, but this was not necessarily true.
Of the three most highly populated states in the 1920!s,
Veracruz, Puebla, and Jalisco, the latter state was the
only one to contribute substantially to the immigration 8
flood. Although many Mexicans doubtless emigrated to
escape political insecurities and economic vicissitudes
resulting from the 1910 Revolution, the Revolution itself
does not account for the tremendous surge in migration. -In
fact, the trend of immigration increased in the period 7 Manuel Gamio, Mexican Tmmlgrati on to the United States:
A Study of Human Migration and Ad justment (Chicago, 19 30), pp. 21-23. Hereafter cited as Gamio, "Mexican Migration."
8Ibid., p. 21.
t)
1923 to 1928 after the violent stage of the Revolution had 9
ended.
A more sophisticated answer is found in the system of
landholding in Mexico. In the central area of Mexico, as
represented by Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacan, and in
the northern parts land is distributed in large estates
owned by a few wealthy families. Population pressure on
the land forces the peon class to emigrate periodically.
The coastal and southern areas are not plagued with such
extensive landholdings and, therefore, contribute almost -j Q
negligible amounts to the migration pattern,"
^ The effect of the early migration on the individual
worker an<i on Mexico is at best controversial. It was
hoped that the money earned in the United States would be
used to purchase land and farm equipment, but a majority
of migrants spent most of their money in the United States,
usually for luxury items, before returning to Mexico.
Many of the skills learned in the United States were
not applicable to the home siuuatjon In Mexico, In this
period, Mexican industry and railroads were not highly
developed. The stoop labor skills were used neither on the
large estates nor on the small plots of land that belonged
11 to the peones,'
9: Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the united States," pp. l6-1?'.
10
],bidSee also, Garni0, '"Mexican Migration," pp. 22-2,3.
"^TomaseK, "Mexican Labor in the United States • ,J
7
From the economic viewpoint, Mexico benefited from the
migration. Her workers received better wages and improved
conditions. But even in the early period of immigration,
observers of the trends realized that unregulated migration
portended difficulties for both the United States and
Mexico, j/one of the observers, sociologist Manuel Gamio,
rejected the contention that laissez-faire migration was a
more satisfactory policy than controlled migration. He felt
that unregulated migration would be acceptable if it was
concerned with goods such as cattle; but when related to
human beings, the fluctuations of supply and demand were not
an adequate gauge.jGamio suggested that border authorities /
cooperate to dispense information concerning wages and con-
/ ditions of employment./ The author also urged, as a part of
/
the work contracts, that American employers pay trans-
portation for the worker from the border to his point of 1?
destination and return. " His proposals contain several of
the guarantees which Mexican officials later demanded in
negotiating the international agreement of 19^2.
Thus the pre-World War II immigration influenced the
development of the later program. This was especially true
during the 1920's when the influx of, workers created a
pattern of Mexican migration to the United States. It also
established a precedent of relying on foreign labor among 19 '"Gam:1 o, Mexican Migration, pp. 178-182
• . 8
American farmers and growers by which they partially
justified their pleas for the importation of contract labor
during World War II. The Mexican government, remembering
the chaotic conditions of the 1930's, found justification
for the guarantees it demanded during the negotiations of /
19/12. / Lastly, the mass migration aroused perceptive ob-
servers to encourage cooperation between the United States
and Mexico in order to assure that benefits accrue to the
two nations; and, more importantly, to the individual
worker. / /
CHAPTER II
WORLD WAR II PROGRAM:
19^2-19^7
With the approach of World War II and the resultant
orientation of the economic resources of the United States
from consumer production toward heavy industry, the high
wage rate and regular hours of industrial employment caused
many agricultural workers to leave the farms. Growers in
the country became apprehensive that a sufficient number of
domestic agricultural workers would not be available to
harvest crops. As early as September, 19^1. farm groups
which had used Mexican laborers during World War I and the
1920's reported a critical labor shortage in the country.
These groups petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization
Office to waive restrictions again'on immigration in order
that Mexican nationals could be recruited for the harvest
1 season.
Within the United States government, a possible farm
labor shortage as a result of the war effort was being
discussed. Opinion, particularly in' the Department of
1
"Wayne I). Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program. 19^3-19-/t7. U. S. Department of Agri-culture Monograph No. 13 (Washington, 1951)> 200. Hereafter cited as Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program."
10
Agriculture, was divided concerning the manner with which a
farm labor program should be developed in order to counter-
balance defense shortages. Secretary of Agriculture Henry
Wallace represented the group which felt that the problems
of agriculture centered around a surplus rather than a
shortage of labor. According to the position held by the
Secretary, the problem of a labor shortage reported by the
growers could be solved by an active nationwide recruitment
and transportation program designed to attract domestic
workers. Therefore, the early requests in 19^1 for foreign. ..
labor, coming primarily from cotton growers in the states of \ •
Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico, were" denied by Immigration \ "
and Naturalization authorities. The plan to obtain workers
through interstate recruitment initiated by the United
States Employment Service was successful and temporarily-
met the growers' demand for labor.-''
However, as the 19^2 harvest drew near, the availability
of farm labor had been influenced by several factors, not
the least of which was the Selective Service Act passed in
late 19^0. Whereas the armed forces had only .5 million
men in 19^0, by 19 -1 there were 1.6 million.^ The number
^Ibid., pp. 13-1^.
3Ibid., p. 200.
David Graham Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program—Its Friends and Foes," unpublished master's thesis, Department of History, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas, I963, p. 1 -. Hereafter cited as Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program."
11
expanded to ^ million in 19^2 and 9 million in 19^3* The
decline of potential laborers in the United States occurred
as the world demand for agricultural goods increased. A
study in 19 -2 estimated that in the first month of the year,
as many as 8,^-03,500 agricultural workers would be needed
as a result of the demand foi farm products. The same study
pointed out that in June, the peak harvest month, the need
would increase to 12,068,000. Of the January figure,
1,708,000 would be hired labor, while in June approximately
3 million of the laborers would be hired.^ The problem
which faced the farm employer was one of locating the needed
help.
All farmers, and particularly those who raise perishable
crops, want trie assurance that at harvest time adequate
labor will be available. To make a profit, the harvest •
costs, including labor, must be less than the market prices,
but insufficient labor at the peak of harvest season can in
itself destroy a farmer's investment. The combined effect
of economic and psychological pressures often causes the
harvest labor demand to be more intense than is warranted
6 by the growth cycle.
Growers, thinking their only recourse lay in importation
of foreign labor, renewed their earlier requests to
-Rasmussen, "Emergency i''arm Program," p. 200.
^"Agricultural Labor Relations--The Other Farm Problem," Stanford law'Review, XIV (December, 1961), 121. 4
Immigration and Naturalization Service. The requests
reflected heightened urgency and apprehension with regard
to the approaching harvest season. Particularly vocal in
its requests for labor was the Farm and Livestock Bureau of
— 7 ~
Dona Ana County, New Mexico. Added to the Dona Ana
requests were those of the sugar "beet growers in California
whose estimated need for agricultural workers was placed at O
33.000 persons. Careful investigations proceeded under
the direction of the United States Employment Service to
obtain workers again by interstate recruitment. This time,
however, efforts to secure sufficient workers to fill the
growers' vacancies proved futile. And the Employment Service
certified the existing labor shortage within the country to g
the Office of Immigration and Naturalization.
The growers' demand for imported labor was naturally
receiving attention by governmental agencies interested in
developing an overall solution to the manpower shortage and
in averting possible crop losses as a result of the shortage.
A special committee created within the Department of
Agriculture in April, 19 -2, was assigned the duty of
examining the procedures by which Mexican laborers might be
imported. The committee, headed by Raymond C. Smith of the "^Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 200.
^Lloyd H. Fisher, The Harvest Labor Market in California (Cambridge, 1953). P-
o /Bas"fflussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 200.
• . 13
Department of Agriculture's Interbureau Labor Committee and
composed of representatives from agencies concerned with
national and international affairs, consulted with growers
relative to their labor needs and discussed standards which
10
should be set prior to importation. In the meeting of
the special committee, the important issue was to determine
the wage rate that should be offered to the Mexican workers.
One recommendation presented to the group would have allowed
the Department of Labor, cooperating with the Employment
Service and the Department of Agriculture, to establish the
wage rate. A second suggestion would have given the
Employment Service authority to determine wage rates equiva-
lent to the average wage being received by an industrial
laborer working in the same geographic location in which the
imported, agricultural worker would be used. The Department
of Agriculture, representing the growers' interests,
rejected the latter recommendation arguing that it would
create increased labor costs for the grower sin^e wages
received in industry would be higher than those for agri-
culture in any given area.
Although plans were being formulated in the United
States to contract foreign labor, formal negotiations with
10 "'Ibid, , pp. 200-201. Membership on the special com-
mittee included representatives from the War Manpower Commission, Department of State, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Department of Justice, and Department of Labor,
^ "l'bid , , p. 2.01.
Ik
the Mexican government to ascertain if a program of re-
cruitment would be acceptable or feasible had not as yet
begun. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles instructed
Ambassador George C. Messersmith to mention the subject of
a temporary pact for the importation of agricultural
workers, but Messersmith was not to seek an immediate reply
from Mexican Foreign Minister Esequiel Padilla. In the
talks, Messersmith was to assure him that the United States
was well aware of the i&i sfortunes connected with earlier
migrations and that every possible precaution and safeguard
would be established.
Following his instructions, Messersmith contacted the
Foreign Ministry and talked with Under Secretary Jaime
Torres Bodet. As anticipated by the State Department, one
of the objections tc negotiating a pact, a point stressed
by Torres Bodet, was the troubles of earlier immigrants.
He felt that good relations between Mexico and the United
States might be jeopardized if such incidents reoecurred.
The Under Secretary also discussed internal problems wh: oh
the Mexican government had to consider before signing a
pact. He pointed out that news of a recruitment program
would flood Mexico City with thousands of workers who would f
think they were going to "El Dorado." Instead of returning
to Mexico with money, many would be penniless. Torres Bodet
said that agencies within the Mexican government were dis-
cussing the possibility of setting aside a certain part of
15
the wage of each worker contracted. He also asked that a
part of the wages be given in farm tools that could be used
in Mexico on small tracts of land. Despite the hesitancies,
Torres Bodet suggested meeting on July 10 for further
discussion, but emphasiz.ed that there should be no public
announcement. To do so would only provide additional
material for those of anti-American sentiment to criticize
12
both governments.
Further discussion on the topic occurred at the Second
Inter-American Conference on Agriculture held in June, 19^2.
When approached by representatives of the Agriculture and
State Departments, Mexican officials were receptive to the
suggestions of contract labor, but demanded certain 13
guarantees to protect their citizens. ^ Agreement con-
cerning terms and standards was reached July 10-15 in Mexico
City and made effective by an exchange of notes on August
19 ;-+2.1/+
Immediately following the July meetings, the Mexican
government defined the duties of each department within the 12 Foreign Relations of the United. States: The American
Republics, VI (Washington, 19 -2), 538 —539, 5^-5^5* Here-after cited as Foreign Relations.
13 "^Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Pr'ogram," p. 201.
" Is x U. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of
Mexican Agricultural Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed August 4-, 19^2," U. S. Statutes at Large, LXI, Part II, 1759-1769. Hereafter cited as "Temporary Agreement, 19^2."
16
government toward the contract labor program. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs was responsible for securing all the
guarantees promised to the worker. The problem of labor
recruitment, so as not to hamper Mexico's harvest and
establishment of the savings fund, was assigned to the
Ministry of Labor and Social Provision. • The Ministry of
Government was to prevent illegal entries into the United
States while the Ministry of Agriculture was made responsible
15
for educating laborers in the use of farm implements.
Throughout the negotiations and the establishment of
the necessary governmental machinery, the reaction of the
Mexican government to the international agreement evidenced
a great deal of ambivalence and reluctance. The transcending
consideration of the officials was a realization that no
Mexican government could politically afford to send workers
to the United States without stipulating certain guarantees.
The reaction of the Mexican people to the worker who re-
turned with tales of abuses and discriminations could be
violent enough to bring a downfall of political power. Con-
sideration also had to be given to the effect a great exodus
of workers would have on the economy of Mexico. The Allied
need for agricultural and mining products might create a
demand for workers within Mexico itself. Yet the
^Robert C. Jones, Mexican War Workers in the United States : The Mexic.o-fJn11ed States Manpower Recruiting Program and Its Operation (Washington, 19^5)» P- 2. Here-after cited as Joixis, "War Workers,"
17
war-associated increase in the Mexican economy was mainly
due to fulfillment of United States's needs, and Mexico did
l6
not c^re to offend its best customer.
^Before the final decision had been reached, the bene-
fits that would accrue both for Mexico as a country and for
the individual worker were weighed. It was felt that the
contract labor program could serve as an educational
experience to Mexican subsistence farmers by exposing them
to more advanced farming techniques which could later be
introduced in their home communities. Even more important,
the program would hopefully bring cash into the depressed 17
rural areas of Mexico. To soma Mexican officials, the
benefits to be gained from the program did not outweigh the
potential disadvantages. When discussions opened at the
Second Inter-American Conference on Agriculture, the recal-
citrant members gave their consent only because use of
Mexican laborers in harvesting vital crops was viewed as 18
Mexico's contribution to the x\iar effort.
The terms of the 19^2 International Agreement therefore
reflected a desire to satisfy the labor needs of the United
States, but more important, the agreement reflected the
V
1 *
Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 19^2," Agricultural History, XXXIII (July, i960), 1^3. Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Evolution."
1 '7 Ma than Wnetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago, 19^8), p. 2.70.
18 Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 202,
18
concerted effort by both United States and Mexican officials
to provide adequate protection for the cooperating parties.
Under the provisions of the agreement, the Farm Security
Administration of the Department of Labor was considered the
employer and the guarantor of the performance of the grower
19
or farmer, who was termed the sub-employer. ' The two
governments hoped that, since the United States government
was to be responsible for the treatment accorded the workers,
exploitation similar to that which occurred in the 1930's
could be circumvented. The agreement provided that workers
could be employed only under the following terms: (1) Workers could not be engaged in military
service or made to suffer acts of discrimination. (2) All transportation and living expenses from
the place of origin to destination point and return, as well as expenses incurred in the fulfillment of any requirement of a migratory nature should be met by the employer.
(3) VJages paid to the worker would be the same as those paid for similar work to other agricultural laborers in the respective regions of destination. In no case could the wage be less than thirty cents per hour in United States currency. If piece rates were employed, they should enable the worker with average ability to earn the prevailing wage.
(4) Workers were to be exclusively engaged in agr i cultural employm e n t,
(5) Workers domiciled at migratory labor camps could purchase articles for personal consumption wherever most convenient to them.
(6) Housing conditions, sanitary and medical services enjoyed by the workers were to be identical to chose enjoyed by other agricultural workers in the same location.
(?) Workers could enjoy the same guarantees related co occupational diseases and accidents as
"'"Temporary Agreement, 19^2," p. 1766.
19
other agricultural workers under United. States legis-lation.
(8) Workers were toj be allowed to elect repre-sentatives to deal with t;he employer.
(9) Workers were guaranteed employment for 75% of the contract period with a subsistence allowance of three dollars per day for time not meeting this guarantee. For the remaining 25% of the contract perjod during which the worker might be unemployed, he was to receive subsistence on the same basis established for United States farm laborers.
(10) The United States Government was to deposit money contributed by the worker to the Mexican Agri-cultural Credit Bank (Banco de Credito Agricola) for the purpose of establishing saving funds.20
The reaction to and acceptance of the 19^2 International
Agreement on the part of the interest groups directly con-
nected with the program was a combination of relief and
concern. The growers throughout the country rejoiced that
a supposed labor shortage had been averted, yet they were
opposed to extensive governmental participation. They
wanted all immigration restrictions lifted, allowing growers
? j to recruit workers on a private'basis in northern Mexico." "
The three-fourths work guarantee also met with opposition.
The growers' position was that the worker should assume the
risk of bad weather and other natural occurrences associated
22
with agricultural work."" The major concern of the growers
was that the guarantee of a thirty-cent-per-hour wage rate
20Ibid., pp. 1766-1763,
^Scruggs, "Evolution," p. 1^3 •
9 9 George D. Coalson, "Mexican Contract Labor in American
Agriculture," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIII (December, 1952)- 231"
20
to Mexican nationals was part of a plan to extend the
minimum wage to domestic agricultural workers, driving the
domestics under the "umbrella of social security legis-
23 lation." They quickly noted that Congress had specifically
excluded agriculture from the.provisions of the National
2i| Labor Relations Act and the fair Labor Standards Act.
Labeling the restrictions and limitations of the 19^2 Inter-
2
national Agreement as "bureaucratic obstructionism," the
growers voiced their concern but complied witn the pro-
visions in order to obtain the labor.
Two other groups whose welfare would be affected by
importation of foreign labor registered their reaction to
the international agreement. Labor feared that after the
war Mexican nationals would compete for jobs in the cities.
Even though the agreement restricted the activity of
Mexican nationals to agricultural employment, labor interests
were adamant that they be quickly returned to Mexico at the
end of each harvesting season."" Mexican-American opposition
centered primarily around the fear that a great influx of
foreign workers would tend to lower farm wages. Inasmuch as 23 "^Otey M. Scruggs, "The Brecero Program under the Farm
Security Ad mini strati on, 19^2-19^3 > " Labor "History, III (Spring, 1962), 157• Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Braceros."
^ Ibid.. , p. 15S.
~-'Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (Mew York;, 19^5) > P* 122.
"^Scruggs, "Fvolution, " p, l !-2.
