Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic
International System
PhD DISSERTATION
This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence
University, Islamabad in partial fulfilment for the
degree of PhD in International Relations
By
NAZISH MAHMOOD
NDU/IR/PhD/S-13/022
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Department of International Relations Faculty of
Contemporary Studies National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan
2019
Dedication
I dedicate this dissertation to my late mother Musthsenha Bibi who had
been ultimate source of inspiration to me in life, and my father Mahmood
Ahmed Khan without whose love and prayers I would never have been able
to complete it after suffering the trauma of the loss of my mom during the
pursuit of this degree…..
Acknowledgments
All praise and gratitude for the Almighty alone, who gave me the strength and determination to
complete the task.
I acknowledge my indebtedness and deep sense of gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema who spared time from his busy and very hectic academic schedule. His
scholarly guidance and encouraging attitude enabled me not only to remove the shortcomings in
the work but also the strength to complete it.
My special thanks to Dr. Nazia Fiaz who gave me assistance and guidance on personal level and
her insights into the work at the developing stage was great inspiration to continue this research
to the best of my commitment and dedication.
I am extremely grateful to all my colleagues and teachers, my Head of Department for their
support and guidance.
I also gratefully acknowledge the cooperation extended to me by the staff of the IR department
as well as the staff of the NDU Library.
Last but not least, my family members especially my father Mahmood Ahmed Khan, my
maternal uncle Dr. Najam-ul-Hassan and my friends especially Javeria Hassan for all the
moral and material support to me for the completion of my study. Without their faith and
support, the task could not have been completed up to the best of my ability.
Abstract
Uncontested US supremacy established with the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 is fast
drawing to a close. Impending power transition in the global hierarchy has triggered post-
hegemonic phase in the international system. This transition of power in the global order has
marginalized US military interventionist policy. The “rise of China” along with alternate power
centers has considerably constrained US clout to obtain “desired outcomes.” These systemic
changes apart from inducing drift away from US led and controlled patterns of interaction and
exercise of influence, have altered shape of the existing international system and brought
additional actors with increasing sway on political outcomes. Besides, the drift towards post-
hegemony send strong signals to local / regional hierarchies where “challengers” try to take
advantage of the vulnerability prevailing in the global hierarchy. Such regions with significant
changes in regional structure and hierarchy give rise to great power intervention dynamics
made possible through conflict, instability and erosion of traditional structures of power. One
such region is MENA (Middle East and North Africa) after the unprecedented Arab Spring
upheavals, where a clear de-link from previous US hegemonic practices could be observed.
These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link
between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, explored in the study through
extension of Power Transition Theory research program. The arrival of post-hegemony also
alters military intervention behavior of the declining hegemon that has to rely on “securitization
of threat” through “political discourse” as enunciated through case studies of Libya and Syria
by employing Securitization Theory and Discourse Analysis Approach. The study seeks to
substantiate not only the dawn of post-hegemonic phase in the international system but validate
“threat securitization military intervention model” developed within the study to explore the link
between MENA and global power hierarchy in transition, and significance of discursive
construction of “threat” for foreign direct military intervention The rise of peer challengers, US
“back-seat role” in Libya and its incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy approach towards
Syria has exposed US limitation to influence and direct events on the international stage,
increasingly frustrating acquisition and implementation of US policy goals in key regions like
MENA. The study affirms that power transition in the global order has introduced post-
hegemonic system that has marginalized US unilateral interventionist policy on the use of force.
Table of Contents
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
List of Maps x
INTRODUCTION 1-29
0.1 Aim of the Study 12
0.2 Thesis Statement 12
0.3 Hypothesis 13
0.4 Key Research Questions 13
0.5 Theory & Method 13
0.6 Significance of the Study 25
0.7 Scope & Limitation of the Study 26
0.8 Organization of the Study 27
Chapter 1: Literature Review: War & Intervention – a journey through
History and Theory 30-68
1.1. War / intervention through History 30
1.1.1. Just War Tradition 37 1.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention 51
1.1.3. From Interstate to Intrastate Wars 54
1.1.4. Discursive Dimension in War Literature 56
1.2. Theoretical Perspective on War / Conflict 57
1.2.1. Systemic Level War Theories 58 1.2.2. Dyadic or Interactional Level War Theories 60
1.2.3. State and Societal Level War Theories 61
1.2.4. Individual-Level Decision Making 63
1.2.5. Organizational-Level Decision Making 65
1.2.6. Civil Wars 66
Conclusion 68
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Threat Construction for International
Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic System 69-113
2.1. Power Transition Theory 72
2.1.1. Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics 76 2.1.2. Post-Hegemony and Power Transition 79
2.2. Threat Securitization for Military Intervention 81
i
2.2.1. Stage I: Post-Hegemonic International System 82
2.2.1.1. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony 84 2.2.1.2. Regional Hierarchies in Post-Hegemony 91
2.2.2. Stage II: Threat Securitization 94
2.2.2.1. Securitization Theory 94 2.2.2.2. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Military Intervention 99
2.2.2.3. Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic International System 104
2.2.3. Stage III: Political Discourse and Military Intervention 106
2.2.3.1. Discourse and Political Action 106 2.2.3.2. War Legitimation Discourse 108
Conclusion 112
Chapter 3: Towards Post Hegemony 114-67
3.1. Power Structure of the Post-Cold War International System 115
3.1.1. European Union 129
3.1.2. Japan 132
3.1.3. India 136
3.1.4. Brazil 141
3.2. Power in Transition – Analyzing US-China Relations within the Context 145
3.3. Post-Hegemony begins 153
3.3.1. Global Financial Crisis 2008 154
3.3.2. Russian Reassertion in its ―Near Abroad‖ 156
3.3.3. The Arab Spring 161
Conclusion 165
Chapter 4: Middle East & North Africa (MENA) in Transition 168-218
4.1. Pivotal Regional Players in MENA 170
4.1.1.Iran 170
4.1.1.1. Iran in post-Arab Spring MENA 170
4.1.1.2. Iran-US Relations 179
ii
4.1.2. Saudi Arabia 181
4.1.2.1. Saudi Arabia in post-Arab Spring MENA 181
4.1.2.2. Saudi Arabia-US Relations 189
4.1.3. Turkey 191
4.1.3.1. Turkey in post-Arab Spring MENA 191
4.1.3.2. Turkey-US Relations 200
4.1.4. Egypt 202
4.1.4.1. Egypt in post-Arab Spring MENA 202
4.1.4.2. Egypt-US Relations 205
4.1.5. Israel 206
4.1.4.1. Israel in post-Arab Spring MENA 207
4.1.4.2. Israel-US Relations 208
4.2. Russia Re-enters the Region 209
4.3. US-The Declining Hegemon in MENA 212
Conclusion: Regional Hierarchy in Transition 216
Chapter 5: Libya – US“Leading from Behind” 219-53
5.1. Pre-Qaddafi‟s Libya 220
5.2. Libya under Qaddafi 222
5.2.1. US-Libya Relations 222
5.2.2. Anti-Government Unrest 2011 224
5.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Libyan Military Intervention 229
5.3.1. Geography 230
5.3.2. Intra-State Conflict 231
5.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies 232
5.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups 232
5.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players 235
5.3.3.1. North African Libyan Neighbours 237
5.3.3.2. Key Regional Players in Libyan Crisis 242
iii
5.3.3.3. Keya Extra-Regional Players in Libyan Crisis 246
5.3.4. Legitimacy 252
Conclusion 245
Chapter 6: Threat Securitization for International Military Intervention in
Libya 254-92
6.1. Threat Securitization for Libyan Military Intervention 255
6.1.1. Target State‘s Ruling Regime as a Threat to International Peace & Security 258
6.1.2. ―US‖ versus ―Them‖ Binary Employed 262
6.1.3. Co-opting International / regional Institutions 265
6.2. War Legitimation Discourse 267
6.2.1. Legitimation by reference to authority 268
6.2.2. Legitimation by reference to values 270
6.2.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization 277
6.2.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality 280
6.2.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them Category 283
6.3. Leading from Behind 288
6.3.1. Post-Qaddafi Libya 290
Conclusion 291
Chapter 7: Syria – The US quandary 293-340
7.1. Pre-Bashar al-Assad Syria 294
7.2. Syria under Bashar al-Assad 296
7.2.1. Anti-Bashar al-Assad Unrest 2011 299
7.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables 303
7.3.1. Geography 304
7.3.2. Intra-State Conflict 305
7.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies 306
iv
7.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups 307
7.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players 312
7.3.3.1. Key Regional Players 312
Conclusion 340
Chapter 8: Syria and Threat Securitization for Military Intervention 341 -87
8.1. Key Extra-Regional Players 342
8.2. Legitimacy 354
8.3. Threat Securitization for Syrian Conflict 358
8.3.1. Target State‘s Ruling Regime as a Threat to International Peace & Security 362
8.3.2. ―US‖ versus ―Them‖ Binary Employed 365
8.3.3. Co-opting International / regional Institutions 367
8.4. War Legitimation Discourse 371
8.4.1. Legitimation by reference to authority 372
8.4.2. Legitimation by reference to values 374
8.4.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization 380
8.4.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality 381
8.4.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them Category 383
Conclusion 385
CONCLUSION 388-409
Bibliography 410- 453
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table Title PAGE
5.1. Obama on Libya 250-51
5.2. Clinton‘s Remarks on American Leadership 252
6.1. Positively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 273
6.2. Negatively moralized processes representing ‗Their‘ violent actions 274
6.3. Our side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 275
6.4. Their side‘s negatively moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 276
6.5. Modality – degrees of commitment and certainty 280
6.6. Levels of modality 281
6.7. Temporal Maximization in Obama Statements 282
6.8. We – the International Community 284-85
6.9. They against Us-the International Community 285
8.1. Positively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 376
8.2. Negatively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 377-78
8.3 Our side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 378-79
8.4 Their side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 379-80
8.5 Temporal Maximization for Syria 383
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
0.1 Theoretical Basis of Dissertation 15
0.2 Arguments developed within the study 16
0.3 Van Dijk - The Ideological Square 21
2.1. Hierarchical distribution of power in the international order 74
2.2. Effects of Dissatisfaction and Satisfaction in the International System 75
2.3. Regional Hierarchies in the International System 78
2.4. The Global Hierarchy: A Chinese Perspective 83
2.5. Global Hierarchy in the Cold War Period 87
2.6. The Global Hierarchy in the Post-Cold War Period 88
2.7. Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-led Superbloc 88
2.8. Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China 89
2.9. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony 90
2.10. Issue scale, derived from Buzan et al. 96
2.11. Factors contributing to successful securitization 97
2.12. Internal Hierarchy of the Target State located in a key Region 100
2.13. Military Intervention Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic System 103
6.1 Libyan Military Intervention Threat Securitization 257
8.1 Syrian Military Intervention Threat Securitization 361
vii
List of Maps
Map Title Page
4.1. Political Map of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 169
5.1 Libya consisting of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica 221
7.1 Map of Syria 295
viii
INTRODUCTION
The sudden demise of Soviet Union heralded us in a post-Cold War era with US as its
undisputed leader. The removal of rival competing blocks ignited false hopes of an era of global
peace, prosperity and economic interdependence. This optimism also reflected acknowledgement
of wider scope of international institutions. On the contrary, the structural reality soon
manifested itself in military interventions also where American willingness to do what it thinks
right – international law notwithstanding - became the new norm. Due to this development two
very basic and twin pillars of the existing international system i.e. state sovereignty and non-
intervention had been put to severe test. How external impositions put the developing states in a
fragile position vis-â-vis civil society and expose them to foreign conflict/peacekeeping,
intervention, economic dislocation and external policy imposition has been a matter of keen
interest to scholars across the world.
Foreign direct military interventions which are frequently employed in the twenty-first century
international politics to meet the peculiar challenges of security had also been subjected to
intense debate. The criticism is based on the logic of intervention being employed to achieve the
strategic objectives of the intervening state. Up till the end of Second World War, we saw
conflict mostly between states or/and alliances involving militaries. During the era of Cold War a
temporary but fitful bi-polarity kept the world securely ensconced within different camps and
alliances. Often totalitarian regimes were kept in power and popular sentiments of their people
suppressed by artificial support provided to them by their protagonists. With the advent of a
unipolar world and the effective removal of most big powers from the international stage, the
coast became clear for USA to emerge as unchallenged international player. Simultaneously, the
desire to intervene by USA became more and more tempting and its absence on occasions
equally a source of criticism against it. Where this intervention had been desirable to put an end
to human suffering e.g. in Kosovo, misuse of its pretext to advance agenda of various big powers
had simultaneously raised prickly questions.
1
The most recent debate in International Relations about the impending American decline, end of
the ―unipolar moment,‖ ―rise of the rest‖ especially China and its likely repercussions on
American power and prestige has given rise to alternative perspective raising specter of a post-
hegemonic international system. Studying military intervention within such a system would
prompt new thinking about this old and intriguing concept.
Post-Hegemonic International System
Application of the term ―post-hegemonic international system‖ within the contemporary
international environment is vital for understanding the core argument developed within the
study. Though the term and its attributes have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 yet it is
imperative to define the scope of the term at the start. It is meant to avoid confusion with regards
to its usage and implementation within the study.
Explanation of a ―post-hegemonic international system‖ naturally begins with definition of a
hegemonic one, whether such a system existed, if yes and how it has been elaborated within the
academic and scholarly IR community. Like so many other key concepts, the term ―hegemony‖
is also hotly contested within International Relations as regards its scope and limitations.
Different schools of thought stress different dimensions which have further added to the
confusion regarding its scope and assumptions.
The term ―hegemon‖ is originally derived from the Greek hegemonia, meaning ―leadership‖.
Instead of the coercive and illegitimate forms of power usually attributed in the contemporary
thinking, the original notion of the concept regard ―legitimacy‖ as one of its central attributes. As
a contemporary scholar of the concept Richard Ned Lebow also notes how Greeks deliberately
distinguished hegemonia from arkhe i.e. legitimate leadership from coercive control.
Thucydides‘ History of the Peloponnesian War clearly hints at two core messages with regards
to hegemony: first, its essential for sustainable international leadership; and secondly,
―hegemony requires prudent exercise of power‖. 1 It basically is an honorific status conferred by
others in recognition of the benefits an actor has provided for the community as a whole and
Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, ―Thucydides and hegemony: Athens and the United States,‖ Review of the International Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 603.
2
there is an implied right to lead as well. Lebow also identifies power of persuasion as
fundamental for hegemonia. He adds that this hierarchical relationship is least likely to generate
resistance from the community when initiated by an actor whose right to lead is widely accepted.
But when the same hegemon displays behavior at odds with the accepted morality of the age, not
only its standing and influence are compromised but hegemony undermined too.2
No discussion on hegemony could be complete without referring to Antonio Gramsci‘s
articulation of the concept though he never wrote directly about the International Relations. It
has, however, still attracted interest of contemporary scholars who believe Gramsci‘s ideas could
be profitably adapted as a tool for analyzing power in international arena. For him ―hegemony
presupposes that account be taken of interests….. of the groups over which [it] is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed….such a compromise cannot touch
the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic.‖3 Thus a clear
coercive element is embraced in Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony, though the notion of consent is
there too.
The key shared perspective thus uniting Lebow and Gramsci is the idea that effective power
rests on shared mutual responsibility and obligations on all actors and for the dominant actor it
involves taking into account of interests and concerns of the subordinates too as this kind of
relationship both reflects and embodies system‘s legitimacy, thus conversely the hegemon, and is
the essence of the hegemony.
Charles Kinderberger, however, has been more explicit in his articulation of the term in The
World in Depression where he outlined causes of 1939 economic depression and stated that
global economic and financial stability and prosperity could most effectively be maintained
when a single state (a hegemonic power) is not only able but willing to underwrite structures and
processes of international economic system by acting as ―lender of the last resort‖.4 There is an
evident eco of Gramsci in Kindelberger‘s view and hegemon‘s role is not solely imposed via
coercion and compulsion but with voluntary and willing support and cooperation of the other
Richard Ned Lebow, ―The power of persuasion,‖ in Power in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London, NY: Routledge, 2007), 120-140.
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2005), 161.
Charles Kindelberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (London: Allen Lane, 1973).
3
members within the system it leads, thus giving them a direct stake in supporting and
maintaining this kind of hegemony.
For later scholars, Kindelberger‘s work has become important not only for the elaboration of
hegemony in the economic realm but how peace, security and order are best maintained in a
world which incorporates existence of hegemonic states of the kind he describes. However, the
concept of hegemony has become hardened in contemporary academic writing in comparison
with its origin in ancient Greek thought. John Mearsheimer defines hegemon as ―a state that is so
powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. In essence, a hegemon is the only
great power in the system.‖5 For him no genuine hegemon ever existed mainly due to ―the
stopping power of the water‖.6 Kendall Stiles refers it as ―the predominance of one state over its
peers‖7 and Robert Vitalis equates hegemony to ―the hierarchical order among rival great
powers.‖8
The general lack of consensus on the meaning of hegemony is further underpinned by John
Ikenberry distinction between ―liberal‖ and ―imperial‖ variants of hegemony. His liberal
conception corresponds to the hegemonic thinking evident in writings of Thucydides based on
recognition by the hegemon of the indispensability of allies for advancing its own interests as
well as for maintaining its leading status in the world though he doesn‘t make such a comparison
explicit. While the imperial variant corresponds to the understanding implicit at the core of
Mearshiemer‘s work.9 In one of their works Ikenberry and Kupchan equate hegemony with
―preponderance of military and economic capabilities.‖10
For Jack Levy and William Thompson the term ―hegemony‖ is akin to both concentration of
material capabilities in one state and the political dominance that this material strength may John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 40.
Ibid.
K. Stiles, ―Introduction: Theories of Non-Hegemonic Cooperation,‖ in Cooperating Without America: Theories and Case Studies of Non-Hegemonic Regimes, eds. S. Brem and K. Stiles (London: Routledge, 2009): 2-3.
Robert Vitalis, ―Theory Wars of Choice: Hidden Casualties in the ‗Debate‘ between Hegemony and Empire,‖ in
Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush, eds. C. P. David and D. Grondin (Adlershot: Ashgate, 2006), 26.
John Ikenberry, ―Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age,‖ Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 609-30. ; and John Ikenberry, ―Power and liberal order: America‘s postwar world order in transition,‖ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 133-52.
10G. Jhon Ikenberry and C. Kupchan, ―The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power,‖ in World Leadership and
Hegemony ed. D. P. Rapkin (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner,1990), 49.
4
enable.11
Whereas Keohane in the Hegemonic Stability Theory explicitly equates hegemony
with ―preponderance of material resources.‖12
However, in another work hegemony is defined as
something manifested through rules and its successful creation not only subjected to sufficiency
of power but willingness to exercise it too. Thus a hegemonic power is the one ―powerful enough
to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so.‖13
Corresponding to the debate on post-hegemony is an element of legitimacy. As Martha
Finnemore stated in 2009 article ―the structure of world politics….is social as much as it is material‖ and hence she reminds us the key importance of legitimacy as a factor of power further
adding ―actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be
given by others.‖14
The material preponderance of even a hegemon has to be self-limited in
order to employ fully the social dimensions of power.
This leads us to neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony. Neo-Gramscian perspectives in 1980s
are generally attributed to the rejection of established approaches within IR who have help
maintained prevailing social relations of power with all their injustices, within an existing order.
Robert Cox developed a Critical Theory of Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change
based on the dialectical conception of history centered on the constant process of historical
change and investigates the potential for alternative development.15
This perspective tries to
understand development of hegemony historically.
According to Cox, hegemonic structures are product of social processes, which include social,
cultural and ideological dimensions too. Here hegemony implies prevailing structures of power
and domination, secured by a combination of coercion and consensus. …. The later finds Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ―Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power balancing in Europe, 1945-1999,‖
Security Studies 14, Issue 1 (2005): 1-33.
R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32.
R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 234. ; P. K.
O‘Brien, ―The Pax Britannica and American Hegemony: Precedent, Antecedent or Just Another History,‖ in Two hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001, eds. P.K. O‘Brien and A. Clesse (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2002), 3-4.
Martha Finnemore, ―Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity,‖ World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 58-61.
Robert W. Cox, ―Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,‖ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155. ; Robert W. Cox, ―Gramsci, Hegemony and International
Relations: An Essay in Method,‖ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-175. ; Robert
W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
5
expression in the general acceptance of certain ideas by a large number of actors and is also
undergirded by material resources and institutions. For him Pax Americana is over as
international hegemony is no longer linked so strongly to the role of a leading nation state but is
the expression of the hegemony of the social forces.16
The definitions quoted so far reflect the
tension regarding whether the question of hegemony is to be approached from perspective
resting on material preponderance or the one constituted by normative cohesion – a question also
addressed by Dent and Lee in their works.17
The confusion surrounding usage of the term ―hegemony‖ also stems from the misinterpretation
regarding wide array of terms simultaneously used to invoke unprecedented US-dominated
system in the contemporary history – a dominance that is overlapped with terms such as
―primacy‖, ―empire‖, ―imperium‖ and ―unipolarity‖ etc. Ikenberry removes this confusion when
he distinguishes application of terms like ―unipolarity‖ that ―refers narrowly to the underlying
material distribution of capabilities and not to the political patterns or relationships depicted by
terms such as empire, imperium, and hegemony.‖18
The post-Cold War relationship between the US and the ‗rest of the world‘ which is fundamental
to all aspects of the contemporary international order has largely remained dysfunctional since
1990s. The explicit absence of resistance to US primacy in the decade after the demise of the
Soviet Union does not negate the lack of presence of a constructive relationship capable of
addressing existing extremely urgent problems. However, those who were skeptical of any
imminent shift in the global distribution of power saw US playing ―inevitable…. central role in providing world order,‖ and had been stressing ―world politics will center around how other
powers relate to this global hegemon.‖19
But what these writers had been stressing is the
primacy enjoyed by the US with respect to a number of indicators of material power
conventionally defined as size of population, its territory, resource endowment, military might,
Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, ―Neo–Gramscian perspectives,‖ in Theories of International Relations, ed. Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler, Trans. Alex Skinner (London & NY: Routledge, 2014), 214-230.
C. M. Dent, ―Regional Leadership in East Asia: Towards New Analytical Approaches,‖ in China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, ed.C. M. Dent (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 280. ; L. Lee, US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars in Iraq (London: Routledge, 2010), 2.
G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, ―Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behaviour, and Systemic Consequences,‖ World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 3.
F. Fukuyama, ―Challenges to World Order after September 11,‖ in Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 242.
6
economic capacity and its organizational-institutional ―competence‖.20
They also stress how it
has faced neither any geostrategic rival nor any countervailing grouping of states. For them the
international order, therefore, is probably ―stuck with American hegemony.‖21
The list of scholars endorsing US hegemony as the most striking feature of the post-Cold War
world is probably as long as those contesting its scope and attributes. Among those who
acknowledge and advocate US hegemony include Mark Brawely asserting: ―If there was ever a
time in modern history that a hegemonic power existed, it is now.‖22
For Kori Schake this
hegemony will persist for another forty to fifty years.23
Carla Norrlof also backs the view that
we are ―truly in an era of US hegemony‖ that is ―stable and sustainable‖ and set to persist for the
―foreseeable future.‖24
For Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth: ―No system of sovereign
states has ever contained one state with comparable material preponderance.‖25
Robert Jervis
also vociferously asserts the United States ―is a hegemon in today‘s unipolar world order.‖26
The other camp consists of scholars claiming ―the time for US hegemony may have passed,‖27
as the conditions specifying it have already receded. Citing the same material power as threshold,
they hold the view that the rise of peer challengers, power centers along with relative decline of
the US in material power is gradually diminishing its global role. Such views endorsing a host of
premonitions of the possible erosion of US primacy and hence hegemony can be traced in
writings of Michael Cox, M. J. Williams, Kishore Mahbubani, Fareed Zakaria and Terrence
Paupp.28
When it was being stipulated by some scholars that the Obama Administration may not Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesely 1979), 131.
Kori N. Schake, Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2009), 1-4.
M. R. Brawley, ―Hegemonic Leadership: Is the Concept Still Useful?‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 19, (2003/04): 345.
Schake, Managing American Hegemony, 135.
Carla Norrlof, America‟s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2,x.
S. Brooks and W. Wholforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.
Robert Jervis, ―The Remaking of a Unipolar World,‖ The Washington Quarterly 29, no 3 (2006): 7.
M. H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained And Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 322.
M. Cox, ―Is the United States in Decline-Again? An Essay,‖ International Affairs 83, no.4 (2007): 643-53. ; M. J. Williams, ―The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Cox),‖ International Affairs, 83, no.5 (2007): 945-50. ; Kishore Mahbubani , The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). ; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008). ; and Terrence E. Paupp, The Future of Global Relations: Crumbling Walls, Rising Regions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xvi-xvii.
7
be dwelling on the options requiring ―renunciation of the hegemonic role and the responsibilities
that go with it,‖29
there was an acknowledgement of the contrary view in the official 2010
National Security Strategy. It gave due acceptance and awareness of ―a dynamic international
environment, in which different nations are exerting greater influence‖ and ―emerging powers in
every region of the world are increasingly asserting themselves.‖30
Such a view though not very optimistic in reflecting the US hegemonic role is yet not the least
reason of global financial crisis 2008 and US ability to sustain economic damage to its model of
capitalism. The event has been citied at length within the study as one of the empirical evidences
of the drift towards post-hegemony. It may also be not because of inward-looking US domestic
priorities and fewer dispositions to bear the responsibilities of international leadership as getting
increasingly evident in Trump‘s Administration also. More troubling is the US cultural and
ideological appeal and gradual erosion of elements of its traditional soft power which according
to Hunt, Parmar and Cox may not evoke quite as positive a response as they did in the second
half of the twentieth century.31
Others still find the problem even more deep-seated and find US
as the victim of its own successes. They hold the view that US has helped shape a world which is
not amenable to hegemonic direction.32
The same thought is expressed by John Agnew who
clearly states: ―American hegemony has set in motion a world that can no longer be dominated
by any single state or its cultural fruits.‖ 33
Thus it is apt to quote a statement from Ian Clark
from Hegemony in International Society that, ―whatever the precise condition of today‘s
international order, we can at least agree that it is now post-hegemonic.‖34
Though the discussion on aspects of ―hegemony‖ and its scope is inconclusive but the
contemporary era has given further credence to the debate whether America still is the hegemon.
This debate has been explored at length in Chapter 3 where both from the academic angle and
I. W. Zartman, ―The Quest for Order in World Politics,‖ in Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 20.
United States National Security Council (USNSC) US National Security Strategy 2010 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2010. Hunt, The American Ascendancy, 322. ; I. Parmar and M. Cox, eds. Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Abindon: Routledge, 2010).
K. Bajpai and V. Sahni, ―Hegemony and Strategic Choice,‖ in War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century, ed. C. Chari (London: Routledge, 2008). ; C. Chari ed. War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2008).
John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), vii.
Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society, (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.
8
through citation of empirical evidence, it has been established that the era of unparalleled and
unprecedented US dominance has come to end. US still is the dominant state in any of the
military, political and cultural sectors but the economic and financial realm is fast in flux and
thus its ability to frame agendas in varied international settings and exact preferable outcomes
has considerably been reduced. What we are witnessing is a glaring discrepancy between its
overwhelming military and economic strength and increased inability to get others do what it
wants them to do. This has also challenged US legitimacy as the uncontested leader of the
prevailing international system.
The study thus approaches the question of hegemony away from its conventional connotations and
approaches the problem as rooted in social legitimacy. Thus as Barry Buzan reminds us the question
isn‘t whether US commands overwhelming control over a set percentage of global resources i.e. the
material power alone but whether such unprecedented dominance grants it ability to recruit
―followers‖ also.35
Corresponding to this aspect is Ian Hurd‘s view on hegemony that requires the
strong to subscribe ―to a minimum standard of compliance with the legitimized rule or institution.‖
Resultantly inducing the strong ―to alter their behavior by the effects of the legitimated rules.‖36
Such an approach according to Clark enhances the institutional dimension of hegemony rather than
simply enhancing the power of the hegemon.37
The notion of legitimacy is even more problematic in
neo-Gramscian accounts on the basis of considerable range of interpretation within the school of
thought.38
However, the hegemonic legitimacy most commonly is regarded as a construct of the
powerful where the ruled are seduced to believe it
35
Barry Buzan, ―A Leader without Followers? The United States in World Politics after Bush,‖ International Politics 45, no.5 (2008): 554-70. Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 78-9.
Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 20.
W. L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci‟s Political and Cultural Theory
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). ; P. Burnham, ―Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the International
Order,‖ Capital and Class 15, no.3 (1991): 73-92. ; A. W. Cafruny, ―A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony:
Stages of U. S. Power and the Evolution of International Economic Relations,‖ in World Leadership and Hegemony,
ed. D. P. Rapkin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990). ; R. W. Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996). ; B. Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and
Machiavelli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). ; B. Fontana, ―State and Society: The Concept of
Hegemony in Gramsci,‖ in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, eds. M.
Haugaard and H. H. Lenter (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). ; S. Gill, (ed). Gramsci, Historical Materialism
and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). ; D. P. Rapkin, (ed.) World Leadership
and Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,1990). ; A. S. Sassoon, (ed.) Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers
and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982).
9
―compatible with their interests.‖ 39
Thus in these neo-Gramscian perspectives, unlike the
Hegemonic Stability Theory emphasis is less on the provision of benefits and more on the moral
quality of leadership. Thus not only the consensual element but the shared societal norms
―constitute hegemonic power by defining the range of legitimate behaviour that will cause other
actors to recognize a state‘s identity as a leader.‖40
Without clearly delineating the US primacy grounded in material resources and hegemony
grounded in legitimacy, any intended study on the subject would mean nothing beyond US
enjoyment of degrees of material primacy. The normative account has to be incorporated while
dwelling on the concept to arrive at a conclusion reflecting contemporary realities. Clark traces
three types of stories commonly told about US hegemony since 1945.41
According to the first, it
stretches back unbroken to 1945. This tale is reflected in statements such as: ―For the US power
elite, being on the top of the world has been a habit for 60 years. Hegemony has been a way of
life.‖42
The second is the tale of structural discontinuity where US ceased to be the hegemon in
1970s till the end of the Cold War brought opportunity for its renewal.43
Finally the same logic
is applied where Bush Administration exploited US power potential much more assertively than
previous governments in the post-2001 scenario.44
Clark clearly distinguishes it as a shift away
from hegemony as a structural outcome to one as an agential design.45
However, there is a dichotomy attached to such an interpretation of US hegemony. If hegemony
is no more than the wider leverage in the exercise of unilateral power, then both 1971 and 2001
represented the height of US hegemony rather than a sign of its dissipation. In both episodes US
was able to unilaterally revise the prevalent political and security order by not only overturning Cox, Approaches to World Order, 136.
Lee, US Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 16.
Ian Clark, ―Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order,‖ International Affairs 85, no.
(2009): 23-36. Philip S. Golub, ―The Sun Sets Early on the American Century,‖ Le Monde Diplomatique, October 2007 at https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/25893.html accessed December 27, 2017. A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2002). ; M. Cox, ―Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony,‖ New Political Economy 6, no.3 (2001): 311-40. ; A. Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and
Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana (London: Routledge, 2009), 184-5.
44C. P. David and D. Grondin (eds.), Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush
(Adlershot: Ashgate, 2006). ; J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002). ; Bruce W. Jentleson, ―America‘s Global Role After Bush,‖ Survival 49, no.3 (2007): 179-
; Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005). ; D. E. Nuechterlein, Defiant Superpower: The New American Hegemony (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,2005). Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 24.
10
the Bretton Woods system46
but multilateral security arrangements it had itself been previously
advocating in 1971 and 2001 respectively. While at the other end of the spectrum same events
had extensively been quoted as the signs of US global decline. As Clark aptly asserts: ―To have
the capacity to exercise such revisionism was testimony to the continuing material powers of the
United States; it was the response to those exercises that left the future prospects of American
hegemony in doubt.‖47
Those who accept ―consensual legitimacy‖ as one of the core ingredients
of hegemony, ―there has been no recent American hegemony, its material-power primacy
notwithstanding.‖48
The study also instead of focusing on the attributes of the hegemon or the resources at its
commands viz-a-viz others, emphasizes the perception and responses of the ones it claims to
lead. It had been the ―crisis of legitimacy of US hegemony‖ that precipitated debates about the
continuing collapse of US leadership role in the world.49
Issue of legitimacy is central as it shifts
perspective on hegemony away from something structurally determined by distribution of power
alone and rather incorporates social component also. As Agnew elaborates, this approach
conceives hegemony as a new form of power resting on ―the enrolment of others in the exercise
of your power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing them that they should want what you
want.‖50
The study explores how this crisis of legitimacy in the contemporary ear has given rise
to altered and constrained dynamics for the dominant state sitting at the apex of the international
system.
This era the study identifies as ―post-hegemony‖ is defined as an era beyond the preponderant
presence of US led patterns of interactions and exercise of influence. In spite of being the single
largest aggregation of power, US relative decline in power and absolute decline in influence has
heralded us in a post-hegemonic international system. Here, not only the ―rise of the rest‖
including China‘s Rise constrains the politico-economic space available to the US but the
traditional friends and allies are also adopting increasingly sectoral approach – cooperating B. J. Cohen, Organizing the World‟s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations (New
York: Basic Books, 1977). ; F. Hirsh and M. W. Doyle, ―Politicization in the World Economy: Necessary
Conditions for an International Economic Order,‖ in Alternatives to Monetary Disorder, (eds.) F. Hirsh, M. W. Doyle and E. L. Morse (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).
Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 25.
Ibid.
Walden Bello, ―The Global Crisis of Legitimacy of Liberal Democracy,‖ Focus on Global South, October 2005, at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44824.html.
Agnew, Hegemony, 1-2.
11
where interests are aligned and offering overt resistance where interests diverge. The legitimacy
of the leading nation rests on acquired consensus and US in this post-hegemonic era increasingly
finds it unable to develop this consensus not only among its traditional rivals but staunch allies
and friends also. The study after assuming the post-hegemonic drift as a contemporary reality,
explores the military intervention behavior exercised by a global power in decline. This era may
give rise to another hegemony of US or any other power or it may drift into a non-hegemonic
phase, only time will tell.
