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The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's "Discourse on Inequality"Author(s): Arthur O. LovejoyReviewed work(s):Source: Modern Philology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Nov., 1923), pp. 165-186Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/433742.
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8/12/2019 Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality
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THE SUPPOSED
PRIMITIVISM
OF ROUSSEAU'S
DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY
The
notion hat Rousseau's
Discourse
n
nequality
was
essentially
a
glorification
f
the state
of natureand
that its influence
ended
wholly
or
chiefly
o
promote
"primitivism"
s one
of
the
most
persistent f historical rrors. Many examplesof t mightbe cited;
I
limit
myself
o
one,
chosennot
only
because
it is the
most
recent,
but
also because it
is
found
n
what
s
likely
o be
for
manyyears
to
come the
standard
English
reatise
n
the
history
f
political heories,
a
monumental
work
by
a scholar of
admirable
learning.
In
the
Discourse
n
Inequality,
wrote he
ate
ProfessorW.
A.
Dunning:
The natural
manwas first
he
olitaryavage,
iving
he
happy,
arefree
lifeof
the brute.
The
steps
by
whichmen
merged
rom heir
rimitive
state redepicted ith ascinatingrt,
ut he uthor's
egret
t their uccess
pervades
he
picture.
...
Throughout
hefluctuationsf his
usage,
ne
idea'
lone
ppeared
nmistakable,iz.,
that
the
natural tate
of
man was
vastly
referable
o the ocial
or
civil
tate,
nd must urnishhenorm
y
which o
test
nd correct
t.'
This
is
an
exceptionally
moderate
statement
f
the traditional
view
of the
Second
Discourse;
but it
appears
to
me to be
highly
mis-
leading,
specially
n what t
implies
s to the sort
of
deas
which hat
writing
ended
to
encourage
n
Rousseau's
contemporaries.
The
actual doctrine ftheDiscourse, ts relation o otherconceptions f
the
state
of
nature,
he
character
f
the
nfluence
pon
opinion
which
it
must
have had
in
its
time,
and
the features
f it which
must be
regarded
s
constituting
ts
chiefhistoric
ignificance,
shall
attempt
to show
n what
follows.
As
in
so
many
other
cases,
confusion
as
arisen
n this matter
partly
hrough neglect
o note
the
ambiguity
f
the
terms
mployed
in the discussion. The term "state of nature" has at least three
easily
distinguishable
enses. It
may
have
a
merely
hronological
signification
nd
refer o the
primeval
condition
f
man,
whatever
I
History of
Political
Theories,
II
(1920),
pp.
8-9.
[MODERN
PHILOFOGT,
November,
19231
165
-
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166
ARTHUR
O.
LOVEJOY
its characteristics.
n the
terminology
f
political
theory
t
means
the
status
of human ndividualsor
groups
who
in
their
relations
o
one
another
are
not
subject
to
the
authority
f
any government.
Finally,
t
may
be
used-and
in
the
eighteenth
entury
was
often
used-in
what
may
be called
a
cultural
ense,
to
designate
he state
in which
the
arts
and
sciences-civilization
n
its
non-political
le-
ments-had
made least
progress.
These
three senses were
not
necessarily
dentical
n
denotation.
It
was, indeed,usually
assumed
that
the earliest
tage
was
a
pre-political
ne;
but
it
did not
follow
that the
primitivetage,
n the cultural
ense,
was coextensivewith
the
pre-political
tage.
The
period
preceding
he
organization
f
the
political
tate
might
havebeen
a
very
ongone,
n
the course
f which
mankind
might
have
departed
very
widely-whether
for better
or
worse--from
ts
primeval
condition.
The
confusion f
these senses
is,
indeed,
n old
one. Pufendorf's
efinition,
or
xample,
ombines
the
cultural
with
the
juristic
criteria;
the "state of
nature,"
in
contrast
with
the
"adventitious
tate,"
is forhim
not
only
"such
a
state as we may conceiveman to be placed in by his bare nativity,
abstracting
rom
ll rulesand
institutions,
hether
f
human
nven-
tion
or
of
the
nspiration
rrevelation
f
heaven";
it
is also "a
state
in
which
the divers
sorts
of
arts,
with
all the
commodities f
life
in
general,"
are
lacking.'
In
Locke,
on
the other
hand,
the con-
ception
of "the
natural
state ofmankind"
is
mainly
a
juristic
one.
It
was,
moreover,
commonplace
f
political
philosophy
n
these
centuries
hat
the
juristic
"state
of
nature -whether
or
not it had
ever ctually xistedn thepast, n therelations etweenndividuals-
certainly
xisted
at that
very
time
in the relations
o one
another
of
sovereign
states
having
no common aw or
government.
This
obviously
mplies
nothing
s to the cultural ondition
f the
countries
concerned.
The
oddly
neglected
acts which wish to
point out,
with
regard
to
Rousseau's
Discourse,
re
that
the
juristic
state of
nature--the
period prior
to
the
establishment
f
civil
government-was
by
him
divided ntofourdistinct ultural tages, ll ofthemof ongduration;
that
in
his
terminology
n
this
writing
he
term
"state of
nature"
usually
refers,
ot
to the
pre-political
tate as
a
whole,
but
to
the
first
I
Law
of
Nature and
of
Nations,
Book
I, chap.
i.
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RoUSSEAU'S
"
DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY" 167
of
these cultural
tages;
that
thisfirst
tage--the
"state
of
nature"
in
his own
sense-is
not
regarded
y
him as
an
ideal
state;
that the
third
stage,
which is forhim no more
primitive
ulturally
han
chronologically,
s
the condition
n which
he
regrets
hat
mankind
did
not
remain;
that
he cannot
properly
e said
to
maintain
the
excellence
f the state
of nature n the
purely
uristic
ense,
nasmuch
as
that
state, according
o his
argument,
nevitably
works
tself
ut
into
a final
tage
of intolerable
onflict
nd
disorder;
and
that
the
Discourse n
general
represents
movement
ather
way
from
han
toward
primitivism.
shall also show
that
the
characteristics
f
three fthese
tages closely
orrespondo,
and are
probably
orrowed
from,
hreedifferent
states of
nature"
described
by
earlier
writers:
thathis first
tage,
namely,
s similar o the
state of
nature f
Voltaire
and
substantially
denticalwith
that
of
Pufendorf;
that
the
third
stage
is,
n its cultural
haracteristics,
pproximately
he
same
as
the
state of nature
of
Montaigne
and of
Pope;
and that
the
fourth
stage
is
the state of
nature of
Hobbes.
That the
first
hase
of
human
history,
he
life of
man
tel
qu'il
a
d?
sortir es mainsde la
nature,
was
not for
Rousseau
an
ideal
condi-
tion
s
evident,
n
the
first
lace,
from
he
picture
which
he
gives
of t.
If
he had
really
ntended o
set
up
whathe
called
the
"state
of
nature"
as a
norm,
r
as "the
age
at
whichone
could
have
wished
the
race
had
remained,"
his
ideal
would
have
been
explicitly
hat
of
a
purely
animal
existence;
his
gospel
would
have been
that
t
would
be
better
for
the featherless
iped
if
he
lived the
life
of a
solitary
wild beast.