21
Mexican-American labor was largely restricted to agri-
cultural work, they opposed introducing any factor which
97
might even further depress wages offered on the farm. '
In view of the mixed reaction of all interested parties
to the program of contract labor, as begun in 19'+2, an
evaluation of the agreement is pertinent. The growers'
accusations of the socialist overtones of the program were
without validity. The three-fourths work guarantee,
subsistence pay, and the minimum, wage were necessary
inclusions in order to prevent exploitation and to gain the
receptive ear of the Mexican government. Since the
guarantees were made integral parts of the international
agreement, the agreement likewise did not solely reflect 28
the growers' desire for a cheap source of labor. And,
several of the guarantees which accorded equal treatment- to
Mexican nationals to that of American domestics under United
States legislation were unenforceable. For example, the
clause which granted subsistence "on che same basis
established for United. States farm laborers" offered the
Mexican worker no security since domestic migrants were not
protected by statutory law. Another example of a hollow
guarantee was one which permitted Mexican nationals to have
similar sanitary and medical services as enjoyed by other 2?iMd.
^Ibid, , p. 1^9.
22
agricultural workers in the same area. Domestic workers
did not have such facilities provided for them.
By the following year, 19^3» "both- governments realized
that alteration of the program was necessary. The Mexican
government wanted specific inclusion of Article 29 of the
Mexican Labor Law. Although the guarantees granted "by
Article 29 had been implied in the 19 -2 Agreement, the
Mexican government felt that definite reference to the
Labor Code should be made in the 19^3 revised agreement.
Under the provisions of Article 29. Mexicans entering the
United States would be given free transportation, living
expenses, and repatriation costs by the contracting party.
Two other important changes in the terms of the inter-
national agreement were the extension of the thirty-cents-
per-hour minimum wage guarantee to piece rate work and
29
rewording of the subsistence clause. The guarantee of
75 per cent employment with a three-dollars-per-day sub-
sistence allowance for any time not meeting the guarantee
was maintained. The clause granting' subsistence equal to
that given to domestic workers during the remaining one-
fourth of the contract period when unemployment occurred
was amended to grant Mexican nationals subsistence without
cost. Since the 19^2 Agreement had given little security
29 IJ. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of
Mexican Workers: Agreement Between the United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed April 26, 19^3," U. S. Statutes at Laige, LVII, Part II, 1160-136l.
• . 23
to the Mexican worker, the 19^3 amendment which inserted
the words "without cost" provided substantial protection
for him.
The Mexican government was adamant concerning the
amendments. Aware of their attitude, Messersmith advised,
the State Department that refusal to accept the Mexican
proposals on food and lodging would result in unpleasant
consequences and if . . a flat rejection /is given/
simply on the basis of our present policy we may be fairly
certain the present negotiations will collapse.xxJ From
the Mexican viewpoint, the guarantees contained in the 19^3
Agreement did not discriminate against the American domestic
worker in favor of the Mexican laborer because the American
worker could depend on his family for aid when not earning
wages. Also he could change employers freely if not
satisfied with his wages. 'The Mexican had neither of these
assurances, and particularly not the latter, since it would
constitute a violation of his contract. J
At the same time the international agreement was being
revised, the United States Congress was devising a com-
prehensive farm bill, Public Law . It emerged April 29,
and provided funds to be made available through December Jl,
30, 'orelgn Relations; VI (19^3)» 5^6,
•^Ibid
2'J-
19 -3. recruitment of both domestic and foreign workers.
According to the provisions of Public Law certain
regulations would be waived until the end of the war for
aliens entering the country to do agricultural work.
Sections II and III of the Immigration Law of 1917» which
dealt respectively with bond payment and prohibition against
contracting foreign workers, would be lifted in order that
importation could take place. Other privileges granted to
aliens included exemption from withholdings or deductions
on earned wages under the Internal Revenue Code and
33
exemption from establishing positive proof of birthplace.
Farm pressure groups had skillfully fashioned Public-
Law ^5 to fit their particular needs. The waiving of
statutory regulations on the entry of farm labor amounted
to establishing an open border. Section V(g) of the law
authorized Immigration and Naturalization officials to
issue cards to foreign laborers which permitted them to work
for one year in the United States. On May 11, 19^3• border
officials issued the first cards and within three days over 3'+
two thousand Mexicans were working in Texas and New Mexico. 32-u. Congress, Making an Appropriation to Assist in
Providing a Supply and Distribution of Farm Labor for the Calendar Year 1J9 3> Public iMiTk5, U. S. Statutes at Large, LVlT," Part il","70.'
, p. 73. ok J Otey M. Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program,"
Pacific Historical Review, XXXII, No, 3 (August, 196?), 253 • Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program." Unless cited otherwise, information concerning Public Law ki) will he based on the above artic?Le.
25
The farmers' and growers' motivation for sponsoring Public
Law 4-5 was their desire for cheap and plentiful labor, and
they therefore considered the law favorably. Ambassador
Messersmith took a different point of view and described it
as a "concerted effort" to undermine the bilateral agreement.
He wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull:
. . . in spite of the hue and cry from some of the border states about their need for labor, they have not requested a certification of workers for that area. This is an indication to you that some of the states are not interested in getting workers under the agreement but are more interested in trying to break down the arrangement so as to get workers under arrange-ments that are quite impossible.
The Mexican government also considered the arrangements
as "quite impossible." It warned that if the indiscriminate
recruiting did not cease, the international agreement would
be abrogated. Messersmith felt: the attitude of the Mexican
government was " . . . considerably stronger than it permits
itself to express at this juncture . . . . He advised
the State Department 'chat ". . . if through domestic, laws
we /the United States/ undermine the international agreement
such as permitting us to recruit- labor . . . the Mexican
Government will be justifiably indignant and will denounce
37
the agreement."'5 A few days later, he reported that Mexico
was considering closing the border.'
3-^Fore 1 jgn Relations, VI (19^3), 551.
36-IMd.
o r ;
Ibid., p. 553.
26
The strong negative reaction of Mexico prompted re-
evaluative conferences in Washington. And in deference to
the wishes of the Mexican government, Hull notified Messer-
smith that Section V(g) of Public Law ^5 did not apply to
Mexico and that the Justice Department would act to prevent
the entry of Mexican agricultural worker's not contracted
under the international agreement.
The Mexican position and the quick response of the
State Department convinced growers, especially Texas
growers, that they would have to recruit workers under the
terms of the international agreement or rely on wetback
labor. When Texas growers submitted their requests for
contract labor, the Mexican government refused to honor it
and justified its refusal on the grounds of racial dis-
criminations. Denied labor under Public Law ^5 and the
contract system, Texas growers, aided by the state govern-
ment, undertook various steps to remove the state from the
blacklist.
Interested Texas parties sent Judge Cullen Briggs of
Nueces County to Mexico City to consult with officials con-
cerning workers for the state, In talks with Ezequiel
Padilla, Briggs surmised that Mexico might reconsider its
ban on Texas if the state took certain corrective measures.
On his return, Briggs suggested two proposals to Governor
Coke R. Stevenson. First, he urged the Governor to reaffirm
-^Ibld. , p. S5U'
27
the Good Neighbor proclamation passed by the Texas legislature
on May 6, 1 9 ^ 3 . T h e proclamation, known as the "Caucasian
Race Resolution," gave equal privileges to all Caucasians
in the state and denounced those who used the position to
llQ
. . violate the good neighbor policy of our state."
Stevenson accepted the suggestion and made the declaration on
June 25. Secondly, Briggs felt Stevenson should write a
conciliatory letter to appropriate Mexican „officials ex-
plaining the need for labor in the state and outlining the' ' if 1
efforts taken to reduce discrimination.
Having submitted his recommendations to Stevenson,
Briggs travelled to Washington and 'conferred with officials
of the War Food Administration. He told them that the
Extension Service was being asked to certify a labor shortage
in Texas and that disturbed glowers were collecting money to ij-2
be used to combat racial inequities.
Meanwhile, Padilla responded to Stevenson's letter.
The Foreign Minister felt " . . . the governor's action was
unequal to the magnitude of the problem." A communique
from Messersmith reporting an interview with Padilla on 39Ibid., p. 557
IpQ Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 255.
il "1 """Foreign Relations, VI (19^3)» 5^1.
Li? Ibid., p. 5^9.
I4.3 , •^Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 256.
28
July 19. one day before his reply to Stevenson, revealed a
more candid interpretation of the Foreign Minister's
position. He told Messersmith that domestic problems made
it difficult for the Mexican government to alter its
position and that he regretted the situation. Padilla
feared that " . . . failure of Mexico to let workers go
might bring about a reaction to public opinion in Texas
which would delay the solution of these problems of dis-
44
crimination."
Shortly after receiving the official Mexican reply to
his letter, Stevenson told the Mexican government that a
Good Neighbor Commission would be formed to investigate
complaints of discrimination and to initiate an educational
and propaganda program designed to reduce racial prejudices
The commission was the result of a conference between
Stevenson and two representatives from the State Department Robert M. McGregor, Secretary of the American Embassy in
3itj
^5
Mexico City, and Consul General for Ciudad Juarez, William
Blocker,
By early August, it seemed that Texas had been
successful in its efforts to remove the ban. The Mexican
government announced contract workers would be authorized
for Texas. Still acutely aware of political repercussions,
^Foreign Relations, VI (19^3) » 5&1
^Ibid. , p. 565-
• . 29
the government said selection would be made from workers
already in the United States. If recruitment occurred in
Mexico City, it would be done for the "southern states" but
with the understanding that the workers were bound for
Texas. The recruitment process would not begin, however,
until Stevenson announced publicly the formation of the
Good Neighbor Commission. The Governor withheld the
announcement until September k, when he learned that
federal funds were available for the project. By this time,
the Mexican government decided that because of political
considerations, workers for Texas could not be supplied.
Texas growers, therefore, in 19 +3» harvested their crops
with a motley collection of students, prisoners of war,
Mexican-American migrants, and wetbacks, but without con-
4- - ^
tract laoor.
Even though efforts to gain laborers for Texas con-
tinued throughout 19 '+» domestic politics did not permit
the government of President Manuel Avila Camacho to issue
the authorization. He and Pad!11a preferred to allow workers
to enter Texas because they did not want to antagonize the
United States or hinder the nascent efforts to erase
racial discrimination. Since the political opposition and
the socially discontented capitalized on any difficulty in
the contract labor program to embarrass the Mexican
' ScruR-gs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 25?
30
government, alteration of its position was not feasible.
Large commercial farmers in northern Mexico objected to the
program because they disliked, the disruption it might cause
in their labor force. Small farmers and their supporters,
on the other hand, viewed the contract labor program as a
possible substitute for continued land distribution.
Mexican nationalists, who traditionally opposed cooperation
with the. United States, joined labor leaders who disliked
the government's catering to labor as well as business
interests. In la.be April, 19 -f-, Messersmith casually
approached Padilla on the topic of laborers for Texas, but
he did not press the subject since it was " . . . insistence
on a point which is politically impossible in Mexico at the
7 present time." '
As the summer harvest season approached, growers in
the El Paso area intensified their efforts to secure con-
tract labor. They sent representatives to Mexico City, but
the Mexican government maintained its inflexible position.
When the Justice Department began to repatriate workers who
entered under Public Law ^5 and as it stepped-up its wet-
back campaign, the Mexican government became more conciliatory
and in mid-June, 19^4, agreed to supply workers for El Paso
County, provided Stevenson took a public stand against racial
discrimination. Cit this occasion, the Governor responded to
47Ibid., p. 260.
3:
the Mexican stipulation; but in August, Mexico reversed its
Zj. 8
decision and refused to allow contract labor in Texas.
Stevenson and the Good Neighbor Commission could not
remove Texas from the blacklist for a combination of political
and social considerations already discussed. During the
month of August, however, these considerations were am-
plified by reports in Mexico City newspapers of continued
racial discriminations. One of the capital city's papers,-
El National, published an eight-page monthly, Fraternidad,
which listed acts of racial prejudice in Texas. In addition,
the Mexican Committee Against Racism organized in August
and included among its members such prominent persons as
Jaime Torres Bodet end leftist labor leader Vicente k- o .
Lombardo 'Toledo. The following year, 19h-3< the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies established a special committee to
inform the legislators of all cases of discrimination.
Popular opinion and national indignation had been aroused.
Padilla, in a San Francisco speech, raised the hope of the
growers that agreement was near when he stated that he was
confident the prejudices did not reflect the views of all
Americans, but the ban against Texas remained throughout-SO
the World War II program. k-8 ^
Ibid., p. 261. k-9 yTomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,"
PP. 73-7^. •5° lb id- , p. 7 k .
32
Aside from the regional difficulties surrounding con-
tract labor in Texas, problems of an administrative nature
also interrupted the smooth functioning of the labor program.
One of the first difficulties was that of working out an
orderly recruitment and selection process. The Mexican
government acted quickly; and when American representatives
arrived in Mexico City to begin processing workers, Mexico
had already established a registering service. Selection
began September 21, 19^2, and by the 29th, 500 workers had
been recruited for work in Stockton, California. Within
two months, over 3.000 workers were in California alone.^
Just as Torres Bodet predicted in his initial talks
with Messersmith, the major problem faced by the Mexican
government was the tendency of th« workers to congregate
in Mexico City, creating tremendous sanitation. and housing
problems. The situation became increasingly acute for the
Mexican government because the first American authorizations
for labor simply were not large enough to absorb all the
workers who responded. By J&vuary, 19^3 > the American
.Embassy estimated that there were nearly ^,000 workers in
Mexico City who could not be recruited under the existing
authorizations. Because of the strain on the Mexican
budget, Messersmith urged the State Department to enlarge
<3 y Basmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 206.
• . 33
the authorizations or possibly face the collapse of the
4-. 52 entire program.
By August, the situation worsened, and the Mexican
government began to return to their home states many appli-
cants who could not meet the qualifications. Officials
hoped to improve the situation in Mexico City and also
discourage a further influx of workers by spreading the
word that only a limited number of jobs were available. At
the same time, Padilla, in a conference with Kessersmith,
asked that the rate of contracting be raised from 2,500 to
6,000 workers a week. The Mexican government offered to
pay for the extra costs involved in a stepped-up program of
recruitment. The Ambassador concurred with Padilla's
proposal and, in addition, suggested to the War Food
Administration (WFA) that requirements be lowered so that
recruitment could continue for a longer period of time. In
September, the WFA authorized recruitment of 70,000 workers;
and Messersmith assured Padilla that the number would be
S3
raised to 75»000 within a short time.
In early fall, however, with the peak of the harvest
season approaching;, WFA informed Messersmith that only
20,000 agricultural "workers were needed during the winter,
and requested that he ask permission to use the excess
^'Foreign Relations, VI (19;+3)» 535 •
. PP. 567-570,
• _ 3^
laborers In industry. The Ambassador foresaw several dif-
ficulties involved in the transfer of workers from
agricultural to industrial work, and he did not approach the
Mexican government on the topic. To illustrate his ob-
jections, Messersmith used the request of the WFA to transfer
1,000 to 2,000 surplus farm laborers to'jobs in meat-packing
houses. He doubted if the plants could provide the sains
housing and feeding conditions as the workers had received
in agricultural pursuits. Unless these provisions were met,
the proposal would not be acceptable to the Mexican govern-
ment. In addition, Messersmith felt the higher wage scale-
would create problems when the men returned to agricultural
work.J
As originally set up in the 19^2 agreement, the final
selection of workers occurred at Mexico City in the National
Stadium. There a joint team of American and Mexican officials
investigated prospective workers concerning their agricultural
background, character, and health condition. A routine health
clearance included X-ray of the lungs and digestive tract and
a smallpox vaccination. After 19 (4, the Pan American Sanitary
Bureau gave serologic tests for syphilis. Initially, re-
jections because of health problems were quite high but
declined as the requirements became better known. ^
^Ibid. , pp. 571, 579-580.
Jones, "rfar Workers," pp. c-7.
35
Concentration of the recruitment process in Mexico City
soon proved unsatisfactory for several, reasons. As men-
tioned above, housing and lodging of the prospective workers
created problems for the Mexican government. Also many of
the workers arrived without valid certificates of eligibility
which they were to obtain from local authorities before
travelling to Mexico City. Without a certificate, the men
could not begin the selection process. Early in the
operation of the program, a booming blackmarket developed in
eligibility certificates. It was reported that three
national deputies (congressmen) and numerous government em-
ployees were indicted for their involvement with the black.-C
market activities.J
As a partial solution to problems, decentralisation of
the selection process began in 1QW-, when Mexico designated
the cities of Irapuato, Guanajuato, and Guadalajara,
Jalisco, as recruitment centers. Other changes included
setting up quotas for states which had surplus labor and
using the lottery system as a basis -for recruitment. By the
latter innovation, the Mexican government hoped to reduce 57
the opportunities for bribery and graft.-'
Upon receiving clearance in Mexico, workers were
shipped to reception centers located on the United 56T, . /• Ibid.., p. o
-'Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 21?.
' 36
States border. At these centers, the men signed contracts
with the growers, who transported them to their area of work.
In the new and often totally different environments, some of
the men had difficulty adjusting to the situation. One of
their most frequent complaints concerned the food they
received.
Depending on the labor camp facilities, the workers
either prepared their meals on a cooperative basis or were
served by the growers' associations. Their complaints cen-
tered not so much around the quantity of food but rather
its quality. American cooks simply did not season food
correctly for the Mexican workers. In many cases, the
growers imported Mexican cooks with gratifying results in
the increased work capacity of the men and in their im-
proved morale.^® Between October 23, 19^2, and April 8,
19^+. of the 29.302 workers repatriated from California.,
Nevada, and Arizona, approximately 1,000 listed food as the
<9
reason for their dissatisfaction.
Oftentimes unpleasant conditions such as those con-
nected with food were rectified on a personal basis between
the workers and employer. If this method failed, however,
the Mexican worker had difficulty making his complaint known
because of the unsatisfactory grievance procedure. Part of
Jones, "War Workers," pp. 16-17•
KO -"Rasmussen, "emergency Farm Program," p. 231.
37
the inadequacy of the procedure revolved around the fact
that the worker felt isolated, was intimidated by his new
surroundings, and either spoke no English or had only a
limited knowledge of the language. In addition, the Mexican
consuls, although they had complete access to the camps, and
representatives of the WFA were not always available.