0.1 Aim of the Study
It is to specify detailed mechanisms whereby decision makers within the US administration
become persuaded for considering foreign direct military intervention in fragile, conflict ridden,
unstable strategic regions; and how far they are constrained by the drift in the global hierarchy
towards post-Hegemony. In short, it is to prompt new thinking about the old problem of military
intervention in the contemporary era. This change in the nature of distribution of power at global
level has gradually altered conditions for both the intervening and the target state/s.
0.2 Thesis Statement
Increasing usage of logic of intervention in face of internal conflict and human suffering in a
unipolar world became a reality, yet in absence of universally accepted principles its selective
application raised prickly questions. The dawn of the post-hegemonic international system has
led to further marginalization of the United State‘s ability to exercise military intervention
abroad. In the contemporary global hierarchy in flux, application of time-tested and assertive
hegemonic practices like militarized unilateralism and pre-emption might not be a convenient
and preferable policy option. The study aims to explain how such transition periods create
constrained and altered conditions for international military intervention by the declining
hegemon especially in unstable strategic regions like Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
12
It simultaneously explains how the discriminatory application of the same principle in a post-
hegemonic international system would require the construction of an imminent threat to world
peace and security to provide the intervening state/s with the pretext for direct international
military intervention. Successful construction of an ―existential threat‖ by the declining hegemon
proves that international system is still very much the product of hegemon‘s preferences and
influence while the contrary developments send signals to peer competitors that long-awaited
systemic changes are on the horizon. These preliminary efforts to re-write the global hierarchy
thus prompt both friends and foes to recalibrate their foreign policy orientation keeping in view
their own strategic interests.
0.3 Hypothesis
Power transition within the global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international
system has led to the marginalization of US military interventionist policy.
0.4 Key Research Questions
What is the post-hegemonic international system and how has it marginalized United
State‘s ability to exercise military intervention abroad?
Within the post-hegemonic international system – at which systemic and unit levels does
a discourse and consensus need to emerge for military intervention?
How has power transition affected the US hegemonic interventionist policy in conflict-
ridden, unstable strategic regions like MENA in the post-Arab Spring scenario?
How recent conflicts in Libya and Syria prove marginalized role of the US military
interventions?
0.5 Theory & Method
Whenever a research project is undertaken, the choices available to the candidate are either to go
for quantitative, qualitative research or triangulation. After the formulation of hypothesis and
13
research questions, the researcher has to decide and after careful deliberation come to a
conclusion as to which type of research would most accurately inform the research problem at
hand. As the crux of the research undertaken within the study involves construction of ―threat
securitization military intervention model‖ within a post-hegemonic international system; the
assertions made within the model can most accurately be validated through a qualitative method
involving discourse analysis technique. Alternative choice was the Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA). It originates in positivist
assumptions about objectivity and provides a way of obtaining data to measure the frequency and
extent and not the meaning of the messages. It involves verification as the research goal;
progression from data collection, analysis and interpretation is serial; primary researcher
involvement is reduced to setting up the protocol and then analyzing and interpreting the data.
But the research problem at hand demanded a slightly different approach. It required a recursive
and reflexive movement between concept development – sampling – data collection – data
analysis – and, interpretation. The study undertaken involves data analysis in textual form. Thus
the study is strongly oriented to qualitative data analysis, which involves description, attention to
nuances and openness to emerging insights. Besides adoption of QCA could have given surface analysis rather than an accurate picture,
which required more in-depth analysis through qualitative method. For example reliance on
QCA would have noted few words like ‗threat‘, ‗attack‘, ‗kill‘, ‗bomb‘, ‗destroy‘ etc and
determine the number of times they are utilized or invoked for presenting Qaddafi or Assad
regime as ―threat‖. Such an approach would have failed to present the accurate or complete
picture because it could not have reflected the other synonyms employed or how they have been
framed within a particular context. Hence the qualitative approach fitted within the framework
determined for the study.
Theory Triangulation
Qualitative Researchers usually opt for triangulation to assure validity of the research through
the use of variety of methods to collect data on the same topic. This technique not only cross-
validates data but is simultaneously useful in capturing different dimensions of the same
phenomenon. There are four types of triangulation: (a) data triangulation, (b) method
14
triangulation, (c) investigator triangulation, and (d) theory triangulation. The study has employed
theory triangulation for the analysis and interpretation of data gathered for research.
It relies on three dominant schools of thought represented below (Figure 0.1) on a continuous
spectrum to establish grounds for theoretical research. A. F. K. Organski‘s ―Power Transition
Theory‖ with roots in ―Realist‖ school of thought and Barry Buzan‘s ―Securitization Theory‖
with links to ―Social Constructivism‖ along with insights from T. A. Van Dijik‘s and Van
Leewen ―Discourse Analysis‖ technique has helped formulate a ―Military Intervention Threat
Securitization Model‖, subsequently tested in case studies of Syria and Libya.
Realism
Social Constructivism
Critical Theory
Power Transition Theory
Securitization Theory
(insights from) Discourse Analysis
Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model51
Figure 0.1. Theoretical Basis of Dissertation
Hence, Triangulation has been employed to achieve two basic purposes with regards to the
research undertaken. First, it has been done to reduce the risk that study‘s conclusions might
reflect bias because of limitations of a specific theory, thus allowing broader understanding of
the issues under investigation. Secondly, this has also been done with the aim to produce
coherence in the study‘s arguments that dwells on post-hegemonic phase in the global hierarchy
to power transition and threat securitization for military intervention in the regional hierarchy
(Figure 0.2).
This study repeatedly employs terms such as ―threat securitization‖ or ―military intervention threat securitization‖ throughout the study. This basically is a model developed in Chapter 2 after incorporation of three aforementioned schools of thought. This model explains the underlying assumptions about the change in US military interventionist policy in the post-hegemonic system and how these assumptions will be used to validate study‘s hypothesis through case studies of Syria and Libya.
15
Post-Hegemonic Drift within the Global Hierarchy (US waning hegemony)
Power Transition in the Regional Hierarchy (MENA in transition)
Threat Securitization for Military Intervention (Libya & Syria)
Figure 0.2. Arguments developed within the study
The detailed link between them for the formulation of a military intervention model has been
explored in Chapter 2. It first establishes characteristics of the bourgeoning Power Transition
program and its extension Multiple Hierarchy Model. It then identifies the theoretical gap in the
research program by linking the two models and applying it for study of contemporary era and
developments. ―Threat Securitization Military Intervention Model‖ thus formulated help us
analyze change in military intervention behavior of a declining global hegemon i.e. US in an era
reflecting drift towards ―post-hegemony.‖
Comparative Case Study Research Design
The study is qualitative employing comparative case-study research design. A case study
involves in depth study of a particular situation rather than a sweeping survey regarding the
phenomenon under investigation. It narrows down a very broad field of research into easily
researchable topic. It might not fully explore the question under investigation within the study
but it will give some indications and allow further elaboration of the research undertaken. A
case-study can also be designed as a comparative investigation that shows relationships between
two or more than two subjects as enunciated by Michele C. Flores in her elaboration of
comparative methods.52
The study incorporates insights from Flores comparative methods to
enrich the findings of the project under investigation.
For determining the extent of post-hegemonic drift within the global hierarchy and detection of
change in US military interventionist policy, the study relies on ―structured, focused
Michelle C. Flores, ―Comparative Methods,‖ in 21st
Century Political Science: A reference Handbook, ed. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (California: SAGE Publications, 2011): 283-92.
16
comparison‖ of Libyan and Syrian cases. This method has been advocated in Alexander George
and Andrew Bennett‘s Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences and allows
for collection of data that can be systematically compared as well as accumulated.53
Catherine L.
Jhonson in her elaboration of case study methodology also recommends this as one of the
qualitative methods adopted by social science researchers to rigorously examine an event, for
developing original theoretical insight and for allowing in-depth appreciation of complex
phenomenon being observed.54
―Structured, focused comparison‖ required same information to be collected for Libya and
Syria, and same questions to be addressed in each case to draw valid causal inferences. Research
establishes how both these cases represent the most appropriate case-studies for elaborating
military intervention model in a post-hegemonic international system. The study specifically
chooses Arab upheavals 2011 and explores how the unfinished transition in MENA in the wake
of the Arab Spring gave rise to competitive environment regionally. This competition for the
reconfiguration of the regional hierarchy has manifested itself in regional conflicts in Libya,
Syria and Yemen etc. It simultaneously reflects US marginalized role to affect political outcomes
within the region in the backdrop of power transition within the global hierarchy. This inability
to affect desired outcomes can directly be linked to US role as a declining hegemon and
establishes a change in US military intervention behavior; the choice of Libya and Syria were
most appropriate to explore the phenomenon.
Libya was chosen because a foreign direct international military intervention took place after the
unrest against the Qaddafi regime in the wake of Arab uprisings; and US back-seat and ―leading
from behind‖ role was vocally criticized as a sign of abdication of its role as the world‘s leading
superpower and as an early indication of its decline. Similarly, Syrian case-study was the logical
choice to further explore the sings of arrival of post-hegemony, especially within MENA. Obama
Administration explicitly stated that chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime would
constitute a ―red line‖ that would prompt punitive military reaction from the US. In spite of
publicly committing to such a path, the Obama Administration failed to implement it, thus giving
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
Catherine L. Jhonson, ―Case Studies,‖ in 21st
Century Political Science: A reference Handbook, ed. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (California: SAGE Publications, 2011): 293-99.
17
further credence to the argument that decades of unprecedented American dominance within the
region were over. It simultaneously gave substance to the argument that US would no longer be
be able to act as sole dominant arbiter within the region.
Thus these case-studies helped us reveal and illuminate a previously ignored issue of studying
post-hegemonic drift in the international system through foreign direct military intervention in a
conflict-ridden, unstable regional hierarchy.
Variables
The study is based on two variables. ―US military interventionist policy‖ is the dependent
variable and ―post-hegemonic power transition‖ is the independent variable because the
proposition of the thesis shows that dependent variable is affected by the independent variable. It
is the power transition in the contemporary era and drift towards the post-hegemonic phase that
has affected US military intervention behavior.
Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation
The study first establishes that long-awaited systemic changes in the shape of waning US
hegemony are on the horizon. It relies on already published academic material: journals, articles
as well as latest figures available through primary and secondary sources to determine the extent
of hegemonic control lost by US vis-a-viz other peer challengers in the contemporary
international system. The data explicitly relies on published, available, accessible and retrievable
data to gauge the prevalent perception among scholarly and analytical community; and make
inferences based on the dominant thought.
The next stage establishes power transition in the regional hierarchy and explains with reference
to the foreign policy pursuits of major regional actors that fragile regional balance of power in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the first Gulf War of 1990s is fast in flux. It
establishes that changes in the global hierarchy though not directly linked with the upheavals
occurring in the region; nevertheless affect regional hierarchy significantly and trigger events
18
there. US inability to affect the outcome of events like Arab Spring emboldens regional actors
for assertive foreign policy behavior and draw extra-regional actors into the region. The regional
and extra-regional challengers to US policies speculating changes in global power hierarchy
resort to traditional hard balancing strategies to protect their self-interests.
The argument for validation relies on both primary and secondary data. Primary data refers to the
explicit foreign policy declarations of these actors, available in the shape of official documents.
While the secondary data refers to the way foreign policy developments have been identified and
published in the news stories, articles and journals and how they have been used to build specific
narrative about involvement and role of different actors within the region. To help address
author‘s bias a wide range of news stories have been consulted from both Arab and non-Arab
sources. Local, regional and international stories all are simultaneously quoted to verify the
foreign policy claims, aims and objectives of the actors involved. The aim of relying on news
stories, in particular, is to determine how alignments and realignments in the region were
presented in the region for the local and international audience. Based on this foreign policy
orientation of key actors and their role in Libyan and Syrian conflict were gauged.
Discourse Analysis Technique
Once the conditions specifying post-hegemony in the international hierarchy and MENA in
transition are established, case-studies of Libyan military intervention and Syrian emerging
scenario are studied at length to ascertain change in foreign direct military intervention behavior
involving the declining hegemon. The study probes into the political discourse of both the
interveners and the target states to determine how ―securitization theory‖ along with ―discourse
analysis‖ technique is employed to construct ―threat‖ for ―international military intervention‖.
The case studies are also used to elaborate the link between unit and systemic level variables,
and establish how and why foreign military intervention model in case of Libya could not be
replicated for Syria so far.
The case-studies examine the intertextual encounters based on identity, morality, security, threat
and legitimacy language that helped US construct ―existential threat‖ posed by Qaddafi regime
to ―international peace and security‖; and how the replication of strategies failed in case of Assad
19
regime because of successful counter-narrative by Syrian regime allies. The insights form Van
Dijik‘s and Van Leewan ―Discourse Analysis‖ approach helped analyze ―war legitimation
discourse‖ employed in both cases. The approach looks into presidential ―speech acts‖ that
constructed the kind of ―threat‖ Libyan and Syrian regimes posed; examines discursive practices
by the US president, other dominant US elite actors like Secretary of State etc. and US allies;
analyzes the employment of moral, social, security, ideological, religious, and political language
and explores intertextual patterns in both official political language and media discourse. Then it
compares the reproduction or resistance to official rhetoric and discursive structures in media for
―war legitimation‖ and ―military intervention‖ in Libya and Syria. It thus employs political
speeches and statements of elite actors of both the target state and the intervening parties to
analyze post-hegemonic regional hierarchy, military intervention threat securitization, and
construction of war legitimation discourse. Both case studies help us validate study‘s hypothesis.
Why Political Speech/Discourse was opted?
Jonathan Charteris-Balck defines ―political speech‖ as ―a coherent stream of spoken language
that is usually prepared for delivery by a speaker to an audience for a purpose on a political
occasion.‖55
Broadly speaking they are either classified as policy-making or consensus-building
speech, though a clear-cut division does not exist as the typology suggest. Whenever political
leaders deliver speeches or address public they have the audience in mind and their choice of
language is influence by their assumptions about the audience current state of knowledge about
the event under focus. They also have understanding of the media through which speech will be
transmitted to attain maximum effect.
As speech is a socially produced text, so it is analyzed by journalists, de-constructed by
academics and judged by the general public too. The study for analysis of political statements
and speeches rely on insights for critical discourse analysts like Van Leewan and Van Dijik
because these analysts believe language is crucial in determining social power relationships.
Their point of view is based on the assumption that power is not equally distributed in society
Jonathan Charteris-Black, Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), xiii.
20
and language is central to how this power is enforced. Thus with regard to the political utterances
critical discourse analyst interest is in analyzing how these social and political relations of
power, dominance and inequality are enforced and determining the role of discourse in their
reproduction and permeation through society. Besides it is also significant whose voice is being
heard, who has more access to public mind as well as the privileged access to media.
Emphasize our De-emphasize their
positive positive characteristics
characteristics
De-emphasize our Emphasize their
negative negative
characteristics characteristics
Figure 0.3 Van Dijk – The Ideological Square56
With regard to the research undertaken it was analyzed that a discourse of threat securitization
for military intervention will set the stage for how mass media, leaders and citizens would define
the unrest in Libya and Syria in the wake of Arab Spring. For example, when a group in power is
referred as ―regime‖ it deemphasizes the positive characteristic of legitimacy that is implied
when the same group is referred as ―government‖. Conversely, if it is referred as an ―elected
government‖ this reinforces positive characteristic of being democratic. We have seen how
repeatedly these regimes are referred as ―fascist regime‖ as it further emphasizes its negative
characteristics. Similarly, the ones opposing these regimes as either referred with positive
characteristics ―revolutionaries‖ or relatively neutral nouns like ―rebels‖ are employed to negate
the negative connotation attached with the word ―terrorist‖ though there is an implicit hint that
such elements exist. Van Dijk through his ―Ideological Square‖ elaborates the same point (Figure
0.3).
T. Van Dijk, Ideology (London: Sage, 1998) , 267
21
When actions of a specific regime become matter of discourse, it ―expands‖ beyond specific
referent to be used as a more general orientation. Over time, with repeated usage and nuances
blend, we have a different perspective on the particular situation. That‘s exactly why discourse is
used for constructing threat securitization and its analysis help us understand the kind of
language employed to achieve one‘s objective. Hence, the political utterances (speeches,
statements) became the logical choice for analyzing threat securitization for Libya and Syria.
How Data Validity Assessed and Contradictions Resolved?
As the study involves threat securitization for international military intervention in Libya and
Syrian ongoing crisis, so the data basically relies on threat securitization through elite discourse.
The study focused on official discourse, presidential speeches, wider foreign policy debate for
military intervention in Libya and Syria, print and electronic media and public opinion polls and
surveys. In order to specify how the validity of the data for both case-studies was assessed and
contradictions resolved, the detailed process for Libya would be elaborated. It was
simultaneously repeated for Syrian case-study too.
First of all the temporal period was identified. In case of Libya, the temporal period focused on
the time since the unrest against the Qaddafi regime began in mid-February 2011 to his grisly
demise in Sirte on October 20, 2011.
Secondly, the elite actors within the US administration were identified. They were the President,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and any other related key government officials
who made significant statement about the Qaddafi regime or the unrest in Libya e.g. US
representative to the UNSC etc.
Thirdly, it was carefully outlined that speeches and statements should be from the chosen time
frame identified within the study so that it could be accurately gauged when the events were in
flux and no one was certain about the outcome of the situation, how the threat Qaddafi regime
posed was carefully constructed; how it materialized into UNSC resolution requiring
implementation of ―all necessary measures‖ so that threat could be accepted as imminent by both
the domestic and international audience. Similarly, the logic of reinforcing the same threat
22
throughout the conflict that could justify the continued operation by NATO that ultimately
brought the regime change was also explored.
Fourthly, these statements covered press statements, press conferences, TV interviews, official
meetings with foreign dignitaries, keynote addresses to briefings on NATO operation in Libya
etc.
Fifthly, most of these statements were accessed from the US official websites like
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ and https://www.state.gov/ which are not only electronically
accessible but retrievable too. The question of checking the validity of US official statements did
not arise as they were directly accessed from US official websites. For analyzing the narrative
from the other side, Libyan officials‘ statements during the same period were consulted. As it
involved translation of the original Arabic text into English, so as to reduce the biases wherever
Libyan official English subtitles of the original text were available it was given preference. In
other cases the translation of the same source was checked from different sources. For example,
it was checked how the same speech appeared in any of the Arab, African or Western
newspaper/media. In case of contradiction rather than relying on Western, African or Arab
sources, biases (if any) were simultaneously were quoted within the text.
Lastly, print media stories also played a vital role in threat construction. Whenever, threat
construction from ―Our‖ side representing US and allies was involved, research heavily relied on
Western international and pro-US Arab allies sources. For Libyan side, mostly African sources
or pro-Qaddafi African government sources like Algerian newspapers were consulted. So
basically effort was made not only to have access to the most truthful and accurate data but to
ensure the validity of the data the existence of bias in reporting or presentation of a political
statement was duly acknowledged and accordingly dealt with.
The methodology employed in case studies (Syria and Libya) can be summed up
Ontological Position: Subjective / Anti-foundational: The world out-there is the one of our
making.
Epistemological Position: Interpretive: knowing through interpretation
Theoretical Perspectives: Juxtaposition of Realist tradition and critical social constructivism.
23
Method of Analysis: Discourse Analysis (Van Dijik and Van Leewan)
Number of selves for discourse analysis: Two
―US‖ represented through United States and those on ―Our‖ side ―Them‖ represented by Libyan and Syrian regime and those with ―Them‖
Analytical focus: official discourse: presidential speech-acts and discourse on Libya and Syria;
wider foreign policy debate on military intervention in Libya and Syria; media (print and
electronic news articles) and public opinion polls.
Object of analysis: official texts, intertextual links, supportive texts, academic analysis, media
texts (local, regional and international) and public opinion polls and surveys (secondary).
Focus of study: US foreign policy and war legitimation discourse; Arab Spring upheavals in
Syria and Libya; identity, morality, fear, threat and legitimacy language and threat securitization
in the official and media discourses.
Number of events: Arab Uprising 2011; Libyan Unrest 2011; Syrian Civil War 2011 -2017
Temporal perspective of study: historical developments and construction of war legitimation
discourse in US foreign policy in official and media discourse during Libyan uprising 2011 and
Syrian civil war 2011 to date.
Focus of temporal period: for case studies of Syria and Libya- Arab Uprising 2011; Libyan
Unrest – 2011 till death of Mummar Qaddafi; Syrian Civil War 2011 to mid 2017 (the civil war
continues unabated till the point of submission of this study but the focus of the period was when
first chemical attacks by Assad regime were reported and Obama Administration speculated
direct military intervention.
Intervention: study of multiple discursive encounters in the presidential and official narrative on
Libyan and Syrian regime for threat securitization for international military intervention, their
reproduction / resistance in local, regional and international media and its overall impact on war
legitimation threat securitization.
24
Validity: Although there is no universally accepted terminology and criteria to evaluate
qualitative research but certain strategies are usually recommended that had been followed in the
study too to ensure validity of the study. First, Theory triangulation whereby different
perspectives help produce a more comprehensive set of findings has been followed; Second,
establishing a comparison case/seeking out similarities and differences across accounts to ensure
different perspectives are represented. Hence, ―structured, focused comparison‖57
of Syrian and
Libyan cases has been done; and Third, acknowledging biases in sampling and ongoing critical
reflection of methods to ensure sufficient depth and relevance of data collection and analysis. In
sampling a wide variety of Arab and non-Arab, local, regional and international sources were
consulted and quoted to minimize perspective bias of both author and those quoted;
0.6 Significance of the Study
The findings of the study will contribute to the already burgeoning Power Transition Research
program. It has contributed to the extension of the Power Transition Theory and its Multiple
Hierarchy Model by formulating a model for Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic
International System. It deals with a period when the US hegemony is in decline and other
potential actors are staging a comeback on the international theatre, before a new global
hierarchy is established. Power transition with its clear focus on the dominant state and potential
challenger misses the changing dynamics in wider international system when the system is in
flux. In the contemporary environment, this research program with scholarly analysis chiefly
through lens of China‘s Rise-US Decline has produced dearth of literature for impact of such
transitions on troubled regions like Middle East where a clear delink from previous US
hegemonic practices could be observed.
Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model introduced in the study will remove the
shortcoming in the Power Transition Research Program that hitherto has been restricted on the
analysis of outbreak of major power wars or wars within regional hierarchies with little or no
focus on exploring the link between the two. The study has contributed to the program by
George and Bennett, Case Studies.
25
looking at the effects of post-hegemony on foreign direct military intervention in troubled
regions like MENA.
Secondly, the exploration of the concept of intervention through political discourse technique has
helped us reveal social construction of ―intervention‖ discourse and how securitization of
projected ―threat‖ gain acceptance among members of the international community, eventually
labeling it ―existential‖ thus facilitating intervening state/s and providing them with desired logic
that establishes ground for intervention. Most of the existing literature on ―war‖, ―intervention‖
and the ―use of force‖ in the present day globalized world focuses on dimensions other than
―threat‖ as socially constructed phenomenon. The discursive dimension of threat construction
has still scope to be explored within military intervention cases.
Contemporary works in literature focus on purposes of the intervening state/s and identify them
in regime change, some geopolitical objective, gaining access to the economic resources of the
target state or recently most international interventions have been justified on humanitarian basis.
The underlying pattern of ―threat construction‖ and its ―securitization‖ through discourse has
widely been neglected in current literature which has been explored in the study through political
discourse analysis. The examples from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya have proved beyond doubt
that war is a discursive reality and the intervener/s resort to ―threat securitization‖ through
political discourse. Besides since 9/11 discursive dimension with regard to the military
intervention has been under focus for the Iraq War 2003. The scope for exploration of the same
discursive practices with respect to ongoing Libya and Syria conflicts is very much there as these
conflicts and their discursive threat securitization hitherto have captured little attention within the
IR academic circle.
0.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study
It is imperative to define the scope of the study and its limitations so as to avoid
confusion especially with regard to the contentious term ―post-hegemony‖. The study identifies
2008 as the year when the drift towards post hegemony started within the international system
and dwells on three global events of immense significance i.e. The Global Financial Crisis 2008;
Russian Resurgence in its Near-Abroad; and The Arab Spring 2011. It then picks up the Arab
26
Spring for detailed analysis because the Arab upheavals in MENA not only establish the link
between global and regional systems in transition but also explain impact of arrival of post-
hegemony in a key geo-political region. While elaborating that structural changes occurring
during the period are too important to be ignored, the study focuses only on the military
intervention behavior exercised by a global power now in decline.
The study simultaneously acknowledges the limitation of the research project as the post-
hegemonic phase has been explored with regard to the military intervention and that too in
MENA region only. Unless other regions like East Asia with its North Korean crisis or Russian
near-abroad with Georgian and Ukrainian crisis are explored plus other dimensions like impact
of this phase on US financial aid, economic realm etc., full impact of the post-hegemonic drift
would remain concealed.
0.8 Organization of the Study
The dissertation has been organized into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 discusses the concept of war and intervention and its evolution through history and
theory. Divided into two parts it covers the general literature on the use of force, war, military
intervention and how the use of force has changed over time, mapping out the just war tradition,
aspects related to ethical foreign policy, changes in the twenty-first century with a drift in trend
from inter-state to intra-state wars and discursive dimension in IR literature on war. A review of
different theoretical perspectives on the question of war and conflict has helped identify the
existing theoretical gap and scope for further exploration, laying basis for ―military intervention
threat securitization model‖ developed in the next chapter.
Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical framework for military intervention in post-Hegemonic
International System. It starts with the proposition that power transition in the contemporary
global hierarchy has triggered ―post-hegemony‖ in the international system which coincides with
the waning influence of the established but declining hegemon (US) and increased assertiveness
on part of other rising and resurgent powers. It simultaneously explores how global hierarchy in
transition affects key regional hierarchies ridden with conflict and chaos, and establishes the link
27
between the two by extending the Power Transition Research Program. It concludes that the drift
towards the post-hegemonic international system not only raises prickly questions about
declining hegemon‘s international standing but alters its military intervention behavior in
regional hierarchies by increasing its reliance on securitization of threat through political
discourse.
Chapter 3 validates theoretical assertions made in Chapter 2 regarding impending power
transition in the global hierarchy and how it has already triggered post-hegemonic phase in the
international system. The ―Rise of China‖ along with alternate power centers has considerably
constrained US clout to obtain ―desired outcomes‖ and few significant political developments in
the first decade of the twenty-first century are already tilting the debate in favour of drift towards
post-hegemony.
Chapter 4 deals with power transitions in regional hierarchy in post-hegemonic phase. The
focus of contemporary debate on power transition through ―China Rise-US Decline‖ lens seldom
explores impact of such global transitions on troubled regions like Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) where a clear de-link from previous US hegemonic practices could be observed. Here
significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy have given rise to new dynamics, made
possible through conflict, instability and erosion of traditional structures of power hierarchy.
These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in exploring the link
between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, being more vulnerable as a play
ground where potential challengers to the declining hegemon could be seen with their assertive
foreign policy behavior and traditional soft and hard balancing strategies. These regional
hierarchies are open for great power intervention because disturbances in these regional
hierarchies with interests at stake for great powers draw them it in local settings and make
regional hierarchies as play ground for proxy wars and at time for direct and overt military
intervention.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss international military intervention in Libya from the perspective of
post-hegemony. US ―leading from behind‖ exposed not only limitations of a global power in
decline in influence in the wake of failed Middle Eastern adventures of Afghanistan and Iraq, but
a changed international environment that heralded arrival of potent peer competitors in
international politics. Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model developed in chapter 2 is
28
tested with reference to construction of threat for military intervention in Libya. It asserts how
gradual loss of influence made co-opting of international and regional institutions along with
construction of target state as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and security contingent
for semblance of legitimacy for undertaking third international military intervention within a
span of a decade since 9/11. US backseat role and reliance on securitized military discourse gave
earlier indications of global drift towards post-hegemony in international system.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the Syrian conflict in progress since last seven years shedding
further light on the global hierarchy in transition and how far the world has moved away from
US controlled patterns of interactions since the fateful events of Global Recession 2008; Russian
resurgence and belligerence in its ―near abroad‖; and the Arab Spring triggered post-hegemony
in the international system. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) seemed drifting away from
predominant US control established since the unprecedented victory of the First Gulf War.
Syrian civil war has become arena of the proxy war where the battle for a new global hierarchy is
simultaneously being played along with restructuring of the erstwhile US endorsed and allied
regional hierarchy. Decades-long and time tested old allies are gradually replaced and those with
links still intact with their American counterparts have displayed increased assertiveness with
regards to regional disputes. The writing on the wall tells MENA by the resolution of the Syrian
conflict will have empowered sworn US enemies in a region that traditionally and hitherto had
been shaped in accordance with US desires and goals. A post-hegemonic MENA along with
post-hegemonic international system is on the march.
Conclusion sums up the task undertaken in the study. It points out the limitation of the research
program as well as the way forward for future scholarly work to be undertaken within the field.
29
Chapter1: Literature Review
War &Intervention through History and Theory
It won‘t be an overstatement to claim, that questions of war and peace, have most consistently
preoccupied human mind since times immemorial. The centrality of the subject to human
existence and its direct impact on human life, has led political scientists to give immense
importance to exploration of key concepts related to the use of force in global society. Tons of
available material on the subject focuses on pertinent aspects but fresh perspectives keep
intriguing scholarly minds and beg constant attention. It would be impossible to present a review
of the available literature; however, considering the scope of the subject undertaken in this study,
few broad areas directly related to dissertation will be discussed.
Review of literature would fall in two categories with the aim to cover the allotted area. First part
will cover the general literature on the use of force, war, military intervention and how the use of
force has changed over time, mapping out the just war tradition, aspects related to ethical foreign
policy, changes in the twenty-first century with a drift in the trend from inter-state to intra-state
wars and discursive dimension in IR literature on war; Second part will chiefly focus on review
of the different theoretical perspectives on the question of war and conflict, and will determine
whether a theoretical gap could be identified for further exploration.
The study takes into account other determining variables apart from post-hegemonic drift that
brought a change in US policy on the use of force. The literature review chiefly reflects on the
changes in the war / intervention tradition throughout history and how the evolving tradition
along with peculiar circumstances has constrained US military interventionist policy in the
contemporary era.
1.1. War / intervention through History
30
Any study of foreign military intervention has to begin with the use of force which has been the
most prominent, consistent and regular feature of international politics, being employed against
one another by members of the international society without discrimination, as far back as
history can trace. This is because how ―force is used among members of a society, by whom, and
to what purpose reveal a great deal about the nature of authority in the group and the ends that its
members value.‖1 The shared notions that govern the use of force in international society grant
large-scale force as the prerogative of states only; use of violence by non-state actors is not only
branded as illegitimate but its perpetrators are hunted down by states too, often collectively, in
the name of the ―international community‖. Hence intervention and ultimately war becomes the
most consequential ways of enforcing standards of conduct agreed upon by the states.
Unlike war, interveners have choice whether to use force; that‘s why they ―debate long and hard,
and those and among themselves, about whether to intervene, who should intervene, and what
social values exactly are being secured by uses of force.‖2 Patterns of military intervention might
have changed over time but it is likely to remain salient phenomenon on the international scene.
The undeniable fact is interventions are
―one of those phenomenon endemic in the quasi-anarchic nature of the international system, irrespective of its particular structure and the particular types of domestic political systems of its major actors….there is no international system known in the past or imaginable in the future which is either reassuringly
preventive or comfortably non-conducive to military interventions.‖3
Part of the problem inherent to the study of any type of intervention is the difficulty in defining
the concept. What has particularly intrigued scholarly minds is how to differentiate ―classical
wars‖ from ―foreign military interventions‖; whether one can be interchanged with another; what
qualifies as an ―intervention‖ and why it is being pursed in such an enthusiastic manner as
compared to the term ―war‖ in contemporary international discourse. Stanley Hoffmann defines
1 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 1.
Ibid., 2.
Bruce Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite, ―The Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ in Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, ed. Ariel E. Levite et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 14.
31
intervention in its most abstract form as ―practically the same thing as international politics, from
the beginning of time to the present.‖4
However, Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite based their distinction on the basis of three
factors. First, the principle domain of conflict is ―interstate‖ in case of ―classical wars‖ with the
aim to transform the international order and ―intrastate‖ in case of ―foreign military intervention‖
to affect domestic affairs of the state, not the external activities. Recognizing both have
consequences and reverberations beyond their principle domains form ―outside in and inside
out‖, respectively, they go on to explain that the point is not to define their limits so much as to
differentiate their epicenters. Second, ―direct physical control over territory, destruction of
military capabilities, often also destruction of the adversary‘s economic infrastructure‖ is the
central objective being pursued in ―classical war‖, while focus is less to control the territory than
to shape in intervention that Oran Young calls ―the political authority structure‖ of the target
state, to be done in part coercively, nevertheless indirectly through a local ally who is to be
assisted in gaining or maintaining power.
Third difference is with respect to the strategy. Classical wars are fought with strategies that are
primarily military and secondarily political. Armed forces of the attacking state confront the
military forces of the target state on the battlefield. Other strategies like special operations,
psychological warfare, counter-terrorism and other conventional political strategies are largely
supplementary and supportive ones. The relative balance is reversed in foreign military
intervention i.e.it becomes a political-militarily strategy. The goals being pursued are much less
readily translatable into operational military objectives as the intervener has to build political
support for his local ally and not just defeat the adversary on the battlefield. Besides
unconventional strategies particularly counterinsurgency guerrilla warfare and anti-terrorism
gain ascendance over conventional military capabilities.5
What needs to be understood that military interventions are neither the only nor the most
frequent strategy of intervention but in fact represent ―only a small segment of the intervention
Stanley Hoffmann, ―The Problem of Intervention,‖ in Intervention in World Politics, ed., Hedley Bull (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), 7.
Jentleson and Levite, ―Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ 5-6.