For
the Discourse
maintains
with
ll
possible
definiteness
hat
n
the
true
state
of
nature
man
differed
rom
other
animals,
not
at all
in
his
actual
mode
of
ife,
ut
only
n
his
yet
undeveloped
otentialities.
L'homme
auvage
commencera
ar
les
fonctions
urement
nimales.
Apercevoir
t
sentir
era
son
premier
tat,
qui
lui
sera
commun
vec
tous
es
animaux.
His
life,
n
short,
was
"that
of an
animal
limited
at
first o
mere
ensation,
carcely
rofiting
y
the
gifts
which
nature
held
out
to
him,
nd not even
dreaming
f
eizing nything
rom
er."
He
lived
only
in
and for
the
moment,having
almost
no
power
of
forethought,
s
little
memory,
nd
consequently
o
ability
to
learn
from
xperience.
He
possessed
no
language
and had
no
use of
tools
or
weapons.
No
social
bonds
united
men;
not
even
the
herd,
o
say
-
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168
ARTHUR
O.
LOVEJOY
nothing
f the
family,
s
yet
existed.
The
young
remainedfor
a
relatively
rief
period compared
with
the
prolongedhelplessness
f
children
nder
civilization)
with the
mother,
ut once
strong
nough
to
forage
or
themselves,
hey
efther and
were thereafter nable to
recognize
ven
this
tie
of
kinship.
The
individual,
n
short,
ived
a
life
oisive,
rrante
t
vagabonde,
eveloping nly
"those faculties
which
were needed
in
attack
or
defense,
ither
o
overcome
his
prey
or
to
protect
himself
rom
ecoming
he
prey
of
other
nimals
-a
danger
always
at
hand.
And
lest
there
be
any
doubt
about
his
meaning,
Rousseau
expressly
ontends
(Note 10)
that
the
gorilla
and
the
chimpanzee,'
whosemanner
fexistence
ad been
described
y
travel-
ers
in
Africa,
re
probably portion
f the human
species
who
still
remain
dans
l'6tat
primitif
e
nature,
re
"veritable
savage
men
whose
race,
dispersed
t some
early period
n
the
forest,
as never
had occasion
to
develop
any
of ts atent
faculties."
The
only
differ-
ence,
indeed,
between
primitive
man and
the
gorilla
discoverable
in Rousseau's
pages
is favorable
to the latter
animal, since,
as
describedby Rousseau's authorities,t represents stage definitely
higher
han
the
trulyprimeval
condition
f
mankind,
s
described
by
Rousseau
himself.
Those who
set
forth the
doctrine
of the
Discourse
n
the
manner
tillusual
n
histories f
iterature,
hilosophy,
and
political
heory,
must be
supposed
to
have
neglected
o
read,
or
to have
entirely orgotten,
ousseau's
Note 10. In this
same
note,
it
is
worth
emarking,
ousseau
appears
as the
herald
of
the science
of
anthropology.
He
laments
that
the
knowledge
f
his
day
con-
cerning othgorillas nd savage tribes s derivedmainlyfrom ravel-
ers'
tales and the
relations
f
missionaries;
he
formerre
proverbially
mendacious,
and
the
missionaries,
however
well-intentioned,
re
scarcely
bons
observateurs;
for
the
study
of
man
there re
requisite
gifts
which
are
not
always
the
portion
of
the
saints."
Rousseau
therefore
alls
upon
the
scientific
cademies
to send
expeditions
om-
posed
of trained
and
genuinely "philosophical"
observers
to "all
savage
countries,"
n order
hat,
upon
their
eturn,
uch
nvestigators
1 t is clearly to these animals that Rousseau refers, hough he supposes them to be
the same
as
"the animals called
orang-outangs
n
the
East
Indies."
His
knowledge
of
these
African
apes
is
derived
from
the
original
description
of
them
by
the
English
sailor
Battel,
given
in
Purchas
his
Pilgrimes
(1614)
and
reproduced
in
the
Histoire
gdndrale
des
voyages.
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ROUSSEAU'S
"DIscOuRsE
ON
INEQUALITY"
169
"may
compose
at leisure
an
histoire
aturelle,
morale t
politique
f
what
they
have
seen."
By
such
a
study
a
whole
"new
world,"
he
declares,
would
be
disclosed,
nd
by
means
of
it
we
should "learn to
understand ur
own."''
It
was,
then,
a
primary
bject
of the Discourseto
identify
he
state of
nature
with
he tateofthebrute. The sketch f
the
manners
and customs
fthe naturalman drawn
by
Rousseau
s,
when
nalyzed,
no
more
ttractive han
that
given
n the
principal
arly
eighteenth-
century
atire
upon
primitivism,
oltaire'sLe
Mondain
(1736):
Quand a nature taitdans onenfance,
Nos
bons
ieux
vivaient
ans
l'ignorance,
Ne connaissant
i e tien i
e mien:
Qu'auraient-ils
u
connattre
ils
n'avaient
ien
..
11
eur
manquait
'industrie
t
l'aisance:
Est-ce
ertu
c'4tait
ure gnorance
..
Le
repas ait,
ls
dormentur a
dure:
Voil&
l'6tat
e
la
pure
nature.
Rousseau's
etat
primitif
iffered
rom
his
only
n
that
it
was
a
still
more brutish ondition. It is almost denticalwiththeunfavorable
picture
f
the state
of
nature
presented
y Pufendorf,
f
the
French
translation
f whose work
a new
edition had
appeared
only
a few
years
before.2
Many philosophers,
s
Rousseau
justlyenough
points
out,
had
arrived t their
onception
f
man
in
the
state of
nature
by
1
Note 10
and much more of
the same
kind
throughout
the
Discourse
seem
to
me fatal
to
a
view
expressed
by
M. Durkheim
(Rev.
de
Mitaphysique,
XXV,
4)
and
apparently
given
some
support by
Mr.
Vaughan-viz.,
that
Rousseau
was
not
attempting
a
hypo-
thetical
reconstruction
of
the
early history
of
civilization,
and
was
therefore
ot interested
in
historicalfacts,
but
was
merely presenting
n
a
picturesque way
a
psychological analysis
of certain
permanent
factors
n human life. The
term
" state
of
nature
"
according
to
this
view,
does not
designate
a
stage
in
social
evolution;
it is an
expression
for
"
those
elements
of
human
nature
which derive
directly
from the
psychological
constitution
of
the indi-
vidual"
in
contrast
with
those
which
are of social
origin.
The
only
evidence for
this
is
the
passage
near
the
beginning
in
which
Rousseau disclaims
any
pretension
to offer
veritds
historiques.
The
context, however,
shows that
this
disclaimer
is
merely
the
usual
lightning-rod
gainst
ecclesiastical
thunderbolts;
it
would,
says
Rousseau,
be
inadmissible
to
regard
the state
of
nature
as
a fact "because
it
is
evident from
a
reading
of
the sacred
books
that the
firstman
was
not
in
this
state,"
etc. In
reality,
Rousseau
was
keenly
interested
in
tracing
the succession of
phases through
which
man's
intellectual and
social
life
has
passed;
but
he
recognized
that the
knowledge
of his time
permitted only
raisonne-
ments
hypothitiques
n the
subject.