Further, many of their inspection trips were made while the
workers were in the fields.
If the worker and his employer could not settle their
dispute personally or by use of the formal grievance pro-
cedure, the worker was eligible to be repatriated. Any
workei who terminated his contract early for a certified
reason .and defrayed his own expenses could be contracted
another time. But, if the WFA paid for the repatriation, he
60
was not eligible for re-selection. " In 3 9^5 the repa- •
triation procedure was modified so that the WFA agreed to
pay expenses if a worker left because the grower failed to
comply with the contract terms, or because of bad treat-
ment or discrimination. The WFA did not pay for repatriation
if the worker offered no reason for terminating his con-
tract or if he was working for an employer who was not in 61
the WFA program.
No doubt one reason for the number repatriated was
simple homesickness. Since the main concern of most of 60 Jones, "War Workers," p. 1 -.
(5 * Rasmus sen, ''Emergency Farai Program." pp. 223-22^-.
38
the officials was recruitment, transportation, and pro-
duction, educational and recreational activities which might
have cured the loneliness were overlooked. California's
Bureau of Agriculture, however, made some efforts to provide
educational training for, the workers. The agency set up
classes which the worker attended on a voluntary basis.
Initially, course content centered around farming techniques,
but later in response to the participants' requests, English
classes were added to the curriculum.^
As organized under the 19 -2 agreement, the Farm
Security Administration (PSA) was responsible for super-
vision of the contract labor program in the United States.
Its control of the program terminated in 19^3 > primarily
because of the growers' discontent with the FSA. The
growers' strategy from the outset of the program was to
eliminate the F'SA's control because they considered the
agency responsible for the guarantees written into the con-
63
tracts. v Thus friction between the growers and the FSA
developed early.
In the Imperial Valley of California, for example, the
two groups argued over the interpretation of the work con-
tracts. The contracts stipulated that hours worked on days
of less than eight hours employment should be totaled at
p. 67.
^Jones, "War Workers," pp. 21-22.
6 "3 ^'Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,"
• . 39
the end of the contract period to determine unemployment
compensation. The growers maintained that it did not matter
if they provided eight hours of employment daily as long as
they provided forty-eight hours during a six-day week. The
FSA rejected their argument and insisted on a strict in-
6k
terpretation of the contract.
The growers' campaign to remove the FSA was successful
with the passage of Public Law 4'-5 in April, 19^3- The bill
placed the WFA in control of the program and, at the same
time, transferred the Farm Placement Service of the United
States Employment Service to the Department of Agriculture.
In practice, the changes jn the administrative machinery
meant that county agents of the Department of Agriculture
in cooperation with the Office of Labor of the WFA would
certify the number of Mexicans needed in particular areas.
Although there was no outstanding deterioration of the
program under the WFA, the number of workers needed was
sometimes exaggerated because of the close contact between 65
local county agents and growers. *
While difficulties in the daily operation of the con-
tract labor system were being worked out, additional changes
in the international agreement occurred. In 1 9 ^ and 19^5
the amendments were directly related to subsistence.
^Scruggs, "Braceros," pp. 156-157.
^Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States," pp. 67-68.
• he
The 19^+ change clarified the procedure for calculation of
subsistence by providing that for any day of less than four
hours that an employee worked, he was to receive subsistence
without cost for that day. The change was specifically de-
signed to cover the 25 per cent time of the contract period
not covered by the' three-dollar-per-day subsistence allow-
66
ance. The negotiating officials felt that by stating
the number of hours which composed an unemployed day,
growers could more easily determine whether the worker was
owed the three-dollar allowance for subsistence or sub-
sistence without cost.^
According to the 19^5 modification, subsistence pay
owed the employee would be paid at the end of each payroll
period,^ Prior to the 19^5 arrangement, workers were not
paid any subsistence allowance due them under the three-
fourths work guarantee until, the end of the contract • /> 69 period.
By the following year, the subsistence provisions
again posed a problem, but between the United States
government and the grower rather than between Mexico and
the united States. Since the 1 9 ^ and 19^5 changes in
^°"Study of Population," p. "jl. S ri Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 207.
6R "Study of Population," p. 31<
60 'Iiasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program, " p. 209.
hi
subsistence calculation had increased the' cost to some
growers, the terms of the grower's contract with the govern-
ment was amended to require the government to reimburse the
grower for subsistence payments. It was agreed that if un-
employment for less than four hours a day was caused solely
by rain or snow on the day of employment or the day imme-
diately preceding, the United States government would
reimburse the grower for the subsistence costs.' Also in
19^5. the minimum wage rate was raised to thirty-seven cents
per hour or a guaranteed $33*60 per two-week payroll, period.''7'1'
The most notable changes in 19 -7 limited the cost of
food sold at farm labor camp commissaries to $1.50 P©r day ry r\
and established procedures for repatriation of the workers.
If not returned to Mexico within fifteen days after termi-
nation of contract, the Department of Agriculture would pay
the worker a stipend of fifty cents a day which would be
added to subsistence benefits.
Since Public Law 45 had only provided operational funds
for a one-year period, the program was maintained by granting
X
Study of Population,'' p. 31-
71Ibid.
72 J U. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of
Mexican Agricultural Workers: States and Mexico; Supplement 19^2, as revised April 26, 19 Notes, Signed Mexico City, Ma Entered into Force April 2, 19''-7»" U. S. Statutes at LXI, Part k, 37-^3-37^.
Agreement Between United ing Agreement of August h, ^3; Effected by Exchange oi rch 25 and April 2, 19^7.
42
additional appropriations on a yearly basis. Public Law 229
7 3
(1943) extended the program until December, 1944, ^ and in
1944 the WFA, as part of a general appropriation bill, was -
given twenty million dollars to continue recruitment of 9 Zj.
foreign workers until December, 1945. The 1944 appro-
priation also provided that foreign laborers could enter and
remain in the country for the duration of their contracts
even though World War II should end. 73 '- U. S,, Congress, Making an Appropriation to Assist
in Providing a Supply and Pistribution of Farm Labor for the Calendar Year 1^44, Public Law 229, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, U. S. Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part I, 11,
74 U. S., Congress, First Supplemental Appropriation
Act, 1945; Public Law 5^9, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, U, S. Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part I, 862-863.
CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC LAW 78 AND THE
WETBACK CHALLENGE: 19^+7-1955
With the termination of World War II, the Mexican con-
tract labor system as originally provided for in the 19^2
International Agreement- and Its subsequent amendments also
ended. No appropriations were made to continue recruitment
later than December 31 > 19^7 > a cl in Hay, 19^7. act of
Congress provided for the sale of labor supply camps,''' Seme
congressmen and other interested parties felt it v:as appro-
priate that the wartime program of recruiting foreign labor
should cease. They argued that the emergency in farm labor
had passed and that sufficient domestic labor would soon be
available,
Opposed to the idea that importation of Mexican agri-
cultural workers should end were the growers and
representatives of related industrj.es. This group, having
grown accustomed to Mexican labor, wanted to continue the
contract system. Nevertheless, there was no congressional
"U. S., Congress, An Act to Provide for Six Months Extensi on and Final Liquidation of the Farm Supply Program, and for Other Paroos-js, Public Law *K), 80th Congress, 1st Session, U. S. Sta tutes at LXI, Part 1, 55 • See also (J. S. , Congress, Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 19 -7, Public Law 76, 80tF Congress, 1st Session, U. S. Statutes ar- L-aJ:_g_e, LXI, Part- 1, 109-
£|4
appropriation or authorization for the United States govern-
ment to continue as the guarantor of the contracts. A
series of talks with officials of the Mexican government
took place in El Paso, Texas, followed "by conferences in
Washington between representatives of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Agriculture, and State Depart-
ments .
As a result of these meetings, it was decided to con-
tinue the contract system but under radically different
terms and standards from the 19- 2 Agreement. One of the
outstanding changes in the new international agreement and
a major reason for the lack of securities for the braceros
was that the United States government no longer employed
Mexican workers and, therefore, did not serve as a guarantor
of their contracts. It was specifically understood by the
19 -8 Agreement that the term "employer" would mean the
owner or operator of a far?? in. the United States and would
not apply to trie government, Whereas the United States
government had operated recruitment -centers in Mexico under
the original agreement, the 19^7 Agreement arranged for
^Pfeif'fer, "The Mexican Contract Labor Supply Program," P. 3^-
\t. 3., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico Superseding Agreement of April 26, 19^3> and March 10, 19^7; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed Mexico, D. F., February 20 and 21, 19^8; Entered into Force February 21, 19^8," U. 3, Statutes at Large, LXII, Part III, 3888,
^5
the growers to recruit workers on an individual basis in
northern Mexico.
Other significant changes were made in the area of
wages and subsistence. The stated minimum wage rate for
both hourly and piece-rate work was deleted from the con-
tracts. A similar change appeared in the determination of
subsistence. The three-fourths work guarantee remained,
but the stated three-dollar-per-day subsistence allowance
did not appear in the contracts.
Since the lack of guarantees was obvious, a system
whereby grievances could have been heard and contracts en-
forced would, have been a valuable asset to the 19 -8
Agreement. Such compliance would necessarily have involved
the active participation of both governments. But, since
the United States government was not so deeply involved -in
the 19 -8 Agreement as in previous arrangements, the pro-
cedure for compliance did not evolve until a new agreement
was negotiated in 19^9- the interim period, the "good
offices" of the United States Employment Service (USES) were
6
used with a "view toward compliance."
Under the procedure set up in 19^9» violation of con-
tract could be registered (1) after an official and periodic
Ibid
"'Ibid. , pp. 3890, 3693.
6Ibld., p. 3890.
'46
investigation of working conditions by the USES in conjunction
with Immigration and Naturalization officials, (2) by a dis-
contented grower, and (3) by the Mexican worker. In each
case, if the grievance were valid and corrective measures
were not taken, the Mexican consulate could terminate the
individual work contract, and the laborer would be returned
7
to Mexico at the grower's expense.
Though the 19^9 procedure improved the situation as it
existed under the 19^8 Agreement, the system of compliance
was never entirely satisfactory. It was particularly un-
satisfactory to the Mexican worker because he lacked
knowledge of the English language and was unfamiliar with
his environment in the United States. For example, the pro-
cedure was written into the International Agreement in
English, which the typical Mexican worker could not read.
The individual work contract was in Spanish and was given
to the worker; but it contained only references to a
compliance system, not detailed information regarding its
operation. If a worker desired action on his complaint, his
most common move was to locate the Mexican consulate in his
area. As a rule, timidity and isolation prevented him from
7 'U. S,, Department of State, "Mexican Agricultural
Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed Mexico, August, 19 -9 Entered into Force August 1, 19^9» and Amendments and Interpretations Effected by Exchange of Notes," United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1951i Part 1, pp.' IO56-IO58.
• k 7
attempting to initiate action by notifying a representative
of the USES. And. even if the worker preferred the latter
procedure, it was difficult to locate a USES inspector since
there were only nine of them who handled the entire com-
pliance program.
Because the enforcement system was 'cumbersome and in-
volved several governmental agencies, there was always the
possibility that a worker's complaint would be misplaced
rather than processed. A large number of workers, there-
fore, deserted or "skipped-out" on their contracts lather
than waiting for the established system to rectify an un-
pleasant situation. Desertions in 19^8 in one area studied
were 20.8 per cent, indicating that the compliance system
was not completely effective. A 1950 survey of workers
revealed that one-third were in an illegal status, primarily
s by deserting their contract.
It is apparent that during the period 19^8 to 1951 the
operation of the contract labor program deteriorated.
Possibly the best explanation for the deterioration was the
lack of governmental supervision by both the United States
and Mexico. Since the United States did not serve as the
guarantor of contracts, growers who used Mexican labor did
not always comply with the contract terms. For example,
'U. S., President's Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture (Washington, 1951)» pp. hk-ho. Hereafter cited as "President's Commission, 1951."
48
although the international agreement did not allow braceros
to work on farms which used wetbacks, the growers often em-
ployed both legal and illegal workers at the same time.
Sometimes full wages were not paid, or the Mexican did not
receive the guaranteed 75 per cent employment. The inter-
national agreement'also stipulated that Mexican workers could
not continue work when labor strikes occurred. But on
October 1, 19^7. when the American domestic workers struck
the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation in California, braceros
9
were not removed from the job until the following month.
The Mexican government was also lax in implementing
the program. It did not limit the -number of Mexicans
leaving the countrys nor did it operate the contracting
centers efficiently. Instances of graft which had charac-
terized the World War II program increased as the program
expanded in size. There is also evidence that the Mexican
government not only countenanced a system which exploited
the braceros but actually made several concessions to the
United States in order to prolong the program. It agreed to
establish additional recruitment centers in Monterrey,
Chihuahua, and Hermosillo, all of which were located rela-
tively near the United States border. In the past, Mexico 3 0
had insisted on recruitment centers being placed in the interior.
22.9
C' •^Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,'1 pp. 228-
1 0 T > " ^ Ibid,
Lf-9
By 1951. in addition to the overall deterioration in
the program, several other factors were operating which
influenced a complete reorganization of the contract labor
system. One of the most influential factors which aided in
arousing public concern was publication of the findings of
the President's Commission on Migratory Labor. The Com-
mission pointed out the harmful effects that imported labor
had on domestic labor with z egard to wage rates and job
displacement. Concerning the problem, the Commission
report noted that farmers, assured of access to Mexican
labor, agreed to a low wage prior to the harvest season.
When the Commission asked the president of the New Mexico
Farm and Livestock Bureau what criteria were used for de-
termining the prevailing wage scale, he responded, . .
the farmers have a meeting and they determine, roughly,
what they are going to pay. It doesn't mean that they -1
will hold to it; it will vary, as a matter of fact."1
Often these arbitrary wages weie not adequate to provide
a domestic laborer with a decent living. He was thus
forced to migrate, creating a labor vacuum to be filled by
imported Mexican nationals.
To substantiate the conclusion that the availability
of Mexican workers depressed the wage rates offered in
any locality, the Comnission compared wage rates offered in
1 1 "President's Commission, 1951»" P. 59
50
Texas and California. In 19^5 California got 63 per cent of
the contract laborers, and it raised cotton wages 136 per
cent. Texas, as a result of the blacklist, received no
Mexicans; and in the same period cotton wages rose 236 per
cent. Under the post-war program, the situation reversed
itself. Texas got 46 per cent of the contract labor (19^9)
and lowered its cotton wages 11 per cent. California, on
the other hand, with only 8 per cent of the contract
laborers, raised its cotton wages 15 per cent. After citing
the comparison, the Commission stated it was . . useless
to pretend that the prevailing wage has either the fairness
or the precision of a wage developed by the employers and
12
workers meeting on an equal footing."
The lack of guarantees given the domestic migrant was
also discussed. The Commission contended that an agri-
cultural labor shortage which necessitated the importation
of foreign workers would not exist if guarantees such as
workmen's compensation end other similar benefits were
offered to domestics. S'ven though these benefits were not
extended to domestic labor, the Commission concluded that
" . . . by better recruitment and placement of domestic
labor, we would have eliminated most if not all of the
occasion for the certification of labor shortage during
the years 19^7 to 1950.
""'"Ibid., pp. 59-60.
13 ";Ibj_d, , p. 61
51
The second powerful factor influencing a reorganization
of the program was the position of the Mexican government.
It wanted to abandon the post-World War II arrangements and
reinstate the United States government as the recruitment
agency. In talks with American officials, the Mexican
government expressed its desire for a more adequate com-
pliance system. To indicate the need for Its demand, claims
were presented in which Mexican laborers had not received
In-payment for their work. In accord with the President's
Commission, the Mexican government was also dissatisfied
with the method for determining the prevailing wage.
Mexico became more adamant in its demands for re-
organization of the program to include United States
government participation after the El Paso incident of
October 16, 19^8. As a result of the improper functioning
of the contract system, large numbers of workers gathered
at the border across from El Paso, Texas. Without waiting
to be recruited, the workers streamed illegally across the
border. Instead of deporting them, border officials by
unilateral action "paroled" the Mexicans to farmers in the
area. As a result of this incident, Mexico abrogated the
international a g r e e m e n t . T h e two governments nevertheless
14 U. S., Congress, House, CorAm.ittee on Agriculture,
Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, H, Rept, 326 to accompany H. R. 3283, p. Hereafter cited a s ' ' I iouse Report I-io, 3 2 6 . "
" ''-'President's Court!ssion, 1951 >*' p. 53-
52
were able to come td a ncv; agreement in l'9-9 which extended
the program for one year. By 1950; however, Mexico pressed
strongly for drastic revision of the farm labor supply
16
along lines of the World War II arrangements.
From January 26 through February 3» 1951. & commission
of thirteen Mexicans and twelve Americans conferred in
Mexico City on a reorganization plan. The two prominent
American delegates were Allen J. Ellender, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and
W. R. Poage, chairman of the House Committee on Agri-
culture. By and large the meetings between the two dele-
gations proceeded smoothly, but occasionally they were 17
interrupted by "friendly but obstinate bickering."
Primarily the misunderstanding occurred because the
Mexican government did not fully recognize the difference
between the respective governmental systems. It wished to
negotiate with a "responsible" United States governmental
agency, one that could force compliance with any standards 18
set forth in an international agreement. Mexico likewise
failed to realize that the United States did not have laws
to protect agricultural workers, with which a government ^"Study of Population," pp. 3^~36. 17 'Howard F. C'Jine, The United States and Mexico (New
York, 19^3), p. 392. Hereafter cited as Cline, The United States and Mexico.
l8Ibic., po. 392-393.