32
field.‖6 Other possible interventionary strategies being what Richard Little calls the ―verbal
intervention‖ of demarches and other declaratory diplomacy; carrot and stick strategy where both
economic benefits, aid and sanctions are employed; intelligence activities and covert actions; and
military strategies short of full-fledged direct intervention like aid, training, advisers, even
sporadic incursions are employed to coercively influence the internal political order of another
state.7
Martha Finnemore states that intervention policies lie at the boundary of war and peace. Even
when military forces are deployed against another state, yet states take pains not to label explicit
hostile activity as war. While intervention is considered as different and usually something less
than war but just what those differences are, can be at times difficult to discern from facts on the
ground. Though a formal declaration of war is a trivial distinction, but one that needs to be taken
seriously Finnemore asserts. She defines this reluctance to declare war as a change from the past
patterns. At one place she asserts that one distinction is that interventions are smaller in scale and
have more limited objectives than war, but at the same time recognizes that when objectives are
to replace whole governments, the definition loses its clarity except limited objectives do not
include territorial conquest and absorption. Thus objective alone seems to be a weak source of
distinction between two; just as if scale is the criteria i.e. one has wars with strong states and
intervenes in weaker ones, then why even anyone would bother with the term ―intervention‖.8
Most of the existing literature on interventions dates back to the 1960s, agree with James
Rosenau that the central objective of a military intervention is to change ―political authority
structure‖ of the target state; hence they distinguish it from more pedestrian foreign policy and
emphasize the need for military personnel to cross borders, presumably for the same reason. The
debate during 1960s basically centered on the question whether intervention required an armed
force.9 The term, therefore, has evolved over a period of time and has been redefined in ways
Richard Little, Interventions: External Involvement in Civil Wars (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), 11.
Ibid., 8-11.
Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, 8-9.
James N. Rosenau, ―The Concept of Intervention,‖ Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2 (1968): 165-76; James N. Rosenau, ―Intervention as a Scientific Concept,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 2 (1969): 149-71; James N. Rosenau, ―Foreign Intervention as Adaptive Behavior,‖ in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore (Baltimore, Md: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 129-51.; Oran Younge,
―Systemic Bases of Intervention,‖ in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore, (Baltimore, Md: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 111-126; Jentleson and Levite, ―Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ 1-22. ; Max Beloff, ―Reflections in Intervention,‖ Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2
33
that legitimate or require certain kinds of behavior and deligitimate or bar others depending on what
is required to be accomplished. For example, the term ―humanitarian intervention‖ has evolved over
time from military action to rescue one‘s own citizens in other states to the protection of citizens of
other states by military means and now as response to ―complex humanitarian emergencies.‖10
How
the pattern of intervention is increasingly being understood in the normative context, definition of
who is a ―human‖ and why multilateralism is being preferred to unilateralism has been explored by
Finnemore in The Purpose of Intervention.11
Hence, for a state to describe the activity as an
―intervention‖, they not only are suppose to understand that they are engaging in something labeled
so but also had to use the term when writing to and talking with one another at the time. Secondly,
military action has to be involved.12
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts on the other hand were concerned with the implication of the
term ―intervention‖ in international law and therefore, produced a legal definition: ―the forcible
or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain
conduct or consequences on that other state.‖13
For some it might represent a narrow definition
but nevertheless significant because it differentiates those military operations aimed at
influencing the internal affairs of the states from those whose purpose is to influence the
outcome of an international dispute between two or more state parties.14
It is important to understand domestic dimension of international disputes and how the internal
affairs of one state may be the root cause of international disagreement or indeed constitute a
threat or be perceived as such to international peace and security. Even when military serve both
―internal‖ and ―international‖ security purposes, Steven Haines asserts that still legal distinction
between two may still have relevance to the particular circumstances of each case and may also
influence the way soldiers conduct themselves. For non-legal observers Haines keep it simple as
it includes ―the use of military forces to intervene in international disputes.‖15
While Steve Chan
(1968): 198-207; Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963), 20.
Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, 10.
Ibid., 52-84.
Ibid., 11-12.
Sir R. Jennings and Sir A. Watts, Oppenheim‟s International Law Volume One: Peace (Introduction and Part I),
9th
ed., (London: Longman, 1996), 430. Steve Haines, ―Military Intervention and International Law,‘ in Issues in International Relations, ed. Trevor C.
Salmon (New York: Routledge, 2000), 104.
Ibid., 104.
34
regards intervention as ―any involvement by a government in a conflict situation that does not
concern it in a direct or major way.‖16
Although the terminology ―war‖ has been more frequently employed as compared to
―intervention‖ in recorded history but forced military intervention go all the way back to the
Peloponnesian Wars, when Athens and Sparta intervened in civil wars and other internal political
conflicts of the city-states as expressly stated by Thucydides: ―It became a natural thing for
anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from outside‖.17
Hans Morgenthau
also elaborates why from ―the time of ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it
advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests.‖18
Besides the interveners had been superpowers and regional powers, democracies and non-
democracies; just as the target countries have been both distant ones and neighboring allies; and
the local allies have been both incumbent regimes and insurgent movements.
The contemporary literature on military operations since World War II has identified three
different categories of intervention for influencing international disputes: partial intervention,
impartial intervention and enforcement actions. There is nothing new about ―partial
intervention‖; any state which has provided assistance to another to resolve an international
dispute throughout history is labeled as one. The category also includes the military combat
operations within any sort of military alliance framework. ―Impartial intervention‖ is the one
when military forces are deployed between states with the aim to act as honest brokers to aid
dispute resolution. Not entirely a post-Second World War phenomenon though, has provided a
baseline for future since operations under the ―peace-keeping‖ banner of UN Enforcement Force
to Egypt in 1956. However, a sharp increase in the number of operations in late 1980s and early
1990s; the number of states providing forces to them; and the variety being mounted has
generated complexity in terms of the legal basis for what these operations are trying to achieve
and how to distinguish ―impartial intervention‖ from ―enforcement action‖, which brings us to
the third category of intervention defined as one which involves application of UN-endorsed
Steve Chan, International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare, and Justice (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 81.
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner (Penguin: Hammondsworth, U.K., 1954), 208.
Hans J. Morgenthau, ―To Intervene or Not to Intervene,‖ Foreign Affairs, 45, no.3 (April 1965): 425.
35
military sanctions (diplomatic, economic, and military) in accordance with Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.19
Beside these three categories there are military operations which intend to have an impact on the
internal affairs of the ―host‖ state. A further sub-categorization is done to distinguish between
military operations done with the consent of the host state and those that do not. They fall into
four categories. First: at request of or with agreement of the host state. It can become illegal,
even if the deployment is done with the consent of the host state, when forces deployed overstep
their mandate. Another problem notwithstanding prior consent is subsequent legal confusion
over interpretation and even fabrication of the already given consent; Second: at request of
previous colonial possessions e.g. U.K. interventions in Muscat and Malaysia and French in
Chad and Zaire; Third: non-consensual military intervention e.g. Soviet Union in Hungary and
U.S. in Grenada. This position stems from the legal definition employed for ―intervention‖ which
implies lack of consent by a government or at best its unwilling acquiesce in face of a military
force deployed in its territory. This precise legal definition reflects the International Law
Commission‘s draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, by Article 3 of which ―every
State has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other
State.‖ Besides Article 2(7) of the UN Charter itself establishes the same position with respect to
the domestic affairs of the states, as one of its fundamental principle.; Fourth: humanitarian e.g.
Liberia and Somalia. A detailed analysis of this last category will be done subsequently in the
discussion on the Just War Tradition section.20
Interventions differ in their scale, composition, duration, intensity, authority and above all
objectives. Keeping these differences in view Richard Hass classified military interventions on
the basis of their purposes as: deterrence, prevention, compellence, punishment, peacekeeping,
war-fighting, peace-making, nation-building, interdiction, humanitarian assistance and rescue.21
Hass covered these types of interventions in his work on the use of American military force in
the post-Cold War world, exploring when it is appropriate for the US to use military force as an
appropriate policy tool. Haines, ―Military Intervention,‖ 104-111.
Ibid., 111-127.
Richard Hass, Intervention: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World, revised. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 49-65.
36
Apart from defining the term ―intervention‖ and its sub-categorization, scholarly work on
interventions has focused on questions like why interventions have taken place, how they have
been conducted and what policy lessons had been learned. However, in the age of
internationalism, when the actions, be they domestic or international in their orientation, are
under the global scrutiny and whether they were right or wrong being unceasingly determined or
labeled so, one cannot afford to gloss over general normative or legal consideration of a military
action whether a ―war‖ or an ―intervention‖. Hence how war and intervention grapple with
questions of sovereignty, norms, ethics, motives, intentions, perceptions, legitimacy, justice, law
(to quote few among others) and influence international order or shape new rules has been
debated throughout history.
1.1.1. Just War Tradition
It would not be an overstatement to assert that ―no‖ discussion on war may be complete without
mapping the evolution of the Just War Tradition along with the controversies that shaped it and
without investigating the normative dilemmas it pose to the contemporary wars and
interventions. By addressing aforementioned questions of sovereignty, law, ethics, justice,
norms, legitimacy, and intentions etc., the tradition shapes our contemporary understanding of
changing pattern of foreign military interventions.
Just War Tradition is more than a two thousand year old conversation about legitimacy of war22
that over time has crystallized around several core principles and sub-traditions, which however
provide more than a framework for judgment as it also constrains and enable certain types of
activity. By using the word ―just‖ the tradition is not implying that it is just to wage war or it is
good in itself but instead recognizing it as a social fact which can‘t be overlooked, hence the
criteria is to be used as a tool for evaluating and critiquing the actions of those involved both
political leaders and soldiers.23
Acknowledging war with its evil consequences, principally the death of non-combatants;
tradition draws attention to the fact that there are some wrongs worse than the wrong of war T. Nardin, ―Ethical Tradition in International Affairs,‖ in Traditions of International Ethics, eds.T. Nardin and
D.R. Mapel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-21. ; J.N. Rengger, ―On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,‖ International Affairs 78, no. 2, (April 2002): 362.
J.T. Johnson, ―The Just War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,‖ in The Leader‟s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity
and Responsibility, ed. J. C. Ficarrotta (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), 110.
37
itself. The Just War is a ―theory‖ in the loosest sense, in fact comprising many fragmented sub-
traditions, indeed sub-sub-traditions, none of which permanently prevail over one another. It at
best can be defined as a conversation between different theories: secular and divine, legal and
moral, consequentialist and deontological.24
Alex Bellamy comprehensively sums up that these fragmented sub-traditions are united by three
common factors: first, they are unanimous in their concern about how the recourse to war ought
to be limited and its conduct made as humane as possible; second, these sub-traditions have their
origin in the Western tradition of theological, legal and philosophical reasoning; third, despite
having differences over the interpretation and the relative weight they attach to them, they do
subscribe to a common set of rules governing jus ad bellum (the decision to wage war) and jus in
bello (its conduct).25
The evolution of the tradition over centuries along these lines has lead us to
an era where war has been outlawed as a policy tool and interventions in the internal affairs of
other states require fierce debate between and among themselves and has to meet minimum
criteria of justice and legitimacy.
Although the Just War Tradition is commonly traced to ancient Greece and Rome but there is
sufficient proof to assert that earlier civilizations like Aztecs, Chinese,26
Ancient Hindus,
Egyptians and Hebrew civilizations also attempted to limit war.27
Attempts to limit recourse to
war and its conduct in antiquity was witnessed in ancient Greece between 700 and 450 BC,
derived mainly from Hellenic customs and written treaties. The aftermath of the Peloponnesian
war brought new forms of philosophy to the fore, prompting new ways of thinking about war.
Plato directly addressed the question of war in The Laws; accepting war as the eternal feature of
human society, he asserted that it should only be waged for the sake of peace.28
Compared to Plato‘s deontological conception of justice, a relational concept was given by According to him, justice depended on human relations. He not only came
forward
Alex J. Bellamy, introduction to Just Wars From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 3-4.
Ibid.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. S.Griffth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 76-78.
P. Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 9-10.
Plato, The Laws, trans. T. Saunders (London: Penguin, 2005).
F. D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle‟s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 84.
38
Aristotle.
29
with legitimate causes of war but even used the term ―just war‖.30
Thus Ancient Greece saw
restraints placed on both recourse to war and its conduct after having witnessed devastating
consequences of war for Athens and the Hellenic society but these restraints were valid for only
in internal Greek wars.
Rome valued military glory so much that their leaders launched new offensive almost every year
but this does not mean, there were no rules about the decision to wage war. Ancient Rome
believed in satisfying gods to gain victory and therefore, followed ius fetiale (fetial law) to please
the gods when deciding to launch defence.31
Under fetial law, emissaries were sent to the enemy
states with proposed demands. After a thirty-three days period, when either those demands were
rejected or no reply was forthcoming, war would be waged that too once religious leaders (the
fetiale) had endorsed the proposed action. This practice too disappeared around 171 BC.32
Neither the concern to create a pretext to wage a war nor the fetial law could restrain Roman
expansionism or could compel them to fight defensive wars only.
According to Cicero, wars could only be fought to protect the safety or honour of the state33
and
the only excuse would be to gain ―peace unharmed‖.34
He, however, justified expansionist wars
―to enlarge the boundaries of peace, order and justice‖. No contradiction existed between
fighting for either the glory of Rome or to preserve peace for him.35
Despite the fact that
Cicero‘s prescriptions were overlooked on number of occasions, Roman practice did bequeath
that certain laws were binding on all. Hence one of the most significant contribution of the
Roman law and ethics to the later Just War Tradition was providing a useful guide to the
question of jus ad bellum especially just cause and right authority.
Unlike ancient Greece and Rome, the early Christians confronted a problem in the New
Testament which contained no definitive answer to the question pertaining to the participation of
a Christian in a war. Constantine conversion to Christianity, which became empire‘s religion,
was an important turning point in Christians‘ attitude towards war. ―This changed situation was
Aristotle, The Politics, trans. E. Baker, ed. R. F. Stalley (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1998), 199.
W. R. Halliday, Lectures on the History of Roman Religion: From Numa to Augustus (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1922), 114.
W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 167.
Cicero, De Re Publica III, trans. C. Keyes (New York: G. P.Putnam‘s Sons 1928), 211-3.
Cicero ,De Officiis, trans. W. Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 38.
R. N. Wilkin, Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 65.
39
reflected in the writings of the Church leaders from the fourth century onwards- particularly
those of Ambrose of Milan and Augustine of Hippo.‖ 36
For Ambrose, the Jesus injunction to ―turn the other cheek‖ pertained more properly to the
―inward disposition of the heart than to outward actions.‖37
He was the first one to deal with the
question if it was right for a Christian to use force to protect the empire, the faith and the law and
such other questions which were irrelevant when the state was pagan and persecuted Christians.
However, it was his contemporary, Augustine of Hippo, who is credited with forwarding the first
Christian doctrine of the Just War. A refinement of the earlier work rather than a break with the
past, Augustine‘s work started with the debate whether an individual could permissibly kill in
self-defence, which he did not endorse on grounds that it was not the act of killing in self-
defence that was itself sinful but the inward disposition that drove the act (love for earthly
things-life, honour, property-over spiritual). Though the question why it was impermissible to
use force to save oneself drew criticism from pacifists, most eloquently expressed by Robert
Holmes.38
Two principle insights on the ethics of war could be drawn from Augustine: first, war must be
waged with right intentions; second, if killing was only justified on behalf of the state, in the
service of the common good then it can only be just if authorized by the appropriate public
authority.39
Criticism notwithstanding, Augustine was the one who combined Christian theology
with Roman law and philosophy and provided basic ideas that would inform judgments about
legitimacy of war for centuries to come.
The European political order was chaotic and complicated at the start of the Middle Ages, as
feudalism flourished and both Church and empire laid claim to political authority. In theology,
canon law and Christian practice, three strains of thought – pacifism, holy war and Just War -
developed into coherent bodies of thought. At least three significant ideas were added to the Just
Bellamy, Just Wars,24.
Louis J. Swift, ―St Ambrose on Violence and War,‖ Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 101 (1970), 541.
Robert Homles, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 121-2.
Richard Shelly Hartigan, ―Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of the Innocent,‖ Journal of the History of Ideas 27, no.2 (April-June 1966), 203.
40
War Tradition during this period. First, a consensus emerged through Canon lawyers40
and
Aquinas on the question of who had the legitimate authority to wage war. Through ―Peace of
God‖41
and ―Truce of God‖42
movements two lasting contributions were made to the Just War
Tradition. First, clerics were not to be targeted; second, certain groups of people were to be free
from ravages of war. Gratian of Bologna‘s Decretum, remains the most influential source of
guidance in the tradition, addressing questions of whether war and killing were ever justified; the
nature of the just war; question of right authority; and conduct in war.43
Second key contribution of the Middle Ages was Thomas Aquinas doctrine of double effect and
providing a blend of both philosophical and theological underpinnings to the just war tradition.
He formulated doctrine of double-effect on two fundamental elements: First, any act has two
consequences: one intended, other not. Even in self-preservation, an individual has to
demonstrate that his intent was not to kill the assailant. Likewise the government has to
demonstrate that it acted out of intent to promote the common good and have a just cause.
Second element of doctrine related to objective consequences of an act and asked whether it has
met criteria of proportionality. If injustices of an act outweigh the injustices of war waged, only
then it could be waged.44
Third key contribution of the period was chivalric code‘s development of customary jus in bello
rules. Although it would be an overstatement to state importance of chilvary‘s rules on the
conduct of war, especially as far as non-knights are concerned, but it did establish soldiers as a
discrete professional class governed by its own code of ethics.45
Canon Law was a system of law governing the Church and individuals who fell under its jurisdiction. Among
other things, canon law claimed jurisdiction over wills, offences against God, oaths and war.
Established by Abbey of Cluny, ‗Peace of God‘ movement was a response to the increasing violent nature of feudalism towards the defenseless and the Church especially. It forbade all acts of warfare and vengeance against clerics, pilgrims, merchants, Jews, women, and peasants and the despoliation of ecclesiastical and agricultural property.
Created by Abbot Odilo of Cluny, the Church forbade the conduct of war from Saturday noon until Monday morning, during Lent and Advent and on other holy and saint‘s days under the banner on ‗Truce of God‘.
F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 57.
T. Aquinas, Political Writings, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 264.
Bellamy, Just Wars, 40-4 and 48.
41
With the launch of Crusades in the Middle Ages, Holy War doctrine gained importance. It was a
part of the Just War Tradition rather than antithetical to it46
as it drew upon the Just War idea
that war was justifiable if directly commanded by God.47
Through Holy War doctrine, Pope
gained highest authority to wage war and the idea of constraints on conduct were rejected. With
gradual fracture of Christianity, the crusading impulse was directed at other Christians rather
than Muslims. By seventeenth century, this idea was exclusively used by Catholics and
Protestants against each other and the same doctrine was used to furnish justification for the
carnage of the Thirty Years‘ War.48
From sixteenth century onwards, the Just War Tradition witnessed a more secular trend as its
foundations shifted from canon law and scholasticism towards natural law grounded in human
reason and positive law based on voluntary agreements of sovereigns.49
Though it was not until
nineteenth century, this fully ―secularized‖ form could be realized; till then secular ideas and
theological doctrines co-existed within the tradition. Three of the aforementioned sub-traditions:
canon law, scholasticism and the chivalry code became less central during the period.
Another simultaneous development during the period was Machiavelli‘s realism which gave a
very different concept of virtue from the one held by scholastic and canon lawyers. His Prince
was to appear to conform to traditional Christian virtues of ―compassion, faith, integrity,
humanity and religion‖ for the sake of domestic legitimacy but insisted that it was sometimes
necessary to act ―against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion‖.50
His
theory of justice51
was also at odds with the prevalent ideas of the day. For him, state required
justice ―to restrain and correct the subjects‖ and arms ―to protect them from foreign attacks.‖52
LeRoy Walters, ―The Just War and the Crusade: Antitheses or Analogies?‖ The Monist, 57, no.4, Philosophy of
War (October 1973): 584-94.
C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),7.
N. Housely, ―The Crusading Movement: 1274-1700,‖ in The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades, ed. J.
Riley-Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 270.
Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, 49-110. ; A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 76-122.
N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. C. Detmold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 18.
What Machiavelli meant by ‗justice‘ was outlined in part in the Discourses, which he wrote between 1515 and
1520. See N. Machiavelli, ―The Discourses,‖ in Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, ed. and trans. A. Gilbert (Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1965).
A.J. Parel, ―Machiavelli‘s Notion of Justice: Text and Analysis,‖ Political Theory 18, no.4 (November 1990): 531.
42
No moral or legal constraints were placed on Prince‘s decision to wage war, his only guide being
necessity, making room for moral evil means if they accomplished good consequences.53
For legalists, Machiavelli schema was problematic; agreeing that states were valuable but
departed their position from realism by arguing they comprised an international society
constituted by laws and norms governing their mutual relations. While their difference with
scholasticism centered on their rejection of theology as a foundation of earthly law. Balthazar
Ayala and Alberico Gentili were among the best known advocates of the sixteenth century
legalism. 54
The fourth tradition which emerged in the sixteenth century England and challenged king‘s right
to wage war for its anti-humanist consequences because famous as Reformism. Erasmus More
and John Colet were few among celebrated reformists who questioned the foundations of classic
Just War thinking, realism and legalism. Colet expressly challenged that predominant
justifications of war deviated from scriptural teachings as there was little in scripture to support
the view that ―evil was a good, just and Christian means of overcoming evil.‖55
Reformists
poked fun at marital values attached to war, even though war may be justifiable in certain
circumstances. Erasmus argued that an unjust peace was morally preferable to a just war, thus
almost endorsing pacifism. He lifted the proportionality bar much higher than either the
scholastics or legalists had placed it.56
These ideas gained much approval during the period
alarming authorities that they were actively suppressed throughout Europe after 1520s.
The period between 1570 and 1660 was one of almost incessant holy war in Europe,57
brought
to an end by two treaties collectively known as the ―Peace of Westphalia‖. Hobbes reaction to
civil strife of the seventeenth century was his rejection of scholasticism and giving preference to
C.L. Hancock, ―Cicero Versus Machiavelli: Does the End Justify the Means?‖ Contemporary Philosophy 16, no. 6 (1994):14.
A. P. D‘Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Hutchinson University Library,
1951),68. ; G.H.J. Van Der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law: His Life, Work
and Times, 2nd
revised edition (Leyden: A.W.Sijthoff ,1968),116-17. R. M. Adams, The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace 1496-
1535 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 22.
D. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, trans. L.K.Born (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 252.
J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe: 1450-1620 (London: Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana Paperbacks, 1985), 28.
43
reason and history instead.58
He believed civil wars were result of the breakdown of sovereign
power; to increase their chance of survival in an anarchic international society; the states should
maximize their power. He advocated an absolutist conception of sovereignty which had
important consequences for Just War tradition.
Grotian response to holy wars also altered elements within the Just War Tradition as theological
arguments were explicitly marginalized in favour of natural and volitional law based arguments. He
challenged sovereign right to wage war for any reason as states, according to him were bound by
international law. He divided international law into natural and human law, the first governing what
was just, and the latter determining what was legal.59
Natural law was binding on all people only
acts that were clearly repugnant and ―unambiguously destructive of society‖ were forbidden by it.60
Human law was more comprehensive element of international law which referred to the agreements
of states manifested in treaties and customs.61
The complex relationship between two was shaped by
Hugo Grotius ―notion of permissions‖. Grotius argued that ―human law cannot command what
natural law forbids or forbid what natural law commands.‖62
Legalism bifurcated into two sub-traditions after Grotius. The first, Natural Law, manifested
itself in the works of such celebrated authors like Samuel Von Pufendorf and Christian Wolff
while the other Positive Law was evident in works of Emerde Vattel and Cornelius Van
Bynkershoek. For Pufendorf natural law could be studied without appeal to theological argument
but religion also was not irrelevant to international law.Besides natural law, for him, was
grounded in right reason and hence, carried a significant moral component. On the law of war, he
argued nature permitted war waged for the end of peace.63
By elaborating just causes of war as a
wrong received, the satisfaction of rights, reparation for wrongs and to guarantee future peace, he
echoed his predecessors.
S. Cahn , ed., Classics of Modern Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
79.
H. Grotius, De Jure Beli ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. F.W. Kelsey (Washington,DC: Carneige Council, 1925), 44-5.
W. Ballis, The Legal Position of War: Changes in its Practice and Theory from Plato to Vattel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937), 110.
H. J. M. Boukema, ―Grotius‘ Concept of Law,‖ Archive fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archive for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 69, no.1(1983): 68-73.
Steven Forde, ―Hogo Grotius on Ethics and War,‖ American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 ( September 1998): 644.
S. Pufendorf, ―On the Law of War,‖ in The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, ed. and trans. C.L. Carr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.
44
Even Wolff, though articulated a cohesive account of the laws of war but failed to fill the gaps in
Grotius work. Wolff‘s natural law gave both individuals and states a right of self-preservation
and perfection but this right entailed a duty to assist others. Both Pufendorf and Wolff failed to
make substantive contribution to the Just War tradition as they were unable to articulate a
doctrine of natural law that went beyond scholasticism.
The second strand of thought within post-Grotian legalism which proved more successful than
naturalism in terms of both intellectual development of Just War tradition and restraining the
actual conduct of war was positive law. Its most significant contributor was Vattel, who along
with Grotius dominated the thinking about the laws of war until the twentieth century. For
Vattel, nations were free, independent and equal in nature; hence separate nations were equal
sovereigns, thereby rejecting idea of a universal community predicated upon either Christianity
or rationality. The laws of the war were grounded in relationship between sovereigns and the
rights and duties they owe to each other.64
It was the idea of an international society bounded by
voluntary rules that was propagated by him.
While at the same time reformist school under Immanuel Kant also made significant contribution to
the Just War Tradition whose relevance though had also been hotly contested. This was because Kant
dismissed ―the idea that there could be a just war‖65
as ―nothing but confusion and harm resulted
from regarding wars as just‖.66
Natural law had no appeal to his discussion of war, only sources of
law were customary practices, treaties and opinions of ―recognized authorities‖.67
He was more
optimistic than legal positivists of nineteenth century about potential of law in reshaping relations of
states governed by rule of law. His Perpetual Peace also presents the same argument: that
international society can have lasting peace if states voluntarily bind themselves to rules. His
enlightened states if first abide by six preliminary articles that he enunciated in his work Perpetual
Peace, would be able to create conditions for three definitive articles which
E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of
Nations and of Sovereigns, trans. , C. G. Fenwick (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution,1916), 3.
Fernando R. Teson, ―The Kantian Theory of International Law,‖ Columbia Law Review 92, no. 1(January 1992): 90.
W. B. Gallie , Philosophers of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), 19-20.
C. Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International law and International Relations
(New York: St Martin‘s Press, 1998), 94.
45
would abolish war altogether.68
This last point led his opponents to insist that he had nothing to
do with Just War tradition.
Brain Orend proposed that it was possible to construct a Kantian Just War theory comprising jus
ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum. Orend argued Kant jus ad bellum holds that a just
cause is created when the rights of a state are violated. His jus in bello was much less well
developed; though principles of non-combatants immunity and proportionality could be inferred.
Also sixth preliminary article69
of Perpetual Peace forbid use of strategies inconsistent with the
long term ideal, thus putting restrictions on jus in bello, as suggested by the requirement to abide
by treaties. Orend, however, added an innovative component in his Just War doctrine - jus post
bellum: To create perpetual peace, the victor must allow the right of self-determination to the
vanquished, to select their own form of government and not have it imposed on them.70
The technological changes by the end of the eighteenth century not only increased military
firepower dramatically but advancement in communications and logistics enabled states to field
much larger and rapid military and that too for much longer periods.71
War-wagging turned into
a duty for every citizen. By the times Napoleonic wars came, they pitted nations rather than
mercenaries against each other. Sovereigns enjoyed unlimited legitimacy to wage war, tempered
only by military necessity as Realism dominated this time period, though the position later
challenged by legalists from mid-nineteenth century onwards.
Friedrich Hegel‘s concept of state as enunciated in a series of works, illustrated how realism got
translated from broad philosophical worldview into state‘s ideology combining both nationalism and
militarism during the nineteenth century. Hegel identified defending the state and its interests as the
most important human endeavour. Following this, it can be inferred that the doctrine of raison
d‟e tatwas the guiding idea for political leaders in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Where
prudence, morality and power conflicted, the doctrine of raison d‟e tat suggested a clear hierarchy.
The doctrine also shifted normative discussion about the war during I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. Campbell Smith (London: Simon Sonnenschein &
Co., 1903), 109-142.
‗No state at war with another shall countenance modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent state of peace‘. (Kant 1903)
B. Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000) 51-2 and 58-9.
J. Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents 1450-2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 164-70.
46
the same period. Though domestic political and moral concerns, prudence and utility acted as
central constraints on war-fighting, the key determinant of the actual conduct of war was
strategic. Raison d‟e thadt important impact on the Just War tradition too as it allowed political
and military leaders to invoke ―necessity‖ to justify overriding tradition‘s rules.72
Carl von Clausewitz was another most influential thinker of the times, who expressly talked
about prioritization of strategic over moral considerations. He was skeptical about either legal or
moral constraints on the conduct of war which can only be limited by its end.73
War, though can
be waged whenever it is in the interests of the state but Calusewitz insisted that political leaders
must stipulate clear political objectives when ordering armies. Thus for nineteenth century
strategists, it was not universal morality or law that limited war but domestic political
considerations. In Just War tradition‘s context, Jus ad bellum concerns were clearly subverted
with only proportionality left intact as a prudential check on reckless war while in jus in bello,
realists argued war is limited by its political goals.
A manifestation of mounting humanitarian concern was witnessed in Europe, which finally led to
establishment of Red Cross in a conference in Geneva in 1863. Two important contributions in
jus in bello were made by 1984 Geneva Convention: first, it granted recognition to International
Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) which then became a key player in development of the laws of
war74
and secondly non-combatant community was extended to medical personnel and wounded
soldiers.75
As state‘s legal right to wage war against each other was recognized, from 1860s
onward states started focusing almost solely on jus in bello. This period also started a ―golden
era‖ till the outbreak of WWI for international treaty-law governing war conduct.76
The First World War as an indisputable ―total war‖, pitted entire societies against each other,
was responsible for over six million deaths; after war challenges were more to reduce likelihood
of war significantly through compulsory arbitration, collective security and legal prohibition than
to create stronger jus in bello rules. Hence a shift in Just War Tradition from jus in bello back
Bellamy, Just Wars, 91.
M. Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 34-5.
Y. Sandoz, ―The Red Cross and Peace: Realities and Limits,‖ Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 3 (1987): 287.
C. Moorhead, Dunant‟s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1998), 47.
See James Brown Scott, ―The Codification of International Law,‖ American Journal of International Law 18, no.2 (1924): 260-80.
47
towards jus in bellum was seen. League of Nations created in the immediate aftermath of WWI
was predicated on the assumption first: that there were blatantly unjust wars of aggression, which
necessitated establishment of system of collective security for their prevention; second: there are
genuine disputes over rights which could be prevented by establishing a system of compulsory
arbitration. The League thus failed to make a revolutionary shift in the way states thought about
war.77
By the time of WWII, the Just War Tradition had crystallized around realism and positive law.
But there were significant differences from nineteenth and early twentieth century realism and its
post-Second World War successor as it became imbued with Just War thinking. A number of
factors contributed to this e.g. the introduction of nuclear weapons exponentially increased
inherent danger attached to war while the unbridled pursuit of national interests was exposed by
excesses committed by Nazi Germany. The questions which continued to resurge were how to
make moral and prudential sense of strategic dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons and how to
place more effective constraints on human behavior. Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr
were two proponents of this new type of realism. Both acknowledged that moral and legal
considerations should be factored into decision-making. But there are dangers of over-reliance
on morality and law, hence for them they play secondary role to power and prudence. ―However,
the principled realism of Morgenthau and Niebuhr still influence political leaders inasmuch as
leaders must constantly balance that which is ‗right‘ with that which is ‗necessary‘ or ‗effective‘
in case where the two collide‖.78
In spite of failure of positive law to prevent Germany and Japan from launching aggressive wars
in WWII, efforts to restrict both state‘s right to wage war and its conduct continued. The United
Nations Charter went ahead than League of Nations for prohibiting threat or use of force as
enunciated in Article 2(4). All international force, except when used in self-defence, was
outlawed as expressed in Article 51 or when authorized by UN Security Council for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security as stated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus
aggressive wars were outlawed and sovereigns had to justify their actions to their peers whenever
Lynn H. Miller, ―The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War,‖ World Politics 16, no. 2 (January
1964): 261.
Bellamy, Just Wars, 103-107 and 114.
48
they decided to use force thus delimiting the kinds of justifications acceptable to international
community.
Today‘s Just War Tradition rules are divided into jus ad bellum and jus in bello with increasing
emphasis on jus post bellum also. Jus ad bellum can further be divided into three types of
criteria: substantive, prudential and procedural. A substantive criterion is further subdivided into
four: the right intention i.e war can only be waged for common good or not for self-
aggrandizement; it can only be waged for a just cause; proportionality of ends have to kept in
focus i.e. whether the overall harm likely to be caused by war is less than the one that is being
righted; and final substantive test is of last resort. Prudential criteria impose checks on otherwise
justifiable wars. There has to be reasonable chance of success i.e a state may be able to prevail
but it has to carefully assess that the cost of prevailing may be much higher than it wishes to pay
or accept to satisfy a particular just cause. While procedural constraints involve satisfying
requirements of right authority and proper declaration.
Jus in bello regulates conduct of war and involves three basic criteria. First it takes into account
principle of discrimination emphasizing that non-combatants must never be deliberately
attacked. Second is the principle of proportionality regarding military targets which can only be
attacked if their military value outweighs the foreseeable destruction that will result. Third and
the last criteria bind combatants not to use prohibited weapons or to conduct themselves in ways
that violate established laws of war.
While jus post bellum focus is on how the victors should conduct themselves after the war.
Though realism, positive law and natural law can all be identified in this Just War tradition but
all differ from each other on three counts; on the basis of different interpretations they offer to
the criteria; different weight they attach to the criteria and different modes of reasoning. Despite
the differences which accompany contemporary Just War Tradition, there are at least two
absolute rules which have firmly taken their roots: actors remain obliged to provide good reasons
for waging war and non–combatants must never be deliberately targeted by combatants.