2Droit de la Nature et des Gens (6th ed., 1750), Book II, chap. i, ?2. The similarity
has been
pointed
out
by
Morel,
Ann. de la
Soc.
J.-J.
Rousseau
(1909),
p.
163.
Pufen-
dorf,
however,
is
less
thorough
and
consistent
than
Rousseau
in
the
recognition
of
the
pure
animality
of
man in this
state.
"L'usage
de
la
raison,"
he
writes
n
a later
passage,
is
"ins6parable
de
l'6tat
de nature"
(ibid.,
?9).
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170
ARTHUR
.
LOVEJOY
a
pure
process
of
idealization,
had
conceived
of him as
"himself a
philosopheriscovering
naided
he most ublime
ruths."
Rousseau
prides
himself
pon
his
adherence o a
morerealistic
method,
pon
a
morefaithful
nd
less
flatteringicture
f the
genuinely
atural
and
truly primitive.
And
such
a
picture
shows
us,
not the
benignant
primeval
age
animated
by
maximesde
justice
et
de
raison
tires
de
l'amour
de
l'ordre
n
gne'ral;
showsus
not
even
beings
ike Mon-
taigne's
"Cannibals,"
who
were "less barbarouss
han
we,
eu
esgard
aux
regles
de
la
raison";
it
shows
us,
says
Rousseau,
creatures
characterized ythe astdegree
f
pesanteurt tupidit6,
nd destitute
of
moral deas
of
any
kind.
True,
Rousseau
points
out certain
very
real
advantages
enjoyed
by
the
human
species
n
this
nitial
phase
of
ts evolution.
If
primi-
tive
man
was
merely lazy
and
stupid
animal,
he
was
at least
a
healthy,
a
happy,
and
a
comparatively
harmless animal. It
is
when
rhapsodizing
ver the
physical uperiority
f
early
man that
Rousseau
falls into the
often-quotedanguage
which
probably
has
done most to give hasty readersthe impression hat he identifies
the
state
of nature
withthe ideal state.
After
racing
he
physical
disorders
of
modern mankind
to the luxuriesand artificialities
f
civilization,
ousseau
continues:
Such
s the
melancholy
vidence
hatwe
might
ave avoided lmost
ll
the
lls
we
suffer
rom,
f we had
kept
o
the
imple, niform,
nd
solitary
existence
rescribed
o
us
by
nature.
If she
ntended s to be
healthy,
venture
lmost
o affirmhatthe
stateof reflections a state
contrary
o
nature
nd
that
heman
who
hinks
midite)
s a man
depraved.
But
the
proposition,
t must be
noted,
s
hypothetical,
nd
in
the
final
umming-up
ousseau does not
assert
the
hypothesis;
he
does
not
hold
that
physical
health
s the sole
or
chief nd
of
nature
with
regard
to
man.
That the sentences
uoted
refer
only
to
physical
well-being
s made certain
y
Rousseau's
ownremark t the end of
the
passage:
"I
have thus
far
been
considering nly
'homme
hysique."
Primitive
man
was
also
happier
than
his
civilized
successors,
Rousseau undeniablymaintains. He maintains t on the grounds
on
which
many
would
still
maintain
that
the animals in
general
experience
ess
suffering
han
man.
The
primeval
ete
umaine,
iving
in
the
moment,
was untroubled
ither
y
regrets
r
by
fears
f
coming
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ROUSSEAU'S
"DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY"
171
evil.
His
powers
and
satisfactions,
hough
few and
meager,
were
commensuratewith
his few
and
simple
desires.
Since
self-esteem
had
not
yet
waked
n
him,
t
was
his
body
alone
that
was
vulnerable;
he
knew
nothing
f the
deeper
nd
more
eptic
wounds
of
vanity,
r
of
the
torment
f
unsatisfied
mbition.
Having
no
ideas
of
moral
obligation,
e
was
as
little
ubject
o the
reproaches
f
conscience
s he
was
disturbed
by
its
incitements.
Having
no
affections,
e was
untouched
by
sorrow. There is
nothingparticularly
paradoxical
about
this.
That men
are,
n Rousseau's
sense,
ess
happy
than
dogs
or
sheep,
is
a
familiar,
lmost
a
platitudinous,onjecture,
nd
not
lacking
in
plausibility, hough
omewhatdifficult
f
proof.
Rous-
seau's
thesis bout the
happiness
fthe state of
nature
has
essentially
the
same
meaning.
And
just
as
the admission
of the
former
on-
jecture
does not
imply
that one
would,
on
the
whole,
prefer
o be
a
dog
or
a
sheep,
so Rousseau's
thesis does not
necessarily
mply
a
preference
orthe
condition
f the
truly
natural
man.
Later in
the
Discoursehe
expressly
eclares
hat forman
"to
place
himself
n
the
level
of the
beasts,
which
are
the
slaves
of
instinct,"
would be to
"degrade
his
nature."
True
it
is, also,
that Rousseau
asserts he
"goodness"
of
man in
his
primitive
tate;
but how
little
this
means
has
been shown
by
others,
otablyby
Professor
chinz.'
That
in
the
tate of
nature
man
has
not
the status
of
a
moral
agent,
Rousseau
plainly
tells us:
les
hommes
ans
cet tat
n'ayant
ntre ux aucune
sorte e
relation
morale
ni de
devoirs
onnus.
The
doctrine
f
a
bonte
aturelle,
o far
s
the
Second
Discourse s
concerned,
ould
best be expressedn Englishby
the
proposition
hat
man was
originally
non-moral
ut
good-natured
brute.
He
was
not
mechant,
ot
malicious
nor
wantonly
cruel.
Against
Hobbes's assertion hat
"all
men
n
the
state
of
nature
have
a
desire and
will
to
hurt,"
Rousseau maintains
hat
primitive
man
(like
some other
nimals)
had
"an
innate
repugnance
o
see others f
his kind
suffer."2
n
the
course
of
social
development,
Rousseau
finds,
f man
has
learnedmoreabout the
natureof the
good,
he
has
I
A.
Schinz,
"La
Notion
de vertu
dans
le
Premier
Discours de
J.-J.
Rousseau,"Mercurede
France,
XCVII
(ler. juin, 1912),
532-55;
cf. also
"La
Theorie
de
la
bontd
naturelle
de
l'homme
chez
Rousseau,"
Revue
du
X VIIIe
aiscle,
I
(Oct.-dcc.,
1913),
433-47.
2
As
will
be
shown
below,
however,
Rousseau does not
really
join
issue with
Hobbes
here,
for
he
was
not
dealing
with
the
same
"state
of
nature."
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172 ARTHUR . LOVEJOY
lost
much
of
his
primitive ood
nature;
his
progress
n
moral
knowl-
edge
has
been
accompanied
by
a
weakening
f
his
animal
nstinct
f
sympathy-and
the former as
unhappily,
Rousseau is
persuaded,
proved
less
efficacious
eans
of
preventing
men
from
njuring
heir
fellows.