<3 J
agency could demand compliance. Unlike the United States,
Mexico, by constitutional law, prescribes certain minimum
standards for its nationals who leave the country for em-
19
ployment- purposes. '
A draft of a new agreement which was acceptable to both
teams of negotiators finally emerged, and the leaders of the
United States delegation returned to Washington prepared to
present the provisional agreement to the Senate. Certain
provisions of the agreement encountered heavy and, on oc-
casion, vitriolic opposition on the Senate floor. During
the debate, opposition also arose in Mexico. Newspapers in
Mexico City carried stories of mistreatment received by
Mexican nationals in the United States, especially the
braceros. As a result, the government of President Ruiz;
Miguel Aleman announced on June 15, 1951> that no more
braceros could be contracted. Although the declaration
portended major difficulties in reaching a fina.l agreement,
members of the joint commission continued their efforts.
Finally, in August a workable compromise emerged which con-
tained nearly all the guarantees originally demanded by the
Mexican government. Mexico, however, stipulated that a .
final treaty was contingent on the United States taking
actions which would indicate that the guarantees would be
implemented. In addition, Mexico demanded that the
1 9 "President's Commission, 1951»" PP- 50-51-
5^
United States move to curb wetback migration to the United
States.
At the time of the Mexican cancellation of the bracero
pact, Congress had not passed any legislation which would
permit continuation of a contract labor system. Within a
month, however, Public Law 78 emerged from Congress in the
form of an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 19^9• With
subsequent modifications, Public Law 78 defined the terms
under which recruitment of Mexican nationals took place
until the final termination in December, 1964-. According
to Public Law 73, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to
perform the following duties: ' *
(1) Recruit Mexican agricultural workers. (2) Establish and operate reception centers. (3) Provide transportation; subsistence, medical
care, and burial expenses (not to exceed $150 Per worker) from recruitment centers in Mexico to reception centers in the United States.
(4-) Assist in negotiation of contracts between workers and employers.
(5) Guarantee performance of employer as related to wage payments.
The authority of the Secretary of labor in the re-
cruitment process was further expanded by the stipulations
of Section 503 of Public Law 73. No Mexican worker could be
employed unless the Secretary of Labor certified that
(1) sufficient qualified domestics were not available,
(2) that employment of aliens would not adversely, affect
wages or working conditions of domestic agricultural workers,
^vCline, The United States and Mexico, p. 393-
; i
55
and (3) that reasonable efforts had been made to attract
domestics at wages and standards comparable to those offered
to foreign workers.
In order to qualify as a participant in this con-
tracting of foreign labor, Public Law 78 required growers
to enter into an agreement with the United States on the
following matters:
(1) To indemnify the United States in its role of guarantor against losses.
(2) To reimburse the United States for trans-portation and subsistence costs in an amount not to exceed fifteen dollars per worker.
(3) To pay the United. States a sum determined by the Secretary of Labor for any worker not properly returned to the reception center.
It was also stipulated that no employer who knowingly used
illegal aliens would be eligible to employ Mexican workers
21
under terms of the contract system.
Even though Public Law 73, after Mexican termination
of the international agreement, passed through Congress
rather rapidly, several provisions of the proposed bill met
heavy opposition. For example, there was opposition to the
amount of reimbursement growers .were required to pay. As
approved by the House Committee on Agriculture, growers w ou.Id have reimbursed rhe United States in an amount not to
2? exceed ten dollars per worker. Representative Harold
U. S., Congress, An Act to Amend the Agricultural Act of 19 -91 Title V, Agr i cul cura 1 Workers, Public Law ?S, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» §,• Statutes at Large, LXV, Part 1, 119-121. Hereafter cited as "Public Law 11
' . 56
Cooley (D., N. C.) explained that the ten-dollar limit was
established to protect growers from excessive and wasteful
23
governmental expenditure.
Minority membership of the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry disagreed with the House and
Representative Cooley. Headed by Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.),
the senators declared the ten-dollar limit unrealistic. The
committee a.rgued that if workers were not hired immediately
upon arrival at reception centers, the cost of subsistence 24
would increase. As noted above, the Senate was able to
raise the reimbursement cost an additional five dollars.
The recruitment procedure as approved by the House of
Representatives did not meet with Senate approval. Ac-
cording to the House bill, the regional director of the
Bureau of Employment Security was authorized to certify a
shortage of sufficient domestics, and whether the employment
of Mexicans wouHd adversely affect wages and working con-
ditions.^ Contending that labor shortages should be
determined on a national perspective rather than on a
regional basis, the Senate committee recommended that the
^Ibid. , p. 5«
24 U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» S. Kept. 21^7 Part II to accompany S. 984, p. 8. Hereafter clued as "Senate Report No. 214."
^"'"House Report No. jZ6," p. 9-
57
Secretary of Labor be vested with the certification power.
Paraphrasing the President's Commission on Migratory Labor,
the Senate noted that labor shortages often resulted from
unattractive wage offers. The committee suggested therefore
that before the Secretary of Labor could certify a shortage,
an additional provision should be added which required
growers to make reasonable efforts to secure domestics.^
Again the Senate was successful at the conference table,
and both recommendations appeared in the final draft of
Public Law 78.
Besides the discrimination against the American do-
mestic with regard to wages, the Senate minority report
objected to the more subtle provisions of Public Law 78,
which would be disadvantageous to domestic laborers. The
report argued that Section 505 which exempted Mexican agri-
cultural workers from old-age and survivors insurance
benefits of the Social Security Act discriminated against
the Mexican, but at the same time gave him employment
preference over a domestic. Since an employer did not pay
Social Security on his Mexican workers, he would havo
27 another financial incentive not to hire American migrants.
The third, area in which the Senate desired modifi-
cations of the House bill was related to the control of
9f)
"Senate Report No. 21^," pp. J-k'.
^Ibid. , pp.
5 8
illegal aliens or wetbacks. Using the findings of the 1951
report, the Senate suggested Immigration and Naturalization
officials be given a search warrant if wetbacks were thought
2 8
to be employed. Although the House had been amenable to
most Senate suggestions, it would not acquiesce by providing
Immigration and Naturalization personnel with what it con-
sidered to be broad statutory power.^
Quite naturally the controversy in the committee
hearings on the bill spilled-over onto the floor of Con-
gress. Leading the opposition forces in the Senate chamber
was Senator Dennis Chavez (D., N. Mex.). In extensive de-
bates, Chavez questioned Ellender on the merits of the
proposed bill. When Chavez stated that the only purpose of
the bill was to gain labor for the farmer, Ellender re-
plied, "That is one of the purposes, yes, and the chief
source of foreign labor in this hemisphere is Mexico."
Chavez retorted that he felt the chief source should be
American labor. Senator Edward J. Thye (R., Minn.) aided
Ellender in the defense of the bill and gave Chavez one of
the perennial justifications for' the need of foreign labor: . . . there is a certain work which must be performed in the harvesting of root crops, such as sugar beets and potatoes which involves what is called "stoop labor." It is the kind of work which is most tedious.
2 8 x , . , Q Ioio., p. o.
2Q U. S. , Congress. House, Importation of Foreign AgrjL-
cultural Workers-, Conference Report No. T>68 to accompany S. 985, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951. P- 6.
59
If a job of that kind were offered to the average American worker, under present conditions, when fac-tories and the employment in every other field are bidding for workers, he would take the job which was far more pleasant than the stoop labor . . . .30
Another section of the bill which generated much debate
was the stipulation that no employer who knowingly used
illegal aliens could be eligible to use contract workers.
The provision had been included not only to attempt to
solve the troublesome problem of wetback migration but also
to placate the Mexican government. As noted, Mexican of-
ficials would not sign a permanent international agreement
until the United States took action on their mutual prob-
lem. There was a divergence of opinion in Congress with
regard to the adequacy of the provision. Representative
Harris Ellsworth (R., Ore.) felt that without the bill,
conditions along the border would worsen. On the other
hand, Emanuel Cellar (D., N. Y.) argued that the bill would
only aggravate the wetback situation since it contained no
safeguards against illegal immigration. Representative
W. R. Poage (D., Tex.), who sponsored the bill in the House,
doubted that the bill would intensify the situation since
it provided legal means of immigration. By way of sum-
marizing his rebuttal, Poage candidly stated the majority
opinion of the Committee on Agriculture:
We are simply saying all the way through that we are trying to provide adequate agricultural labor for
O A JKJCongiessj ons.l Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session,
IV, k'4lQ-Wl9.
6o
the country. When we have done that the Committee on Agriculture is not concerning itself with social reform or immigration laws or with the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of the United States.31
Many of the opposition's opinions were reflected by
President Truman's reluctant signing of the bill (S. 984).
He stated that even though the Secretary of Labor had been
given authority to determine shortages and possible adverse
affect on wages, the guarantees would be meaningless as long
as illegal entrants into the country continued unabated.
Pour recommendations which the President felt could
strengthen future legislation were presented:
(1) Legislation should be enacted to provide punishment for harboring or concealing illegal aliens.
(2) Immigration and Naturalization should be given statutory authority to inspect places of em-ployment without a warrant in search of illegal aliens.
(3) Supplemental appropriations should be given to Immigration and Naturalization to expand personnel in the Southwest.
(4) Supplemental appropriations should be given to the Farm Placement Service of the Department of Labor to aid in recruitment of domestic labor.32
Considering the commission's report of 1951 which
indicated an inverse relation between wage rates and the
presence of alien laborers as well as the problems of com-
pliance, it would have appeared logical to have allowed
31 Ibid-. V, 7151-7156,
S., Congress, House, Message from President of the United States Transmitting Recommendation Supplementing: Provisions of. S. 934, An Act Relating to Recruitment and Employment of Agrlcultural Workers from Mexico, House Document No. 192, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» P» 2.
the entire program to lapse when the Mexican government re-
nounced the international agreement. However, as the
original 19^2 Agreement had been initiated, to combat war-
time manpower shortages, justification given by the
supporters for continuation of the contract program was to
counterbalance labor shortages created by the Korean con-
flict.
By the late 19^01s and early 1950's the influx of
wetbacks presented problems for the United States, and it
challenged the continuation of the bracero program. In-
asmuch as the entry of illegal aliens had on earlier
occasions posed a threat to the perpetuation of the bracero
program, the situation of the late 19 -0' s and early 1950' s
was not an entirely new .problem. The wetback had received
his name because he often swam or waded the Rio Grande in
order to enter the United States undetected by border
guards. Regardless of the way the;'" entered, the wetbacks,
who were without any legal protection, were so readily
available as a source of cheap labor that growers often
preferred them to braeeres or domestic migrants. One aim
of the 19 -2 Agreement had been to curb the flow of wetbacks
into the United States, but officials on both sides of
-^T. Richard Spradlin. "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation program---Review and Reform," The George Washington Law Review, XXX (October, I961T, 8?. Hereafter ciTecf' as Spr&dl in7~~"The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program."
62
the border realized that the agreement only stimulated
illegal entries.
When the terms of the 19^2 Agreement became known in
Mexico, workers from the interior flocked to the border towns
of Ciudad Juarez, Tiajuana, and Mexicali, thinking that the
recruitment centers would be located near the border.
Instead, the Mexican government established the centers in
Mexico City. Many of the workers who had gone to the
border towns were thus faced with the decision of returning -
southward or illegally entering the United States in search
of employment. Lured by the prospect of high wages, they
flooded across the border before transportation to the
interior could be provided. Growers in the border states
who disliked the guarantees under the bracero agreement
encouraged the wetback immigration. In Texas the grower.s
were particularly eager for wetbacks since Mexico had
refused to authorize braceros for the state.
A year later, 19^3 > 110 efficacious solution had been
found to curb the high rate of illegal entrants. At this
time another situation arose, adding to the problem. The
Mexican government refused to grant the quota of contract
labor that the growers felt necessary to harvest their crops.
31\, • Otey M. Scruggs, "The United States, Mexico, and the
Wetback," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLIII (May, 19617~, 31^-329• Unless cited otherwise, information related to wetbacks will be taken from the above article, pp. 316-329.
63
Unable to gain sufficient laborers through the contract
process, many farmers began to hire wetbacks. Although the
Mexican government could not escape partial responsibility
for the resurgence of wetbacks, the United States was warned
that unless it took action to discourage illegal migration,
the bracero program would be in danger of unilateral can-%
cellation.
Concerned with the exploitation of the wetbacks and the
threat posed to the bracero program, the two governments
agreed to take joint action. The Mexican government promised
to strengthen its border patrol but was unsuccessful in re-
ducing the number of wetbacks leaving the country. In the
United States, the Commissioner of Immigration assured the
Secretary of State that action was being taken to prevent
the illegal entrance of aliens. Even with these efforts,
the wetbacks could not be controlled; and the violations
created difficulties on both sides of the border. Texas
growers became more flagrant in their defiance by crossing
the border and engaging workers on an individual basis. The
workers were transported to the fields and either given
shelter in labor camps or returned to Mexico. The influx
of migrant workers into the Mexican border towns of Ciudad
Juarez and Mexicali created overwhelming sanitation and
welfare problems.
Unable to improve the situation, the two governments
decided that stronger action was needed and signed a joint
6k
agreement which went into effect June 1, 19^. By its terms,
the Mexican government was to issue decrees forbidding the
departure from Mexico of all non-contract labor. The
United States agreed to reenforce its border patrol and to
repatriate illegal entrants immediately. In compliance with
the terms of the agreement, Immigration and Naturalization
officials repatriated ^5,000 wetbacks between June 2 and
December 1, 19^. The high number apprehended possibly
reflects the failure of the Mexican government to publish
the decree forbidding departure of non-contract labor and
the failure to augment its own border patrol.
The second agreement, dated June 9> 19^5 > concerned
the ports of entry through which the wetbacks would be
returned to Mexico. United States officials agreed to
diversify the border towns used for repatriation purposes.
Prior to the agreement, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) processed wetbacks through the closest port
of entry, which resulted in drastic social welfare problems
for the Mexican border town. After the INS repeatedly
refused to use the cities of Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo
for returning wetbacks, as requested by the Mexican
government, Mexico closed the ports of entry in Baja
California and ultimately caused the United States to
diversify. The towns of Mexicali and Tiajuana were used if
the wetbacks originated in Baja California; Nogales served
as a center for the wetbacks who came from the states of
65
/
Sonora, Sinaloa, and Jalisco; and Ciudad Juarez for those
who lived in other parts of Mexico.
Conditions might have improved had there been strict
adherence to the two agreements. But the Mexican government
did not strengthen its border patrol, and the American
growers continued to offer inducements to Mexican workers
that encouraged illegal entries. A statement by Mexican
Foreign Minister Manuel Tello indicated that perhaps the
agreement would never be effective unless the American
growers were penalized for their role in the wetback prob-
lem : Without presuming to suggest any action to the Govern-ment of the United States, yet if the problem were attacked at its economic source, imposing sanctions on American employers who employ illegal entrants, the result would promptly come about that Mexican workers would not in the future embark upon adventure made both difficult and unprofitable.
By 19 -7 > the wetback situation became increasingly
acute when the two governments decided to solve the prob-
lem by placing the wetbacks under contracts similar to the
braceros. The contracting of wetbacks, a plan described as
3 K
"more insidious than ingenious,allowed illegal aliens
in the United States to be returned to border cities of
Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, and Reynosa in order to obtain a
work contract. They got a minimum wage of thirty-seven
cents per hour, an eight-hour day guarantee; and they
-^"President's Commission, 1951." p. 53
66
received the same housing, transportation, and medical care
as given to American laborers. As a part of the 19 -7 accord,
the Mexican government agreed to control the sale of rail-
road tickets on the Punta PeiTasco, the only railhead from
the interior into the Baja California area. Also, Mexico
was to prevent the accumulation of workers on its side of
the border.
The results of the program differed greatly from its
stated purpose~-to curb illegal entries into the United
States. The 19^7 Agreement, in fact, fostered lawbreaking.
Under the bracero program, the worker had to comply with
the entire recruitment process which included quotas, se-
curity checks, and medical examination. As an illegal alien,
the wetback had only to enter the United States, be appre-
hended, and returned across the border to be quickly
processed as legalized farm labor. According to a subse-
quent study, the 19 *7 Agreement allowed 55>00° illegal
aliens to become legal in the year 19^7 alone. In the same
year, the number of workers imported directly from Mexico
on under the bracero program was only 19,632, The figures
3 U. S. , Department of State, '''Agreement Between the
United States of America and Mexico Replacing the Agreements of June 2, 19'^ and January 9» 19 *5> Respecting Mexican Agricultural Workers: Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed, at Mexico City, March 10, 19^9; Entered into Force March 10. 19 -7." U. S. Sta r-utes at Large, LXI, Part IV, ^106-^107.,
37 „ President's Commission, 1951>" P- 52.
67
recorded, for 19^9 were even more revealing: 19,625 Mexican
farm workers were recruited in the interior, while 8?,220
wetbacks were legalized.
A partial answer to the rise in wetback migration was
the uncooperative attitude of the American grower. He
objected to the contract provisions of the legalized wet-
backs for the same reason he did not approve of the regular
bracero pacts--both contained stated wage rates plus
housing, transportation, and food guarantees. Since he dis-
liked legalizing wetbacks, the grower often violated the
contract terms. Refusal of the El Paso Cotton Growers'
Association to pay the thirty-seven cents an hour wage
forced the Mexican government to sever relations with this
organization.
When the 19-+7 Agreement expired, neither government made
efforts to renew it. The following year, workers were re-
cruited in the interior of Mexico. But bhe arrangement soon
proved unsatisfactory because the selection process was not
fast enough to assimilate all the men wanting jobs. Trying
to by-pass the long recruitment process, the men flocked to
the border cities, such as Ciudad Juarez. They crossed the
border illegally and, instead of being returned, were em-
ployed in the surrounding area. Mexico abrogated the 19 -8
Agreement; but in August, 19^9, the two countries signed an
agreement renewing the contracting of wetbacks. Presumably,
the Mexican government reversed its position because it
68
wanted its nationals to have every protection possible when
they worked, in the United States. The practice of con-
tracting wetbacks continued to 1950."^
Instead of diminishing, wetback immigration continued
to increase during 1950 and 1951. A series of articles by
Gladwin Hill in The New York Times focused public attention
on the problem. Particularly revealing was the study of
three counties (Hidalgo, Cameron, and Wiliby) in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley of Texas which indicated the intensity of
the wetback problem. The three counties in 1950 had a total
population of approximately 300.000 persons and a gross
area of 3.000 square miles under cultivation. Wetbacks
performed, most of the labor on the farms. In fact, a ran-
dom survey of 1^ faims in the counties disclosed that 93
out of every 100 workers were illegal aliens. The Lower-
Rio Grande was not the only area of the country which used
wetback labor. They were used extensively by farmers in
the Salt River Valley of Arizona and'in the Imperial and
San Joaquin Valleys Ox California.