Contemporary debate on Just War has to deal with a range of issues, such as terrorism, pre-
emption, aerial bombardment and humanitarian intervention. All these issues represent the
change in trend in twenty-first century warfare that prompts us to think how time tested and
49
centuries old Just War rules will figure in with new realities. Terrorism is never justifiable.
Viewing terrorism within the Just War tradition paradigm provides us to interrogate the morality
of different types of violence. If the jus ad bellum criterion is not satisfied by an actor, it means
every act of violence it unleashes is immoral. Besides the very criteria of proportionality and
non-combatant immunity is violated in acts of terrorism.
Even when self-defence is recognized as a just cause of war, pre-emptive wars, except in face of
imminent threat, are expressly rejected as acts of aggression. Article 51 of the UN Charter
declares that ―nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs‖. The interpretation of Article 51 has lead to
two schools: one who believes in narrow interpretation and refers only to large scale invasion is
termed as restrictionists. They expressly rule out pre-emption as states have self-defence right
only after an armed attack has taken place, a view supported by ICJ in the Nicaragua vs. United
States case also.79
Counter-restrictionists include all ―armed attacks‖ regardless of the scale as
an armed attack.80
They, therefore, do not think that Article 51 diminishes state‘s inherent right
to pre-emptive self-defence. Hence it would not be an overstatement to argue that contemporary
international law permits limited right of pre-emption to state (based on imminence, necessity,
proportionality) that extends beyond Article 51 of the UN Charter but nevertheless limited by
customary international law and state practice since 1945.81
Not going into the further details
and merits, demerits of both schools, pre-emptive strategy became a part of the US military
doctrine and was employed in US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan once again raised ethical dilemmas associated with
aerial bombing as waging war on terrorists makes it difficult to distinguish terrorists/combatants
from non-combatants. They conceal themselves among civilian population thus manipulating
moral and legal restraints observed by their enemies. Though the moral absolutes of the Just War
tradition explicitly commit not to deliberately kill, maim or otherwise harm non-combatants but
pins the responsibility for deaths in such cases on terrorists and insurgents who put the 79
Hans Kelsen, ―Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter,‖ American Journal of International Law 42, no. 3 (October 1948): 792.
80 Josef L. Kunz, ―Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,‖ American Journal of International Law 41, no 4 (October 1947): 878.
I. Detter, The Law of War, 2nd
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 86.
50
combatants in harm‘s way. The use of cluster bombs and terminology like ―collateral damage‖
has brought refocus on jus in bello in contemporary warfare.
1.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention provides the most plausible reason to intervene in the internal affairs
of the country and has recently been employed in a number of cases to override the universally
acknowledged norm of non-intervention. Even within the post-hegemonic system this logic of
intervention is most frequently employed and when threat securitization is made, the security
discourse is couched in humanitarian terms. This section traces how the humanitarian
intervention connotation has evolved over time.
The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention involves heated arguments from proponents of the
advocates of sovereignty, self-determination and ban on the use of force on one side and those
who are the champions of universal human rights on the other side. Keeping in view whether one
prioritizes natural or positive law, or offer a permissive or restrictive view of humanitarian
intervention four broad positions have been delineated. Legal positivist restrictionist school
argues for preserving ban on the use of force not authorized by UN Security Council. Without
this general ban, they state that ―there would be more war in international society but not
necessarily more genuine humanitarian interventions‖.82
Legal positivist counter-restrictionists position insists that a customary right (not duty) of
intervention exists in ―supreme humanitarian emergencies‖.83
Cases of genocide, mass killings
and ethnic cleansing are cited as grave humanitarian crises warranting intervention as per general
agreement in international society.84
The problem with approach is the extent to which it
exaggerates the consensus about the use of force to protect human rights. The third
communitarian position asserts that nations are free to determine their own system of 82
S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 231.
N.J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.
See A. C. Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm
(London: Routledge, 1993). ; F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd
ed. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1997).
51
governance, right to develop and protect their idea about how its members ought to live. This
position is echoed by both Michael Walzer and John Stuart Mill.85
While the final approach liberal cosmopolitanism insists on certain inalienable individual rights
grounded in natural law and focus less on inter-state consensus. It departs it ways from counter-
restrictionism in insisting that external actors have not only the right but the duty also in
intervening in supreme humanitarian emergencies.86
Sovereignty entails a responsibility on
sovereigns to protect the welfare of their citizens, failing which it loses its sovereign right.87
Some draw from Kant‘s concept of rational individual with certain pre-political rights 88
to come
to this conclusion while others refer to contemporary globalized world and implications of events
at one place on every other part, creating moral obligation.89
Millions killed in Afghanistan, Biafra, Balkans, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, East
Timor, Latin America, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and elsewhere, convinced that principles
of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of the states cannot constitute a screen
behind which such mass murder or ethnic cleansing might be carried out. Hence, use of force
against such sovereigns was justified ―as an exercise of cosmopolitan justice or global
solidarity‖.90
Evidently the idea of ―sovereignty as responsibility‖91
floated by Francis Deng and
his collaborators, gained attention and even led to a statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Philosophical Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 87.; John Stuart Mill, ―A Few Words on Non-Intervention,‖ in Essays on Politics and Culture, ed., G. Himmelfarb (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 368-84.; Gerald Doppelt, ―Walzer‘s Theory of Morality in International Relations,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 8, no. 1 (Autum1978): 3-26. ; Bhikhu Parekh,
―Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,‖ International Political Science Review 18, no. 1 The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention. Les dilemmes de l'intervention humanitaire (January1997): 60.
J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1999), 119.
F. Teson, ―The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,‖ in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and
Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93. Simon Caney, ―Human Rights and the Rights of States: Terry Nardin on Non-Intervention,‖ International Political
Science Review 18, no.1(January 1997): 34.
Tony Blair , (Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, 22 April 1999), to the Economic Club of Chicago, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm.
R.B. Miller, Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism and the Just War Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 57.
Francis S. Kimaro Deng, T. Lyons, D. Rothchild and I.W. Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict
Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).
52
Annan in 2001: ―the sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations
of human rights‖.92
The high-profile International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
constituted by Canadian government in 2001 further bolstered efforts to address issues of crimes
against humanity.93
Global society since the end of the Cold War has been most divisive on the
morality, legality and politics of humanitarian intervention, as it is suspected that mostly
humanitarian claims are invoked to conceal underlying geopolitical goals. This divisiveness is
clearly reflected in the recent literature produced on the subject.94
A more recent trend in intervention behavior points towards the multinational operations. For
states living in a world of legal anarchy, where the use of military power not only energizes the
government machinery but raises the emotional temperature of political debate too; Alliances
among pluralist democracies have all the problems of translational cooperation that one can
imagine. Such operations introduce unique burdens including the responsibility for developing
and maintaining coalitions, compromise on the use of force, how to establish clear and agreed
upon mission objectives, how to determine operations command and control, assessing financial
viability and focusing on reconstruction after hostilities have ceased. It hasn‘t been easy to
secure the cooperation as a country‘s willingness to share the burden and responsibility depends
upon its perception of threat as well as opportunities such an act might offer.95
As the frequency of interventions is increasing in the post-cold war world so is the concern on
how to proceed for reconstruction and stabilization in post-conflict states. Authors state that only
a comprehensive strategy in four component domains – political, social, security and economic –
and the interaction between them can help governments intervening and confronting numerous Kofi Annan, ―Nobel Lecture‖ (December 10, 2001), http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annan-
lecture.html. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
ICISS, 2001), 17.
Of the vast literature see A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, ed., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations Press, 2000). ; J. Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). ; J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane, ed. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). ; A. Jokic, ed., Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues (Toronto, Canada: Broadview Press, 2003). ; T. J. Farer, ed., Toward a Humanitarian Foreign Policy: A Primer for Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Froster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 2, 199 and 207.
53
and profound challenges. Besides focus of the intervenors, is also on addressing the dilemmas
such as short- and long-term goals and whether to work through or around state‘s central
government.96
1.1.3. From Interstate to Intrastate Wars
The shift from interstate to intrastate during recent periods has broadened our study of war to
include colonial wars, civil wars, ethnic and tribal wars and other forms of warfare. Similarly,
theoretically the factors explaining civil wars such as key variables of levels of economic and
social welfare, are given much less attention when elaborating causes of interstate wars that
focus on the distribution of the military power in the international system.
Human warfare evolved over centuries (discussed above) and the experience of the last two
world wars and the destruction associated with them reduced the incentives of great powers to
fight them. Resultantly the world has experienced no great power war in the last fifty plus years,
prompting some to term it as ―long peace‖.97
This is the longest period of peace between great
powers in the last five centuries which is usually attributed to the development of nuclear
weapons and their deterrent effects by few scholars.98
However, there are others who find this
observation misleading and refer to proliferation of small wars and other forms of conflict
especially civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflicts since WWII as counter-argument.99
The resultant shift of ―symmetric‖ interstate wars where two sides of roughly equal strength and
with almost similar weapons fought each other to civil wars with changing nature has raised
96
Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World,
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008). ; Charles T. Call, ed., Building States to Build Peace (Colo: Lynne Rienner,2008). ; Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press and Association of the U.S. Army, 2005). ; Keith Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2003). ; Michael Barnett, ―Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,‖ International Security 30, no.4 (Spring 2006): 87-112. ; Nora Bensahel, ―Organizing for Nation Building,‖ Survival 49,(2007): 43-75; Paul K. Davis, Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction (RAND Corporation,2011). ; Richard D. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). ; Roland Paris, At War‟s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). ; Seth D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (New York: Praeger, 2008). ; A thorough exploration of the stabilization and reconstruction literature is beyond the scope of the study undertaken. However, few works had been quoted for reference.
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
54
questions on conventional ―Westphalian‖ model of warfare and its relevance in contemporary
era.
In civil wars, nowadays, the army of state instead of facing a single rebel army faces a coalition
of rebels representing different groups with different interests.100
Some of them represent
religious or ethnic groups thus these wars are referred to as ―identity wars‖ and ―ethnic wars‖ but
underlying factors are driven by political power, economic resources, security goals, or these
labels may be used to mask private interests.101
In the present day globalized world, criminal
networks also play significant role and often these wars are sustained by illicit black markets.102
Thus armies have increasingly ―outsourced‖ many of their traditional functions, giving this
whole phenomenon a more privatized face.103
The change in the nature of civil warfare has also led to change in strategy and tactics as well as
norms of warfare which is increasingly ―asymmetric‖ now. Rebels groups resort to strategies of
guerilla warfare, terrorism and insurgency and may not hesitate to employ tactics of direct
targeting of civilians, ethnic cleansing and massacre, thus leading to increased ―barbarization of
warfare‖.104
This is a deliberate strategy to coerce people to shift loyalty and to demonstrate that
state is unable to protect citizens. This trend has been evident in present-day conflicts too and the
post-hegemonic military interventions exhibit this pattern also. Here, these groups are recruited
by rival parties to obtain their strategic objectives without overtly engaging their respective
countries in the on-going conflict. This is the image of ―new wars‖ which are often contrasted
with Westphalian ―old wars‖105
and has sparked the recent debate whether or not the elements of
the new wars can be found in past historical periods.106
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
V.P. Gagnon , Jr. , The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). ; Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black
Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
Deborah D. Avant, The Market of Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
George Kassimeris, ed. The Barbarization of Warfare (New York: New York University Press, 2006).
Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). ; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). ; Herfried Munkler, The New Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). ; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, and Jan Angstrom, ed. Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 2005). ; Sinisa
55
1.1.4. Discursive Dimension in War Literature
A new dimension witnessed in the 21st century has been the way discourse on war is being
framed and how discursive dimension has gained importance. It has become especially
predominant in the wake of 9/11. After ―war on terror‖ narrative was constructed by US to carpet
bomb Afghanistan‘s Taliban regime scholars started paying attention to the role of political
speeches, statements issued by key actors and the role of electronic, print and social media in
framing and constructing war narrative to legitimize war/intervention.
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has given further boost to discursive analysis and theatrical
presentation of people, events and outcomes which is now a major component of any
intervention undertaken. Without taking into account this aspect, the reasonableness or otherwise
of military employment of force and its unprecedented scope and severity could not be assessed.
Resultantly what we witness now since Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya is frequently divided war
narrative that involves a dichotomous representation of the international scene and a global clash
between two antagonistic forces that invariably carry with them a moral identity.107
Scholars has explored different dimensions of discourse analysis technique and analyzed how it
is used to either construct narrative for war or used for manipulation by laying emphasis on the
usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing ―Our‖ good things and
―Their‖ bad things. Thus manipulation through discourse involves not only power but abuse of
power i.e. domination as it implies illegitimate influence by means of discourse and controlled
by dominant political, bureaucratic, media, academia and corporate elite. Manipulators make
others do or believe things that are in their best interest and against the best interests of those
being manipulated. This has given rise to discourse and legitimation literature now widely
Malesevic, ―The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts,‖ International Political Sociology 2, no. 2 (June 2008): 97-112.
107 See S. Aoun, ―The Theatre of War,‖ Metro Magazine, 2004. ; M. Baseman, ―Selling war as an obligation:
Appeals to obligation at work in George W. Bush‘s Iraq speeches‖ (Master of Science thesis, Florida State University, College of Communications, 2006). ; C. A. Smith, ―President Bush‘s enthymeme of evil: The amalgamation of 9/11, Iraq and moral values,‖ American Behavioral Scientist 49, no. 1 (September 2005):32-47. ; Dana L. Cloud, ―Beyond Evil: Understanding Power Materially and Rhetorically,‖ Rhetoric &Public Affairs 6, no.3 (Fall 2003): 531-538. ; Richard Jackson, ―Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,‖ International Politics 48, no.2/3 (2011): 390-4111.; Trevor McCrisken, ―Ten Years on: Obama‘s war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice,‖ International Affairs 87, no.4 (2011): 781-801. ; Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, ―Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11 –Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration‘s Rhetoric,‖ Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 525-537.
56
employed in studies on war legitimation discourse.108
The link between war and legitimation has
important implications for this dissertation and it will be explored in detail in the next chapter.
1.2: Theoretical Perspectives on War / Conflict
Considering the frequency of war in human society since times immemorial, it is not possible
that this central topic would not have been analyzed extensively theoretically too. To analyze
war/intervention various theoretical frameworks start with the ―levels of analysis‖ approach.
Taking inspiration from Kenneth Waltz‘s Man, the State, and War (1959), this framework
identifies three ―images‖ of war corresponding to the individual, the nation-state and the
international system respectively. These images were then referred as ―levels‖ of analysis,
following classification by J. David Singer.109
The levels of analysis is not a theory of war but
certain theories then came forward based on these levels to explain the causes of war.
The individual level pertains to the political leaders of the state and their decisions but also
include characteristics shared by all humans such as ―human nature‖ and dwells on human
predisposition towards aggression. Though variations in personalities, social mobilization,
ideologies etc are recognized but it presumes on the whole that particular individual or
individuals have important casual effect on the foreign policy decision-making.110
The next level i.e the nation-state or the national level includes factors associated with both the
government and the society. The former is said to contain variables like political system‘s
institutional structure and its policy-making process while the later is based on variables like
interest groups, public opinion, as well as its economic system and political culture and ideology.
Lilie Chouilaraki, ―The Soft Power of War: Legitimacy and Community in Iraq War Discourses‘,‖ special issue of
Journal of Language and Politics 4, no. 1 (2005). ; L. M. Martin Rojo and Tenu A. Van Dijk, ―There Was a Problem,
and It Was Solved: Legitimating the Expulsion of Illegal Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse,‖ Discourse &
Society 17, no. 3(2006): 359-383. ; Tenu A. Van Dijk, ―Discourse and manipulation,‖ Discourse & Society 8, no. 4
(1997):523-566. ; Federica Ferrari, ―Metaphor at work in the analysis of political discourse: investigating a ‗preventive
war‘ persuasion strategy,‖ Discourse & Society 18, no. 5(2007): 603-625.
J. David Singer, ―The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,‖ World Politics 14, no. 1 (October 1961): 77-92.
John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic 1989).
57
This level of analysis has given rise to war theories who state that come cultures are more prone
to war or that democracies behave differently that authoritarian regimes.111
The third and the final systemic level refers to the anarchic structure of the international system
and it further encompasses factors such as number of great powers in the system and other
factors related to the distribution of power besides military and economic power, and the pattern
of alliances etc. Most realist theories are system-level theories such as those of hegemonic order
and power transitions. Similarly, some scholars resort to the ―dyadic‖ or ―interactional‖ level to
reflect bilateral interaction between pair of states while others just prefer system-level to include
everything in state‘s external environment.
1.2.1. Systemic Level War Theories
However, based on the classification above, we will briefly dwell on the theories of war. Most of
the theories of war traditionally are dominated by realist school of thought and pertain to the
systemic level. The realist school that dates back to Thucydides‘ account of the Peloponnesian
War is not a single theory but rather a constellation of theories with shared assumptions.
Morgenthau‘s Politics Among Nations lead to resurgence of this school in 1948.
The security dilemma compels states to respond with measures that obviously are deemed
threatening to others, generating an action-reaction cycle and a conflict spiral that may
eventually escalate into war.112
According to Jervis both conflict spiral and security dilemma are
at the core of the spiral model of war and peace that elaborates how war can occur even if states
prefer peace and behave rationally since conflict spirals are structurally induced by the system.
This model is often contrasted with deterrence model that suggests war occurs when deterrence
fails where one side‘s threat lacks credibility or lacks the military capability to threaten a
sufficiently costly response to an aggression.113
Both these theorists in fact argue that it‘s the
policy prescriptions that make the war more likely.
Michael Doyle, ―Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 Parts I & II, no. 3 &
4(Summer & Autumn 1983): 205-35 and 323-53.
John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). ; Robert
Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,‖ World Politics 30, no.2 (1978): 186-213. ; Charles L. Glaser, ―The Security Dilemma Revisited,‖ World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), chap. 3.
58
In realist school, the classical realists trace multiple sources of state behavior leading to various
causes of war. In addition to the absence of central authority in the international system, the role
of human nature especially aggressive instincts like selfishness, greed, pride and passion are
emphasized as a source of aggressive behavior and war by classical realists. While Waltzian
variation of realist school criticize this emphasis on human nature114
and instead point to the
pursuit of security rather than the power as an end in itself by placing particular emphasis on the
international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international system. He stressed the
central importance of ―polarity‖ in the international system and elaborated how states of different
polarity create different threats and opportunities for states leading to different foreign policy
behaviours, especially for great powers.115
His theory proved to be the most influential theory in
the last half century of the international system.
Waltz‘s theory lead to further variation of realist school of thought and the debate started that
states instead of balancing against the leading state in the international system as stressed by
Waltz, balance against the threats. This generated Stephen Walt‘s ―balance of threat‖ theory116
and gave birth to defensive realists‘ school with their emphasis on a more ―fine-grained structure
of power‖117
that dwells on the impact of decline of military power over distance (the ―loss of
strength gradient‖)118
R and importance of technology affecting the ―offensive-defensive
balance‖.119
Among realists, the defensive realists are most confident about restraining of aggression through
balance of power mechanisms.120
While the other variation ―offensive realism‖ trace the
existence of predatory states and leaders, inherent uncertainty about the intention of others, and
without invoking the domestic variables refer to anarchy-induced tendencies towards worst-case
analysis which compel even status-quo oriented states to adopt offensive strategies.121
Even Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Stephen M. Waltz, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962): 262.
Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.‖; Van Evera, Causes of War.
Jack Synder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). ; Glaser, ―The Security Dilemma Revisited.‖; Andrew Kydd, ―Sheep in Sheep‘s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight One Another,‖ Security Studies 7, no.1 (1997): 1-49. ; Van Evera, Causes of War.
Fareed Zakaria, ―Realism and Domestic Politics,‖ International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 177-198. ; Eric J. Labs, ―Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,‖ Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-69. ; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). ; Colin
59
currently benign intentions can provide no guide against future belligerent turn in future122
thus
offering a strictly structural theory of war and peace.
While neoclassical realists recognize the material capabilities as the single most important
determinant of state strategies along with recognizing the importance of anarchy and give casual
primacy to system structure. They however, emphasize that system-level pressures affect foreign
policy through intervening domestic pressures which include political perceptions of leaders
about material distribution of power; state‘s ability to build army through extracting resources;
autonomy of state from society and influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups in
the process.123
Each of these realist theories, however, emphasize varying degree of centrality of balance of
power concept in their theories of conflict and war by dwelling on concepts like ―external and
internal balancing‖124
to prevent hegemonies from forming; ―power parity and power
preponderance‖ hypothesis to ascertain whether power preponderance or its disparity is more
likely to lead to peace125
; and ―offshore balancing‖ to explain that states that have achieved
regional hegemony prevent rise of peer competitors by playing role of ―offshore balancer‖.126
Then there are hegemonic theories like power transition theory and long cycle theory which will
be discussed in detailed in the next chapter because of their relevance in the theoretical
framework. A brief analysis of realist theories has shown that they include multiple levels in
their analysis of causes of war.
1.2.2. Dyadic or Interactional Level War Theories
Then there are dyadic-level theories like the ―steps-to-war‖ model, the bargaining theory of war,
theories of economic peace and interdependence which though not exclusively dyadic in
Elman, ―Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America‘s rise to Regional Hegemony,‖
American Political Science Review 98, no.4 (November 2004): 563-76. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
Gideon Rose, ―Neoclassical Realism and Theories of foreign Policy,‖ World Politics 51, no.1 (October 1998):
144-172. ; Randall L. Schweller, Unaswered Threats: Political constraints on the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Presss, 2006). ; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ed. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Waltz, The Theory of International Politics.
Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke,ed. Parity and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996). ; D. Scott
Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, The Behavioral Origins of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004). ;
Mearshiemer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
60
character, however, place primary emphasis on casual variables relating to the interaction
between pair of states. The ―steps-to-war‖ model of Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez is
about particular behavioural patterns that likely increase the probability of war with primary
emphasis on issues of contention between states than to power relations between them.127
While
later works identified greater tendency to fight for some issues like territorial disputes more than
other issues.128
The ―Bargaining Model of War‖ posits that actors make decisions of war based not only on their
preferences and constraints under which they act but on the anticipation of how others are going
to react, thus rendering human behavior as both rational and strategic. So if the adversaries have
similar expectations about the outcomes of war and minimal differences about the relative power
of each other, they should be able to reach some agreement based on those shared expectations
about how war will end.129
While liberal theorists have long held that trade and other forms of
economic exchange can promote peace between states giving rise to economic theories of
Interdependence and conflict130
while others hold that trade continues between warring parties
thus overwriting importance of this factor for introducing peace.131
1.2.3. State and Societal Level War Theories
Besides there are state and societal level theories especially the liberal and Marxist-Leninist ones
locating the causes of war by focusing on the international political and economic structures of
states and societies. They cover wide range of arguments based on state structures, conditions
and processes believed to increase the likelihood of war. Marxist-Leninist theories central
argument rests on the contention that war and imperialism is driven by the interests of the Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
Paul K. Huth, ―Territory: Why are Territorial Disputes between States a Central cause of International Conflict?‖ in What Do We Know About War, ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000: 85-110). ;
Paul R. Hensel, ―Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,‖ in What Do We Know About War?, ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000: 57-84).
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd
ed. (New York, Free Press, 1988).
For different liberal perspectives see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). ; Bruce Russett and John R.Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).; Edward D. Manfield and Brain M. Pollins, ed. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).; and Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri and nils Petter Gleditsch, ed. Globalization and Armed Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ―Commercial Liberalism under Fire: Evidence from 1915 and 1936,‖ Security Studies 6, no.2 (1996/97): 4-50. ; Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy, ―Sleeping With the Enemy: Trade Between Adversaries During Wartime,‖ Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 463-479.
61
capitalist class who benefits from war and thus, is responsible for it. This class then uses state
apparatus to formulate policies to advance its own parochial interests while shifting the costs of
those policies to other societal groups.
The chief exponent Karl Marx did not develop a systematic international theory but primarily
focused on the domestic politics. Lenin added the international component by building on the
ideas of J. A. Hobson, Rudolph Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg;132
given Lenin‘s central role
the theory is referred as ―Marxist-Leninist‖ theory of imperialism though a number of variations
exist.133
These are the theories of the military-industrial complex that emphasize how generating
military build-ups and a ―war system‖ produces profits for business that goes far beyond
reasonable security precautions.134
Apart from the emphasis on domestic sources of imperialism and war, there are other theories
that focus on the system-level sources of international patterns, behavior and conflict, especially
the structure of the world political economy as depicted through ―core-periphery‖ thesis. The
wealthy ―core‖ dominates the ―periphery‖ located outside the core and dependent on it. Such
arguments are advanced in sociology by the proponents of the ―world system theory‖.135
Various coalitional theories are also attributed to this state and societal level which emphasize
that grand strategies pursued by state are actually the product of the bargaining between
opposing coalitions of the economically self-interested domestic groups. Mostly widely
discussed among them are Jack Synder‘s ―theory of logrolled coalitions,‖136
Kevin Narizny‘s
137 and Steven Lobell‘s
138 economic models of domestic grand strategy and Benjamin Fordham
V. I. Lenin, Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, ([1916] 1939). ; J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press, [1902] 1965). ; Rudolph Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of
Capitalist Development, trans. Morris Watnick and Sam Gordon, ed. (Tom Bottomore, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul [1910]1981). ; Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, [1913]1981).
V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). ; Bernard Semmel, ed. Marxism and the Science of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Seymour Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). ; Steven Rosen, Testing the Theory of Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973).
Immanuel Wallerstein, ―Three Instances of Hegemony and the History of the World Economy,‖ International Journal of Comparative Sociology 24 (1984): 100-108.
Synder, Myths of Empire.
Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
Steven E. Lobell, ―The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain‘s Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment,‖ International Politics 43, no.3 (2006): 283-304.
62
elaboration of the competition of the opposing coalitions for power and influence within the
liberal state.139
Other theories of war discussed at societal-level are the ―diversionary theory of war,‖ that
advocates finding a common enemy against whom state can make a common cause by creating
―rally‖ round the ―flag‖ effect, increasing popular support for political leaders and are often
explained in terms of ―in-group/out-group‖ or ―conflict-cohesion‖ hypothesis when conflict with
an out-group increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group:140
the
―democratic peace‖ thesis advocating unique features of democratic states and their foreign
policy behaviors that make them less prone to war against other democratic states;141
and the
―clash of civilization‖ thesis which is the most prominent culture-based explanation for war,
emphasizing the fault lines between civilizations as the source of most prolonged and most
violent conflicts in history.142
This assertion is contrasted by others who however advocate that
sates are not more prone to militarized conflict across civilization lines than within
civilizations.143
1.2.4. Individual-Level Decision-Making
Having surveyed variety of national-level causes of war, there are theorists who have focused on
the role of decision-making at both the individual and organizational level. Within the individual
decision-making level fall theories such as: rational decision-making; psychological models of 139
Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security
Policy 1949-51 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). George Simmel, ―The Persistence of Social Groups,‖ American Journal of Sociology 3, no. 5 (1898): 662-98. ; 3, no. 6: 829-
36. ; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959).
R. J. Rummel, ―Democracies Are less Warlike Than Other Regimes,‖ European Journal of International Relations 1, no.4 (1995): 457-479. ; Kenneth Benoit, ―Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General),‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996): 309-41. ; Zeev Maoz, ―The Debate Over the Democratic Peace:
Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?‖ International Security 32 (1997):162-198. ; Bruce M. Russett and
Harvey Starr, ―From the Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International
System,‖ in Handbook of War Studies II , ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 93-128.
Samuel P. Huntington, ―The Clash of Civilizations?‖ Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-29. ; Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
Giacomo Chiozza, ―Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict
Involvement, 1946-97,‖ Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6 (November 2002): 711-734. ; Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, ―Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence,‖ Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (September 2000): 583-608.
63
international conflict; prospect theory; poliheuristic theory; and crisis decision-making process to
be discussed subsequently.
Traditional approaches generally assume that political leaders select policies believed to advance
state‘s interests without giving due importance to the internal processes driving foreign policy.
The dissatisfaction with this approach along with increasing interest in the more explicit
conceptual framework for analyzing foreign policy led in 1960s to the development of the
decision-making approach to the foreign policy.144
This approach rests on the premise that
understanding of the processes through which political leaders perceive the external world; and
make and implement their decisions is very important for understanding the foreign policy
actions of the state. It is necessary to open the ―black-box‖ of decision-making to understand the
foreign policy behavior as the choices determined by key individuals, groups and organizational
actors have impact on state foreign policies.145
Rational models of decision-making thus emphasize that it does not matter what goals are
pursued by actors but what is significant is their engagement in an ends-means calculation and
selection of those strategies or options that it anticipates will maximize its values or goals. Thus
immoral or repulsive goals in themselves do not make the behavior immoral.146
Then at this
level certain psychological models of international conflict are also analyzed focusing on the
content of individuals‘ belief systems about world politics, their personalities, emotions and the
psychological processes through which they acquire information and implement decisions.147
The most important factor in this analysis is the role of perceptions and misperceptions of the
capabilities and intentions of both adversaries and third parties.148
144
Richard C. Synder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, ed. Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).
Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War, (West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell Publication, 2010), 128-129.
Ibid., 130-133.
Ole R. Holsti, ―The ‗Operational Code‘ Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles‘ Philosophical and Instrumental Belief,‖ Canadian Journal of Political Science 3, no.1 (March 1970): 123-57. ; Alexander L. George, ―The ‗Operational Code‘: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and
Decisionmaking,‖ International Studies Quarterly 13, no.2 (June 1969): 190-222. ; Jervis, Perception and
Misperception. ; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
148Jack S. Levy, ―Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problem,‖ World
Politics 39, no.1 (October 1983): 82-93.
64
Similarly ―Prospect theory‖ that asserts that people avoid losses and optimize for sure gains
when choosing among several alternatives because the pain of losing is greater than satisfaction
of an equivalent gain, has a number of implications for war and peace in international
relations.149
Apart from prospect theory, ―Poliheuristic theory‖ developed by Alex Mintz and
Nehemia Geva is an interesting addition to the set of alternative models of decision-making with
implications for the study of decisions involving war and peace.150
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 prompted scholars to devote energies to study of crisis decision-
making as the nature of the regime, the institutional structure of the state and nature of the
decision unit may impact process of judgment and decision-making in a crisis situation than in a
more routine decision context. Hence, most of the literature on the subject focuses on the
characteristics of decision-making during crisis and how they differ from non-crisis contexts.151
1.2.5. Organizational-Level Decision-Making
Organizational level decision-making, however, focuses on theories of bureaucratic politics and
organizational processes and look at the key variables that might contribute to the processes
leading to war. These theories shed light on the impact of bureaucratic politics on state strategies
and on the distortion of information.152
Graham Allison‘s Essence of Decision was the For discussion of these see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ―Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk,‖ Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-91. ; Barbara Farnham, Taking Risks / Avoiding Losses (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). ; Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). ; James W.
Davis Jr., Threats and Promises (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000). ; Jack S. Levy, ―The Implications of Framing and Loss Aversion for International Conflict,‖ in Handbook Of War Studies II, ed. Manus
Midlarsky (Cambridge: MIT Press,2000): 39-83. ; and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
Alex Mintz, ―The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution
37 (1993): 595-618. ; Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, ―The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,‖ in
Decision-making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, ed. Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1997). ; Alex Mintz, ―How Do Leaders Make Decisions? : A Poliheuristic Perspective,‖ The Journal of
Conflict Resolution 48, no.1, The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb. 2004): 3-13.
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 156; For more see H. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic
Books, 1967). ; Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, ―The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-
Makers,‖ in Political Science Annual, ed. C. P. Cotter (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975). : 255-319; Ole R. Holsti,
―Crisis Decision-Making,‖ in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. I, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989): 8-84. ; and Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality (New York:
Pergamon, 1993).
Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, ed. Readings in American Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1973). ; Morton Halperin , Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974). ; John
Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974): chp. 3 &4
65
groundbreaking work that gave first systematic challenge to the assumption that where national
interest was at stake, governmental politics was put aside in favor of national interest
calculations.153
His ―governmental politics model‖ reject the assumption that state act as a single unit with well-
defined foreign policy goals, but is the outcome of the inner circle of decision-makers where
President or the Prime Minister is the single most powerful actor and his power is limited by
other actors in top positions in primary governmental organizations involved in foreign policy
making. Here each actor tends to maximize his/her interest as he/she defines them, based
primarily on organizational interests. The influence of each actor depends on his/her formal
position within government; access to president (prime minister); political skill; expertise or
reputation; control over information, resources and policy implementation; and his ability to
mobilize external support. The foreign policy then becomes the outcome of internal process of
bargaining, conflict and consensus building among these actors.154
While the ―organizational behavior model‖ instead of emphasizing on the overtly political
dimension of organizational behavior, focuses on key foreign policy agencies and standard
operating procedures. Thus bureaucratic politics take place between as well as within
organizations.155
Organizational interests and routines thus contribute to war by virtue of their
impact on the flow of information within decision-making units.
1.2.6. Civil Wars
Considering the increase in the relative frequency of civil wars since the 1945 according to the
Correlates of War Project that recorded 23 interstate and 108 civil wars in the period from 1945 to
1997, most of the recent theorizing about civil war has focused on casual factors and respective roles
of greed, motivation, grievance and opportunity.156
It is not useful to apply level-
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (New York: Longman, 1971). ; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow,
Essence of Decision, 2nd
ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 162-166.
For details see Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision.
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, introduction to The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). ; Cynthia J. Aronson and I. William Zartman, ed. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). ; David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War, Adelphi Paper No. 320 , (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1998). ; Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler, ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War,‖ Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563-595. ; Paul Collier, Anke
66
of-analysis framework to civil wars as they do not emphasize a privileged variable or a variable
at a particular level although socioeconomic inequality, weak states or rebel group financing
have been analyzed but the core argument usually revolve around motive versus opportunity
debates and less explicitly on the onset verses duration considerations.
Similarly, many of the internal wars are not really exclusively waged as internal wars and
involve rebels engaged in some type of operations outside of their home state, with support from
interstate rivals who exploit dissidence as a proxy for interstate conflict. Not surprisingly, civil
wars occur in regionally linked conflicts and are interdependent. ―The more permissive the
regional opportunity structure, the more incentive rebels have to risk taking on regimes that they
hope to change or overthrow.‖157
There are others who adopt systemic perspective with respect to civil wars and link weak states
to fundamental changes in the international system.158
They discuss how changing international
norms have discouraged expanding territorial boundaries by force and thus the previous
mechanism of eliminating weak states is no longer in operation. This forces weak states to act
like stronger states to provide security and welfare to their citizens but lacking in capacity to do
so. Thus when local grievances emerge in weak states, they are less likely to be successfully
managed, giving weight to Ann Hironak‘s point that what take place at the local level is
contingent on systemic and dyadic levels of interaction. Thus the same international system and
international norms along with aid from superpowers help sustain these weak states and prohibit
other states from becoming stronger through warfare in the old-fashioned way.