Primitive
man killed
when
necessary
o
procure
ood or
in
self-defense;
but
he
invented
no
instruments
f
torture
and he
waged
no wars.
In
spite
of
these desirable
spects
of
the state of
nature,
t
would
be
scarcely
onceivable-even
if
we
had no
direct
tatement
f Rous-
seau's
upon
the
point-that
he
should
have wished his
readers to
understand
hat he
regarded
s the deal
existence orman
a
state of
virtual
idiocy--the
ife of
a
completely
nintelligent,
nsocial,
and
non-moral
though
good-naturedbeast,
such as
was
realistically
portrayed
n
his
version
f the natural state of
man.'
Jean-Jacques
was doubtless
more
or less
mad,
but
he was
not so mad as
that;
and
if
he
had
been,
it
is
certain hat no such
teaching
would
have been
taken
seriously
y
his
contemporaries.
The
Discourse,
t
is
true,
is
characterized
by
a
great
deal
of
wavering
between
conflicting
endencies. There
was,
on
the
one
hand,
the
tendency
which
had been
dominant,
though
not
un-
challenged,
or ome two centuries
mong
thinkers
mancipated
rom
theological
radition)
o
employ
he
adjective
"natural"
as
the term
of
highest
ossible
eulogy,
nd
to assume that man
"as
he came from
the
hands
of nature"
must have
been
the model of what
"nature"
intended,
being
of
uncorrupted
ationality, nowing
ntuitively
ll
essentialmoraland religious ruths,
nd
completely urnished or ll
good
works:
Nor
think
n
Nature's
tate
hey lindly
rod;
The State
of
Nature
was
the
reign
fGod:
Self-love
nd
social
t her
birth
egan,
Union
he
bond f ll
things,
nd of
man.2
This
sort
of
philosophy
f
history
was of
the
essence
of
deism:
no
religious
eliefs
ould
be
true,
r
at all events
none
could be
impor-
tant, whichcould not be supposed to have been evident to man
I
Since
writing
he above
I
find hat M.
Lanson
has
made
substantially
he
same
remark:
"If
we are
to
conceive
f
the
man
of
nature
s
resembling
he
orang-outang,
can
we
suppose
that Rousseau
seriously
esired
o make
us
retrogress
o
that
point
"
(Ann.
de
la
Soc. J.-J.
Rousseau,
VIII
[1912],
12).
2
Pope,
Essay
on
Man, III,
147-50.
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ROUSSEAU'S
"
DIscOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY
"
173
from
he
beginning.
This
was
the
meaning
of
the
thesis
embodied
in
Tindal's
title:
"IChristianity,"
dentified ith
natural
religion,
as
"as
Old as
the
Creation,"
i.e.,
known to the earliest
men;
it
would not
have been
"naturPl"
if t had not been.
The idea
of the
"noble
savage,"
whether
rimitive
r
contemporary,
as a natural
and
usually
recognized
corollary
from this
assumption.
Now
Rousseau,
even
when
writing
f his first
tage,
was not unaffected
by
this
tradition,
hough
he was
working
imself ree rom
t;
though
his "state of nature" was
essentially
ifferentrom he oldercon-
ception,
nd was not
likely
to be taken
seriously y
anyone
as
an
ideal,
he was not
yet wholly
emancipated
from he
assumption
f
the
excellence
f the "natural" as such. And
thus,
with his char-
acteristic
agerness
o
put
the
point
he is
at
the moment
making
s
forcibly
s
possibly,
he sometimeswrites
what,
taken
apart
from
their
general
ontext,
ound ike
enthusiastic
ulogies
f
the
primitive
state.
The
opposition
etween his and the
contrary
endency
on-
sequently
ometimes
pproaches,
erhaps
n
one
passage
in the
pre-
amble
reaches,
he
point
of actual contradiction. But the
historian
of
ideas
has
performed
ut
a small
part
of
his
task
when he
points
out
such
an
opposition
f
tendencies,
r
even
a
direct
ontradiction,
in
a
historicallymportant
writing.
What is
essential
s
to see
from
what
nfluences
nd
prepossessions
he
opposing
trains
n
the
author's
thought rose;
to
observe their
often
complex nterplay;
to
note
which was the
prevailing
nd more
characteristic
endency;
above
all,
to
determine
when
the
author s
merely epeating
urrent
omi-
monplaces,
nd
whenhe
is
expressing
ew
insights
ot
yetperfectly
disentangled
rom raditional deas.
It
is,
in
short,
needful
o
know
not
only
where
writer
tands,
but
in
whichdirection e
is
heading.
Now
it was
the
primitivistic
trainthat
was
(contrary
o
the
usual
supposition)
he
traditional
nd
imitative ide of
the
content
f
the
Discourse.
The
relatively
nnovating
ide of
t
consisted
n a
repaint-
ing
of the
portrait
f
the
true
child of nature o
that
he
appeared
n
a
much
ess
pleasingguise,
ven
though
few
of the
old
featureswere
left.
How far
from
dyllic
s
Rousseau's
picture
f
the state
of
nature
may
be
seen,
finally,
rom
is
account
of
the
causes
which
brought
his
phase
of
the
history
four
race to
an
end.
The
explanation
s couched
in
somewhat
Darwinian
terms,
hundred
years
beforeDarwin. As
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174
ARTHUR
.
LOVEJOY
the
species
increased
n
numbers,
Rousseau
observes,
there
arose
between
t and other
pecies
formidable
truggle
or
xistence. He
clearly
distinguished
he three
aspects
of such
a
concurrenceitale:
the
growing
nsufficiency
f
readily
ccessible
food-supply,
he
com-
petition
f
other
animals,
both
frugivorous
nd
carnivorous,
or
the
means
of subsistence
which
they
shared
with
man,
and
the direct
attacks
of carnivorous nimals.
This
struggle,
ousseau
intimates,
might
have
ended
in the elimination
f
our
species,
f man had
been
able
to
fight nly
with
tooth
and
claw. But
under
the
pressure
f
necessity,
nother
endowment,
which
is le
caractere pecifique
e
l'espece
humaine, egan
to
manifest
tself-intelligence,
n
its several
elements and
manifestations;
a
power
which, meager
enough
at
first,
s
yet
capable
of
an "almost
unlimited"
development.
Because
it is
thus
the
distinguishing
haracter
of man
among
the
animals,
and because
its
unfolding
s
gradual
and
progressive,
ousseau
calls
it
the
faculte
de se
perfectionner,
r,
for
short,
"perfectibility."
At
the outset ts
functions ere
purely
ractical;
it
was
simply
means
of
survival. It enabled man to inventprimitiveweapons and
rudi-
mentary
ools,
o
discover
he art
of
making
ire,
nd to
adapt
himself
to
diversities
f
climate
nd
food
n
the new environments
o
which
he
was forced
y
ncrease
f
population
o
migrate.
Thus
themoment
at
which
man firstmanifested
he
previously
atent attribute
dis-
tinctive
fthenature
f
his
pecies
was,
n
Rousseau's
terminology,
he
moment
t
which
his
emergence
rom
he
state of nature
began.
From
this ccount
of
the
first
tage
alone
it is
easy
to see
that
the
Discourse, o farfrom trengtheningheprimitivisticllusion, ended
to weaken
t.