Regardless of where the wetbacks were found, Hill's
articles noted one similarity among areas using wetback
labor--the presence of available labor, without contracts
or guarantees, depressed, wage rates. In the Rio Grande
Valley, the prevailing wage paid for thinning cotton was
13 J Coalson, "Mexican Contract Labor in American Agri-
culture," p. 233«
69
$2.25 per hundredweight, but the rate rose in areas further
from an excess of available laborers. For example, Hill
noted that Texas farmers on the Coastal Plains paid $4.00;
on the Rolling Plains, $5.00; and on the High Plains the
rate was $5-25-"^
The problem of illegal aliens came under close scrutiny
during debates on Public Law 78. On the same day that
President Truman sent his message to Congress accepting the
law, Senator Joe Kilgore (D. , Tex.) introduced a bill
prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service de-
signed to effectuate the first two recommendations suggested
2|0
by the President, As introduced, the bill provided that
any person who " . . . landed or transported, or concealed,
harbored, or shielded an illegal alien, or encouraged, or
induced, any alien to enter the United States illegally, was
guilty of a felony punishable by a fire not exceeding
$2,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or
both, for each alien in respect to whom the law was vio-
41
lated," The bill also allowed Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv3.ce employees to enter 'any place of employment,
excluding dwellings, in search of illegal aliens. The First J % h e New York Times, March 26, 1951. P« 25-ILQ ,
See pagv bO for Truman's recommendations.
4 i Irving rf. Sa/bgfiir, "Mexican Contract Labor in the
United States, 1948-1953." unpublished doctoral dissertation. Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953. P*
70
Session of the Eighty-Second. Congress adjourned without
taking action on the bill. Meanwhile the contract labor
pact which expired February 11, 1952, was extended to May 11,
1952. The short duration of the 1951 Agreement was de-
signed. to pressure Congress into taking measures against the
4 2
wetbacks.
In the interim period between sessions, groups opposed
to the wetback legislation organized their forces for the
reconvening of Congress. When the Second Session opened,
an amendment to the Kilgore Bill made it necessary to prove
that an employer "willfully and knowingly'' harbored, con-
cealed, or encouraged an illegal alien. The ultimate
victory for the opposition was that the employment of an
alien did not constitute "harboring or concealing." As
long as an employer made no attempt to harbor or conceal a
wetback, he did not commit a felony.
Other amendments to the original bill equally re-
stricted its effectiveness. Rather than being allowed to
search for wetbacks without a. warrant, the revised bill
called for Immigration and Naturalization officials to
obtain warrants. Even though the Kilgore Bill as amended
did not entirely fulfill the President's recommendations,
Truman signed it March 20, 1952. J
"Study of Population," p. 33. I , Q
Ibid. See also, The New York Times, March 21, 1952, pi "17.
71
Wetback migration continued to increase throughout
1952. In the Delta Lake Section of South Texas alone, the
Border Patrol rounded up 1,200 wetbacks in early August. By
April, 1953 > illegal entries reached a new record peak with
the apprehension of 87,4-16 along the border from Brownsville,
Texas, to San Diego, California. Even though the American
Border Patrol attempted to curb the high number of illegal
entries, its officials admitted that the wetback situation
could easily soar "out of sight."
One reason Border Patrol spokesmen feared that the
wetback flow would accelerate was the difficulty the Patrol,
had in guarding the border. Including administrative
personnel., the Border Patrol had only 600 men in service.
With so few employees, the Patrol did not try to maintain
any kind of cordon along the border but rather adopted, a
"defense in depth" method of patrol. This operation ex-
tended several hundzed miles back from the border and
functioned by mass round-ups of wetbacks in towns and on
fan,.* 5
After the wetbacks were apprehended, the Border Patrol
transported them to Mexico. For a time it airlifted them
to Mexican cities located in the interior, such as Guadala-
/ 46 jars., San Luis Potosi, and Durango. Another method of
hh
The New York Times, May 10, 1933
"Ibid. ^°lbid., June 3, 1951> P- 34.
72
deporting the wetbacks was to transport them "by train to
areas in the interior. Initially the Mexican government
provided military escort for the train until it was 700
miles from the United States border. Later, however, the
military guard provided escort for only sixty miles into
Mexico. Withdrawal of the guard, which encouraged "train-
jumping," combined with the closing of the airlift because
of insufficient funds, served to heighten the x^etback prob-
i ^7
lem.
The "push factors" in Mexico which stimulated the wet-
backs to migrate were similar to those which motivated the
braceros. One main consideration was the obvious disparity
between wages in Mexico and those in the United States.
Because Mexico was unable to provide high standards of
living for all its citizens, the situation became more gx.ave
with the rapid population expansion. Mexico's population
grew from 16.5 million in 1930 to 19.6 million in 19 +0,
and to 25-5 million in 1950. In 19^9 the Mexican birth rate
was '^A per thousand compared with a birth rate in the If. 8
United States of 2.5-3 pe*1 thousand.
In addition to pressure of population against the
economic resources, rampant Inflation stimulated the wetback
migration. In the cotton growing areas of Matamoros, **7Ibld. , January 27, 1953. p. 32.
LR "Study of Population," p. 71.
73
Mexico, and in other areas near the Unite'd States border,
farm wages in December, 19^7, were $1.10 a day (figured in
United States currency). Through inflation, the real wage
in October, 19 *9» was 69 cents per day. Wages in interior
Mexico were even less, only 38 cents per day.^ Besides
Mexico's "ancestral poverty" and the traditionally low
wage rates, the early 1950's were drought years in Mexico.
The lack of water resulted in crop failures and intensified
an already bad situation. In the state of Durango in 1953,
^0 per cent of the cattle, or 379.200 head, perished in the
t. Q
drought with an estimated dollar loss of 8.7 million.
At the height of the wetback influx, the bracero pact
came up for renewal, but negotiations halted on the wage
question, Mexico wanted a fixed wage rate written into the
international agreement, instead, of accepting the prevailing
rate for its workers. In anticipation that negotiations
might fail, the United States had discussed possible
alternatives to the bracero pact prior to the negotiations.
One alternative suggested was to legalize wetbacks once
again. The other alternative, and the one eventually
attempted, was to contract workers unilaterally until the
two countri es readied a new agreement. The "stop gap"
^Ibid. , pp. 71-72,
R. ?. Eckels, "Hungry Workers, Ripe Crops, and the Non-Existent- Mexican Border." The Reporter, X (April 13, 195*0. 29.
7^
recruitment program was announced, jointly by the Departments
<1
of State, Justice, and Labor.
The official, position of the Mexican government in
response to the unilateral recruitment was reflected by
President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines who said the failure to
reach agreement was "not a problem, but only an incident."
Prominent officials within Mexican governmental circles
expressed quite different views and claimed the United
States deliberately adopted a "too tough" position. Out-
side the government, many segments of the population united
in opposition to the unilateral recruitment. In January,
195^. Mexico placed guards along the Mexican border across
from Calexico, California, to prevent the crossing of
several hundred, workers, but with lit'cle success. Braceros,
eager for work, continued, to congregate In the border ar.eas.
By February it was reported that nearly 5,000 had entered
the Western States since the failure to negotiate a new
agreement. -/~
The Eisenhower Administration continued its talks
aimed toward a new migrant pact with the Mexican government.
Finally in March the two governments reached terms to be in
effect through December Jl, 1935• The program to recruit
J 1The New York Times, January 16, 195^» P. 3-5; January 17, 19 5^ > P« 6' 2.
-^Ibid. , January 18, 195^» P- January 23> 195^» p. 3; January 2^, 195^. P» 10: February k, 195~K p. 16.
75
workers unilaterally was never officially' in operation since
the new agreement was reached eight days before the law was
signed on March 18, 1954. On the controversial issue of
wages, the new pact reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary
of Labor in determining the prevailing wage; but it em-
phasized the right of the Mexican government to request
periodical reviews of the wage rate. J Even though the
bracero situation had been temporarily settled, the wetback
problem persisted as a disruptive element for both countries.
Yet, with publicity, congressional legislation, and the
obvious acuteness of the situation, no aggressive action
designed to curb the wetback influx was taken until mid-
summer of 1954. After touring the border areas in early
June, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., announced
that the Commissioner of Immigration, Major General Joseph
Swing (United States Army, retired), would soon begin to
round up setbacks. Commissioner Swing's plan called for
the re-enforcement of the Border Patrol from California to
Texas with guards from other parts of the United States.
The additional help along the Mexican border would allow one
part of the guard to seal off the border while the other
half apprehended wetbacks for repatriation. Chartered buses
•5-'"Study of Population," p. 39.
^The New York Times, June 10, 1954, p. 25-
-^Robert D. Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem and Pressure Group Politics," The Journal of Polltics, XXIII (May, 1961), 314. Hereafter cioed as Tomasek, "Trie Migrant; Problem."
?6
would take the wetbacks to Nogales, Arizona, where the
Mexican government would then transport them to the in-
<6
terior. Swing assured farmers that every effort would be
made to fill vacancies created by the loss of wetbacks with
either domestic or bracero labor. For the most part,
farmers seemed willing to cooperate, primarily because they
thought the wetback drive would be pursued with equal vigor
all along the border, thus minimizing competitive dis-
57 advantages."
California was the first testing ground for Operation
Wetback. The plan proved successful. When the Border
Patrol began its roundup, arrests were as high as 2,000 per
day, but later decreased to 1,000. Loss of the wetbacks
did not interrupt bhe harvesting because, as Swing 58
promised, braceros replaced the illegal aliens. With the
initial California successes, Swing, in mid-July, swept into
the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas.
In Texas there was much resistance to Operation Wet-
back, and the Border Patrol encountered ". . . a campaign
of protest and vilification of a sort rare in the . . . KQ
annals of law enforcement."^* At times Bord.er Patrol ^The Mew York Times, June 13, 195 ', P* 24.
^"ibid., June 27, 1954, p. 36.
^8Ibid., June 28, 1954, p. 39-
~^Ibid. , August 2, 195'+, P. 8.
77
employees were refused service in restaurants and motels,
and were sneeringly called the "army of occupation." One
drug store in Harlingen displayed a sign which read, "Price
Double to Border Patrol till cotton is picked."
Despite the lack of local cooperation in some areas
and of insufficient funds originally appropriated, Com-
missioner Swing fulfilled a successful mission. Estimates
f 1 indicated that about one million wetbacks w„ere deported.
One Texas grower, who despaired at seeing the wetbacks given
official government escort across the Rio Grande, later
commented on the thoroughness of Operation Wetback:
The abruptness, completeness and finality of this campaign is still hard to believe after eight years. Had Herr /Walter/ Ulbricht had the services of any-one as able as General,Swing, the Berlin Wall would never have, been built.°2
Operation Wetback definitely affected the contract .
labor program. The Labor Department announced increased
demands for braceros in the border states of Texas,
California, Arizona, and New Mexico. In California re-
quests for membership in growers' associations, the agency
which normally contracted the braceros, doubled in Imperial
and San Diego counties. By September, 195^» there was a
60T. . , I Did.
6i "Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem," p. 315-
6 2 John G. McBride, Vanishing Bracero: Valley Revolu-
tion (San Antonio, 19^3)> P- 8.
78
25 pe^ cent increase in the use of Mexican nationals in
California over September, 1953-
In Texas there was not only a demand for additional
braceros but also a rise in wage rates. To maintain the
domestic laborers normally displaced by the wetbacks, cot-
ton growers increased wages from $1.50 a- hundredweight for
cotton to $2.05.^ As a result of the demands for braceros,
the Labor Department requested an additional 90,000 contract
workers, or a total of 350,000, compared with only 200,000
in 1953.
^Edward F. Hayes, "'Operation Wetback'--Impact on the Border States," Employment Security Review, LXIII (March, 1955), 17-18, 21.
^The New York Times, July 15, 195^» P« 12.
CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION AND LIQUIDATION OF
THE BRACERO PROGRAM: 1955-1964'
Following the 1955 struggle to renew the international
agreement, the years to 1959 were quiescent ones for the
Mexican contract labor program. On August 9» 1955> Public
Law 78 was extended, for nearly four years, to June JO, 1959.
At the same time, two amendments were added with little
controversy. One amendment provided that if a worker had
cX 1 1 ready been paid, but not returned to the reception center,
the employer need not pay the transportation and subsistence
costs within the United States, The other change required
the Secretary of Labor to consult with employers and workers
regarding the availability cf domestic migrants and the
possibility that wage rates were adversely affected. The
information was to be posted in public places. During the
four-year period, the international agreement which governed
recruitment of contract workers was also renewed, without -
effective opposition or major difficulties in the negotia-
tions. It was extended on December 23> 1955» to be in
effect until December 31> 195&; and eleven days prior to
expiration, the agreement was renewed until June 30, 1959.
''""Study of Population," pp. 39-^0.
79
80
Several reasons for the decline of the opposition to
the bracero program can be cited. Undoubtedly one reason
was that after Operation Wetback the influx of illegal aliens
dropped sharply. Thus the wetback problem did not attract
so much unfavorable attention to the program as in the mid-
19501s. The absence of wetbacks likewise did not impede
2
negotiations of che international agreement. Secondly,
organizations which regularly opposed the program became
less active. For example, the National Farm Labor Union
(NFLU), composed of small farmers and representing the
dome,st;ic migrant and workers, dropped its traditional role
of opposing the bracero program. At least one reason for
its inactivity was the weaknesses inherent within the NFLU.
Its a ember ship came primarily free, seasonal workers who
lacked extensive financial resources and dynamic leadership
ability.^ Another group which took a less energetic stand
against the importation of foreign labor was the National
Agricultural Workers Union (NAVU) of the American Federation
of Labor. The objective of the NAWU was to organize do-
mestic agricultural workers into an effective pressure
group similar to that of th^ growers. But in December,
1956, its president, H. L. Mitchell, expressed his
^Ffelffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program,
Toraasek, "The Migrant rtotles," p. JOh.
81
discouragement with 'the efforts to organize domestic mi-
k-
grants into labor unions.
Behind the facade of tranquility which characterized
the program in the late 1950's, the forces opposed to the
bracero pact were organizing. Much of the opposition
developed outside governmental circles, and public interest
over the program's operation was similar to the concern
evidenced when the non-governmental program was in effect.
These groups, upset with increased farm subsidies and crop
surpluses, could not understand the necessity of importing
foreign laborers when there was a high unemployment rate
among domestic workers. Their position was candidly stated
in an article by Gladwin Hill in The New York Times: "What are those people doing?" asked Alice,
surveying a vast fertile southwestern valley. "They're cultivating surplus cotton and lettuce,"
replied the Red Queen, "Who are they?" asked Alice, tactful],y ignoring
the matter of why anyone should produce surplus crops. "They are Mexicans, imported because of the labor
shortage," explained the Red Queen. "Labor shortage?" asked. A] ice. "I thought we had
5,000,000 unemployed and a million or so migrant farm laborers who need, work."
"Obviously," retorted the Red Queen testily, "you don't understand the American agricultural system. "5
An even more decisive factor in renewed opposition to
the program was the position of Labor Secretary James P.
Mitchell, Mitchell, more thsn any of the earlier Labor
Pfeiffer, "I'ae Mexican l-'ana Labor Supply Program." P. 7'i-.
^Ibid ., p, 76. See also, The New York Tim°s, April 5> 1959. p. 53r arKl Tos,?.sek, ''Tr.e Migrant Problem, " p. 295-
82
Secretaries who had administered the contract labor system,
had a deep interest in the bracero program. Upon accepting
his post, he began to study the farm-labor situation. As a
result of his investigations, several bracero camps were
closed and improvements undertaken in various others. He
also began working on ways to improve the condition of mi-
grant workers. Mitchell's position contrasted sharply with
that of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. Through-
out the history of the contract labor system, the Department
of Agriculture rather consistently represented the needs of
the large, prosperous farmers. Benson did not break with
tradition. During the Eisenhower Administration his
position, and that of Mitchell, often clashed with regard
to the bracero program.^ One of the most aggressive steps
taken by Mitchell concerning the reorganization of the con-
tract labor system was to appoint a committee of four
consultants to study Public Law 78. The committee's lengthy
report was extremely influential in shaping future amendments
to the law.
The committee noted that Public Law 78 had two prime
objectives: to obtain agricultural workers from Mexico to
meet the demands for seasonal labor shortages and to insure
that domestic migrants were not adversely influenced by the
'Arnol Mayer, "Grapes of Wrath, 'Vintage 1961," The Reporter, XXIV (January-June, I96I), 35- Hereafter ^ited as Mayer, "Grapes of Wrath.See also, Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem," r>. 30* .
83
importation of Mexicans. The committee felt that Public
Law 78 fulfilled its first objective but had. been less
successful with regard to the second, primarily because of
the difficulty in administering Section 503 of the law.
This section prohibited the Secretary of Labor from issuing
authorization for Mexican workers unless (1) domestic
workers were not available, (2) employment of Mexicans
would not adversely affect wages and working conditions of
domestics, and (3) reasonable efforts had been made to
attract domestic workers at wages and standards comparable
7
to those offered to Mexican workers.
One of the major difficulties,- the committee explained,
in the administration of Section 5^3 was that of determining
an acceptable interpretation of the term "adverse effect."