Stathis Kalyavs and Laia Balcells take Hironak‘s argument further by arguing that civil wars are
actually manifested in three types: Asymmetric civil wars where state is stronger than the rebels
and it generally go by several names such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency and irregular warfare;
second is conventional civil war where both sides relatively equal with relatively high levels of
military technology. And the third is unconventional combat where both the opposing sides are
Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, ―On the Duration of Civil War,‖ Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 253- ; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ―Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,‖ American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75-90.
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 195.
Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). ; Michael C. Desh, ―War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States,‖ International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 237-268.
67
comparable but both have access to low military technology and wage civil wars referred ―new
wars‖ by Kaldor.159
It is further argued by Kalyavs and Balcells that the post-Cold war era has
given rise to symmetrical unconventional civil wars as compared to insurgencies that dominated
Cold War period. They further argue that it is only in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
where still Cold War-style insurgencies still predominate.
In this section attempt had been made to briefly cover the theoretical perspectives pertaining to
the causes of war and explain through ―level-of-analysis‖ framework how different theories
tackle the issues of war and conflict.
Conclusion
War is such a permanent, consistent and constant phenomenon of human history that it is
impossible to explore the full dimensions and thus the changes associated with it over a period of
centuries. After going through the literature, the theoretical extension of the Power Transition
theory, whose research program has been most dynamic for the last more than half century, was
chosen for subsequent work. The gradual changes occurring in the systemic hierarchy especially
after the 9/11 has led to a peculiar situation described as post-hegemony in dissertation and this
systemic change has far reaching impact on regional hierarchies undergoing transition.
The course of study reveals that the ―Power Transition Theory‖ and its extension ―Multiple
Hierarchy Model‖ could be linked together through a ―Threat Securitization Model‖ which will
help us understand military interventions taking place in the twenty-first century by a global
power in decline. This model besides exploring the unit-systemic link, will help us analyze the
discursive turn through war legitimation and its incorporation in war narratives at a point of time
when US legitimacy to lead the system is at its lowest. Hence, Chapter 2 will discuss this model
and its attributes in detail.
Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, ―International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,‖ Unpublished Paper, Yale University, 2009 quoted in Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 196-197. ; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
68
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
Threat Construction for International Military Intervention
in Post-Hegemonic System
As the initial enthusiastic proclamations about the durability of the ―unipolar moment‖ are being
replaced with rampant speculations about the impending US decline, power transition theories
are staging a comeback among scholarly international relations community. Increasingly
optimistic projections of ―China‘s Rise / Threat‖ scenario have given fresh impetus to the debate
whether a new configuration of powers is on the horizon. Hence, the reduction of power parity
gap between the two giants point towards an intense conflict of interest which may lead us
towards yet another inevitable great power confrontation as frequently witnessed in previous
power transitions.
Historically systemic changes in world politics are accompanied by a recurrent pattern or cycle
of major wars. Literature that accounts for power transition and its linkage to war abounds in
international relations and include among others Arnold Tonybee (1950)1, Charles Doran‘s
Power Cycle Theory (1971, 1991)2, George Modelski‘s Long Cycle Theory (1987)
3, Immanuel
Wallerstein‘s World System Theory (1987)4, Robert Gilpin‘s Hegemonic Leadership Theory
(1981)5, Robert Keohane‘s Hegemonic Stability Theory (1980)
6, Torjorn Knutsen‘s Rise and
Fall of World Orders (1999)7 and Quincy Wright‘s Study of War (1965)
8. However, A. F. K.
Arnold Tonybee, War and Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).
Charles .F. Doran, The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1971). ; Charles. F. Doran, Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century‟s End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987).
Immanuel Wallerstein, ―The United States and the World ‗Crisis‘,‖ in America‟s Changing Role in the World
System, ed. Terry Boswell and Albert Bergesen (New York: Praeger, 1987), 1-29. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
R. O. Keohane, ―The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-
1977,‖ Cisa Working Paper Series No. 12, (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for International Relations, 1980). ; Most theories of the hegemonic stability theory are the theories of the stability of the international political economy and say little about war and peace.
Torjorn L. Knutsen, The Rise and Fall of World Orders (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
69
Organski‘s Power Transition Theory (1958)9 is the one that explicitly links power transition to
major wars (between great powers) and calls attention to the danger that a period of power
transition may increase the probability of war.
Being one of the most enduring and successful structural theory of international war, Power
Transition Theory (PTT) has been frequently utilized over the last five decades to answer
questions such as what happens when an established (and declining) dominant state and rising
power confront each other over the leadership of the international system.10
Since its initial
formulation by Organski in World Politics in 1958, PTT has proved to be ―a lively and
expanding research program that has moved forward in several substantive directions‖
generating ―novel predictions, many of which are empirically corroborated‖11
, subsequently
resulting in extending the bounds of power transition theory. Besides originally addressing the
questions of war and peace as dealt with in foundational works of Oragnski (1958), Organski and
Kugler (1980), Kugler and Lemke (1996) and Tammen et al (2000),12
the research program has
been extended to incorporate additional questions such as the positive relationship between
power parity and international war and conflict,13
the impact of alliances on dyadic relations,14
A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
A term ―Thucydides Trap‖ has also been coined by Graham T. Allison, an American political scientist to explain the same phenomenon, and is named after the 5
th Century Athenian historian Thucydides. For more details see
―What is Thucydides‘ Trap in International Relations?‖ The Hindu, June 16, 2017; Shannon Tiezzi, ―Graham Allison on the ‗Thucydides Trap‘,‖ The Diplomat, July 29, 2017.
Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, ―Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition
Research Program,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (December 1999): 700. ; Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy cited in R. L. Tammen, ― The Organski Legacy: A fifty-year Research Program,‖ International
Interactions 34, no. 4 (2008): 315.
Organski, World Politics. ; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). ; Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War. ; Ronald Tammen et al. Power Transitions (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, ―Power Transitions as a Cause of War,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1988): 87-102. ; Charles S. Gochman, ―Capability-Driven Disputes,‖ in Prisoners of War, ed. Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 141-159. ; Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita ―The Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony,‖ World Politics 43(1990): 28-52. ; Woosang Kim and James Morrow, ―When do Power Shifts Lead to War?‖ American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992): 896-922. ; Stuart A. Bremer, ―Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1819-
1965,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 309-341. ; Daniel S. Geller, ―Power Differentials and War in
Rival Dyads,‖ International Studies Quarterly 37(1993): 173-193. ; John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993). ; Zeev Maoz, ―The Onset and Initiation of Militarized Interstate
Disputes in the Modern Era,‖ International Interactions 19 (1993): 117-141. ; Indra de Soysa, John R. Oneal and
Yong-Hee Park, ―Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1997): 509-528. ; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace (New
York, NY: W. W. Norton and CO. 2001).
Woosang Kim, ―Alliance Transitions and Great Power War,‖ American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 833-850.
70
the stability of the nuclear deterrence,15
the relationship between power transition and
international war,16
the relationship between arms races and conflict,17
between dissatisfaction
with status quo and international war,18
the democratic peace19
and more recently it has been
extended from international system to regional subsystems throughout the developing world.20
The theory has extended well beyond the originators to generate a wealth of additional
hypotheses about risk propensity, the timing speed, and trajectory of overtakings, and about
integration as an opposite of war.21
The burgeoning of power transition research program has led
to its development, specification and application to increasingly diverse political and economic
phenomenon. Notwithstanding the strength and applicability of its ever expanding research
program, the original theory introduced in 1958 and its subsequent modification in 1989, along
with its extension into Multiple Hierarchical Model (MHM)22
1993 by Douglas Lemke will
provide the basis for arguments in this dissertation.
The chapter will be divided in two parts. Part I will reiterate Power Transition Theory as
propounded by Organski (1958), Organski and Kuglar (1989) and Lemke (1993) and discuss
what the theory has to offer for contemporary issues. Part II will provide a framework for ―threat
securitization for military intervention in Post-Hegemonic system‖ by building on the insights Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, ―The Long-Term Stability of Deterrence,‖ International Interactions 15, no. 3-
4 (1990): 255-278. 16
Charles F. Doran, ―Systemic Disequilibrium Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle,‖ Journal of Conflict
Resolution 74 (1989): 371-401. ; Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, ―Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of Great Power War: Toward a Synthesis,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1991): 107-116. ; Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama , ―A Two-Level Explanation of World War,‖ in Parity and War, ed. Jack Kugler and Dogulas Lamke (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,1996), 107-116. ; Gilpin, War and Change. ; Robert Gilpin, ―The Theory of Hegemonic War,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 591-613.
Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, ―Power Transitions and Military Buildups,‖ in Parity and War, ed. J. Kugler and D. Lemke (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 187-207.
Woosang Kim, ―Alliance Transitions and Great Power War.‖ ; Woosang Kim, ―Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo,‖ World Politics 45,(1992): 153-172. ; Woosang Kim, ―Power Parity,
Alliance, Dissatisfaction, and Wars in East Asia, 1860-1993,‖ Journal Of Conflict Resolution 46 (1996): 654-671. ; Michelle Benson, ―The Ties that Bind,‖ PhD Dissertation, (Claremont Graduate University, 1999).
Douglas Lemke and William Reed, ―Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations,‖ International Interactions 22, no.2 (1996): 143-164.
Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Kim and Morrow, ―When do Power Shifts Lead to War?‖ ; Mark Abdollahian , In Search of Structure, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California, 1996). ; Carole Alsharabati, Dynamics of War Initiation, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California,1997). ; Brian Efird , From Conflict to Integration, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California, 2001). ; Kelly Kadera, The Power-Conflict Story (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
Just as Organski‘s Power Transition Theory deals with power transition at the systemic level. MHM by Douglas Lemke replicates Organski‘s power transition in regional scenario and asserts that without interference from the top, it works in exactly the same way as the global hierarchy. For details see Lemke, Regions of War and Peace.
71
provided by Power Transition Theory. It proceeds in three stages. Stage I establish post-
hegemonic international system and explain how global and regional hierarchies work in such an
international system. Stage II elaborates threat securitization for military intervention in a post-
hegemonic international system while Stage III deals with the role political discourse play in
legitimizing international military intervention. The aim is to come up with a ―threat
securitization model for international military intervention in post-hegemonic system‖ that can
help us analyze international military intervention in Libya and Syrian emerging scenario.
2.1. Power Transition Theory
Any discussion on Post-Hegemony naturally begins with Power Transition Theory which is
about the causes of major interstate wars in international politics, with emphasis on shifts in
relative power among the dominant states as a primary catalyst for conflict. Whereas balance of
power theory posits that states balance against any state threatening hegemony, and stability best
achieved when power distribution is approximately symmetrical; hegemonic theories such as
power transition argue in favour of strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single state
in the international system and finds stability in the imbalances of power - the greater the
imbalance, the greater the stability.
Viewing balance of power theory as too static, too narrowly focused on military power and
inattentive to the sources of changes in relative power; power transition theory was advanced by
Organski in 1958 to capture the dynamic and cyclical nature of international relations. Rise and
fall of states is associated with differential rates of growth, based largely on different rates of
industrialization in this dynamic theory. Using the metaphor of a pyramid, it describes hierarchy
of states within the international system. At the top of the pyramid sits a dominant state who is
the most powerful nation in the world, the nation that controls the established international order of its own making and receives the greatest share of benefits that flows from the existing
international order. Its relationship with lesser members in this international order varies
according to power of the lesser members involved. A large power discrepancy between them
not only ensures security of the leader but the stability of the order as whole too.23
Organski, World Politics, 326-327.
72
Organski then places great powers just below the apex of the pyramid, which are to be
distinguished from dominant state on the basis of the lesser influence they enjoy with other
members of the international order as compared with the dominant state as well as the
differential benefits they receive as members of the same order. Support of few of these great
powers, however, is vital for the smooth functioning of the international order created by the
dominant state. Hence, they accordingly drive greater benefits too by aligning themselves with
the established leader.24
They are then followed by middle and small powers respectively; most
of those have found a place in the existing international order that assures them certain benefits
but otherwise lack power to bring changes to the established international order, if they desire
so.25
Power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo are described as key conditions for war in
power transition theory. The most war prone situation is when a rising but dissatisfied state with
the status quo begins to approach the strength of the leading dominant state. The challenger, as
usually referred, seeks to upset the existing international order, because it has grown in power
after the rules of the existing international order have been imposed and main benefits have
already been allocated to the dominant state and its allies.26
The dominant state and its allies are
not usually willing to grant more than a small share of the advantages they receive to the rising
state. Challengers, on the other hand, seek to establish a new place for themselves in
international society, ―a place which they feel their growing power entitles them.‖27
They are
unwilling to accept a subordinate position when they have a reason to believe that they can rival
or surpass the dominant nation in power and dominance would endow them with much greater
benefits and privileges.
Power parity which is considered a necessary condition for major war is defined as a phase
when the potential challenger develops more than 80 percent of the resources of the dominant
power and ends when it exceeds by 20 percent the resources of the dominant nation.28
Figure 2.1
illustrates conditions for both peaceful international order as well as periods of instability. The
Ibid., 327-328.
Ibid., 329-330.
Organski and Kuglar, The War Ledger, 174.
Organski, World Politics, 328.
Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, ―The Power Transition Research Program,‖ in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus I. Midlarasky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 130-1. Italics original
73
former prevailing ―when the dominant nation has a large power advantage over any other single
nation and most combination of countries dissatisfied with the status quo in the second tier‖.29
Hence preponderance of power is equated with periods of stability and peace in power transition
theory and specifically where there is preponderance coupled with broad acceptance of status
quo or satisfaction with the state of international system, while instability is likely only during
periods of ―relative parity among potential competitors.‖ Thus ―as a dissatisfied great nation
approaches parity by growing in power more rapidly than the dominant nation, instability
increases and so does the probability of conflict‖.30
Dominant Nation
Great Powers
Satisfied Middle Powers
Dissatisfied Small Powers
Colonies
Figure 2.1. Hierarchical distribution of power in the international order (Organski 1958)
Organski and Kugler further elaborate that this fear on account of closure of power gap is
engendered among leaders in dominant nation because they suspect that the challenger will ―(1)
surpass the dominant country, (2) become increasingly unwilling to accept a subordinate position
in the international order, (3) challenge the leadership and rules of the international order‖.31
In
its original work by Organski factors causing war are listed as depending on the power potential
of the challenger when it begins to climb to power; the speed with which the challenger rises in
power; the flexibility of the dominant nation in adjusting to the changes required by the
appearance of a new major nation; the last not least being the amount of friendship between the Organski and Kuglar, The War Ledger, 174.
Ibid., 175.
Ibid.
74
dominant nation and the challenger.32
While the effects of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the
international system are graphically captured by Okon Eminue and Henry Ufomba in their recent
work, which has been reproduced here to elaborate the point (Figure 2.2)33
Satisfied Maintenance of the status quo
Great Power
Dissatisfied
Challenges the status quo
Loss
Great Power wars
Wins Changes the status quo
Figure 2.2. Effects of Dissatisfaction and Satisfaction in the International System (Eminue
and Ufomba, 2011)
The important question of timing of war during a power transition is still without consensus.
Organski‘s (1958) argues that war is initiated by the rising challenger before the point of
transition while Organski and Kugler (1980) empirical analysis offers arguments in favour of
war more likely to occur after the point of transition; the finding then again is questioned by
Kugler and Lemke (2000) in their work. While a more recent research on power transition by
Tammen et.al (2000) suggests that the challenger initiates a war after the point of transition.
However, war initiation can be attributed to both dominant state and the challenger, albeit
different reasons. The dominant nation or the hegemon in a power transition might initiate a
preemptive war to prevent a rising challenger from surpassing it and hence assuming position of
Organski, World Politics, 333-337.
Okon E. Eminue and Henry U. Ufomba, ―Modeling Terrorist Target Selection: Organski‘s Power Transition
Theory,‖ Defence and Security Analysis 27, no. 4 (2011): 377.
75
dominance. While a challenger through military consolidation and industrial modernization
might act to prevent the hegemon from blocking its rise to ascendancy.34
2.1.1. Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics
An important contribution in the Power Transition research program came from Douglas Lemke,
who originally in his PhD dissertation Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics35
took up issue to
determine ―whether a well established theory of great power interactions could be modified to
help understand interactions among minor powers‖ and hence by extension give careful
consideration to ―international sub-systems within which sates interact‖.36
What makes such an
extension significant is the persistence and continuance of most of the conflict in international
system among less powerful states in regional interactions. This Multiple Hierarchical Model
(MHM) then appeared in his celebrated work Regions of War and Peace. It is important to dilate
characteristics of MHM whose subsequent extension and modification will help us understand
structural dynamics in Post-Hegemonic System.
Based on the assumption that regional hierarchies are functiontionally identical to the overall
global hierarchy dominated by great powers and as propounded by PTT; Multiple Hierarchy
Model comes with the exception that in regional hierarchies a regional dominant state establishes
and maintains status quo. Satisfaction / dissatisfaction with the status quo and power parity
create the same incentive for potential conflict in a regional hierarchy as it exists in a global
hierarchy. Other states in the regional hierarchy are either satisfied with this regional status quo
and hence are advantaged or they are dissatisfied like the ones in global hierarchy and hence
disadvantaged. Hence negative evaluations of the status quo and power parity are associated with
war in regional hierarchies too. The only significant difference between a regional hierarchy and
global hierarchy is that they are subordinate to overall global hierarchy and should the great
powers chose to interfere with relations among regional hierarchy members, they can and they
do whenever they choose. Thus unlike great powers at the peak of the overall global hierarchy,
34
Zhiqun Zhu, US-China in the 21st
Century: Power transition and peace (Routledge: London and New York,
2006), 16. Douglas Lemke, Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1993).
Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 1.
76
the regional hierarchies are subject to international intervention and the outcome of any
confrontation at the regional hierarchy could be significantly altered with their interference.37
Secondly, ―Power Transition anticipates that wars will diffuse downward from the global to the
regional hierarchies but will not diffuse upward from regional to global‖.38
As wars in the global
hierarchy are fought for the control of the international system between the dominant state and a
dissatisfied challenger, it is up to them if they want to expand the scope of the war or want to
keep them confined within their area of origin, because they are the only ones to have the power
projection ability outside of their region too. On the other hand, minor power conflicts in a
regional hierarchy are waged over regional concerns, where minor powers also lack power to
make credible threats against great powers; their goal is to establish prominence within the
regional hierarchy, thus these disputes remained confined to the regions between minor powers.
Diagrammatically (Figure 2.3.) MHM is visualized as a three-dimensional cone within which
smaller cones are nested, each representing a hierarchy. The largest representing global hierarchy
while the smaller cones representing regional hierarchies. Geographic distance is the third
dimension represented in the cone which highlights that how dominant states of regional
hierarchies like Brazil in South American regional hierarchy and India in a South Asian regional
hierarchy, are placed at the same height in the three-dimensional triangle but they do not interact
within the same regional hierarchy.
Lemke‘s classification of ―regions‖ is based on proximity and patterns of interaction.
Proximity39
is important because it increases the potential for disputes by not only increasing
interaction between them but also forcing countries to be more sensitive about the space they
inhibit and the threats to it. Thus regional/ local hierarchies are defined as existing where ―the
members of each local hierarchy consider each other when developing their foreign policies and
planning for various military contingencies‖.40
While powerful states concern themselves with
larger areas, less powerful states are constrained to limit themselves to their ―politically relevant
neighborhood‖ because of resource constraints to affect matters far from their borders. Hence
Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 63-65.
Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 8.
The strongest evidence that proximity increases the probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute has been presented by Bremer in ―Dangerous Dayds‖.
Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 68.
77
more attention is paid to that part of the globe where ―the members of such international sub-
systems as able to interact military with each other‖.41
Patterns of interaction are also very important. Regional status quo are primarily territorial but
may also be characterized by ethnic, military, economic or ideological disagreements between
regional dominant powers and regional challengers. Potential great power interference within the
regional hierarchy depends upon the character of the regional status quo, more likely to be of
great power interest and interference when the regional status quo is more salient externally.
Global Hierarchy
Regional Hierarchies
South Asian
regional
South American hierarchy
regional
hierarchy Brazil India
Pakistan
Argentina
Chile Bangladesh
Figure 2.3. Regional Hierarchies in the International System (Lemke, 1993)
Regional hierarchies will parallel the overall global hierarchy more, if there is less interference
from the above.42
Despite powerful evidence that great powers rarely involve themselves overtly Ibid.
78
in minor power interstate disputes, Afghanistan, Korea, Vietnam offer dramatic examples to the
contrary.43
Therefore great power interference in a regional dispute / status quo should be
expected when the stakes involved are consequential to the great powers. Strong empirical
evidence suggest that parity and dissatisfaction make war ten times more likely in a minor power
regional settings, thus providing convincing validation to the multiple hierarchy model‘s
expectation.44
Thus MHM is an important extension of the power transition theory which can be
utilized to analyze minor power international interactions.
2.1.2. Post-Hegemony and Power Transition
Organski‘s Power Transition Theory and Lemke‘s Multiple Hierarchal Model both offer
valuable insights about power transitions at systemic/global and sub-systemic/regional levels.
Post-Hegemony characterizes conditions which can be conveniently explained by logical
extension and modification of the aforementioned research program. However, PTT with its
exclusive focus on the global hierarchy and MHM with its main emphasis on regional hierarchy
level leave limited scope for the joint investigation of the interplay of global and regional
hierarchies when power is diffusing in the global hierarchy and power transition towards post-
hegemony is taking place.
Post-hegemony rests on the contention that we are witnessing a power transition in the
international system. This power transition is increasingly evident in the light of wealth of
literature being generated on the recent debates between the reigning dominant but declining
hegemon i.e. U.S. and the rising challenger i.e. China.45
Power diffusion at the global level is
very significant as it alters conditions and potential for conflict in a local hierarchy too. Instead
of focusing on the differential rates of growth of capabilities, the speed of overtaking and the
timing of a major power war that might cause a reconfiguration of the international system as
explicitly propounded by PTT during periods of such power transitions; post-hegemonic phase
focus in this dissertation is: how transition periods create constrained and altered conditions for
international military intervention for the declining hegemon. Existing status quo, as established
Tamment et al. Power Transitions, 68-69.
For details see Douglas Lemke, ―Toward a General Understanding of Parity and War,‖ Conflict Management and Peace Science 14 (1995): 143-62.
Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 73.
In the subsequent chapter an entire section is dedicated to discussion on US-China power trajectory.
79
by the dominant state, is in flux and replication of time tested assertive hegemonic practices for
international military intervention (e.g. pre-emption, unilateral militarism etc.) might not be a
convenient and preferable option for the declining hegemon.
While Organski‘s PTT and MHM by Lemke offer insightful explanations for potential for
conflict in their global and local hierarchies, with the aim to establish, control or reassert
dominance in their respective hierarchies; nevertheless, both address issues which are mutually
exclusive. Dominant state in a global hierarchy has a concern to maintain status quo which can
perpetuate its leadership in the international system and prevent rise of any potential challenger
rising that aims to re-write the rules of the system to its own advantage; while regional dominant
state is focused and concerned with maintenance of regional hierarchy which prevents rise of
local challengers to established regional status quo. However, when one tries to find out how a
power transition in a global hierarchy alters conditions for a conflict ridden regional hierarchy
and provide incentives to dominant states within the regional hierarchy to either reassert status
quo or for regional challengers to rewrite regional hierarchy, both these research programs fail to
establish a casual connection between the two.
Besides wherever issue of diffusion of great power wars in regional hierarchies is concerned, it is
assumed as a logical extension of the issues at stake for the great powers as witnessed during
World War II where the original conflict between the United Kingdom and Germany expanded
to Russia and then virtually encompassed every regional hierarchy with the exception of South
America.46
Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM) precludes diffusion of minor power interstate
militarized disputes into wars encompassing great powers. Wherever great powers intervened in
regional disputes - a rather rare phenomenon, they did it mainly to protect their own interests at
stake as witnessed in World War I when the conflict between Austria-Hungry and Serbia
expanded to engulf the world.47
Notwithstanding the limitations of these research programs when analyzing power transition in
post-hegemony; Structural changes taking place during post-hegemonic phase are too important
to be ignored or left for analysis for a period where a new hierarchy of power has been
established. On the contrary by lying thread bare dynamics surrounding changing circumstances, Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 77.
Ibid., 78.
80
it becomes far easier to understand how systemic change from hegemony to post-hegemony is
taking place and what such changes has in store for important events, like military interventions
by the declining hegemon occurring in the international arena.
Even contemporary scholarly focus on power transitions chiefly through the prism of ―China‘s
Rise–US Decline‖ scenario has produced dearth of literature for the impact of such transitions on
troubled regions like Middle East where a clear delink from previous US hegemonic practices
could be observed. One basic reason for this has been the restriction of power transition model to
the analysis of outbreak of war between major powers or to wars within regional hierarchies with
little focus on exploring the links between two. Arguably then, scholarly research has largely
failed to examine how power transition in a post-hegemonic setup plays out; for instance, in
terms of scope and substance of the military intervention exercised by a global power now in
decline.
By expanding the research program to include military intervention by great powers in a regional
hierarchy when power at the global hierarchy is already undergoing transition, helps us explore if
there exists a causal connection between two. Besides it will help us understand in a period of
ambiguous power preponderance at the global hierarchy, how regional powers undergoing power
transitions are more prone to conflict with increasing scope for great power interference and
intervention. Hence conditions signifying post-hegemonic military intervention will be detailed
in the subsequent section, besides addressing question of what characterizes post-hegemony and
why it increases reliance on ―threat securitization through political discourse.‖
2.2. Threat Securitization for Military Intervention
Construction of ―threat securitization through political discourse‖ for military intervention
follows a distinct path in post-hegemonic system which will be traced through three stages, each
though independent but provide necessary foundation for the subsequent stage. This section will
be utilizing insights of the power transition research program to formulate a military intervention
threat securitization model to be tested for case studies of Libya and Syria. These case studies
will highlight the arrival of a post-hegemonic system that has dented US unprecedented
81
preponderance and standing in the international system while simultaneously heralding long-
anticipated systemic changes.
STAGE I establishes conditions characterizing post-hegemonic international system.
STAGE II elaborates how threat securitization for international military intervention takes place
in post-hegemonic system. This stage also deals with the interplay of systemic and unit-level
variables that may or may not constrain both the intervener and the intervened.
STAGE III deals with the role that political discourse plays in legitimizing military intervention.
It explores at which systemic and unit levels does a discourse and consensus need to emerge in
order for military intervention to take place. Besides it determines within unit and systemic
levels – is one discursive proponent more important than the other in generating normative
structure? Aim is to look at the nature, content and normative effects of the discourse espoused
by a global power on the decline. Specifically the discourse around securitization to legitimize
military intervention and to ascertain in what ways does the discourse change as a result of
decline.
A detailed analysis of three stages through case studies of Libya and Syria will demonstrate
whether a pattern of threat construction can be traced that might emerge through unit-systemic
interplay of securitized political discourse hence either confirming or disapproving this research
project hypothesis, i.e.
Hypothesis:
Power transition within the global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international
system has led to the marginalization of US military interventionist policy.
2.2.1. STAGE I: Post-Hegemonic International System
US uncontested supremacy established with the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 has been
replaced with another threat to US dominance in the world theatre; this time in the shape of a
formidable China. Organski in one of his most prophetic predictions back in 1958 stated that ―the
question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather how
long will it take her to achieve this status ….. The United States will retain world leadership for
82
at least the remainder of the twentieth century, perhaps even for a longer time, but the position
will eventually pass to China‖.48
The same thought was again echoed in words of a former US
ambassador to China Winston Lord when he expressed his concerns in these words ―The
question is not whether China will be a major player in global as well as regional security affairs
but rather when and how. China‘s rapid economic development, its growing military capabilities
and its historical international role will make it a major power in the coming century‖.49
United States
Europe
Japan Russia
China
Figure 2.4. The Global Hierarchy: A Chinese Perspective (Xue Mouhang, 1995)
The Asian landmass with China at the heart of it has already brought Asian theatre in the
forefront of US foreign policy focus while its previous Eurocentric orientation has taken a
backseat. Notwithstanding China‘s economic, demographic and political potential to establish
parity and then overtake US first in the size of its economy and then in other domains of power;
scholars like Xue Mouhang50
still finds US at the heart of a global hierarchy composed of a
square pyramid, visually represented in Figure 2.4. Organski, World Politics, 446.
Winston Lord, ―U.S. Policy Toward China: Security and Military Considerations‖ Statement before the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1995, U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6(43): 775
Xue Mouhang, ―The New World Order: Four Powers and One Superpower?‖ Beijing Review 38 (1995): 19-20.
83
2.2.1.1. Global hierarchy in Post-Hegemony
The question of China attaining parity with US and then may be overtaking it would be a matter
of detailed discussion in the next chapter. Here the focus of analysis is on post-hegemonic phase
when the waning of American hegemony has altered the shape of the existing international
system and brought additional actors with increasing sway on political outcomes. It is important
to dwell on what is ―hegemony‖ before announcing a verdict about the arrival of ―post-
hegemony‖ in the international system. The term ―hegemony‖ has generated intense debate
between liberals and realists for a long period of time. For scholars like Michael Doyle, it stands
for ―controlling leadership of the international system as a whole.‖51
Michael Mastanduno,
however, characterizes establishment of hegemony when one political unit has the ―power to
shape the rules of the international politics according to its own interests.‖52
Others like Stuart
Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Wohlforth equate hegemony with hierarchy which is the
political-military ―domination‖ of a single unit ―over most of the international system.‖53
Such
influence ultimately rests on material power, and John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan assert is
―effectively exercised when hegemon is able to establish a set of norms that others willingly
embrace.‖54
For liberals like Robert Keohane, hegemony is a mix of power and norms, resting
on the twin premises: that ―order in world politics is typically created by a single hegemonic
power‖ and ―the maintenance of order requires stability.‖55
For liberals and realists, hegemony is a question of power; for realists, in particular, material
capabilities constitute power, which then in turn confer influence. Exclusive emphasis on
material component as power, ignore how that power simultaneously depend on the nature of
state‘s capabilities, how they are developed and used. In the contemporary era of enhanced
nationalism, people are less willing to be coerced by foreign powers, increasing great powers
reliance to translate power into influence through resort to a combination of carrots and sticks
policy. Use of raw power in a politically unsophisticated way and at odds with the prevailing Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 40.
Michael Mastanduno, ―Hegemonic Order, September 11, and the Consequences of the Bush Revolution,‖
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 5 (2005): 177-96.
Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7.
G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ―Socialization and Hegemonic Powers,‖ International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283-315.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 31.
84
norms erodes not enhances the influence of the state sitting at the apex of the system already
witnessed in case of epic failures of US in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus power‘s material and
social basis has to be taken into account. It is not feasible to disaggregate influence from power.
Too much emphasis on the material factor alone has been unable to explain why the
preponderant US military and economic power fails at time to get desired outcomes. While
taking into account influence that rests on persuasion (shared values and acceptable practices)
convinces others that it is in their interests to do what you want them to do. Influence of this kind
is not a function of material capabilities though it benefits from them. Such influence ―depends
on sophisticated leaders and diplomats, shared discourses with target states, advocacy of policies
that build on precedent, and a willingness to let others help shape and implement initiatives.‖56
Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow in their recent work Good-Bye Hegemony, talk about a
―posthegemonic world‖ by describing three functions that personify a hegemon and how they
require ―contingent forms of influence rather than the blunt exercise of power.‖57
Hegemon‘s
first responsibility is normative. It is the capacity to shape the policy agenda of global institutions
and ad-hoc coalitions based on knowledge and manipulation of appropriate discourses.58
Here
constructivists emphasize persuasion over coercion, achieved primarily through agenda setting
and by appeal to shared norms. Second constituent of hegemony is the economic management.
Here they refer to the declining performance of the US as manager of the global system either
willingly or increasing lack of capability. Third and final element is the enforcement of global
initiatives referred to as sponsorship resting ultimately on capabilities. It entails agreed-upon
goals and procedures to confer legitimacy on any initiative; dialogue; negotiation; and the use of
regional or global institutions as venues. By emphasizing how these functions are becoming
diffused among states and non-state actors rather than concentrated in hands of hegemon, they
announce the arrival of a posthegemonic world.59
Hence the study defines post-hegemony as a phase which signifies a new era beyond the
preponderant presence of US led patterns of interactions and exercise of influence. US still is the 56
Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 6.
Ibid.,8.
See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ―Power in International Politics,‖ International Organization 59, no. 1(2005): 39-75, especially 56-57. ; Ian Manners, ―Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?‖ Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-58, especially 239.
Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 6-8.
85
single most powerful nation in any of military, political and cultural domains of power but
because the economic realm is fast in flux so it undercuts US ability to exercise unmitigated
influence that it had enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth century as the sole superpower or
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thus drawing on theories of Antonio Gramsci and
Roger Simon that describe hegemony as a relation ―not of domination by means of force, but of
consent by means of political and ideological leadership,‖60
we will discuss the loss of
―legitimacy‖ as an important component in announcing arrival of post-hegemonic world. Reich
and Lebow aptly characterize this phase as the glaring discrepancy between ―America‘s self-
image and goals on the one hand, and the others perception of them…. the extraordinary military and economic power of the United States and its increasing inability to get others to do what it
wants.‖61
(Italics in original text)
The economic attenuation between US and China is already restructuring the global hierarchy.