Though
t shows
ufficientlylain vestiges
f
the
older
habit
of
mind,
t nevertheless
nsists that the
historian
f
mankind
must
begin
by supposing
he
human
race
in a
state,
not
of
primitive
perfection
romwhich
t
has
degenerated,
ut
in a state of
pure
animality,
with
all its
lumieres,
oth
moral
and
intellectual,
till
to
attain,
through
n
immensely ong,
slow
process,
due
primarily
o
environmental
necessities
working
upon
an
originally
dormant
capacityfor the exerciseof ntelligence. Thus to the conviction f
the
undesirability
f the
true state of
nature,
already
found
in
Voltaire nd
Pufendorf,
as
added
the
dea
of
a law
of
necessary
nd
gradual
progress
through
natural
causes.
This
combination
of
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ROUSSEAU'S
"DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY"
175
ideas
was
not
new
in
1755.
It
had,
indeed,
been
the central ssue
n
a
celebrated
ontroversy
hich
had
lately gitated
he earned
world,
the
affair
f
the
Abb6 de
Prades;
and,
as M.
Morel
has well
shown,'
Rousseau
in
this
part
of
the
Discourse s
simply
developing oncep-
tions
presented
y
Diderot
n
his
Apl1ogie
de
l'Abbe
de
Prades,
1752,
and
in
the
Pensees
sur
'interpretation
e la
nature,
754.
What was
significant
n
the
Discourse was that
through
t
Rousseau
aligned
himself
ith
he
partisans
f a
new
movement,
veritable
hilosophie
nouvelle,
s Diderot
had
called
t-a
movement
ssentially
ntagonistic
to the current rimitivisms well as to religious rthodoxy. The
Discourse,
n
short,
s
chiefly
otable
in
the
history
f
ideas
as
an
early
contribution
o the formulationnd
diffusion
fan
evolutionary
conception
f human
history.
It
has
other
aspects,
some
of
them
partly
ncongruous
with
this;
but this
is
obviously
the
most
sig-
nificant,
ince
it
was a manifestation
f a
new
tendency
which
was
destined o revolutionizemodern
hought.
That
the
Discourse
helped
to undermine he
primitivistic
re-
possessionntheminds f ighteenth-centuryeadersmaybegathered
from
ome
of
the commentsmade
upon
it
by
Mme
de
Stall
in
1788.
"With how much
finesse,"
he
exclaims,
does
Rousseau
follow
he
progress
f man's
ideas
How he
inspires
us with
admiration
for
the first
teps
of the human mind "
That
his own
admiration id
not extend
o
the
later
steps,
Mme
de Stadl
notes;
but
she
intimates
that thiswas
an
inconsistencyrising
rom
peculiarity
fRousseau's
temperament,
ot a
consequence
f
the
principles
which
he
adopted.
"Rousseau oughtperhapsto have acknowledged hat this ardorto
know and
to
understand
was also a
natural
feeling, gift
f
heaven,
like
all
other
facultiesof
men;
means
of
happiness
when
they
are
exercised,
torment
when
they
re
condemned o
inactivity."2
The
term
"perfectibility"
o
which-though
t was
apparently
nvented
1
Ann. de
la
Soc.
J.-J.
Rousseau
(1909),
pp.
135-38.
Lettres
ur
les dcrits
de
Rousseau,
1788:
(Euvres, (1820),
15 A
still
better
illus-
tration
of this
aspect
of
Rousseau's
influence,
noted
since
the
foregoing
was
written,
s
to
be
seen in
one
of
the
earliest British
Rousseau
enthusiasts,
James
Burnet,
Lord
Mon-
boddo. In his Origin and Progress of Language, I, p. iii (1773), he says that the only
philosopher
who
seems
really
to
know
anything
of
the state
of nature
is
"Mr.
Rousseau,
a
very
great genius,
in
my
judgment";
and,
expressly
following
Rousseau,
the
Scottish
writer
asserts our
descent
from the
orang-outang,
and
attempts
to
trace
the
gradual
evolution
of
man's
intelligence
and
language
from the
purely
animal
stage.
On
this I
hope
shortly
to
write
more
fully
elsewhere.
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176
ARTHUR
O.
LOVEJOY
by
Turgot
in 1750-Rousseau
probably
did more than
anyone
else
to
givecurrency,
ecame
the catchword f Condorcet nd other
ub-
sequent
believers n the
reality,
ecessity,
nd
desirability
f
human
progress
hrough
fixed
equence
of
stages,
n
both
past
and
future.
Rousseau's
own
thought,
however,
s
more
complex
and
many-
sided
than
that
of his successors
who
drew
from
hese
conceptions
an amiable
confidence
n
the
speedy
"perfecting
f
the
species."
For,
in
addition
o the
two
conflicting
endencies
lready
noted,
here
is
in
the
Discourse third
train
which
modifies
nd deflects oth the
others
n a curious
way,
o
which
Rousseau's commentators
ave
given
too
little
attention.
This
was the
influence
f
Hobbes's
conception
of human
nature,
and
in
particular
his
account
of
the
"passion
"
which
s dominant
n
and distinctive f
man.
Hobbes finds
that
the
object
of our
characteristically
uman
esires,
he sole
"pleasure
of
the mind"
(as
distinct
from
hose
of
the
senses,
which
he sums
up
under
the word
"conveniences"),
"is
either
glory
or
to have
a
good
opinion
of
oneself),
r
refers
o
glory
n
the
end";
and
glory
"consists in comparison
nd
precellence."
"All
the pleasure
and
jollity
of
the
mind,"
he
writes
gain,
"consists
in
this,
even
to
get
some
with
whom
comparing,
t
may
find
somewhat
wherewith
o
triumph
nd vaunt
itself."
It
is
this
cravingchiefly
which
makes
men
social
animals.
"Men
delight
n
each
other's
company"
that
they
may
"receive
some
honor r
profit
rom
t,"
may
"pass
the more
current
n
their
own
opinion"
or "leave behind them
some esteem
and honor
with
those with
whom
they
have been conversant."
"All society," n short, is either orgain,or forglory; that s, not
so
much
for ove
of our
fellows s for
ove
of
ourselves."'
But
while
"vain
glory"
thus
engenders
kind
of
elf-seeking
nd even
malicious
sociability,
t is
also the
most
frequent
ause
of
quarrel mong
men.
While
conflicts
etween
ndividuals
r nations ometimes rise from
actual
oppositions
of
material
interest,
hey
arise
much
oftener,
Hobbes
thought,
rom
his
passion
of
self-esteem,
hich
causes
men
to
attack
one
another
for
trifles,
s
a
word,
smile,
different
pin-
ion,or any other ignofundervaluing,itherdirect n theirpersons
or
by
reflection
n
their
kindred,
heir
friends,
heir
nation,
their
profession,
heirname."
I
Leviathan,
chap.
xiii;
Philosophical
Rudiments
concerning
Government,
hap.
i;
in
Woodbridge's
The
Philosophy of
Hobbes
in
Extracts,
pp.
233-37,
240-48.