In its strict sense, the term meant that the use of Mexican
nationals should not deprive the American worker of jobs,
lower his wages, or impair working conditions. If this
interpretation was accepted, the Secretary of Labor's role
would be to insure no "worsening of conditions" and thus to
maintain the status quo of domestic migrants. On the other
hand, adverse effect could mean that employment of braceros
prevented wages from reaching higher rates. Closely related
to this interpretation was a possible third meaning, that the
7 'U. S., Department of Labor, Mexlcan Farm Labor Con-
sultants Re_go;r_t (Washington, 1959) > P. 1« Unless cited otherwise, information on the committee's report will be based on pages 1-17 of the above report.
84
employment of Mexican nationals interrupted the "normal
interplay between labor and employer."
In order to minimize adverse effect, the Secretary of
Labor, prior to the report, had established several proce-
dures. The Labor Department made pre-seasonal "supply-
demand" analyses to determine labor shortage, and then tried
to provide workers for these areas by interstate recruitment.
The Secretary also attempted to reduce the chances of ad-
verse effect by placing restrictions on employers who used
Mexican nationals. They were required to supply acceptable
housing and working conditions and to pay the prevailing
wage to Mexicans. These safeguards protected domestics and
also prevented the exploitation of foreign laborers. In
addition, employers were sometimes required to hire qualified
domestics to supplement or replace Mexican nationals.
Despite the efforts of the Department of Labor, the
committee felt that domestic agricultural workers continued
to be adversely affected, especially by job displacement.
There was a tendency for Mexicans to work' in skilled or semi-
skilled positions. Increasingly, they were entering the
areas of packing and sorting fruits and vegetables. This
type of work was usually done by packing-shed operators at
higher wages; but with new kinds of machinery, the Mexicans
could perform the work in the field. The American workers
often lost their jobs because they could not easily transfer
• . 85
to field jobs, or they were obliged to continue working at
the lower wages paid to field hands.
There were at least two other ways by which the do-
mestic was displaced from his job. One was through the use
of braceros in year-round occupations. Although Public
Law 78 did not prohibit the full-time use of Mexicans, it
had generally been used to acquire workers for seasonal em-
ployment. Secondly, the influx of a large number of workers
shortened the work season for domestics since the crops could
be harvested more quickly. And, the availability of a
potential labor force not only shortened the work season
but also depressed the wages of the American migrant.
The committee explained in depth the interrelation of
the two factors. The Mexican agricultural workers received
the prevailing domestic wage, which was determined by con-
ducting periodic and random surveys of areas where foreign
workers were needed. By a formula adopted in 1958.- the wage
rate paid to k-Q per cent of the workers was considered the
prevailing wage. In cases where no single wage could be
8
determined, a special method was used. The committee con-
cluded that the concept of the prevailing wage was
8 Ibid., p. 6. By the special method, the prevailing
wage is found by placing the wages along a scale, starting with the largest rate and proceeding upward until 51 per cent of the workers are included. The highest wage paid to any worker in the 51~P^r cent group becomes the bottom of the range while the top of the range is the highest rate paid to any worker in the survey.
86
satisfactory in areas where rates were competitively de-
termined. But it considered the method inadequate in
situations where a potential labor reserve existed. The
potential reserves depressed the domestic wage rate which
then tended to stabilize. To substantiate its conclusion,
the consultants pointed out that farm wages from 1953 to
1958 increased Ik- per cent. But in areas where Mexican
nationals were used, the average rate paid to domestic mi-
grants remained, unchanged or decreased in three-fifths of
the cases studied. In the cotton-growing areas which em-
ployed about one-half of the Mexicans, three-fourths of the
cases studied indicated that the wage rates for domestics
were unchanged or lowered.
Again the committee noted the difficulty in inter-
preting the term "adverse effect." If the Department of.
Labor's obligation under Section 503 was to (l) restore
wages to a level they would have reached without foreign
labor, (2) obtain a level at which supply and demand
balance, or (3) keep wages in line with areas in which
foreign labor was not used, then the committee felt that
procedures for determining the prevailing wage were in-
adequate. Not only was it unsuccessful but also the report
termed it "meaningless" in areas that were totally dominated
by foreign workers, such as the lettuce and citrus crops of
California or the cotton fields of New Mexico. To set the
prevailing wage in dominated areas, the Secretary of Labor
87
used wage rates in non-dominated but comparable situations.
The difficulty proved to be one of locating a comparable
area which had not been influenced by foreign workers.
The report pointed out obvious advantages given to the
Mexican worker which had not been extended to the American
migrant. The latter did not have the security of a minimum
wage guarantee, he did not receive housing or transportation,
nor was he protected by insurance coverage from occupational
risks. The braceros, on the other hand, had all the se-
curities with the added assurance that the United States
government served as the guarantor of the contract.
After careful investigation of the bracero program and
its relation to the situation of domestic migrants, the
consultants suggested that Public Law 78 be extended on a
temporary basis but with several amendments. Simple re-
newal of the law without any changes would tend to postpone
necessary reforms. In the committee ' s opinion adverse
effect could not be avoided but could possibl3r be minimized
by implementing the following recommendations:
A. Future legislation should clearly confine em-ployment of Mexican nationals to necessary crops in temporary labor shortages and to unskilled, non-machine jobs.
B. The Secretary of Labor should be authorized to insure active competition for the available supply of domestic agricultural workers with the objective of reducing the reliance on Mexican labor. To stimulate active competition, the commit bee suggested limiting the ratio of Mexicans to domestics on individual farms and Hairing the number of Mexicans that could be em-ployed in any crop area.
88
C. The unavailability of domestic migrants should not be certified by the Secretary of Labor un-less employers had attempted to recruit domestic workers and had offered them working conditions equiva-lent to those given the braceros, such as housing, transportation, and wages.9
On the controversial issue of interpreting adverse
effect, the committee recommended the use of more specific
criteria. It suggested (a) the failure cf wages in areas
using Mexicans to keep pace with general wage increases,
(b) the relations between Mexican employment trends and
wage trends in areas not using Mexicans, and (c) the dif-
ference in wage and earning levels of workers on farms
using Mexicans compared with non-users.
With the consultants' report indicating the need for
amendments to Public Law 78 and suggesting ways to accomplish
the changes, anti-braeerc members of Congress led by
Representative George McGovern (D., S. D.) introduced a
reform, bill in the i960 Congressional session. The bill
incorporated the consultants' recommendations, and imme-
diately it encountered strong opposition when . . In-
dustrialised agriculture joined with canr.srs and processors
10
to exert pressure for extension . . . " without reform.
McGovern's supporters soon realised they did not control
enough votes to amend Public Law 78, and the pro-bracero Q ' Ibid.. pp. I j-1o.
1 0 Mayer, "(irapes of Wrath," p. 35- Unless cited other-
wise, inforoiation on the i960 Congressional action will be based on the -above article, pp,
89
faction dominated the House Committee on Agriculture. Al-
though the liberals under McGovern threatened to filibuster,
the House of Representatives renewed Public Law 78 for two
more years without amendments.
In the meantime, the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry extended Public Law 78 for a six-month period
without incorporating any of the reforms suggested in the
consultants' report. The Senate committee .ignored a reform
measure introduced by Senator Eugene McCarthy (D. , Minn.)
and placed the extension bill before the full Senate with-
out conducting hearings on the matter. Again the anti-
bra cero members threatened to filibuster. They felt the
six-month extension could easily be expanded to a two-year
extension in a House-Senate conference committee.
To stop a filibuster which would hinder campaigning-
in a crucial election year and to insure adequate labor for
the harvest season, the two opposing groups agreed on a
compromise. The contract labor program was extended for
six months with thorough hearings to be held in 1961. Even
though the anti-bracero congressmen met defeat in amending
Public Law 78, they still claimed partial victory for
several reasons. They had prevented joint administration
of the braeere program by the Agriculture and Labor De-
partments, shortened the period of extension from two years
to six months, and demonstrated that the growers' lobby in
Washington v:as not invincible.
90
The i960 attack in Congress against Public Law 78 re-
flected a stiffening attitude toward the bracero pact and
was the prelude to heightened opposition. When Public
Law 78 came up for renewal in 1961, the Kennedy Administra-
tion was unwilling for the law to be extended without certain
reforms. The four amendments proposed by the Kennedy
Administration were not new, but were based on the 1959
study of the farm-labor situation. First, the Administration
wanted to prohibit the employment of Mexican workers in jobs
requiring the operation of machinery and in year-round jobs.
Supporters of the amendment contended it was necessary even
though the Secretary of Labor was authorized to determine
domestic labor shortages. They pointed out that the
authorizations were automatic since Mexicans displaced do-
mestic migrants in some areas of the country. Congressmen
who representee1 the growers' interest argued that limitations
on the employment of Mexicans should not be established since
11
domestics would not perform stoop labor.
The Administration also wanted a statutory wage-
standard. The proposed wage amendment required that any
employer who paid less than average wages must raise his,
wage rates to the state or national farm wage average, de-
pending on which wage was lovrer, The wage did not have to
11 "Spradxin. "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Prob-
lem," pp. 101-102. 10 -. Unless cited otherwise, discussion of the Kennedy Administration's proposals in I96I will be based on the above article, pp. 8^-121, 311-327.
91
be raised more than ten cents a year, but any employer who
offered domestics less than he paid Mexicans would be
ineligible to participate in the bracero program. The wage
amendment met with heavy opposition. The pro-bracero
faction argued that such an amendment would lead to wage
escalation, higher customer prices on the retail market,
and inability of the farmers to pay higher wages. The crux
of the opposition, however, was that growers feared the wage
amendment was a step toward extending the minimum wage to
agricultural workers. During the hearings on the amend-
ments, those who agreed with it countered the opposition's
arguments by suggesting that if growers were unable to pay
wages based on the state or national average, they were
certainly too poor to be hiring Mexican nationals.
The third amendment prohibited the recruitment of
Mexican nationals, unless an employer offered domestics
comparable working conditions, such as housing, transporta-
tion, subsistence, and other guarantees. If the amendment
was accepted, the Administration felt domestics would be
more attracted to stoop labor jobs ana the need for
brac-eros would be eliminated. The House Committee on
Agriculture was adamant in its refusal to approve the
amendment and termed the suggestion impracticable. The
committee argued that the amendment would obligate growers
to provide housing and transportation with no guarantee
that the domestic migrant, might not desert his job at the
92
peak of harvest. The growers would have Incurred the extra
expense without receiving any services. The proposal would
allow growers to reimburse themselves from the government
for travel expenses paid in advance if a domestic should
quit his job without notification. When the Senate received
the amendment to Public Law 78, Senator Kenneth Keating
(R., N. Y.) attempted to reinstate the requirement that
comparable terms of employment such as workmen's compensation
be offered the domestic migrant. The Senate rejected his
amendment by a vote of thirty-five yeas to forty-nine noes
with sixteen abstentions.
The final amendment- supported by the Kennedy Administra-
tion, to limit the number of Mexicans that could be employed
on an individual farm, failed to be included in the extension
of Public Law 78 to December jl, 19^3- Even though the
extension of Public Law 78 contained, some points favored by
Washington such as the prohibition against Mexicans operating
farm machinery and their limitations to temporary, seasonal
jobs, the Kennedy Administration remained unsatisfied. For
example, the wage amendment designed to minimize adverse
effect likewise did not pass Congress. The amendment re-
quiring employers to offer comparable working conditions
passed Congress, but with the provision that "working con-
ditions" excluded housing, transportation, subsistence, and
12 work, guarantees.
12 Ibid., p. See also, "Study of Population,"
p. ^ 1.
93
When he signed the law extending the contract system
for an additional two years, President Kennedy stated his
regret that Congress had ignored studies revealing the
detrimental effects which the employment of foreign labor
had on domestic migrants. He added that he signed the law
only because he realized workers were ne.eded for the coming
harvest and because of the impact which the termination of
13
the program might have on Mexico. Even though the initial
efforts of the Kennedy Administration to reform the contract
labor system and thereby protect the domestic migrant were
not completely successful, it was determined to improve
the administration of the program. The President announced
on signing the extension that the Secretary of Labor would
use the power granted to him under the adverse effect clause
(Section 503) to determine whether Mexican laborers were 1
needed in the country. The action of the Secretary of
Labor combined with the l$6l amendments led to a decline in
the use of braceros from 19ol to 196 -.
In the spring of 1962, Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz exercised the powei given him under Section 5^3 of
Public Law ?8 and issued adverse effect determinations for
twenty-four states. The new wage rates established in
~ "'Public Papers of the Pre si den ts of the United States, Containing the Public "Me¥saa.'es7"Speeches, and Statements of thT'P^esIdentr Jhhii P." Kennedy, 12*61 (Washington, 19511.
14. Ibid.
9^
these states ranged from sixty cents to one dollar an hour.
The Secretary also announced that no Mexican could work on a
piece-rate basis if it did not allow him to earn the t
specified hourly rate. And the hourly earnings of piece-
rate workers in any payroll period must not be less than
the adverse effect'rate for the area in which he was em-
ployed. The effect of the new regulations was to raise the
wage rates for domestics, while the increased expense of
hiring Mexican workers reduced the annual average employment-
of "braceros.
A second factor in the decline of bracero usage was the
1961 provision which limited their -employment to temporary,
seasonal jobs. In compliance with the amendment, only 15
per cent of those admitted during 1962 could stay longer
than nine months. Frior to the amendments, contracts were
extended up to a year with some workers remaining in the
country for eighteen months. With the new restriction,
however, the average length of employment for Mexican workers
was shortened from 3*3 months in 19^1, to 2.9 in 1962, and 1 f\
later to 2.62 months in 3 963.
1 ^U. S., Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign
Workers in 1962," Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963), p. 1.
i Ibid., p. 2. See also, U, S,, Department of Labor,
"Employment of Foreign'Workers in 1963," Farm Labor Market Developme-nts ( k'ash ing 0 on, 19 6-4-) , p. 1,
95
Directly related to the above factor-s which contributed
to the decline in the number of braceros recruited in the
early 1960's was increased mechanization of the 1950's, !
especially in the cotton areas. In 1959. only 4-3 per cent
of the cotton was harvested by machines, compared with more
than 50 per cent a year later. Improved administration of
Public Law 78, and particularly increased wage rates,
stimulated the shift to mechanization. Obviously, the cotton
harvesting machines served to reduce the number of workers 1 7
normally required.
As a result of these factors, approximately 195.000
Mexicans were contracted in 1962. This represented a 33
per cent decline from 1961. In September. 1962, the peak
employment month, there were only 111,000 braceros in the
United States, which represented the lowest number employed
in the history of Public Law 78. The September employment
was per cent lower than the 1961 peak, and 62 per cent
below the all-time high of 292,000 in 1959- The decline
was particularly obvious in states which normally depended
on braceros. In Texas, for example, Mexican employment
during the first six months of 1962 averaged about 9>000
less than in 1961. In July and August, the number employed
1 7 Spradlin, "The Mexican Contract Labor Importation
Program," pp. 92~93« See also, U. S», Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign Workers in 1^62,u Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963). p. 1.
96
was 20,000 to 30,000 less than in 1961, and from September
1 R to November, there were 60,000 less than in 1961.
California and Arizona growers also employed fewer (
Mexicans. In the latter state about 5*000 braceros were
used in 1962, which was 2,000 less than in 1961. Almost
no Mexican labor was used in the Arizona, cotton fields in
1961 compared with 3>200 workers in 1962. Cotton growers
shifted to harvesting by machines when the adverse effect
determination required them to pay piece-rate workers an
average hourly earning of 95 cents. In California, em-
ployment of Mexican labor dropped by about 3>000 in I962 .
The trend away from hiring Mexican workers continued
in 1963. During the year, an average of ^5>900 Mexicans
worked, in the United States, or 2.3 pe~-f cent less than in
1962. At the peak of employment only 90,000 were employed,
a 19 PS-f cent decline from the 111,000 reached in 1962.
The reduced, dependency of foreign labor certainly affected
domestic migrant workers. Growers began to hire them and
also paid them higher wages. In. Texas, the adverse effect
determinations set the hourly rate of seventy cents as the
lowest at which Mexicans could be employed. This relatively
high rate tended to raise wages offered to domestics.
Arizona felt effects similar to Texas in 1963. The employment
1 8 -U. S., Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign
Workers in 1962,1: Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963), pp. 2-4.
9?
of braceros declined 1^ per cent while the use of domestics
increased 8 per cent. Domestic laborers, however, did not
completely fill the vacancies created by fewer braceros.
The Yuma County State Employment Office recorded that some
of the laborers were visa immigrants, many of whom commuted
from Mexico. The report noted that often the commuters
19
were former braceros. '
Encouraged by the higher wage rates and the increased
employment of domestic agricultural workers, the Labor
Department announced that the need for imported labor should
be curtailed even further in 196'4. According to the Labor
Department, domestic seasonal, workers were available in
adequate numbers to fill labor shortages. To buttress its
case, the Department pointed out that 182,000 persons who
performed 25 or more days of farm wage work in 1962 cite.d
unemployment as their "chief activity" during the year.
Workers in this category increased 16,400 per year over the
preceding decade, and thus the Labor Department calculated
that over 200,000 domestic workers were available for 20
additional farm work in 196 -.
Despite the vigorous action of the Labor Department
which had raised the wage rates of contract laborers after 19 yU. S.. Department of labor, "Employment of Foreign
Workers in 1963," Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 196^) , pp. 1-3. ' " " ~
20 U. S., Department of Labor, "Review and Outlook,"
Farm Labor Market. Develor'inentq (Washington, 196*0, p. 9.
93
1961 and required better working conditions, many growers
still preferred braceros to domestics. The Mexican workers
were more easily housed since they travelled without their
families; they were usually healthy young adults; they were
normally docile; and they did not complain about their
working conditions. As one grower explained, . .we
used to own our slaves, now we renb them from the govern-
21
ment. "
The time was rapidly approaching, however, when growers
would no longer be able to rely on contract laborers. In
1963, when Public Law 78 came before Congress for con-
sideration, the Labor Department introduced several
amendments. Although the recommendations were not adopted,
opposition to Public. Law r/d> had grown to the point that
its supporters could only force a one-year extension of the
program. The extension to December 31> 196k, marked the
termination of the Mexican contract labor supply program.