Whether it has the potential of peaceful transformation that was witnessed a century ago between
Britain and US and almost two decades ago when the mantle of power peacefully slipped from
USSR to US without a great power confrontation, is still far from clear. Power transition theory
predicts power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo as two important variables that have
the potential to convert a great power transition into a great power conflict. But before such
variables could assert themselves in China-US case, a phase of uncertainty prevails which could
turn things around either way. This phase of drift away from the US hegemony to the
establishment of a new global hierarchy of power in the international system is termed as post-
hegemony. Post-hegemony may eventually give way to a new hegemony with or without a great
power confrontation or it may just slip into a non-hegemonic international system with a
different configuration of power, as also witnessed in history.62
Debates on America‘s waning influence has already led to speculations about the future of the
international power structure and who might qualify in the prestigious category and on what
basis. Power transition research program has also made significant contribution on the emerging
structure of the international system. Tammen et.al in their book Power Transitions: Strategies Roger Simon, Gramsci‟s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 21.
Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 3.
For further discussion on nonhegemony see Amitav Acharaya, ―Nonhegemonic International Relations: A Preliminary Conceptualization‖ (Working Paper No 10, presented at the International Studies Association
Convention, San Francisco, 2008).
86
for 21st Century published a chapter under the title ‗The World to Come‘ and after outlining
what power configuration of the international system had been in World Wars, Cold War and
Post-Cold War period, speculates about the global hierarchy of the future as well.
United States
Europe
Japan USSR
China
Figure 2.5. Global Hierarchy in the Cold War Period (Tammen et al., 2000)
The global hierarchy in Cold War period (Figure 2.5. ) suddenly changed with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and gave way to a US-led international system (Figure 2.6.) with preponderance of
power in military, economic, political and cultural sectors. Post-Cold War period also saw
exclusion of Japan as one of the main contenders for supremacy in the international theater as its
economic strength was significantly constrained as opposed to previous speculations about it.
Power transition theory predicts that ―the future structure of the global hierarchy will be
determined by the continued economic expansion of the great powers. As endogenous growth
fosters convergence in the growth of per-capita economic output, the size of a nation‘s
population will ultimately set limit on the size of its economy‖.63
Based on the endogenous
model it can be predicted that the distribution of world economic resources will shift over time,
with Asia as the largest holder of world‘s wealth as per-capita GDP converges.64
Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 189.
Ibid., 190.
87
United States
Europe Russia
China
Figure 2.6. The Global Hierarchy in the Post-Cold War Period (Tammen et al., 2000)
Power transition theory predicts a number of possible structural arrangements in the twenty-first
century. There are two ideal types representing opposite ends of the spectrum of possible
hierarchies with many types in between. On one end of the spectrum is U.S.-led superbloc
(Figure 2.7.) wherein US can greatly increase its power by expanding NATO via incorporation
of Russia, China and India into a superbloc.
U.S. Superbloc
Europe
India Russia
China
Figure 2.7. Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-led Superbloc (Tammen et
al., 2000)
88
While the other end of the spectrum is represented by Greater China (Figure 2.8.). Here a
dissatisfied China overtakes the US as its coalition proves stronger than the satisfied states led by
US.
China
Europe
India U.S. /
NAFTA
Islamic Bloc and/or
Resurgent Russia
Figure 2.8. Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China (Tammen et al., 2000)
While the first scenario predicts an ultrastable system with US as its leader for decades to come,
the second raises prospects for global war. What alternative B implies that in war or peace Asia
will be occupying centre of the international system with an Asian state as a dominant power
replacing U.S.65
Which future alternative will finally prevail, many thinks it still is in US hands.
However, this study deals with a period between the two i.e. when the US hegemony is in
decline and other potential actors are staging a comeback on the international theatre, before a
clear new hierarchy is established. Power transition theory with its usual focus on the dominant
state and potential challenger misses the dynamics unfolding in the international system when
the system is still in flux. This phase as already labelled ―post-hegemony‖ is represented through Ibid., 189-193.
89
a pentagonal pyramid (Figure 2.9.). Post-hegemony deal with the contemporary international
environment and how it is unfolding at the systemic level.
United States
Brazil
Europe India
China
Russia Japan
Figure 2.9. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony
US still occupies the top and leads the system through its capability to secure preferable
outcomes, being constrained with the emergence of other key actors with significant resources
and power e.g. Europe, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil. While China occupies the base of the
contemporary global hierarchy with its overwhelming economic strength through which it
increasingly makes its presence registered as the key contender that routinely pushes its agenda
to be at the top of the pyramid by replacing US.
While the power is in transition in the global hierarchy and this flux provides different incentives
to major players in different contexts. These players do assert themselves and provide not only a
strong opposition to US-led systemic structure but at the same time try to construct alternative
structure thus undercutting US influence and hence its ability to frame agendas to a certain extent
in varied international settings.
90
Power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo again being the two most dominant variables
driving foreign policy behavior of emerging actors in the post-hegemonic phase too. However,
power parity (power diffusion) is not only about the leading challenger approaching parity in
power with the dominant state, in any of the leading sectors (political, economic, military) but it
is also about how other political contenders (e.g. India, Russia, Brazil) which have recently
emerged, try to carve a place for themselves in the emerging structure of the international
system.
When leading actors are dissatisfied with the status quo, as they have emerged to power after the
rules of the international system have been written by the hegemon and established and
maintained with the active involvement of its allies (EU, Japan) who also disproportionately
profit from hegemon. The emerging new actors in a bid to carve a larger space for them try to
align themselves with other actors with whom they might not have anything in common except
the will to find a larger share for themselves in the evolving international system. It is also a well
established fact without joint efforts no single actor, not even the strongest among them, is in a
position to rewrite the rules of the international system in its favour.
2.2.1.2. Regional Hierarchies in Post-Hegemony
The drift towards post-hegemony in the global system sends very strong signals to regional /
local hierarchies which try to take advantage of the vulnerability prevailing in the global
hierarchy. The challengers in a regional hierarchy might get emboldened and attempt to rewrite
the rules for the regional hierarchy, under the impression that they might not encounter the same
kind of opposition as they expected earlier.
Regional hierarchies in post-hegemony function very much like the mechanism outlined in
Lemke‘s Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM). However, one significant difference is the
increased likelihood of interference of other powers/ great powers in regional hierarchies. While
MHM asserts that great powers do not intervene when the interstate disputes are territorial or
their national interests not at stake. Regions with established hierarchies in flux are of special
concern to great powers.
It is the interplay of regional and global hierarchies which attains significant importance in post-
hegemonic phase. To establish this linkage and understanding how its unfolding affects the
91
dynamics of international system in flux, will help us understand how undertaking international
intervention takes a distinct route in post-hegemony.
The inter-linkage between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony depends on the
identification and categorization of regional hierarchies and how they evolve to create room for
an increased likelihood of great power interference and intervention.
Lemke‘s definition of regions is built upon notions of proximity and the ability to interact
militarily with each other. Each state has power to exert military influence over some portion of
the globe‘s surface which degrades because of the loss-of-strength gradient.66
The steeper the
later, the smaller the ability of state to interact or influence other states militarily. Applying the
concept of the loss-of-strength gradient, Lemke calculated a state‘s ―relevant neighbourhood‖
where it can ―reach‖ them militarily and thus exert influence within their territory. Such states
were then designated as ―relevant dyads‖ as their joint reachability makes wars possible between
them. Lemke then adjusted ―miles per day‖ formula of Bueno de Mesquita67
to his estimates of
―transit ranges‖ to form set of local hierarchies, suitable to his theoretical framework.68
Regional hierarchy classification given by Lemke in 1990‘s still holds true for the regions that
have been relatively stable over a period of time and / or the dissatisfied challengers have failed
to bridge the 80% power parity gap, as identified an important threshold for initiating power
transition in a relevant dyad, with the leading state, as witnessed e.g. in case of South Asian and
South American local hierarchies. In South Asia India over a period of time strengthened its
position in spite of increasing tensions with the regional challenger Pakistan. Similarly in South
America Brazil has kept its leading role intact.
However there are certain regions where significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy
have given rise to new dynamics, made possible through conflict, instability and erosion of
traditional structures of power hierarchy. Such regions with uncertainty, conflict and instability
prevalent among them and struggle among potential leaders have opened room for intervention /
interference by great powers. For details see Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defence (New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1962).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita The War Trap (New Haven,CT: Yale University Press, 1981) 103-108.
Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 67-111. Lemke formula incorporates types of terrain to be traversed and the transportation technologies used to traverse terrain type. Thus ―miles per day‖ formula might be different for a terrain because of the transportation technology employed.
92
These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link
between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, being more vulnerable as a play
ground where potential challengers to the declining hegemon could be seen with their assertive
foreign policy behaviors and traditional soft and hard balancing strategies. Middle East and
Northern Africa are regions where we will see the post-hegemonic interplay of global and
regional hierarchies. These two regions will be later explored through case studies of Syria and
Libya.
In post-hegemony the global hierarchy undergoing power transition is comparatively stable. The
declining hegemon and potential challenger are engaged in maintaining and altering the
established status-quo to their own advantage respectively but none is in a position nor
displaying disposition to upset the status quo through traditional overt power transitional great
power confrontation.
The declining hegemon would not initiate a conflict because it still enjoys preponderance in all
the major sectors of powers and it has reasons to believe that potential challenger could be co-
opted in the established status-quo. While the potential challenger though dissatisfied with the
status quo and aiming for an enhanced presence in the international system commensurate with
its growing strength would not be in a position to overtly challenge the established status quo.
This inability comes both from the prevalent power gap where 80% threshold in all the leading
sectors has not been attained and the realization that existing power hierarchy though not fully
compatible with its growing strength, has been responsible for its rise as a major power and
hence continues to feed it. Secondly, overt hard balancing against the declining hegemon could
be counter-productive, as it could unnecessarily provoke it for retaliatory postures. Co-opting
other states dissatisfied with the status quo could also be far from possible.
In the absence of both internal and external balancing mechanisms, system changing great power
conflict is still a far-fetched reality. Regional hierarchies without dominant leaders and conflict-
ridden dynamics, are however, open for great power intervention. Because disturbances in
regional / local hierarchies with interests at stake for great powers, draw them in local settings
and make regional hierarchies as play ground for proxy wars and at times for direct and overt
military intervention.
93
These regional hierarchies are also vulnerable because inter-state and intra-state conflicts have
left such regions without dominant leaders. Power abhors vacuum which then make conditions
ripe for uncertainty and conflict with overt intervention from the top, to be replaced with a new
regional hierarchy, however unstable that might be.
2.2.2. STAGE II: Threat Securitization
Once the conditions specifying post-hegemony are in place, it is easier to ascertain that military
intervention in a regional scenario by the declining hegemon would trigger certain dissatisfied
potential challengers too. Disturbance in a local hierarchy, where interests of great power are at
stake, are of special concern to the state sitting at the apex of the system. The reconfiguration of
regional hierarchy, not suitable to the dominant state of the global hierarchy, is an outcome that
ought to be avoided at every cost. Such an outcome is especially unacceptable to declining
hegemon as it leads others to question its legitimacy as leader of the international system.
Reconfiguration of an important region has to be in line with expectations of the globally
dominant power. This reaffirms that international system is still very much the product of the
hegemon‘s preferences and influence. The contrary development sends strong signals to potential
challengers that long awaited systemic changes are in progress.
With a decline in hegemon‘s standing, the reliance on international and regional bodies
increases. Hence, a change in military intervention behaviour is also detected. Instead of opting
for assertive unilateralism, the leading state prefers multilateral course where the target state is
presented as a threat to international peace and security. Securitization theory presents the most
logical choice to analyze military intervention in post-hegemonic system. It will be elaborated in
the first part of the section. Next section will identify the systemic and unit-level variables that
may or may not constrain both the intervener and the intervened while military intervention is
being undertaken. How threat securitization in post-hegemony is achieved will be elaborated in
last section of stage II.
2.2.2.1. Securitization Theory
Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School in 1990s originally consisted of
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde. Their groundbreaking work Security: A New
Framework for Analysis (1998) aimed at widening and broadening security beyond the
94
traditional political-military sectors to include economic, societal and environmental sectors too.
Secondly it had widespread influence in the early development of Critical Security Studies as it
provided a ―constructivist operational method‖ – an analytical framework for distinguishing how
and when issues become security issues.69
However, in retaining the role for the state in
international security it earned criticism for still being wedded to (neo)realism but it maintained a
link with traditional security studies with the aim to ―analyze international security without
losing sight of its original purpose‖.70
―Security‖ according to them, ―is still about survival‖. It is when an issue is presented as posing
an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state,
incorporating government, territory, and society).71
The security-survival logic is maintained
and extended to include other four categories beyond military sector. The dynamics of each of
these sectors are determined by ―securitizing actors‖ and ―referent objects‖. While former are
―actors who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened‖;
while later are ―things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim
to survival‖.72
While ―securitizing actors‖ can be expected to be ―political leaders, bureaucracies, governments,
lobbyists, pressure groups‖73
but ―referent objects‖ and the kind of existential threats they face
vary across security sectors and levels of analysis eg., state in military security, national
sovereignty or an ideology in political security, collective identities in societal security etc. 74
Securitization is thus a two-stage process for which the Copenhagen School provides a spectrum
along which issues can be plotted as non-politicized, politicized and securitized (Figure 2.10).
This framing of a security issue and its movement from politicized to the securitized end of the
spectrum takes place through an act of securitization. In this discursive process an already
politicized issue is articulated as an existential threat to a referent object (for example, state,
groups, national sovereignty, ideology, economy, species, habitat) by a securitizing actor (for
example, government, political elite, military, civil society). Thus ―an issue is dramatized and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), vii.
Ibid., viii.
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 40.
Ibid., 21-23.
95
presented as an issue of supreme priority: thus by labeling it as security an agent claims a need
for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means‖75
.
NON-POLITICIZED
Issue has no state involvement and is not subject to public debate or decision
POLITICIZED
Issue is part of public policy, needing government decision and resource allocation
SECURATIZED Issue is an existential threat, requires emergency measures and actions outside the scope of normal politics
Figure 2.10. Issue scale, derived from Buzan et al. (1998: 23)
Thus securitization ―is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be
seen as a more extreme version of politicization‖.76
While desecuritization is the reverse process
and involves the ―shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining
processes of the political sphere‖.77
Through the two-stage process it is explained how and when an issue is to be perceived and
acted upon as an existential threat to security in securitization. The first stage deals with
portrayal of certain issues, persons or entities as existential threats to referent objects. Here
usually state initiates a move of securitization but non-state actors can also be the initiators like
popular movements or trade unions but the process tends to be dominated by powerful actors
with privileged positions in state thus revealing the power and influence of the securitizing
actor.78
The use of language of security does not mean that an issue is automatically transformed into a
security question as second stage depends upon acceptance by the relevant audience (public
opinion, military officials and other elites) that a referent object is existentially threatened; only Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 4.
Allen Collins, ―Securitization, Frankenstein‘s Monster and Malaysian Education,‖ Pacific Review 18, no. 4(December 2005): 567-88.
96
then can extraordinary measures could be imposed. Central to this stage is ―speech act‖- ―the
utterance itself is the act‖79
thus signifying the discursive representation of a certain issue as an
existential threat to security. It is the starting point of securitization process where through
speech alone a certain issue is designated as an existential threat to security irrespective of the
―reality‖ of the threat or its existence in material terms. It is the use of ―discourse‖ which
articulates an issue as threat as ―existential threat‖ to the relevant audience and thus presenting a
case for immediate mobilization of state power and movement beyond traditional rules; hence it
always a ―political choice‖80
Timing
Social and Audience
discursive context
of speech act acceptance
SUCCESSFUL
Repetition / process of External reality:
security speech acts
SECURITIZATION
nature / features of
following grammar of ‘threat’
security
Relationship
between speaker
and audience
Positioning of securitizing actor
Figure 2.11. Factors contributing to successful securitization (Jonna Nyman, 2013)
79
Ole Waever, ―Securitization and Desecuritization,‖ in On Security, ed. Ronnie D.L. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 55.
Buzan et al. Security, 29.
97
Waever describes ―something is a security problem when the elites declares it to be so‖81
thus
signifying that actors with privileged position of power (governments and political elites) had an
added legitimacy of their position and hence they are more successful in securitizing an issue.
Thus this school regards security as a socially constructed concept and hence is primarily
constructivist in its approach.82
What constitutes an ―existential threat‖ is very much a subjective
matter depending upon shared understanding of a danger to security. In other words a collective
has to accept it as such; only then would standard political procedures would be discarded as
inadequate and adoption of emergency measures considered feasible.
An act of securitization has a tendency to lead to excesses and abuse of power also. Besides
moves of securitization can fail also if the audience rejects the speech act articulated by the
securitizing actor. In such a case it remains a securitizing move but not a successful
securitization.83
In sum successful securitization (Figure 2.11) involves three key facilitation
conditions: the speech act itself following the ―grammar of security‖ emphasizing priority,
urgency and survival; the securitizing actor being in a ―position of authority‖ to maximize
audience acceptance; and the features of ―alleged threat/s‖.84
Another point to be emphasized is the tension within securitization theory on ambiguous
understanding of ―the speech act‖, which has led it to evolve into two distinct directions with a
sociological and a post-structural branch. This tension is because of the desire to have both ―a
social sphere (with ―actors‖, ―fields‖, ―authority‖, ―intersubjectivity‖, ―audience‖ and
―facilitating conditions‖) and a (post-structural / post-modern) linguistic theory of Derrida and
performativity‖.85
However this tension could be partially resolved by a greater emphasis on
discursive context.
Waever, ―Securitization and Desecuritization,‖ 54.
Thierry Balzacq , ―Constructivism and Securitization Studies,‖ in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, ed. M.D. Cavelty, V. Mauer and T. Balzacq (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 56-72.
Buzan et al. Security, 25.
Ibid., 33.
85H. Stritzel, ―Towards a Theory of Securatization: Copenhagen and Beyond,‖ European journal of International
Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 377.
98
This securitization theory by Buzan et. al will be used to explain discursive construction of
existential threat in post-hegemonic system for international military intervention in a local /
regional hierarchy.
2.2.2.2. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Military Intervention
Exploring the link between systemic and unit-level variables is significant. As already discussed
the uncertainty, instability and conflict in regional hierarchy has rendered local states vulnerable
and this vulnerability is exploited by both the regional and extra-regional actors and assist them
in pushing forward their agendas. Besides it‘s the power transition in the global hierarchy that
provides additional impetus to events unfolding in regional hierarchies.
Geographical setting, intra-state conflict, legitimacy of the global dominant state and hence the
system its constructed, domestic-political settings of the intervening state and regional, extra-
regional scenario all are important variables and their interplay makes great power military
intervention in a local hierarchy all the more probable.
2.2.2.2.1. Geography
Declining hegemon intervenes in areas of strategic importance. Even Lemke‘s Multiple
Hierarchy Model postulates that great powers never intervene in minor powers territorial
disputes. Overt military interventions in such geographical settings take place when interests of
great powers are at stake or adverse outcomes are consequential to them. As power transition
theory caters to the cyclical nature of international politics so it can be logically stated that these
minor states or local hierarchies gain importance at one time and become irrelevant at others.
Contemporary international environment and events shaping the politics at the global level thus
play significant role in assigning importance to a region / local hierarchy.
While the global dominant state will elevate or reduce the region in importance depending on
contemporary international environment; the target state in a local hierarchy is permanently
caught in a geographical dilemma like all territorial bound states. One can neither chose one‘s
neighbors nor shift boundaries when friends turn into foes. When a military intervention is
undertaken in a local hierarchy, role of its neighbors and regional dominant state play a decisive
role. Any target state surrounded by hostile neighbors will fear intervention more; while target
99
states with friendly allies in the region could frustrate any intervening state. Exploration of
military intervention patterns in Libya and intended action against Syria will shed light on the
issue in the subsequent chapters.
2.2.2.2.2. Intra-State Conflict
Besides the external conditions facilitating intervention by a great power, certain internal factors
also make the overt intervention more probable. These include domestic politico-military
situation and economic conditions.
Satisfied, stable, thriving and functioning polities whatever their form of government, rarely
attracts foreign intervention. Whenever internal political setup is in transition or there is active
opposition to the state‘s established status-quo, plus internal dissatisfied challengers who could
be co-opted by interveners, intervention by regional / extra-regional players becomes a reality.
It can thus be stated that power transition two key variables satisfaction with the state‘s status-
quo and potential dissatisfied challengers make state vulnerable for external overt intervention
which can be visually represented as Figure 2.12. Hence it‘s possible to analyze domestic
conflictual situation in the target state through power transition lens.
Target State‘s Established Status-Quo
Stable, Satisfied, Thriving
& Functioning State
Dissatisfied Challengers & Status-quo
in Transition
No Overt External Military Intervention
External Military Intervention and / or
Regional and Extra-regional Players
Figure 2.12. Internal Hierarchy of the Target State located in a key Region
100
2.2.2.2.3. Legitimacy
When internal disturbances in a state upset hierarchical balance in a key regional hierarchy and
overt intervention by both regional and extra-regional players becomes apparent; then the
legitimacy of the globally dominant state becomes at stake. Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as
―a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs and definitions.‖86
It also
refers to ―the normative belief by an actor that a rule or an institution ought to be obeyed. It is a
subjective quality between actor and institution, and defined by the actor‘s perception of the
institution. The actor‘s perception may come from the substance of the rule or from the
procedure or source by which it was constituted.‖87
Here legitimacy refers to the ability of the
globally dominant state to run the affairs of the world and others perception of its capability to
manage them accordingly. When perceived to be legitimate, then rule assumes authoritative
quality. ―The character of power accordingly changes when it is exercised within a framework of
legitimate relations and institutions. The concepts of power and legitimacy might be said to come
together in the exercise of ―authority‖.88
There are certain regions where frequent inter-state and intra-state conflicts are witnessed that
never attract great power intervention. Usually in such regions the apex of the regional hierarchy
is not in dispute and a different outcome won‘t affect hegemon‘s influence within the local
hierarchy. Such inter-state militarized disputes thus seldom attract attention (Somalia, Rwanda)
or if they do hegemon‘s interest is restoring peaceful status-quo. Besides, such inter-state
militarized disputes with minimum possibility to engulf regional hierarchy also seldom raise
alarming questions on dominant state‘s claim to global leadership. The legitimacy is questioned
when the outcome of an intra-state conflict could alter regional status-quo, vital to the interests of
the global dominant state. Hence, such conditions warrant overt military intervention, thus
enlarging the circle of a local conflict to include extra-regional players.
Contemporary US foreign policy overtly states that it will not allow opposition in any region by
any state. Such a public declaration puts additional pressure because an outcome contrary to the 86
Mark Suchman, quoted in Ian Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 387. Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ 381.
Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 36.
101
declared policy could mean acceptance of an overt loss of influence in a key region. Legitimacy
is such an important variable that international organizations are co-opted to assume a semblance
of international support even by the state sitting at the apex of the international system. To
intervene or not to intervene then becomes a policy matter directly linked to hegemon‘s ability to
shape international system to its own preferable outcomes. This is a stage where securitization
theory becomes implicit.
Military intervention in a state located in a key regional hierarchy is thus framed for the domestic
audience as the test of dominant state‘s systemic legitimacy. An untoward situation externally
imposed through ―irresponsible‖ actions of target state rather than a matter of choice which could
be side-stepped. This framing then cites threats emanating from local hierarchy as ―existential‖
directly linked to the security of the dominant state and conversely the system it created.
Domestically an audience has to be satisfied which includes organizational- bureaucratic
interests besides general public. Besides domestic politics and international politics are closely
related, hence, politics that takes place within states affects politics that occur outside states.
Securitization of threat then gains special place in a democratic society where public registers its
dis/content through electronic, print and social media, mass gatherings and dissenting opinion
gets heard on every major forum within the country.
Framing of disturbance in a local hierarchy thus assumes ―existential threat‖ character, expressed
through political speeches of elite actors. This will be discussed in detail in next section.
2.2.2.2.4. Regional and Extra-regional Players
An inter-state conflict may or may not attract the regional involvement and may be limited to a
conflict within the relevant dyad. However, a conflict with intervention from the global hierarchy
always triggers other regional and extra-regional actors and hence potential challengers in a local
hierarchy get active to carve a place for themselves when the local hierarchy is still in flux and
obtain a favourable outcome for themselves.
Thus local disturbances offer incentives to both regionally based states and extra-regional
players. While regional states are concerned with new configuration of power to emerge once
102
the conflict ends. Extra-regional players want to enhance their position as important global
player with ability to alter local status-quo.
Military intervention in a post-hegemonic system has been diagrammatically represented below
in Figure 2.13.
Regional hierarchy in Intervener Intervener
transition
(declining
Post-Hegemonic Phase
hegemon)
Domestic
politics
Target State
Threat Legitimacy
State hierarchy International
in transition Securitization Crisis
Institutions
Extra-Regional involvement
Post-Hegemonic Phase
Intervener
Figure 2.13. Military Intervention Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic System
Military intervention can become protracted when extra-regional players are also dissatisfied
potential challengers in global hierarchy. This reinforces legitimacy factor for declining hegemon
and draws them more heavily in a local hierarchy.
Any adverse outcome in a key local hierarchy may not altogether alter contemporary global
hierarchy but it definitely constrains the dominant state‘s legitimacy to lead the system and may
embolden potential global challengers to assert themselves more visibly leading to overt hard
balancing strategies.
103
The events following military intervention and its subsequent effect on local and global
hierarchy also explain inter-linkage between the two. Both regional and global hierarchies in
transition make international military intervention by declining hegemon an event of unusual
political importance and impact.
The swift conclusion of such undertaking by the globally dominant state signify that potential
global dissatisfied states haven‘t bridged the power parity gap with the declining hegemon and
hence their ability to undercut its international political influence would be undermined.
International system and its structure thus run on rules and norms erected by the declining
hegemon with the ability to reassert its hegemony if it could arrest factors draining its strength.
However a protracted involvement in a local hierarchy may lead to system transformation as
witnessed in case of Soviet Union when it got bogged down in Afghanistan mess and it
eventually led to the very disintegration of the mighty Soviet Union. Thus protracted wars in
local hierarchies have potential to lead to peaceful systemic reconfiguration also.
Further exploration of this hypothesis might reveal interesting dynamics of system transforming
minor-major power wars but it is beyond the scope of the study undertaken in this dissertation.
2.2.2.3. Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic International System
Power Transition Theory posits that great powers rarely interfere in a local hierarchy involving
minor powers until and unless their vital national interests are at stake. It has already been
specified that when power in key local hierarchy is in transition, uncertain and unstable
environment prevailing in the region invites other regional and extra-regional players to indulge
in local matters and try to shape regional environment suitable to their national interests.
Dominant state sitting at the apex of the global hierarchy has special interest in shaping overall
regional environment; otherwise an adverse status quo in a key regional hierarchy can have
consequential impact on its legitimacy and hence embolden potential challengers to bid for
increased assertion in pursuit of their goals, not compatible with interests of the declining
hegemon. Hence legitimacy is an important variable and declining global hegemon‘s ability to
lead the international system and shape its structure rules and norms, rest in proving itself as
―legitimate‖ leader of the free world. It is again reiterated that seldom a set-back in a local
hierarchy threatens the international system configuration of power as witnessed in Afghan-
104
Soviet case but it can seriously dent dominant‘s power claim as leader of the established global
status quo.
Key regions with unstable and uncertain local hierarchies and conflictual regional environment
draw increasing external intervention from both regional and extra-regional players. Legitimacy
of the global dominant power is at stake when overt military intervention from extra-regional
players involves powers designated as members not satisfied with the established global status
quo club also. These dissatisfied global players though not in a position to openly challenge the
declining hegemon on one-on-one basis, resort to power display through supporting regimes not
acceptable to the declining hegemon. Thus great powers get deeply drawn in a local hierarchy
and overt military intervention becomes a more probable future.
This is where the Copenhagen School and its Securitization theory provides framework to
determine how a specific matter is securitized by the intervening state to provide it with a pretext
to justify not only military intervention in the target state but to reassert its claim as the leader of
the free world . Besides discourse analysis technique provide us an insight that reveals intricate
role of language which is used to construct ―existential threat‖ that resonates more positively
with domestic and to some extent with international audience as well, hence legitimizing use of
force.
In post-hegemonic international system, resort to unilateral use of military force is not the most
preferable intervention behavior sought by the Intervening state even if it still retains
predominance in key sectors of power. Intervention logic is built around ―existential threat‖
which gains acceptance within unit and systemic levels. Discourse of the securitizing actor play
critical role, which consistently generate narrative pertaining to the securitization of threat. By
politicizing local events in the target state and selling them to domestic public, Intervening state
creates space for discourse to be generated at systemic level.
Threat securitization in post-hegemonic system involves securitizing actor (the intervener, which
security). It is subjective discursive construction that has more to do with positioning of the
securitizing actor within the systemic level and its ability to manage a successful securitizing
move within the relevant audience. The path followed for threat securitization is already
explained in Figure 2.13. Intervening state takes advantage of its global dominant position and
105
intervenes in a local hierarchy to re-arrange key hierarchy in line with its own declared national
interests and preferred local hierarchical configuration. Military intervention in the target state
thus begs for discursive construction of threat as more regional and extra-regional players get
involved.
The domestic audience is relevant for successful securitization and thus both media and interest
groups are employed to construct narrative which support stated official position and hence
establish ―legitimate‖ authority to adopt extraordinary / emergency measures to pursue their
political agenda by-passing traditional normal politics. The intervening actor employs
―existential threat‖ discourse internationally too, through will it legitimizes use of force.
International organizations are co-opted to attain semblance of legitimacy; if UN is not
forthcoming then regional organizations are co-opted to convince the domestic and international
audience of the legitimacy of intended intervention. The relevant audience in domestic political
spheres and in international organizations is convinced through a discursive process that target
state poses an ―existential threat‖ to international and peace. By defining the ‗existential nature
of threat‘ the intervener legitimizes the use of force.
2.2.3. STAGE III: Political Discourse and Military Intervention
After specifying conditions characterizing post-hegemony and elaborating how the interplay of
global and regional hierarchies in transition, make conditions conducive for great power
involvement in a local hierarchy; it will be now outlined how securitization of threat through
political discourse is employed for military intervention. This stage discusses the role that
political discourse plays in legitimizing military intervention. It also explores systemic and unit
levels where a discourse and consensus need to emerge for military intervention to take place.
Besides it will also determine within unit and system levels – is one discursive proponent more
important than other in generating normative structure.
2.2.3.1. Discourse and Political Action
Federica Ferrari says that ―the rationale of political discourse is intrinsically rooted in the consent
of its audience, all the more so within a political system that defines and frames itself as
106
democratic‖.89
Ever since 9/11, the world saw US as ―protagonist as well as principal agent and
operator on the international scene‖ which conversely was ―responsible for the hardening of
American political rhetoric as one of the distinctive features of a ―securitization‖ programme‖.90
The rhetorical aspect is one of the essential components of ―securitization theory‖ of Buzan et al.
and the process of ―securitization‖ is associated with ‗speech acts‘ which is the utterance itself
that is the act.91
Defined in this way ―securitization is essentially an intersubjective process. The
senses of threat, vulnerability and in(security) are socially constructed rather than objectively
presented or present‖.92
As a consequence no ―really‖ endangered object is to defended or
secured rather securitization implies understanding the ―processes of constructing a shared
understanding of what it is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat‖.93
When a securitizing move is made, political elites are conscious of the fact that they are stating
―a political fact that has consequences because this securitization will cause the actor to operate
in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise‖.94
As the entire process is
intersubjective, it will lead different communities to react differently to ―threat‖. For one what
might seem as legitimate securitization may appear paranoid to others outside it or they may
perceive that it has been undersecuritized by a political community.95
As a consequence it is
possible to maneuver interaction ―if one knows who can ‗do‘ security on what issue and under
what conditions‖.96
Political discourse employed for building consensus for international military intervention
reveals that both systemic and unit levels are involved and an ―existential threat‖ cannot be
constructed without employing threatening discourse catering to both levels. Based on conditions
identified for military intervention in Figure 2.14, the systemic and unit levels are explored
through three assumptions which will be tested through political discourse in case studies of
Libya and Syria in subsequent chapters.
Ferrari, ―Metaphor at work,‖ 606.
Ibid.
Buzan et al., Security, 26.
Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 30.
Ibid.
Ibid., 31.
107
Assumption 1: Target state is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and
security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide acceptance
while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed as
propaganda) and discredited internationally.
Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention
are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.
Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts
international institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for authorization of
force against the target state.
The War Legitimation discourse strategy would be employed to analyze the aforementioned
three assumptions for ‗securitization of threat‘ for military intervention in case studies of Libya
and Syria
2.2.2.3. War Legitimation Discourse
―Legitimacy‖ has already been identified as one of the most important variables as it deals with
―reinvention and legitimization of American superpower identity in the post-Cold War era‖.97
Power in transition in global hierarchy has created a ―crisis of legitimacy‖ for the declining
hegemon. This ―crisis of legitimacy‖ has both internal and external dimensions. In order to
reestablish American superpower identity in times of political crisis, the political discourses of
ruling elites consciously resort to legitimation discourse which is a process through which
legitimacy is acquired and maintained. Van Dijk expresses similar opinion when he states,
―Legitimation may not be necessary in normal course of events and when no
challenges to institutional power or authority are imminent. They become
imperative, however, in moment of crisis, when the legitimacy of the state, an
institution…… is at stake. Legitimation, then becomes part of the strategies of A. Lazar and M.M.Lazar, ―The Discourse of the New World Order: ‗Out-Casting‘ the Double Face of Threat,‖
Discourse & Society 15, issue 2-3 (2004): 225.
108
crisis management, in which in-groups and their institutions need self-legitimation
and out-groups must be delegitimated.‖98
War/intervention legitimation discourse involves developing ―rapport with both domestic and
international audience‖, ―hostility towards the enemy‖, ―postive self-perception and
representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖. Domestically, ―political
action is equated with societal purpose, and, as a result, short-term and substantive matters of
policy are given broad teleological meaning‖. It in turns provides ruling regime with ―supporting
social conditions for effective policy‖.99
Besides, presence of domestic component means that
enunciated foreign policy has both a national and an international audience, thus creating the
necessary link between the two.
At the system level, through international institutions attempt is made to construct ―existential
threat‖ involving international community. Building consensus at systemic level is very
important as it not only establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the intervener authorizing use of force against
the target state but it conversely establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the system also whose rules and
norms have been shaped by the declining hegemon. Thus perpetuation of the system, its stability
and security is constructed as the principal duty of the most powerful nation on earth, along with
its duty to take timely action against threatening culprits.