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"DISCOURSE ON
INEQUALITY
177
This
social
psychology
f
Hobbes,
with
its
implication
of the
inherent
mechancete
f
man,
we
have seen
Rousseau
rejecting,
o
long
as
he
is
describing
he
pur
etatde nature. The
original
gorilla
was
not
interested
n
nor conscious
f the ort f
figure
e
cut n
the
eyes
of
other
nimals
of
his kindnor n that
which,
n
comparison
with
thers,
he
cut
in
his own.
But the
"pure
state of nature" for
Rousseau,
t
must
be
remembered,
s
precisely
he
stage
in which that
which
s
distinctive f human nature has not
yet
manifested tself.
When,
however,
man becomes differentiated
romthe other
animals,
his
rulingpassion
and his
generaldisposition,ccording
o the
Discourse,
are
precisely
uch as the
philosopher
f
Malmesbury
had described.
Rousseau's
theory
of human nature
here,
n
short,
s
identicalwith
and
manifestly
erived from hat of Hobbes. "It is
easy
to
see,"
he
too
declares,
"that
all our labors are
directed
upon
two
objects
only,
namely,
for
oneself,
he commodities
f
ife,
nd
consideration
on
the
part
of others."
Amour-propre-"a
sentiment
which takes
its source
n
comparison-is
"not to be
confused
with
l'amour
de
soi-meme." The latter
s a
natural concern
or
one's own
interest,
which
s
common
o
man and other
nimals;
the
former
s
a
"facti-
tious
feeling,
risingonly
n
society,
which eads
each man
to think
more
highly
of himself han
of
any
other."
This
passion
began
to
show tselfwith
the firstmoment
f
human
elf-consciousness,
hich
was
also
that
of
the
first
tep
of human
progress:
s
he
emerged
rom
the state
of
nature,
man
came
to
feel
racial
pride
n
his
superiority
over the
other animals.
C'est
ainsi
que
le
premieregardu'ilporta
ur
ui-meme
produisit
e
premier ouvement'orgueil; 'estainsique,sachant ncore peinedis-
tinguer
es
rangs,
t se
contemplant
u
premier
ar
on
spece,
l
se
pr6paroit
de
loin
y pr6tendre
ar
on ndividu.
The same
passion
has ever
since
been,
nd still
s,
Rousseau
declares,
the
principal
ource
of all that s
most
characteristicf
us,
both
good
and
bad-but
chiefly
ad.
It is
to
this
niversalesire
or
eputation,
onors,
nd
preferment,
hich
devours s
all,
....
this rdor o make neself
alked
bout,
his
ury
o
be
distinguished,
hatweowewhat s best ndworst
n
men--our
irtues
nd
ourvices, ur ciencesnd our rrors,ur onquerorsnd ourphilosophers-
in
short,
vast
number
fevil
things
nd a small
numberf
good.
It
is
this,
Rousseau in
one
passage
goes
so far
as
to
say,
"which
inspires
men
to
all
the evils
which
they
nflict
pon
one
another."
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ARTHUR
O.
LovEJOY
It
is
the
cause
of the
boundlessness
of human
desires;
for
while
thenormal esires
or
commodities,"
ormeans
of
ensuous
gratifica-
tion,
are
limited,
he
craving
for
"distinction,"
for
that
whichwill
feed
the
individual's
sense
of
importance,
pre-eminence,
ower,
s
insatiable,
nd
infiniten the
variety
of
the
forms n
which t mani-
fests
tself. Man-once
he becomes
truly
man-is thus
by
his own
constitution
so long
as he fails
to
become
aware of
and to restrain
this
impulse)
condemned
o endless
dissatisfaction,
o
a ceaseless
pursuit
f
goals
which
when ttained
eave
him no more
content
han
before.
Finally, I'amour-propre
s
the source
of
that
insincerity
which
Rousseau
finds
especially
odious
in
the emotional
ife
and
behavior
of civilized
men-the
elaborate
structure
f
pretense
nd
accommodation,
keeping
up
appearances,"
simulated
good
will
or
admiration,
he
tribute
which
he
vanity
of
one
leads
him to
pay
to
the
vanity
of
another,
n
order
hat he
may
receive
return
n
kind.
Through
this
exclusively
human
type
of
desire,
men
have
finally
developed
strange
ortof
mutual
parasitism
n
their
nner
xistence;
theyhave
come
to be
beings
who
savent
tre eureux
t contents
'eux-
m~mes
ur
le
t6moignage
'autrui
plut6t
que
de leur
propre.
"The
savage
has
his lifewithin
himself;
social
man
outside
himself,
n
the
opinion
of others."'
It
is
therefore
s true o
say
that
Rousseau
teaches
the
mechancete
naturelle,
s
to
say
that he teaches
the
bont6
aturelle,
f
man;
and
the
former
eaching
s the more
significant
f
the
two,
since t alone
relates
to what
s
distinctive
n man's nature. It
is
thus
evident
hat
the doctrine f the Discourse s almostcompletely ontrary o that
which
Professor
rving
Babbitt
sets forth
as
characteristic
f
Rousseau:
He
puts
he
blame
f he onflictnd division f
which
e s
conscious
n
himself
pon
he
ocial
onventionshat
et bounds o his
temperament
nd
impulses;
nce
get
rid f
hese
urely
rtificial
istinctions,
nd
he
feels
hat
he
will
be
one
with
imself
nd
nature.2
The
real
source
of
our evils
Rousseau here
finds n
human nature
itself,
nd
in
the most
characteristic
f
ts
propensities.
But
though
1
This
idea
has been
wittily
laborated
by
Henry
James n
his
short
tory,
The
Private Life."
One of
Its
characters,
hough
master f
all
the
social
graces,
had
no
private
ife;
he
ceased to
exist
ltogether
hen
not n
society-when
no
longer
n
object
of
the
admiring
ttention
f others.
S
Rousseau
and
Romanticism,
p.
79.
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ROUSSEAU'S
DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY"
179
he holds that
intellect
nd
iniquity
made
their
d6but
together
nd
have
since
developed ogether,
e does not
represent
hem
s
develop-
ing
pari passu.
In the
earlier
stages
of
cultural
evolution,
fter
men's
emergence
rom
he
state
of
nature,
their
animal
instinct
f
sympathy
was
still
relatively trong,
heir
amour-propre
elatively
weak,
or
lacking
in means
of
expression;
so
that
the
progress
n
knowledge
nd
power
made
possible by
man's
intellectual
perfecti-
bility
was
only
slightly
ffset
y
the effects
f his
egotism.
The
characteristics
f these
stages,
s
Rousseau
pictures
hem,
must
now
be
recalled.
The
second
stage
in
his Outline
f History
s a
long
transitional
period-covering,
he
says,
a
"multitude
of
centuries
-in
the course
of
which
men ittle
by
little
earnedthe use
of
the
simpler
ools
and
weapons,
united
in
herds
for
mutual
protection
nd for
procuring
food,
invented
anguage,
finallydeveloped
the
permanent
family,
and
with
t
a first nd
very
imited
tage
of
the nstitution f
property
-in
the
form
of
recognized wnership
by
each
individual of
his
weapons
and
other
personalbelongings,
nd
by
each
family
of
its
own cabin.