The three major proposals recommended by the Labor
Department in 19^3 were (1) employers of Mexican nationals
had to provide workmen's compensation insurance for the
domestic workers employed, (2) employers had to provide
domestics with the same housing arid transportation provided
91 Mayer, '-'Grapes of Wrath," p. 35.
99
Mexicans, or (3) employers had. to give supplemental payments
Op
to domestics in lieu of housing and transportation.
On August 6, 1963» ^he Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry reported favorably on S. 1703 which called for
a simple extension of the bracero program without amendments.
But the minority on the committee composed of Senators
William Proxmire (R. , Wise.), Maurine Neuberger (D., Ore.),
George McGovern (D. , S. D.) and. Eugene McCarthy (D. , Minn.)
submitted a strong protest. The minority opinion contended -
that all interested parties had not been given the opportunity
to present their views because the Senate did not conduct
hearings, and they felt the Senate committee failed to con-
sider the plight of domestic migrants by recommending extension
without amendments. Senator Spessard L. Holland (D,» Fla.),
representing the majority viewpoint, refuted the minority's
objections. He stated that all interested groups had been
given ample opportunity since the House held hearings on
the topic for three days in March, and the hearings in July
of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare
provided, another chance for testimony and investigation.
Holland denied that the domestic laborer was overlooked by
the extension. He quoted the Secretary of Labor's remark
before the Senate subcommittee hearings that the administration
22 U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture,
One Year Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program, H. Rept. 72.2 to Accompany H. R. 8195. 88t-h Congress, 1st Session, 1963. p. 15. Hereafter cited as "House Report No, 722."
100
of Public Law 78 since the 1961 amendments had been "rea-
sonably successful" in minimizing adverse effect.
Holland further justified the Senate committee's refusal
to approve the amendments of the Department of Labor. The
authority needed by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
proposals was considered "vague, extensive, and unnecessary"
as well as "impractical and unreasonable." To amplify his
argument, Holland attacked the amendment which required em-
ployers to provide transportation for domestics. The
amendment allowed growers to collect from the national
government if a migrant left the place of employment before
the end of harvest. According to the Senator, the entire
?'3
amendment was "unreasonable.
Holland's explanations and justifications naturally
did not quiet the opposition, which was becoming more
vociferous. Senator Proxmire argued that the bracero
program was in violation of the American system of free
enterprise since it interrupted the balance between supply 24
and demand, thus preventing farm wages from rising.
Another member of the minority, 'Senator McCarthy, offered
an amendment, in line with the Labor Department's recom-
mendation, to provide workmen's compensation and other
benefits to domestics, The amendment was rejected by a c C ongr e s s i onal Record , 88 th Congress, 1st Session,
II, 15185-15180.
2ifIbid., II, 1518?.
101
k$ to 45 tie vote. -McCarthy then offered' essentially the
same amendment, but he struck out the provision which re-
quired the Secretary of Labor, prior to December 31, 196^,
to take action to assure the availability of domestic
agricultural workers. The amendment passed by a one-vote
majority of kk to ^3.^
By a vote of 62 to 25» the Senate passed S. I703 which
gave a one-year extension to the bracero program, but with
the important McCarthy amendment. The clause of Section 5°3
of Public Law 78 which provided working conditions to
domestics comparable to those offered to foreign workers
was struck out. It was amended to include specifically
". . . workmen's compensation, or occupational insurance
coverage, housing, transportation, and work period guarantees
comparable to those provided foreign workers.
In the House of Representatives, the Labor Department's
proposals also encountered opposition. Majority opinion
and justification in the Hous-e Committee on Agriculture
paralleled that of its sister committee in the Senate. The
Committee members fully agreed with the Senate that the
Secretary of Labor should not be given such "broad discre-
tionary power," and that paid transportation for domestics
was unreasonable. They argued that historically state
2^Ibid., II, 15201-15202.
26 Ibid., II, 15219.
102
governments passed laws concerning workmen's compensation,
and that they did not want to set a precedent by its "casual
27
inclusion" in a national statute.
Though the House minority declared that Public Law 78
was a . . bad law, a wretched law that should be buried 1128
* * *' the majority would not approve the proposed
recommendations.- After House-Senate conference committee
consideration, the Senate accepted the House amendments to
S. I703 which extended the bracero program for one additional
year. The House version did not contain the McCarthy
amendment, nor did it incorporate the Labor Department's 2Q
recommendations. "
Realization that the bracero program would be terminated
on December 31 > 196^» stimulated much activity in the Labor
Department and among the country's growers. In California
citrus fruit growers reflected an attitude that was wide-
spread. They considered the abandonment of the bracero
program as a "fact of life," and therefore took action to
prevent crop losses. At a conference in Sacramento, growers
initiated studies to determine labor needs on a "county-by-30
county, crop-by-crop, month-by-month basis.
^"House Report No. 722," pp. 15-16.
28Ibid., p. 21.
^ C ongresslonal Record, 88th Congress, 1st Session, XVIII, 23223."
3°The New York Times, February 25. 196 -, p. 55 •
103
Secretary of Labor VJirtz assured growers across the
country that his department would make every effort to fill
labor needs with domestic migrants. If labor shortages
still existed, Wirtz agreed that foreign labor could be
imported under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(Public Law 4l4) . And in late December, 1964, the Labor
Department conducted a series of meetings in Washington,
Miami, Dallas, and San Francisco to establish criteria for
the employment of foreign agricultural labor under the 1952
law, There was an immediate negative outburst from the
anti-bracero forces, which argued that Importation of
workers under Public Law 4l4 was a subversion of the will
of Congress. Reverend Samuel A. Snyder, spokesman for the
National Council of Churches, urged the Labor Department
to concentrate Its efforts on improving the conditions of
domestics rather than seeking ways to continue contracting
31
foreign labor.
Even though the Department of Labor held the criteria
hearing, Wirtz acted to reduce the need for foreign workers
and also to make their employment impracticable. On
December 13, 1964, he announced plans for a massive nation-
wide recruitment of domestics to replace bracero labor. A
week later new wage levels set by the Labor Department
-^ibld., November 15. 1964, p. 65; December 1, 1964, p. 25.
104
required farmers who desired to import foreign workers to
pay wages which varied from $1.15 to $1.40 per hour.-^
Quite naturally the termination of the contract labor
system received much attention in Mexico. As in the United
States, there were divergent reactions to the effect the
ending of the program would have in Mexico, During the 19&3
Congressional debates on the extension of the program,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk received a note from the
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Antonio Carillo
Flores. The Ambassador urged that the termination of the
contract system be carried out gradually so that the Mexican
economy could adjust and absorb the workers who would be
unemployed. If the demand for workers was decreased
slowly, Carillo Flores felt such action would " . . . stave
off the sudden crisis that would come from an increase in
33
national unemployment."-^
For popular consumption in Mexico, the position of the
Mexican government was that the termination of the bracero
program would not greatly affect the economy. The Mexican
Department of the Interior announced that industry could 3I4.
absorb the unemployed agricultural workers. Other reports
32ibid., December 13, 1964, p. 83; December 20, 1964, P. 39. "
^^Hispanic American Reuort, XVI, No. 8 (October, 1963), 754. The note was dated June 21, 19o3> aud was not reported in the American or Mexican press.
34 Congressional Record, 88th Congress, 1st Session, X,
12945-129467 Article by Emil Zubryn, "Failure to Extend Program for Braceros Brings Divergent Reaction in Mexico," Cotton Trade Journal (June 7? 1963)-
105
announced, that tourism would make up the anticipated, loss
in foreign exchange caused by the ending of the program.
The Associacio'n Mexicana de Turismo said, that 73»190 foreign
tourists spent $75 million in January, 1963* which was an
increase of $7 million over the preceding year. The
problem, however, was that while tourist spending compen-
sated for the loss in foreign exchange, this money did not
reach the people who normally depended on bracero money.
One influential newspaper, La Prensa. editorialized that
some 300,000 Mexican families would suffer directly from
the ending of the bracero program.- J
While La Prensa's position seemed to indicate the
desirability of continuing the program, many segments of
the Mexican press and society did not concur. Leftist
opinion represented by Politica condemned the program as,
an imperialist plot to keep Mexico dependent on the United
States and urged a national solution to agrarian problems.
Excelsior, a conservative daily, also hailed the termination
of the program and. called on the government to create new
36
employs'en t opportunities for ex-braceros.
The administration of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,
which took office in l$6k, announced, that the problem of the
braceros was receiving intensive study under the direction
-^Hispanic American Report, XVI, No. 6 (August, 1963), 5^8.
36-Ibid.
106
of Antonio Carillo Flores. Besides the unemployment created
in Mexico, one of the major fears expressed by Diaz Ordaz
was that the ending of the bracero program would increase
wetback migration to the United States. He and Carillo
Flores urged the United States to take every effort to
37 prevent an upsurge in the illegal migration.
37 The New York Times, December 16, 196^, p. 16.
CHAPTER V
THE POST-BRACERO ERA, 1964-1966:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When Public Law 78 lapsed without renewal on December 31,
196^, the contract labor systems with Mexico which had been
in effect for over a twenty-year period ended. Many persons
who had consistently supported the practice of importing
foreign labor predicted dire consequences for the American
agriculturax system. Having relied on braceros for several
years, they did not believe domestic migrants would perforin,
stoop labor. And they believed the lack of workers would
result m crops perishing in the fields, creating higher
retail prices for many farm products. On the other hand,
some groups hailed the termination of the bracero pact as a
progressive step toward improving the conditions of do-
mestic migrant workers. Secretary of Labor Wirtz hailed
the oeginning of a ". . . new era in a major segment of
American agriculture . . . " and stated that the time of the
government-sponsored, "guaranteed and assured" farm labor
3
supply had ended. Although no one familiar with the
seasonal farm labor prob]em would agree that the new era
nad fully arrived, the year 1965 represented the transition
1 The New York Times, March 29, 1965, p, 1.
10?
108
from reliance on foreign labor to dependency on domestics.
The transition occurred without major difficulties, but it
produced interesting results. In a lengthy and detailed
study submitted to the public in early 19 6 6 , the Secretary
reported the significant events of the preceding year.
During 19^5 there was an 83 per cent reduction in the
use of all foreign farm laborers, with the major change
occurring in the use of Mexican nationals. There were only
20,300 Mexican workers employed in the United States in
1965. compared with 1 7 8 , 0 0 0 at different times in 196^,
Whereas braceros worked in seven states in 196^, California
was the only state using Mexican nationals in 1965. And
the 20,300 in that state naturally were not admitted under
Public Law 78, but under the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (Public Law ^lk).2
• According to the previsions of Public Law klk, if the
Secretary of Labor certifies a labor shortage, foreign
workers can be imported. With the termination of Public
Law 78, many growers wanted to continue contracting under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, but Wirtz destroyed
their hopes. Although he never flatly refused to authorize
foreign laborers In proven emergencies, Wirtz stated in
2 'U. S., Department of Labor, "Year of Transition:
Seasonal Farm Labor, 1965" (Washington, i960), pp. 5~S. Hereafter cited as "Year of Transition, 1965."
109
March, 1965, that large-scale admission o'f workers would not
3
be revived under Public Law '4lk,'
The Department of Labor, prior to Wirtz's statement,
established certain criteria regulating the importation of
workers under Public Law klk. The new regulations established
a minimum wage that had to be offered to domestics before
the need for foreign labor could be certified. Prom January
through March, 19^5 > the wage ranged from 90 cents to $1-25
per hour, but effective in April, the rates were $1,15 to
$1.^0 per hour. In addition, any employer desiring foreign
labor first had to provide housing and transportation, and
meet all the terms end conditions of employment extended, to
Mexicans under the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 > including
its subsequent amendments. One important provision was
that no worker contracted under Public law hlk could remain k
in the United States more thai: 120 days. The stipulation
was included on the grounds that the only justification for
importing foreign workers was to harvest crops which easily
spoiled if not harvested quickly.
Several complications have arisen in the administration
of Public Law As previously noted, before the Secretary
of labor certifies the need of foreign laborers, prospective
employers must prove that 8 labor shortage definitely exists - The Mew York Times. March 29* 19o5> p. 1* h "I'ear of Transition; 1965," Appendix II, pp. 7-8.
110
and that failure to fill it could result in crop losses.
California growers were the only group who adequately
demonstrated a need for labor. When Wirtz allowed foreign
labor to enter California, he received criticism from
states which had previously used braceros, but'had been
denied similar authorization. Senator John Tower (R., Tex.)
claimed that his state had the same farm problems as did
California, and he urged the Secretary to !!. . . readmit
Texas to his special union of states and to apply his
5
Bracero remedy nationwide without discrimination."
One of the major difficulties in administering Public
Law is the overlapping authority between the Secretary
of Labor and the Attorney General. The former may certify
the need for foreign labor, but the Attorney General makes
the final determination of whether it will be admitted.
In May, 19o5» Wirtz denied Florida laborers from the British
West Indies, but his decision was overruled by Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach.^ Fearing the renexml of
massive foreign recruitment, pressure groups in the country
voiced their disapproval of the Attorney General's decision.
Andrew J. Biemiller, director of the legislation department
of the AFL-CIO, urged that the Secretary of Labor be given
more responsibility in determining whether laborers could
- The Dallas Times Herald, April 29, 1965. P> 6
6The New York Times, May 23, 1965. P. 59.
Ill
enter the country. He pointed out that the conflict between
the Justice and Labor Departments indicated the need for a
7
clearer division of authority with regard to the matter.
Others who thought the Secretary of Labor possessed
too much authority and who disliked his strict enforcement
of Public Law klk wanted the Secretary of Agriculture to
determine the need for foreign laborers. They felt that
the Secretary of Agriculture would be more considerate of
the growers' needs. Long-time supporter of the bracero
program Senator Spessard L. Holland (D., Fla.) introduced
a bill which would have transferred this authority to the
Department of Agriculture. The Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry reported the bill favorably, but
during debates Senator Ross Bass (D., Tenri.) introduced an
amendment which allowed the Secretary of Labor to continue
to determine the need for workers. When the bill came
before the Senate, it was deadlocked in a 4 5 to 45 tie;
however, Vice-President Hubert Humpnrey cast the deciding 8
vote for the Bass amendment.
The termination of Public Law 78 and the curtailed
influx of workers under Public Law klk have noticeably
affected the situation of the domestic farm worker. In 19&5
there was an average monthly increase of about 200,000 native
^The Dallas Morning News, June 9, 19 6 S, p. 3A-
^£h", HSJS I?rk Times, September 3> 1965*. P* 1^5 September 12," 19&5. P» 53; September 1^, 19»5> P- 18,
112
workers in fields previously harvested by foreign labor.
As a result, over 100,000 American workers who otherwise
9
might have Deen unemployed had jobs. At the same time,
hourly wage rates for agricultural work rose from $1.08 in
196^ to $1.1^ in 1965» The raise of six cents was the 1 0
largest increase recorded in any year since the mid-1950' s . 7
The effect of the transition from foreign to domestic
/ workers has been less damaging and less catastrophic to
\
crops than the growers' prediction. The only crop losses ;
in 1965 which were directly attributable to the unavaila """*
bility of labor were the asparagus crops near Stockton,
California, strawberries in the area of Salinas, California,
and pickling cucumbers in Michigan. In the latter situation,
if growers had accepted the termination of Public Law 78 as
fact and had taken steps to recruit domestics, some 'of the
11
loss could have been avoided. According to statistics
compiled by the Labor Department, " . . . the total of even
the claimed losses due to labor shortage in 196.5 i-s
estimated at less than | of 1 per cent of the value this 12
year of crops which foreign labor worked on in 196^."
Commenting on the fact that domestics filled most vacancies,
^"Year of Transition, 1965," p. 10.
I 0 "Ibid., p. 19.
II Ibid., p. 17•
^Ibid. , p. 15.
113
Wirtz said that 1965 dispelled the ". . . false notion that
'Americans won't do stoop labor' /which/ was carefully
nurtured from the truer fact that they won't work for stoop
wages."
From the other point of view, however, not all growers
felt that their labor needs were satisfied. The Tri-Valley
Growers' Association in California complained that the lack
of skilled domestics caused a high crop loss. The Association
announced that it would set up a plant in Mexico to process
and can tomatoes and asparagus. Spokesmen for the Association
said that the action was necessary because labor shortages
in the United States caused a decline in tomato production.
This move on the part of the Association possibly indicated
that United States farm investments in Mexico would increase
lf
sharply as a result of the bracero ban.
The adjustment of California, a state which regularly
employed large numbers of braceros, demonstrates specifically
the problems and the results of the 19'$5 transition period. """-.
The initial reaction of many growers was to refuse to hire
domestics because they objected to the quality of the workers. /
This attitude was reflected when growers in the Imperial
Valley cancelled an order to the State Department of Em-
ployment for 1,800 domestic workers. They complained that '^Ibid. , p. 1.
1 /l The Dallas Morning News, September 6, 19&5< P- 9A.
13>
the " . . . calibre of workers being referred to us these
past few days will make our harvest problem even greater
than the impending labor shortages.""^
Representatives of the growers continued to exert
pressure on Wirtz to certify a labor shortage in California.
Finally the Secretary appointed a three-man panel to evaluate
the actual need for labor. The panel was composed of
Benjamin Aaron, professor of law at the University of
California and director of the Institute of Industrial and
Labor Relations; Daniel Aldrich, chancellor of the University
of California at Irvine and formerly dean of agriculture; and
Arthur Ross, professor of business .administration at . .-\
Berkeley. In its first report, the-, panel recommended that
some Mexicans be allowed to enter for a short time to help
harvest asparagus and strawberries. Following the report,
wo
16
Wirt?: certified workers for the San Joaquin Valley and the
Monterrey areas.