To deal with this structured representation of reality, legitimation then functions not only to
identify relevant norms, but also to make apparent a world compatible with action. Martin-Rojo
and Van Dijk thus define legitimation as the act of ―attributing acceptability to social actors,
actions and social relations within the normative order‖, in context of ―controversial actions,
accusations, doubts, critiques or conflict over group relations, domination and leadership‖.100
In a crisis or in the face of an external threat, then this legitimation is accompanied by persuasive
(or manipulative) discourse where extreme actions become not only acceptable but morally
justified and politically defensible too, citing ―present circumstances‖. Hence the legitimation
discourse employing military intervention provides ―good reasons, grounds or acceptable T. A. Van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 256-8.
B. Thomas Trout, ―Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War,‖ International Studies Quarterly
19, no. 3 (Sep. 1975): 254.
L. Martin Rojo and T. A. Van Dijk, ―‗There was a Problem, and it was Solved!‘ Legitimating the Expulsion of ‗Illegal‘ Immigrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse,‖ Discourse & Society 8, no.4 (1997): 560-61.
109
motivations for past or present action‖.101
Besides it employs polarizing lexical resources to
constitute ―Us‖ verses ―Them‖, ―Self‖ and ―Other‖ binary. Through representation of past and
pre-empting future, the aforementioned binary then legitimizes use of force; military intervention
is then presented as logically consistent path to be pursued in ―present unusual and extraordinary
circumstances.‖
Securitization of threat and legitimation discourse for war assumes importance because
war/intervention is a social practice that involves justifying to domestic audience, especially in a
democratic society questions such as ―Why?‖ – ―Why should we do this‖ and ―Why should we
do this in this way?‖102
The responsibility/task for presenting case, justifying this dangerous, deadly activity is often
carried out by political leaders. Here President is the most important discursive proponent of a
narrative, whose official and policy addresses provides guidelines to the ruling elite to replicate
same themes and rhetoric in their own narratives depicting present and pre-empting future.
Electronic, print and social media too is co-opted for propagating official narrative while
dissenting opinion within the domestic audience is marginalized as half-backed, uninformed
opinion, not only misleading public but simultaneously forcing them to a chart a dangerous, dark
and unknown future. That‘s why legitimation and threat securitization discourse relies on
political elites. As elaborated by Van Dijk too who acknowledged that they have privileged
access to mass media and the power to reach and influence enormous public audiences.103
Threat securitization and military intervention legitimation discourse hence would be analyzed
through Us/Them binary involving the semantic macro strategies of positive self-presentation
and negative Other-representation as outlined by Van Dijk.104
Us/Them binary is useful as ―Us‖
represents not only Us but ‗friendly‘ nation states too in global and regional hierarchies while
―Them‖ is the broad category that describes not only the ―unfriendly‖ nation states but
―uncivilized and opposing groups‖ too.
Van Dijk, Ideology, 255.
T. Van Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ Discourse and Communication 1, no. 1 (2007): 93.
T. A Van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1993). ; Van Dijk, Ideology.
Ibid.
110
―Us/Them polarization is hortatory in that it covertly implies that violent action in
the world is necessary. In fact, by representing an enemy that is completely evil
and ready to strike, the discourse practically necessitates only one course of
action: wipe Them off the face of the planet. In this way Us/Them polarizations is
a key legitimation strategy- an argumentative technique that rhetors employ to
justify violence.‖105
Thus threat securitization and subsequently military intervention legitimation discourse hence
would rely on Us/Them; Self/Other binary
Legitimation by reference to authority (the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of
persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested)106
Legitimation by reference to values (how the moralized lexis is used to differentiate
―our‖ actions [violence] and values from ―their‖ actions [violence] and values; by
reference to discourses of value or value systems, which are not made explicit and
debatable but are only hinted at, by appraisals that ―trigger a moral concept‖107
)
Legitimation through rationalization (by reference to the goals, the uses and the effects of
institutionalized social action)108
Legitimation by reference to temporality (through temporal representation of past and
future, how to legitimize military intervention in present)109
Legitimation by reference to group demarcation (through discourse the rhetors demarcate
Us/Them category-to highlight who are ―with Us‖ and to marginalize and discredit who
are ―with them‖. In this category people who stand in the way of violence are also
deligitimated,; they are frequently described in terms of their connections to or intentions
to connect to other enemies. This is the most sinister form of legitimation, as the mere 105
John Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse: Representing ‗Us‘ and ‗Them‘ in four US presidential addresses,‖ Discourse & Society 22, no. 3 (2011): 289 , doi: 10.1177/0957926510395442.
Van Leeuwen, Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.
Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 91.
P. Cap, Legitimation in Political Discourse: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective on the Modern US War Rhetoric
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006). ; P. Cap, ―Toward the Proximation Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in Political Discourse,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 40(2008):17-41. ; P. Cap, ―Axiological Aspects of Proximization,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 42(2010):392-407. ; P. Dunmire, ―Preempting the Future: Rhetoric and Ideology of the Future in Political Discourse,‖ Discourse & Society 16, no. 4 (2005): 481-513.
111
implication of a mutual relation between certain agents is used as grounds for violence
against non-aggressors).110
These ―legitimation‖ discourse strategies would be employed for exploring ―threat
securitization‖ in case of Libya and Syria in subsequent chapters.
CONCLUSION
With global hierarchy in transition, emergence of a peer competitor and ―rise of the rest‖, the
most powerful state in the system is no more a hegemon whose material capabilities can directly
be translated into desired outcomes. This is so because others are catching up in different
dimensions of power (economic, cultural, financial, and technological) even though the military
sector still has US preponderance.
The power in transition in the global hierarchy creates incentives for other major powers too,
especially the ones who are dissatisfied with the status quo. These dissatisfied powers resort to
hard-balancing strategies and their assertive foreign policy behaviour is evident in conflictual
regions. With global hierarchy in transition, the regions undergoing transition cannot remain
intact and become a battleground for proxy war for great powers. Such conflict-ridden strategic
regions provide opportunities to dissatisfied global challengers to enhance their standing within
the changing global hierarchy.
These diffused conditions enhance ―legitimacy crisis‖ and the declining hegemon gets trapped
within the very institutions it had erected previously to run the globe in accordance with its
preferred rules and norms. Military intervention in regional hierarchies in such circumstances
relies on ‗threat securitization‘ and ‗legitimation‘ discourse and failure to successful
securitization may further erode hegemon‘s dwindling standing and influence in an already
ambiguous international hierarchy.
Domestic structures and processes play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy in
liberal democracies.111
Hence, the role the political systems and public opinion play has to be
given due consideration before leading an intervention that violates sovereignty of another state.
Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 290 and 304.
112
This chapter basically traces change in US military intervention strategy in the post-hegemonic
system. After elaborating how contemporary era has heralded post-hegemonic phase within the
international system it comes up with a military intervention threat securitization model. Rest of
the study will validate the theoretical assertions made within the chapter. Based on the
assumptions made regarding dawn of the post-hegemonic system Chapter 3 will quote academic
and empirical evidence. The drift towards post-hegemony has marginalized US military
interventionist policy. Chapter 4 will, then, explain dynamics of a regional hierarchy in
transition. It is important to see how important regional players are asserting themselves with
less US ability to affect preferable outcomes and increased realization on part of these players
that US no longer is the sole dominant arbiter within the region. Next Chapters on Libya and
Syria then tests the military intervention model for ongoing conflicts and validate the study‘s
hypothesis.
See Thomas Risse-Kappen, ―Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,‖
World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479-512.
113
Chapter 3: Towards Post-Hegemony
The sudden demise of Soviet Union in 1991 along with the disappearance of a biopolar
international order led to enthusiastic proclamations of ―Unipolar moment‖ 1 by advocates of US
primacists. The unprecedented military preparedness and economic prowess with explicit
absence of a peer competitor led credence to the argument that the ―American Century‖2 is not
only well entrenched but capable to last further into the twenty-first century. Thus preserving
―US hegemonic role in a unipolar world‖ became the over-riding grand strategic objective of
every post-Cold War administration from G.H.W. Bush to Barack Obama.3 While Pax
Americana was being hailed by a number of security studies scholars, foreign policy analysts and
policymakers, another heated debate started at about the same time with primary focus on
whether unipolarity can last and/or the maintenance of ―hegemony‖ a wise grand strategy for the
US?
With balance-of-power realists predicting unipolarity to backfire as had repeated bids for
hegemony in past by counterbalancing efforts of other great powers, advocates of ―American
exceptionalism‖ continued to view failure of this hitherto ironclad rule as an exception to
―American primacy‖4. Despite the most forceful and comprehensive defense of uipolar stability,
and durability of American hegemony from Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth in Charles Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment,‖ Foreign Affairs: America and the World 70, no. 1 (1990/91): 23-
The term ‗American Century‘ was for the first time used by Henry Luce, owner and editor of Time magazine, in 1941. Henry Luce, ‗The American Century,‖ Life, 17 February 1941, 61-65.
Christopher Layne, ―The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the Pax Americana,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2011): 149, DOI:10.1080/09557571.2011.558491.
For discussion on ‗American primacy‘ and ‗unipolarity‘ in the first decade of the post-Cold War era, see Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment,‖ 23-33. ; Christopher Layne, ―The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise,‖ International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51. ; Kenneth N. Waltz, ―The Emerging Structure of International Politics,‖ International Security (Fall 1994): 5-41. ; Zalmay Khalilzad, ―Losing the Moment? The United States and the World after the Cold War,‖ Washington Quarterly 18, no.2 (Spring 1995): 87-
; Michael Mastanduno, ―Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy,‖ International Security 21, no.4 (Spring 1997): 49-88. ; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). ; Charles William Maynes, ―The Perils
of (and for) an Imperial America,‖ Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998): 36-49. ; Robert Kagan, ―The Benevolent
Empire,‖ Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998): 24-35. ; Coral Bell, ―American Ascendency and the Promise of
Concert,‖ The National Interest 57 (Fall 1999): 55-63. ; Samuel P. Huntington, ―The Lonely Superpower,‖ Foreign
Affairs 78, no.2 (March/April 1999): 35-49. ; William C. Wohlforth, ―The Stability of a Unipolar World,‖ International Security 24, no.1 (Summer 1999): 4-41.
114
their 2008 book World Out of Balance, scholars in the opposite camp kept predicting impending
end of Pax Americana. It won‘t be wrong to claim that for every analyst announcing the demise
of America‘s power potential and global leadership, we find an equally compelling American or
Western analysis securing another decade of American preponderance.
Amid all these conflicting views, the argument about US drift towards post-hegemony will
proceed in three main directions, to be covered in three different sections. The first section will
discuss the current academic debate between US ―primacists‖ and ―declinists‖ school, shedding
light on the uncertain times we are surviving and how this ambiguity provides substance to
debate on post-hegemony. This section also discusses key players of the post-hegemonic system
mentioned in pentagonal pyramid (Figure: 2.9, Chapter: 2) and the role they are playing in the
impending power transition.
The next section deals with US-China relations in post-hegemonic phase when the global power
is in transition and the shape of a new international order is far from clear. How far power has
become diffused within this dyad and how far China-US power trajectory could significantly
alter any new power configuration, would also be discussed.
The last section will list the events thought to be instrumental in setting post-hegemony in
motion. It includes three significant events of the contemporary history i.e. global financial
crisis, 2008; Russian belligerence and reassertion in its own backyard; and the Arab Spring.
Viewing these events from post-hegemonic lens would shed further light on global power-in-
transition in the twenty-first century and hence with it the prevailing international order.
3.1: Power Structure of the Post-Cold War International System
Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that ―almost as if, according to some natural law, in every century
there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus
to shape the entire international system accordance with its own values‖.5 Twentieth century
bore witness to the application of the statement by blessing US the pre-eminent status, whether
the twenty-first century will also, is a question still being contested in the academic circles. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), 17.
115
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War has been two most significant events in
the last quarter of the twentieth century that not only brought an end to more than five decades of
intense rivalry between two competing ideological blocks (US/Soviet Union;
Capitalism/Communism) but also led to vast speculations about the future power structure. Some
authors tried to make sense of the post-Cold War period, especially after September 11 as ―post-
post-Cold War‖6, referring the tragic and terrible event as the clear dividing line that made world
different from what it had been hitherto then.7 However, the world had changed in far more
complicated ways then to be made sense of it by just adding another ―post‖ to already existing
―post-Cold War‖ label.
One of the foremost ideas to be floated immediately after the end of the Cold War was that of a
―new world order‖ by G.H.W. Bush on September 11, 1990. The concept manifested that not
only would ―power‖ play a secondary role along with ―state‖ as primary actor but would be
replaced by international organizations and entities as the lead actors. The basic objective behind
this proclamation being that realism and power politics have been replaced with a cooperative
liberal perception of international relations in this new order. Since then the idea has been hailed
through different labels from ―idealpolitik‖8 to ―neo-liberalism‖
9 to ―neo-Wilsonian idealism‖
10
and ―neo-idealist moment‖.11
When scholars like Francis Fukuyama were hailing ―The End of History‖12
back in late 1980s
and celebrating ultimate triumph of market economy and Western liberal democracy as the final
form of human government expecting all states to gravitate towards it for pure self-interest, there
were others like Paul Kennedy who saw a vision of a multipolar world owing to the ―imperial
overstretch‖ of the reigning hegemon and rise of other influential actors like European Union and
6Thomas.L.Friedman, ―The post-post-Cold war,‖ New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/opinion/10friedman.html Accessed 29 May,2012 R. Cossa , ―Toward a post post-Cold War world,‖ PacNet 41. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0141.pdf. Accessed 29 May,2012; Richard N. Hass, ―Defining US foreign Policy in a post-post-Cold War world,‖ Defence Institute of Security Assistance Management J1-2 (2002): 30-37. Stanely Kober, ―Idealpolitik,‖ Foreign Policy 79 (1990): 3-24.
Joseph Nye, ―Neorealism and neoliberalism,‖ World Politics 2 (1988): 235-251. ; J.M. Grieco, Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, non-tariff barrier to trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
Charles W. Kegley, ―The neo-idealist moment in international realities,‖ International Studies Quarterly 2 (1993): 131-146.
Francis Fukuyama, ―The end of History,‖ National Interest, 1989.
116
Japan13
. How strong this perception was, can be gauged from statements of Paul Tsonga, the late
US Senator from Massachusetts who said, ―The Cold War is over: Japan won‖ at 1992
Democratic Convention.14
Still others like John Mearsheimer in an article in 1990 argued that
international order in post-cold war period would be a reversion from bipolarity to multipolarity.
But his vision was of a far more pessimistic world, a world that cast doubts on optimistic
projections of a peaceful, prosperous future, a world that he arrived at by drawing parallel
between future of great powers and early twentieth century experience of Europe.15
Apart from the two grand ideas being floated immediately in the post-Cold War period, a third
perspective gained importance and they were proponents of the ‗unipolarity‘ school. It stressed
US hegemony16
and expressed admiration for Pax Americana17
. One of the most initial and
clear manifestation of this vision appeared in March 1992 in the leaked draft of Pentagon‘s
Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) for the fiscal years 1994-99, for referring to preserving
unipolarity as its goal which was subsequently altered owing to its very controversial nature and
strong resistance against it. It explicitly stated:
―We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to
discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the
established political or economic order and that we must maintain the
mechanisms for deterring political competitors for even aspiring to a larger
regional or global role.‖18
The main protagonist of grand idea of unipolarity was Charles Krauthammer, who in a 1990
article ―The Unipolar moment‖ proclaimed an unprecedented era of US dominance that was
expected to last for approximately a decade before giving way to multipolarity.19
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 438-439.
M. Dowd, ―The 1992 Campaign: campaign memo; voters want candidates to take a reality check,‖ New York Times, 1992.
J. Mearsheimer, ―Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war,‖ International Security 4(1990):5-
Christopher Layne and S. Benjamin, ―American hegemony: without an enemy,‖ Foreign Policy 92 (1993): 5-23.
J. Muravchik, ―At last, Pax Americana,‖ New York Times, 1991.
P. E. Tyler, ―Pentagon imagines new enemies to fight in Post-Cold war era,‖ New York Times, 1992.
Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment.‖
117
Did US have any idea ―what to do with it primacy‖20
was a question put forward by Robert Art,
most agree that in the era after the end of the Cold War, US did not play part of the sole
remaining superpower.21
It found itself in a position that required understanding of the new
prevailing situation.22
Hence, 1990s made the unipolar vision moot23
as neither G.H.W. Bush
nor the first Clinton administration could devise a new foreign policy vision and strategy for
implementing ―the idea of unipolarity‖. Thus, argued L.Gaiser and I. Kovac: ―Consequently, the
power structure of the international system changes from bipolar (in the Cold War) to multipolar
(in the post-Cold War).‖ Further adding, if the Gulf war is accepted as a sign of unipolarity, even
then US did not follow up, missing the historic opportunity to be reduced to a historical moment.
―It was so brief that it lasted a few months in the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity, and
did not have a relevant impact on the changing of the power structure of the international
system….the unipolar moment of the US came to fruition 10 years later.‖24
Though the second Clinton Administration was a bit more assertive and Madeline Albright, the
then United States Secretary of State, for the first time stated publicly ―the indispensible nation‖
title for the US in 199825
but it was the G.W. Bush Administration in 2001 to be credited for a
clear vision and strategy to implement the unipolar moment. Even before the catastrophic event
of September 11, his administration emphasized the military preparedness, great power politics
and concrete national interests to implement their grand vision.26
Bush Junior was determined to
preserve US supremacy27
and Condoleezza Rice article in Foreign Affairs in 2000 made explicit
such an intension.28
Robert Art, ―Defensible defense: America‘s grand strategy after the Cold War,‖ International Security 4 (1991): 5-5.
Condoleezza Rice, ―Promoting National Interest,‖ Foreign Affairs 1 (2000): 45.
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 809.
John Ikenberry, ―America‘s Imperial Ambition,‖ Foreign Affairs 5 (2002) : 50
Laris Gaiser and Igor Kovac, ―From Bipolarity to Bipolarity: International Relations Repeating Again,‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 1 (2012): 53, doi:10.1007/s40320-012-0004-1.
Madeline Albright, Transcript: Albright interview on NBC-TV, 1998, accessed August 29, 2012, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html. C. Dueck, “Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004,” Rev International Studies 4 (2004):
A. L. Friedberg , “Same old songs, what the declinists (and triumphalists) miss,” The American Interest (2009):30.
Rice, “Promoting National Interest.”
118
Opening of new bases in former Soviet Republics (Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Uzbekistan)29
; withdrawal from ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile)
Treaty; veto on BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) protocol verification; refusing to sign
the Kyoto-Protocol; refusal to ratify the Rome Statue of International Criminal Court were all
early manifestations of the new grand vision which Ikenberry saw nothing less than ―neo-
imperialistic‖.30
This was unabashed vision of American global supremacy and militant
unilateralism. It involved deep distrust of international institutions and multilateralism generally;
emphasis on military ―pre-emptive strikes‖ to defeat terrorism and curb ―rouge states‖; keeping
―weapons of mass destruction‖ out of wrong hands and a putative campaign for creation of new
democratic regimes.31
What intensified the unipolar drive of the Bush Administration after
September 11 was not a significant change in the international structure rather it were the
political decisions that made the world unipolar in 2001, like the political decisions that had
made it multipolar in 1990s.32
The unparalleled political-military-economic preponderance generated equally unprecedented
confidence in Bush Administration, which not only came forward with its own ―Bush doctrine‖33
conceptualized in 2002 in National Security Strategy of the US but also in the 1-4-2-1 strategy of
Pentagon. This strategy visualized a force able to defend US homeland, operate in and from four
forward regions, defeat two regional adversaries swiftly and simultaneously along with the ability to
achieve regime change in one of those regions.34
Such was a pervasive impact of this preponderant
power that not only Kennedy has to retract his statement of the decline of the US owing to ―imperial
overstretch‖ predicted in late 1980s35
but even Krauthammer was compelled to reframe the earlier
―unipolar moment‖ into a ―unipolar era‖.36
Even a noted American journalist W. Pfaff writing in the
The International Herald Tribune stated ―Washington is considering whether it should deliberately
use American political, economic and military M. Paolini, “la NATO dell’esto,” Limes 6 (2004): 123-138.
Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition.”
Yale H. Ferguson, “Illusions of superpower,” Asian Journal of Political Science 11, no.2 (2003): 23, doi:10.1080/02185370308434225.
Gaiser and Kocac, “From Bipolarity to Bipolarity,” 55.
Charles Krauthammer, Democratic realism: an American foreign policy for a unipolar world (Washington: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2004).
M.T. Owens, “A balanced force structure to achieve a liberal world order,” Orbis 2 (2006): 315.
Paul Kennedy, “The Eagles landed,” Financial Times, 2002, accessed August 29, 2013, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/JohnJudge/linkscopy/EagleLand.html. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar moment revisited,” National Interest 70 (2002): 17.
119
activities to consolidate and expand American global might, making the twenty-first century
even more the American century than was the second half of the twentieth,‖ and reminded us
that ―sun sets on every empire‖.37
The triumphant mood of the Bush administration manifested itself in assertive unilateralism,
especially visible in rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and that too with
substantial international approval, and of Saddam Husain in Iraq. In the later case there was
widespread international opposition and few key NATO allies publicly registered their
disapproval too. These episodes led to apprehensions about the very nature of American power
and words like ―superpower‖, ―hyperpower‖, ―empire‖ and ―hegemon‖ increasingly came to be
associated with US sometimes as acknowledgement of its unprecedented power and at others as
warnings from others; as a sign of growing resentment towards unbridled and overwhelming
power exercised by the lone superpower. It was not until 2008, US had to learn hard way that
military power was not ―the almighty‖ that could solve all challenges.38
The new imperialism which turned into simple militarism and US steadily lost ideological
legitimacy abroad. Michael Mann reflected, ―whereas in the recent past American power was
hegemonic….now it is imposed at the barrel of a gun.‖39
He further stated that though American empire might not yet be over-stretched but ―its stretch is incoherent‖. ―This giant‘s military
might sits uneasily with economic and geopolitical resources that originate in multilateral
arrangement….Its militarism also greatly outstrip its political capacity to rule any conquered
country and contradicts the ideology of freedom and democracy.‖40
This unilateral adventurism generated widespread resentment and dented US ―soft power‖
significantly. At about the same time, we saw that some scholars and analysts were coming round to
another perception. Krauthammer asserted that US was ―past the apogee‖ of its unprecedented
power.41
In spite of having the strongest power and the largest military, US power to get others do
what it wants them to do was constrained and it led Joseph Nye to state that Karen Brutents, “In search of pax Americana,” Russian Politics and Law 37, no. 3 (May-June 1999), 90.
Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” Foreign Policy 137 (2003): 82-87.
Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: verso, 2005), 252.
Ibid., 266.
Charles Krauthammer, “Past the apogee: America under pressure,” Keynote address at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute Annual Dinner, accessed October 13, 2013, http://www.fpri-org/enotes/20061213.krauthammer.pastapooge.html.
120
unipolarity is a misleading term as it exaggerates the degree to which US can obtain the results it
requires in different dimensions of world politics.42
Besides Nye also mentioned how some aspects of international system were unipolar while
others multipolar. He made a distinction between ―relative‖ and ―absolute‖ decline; while
―absolute decline‖ is the sense of decay and ―relative decline‖ is one in which the power
resources of other states grow or are used effectively. He refuted that US could decline because
of ―imperial overstretch‖ but because of ―domestic underreach‖. His ―three-dimensional
chessboard‖ concept captures the diffused nature of power, which according to him posed a
greater danger than power transition. In this concept the top chessboard is occupied by military
which is largely unipolar with US likely to retain the position for quite some time. Economic
power occupies the middle chessboard and its been multipolar for more than a decade where
others are gaining in importance besides US, Europe, Japan and China. The bottom chessboard is
the realm of international relations, here power is largely diffused because of non-state actors
and he further asserts that it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity or hegemony
as far as bottom dimension of chessboard is concerned. 43
Friedberg addresses the same problem by differentiating ―power as control over resources‖ with
―power as control over outcomes‖ and further elaborates just because the US has the largest
economy and the most powerful military might does not mean it can get everyone to do
everything it wants all of the time.44
Samuel Huntington has debated concept of unipolarity back
in 1999 when he came forward with one of his own ―uni-multipolarity‖ concept. He said, ―There
is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar
system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers…. Contemporary international politics……. is a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one
superpower and several major powers.‖45
While there were others who believed that US had been declining since 1970s and US response
to September 11 attacks only accelerated decline. Immanuel Wallerstein remarked, ―The Joseph Nye, The paradox of the American Power: why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 38-39.
Joseph Nye, “The Future of American power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010): 2-12.
Friedberg, “Same old songs.”
Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” 35-36.
121
economic, political, and military factors that contributed to US hegemony are the same factors
that will inexorably produce the coming US decline‖.46
How far damage has been done through
its self-interested unilateral assertiveness can be gauged from the statement that ―the United
States finds itself –a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and
few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control‖.47
Wallerstein was not the only one expressing concern about US unilateral exercise of its huge
military might, Kishore Mahbubani also saw blind pursuit of its narrow self-interests which were
costing US a lot. ―The ‗root causes‘ of the problem of American power vis-à-vis the rest of the
world is that this huge edifice of American power is structurally designed to serve only one
purpose: to further American interests‖.48
A realization that was deeply entrenched among academic circles was that US power will readily
exhaust itself and some even saw visions of new world orders. Richard Hass contributed to this
debate by advocating his concept of non-polarity. According to him it is ―a world dominated not
by one or two or even several states but by rather a dozens of actors possessing and exercising
various kinds of power …. a non-polar international system is characterized by numerous centers
with meaningful power.49
Hass asserts that though US is and will remain the largest single aggregation of power but ―the
reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United State‘s position in
the world – and with the relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and
independence‖.50
For him multipolarity might be a generation or two away but power and
influence are even less linked in era of nonpolarity and it will be increasingly difficult for
Washington to lead an occasion, where collective responses to regional and global challenges are
required. For him history, US policy and globalization have brought the inevitable end of the
unipolarity.51
Power and influence are interlinked and this theme is repeatedly invoked by those
who point out declining ability of the US to get desired outcomes and as a sign of its vanishing
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of America Power: The US in a Chaotic World (New York, London: The New Press, 2003), 13.
Ibid., 17.
Kishore Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust between America and the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 152.
Richard N. Hass, “The age of nonpolarity, what will follow US dominance?,” Foreign Affairs 2008.
Ibid.
Ibid.
122
hegemony. Power shifting sideways from states to markets and non-state actors is an argument
also given by Susan Strange.52
Hass ―age of nonpoloarity‖ thesis wasn‘t the only novel addition to the debate of alternative
world order, Nail Ferguson has already aired his idea of ―apolarity‖ and warned those who were
eagerly looking towards retreat of American hegemony that rather than a multipolar world of
competing great powers, a world that was awaiting them is a world with no hegemon –―apolar‖
world- ―a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would
benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.‖53
Just like Ferguson apolar world, Charles Kupchan contemplates ―no one‘s world‖- ―the twenty-
first century will not be America‘s, China‘s , Asia‘s or anybody else‘s; it will belong to no one.
The emergent international system will be populated by numerous power centers as well as
multiple versions of modernity…...A global order, if it emerges, will be an amalgam of diverse
political cultures and competing conceptions of domestic and international order.‖54
In such a
world the western model will offer only one of many competing conceptions of domestic and
international order.
Amitav Acharya looks beyond the language of hegemony and polarity and gives a vision of a
world order realized through the metaphor of a multiplex cinema- a multiplex being ―a complex
that houses several movie theaters‖. ―In a multiplex world, the making and management of order
is more diversified and decentralized, with the involvement of established and emerging powers,
states, global and regional bodies, and transnational non-state actors‖.55
In such a world the
liberal hegemony story presented by its American proponents is equivalent to one movie at one
time in one theater. Although American show may dominate the box office for a while but
audience may lose interest when faced with more choices.56
A multiplex world is different from
multipolar world that it stresses not the number of powers but the interdependence among them
Susan Strange, The retreat of the state: the diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199), 189.
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of American Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2005), xxviii.
Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, The Rising Rest, and The Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity press, 2014), 7-8.
Ibid.
123
and it is more decentred than a multipolar world with more scope for local and regional
approaches.57
Another notable figure who contributed to this declinist perspective was Fareed Zakaria with his
―rise of the rest‖ thesis and vision of a ―post-American world‖- a world where except the
politico-military level, power is moving away from American dominance in every other
dimension (industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural). A post-American world is likely to
be different from anything that has preceded it – a world defined and directed from many places
and by many people.58
Rise of alternative centers of power chiefly will bring end to US primacy
is debated by Charles Kupchan who thinks it would actually be because of the ―tiring burdens of
global hegemony‖. Further adding ―what makes America‘s unipolar moment fleeting is the
combination of the rise of other powers and US waning and unilateralist internationalism.‖ 59
He
visualizes a digital era replacing today‘s industrial era and multipolarity replacing unipolarity.60
Amidst all these divergent speculations, there were still others who saw a return of bipolarity
with China replacing Soviet Union of the last bipolar order. As early as 2007, Carlo Pelando
made a very compelling case for a new inevitable bipolar strife between US and China. In his
book Grand Alliance he argued that this new fight would be played for triumph of either
autocratic or democratic capitalism and suggested a grand alliance of US, Europe and Russia to
be forged for democratic capitalism to prevail.61
One thing that had been consistent through all
these speculations had been theme of the US decline. Even the National Intelligence Council
made a prediction about the future trajectory of power, speculating that in 2025 ―the US will
remain the pre-eminent power but the American dominance will be much diminished‖.62
Thomas Wright also believed that unipolarity waned in 2008 and he designates the period from
1990-2008 as a ―post-Cold War Concert of Power‖ that ―rested on US unipolarity and hegemony
as well as the collective willingness (of other major powers) to work within it to varying
Ibid., 9.
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 4-5.
Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Alfred A. KNOPF, 2003), 29.
Ibid., 334.
Carlo Pelando, Grand Alliance: The global integration of democracies (Milano: Franco Angeli,2007).
Nye, “The Future of American Power,” 2.
124
degrees‖.63
But this concert began to fall apart even before Obama took office as it was ―the
result of fleeting conditions and a fundamental misunderstanding between the Western and non-
Western powers. …Thus when the unipolar moment waned, so too did the Unipolar Concert.‖64
David Shlapak remarked that the unipolar moment has been ―profoundly ahistorical and was
always fated to end.‖65
While ―declinists‖ were forcefully arguing their case, there were others ready to brush aside
these arguments and stress on US ability to reinvigorate its waning hegemony and primacy.
Confident about the resilience of American system and society and they believe that
prognostications of American decline are nothing new. Back in 1980s this debate had raged
between scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) especially when Robert
Keohane talked about a period ―after hegemony‖;66
Robert Gilpin referred to ―intensified
mercantile competition‖ because of decline of US hegemony67
and David Calleo raised the
question for policy makers how to grapple with US power in decline.68
Others however
dissented at that time too. Notable among them were Susan Strange and Stephen Gill. Strange
wrote about the myth of the hegemonic decline, insisting that many contributors to literature
have chosen indicators which are either irrelevant or imprecise69
; while Gill broke away from
theory of US decline by presenting his neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony, which
according to him was not simply a physical capability such as military might and economic
weight but as ―intellectual and moral leadership‖70
.
Thomas Wright, “The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar concert,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 9-10, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2014.1002150.
Ibid., 21.
David A. Shlapak, “Towards a more modest American strategy,” Survival 57, no. 2 (2015): 60 doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1026068.
R. Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987),
David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: basic Books, 1987).
Susan Strange, “The persistent myth of lost hegemony,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 554.
Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
125
Some of these authors prefer to use anemic words like global ―leadership‖71
while others go for
the inoffensive terms like ―primacy‖72
. Still there are others who unabashedly use the term
―hegemony‖73
. Brooks and Wohlforth had been the most ardent champions of US unipolarity
and its durability. They claimed ―If today‘s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity,
then nothing ever will….. There has never been a system of sovereign states that contained one
state with this degree of dominance.‖74
While Mandelbaum went a step further and claimed,
―The United States is no longer a mere superpower; it has ascended to the status of a
‗hyperpower‘‖,75
though he nonetheless cautioned that US might not be able to sustain the
burdens of global leadership.
―Empire‖ was another term being used to encompass the extent and the vastness of US power.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri asserted that that what we are dealing with, is in fact an
―Empire‖, that is ―a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules
over the entire ‗civilized world‘‖ and in which ―United States does indeed occupy a privileged
position‖.76
While the role of restructuring unipolar world by arrogating to itself ―the global role
of setting standards, determining threats, using force and meting out justice‖ was US
―neoimperial vision‖ in eyes of Ikenberry.77
This overwhelming power was being acknowledged from every nook and corner. The Economist
described an American world where ―the United States bestrides the globe like a colossus. It
dominates business, commerce and communications; its economy is the world‘s most successful,
its military second to none.‖78
While two American triumphalists put it, ―Today‘s international
system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony‖.79
Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets (New York: 2002), 88.
Ferguson, Colossus, 8.
Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 2003), 88. ; Kupchan, End of the American era, 266.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 21 and 23.
Michael Mandelbaum, “The inadequacy of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (September / October 2002), 61.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 2000).
Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” 44.
“America’s world,” The Economist, October 23, 1999, 15.
Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest, Spring 2000.
126
Another addition to the debate is Nye latest book with the tilte Is the American Century Over?
For him the American Century began when US economy represented nearly half of the share of
the world economy in the post-war period and dated it from 1945-70. Though the abnormal share
returned to the normal - of roughly a quarter of the world economy to its pre-war portion but it
led widely to perceptions of American decline. Nye remarks: ―the American Century roughly
coincides with the twentieth century, reaching its peak in the mid century, and it will end in the
next decade or so when analysts expect China to pass the United States as the world‘s largest
economy.‖80
As far as ―purchasing power parity‖ unit is concerned China has already passed US
in gross domestic product while if the economy is measured through exchange rate of currencies
then it may take a decade for China to beat US.81
Nye asserts that China overtaking US in economic size will not automatically mark end of the
American Century. He defines power as ―the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one
wants and there are three ways to do that: by coercion (sticks); by payments (carrots); and by
attraction or persuasion‖.82
Relying only on economic size to define American Century would be
misleading. Instead it should also take into account the resources which are used to affect global
balance of power.83
However, downgrading role of economy would also be tantamount to
distorting the entire picture and it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was the economy as
the single largest indicator that brought the mighty Soviet Union to its knees, more than any
other factor.