The culmination
f
this
process
is
Rousseau's third
period,
which
he calls
the
stage
of
societenaissante
and
(as
I
have
indicated)
clearly
and
repeatedly
distinguishes
rom
the
pre-social
"state
of
nature."'
It
is the
patriarchal
tage
of human
society;
the
only
government
was that
of the
family.
Men
lived
in
loose,
unorganized
illage
groups,gaining
heir
ubsistence
by
hunting
r
fishing
nd
from he
natural
fruits f the
earth,
and
finding
heir
amusement
n
spontaneous atherings
or
ong
and
dance. That so
many
learned
historians
f literature nd of
political
thought,
nd
even
writers
f works
n
Rousseau,
have
failed
to
point
out that this
third
stage,
and
not the
state of
nature,
was
regardedby
him
as
the
most
desirable,
s rather
mazing,
ince
he
is
perfectly
xplicit
n
the
point.2
The
passage
ought
to be the most
familiar
n
the
Dis-
1
There
is,
however,
some
variation
in
Rousseau's
use
of
diat
de
nature,
which is
doubt-
less
partly
responsible
for
the
common
misinterpretation.
I
have
counted
forty-four
instances of
the term in the
Discourse;
in
twenty-nine
of
these
it
designates
exclusively
the
first
tage,
that
of
complete
animality;
in
four
t
is used
in
the
merely uristic
sense,
without reference to any distinction of cultural stages; in two it covers the firstthree
stages,
and
in
nine cases
the context does not
permit
a certain
determination
of
the
meaning.
2
It
should
be
said,
however,
that
Professor
Dunning
(op.
cit.)
mentions
this,
but
treats
it
as
a mere
contradiction
of
the
dominant
contention
of
the Discourse.
The fact
is
duly
recognized
by
Mr.
Vaughan.
The
original
misconception
is well
exemplified
by
Voltaire's
famous
letter to Rousseau on
receiving
the
Discourse
(Moland
ed.,
XXXVIII,
446-50).
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180
ARTHUR
O. LOVEJOY
course;
but
as it is
usually
neglected,
t
seems
needful
o
recall it
here:
Though
men
had
now ess
endurance,
nd
though
atural
ympathy
(pitid)
had
suffered
ome
diminution,
his
period
f the
development
f
human
aculties,
olding
just
mean
between he
ndolence
f
the
primitive
state
nd
the
etulant
ctivity
f ur
elf-esteem,
ust
ave
been
he
happiest
and
the
most
asting
poch.
The
more ne reflects
pon
t,
the more ne
perceives
hat
t
was the tate
east
ubject
o
revolutions,
he
best tate
for
man;
and
that
he
can
have
departed
rom
t
only
y
some
nhappy
hance,
which
nthe nterest
f he
general
ood
(utilitY)
ught
ever
ohave
ccurred.
The
example
f the
savages,
whoare
nearly
ll
found
o be
at
this
point,seems oaffordurthervidencehat his tate s theveritable
outh
fthe
world;
nd
that
ll
subsequent
dvances ave
been,
n
appearance
o
many
steps
owards
he
perfection
f he
ndividual,
n
reality
owards
he
decrepi-
tude
ofthe
pecies.
It
is to
be borne
n
mind,
however,
hat this
patriarchal
nd
com-
munistic
ociety,
upposed
to
correspond
o the cultural condition
of
existing
avage
tribes,
was what
a
number
f writers
eforeRous-
seau
had
meant
by
the "state
of
nature."
Rousseau's
account of
t
is
not
very
dissimilar
o the
passage--quoted
n
part by
Shakespeare
in The
Tempest-in
which
Montaigne
describes he
pleasant
ife f
the
"Cannibals
"-i.e.,
theCarib
Indians-except
for
he
anthropophagy.
which
Montaigne
treats
as
a
trifling
eccadillo
of
his
children
of
nature.
Pope's
"state
of
nature,"
though
it
confusedlymingles
several
stages
which
Rousseau
definitely istinguishes,
n
the
main
also
corresponds
roadly
to Rousseau's third
stage.
It
may, therefore, erhaps appear
at
first hat the
distinction
between
Rousseau's
view
and that
of such
precursors
s
merely
terminological--that
is ideal
is what
they
alled
the state
of
nature,
though
he
prefers
o
apply
that
expression
o
another
condition
f
human
life.
And
it
is,
indeed,
true
that
in
his
praise
of
the third
stage
Rousseau
is
merely
inging
n old
song,
which
all
the
long
line
of sentimental
ulogists
of the
noble
savage
had
sung
before
him.
Yet
the distinction
etween his
position
and
theirs
s much
more
than
verbal.
What
the Discourse
asserted
was
that
this best
condition
f
mankind
was
not
primitive
nd
was
not,
properly peak-
ing,
"of
nature,"
but
was
the
product
f
art,
.e.,
of
a
conscious xer-
cise
of
man's
contriving
ntelligence,
n
its
slow
and arduous
develop-
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ROUSSEAU'S
"
DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY"
181
ment.
The
third
stage
was not invested
with
the
glamour
f
the
sacred
adjective "natural";
you
could
not
say
of
it,
as
Montaigne
had
said of
the
savage
moeurs
whichhe so
enthusiastically epicted,
Hos natura
modos
rimum
edit.
For
Rousseau,
in
short,
man's
good
lay
in
departing
rom
his
"natu-
ral"
state--but
not
too
much;
"perfectibility"
p
to
a
certain
point
was
desirable,
though
beyond
that
point
an evil.
Not
its
infancy
but
its
eunesse
was the best
age
of the human
race. The
distinction
etween
such a view and
a
thoroughgoing rimitivism
mayseemto us slight nough; but in themid-eighteenthenturyt
amounted
to an
abandonment
f
the
stronghold
f
the
primitivistic
position.
Nor is this the
whole
of
the
difference.
As
compared
with the
then-conventional
ictures
of the
savage
state,
Rousseau's
account
even
of his
third
tage
is
far
ess
idyllic;
and
it is
so because
of his
fundamental
nfavorable
iew
ofhuman
nature
ud
human.
Though
the
coloring
s not
uniform,
here
s a
large
admixture
f
black
n his
picture; his savages are quiteunlikeDryden's ndians-
Guiltless
men,
hatdanced
way
heir
ime,
Fresh s their roves nd happy s their
lime--
or
Mrs.
Aphra
Behn's
natives of
Surinam
who
"represented to
her]
an
absolute
dea
of
the
first
tate of
nnocence,
efore
man knew
how
to
sin."
The men in
Rousseau's
"nascent
society"
had
dejd
bien
des
querelles
t
des
combats;
'amour
propre
was
already
manifest
n
them,
as
a
necessaryconsequence
of
theirtranscendence f the
purely
nimal
stage;
and
slights
r
affronts
ere
consequently
isited
with
vengeances
erribles.
Already,
too-from
the same
motive--
men
had
begun
to
desire
bjects,
not for
heir eal
utility,
ut
merely
to
feel
the
pride
of
possession;
objects,
herefore,
privation
f which
was
much
more cruelthan
the
possession
f
them
was
enjoyable."