At the end of 1965. the panel submitted a comprehensive
report and analysis of California's farm situation. They
considered the shift from foreign laborers to domestics to
be successful for both growers and workers. There was a
noticeable rise in the employment of domestics, 20,000 more
finding jobs in 1965 than in 196^. Domestics accounted for
^The New York-Times, January 1, 19^5> P- 12.
"^Ibid. , April 16 April 25. 1965. P- 31-
^Ibid., April 16, 1965. P. 26; April 26, 1965, p. 3^;
115 '
97.3 per cent of the man-years of seasonal hired labor, and
foreign laborers provided only 2.7 per cent. These figures
contrasted sharply with the 1959 to 1964 averages, which
indicated that American laborers provided 73*7 per cent of
the total man-years compared with 26.3 per cent worked by
17
foreign laborers.
The report conceded that some crop losses had occurred
in the asparagus and strawberry fields because of the labor
shortages. But these crops paid the lowest wages in the
state. Even with the losses, growers did not suffer extreme
financial reversals. In fact, strawberry growers grossed 5
per cent more than in the period 1959 to 1964. Asparagus
growers grossed $1 million more than in 1964, a figure only 1 R
slightly lower than the increases from 1959 to 1964.
Even though the situation of domestic agricultural-
workers improved in California with regard to wages and
available jobs, the panel members agreed that much improve-
ment was still necessary. They echoed Wirtz's remark that
transition did not equal fulfillment of objectives, and they
stated that agricultural wage rates for domestic labor were
still not competitive with many other industries. Also many
improvements were needed in the area of providing trans-
portation and adequate housing for^domestic migrant workers."^ ^'Ye,
Ikii
Ibid., p. 31.
'Year of Transition, 1965," Appendix I, pp. 1, 9.
l^lbid,, p. 2.
19
1 1 6 •
The termination of Public Law ?8 has, of course, had
its effect on Mexico. The thought in Mexico initially was
that the ban on bracercs was only temporary and that the
contracting system would be revived. Therefore, much
attention was focused on the actions of cotton', fruit, and
vegetable growers of California and Texas in hope that
pressure from these groups would cause a renewal of the
20
program.
When no action had been taken in that direction by
February, 19^5> the subject of renewal was naturally dis- /•
cussed by the Fifth Interparliamentary Reunion between the
United States and Mexico, held at La Paz, capital of Baja ;
California. Heading the American delegation was Senator
John J. Sparkman (D., Ala.). Other members were Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), George Aiken
(R,, Vt.), and Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), chairman of the
Latin American subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Aside from agreeing that the bracero problem
could not be settled immediately, no other action was taken.
The Mexican delegation put forth i cs traditional requirement that fair treatment be given to all workers should the
21 program be renewed.
20,
21
The New York Tines, -January 3> 1965. P- 5^«
Ibid-. February 21, 1965. p. 31 •
11?
Since one of the phenomena of twentieth-century Mexico
has "been its advancement in the area of economic progress,
it would appear unusual that the Mexican government would
still be amenable to a program which permitted a yearly
exodus of thousands of agricultural workers to the United
States. Such a migration definitely hurts national pride
for it indicates that severe unsolved problems coexisted <
with the rapid steps taken toward economic progress. But i
in the midst of the economic advancements, agriculture re-
mains as one of the inherent problems of Mexico.
Basically, there are two systems of agriculture in
Mexico, one centered around subsistence farming and the
other on high-volume production. The crux of the problem
is the highly fragmented, subsistence farms prevalent
throughout the country. These small plots of land are
unsuitable for mechanization or for effective cultivation.
Even if the land were large enough to employ power-driven
machinery, farmers are usually tradition-bound; and they
fear to take the necessary risks involved in accepting and
implementing new techniques. As a result of the primitive
22
farming methods, the soil becomes increasingly eroded.
The second system of farming involves the production
of non-cereal crops such as cotton, coffee, and sugar cane,
9 9 Henry G. Aubrey, "Structure and Balance in Rapid
Economic Growth: The Example of Mexico," The Political Science Quarterly, LXIX (December, 195'+). 538.'
118
and it is within this system that most of the progress in
agriculture has occurred. In 1955 non-cereal production
accounted for only 27 per cent of the total tilled acreage
and comprised 68 per cent of the total value of production.2^
Cereal production, or the traditional highly fragmented
farms, in the same year accounted for 73 Per cent of the
total tilled acreage but only 30 cent of the total value
2k
of production. It is evident that efforts to improve the
agricultural situation in Mexico should have been directed
toward the small farms which maintain the largest number of
families but which account for the smallest output; yet
available resources have not been channeled into the area.
Most of the "crash" programs to aid agriculture have been
aimed at the large commercial farms in northern and Pacific
northwest Mexico which maintain only 26 per cent of the 2^
total rural population. ^ Central Mexico, plagued by the
largest number of subsistence farms and supplying the
majority of braceros, maintained ^3 pe*' cent of the total
rural population, yet did not receive attention in the aid
program.2^ "-'Richard C. Hancock, 'The Role of the Bracero in the
Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: A Case Study of Chihuahua ("Stanford, 1959T7 P. 33- Hereafter cited as Hancock, "Role of the Bracero."
2l|Ibid.
2%bid.
2bIbid.
119
Rural Mexico suffers from underemployment, which
accounts not only for the "bracero's exodus but also for the
internal rural-to-urban migration." A 1959 study by the
Mexican Department of Agrarian Affairs revealed that over
one-half of Mexico's labor force, or approximately 5>000.000
workers who were engaged in agricultural activities were
28
employed for only lk$ days a year or less. Rapid in-
dustrialization and urbanization have produced some
redistribution of the labor force, but the change has not
alleviated the widespread underemployment in the rural
areas. The agricultural work force has seen some reduction,
but since 1930 it has continued to .increase in absolute
terms.^ In 19^0 agriculture employed 3.830,971 persons
and accounted for 65.^ per cent of the labor force. By
1950 the number of persons engaged in agriculture was
'1,828,901 or 58.3 Per cent of the total laboring force.
One can see the decline in relative terms but the increase
in absolute figures. In 196^, the year the bracero program
was terminated, it was estimated that more than 2,000,000
peasants could leave agriculture without causing a drop in 30
the volume of production or the output rate. 09 Arthur Neef, Labor in Mexico, U. S. Department of
Labor Report No. 251 (Washington, 1963), p. 39-28Ibid., P- ^0-
29Adolf Sturmthal, "Economic Development. Income Distribution and Capital Formation in Mexico," The Journal of Political Economy, LXI1I (June, 1955)> 185.
J Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 0 (August, l963-l9#rrT"595." " '
120
Since Mexico was faced with seemingly overwhelming
obstacles, statements by Mexican governmental officials
continued to reflect two objectives throughout 1965= to
provide workers to the United States and to obtain guarantees
for the workers. This position was clearly outlined by the
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Hugo Margain, in
an address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. He
stated, "We have farm workers ready and are willing to
cooperate . . . but the creditation must be settled legally
after the need is established and the working conditions and
31
rates are agreed upon,"-^
The farm workers were indeed ready and eager to work
in the United States, and few of them could recognize the
difference between recruitment procedures under the expired
Public Law ?8 and those under Public Law klk. They con-
tinued to congregate in the Ciudadela Plaza in Mexico City,
the recruitment center under Public Law ?8. Although
Mexican officials repeatedly told the men that the United
States was not importing laborers, often as many as 3,000
men crowded into the plaza. On 'one occasion, police used
tear gas and billy clubs to disperse them when residents 32
near the plaza, complained that the men were a menace.
-^The Dallas Morning News, May 7> 196.5, Sec. 2, p. 9«
-^"Ibid. , June 6, 1965. p. 12. See also, The New York Times, May 1?, 1965, p. 18.
121
Many prospective braceros who were unwilling to wait
for recruitment under Public Lav; klk resorted to the familiar
tactic of illegally entering the United States. According ;
to a recent survey by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), it was estimated that approximately 1,000
illegal immigrants were working in southeastern Colorado.
A spokesman for the INS stated that all wetbacks apprehended
were stripped of their wages before being returned to
Mexico. By this action, the INS hoped to deter the Mexicans .
33
from attempting to re-enter the United States. ^
Probably wetback migration will not reach the intensity
of the 1950's, but quite possibly the punitive action of the
INS will not bo completely successful in curbing the entry
of illegal aliens. Despite the rapid industrialization
occurring in Mexico, the United States still holds forth the
promise of higher wages. To some workers, the prospect of
gaining these wages may outweigh the possibility of arrest
by the INS. Meanwhile the unemployed peasant farmers con-
stitute a restive and potentially disruptive element beneath 34
the fa cede of social peace in Mexico, ^
One can only speculate whether a contract labor system
similar to the one conducted under Public. Law 78 will ever
be renewed. Undoubtedly some farm groups within the country
- 'The Dallas Times Herald, August 11, 1966, p. 35-
34, The New York Times, June 9> 1966, p. 14; June 11, 1966, p. 10.
122
would support legislation designed to revive the system,
and the Mexican government might also be receptive. But
there are certain factors which seem to militate against
any future renewal of a contract labor system.
Among the factors is the effective nationwide re-
cruitment of domestic workers accomplished by the Department
of Labor in the 19^5 harvest period. Through pre-season 1
planning which located potential reserves of domestic .
workers, catastrophic crop losses resulting from labor
shortages were avoided. Since the 19^5 experience indicated
that sufficient laborers could be provided by massive
nationwide programs, growers in coming harvest seasons will \
J
have little basis for arguing that laborers are not avail-able./' i
A striking example of the long-range recruitment procedure ~-J
occurred in the sugarbeet fields.
Pre-season planning by agents of the Department of
Labor in ccnjunction with area growers began in early fall
of 196^. On May ?, 19^5» &• few days before harvest
operations were to begin, growers presented a request for
^,230 Mexican nationals. But the Department of Labor
denied the requests on the grounds that domestics were
available. Within a week, the orders for foreign laborers
3 had been filled with domestic migrants.
3 S •^E. C. iiancock, "Domestic Workers for Sugarbeets,"
Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 17.
123
Similar activities took place in Texas and Arkansas.
In the latter state a three-man recruitment team publicized
the need for workers in newspapers and over local radio
stations. There were no reported crop losses because of
labor shortages.Texas' successful harvesting of crops
with domestic laborers in part resulted from the expanded
activities of the Texas Employment Commission. The agency
enlarged its recruiting staffs and employed mobile teams
37
for special labor drives.
Perhaps one of the most decisive factors hindering
renewal of the contract system is the increased mechaniza-
tion taking place on modern farms. The change to machine,
harvesting will curtail the need not only for foreign
workers but also for domestic laborers. The cotton har-
vesting machine reduced the demand for workers in the late j
1950's and early 1960's. Since that time, other machines
have been developed. For example, experimentation is being
conducted with a machine which will harvest asparagus.
Although not expected to be in operation for several years,
the machine, if perfected, can harvest a forty-acre field OO
in one day. Already being used are machines which greatly
36 JULloyd E. Curtis, "Using Seasonal Farm Recruiters in
Arkansas," Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 23.
37 ^ William J. Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros," Em-
ployment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 39-^0. Hereafter cited as Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros."
O Q Gerald ¥. Rowland, "Asparagus Harvest Mechanization,"
Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 16.
12b
automate the harvesting process of cantaloupes and cucumbers.
In the case of cantaloupes, the melons are loaded onto a
conveyor, thereby eliminating the need for each worker to
carry a heavy load, and allowing women and children to work
in the melon fields.
Many growers based their hope for renewal of the bracero
program on the anticipated rise in retail food prices which
they felt would result from increased labor costs. Although
there were some increases in consumer prices, a study of the
California fresh fruit and vegetable market revealed that
the price of only asparagus and strawberries rose sharply
in 1965.^ Asparagus was 7 cents a pound above the 196^
prices, and strawberry prices rose 3-8 cents per pound in
1965. The study noted only moderate increases in other
crops. The price of lemons rose only 2.k cents per pound;
tomatoes rose a cent or less; and lettuce rose 0.9 cent
over the previous year. The retail price- for celery actually
dropped during 19^5« Since no sharp increase in retail
prices resulted from higher labor costs, efforts to improve
the plight of domestic farmworkers will undoubtedly continue.
Meanwhile the supporters of the contract labor system
will have to seek other ways of demonstrating the necessity
of importing foreign labor. Their task is becoming more
39 Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros," pp. 55> ^0.
4 0 Irving Cohen, "Farm Labor Costs and Food Prices
196^-1965," Employment Servj ce Review, III, No. 3 (March, 1966), 62.
125
difficult since the attention of Congress is currently-
focused on providing improved social and economic opportunities
for Americans. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that the ad-
vocates of the bracero program will be successful in their
4- 1
efforts to revive the labor system.
In May, 1966, the House of Representatives voted to ex-
tend minimum wage coverage to certain types of domestic farm-
workers;^ and at present (September 1, 1966) Senate
approval of the minimum wage bill indicates that steps are
being taken to provide better working conditions for farm-
workers. Renewal of the contract labor system, a program
which depressed farm wages for several years, is not con-
sistent with the present liberal trends in Congress.
Considering the events since the termination of the
bracero program in 196^, the proponents of the program would
meet major roadblocks in attempting to renew the contract
system. The importation of Mexican laborers aided the United
States in time of national emergency, such as World War II,
when actual labor shortages existed. However, when domestic
laborers were available, the contract system perpetuated- it-
self through habit rather than through need.
U1
' xFor additional information on this aspect of the struggle for renewal see- the following article: Ellis W. Hawlev, "The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-1965?" Agricultural History, XL, No. 3 (July, 1966), 157-176.
^ T h e Mew York Times, May 27, 1966, p. 1. According to the provisions of T h e House bill, laborers on farms employ;ng seven or more workers and members of migratory labor crews will be covered by a minimum wage. By 1969> the wage will reach a top of $1.30 per hour..
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Cline, Howard F. , The United. States and Mexico, New York, Atheneum, 19^3 •
Fisher, Lloyd H., The Harvest Labor Market in California, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953•
Gamio, Manuel, Mexican Iranjuration to the United States: A Study of Human Migration and Adjustment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930•
Hancock, Richard C., The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: A Case Study of Ch ihuahua, Stanford, Hispanic American Society, 1959.
Jones, Robert C., Mexican War Workers in the United States; The Mexico-United States Manpower Recruiting Progrsin and Its Operation, Washington, Pan-Aneilean Union, 19^5 •
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Rasmussen, Wayne D., A Hi story of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 19^3-19^-7. Monograph No. 33» Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•
Schwartz, Harry, Seasonal Farm Labor In the United States, New York, Columbia University Press,-19^5•
Whetten, Nathan, Rural Mexico, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 19S.
Articles
"Agriculture Labor Relations—The Other Farm Problem," Stanford Law Review, XIV (December, 19ol), 120-1-+9.
Aubrey, Henry G., "Structure and Balance in Rapid Economic Growth: The Example of Mexico," The Political Science Quarterly, LXIX (December, 195^),"517-Wo* '
127
Coalson, George 0., "Mexican Contract Labor in American Agriculture," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIII (December, 1932") 7 228-238.
Cohen, Irving, "Farm Labor Costs and Food Prices 196^-1965,11
Employment Service Review, III, No. 3 (March, 1 9 6 6 ) , 58-62.
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Hancock, E. C., "Domestic Workers for Sugarbeets," Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (J'anaary, 1966) , 1?-19» 31-
Hawley, Ellis ¥., "The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 19 50-1965." Agr 1 cul tural Hi s toj",y, XL, No, 3 (July, 1966), 157-176: " ~ ~ "
Hayes, Edward, "'Operation Wetback'---Impact on the Border States," Employment Security Heview, XXII (March, 1.9 35). 1 6 - 2 1 .
Hispanic American Report, 1963-196^.
Hood, William J., "Texas Replaces the Braceros," Employment Service Review," III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 39-^0, 50-
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Rowland, Gerald W., "Asparagus Harvest Mechanization," Emnloynent Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), lB. ~ "
Scruggs, Otey M., "The Bracero Program under the Farm Security Administration, 19^2.-19^3»" Labor History. Ill (Spring, 1 9 6 2 ) , 14-9-168, " " " " '
, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 19^2," Agricultural History, XXXIV (July, i 9 6 0 ) , 1 ^ 0 - 1 ^ 9 .
12t
"Texas and the Bracero Program, 19^2-19^7." The Pacific Historical Review, XXXII (August, 1962), 251-2^K — ""
, "The United States, Mexico, and the Wet-back, 19^2-19^7»" The Pad fic Historical Review, IV (May, 1961), 316-329.
Spradlin, T. Richard, "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program—Review and' Reform," The George Washington Law Review, XXX (October, 1961, and. December, 19<d1) , 8 --121, 311-327.
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U. S., Department of Labor, Arthur Neef, Labor in Mexico Report, No. 2^1, Washington, Government Printing Office, I9T3: \
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_ , "Review and Outlook," Farm Labor Market Developments (January, 1964-), 1-bO.
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129
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' , House Document No. 192, 82.nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951. -
, Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, Report No. ^26 to Accompany H. R. 3283, Parts I and II, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951 •
, One Year Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program, Report No. 722. to Accompany H. R. 81*95, Parts I and II, 88 th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963.
, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•
U. S., President, Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•
, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Containing the PubIIc Messages, Speeches. and Statements of the President, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952.
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U, S.t Statutes at Large, Vols. LVI, LVII, LVIII, LXI, LXII, LXV.
United States Treat!es and Other Internatlonal Agreements, Vol, I, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951»
130
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Pfeiffer, David G., "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program--Its Friends and Foes," unpublished, master's thesis, Department of History, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1963*
Sabghir, Irving H., "Mexican Contract Labor in the United States, 19^-8-19531" unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953-
Tomasek, Robert D., "The Political and Economic Implications of Mexican Labor in the United Stages under the Non-Quota System, Labor Program, and Wetback Movement," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1957-
Newspapers
The Dallas Morning News, 19^5•
The Dallas Times Herald, 19 65-
The New York Times, 1951-195^; 1959"19°6-