Here,
once
more,
t
is
true,
there
s
in
Rousseau
a conflict f
tendencies
which
approaches
elf-contradiction.
ut here
also it
is
not
difficult
ither to
determinewhichtendency
s
the more dis-
tinctive,
r
to
see
how,
n
a
measure,
he
reconciles he
conflict.
It is
the
dark
part
of
the
picture,
esulting
rom
is
assumption
f a radi-
cally
evil
element
n
human
nature,
which
s
the
exceptional
nd
sig-
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ARTHUR
0.
LOVEJOY
nificant
spect
of his
account
of the third
stage;
the other
part
represents
more conventional
train
of
eighteenth-century
hought.
And the
reason
why
he
regards
his
stage
not as
perfect
ut as the
best
actually
attainable condition
of human
life
is
that the
two
characteristic
ssumptions
of
the Discourse
forced
him
to
a
com-
promise.
Those
assumptions,
s
we have
seen,
are
that
primitive
man
was
healthy,
placid,
and
good-natured,
ut
absolutely tupid,
non-social,
nd
non-moral;
and that
civilized
man
is
highly
ntelli-
gent
and
morally
responsible,
but
profoundly
mechant,
nsincere,
restless,
nd
unhappy.
Rousseau
could
not
bring
himself o
accept
either xtreme
s his
ideal;
the
obvious
way
out,
therefore,
as to
regard
the mean between
these
extremes
s
the best
state
possible.
In
the
third
tage,
men were
ess
good-natured
nd less
placid
than
in
the
state of
nature,
but
were
also less
stupid
and less
unsocial;
they
were ess
intelligent
nd
had
less
power
over nature than civil-
ized
man,
but
were
also
less
malicious and less
unhappy.
In
thus
regarding
he state
of
savagery,
which
ome had called
the "state of
nature,"
not
as a
kind of natural
perfection,
n
absolute
norm,
ut as
a
mixed
condition,
intermediatebetween
two extremes
equally
undesirable,
Rousseau once more differed
rofoundly
romhis
primi-
tivistic
predecessors.
With
the causes
which
brought
he
third
tage
to a
close we
are
not concerned
ere; Rousseau,
as
everyone
nows,
ound
hem
n the
introduction
f
agriculture
nd
metallurgy,
hich ed
to
the
establish-
mentof
private
property
n
land,
to the accumulation
f
capital,
and
to an ever increasing nequality
n
the
wealth and
power
of
indi-
viduals.
What
is
pertinent
o the theme of this
paper
is to
point
out that
his
fourth
hase
ofhuman
evolution,
hus
unhappily
shered
in,
was
in essentials
he
same
as the "natural condition
f
mankind"
which
had been
described
by
Hobbes.
Rousseau
differed rom
Hobbes
merely
n
holding
hat this
condition
was
not
primitive;
n
tracing
he
gradual process
hrough
which
mankindhad
come
nto
t;
and
in
definitely lacing
it
after the
invention
of
agriculture
nd
thebeginning fprivateproperty. But
these were
minor onsidera-
tionsfrom
Hobbes's
point
of
view;
his
essential
ontention
was that
the state
mmediately
receding
he establishment
f
political
society
through
social
compact-the
state
into
which
any
civilized
ociety
-
8/12/2019 Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality
20/23
ROUSSEAU'S
"DISCOURSE
ON
INEQUALITY"
183
would
revert f
ll law
and
government
ere
removed-is one
n
which
men,
animated
by
"a
mutual
will
of
hurting,"
would
necessarily
e
involved n
universal
conflict,
atent
or
overt-in a
bellum
mnium
contra
mnes.
Similarly
Rousseau tells us
that in
the
fourth,
r
last
pre-political,
tage,
"devouring
mbition,
agerness
o
improve
heir
relative
fortune,
ess
through
eal
need than
to
make
themselves
superior
o
others,"
nspired
n
all
men
un
noir
penchant
se
nuire
mutuellement.
The
state
of nascent
society
gave
place
to
a
most
horrible
tate
of
war,"
in
which
"none,
whether
ich
or
poor,
found
any security."
The
implications,
n
short,
of the
conception
of
human
nature which Rousseau
had
learned from
Hobbes become
fully
vident
only
n his
description
f his
fourth
tage; they
have
hitherto,
o
to
say,
been held
n
abeyance,
but
are now
permitted
o
work
themselves
ut,
with the
natural
consequence
hat we have
in
this
part
of
the Discourse
ittle more
than
a
replica
of
the state
of
nature
pictured
n
the
Leviathan.
In
the
end, then,
t
is
this
Hobbesian and
Mandevillian
social
psychology
hat
--even
more
than
the
primitivistic
radition
epre-
sented
by Montaigne
and
Pope--prevented
he
evolutionistic
end-
ency
in
the
thought
of the
Discourse
from
ssuing
n
a
doctrine
f
universal
progress,
n
a faith
n
perfectibilite.
Man
being
the kind
of
creature hat he
is,
the
inevitableculmination f
the
process
of
social
development
s
a
state
of
intolerable
vil.
For
the
violence
and universal
insecurity
characteristic
f
the fourth
stage,
the
political
state
was,
says
Rousseau,
invented as a
remedy.
But
it
was
not
invented
n
good faith;
it
was a
trickof
therich,designed
merely
o
protect
heir
property
nd
still
further
xtend
heir
power.
Its
final
ffect
as
to add
political
nequality,
nd thus
new
occasions
of
rivalry
nd
conflict
etween
classes,
to
the
economic
nequality
already
existing-a
consistentdeduction
from
Hobbes's
premises,
though
very
different
rom
Hobbes's
own.
The
remedy,
n
short,
Rousseau
held,
served
only
to
aggravate
the disease. Such
is
the
pessimistic
onclusion
f
the
Discourse.
But in his
next
writing
n
the
subject-the Contratocial, especially he
first
raft
f
t,which
according
o
Vaughan,
"probably goes
back
to
a
date
shortly
efore
or
shortly
fter
the
Discourse
-the
evolutionary
onceptions
on-
spicuous
in
the
latter,
but
there
entangled
with
incongruous
end-
-
8/12/2019 Modern Philology Arthur O. Lovejoy -- The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality
21/23
184
ARTHUR
. LOVEJOY
encies,
reach clear
and
unqualified
xpression.
Never n
the
past,
Rousseau
now
declares,
has
there
been
an
ideal
condition
f
human
society:
La douce
voixde la nature
'est
plus pour
nous
un
guide nfaillible,
i
l'ind~pendance
ue
nous avons
reque
d'elle,
un
tat
d6sirable;
a
paix
et
l'innocence
ous
nt
6chappe
our
amais,
vant
ue
nous
n
ussions
oute
es
delices.
Insensible
ux
stupides
ommes
es
premiers
emps, chappde
ux
hommes
clair6s es
temps
ost~rieurs,
'heureuse
ie
de
'dge
'or
ut
oujours
un
dtat
tranger
la
race
humaine.'
No
exception,
t will
be
observed,
s
made even
for he
third
tage
of
the Discourseon Inequality. As forthe state of nature-already
repudiat