The list of scholars celebrating US unipolar durability and sustainability is just as long as those
speculating its exit and announcing end of Pax Americana. The debate hitherto has been
inconclusive and it is expected to go on till a clear new hierarchy of power is apparent. One
argument which has been established beyond doubt is the gradual shift of power from one centre
of power to an unknown and uncharted territory. It seems too early to speculate what it will be.
Will it be an age of ―nonpolarity‖, ―apolarity‖, a ―multiplex world‖ or will it be ―no one‘s world‖
or simply the familiar ―multipolar‖ or ―bipolar‖ international order, is too early to
Joseph Nye, Jr., Is The American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 3.
Ibid., 3
Ibid.
Ibid., 4.
127
speculate. What, however, is written on the wall that China is emerging fast and it is set to make
its presence felt and go for its rightful place which its growing power has entitled to it.
Henry Kissinger saw scope for ―so dominant an America‖ shrinking in 2010 because of three
successive wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and because of economic conditions which
will inevitably bring about pressure on military budgets, constraining the scope for intervention
and imposing the need for establishing priorities.84
Similarly those who for long have been hailing explicit absence of counterbalancing and
revisionist behavior of other major powers can see the return of both through Russia and China.
Russia‘s coercive diplomacy and military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia had
been useful in checking and preventing further expansion of EU and NATO in Russian ―near
abroad‖. Besides it has also launched countless provocations against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Sweden, Finland and Denmark by intruding into their air and maritime space. Such provocations
cannot be brushed aside without labeling them as hard-balancing by a resurgent Russia.
While China‘s revisionism through its belligerent activities can be seen in both East and South
China Sea, in its military build-up, especially with asymmetric weapons to blunt US power
projection capabilities.85
This was a clear departure from the hitherto prevalent practices. The
US power has been so dominant in all these years that other states either bandwagoned with it or
forged closer and deeper relations either through establishing alliances or partnerships.
Sometimes they tried to bind US to international institutions to gain maximum in an era of
overwhelming and unparallel power. At other occasions they tried to build roadblocks either by
delegitimizing it in the court of public opinion or by using international law to increase costs of
unilateral action for US. But there never had been formal efforts to counter-balancing which has
so far been a normal response to a state seeking hegemony in the international system. How far
can these moves are designated as a shift towards post-hegemony will be discussed in next
sections.
China and Russia are not the only states vying for their place in the emerging configuration of
powers. States like India and Brazil has also been hailed as new members of this powerful circle
Henry A. Kissinger, ―Power Shifts,‖ Survival 52, no.6 (2010): 209, doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.540792.
Thomas Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 7-8.
128
and they are actively seeking to establish themselves as great powers with their own ―area of
influence‖ and interests. Besides these new emerging power centers, European Union and Japan
have increasing realization of changing international environment. Though still firmly allied with
the US, they are nervously watching as US is gradually losing its hegemony and with it the
power to shape ―desired outcomes‖.
3.1.1. EUROPEAN UNION
Any traditional speculation that EU is a contender to end US hegemony starts with quoting its
impressive economic indicators and ends with problems confronting its integration. It usually
begins with how before ―Brexit‖86
and acting as entity, its economy was the largest in the world
and until 2010 Greece fiscal crisis, the euro was the strongest candidate to replace dollar as the
world‘s primary reserve currency. On the downside, EU faces significant limitations on the
degree of its unity. The biggest challenge confronting Europe at the moment is: Will it have
enough political and social-cultural coherence to act as a single entity on a wide range of
international issues or will it remain a grouping of countries whose individual cultures,
nationalisms and foreign policies dominate their European identity even though when it has
substantial influence in WTO and able to balance power on equal terms?87
These questions though not less important but their reply usually rests on quoting facts and
figures to either support or refute the argument. Conclusion based on these arguments may
rightfully state that while Europe is in flux but its power is never going to surpass US. Besides
they are likely to remain allied to each other or even a neutral EU would reinforce US rather than
acting as its peer competitor. The possibility of an EU emerging as traditional balancer to US is
very low, though political frictions might exist. But it would not be the EU that can bring an end
to the US primacy or the ―American Century‖ as usually referred.88
However, post-hegemony is
not about who can and who will replace US hegemony; it is about whether US position among
its traditional allies and supporters be sustained; and/or how far traditional allies interests have
become divergent from each other.
June 23, 2016 British citizens voted to exit the European Union in a referendum.
Joseph Nye, ―Is The American Century Over?,‖ 25.
Ibid., 24-28.
129
Europeans which have been accustomed to believing since Greek and Roman times that their
continent possessed an inherent geo-strategic value that automatically placed them at the centre
of the world politics, are in for a rude shock as twenty-first century introduced new major players
on the international chessboard. As Alan Mendoza aptly remarked: ―The proud continent that
once bestrode world affairs, will be reduced to interval gazing and even greater irrelevance on a
global stage, increasingly dominated by new superpowers and great powers which often will not
share its values or strategic priorities.‖89
The rising powers of the world, most notably China and India are not Europe-based or focused
on Europe, with the partial exception of Russia. Europe is no longer the world‘s strategic pivot
and to remain relevant in a changing world, it cannot solely rely on its strategic importance but
instead have to count on its contribution to global power projection and to Western security
strategy.90
Even the Americans which throughout the Cold War have shouldered more than their
fair share of the Western military expenditures on the grounds that US security was inherently
tied to European security in relation to Soviet Union have slowly begun to question the value of
this transatlantic relationship.
The more recent insensitive remarks from a Republican candidate Donald J. Trump, on the eve
of acceptance of his nomination for President, rattled US NATO allies. In a clear departure from
pre-established principles, he explicitly raised new questions about his commitment to
automatically defending NATO allies as per Article 5 of the charter, especially the small Baltic
States, if they were attacked by Russia, saying he would decide whether to come to their aid only
after reviewing if those nations have ―fulfilled their obligations to us.‖91
Europe too is undergoing its own transition since the time of Bush junior and being riddled with
its own intra-European debate between Euro-Atlanticists who advocates EU to strengthen itself
as a meaningful partner to US and Euro-Gaullists who see EU as a counterweight to US. ―In the
former view, the EU has a distinct interest in reinforcing the dominant Western pole, while
making it multilaterally oriented and managed; in the later, Europe has a distinct interest in Alan Mendoza, ―European defence in the long run: Can Europe play a leading role in a multipolar world?,‖
European view 9 (2010):233 DOI: 10.1007/s12290-010-0137-z. Ibid., 235.
David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, ―Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies Against Attack,” New York Times, July 20, 2016.
130
favoring the transition from unipolarity-that is, American hegemony- to multipolarity.‖
According to the later view EU would evolve itself as a ―new, autonomous pole in the
international system, sometimes supportive of America, sometimes not.‖92
The first Atlantic crisis of 2003 though apparently set off by specific differences over Iraq but
actually revealed that international conditions that made traditional Atlanticism possible had
collapsed. The assumption in Washington that Europe in any case would follow was challenged
by France and Germany. Besides, being no longer the nexus of world politics and after the loss
of pre-eminence in US foreign policy concerns which rests on fact that in post-1989 and post-11
September world the significant threats to US come from beyond the Europe. This is also evident
in US reaction to recent crisis of Georgia and Ukraine. Owing to its over-extended commitments
in other theatres, US response to these crises is a marked contrast with Russian commitment to
draw a clear ―sphere of influence‖ in the region.
Nothing reveals Russian designs to assert itself, more than its ambitious projection of its role in
Eastern Europe. While ―expansion fatigue‖ is evident within EU and NATO and whatever took
post-Cold War expansion of EU to 27 in 2007 and of NATO to 28 states in 2009, have stopped at
the borders of the Eastern Europe. US minimal interest in the region is marked contrast with
Russian war in Georgia in 2008. Even NATO Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and
Georgia discussed in 2008 now seem dead in water. For EU its ―soft‖ southern frontier after
Greece near-default seems a more urgent issue than eastern expansion.93
East Europeans are still frightened by Russian ambitions, especially after annexation of Crimea
and Ukraine crisis; prefer the traditional NATO to continue indefinitely while the rest of the
Europeans resist any American connection that leaves them into hostile relationship with
Russians. What is increasingly becoming evident is the competing as well as common interests
of EU and US towards Russia and the Islamic world. Same is the case with China which is vital
to both US and EU but their policies might not be compatible and both are ―competing to fill the
role of China‘s principal Western partner. In short, even a strong EU would not necessarily
Marta Dassu and Roberto Menotti, ―Europe and America in the Age of Bush,‖ Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 107 DOI: 10:1080/00396330500061786.
Andrew Wilson, “Eastern Europe’s balancing Act,” Current History 109, no. 729 (Oct 2010): 295.
131
always share the same perspectives and interests as a strong United States. Thus it seems far
from certain that a close transatlantic alliance must endure.‖94
In short, in a transition towards post-hegemony, instead of analyzing indicators which place
Europe at par with US and how EU overtaking US can bring an end to US hegemony or replace
it with one of its own; emphasis should be on how far EU has developed complementing or
divergent priorities with US and whether their approach towards key international developments
reflect a departure from Cold-War and post-Cold War era.
A recent analysis show that though EU still sits comfortably in US camp but changing
environment in global and regional hierarchies is forcing both to reassess their interests and
reposition their responses to particular issues. Such ambiguity will lead to not so familiar paths.
At times staunch US allies would not be able to offer the kind of support to US, rendered in the
past as evident from UK parliament rejection of intervention in Syria in August 2013; at other
times, Europe won‘t be US priority as recent Eastern European crisis is reflecting but one thing
is certain old, traditional blocks are being fractured and how far transatlantic alliance can endure
this, only time will tell.
3.1.2. JAPAN
How linear projections based on rapidly rising economic rates can be misleading at times is
exemplified through US-Japan comparisons. Almost three decades ago, US feared of being
overtaken by Japan when its per capita income surpassed that of US. Now with highly
sophisticated industry, third largest economy and the most modern military in Asia, it still enjoys
a status far above others but nowhere in comparison to either US or China. Japan‘s economy was
38% larger than China in 1995 and now China‘s is 295% larger than Japan. Its economy is the
same size today as it was in 1993 while China‘s economy has grown twenty fold over the same
period.
No doubt Japan has considerably been reduced in stature in the post-Cold war emerging scenario
contrary to previous predictions, but it would be equally wrong to agree with the judgment of
Michael J. Green who believes that the end of the Cold War appears to have turned Japan- that David P. Calleo, “Europe and America in a New Century,” Survival 55, no 5 (2013): 219, DOI: 10:1080/00396338.2013841822.
132
almost two decades ago was hailed as the most obvious newcomer in the emerging post-Soviet
power structure - into an economic afterthought and a geopolitical footnote compared to its
bigger neighbours in Asia.95
China‘s neighbours in the Asia-pacific are apprehensive about an illiberal China gaining
ascendance and are searching for ways to constrain it. These changing dynamics have compelled
Japan to reinvigorate its ties with the fellow Asian countries. India in the equation occupies a
peculiar place and the changed circumstances have allowed both to diversify the bilateral
relationship from previously purely economic-based partnership that focused on aid, trade and
investment. The restructuring in the East-Asian security environment in the post-Cold war era
has forced Japan to purse a policy of ―cooperative approach to regional security‖.96
India and
Japan ―Joint Security Declaration‖ signed in October 2008 in good part is attestation that both
are worried about China‘s growing power.97
In these changing circumstances even Sino-Japanese relations would have lasting impact on the
emerging post-hegemonic international order. While interweaving their economies even more
closely both sides at the same time remain poisoned by history and a small insensitive gesture
reignite the bitter old memories, for example, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s December 26, 2013
visit to Yosukuni Shrine caused much resentment in the neighbouring circles. Political leadership
on both sides has failed to address the problem so far, which conversely has been worsened by
rifts that remain deeper, wider and harder to resolve.
These irreconcilable differences over history interpretation have been the main hurdle in closer
Sino-Japanese relationship and remain one of the main reasons for still bad bilateral relationship.
Barry Buzan interprets this as ―an enormous gift to the United States, for which ‗China threat‘
advocates in the Washington are profoundly grateful.‖ The fact that Japan feels threatened by
China, not only underpins US-Japan alliance but also the legitimacy of the whole US military
Michael J. Green, ―Japan‘s Confused Revolution,‖ The Washington Quarterly 33, no.1 (January 2010): 3-19. ; Fred Hiatt, ―Does Japan Still Matter?‖ The Washington Post, December 11, 2009.
Reinhard Drifte, Japan‟s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Economic Super Power to What Power? (London: Macmillan, 1996), 50.
97For details see David Browster, ―The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership,‖ Asian
Security 6, no.2 (2010): 95-120.
133
and political position in the Northeast Asia. Buzan then concludes: ―It leaves the US as the
ringleader between China and Japan……with no interest in seeing their relationship improve.‖98
The easiest route to superpower status is to be free of regional entanglements. The bad
relationship with Japan is the outstanding contradiction that China is rising ―peacefully‖ within
the region, also casts doubt on the rhetoric of ―peaceful rise/ development‖ so earnestly
propagated through Chinese official discourse. With the post-hegemonic shift in progress Japan
occupies a pivotal position not just in the regional but also in the global calculus, especially for
US. If China could improve its relations with Japan, it could weaken US position in East-Asia
and in the long run globally.
An effort to balance power relations with Japan and India would keep Beijing confined to Asian
sphere besides putting a question mark on her legitimacy to lead the region. Legitimacy of their
leadership role is the hallmark of their superpower status and ―by allowing its relationships with
Japan to fester, China strengthens the US position in East-Asia, undermines its prospects for
peaceful rise in its region, compromises its role in international society, and weakens its bid for
global power status.‖99
Besides consensual regional order where power is mediated by
international institutions is more in keeping with the style of contemporary great powers.
While China is struggling to deepen its political standing in the region, US enjoy an edge. Japan
is a long-standing US ally, tied to it through a network of security arrangements in the wake of
its defeat from allies in World War II. But the end of the Cold War combined with intense
economic rivalry between the two, was predicted to lead to a weakening of the security-based
alliance100
but they revamped their ties through 2005 security alliance in a manner that the two
are even more closely allied on a range of issues.101
Rather than shake off the restraints left from
the legacy of WWII and emerging as a power in its own right, Japan has actively sought to forge
closer security ties with Washington. Barry Buzan, ―China in International Society: Is ‗Peaceful Rise‘ Possible?,‖ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 26-27, DOI: 10.1093/ cjip/pop014.
Ibid., 28.
Richard Betts, ―Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,‖ International Security 18, no.3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77. ; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, ―The Coming Conflict with America,‖ Foreign Affairs 76, no.2 (March/April1997):18-32.
Yoichi Funabashi, ―Keeping up with Asia: America and the New Balance of Power,‖ Foreign Affairs 87, no.5 (September/October 2008), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-09-01/keeping-asia.
134
The period between 2001-09 has also been referred as the high point in the bilateral relation.
Japan has been designated as the ―Britain of the Far East‖ implying the ―special relationship‖ it
enjoyed was at par with the one existing between the United Kingdom and the United States.102
David Scott notes, ―US presence, power and pre-eminence in the Western Pacific is further
buttressed by its external balancing carried out with a range of other Asia-Pacific states who are
concerned about China‘s rise, and who encircle China.‖103
The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) carried out since 2007 and US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral
mechanism initiated since 2010 are respectively south and north anchors in the Pacific for the US
to forestall and deter China.104
China is a major trade partner for all the states in the region, including Japan, and Tokyo wants
to enmesh China in a web of ties that will ensure Japanese security but it nonetheless, wants to
avoid a China-dominated regional system and is greatly concerned about Beijing‘s propensity to
use its increased naval power in the region.105
The assertive Chinese stance over the territorial
control of the potentially oil-rich areas of the South China Sea has prompted Japan to explicitly
factor China into their justifications for a more proactive Japanese military posture.106
A former deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg emphasized that the United States needs to
help Japan become ―a more normal Japan‖.107
A militarily-revitalized Japan is eminently
desirable not only to reduce the influence of China but also to control the erratic and irrational
North Korea. Besides the dangers posed by Pyongyang nuclear program, the overshadowed but
102
Kosuke Takahashi, ―Japan to Become ‗Britain of the Far East,‖ Asia Times, February 25, 2005. ; Mike Mochizuki and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―A Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,‖ Survival 40, no.2 (Summer 1998): 127-34. David Scott, ―US Strategy in the Pacific-Geopolitical Positioning for the Twenty-first Century,‖ Geopolitics 17, no. 3 (2012): 623, Doi: 10.1080/14650045.2011.631200.
Y. Wang, ―Basic Features and Problems in Central Asia-Pacific Situation,‖ Foreign Affairs Journal 86 (Winter
2007), (Chinese‘s People Institute of Foreign Affairs), available at http://cpifa.org/en/q/listQurterlyArticle.do?articleId=1147. Yoichi Funabashi, ―New Geopolitics Ranges over Various Parts of Asia,‖ Asahi Shimbun, January 15, 2002. ; Michael Green, ―Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan,‖ in Engaging China, ed., Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 170-72.
John Hemmings, ―China‘s Rise= Remilitarizing Japan?‖ Diplomat, January 21, 2011.
Quoted in Bruce W. Jentleson, ―Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st
Century National Security
Strategy,‖ The Washington Quarterly 37, no.1 (Spring 2014): 125.
135
long-standing territorial issue with Russia has also fostered US-Japan security alliance in the
post-2001 period.108
As per Japan becoming a peer competitor to US, either militarily or economically is very low.
With a population roughly to the size of California and with ethnocentric attitude and policies, it
is unlikely to gain the status that US enjoys today. Though Japan can develop its nuclear capacity
rapidly if its alliance with US enters into difficulties but even then it would be far from a peer
competitor. A troubled past makes alliance with China unlikely and current East-China Sea
disputes also predict Japan seeking an American support to preserving its independence from
China rather than bandwagoning with it against the former.109
Japan‘s place in Asia relative to
its larger neighbours would depend on whether it wants to remain tied to the West as a reliable
member of a Western axis of stability or is it prepared to seek greater integration within the
region in flux that favours a revisionist China more than the distinct declining hegemon.
3.1.3. INDIA
India with a population of around 1.2 billion people, economic progress, significant military
power resources, established democracy and vibrant popular culture with transnational appeal
and influence is being hailed as yet another major power along with other ―emerging‖ nations.
This significant power potential has emboldened many Indians to predict a tripolar world by mid
century with China, US and India as leading poles. But with a third of its population-i.e. less than
a billion people in acute poverty, hundreds of millions of illiterate citizens and with a per capita
income that is half of China and a fifteenth of US, India still has a long way to go.110
India has scored some gains; the most striking among them is a drop in the poverty rate but the
dismal quality-of–life statistics make predictions of India‘s rise as a global power sound hollow.111
The impressive recovery from the great recession of 2008-2010 has confirmed India‘s
108
Shigekri Hakamada, ―Nature of Russian State and Japan‘s Strategy Towards Russia‖ (The 30th
Policy Recommendations of the Japan Forum on International Relations, February 2008). ; Robert Scalapino, ―In Search of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding the Korean Peninsula-Challenges and Opportunities,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests 28, no.2 (October 2006): 367-78. ―Nye, Is American Century Over?,‖ 28-32.
Ibid., 38-41.
These figures are quoted at length in Rajan Menon, ―Asia‘s Looming Power Shift,‖ The Nationao be decisivl Interest 127 (September/ October 2013): 26-27.
136
economic resilience but it still has daunting problems in its path towards great power status. One
aspect of India-on-the-march narrative quotes Indian efforts to seek military modernization and
become a global military power. In spite of entertaining such global ambitions, its reach remains
pretty much regional- and will remain so for years to come.
Besides active Naxalite Maoist insurgency in one-third of the country, increasingly restless
Indian Held Kashmir and Sikh separatist movements are exacerbating already potent differences
of caste, class, language, religion and political ideology, and once celebrated heterogeneity is
increasingly coming under strain. It would not be wrong to claim that its ethnic and linguistic
diversity, once designed to manage country‘s fundamental heterogeneity, now feeds areas
marginalized by uneven economic growth.112
All the daunting problems aside, India is still on a
firm path towards attaining a great power status and the post-hegemonic shift offers peculiar
opportunities to realize her dream.
India is uniquely poised between the U.S. and China in their bid to shape the current post-
hegemonic shift in the international order. Delhi‘s long-standing democratic credentials make her
a natural ally of the secular and liberal values championed by the West while her desire to crave
a special place for herself, commensurate with her contemporary standing, makes her share
resentment with China toward the international system and places her in a bid to rewrite the rules
favouring the ―emerging‖ South wherever possible.
Reversing her long-standing non-aligned tradition India, on the one hand, is actively seeking
strengthened bilateral relations with US which had waxed and waned throughout history but
since the advent of the twenty-first century the bilateral relations has edged toward closer
strategic cooperation. On the other hand, ―the epochal shifts associated with the transition added
an additional rationale for better Chinese relations with India: strengthening China‘s position in
the face of US ‗unipolar‘ pressure and interference.‖113
The support for a multilateral system
drives the two otherwise incompatible giants together. As analyst John Graver wrote, ―Neither
Amy Kazim, ―States of Desire,‖ Financial Times, April 20,2010.
John Graver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 216-7.
137
China nor India liked the fact of unipolarity. Both resented it and felt it was unjust both in terms
of its origins and its consequences.‖114
Though India‘s approach towards US is chiefly guided by her concerns with an increasingly
assertive China right in her backyard but it is not hostage to it. Besides both countries
acknowledge the military threats posed from non-proliferation and terrorism along with sharing a
joint interest in dealing with the conflicts and rivalries in Asia, the threats to oil and gas supplies
from the Gulf, and more generally to Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). 1999-2000 saw a
major shift in the Clinton administration‘s vision of India. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott claimed in 1999 that while ―America and India should be natural partners, but all-too-
often, history, circumstance and incompatibilities of perspective seemed to have kept us from
being so. This is a reality. But it is not necessarily a permanent one or an immutable one.‖115
The change in thinking vis-à-vis India continued in the Bush administration and Delhi voted in
favour of US-backed interim government in Iraq in 2004 after its initial opposition to the
invasion. Besides the strategic partnership meant increased arms purchases from the US along
with joint India-US military exercises.116
Even the contentious issues like CTBT would not
hamper the deepening US-India engagement. The most publicized outcome of these burgeoning
bilateral relations was the nuclear deal first signed in 2005 and eventually passed by the both
governments in 2008. The deal ended three decades of US moratorium on nuclear trade
agreements with India.117
At the heart of the deal lied symbolism that squarely placed India in
the camp of legitimate nuclear powers even though not being a party to the ―non-proliferation
treaty‖. Parshad notes, ―it was rather, as a political matter: an India anointed as a legitimate
nuclear power.‖118
K. P. Vijayalakshmi commenting on the significant shift in Indo-US relations
notes:
Ibid., 353.
Quoted in K. P. Vijayalakshmi, ―American Worldview and Its Implications for India,‖ South Asian Survey 15, no.2 (2008): 206.
James Parisot, ―American Power, East Asian Regionalism and Emerging Powers: in or against empire?,‖ Third World Quarterly 34, no.7 (2013): 1198, Doi: 10.1080/01436597.2013.824655. (biblo 1159-1174)
J. Bajoria and E. Pan, ―The US India Nuclear Deal,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, accessed on March 12, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663. V. Prashad, ―Quid pro quo? The question of India‘s subordination to the ‗American narrative,‘‖ Monthly Review 63, no.5 (2011): 84.
138
―India was now being perceived as an important player on the world stage, on the
assumption that it would play a more active role accompanied by commensurate
expansion of responsibility for reinforcing security and stability in the Middle
East, the Indian Ocean region, Central Asia and even for the international system
as a whole. Perception of India as a rising global power with a rapidly growing
economy signified the comprehensive shift in the image of India.‖119
From the power transition perspective, India assumes significant importance within the emerging
global scenario. India is too big a player to be confined within either the US or the Chinese
camps, should a bipolar international order replaces the current unipolar world. India though
definitely interested in balancing China but ―not alienating China and making it an enemy due to
an over-zealous US ―containment‖ strategy.120
It for sure is an unlikely challenger to US even
after half of the twenty-first century is through, but Sino-Indian collaboration though highly
unlikely has such potential.
Simon Serfaty, on the other hand, paints a scenario where both India and China are more
interested in their relations with the United States and Europe than with each other. This is
because neither ―holds a ‗card‘ that it can play with the other, or even with others, against the
West.‖121
Thus it would be appropriate to assert that there is no ―Chindia‖ in sight even though
India and China had been seen collaborating over trade negotiations and UN-sponsored climate
change negotiations.122
However, Delhi‘s long term security anxiety is clearly China which has forced India to seek
greater economic cooperation with the Southeast Asian nations. Even Indian analyst Anindya
Batabyal acknowledges that the growing Chinese economic and military influence in Asia
clearly appears to be decisive strategy in moulding India‘s ―Look East‖ strategy.123
The power
gap between India and China is still heavily tilted in favour of China. Rajan Menon remarks ―if
China‘s successes routinely make headlines, it is India‘s failures that get attention. While the
Vijayalakshmi, ―American Worldview,‖ 210.
Michael Kraig, ―India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power in a Multipolar and Non-Polar World,‖ Strategic Analysis 33, no.3 (May 2009): 367.
Simon Serfaty, ―Moving into a Post-Western World,‖ The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 16.
Ibid.
Anindya Batabyal, ―Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India‘s Look East Strategy,‖ China Report 42, no.2 (2006): 79-197.
139
acceleration of India‘s economic growth … (has) received coverage, enumerations of India‘s
failings, especially relative to China, are more common, and there are many of them.‖124
Michael Kraig aptly sums up Indian delicate balancing game in both the economic and security
spheres on extra-regional and even global basis through constant efforts to find ―the middle
ground between ideologies and values (Arab, Persian, Israeli, United States, Western, Asian etc.)
and between developed and developing countries, as well as between a complex fabric of
economic import/export preferences across a non-monolithic developing South.‖ Finally
concluding, ―India is not a 100 per cent „friend‟ or „ally‟ of anyone‖125
(italics in original text).
India still lacks the political, economic and ideological freedom to alienate any one bloc or
coalition of actors in the global system despite having substantial defense and economic growth
in recent years, prompting Kraig to declare India has ―a de facto global stance of „no
enemies‘‖126
(italics in original text).
The question is whether India‘s region will remain confined to South Asia or as its capabilities
increase over time, the region will also expand to include a large part of the Asia-Pacific. Where
India has failed to present a feasible regional vision and invest in it, China has built strong
political and economic links with all of India‘s neighbours in South Asia. The net result has been
to tie down India within a regional framework, something that is detrimental to India‘s interests
and ambitions. India is looking for ―extended neighbourhood‖ that includes Central and
Southeast Asia after its lack of progress in SAARC.
As New Delhi searches for a place in the post-hegemonic system that places it squarely at par
with US and China, rather than in one or another camp between any two powers against the
other. India‘ relations with both US and China will remain complicated by its economic interests;
and competition for non-renewable resources and key metals intensified owing to the ever-
increasing population. New Delhi will keep its relations with both ―sectoral‖ in nature, making if
there are alliances, resource by resource and issue by issue, rather than an overall alliance against
the other. India is unlikely to swap American global hegemony with Chinese continental
hegemony. At the same time none of them would be in a position to automatically count her in Menon, ―Asia‘s Looming Power Shift,‖ 26.
Kraig, ―India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power,‖ 367.
Ibid., 368.
140
their club. India is desperate for a great power status and its future actions will prove whether its
fit to be one.
3.1.4. BRAZIL
Rising powers are coming into focus as world enters a period of increasing challenges to waning
US hegemony. Brazil with its significant economic and cultural potential is another power that
recently got attention for its ambitions to carve a large global leadership posture for itself along
with other continent-sized nations and democracies.
Being a home to the world‘s fifth largest landmass that makes its territory thrice the size of India,
the seventh largest economy, 90 percent literate citizens, the world class banking and financial
sector, the third largest stock exchange in the world and one of the top producers of the stuff
from animals, vegetables, minerals to water, energy and airplanes; it has been successful to
recast itself as a global brand and a global power.
2007 massive oil reserves discovery has made it a significant player in the energy sector too.
Besides being without a regional competitor to hold her ambitions back, Brasilia enjoys peculiar
soft power too. Its popular culture of carnival and football has transnational appeal. Chosen to
host the 2014 World Soccer Cup tournament and the 2016 Summer Olympics was perceived to
be an acknowledgement of the nation‘s long anticipated and generally celebrated emergence onto
the world stage.
With all these impressive indicators, it possesses few equally disturbing challenges too. That
includes its inadequate infrastructure, glaring underinvestment in capital and innovation,
overburdened legal system which is notoriously inefficient and costly, high crime rate, rampant
corruption and near absence of the state from the lives of millions of Brazilian citizens with
almost 26 percent of its population still living in slums.
Compounding this alarming situation is that its ―gross domestic product was on track to shrink
by more than 3 percent in 2015, and looks set to repeat this dismal performance again in 2016,
even as inflation running above 10% and the deterioration of government finances hamper an
effective policy response to the recession.‖127
This is a marked contrast with the very recent Mathew M. Taylor, ―Brazil in the Crucible of Crisis,‖ Current History 115, no. 778 (Feb 2016): 68.
141
years when its economy was on a roll, never falling into recession even in the depths of the 2008
global financial crisis.
Brazil of course is way behind in mounting any viable challenge to US primacy. But as has been
asserted previously it is not about replacing or overtaking US in any of the key indicators that set
the process of post-hegemonic transition in motion. Post-hegemony is about waning influence of
the hegemon in a particular region where it had enjoyed massive presence and along with it the
rise of the alternate power centers that are willing to assert themselves , not only when their core
interests are at stake but to increase their own area of influence.
Amidst this background, Brazil‘s ascent coincides with the relative decline of US influence in
Latin America. In doing so it has undertaken an ambitious and far-flung foreign policy agenda,
independent of Washington, heading at times to misunderstandings and dashed hopes. This quest
involves carving a permanent place in the United Nations Security Council, expanded voting
rights for itself and others at influential world bodies like World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, and organizing other major and minor powers into strong coalitions to champion
a South-South agenda in near and far abroad.
Along these lines Brazil has promoted a pan-ideological South American integration. The
primary rationale behind creation of Mercosur (the Common Market of the South) in 1991 had
been Brazilian aspirations to build a self-identified regional sphere of influence. It is
simultaneously working with regional groupings like Organization of American States (OAS)
and Inter-American Development Bank too. Additionally, it has moved to establish the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) to play an increasingly important political role.
The establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, consisting of
every Western Hemispheric nation except the US and Canada, reveals Brazil‘s regional
ambitions. A nascent pan regional military body has also been proposed in parallel with the
Inter-American Defense Board. The concrete impact of most of these parallel regional
institutions has been minimal so far but they are expected to play more valuable role as these
institutions mature with the passage of time.
In post-hegemonic transition, the role of other emerging actors is very important. Unable to
mount a single decisive challenge to US waning hegemony, these emerging actors are searching
142
for convergence of interests that could give additional weight to their demands on international
forum. With the same aim, Brasilia began forging a loose coalition and dialogue with India and
South Africa which lead to the formation of India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum
in June 2003, to benefit from the global power shifts.
They then formed a Group of Three (G-3) during the fifty-eighth United Nations General
Assembly session and contributed crucially to the failure of World Trade Organization‘s Cancun
Conference by pressing for fundamental changes in the agricultural subsidies regimes of the
developed world.128
While they pressed ahead for the establishment of the global market
conditions that would allow developing countries to benefit from their comparative advantages in
agriculture, industry and services in the Doha Round of WTO and with a view to eliminate high
non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by the developed countries.
IBSA states had been able to improve their position in the international trade hierarchy even
though the WTO negotiations had hardly progressed in terms of content. Limited diplomatic
coalitions like IBSA and G-3 are thus, helpful in constraining the power of US and other
established great powers by extending the room for maneuvering for themselves. Post-hegemony
particularly view these developments as impending shifts in power hierarchy.
Beyond the hemisphere, Brazil has been an aggressive supporter of the BRICS and used its
summits to strategically position itself as a leader of the emerging global community. July 2014
initiative of BRICS to establish a New Development Ban with $50 billion initially subscribed
capital, set to launch in 2016 is a key milestone of the cooperation among emerging economies
and developing countries – a testimony of coming age of these countries in the world of
development finance.129
Brazil has proved itself adept in developing cordial bilateral relations with Washington whenever
convenient but never letting its overall strategic vision of building global or regional influence
slipping out of focus. It has very strong ―aspirations to be a significant actor in its own right,
Daniel Flemes, ―India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order: Interests, Strategies, and Values of the emerging Coalition,‖ International Studies 46, no. 4 (October 2009): 402, Doi: 10.1177/002088171004600402.
Eric Farnsworth, ―Dancing with Brazil,‖ The National Interest 138 (Aug 2015): 34.
143
rather than following outlines of a script written in Washington.‖130
It has overtly taken
positions contrary to US to implement its agenda, whenever circumstances arose.
When requested for the use of Brazilian airbases and other military institutions for US military
aircrafts involved in the Colombian conflict by Secretary of State, Madeline Albright in 2002,
Brazil not only rejected the request but denied overflying rights too.131
It strenuously objected to
the bilateral treaty on the use of seven Columbian military bases by the US armed forces in
September 2009.132
Brasilia also complicated efforts to address 2009 political crisis in Honduras
by supporting deposed leader Manuel Zelaya and publicly took a strong position in favour of the
constitutionally mandated electoral process even when Obama‘s team backed off its initial
position on the Honduran crisis and acquiesced in Zelaya‘s ouster.133
But the single most controversial initiate of Brazil to assert its global role had been its efforts to
provide an alternative to UN sanctions against Iran along with Turkey. The initiative involved
persuading Iran to send its uranium abroad for enrichment, was initially proposed by Obama
administration itself. But after Chinese and Russian approval for additional sanctions and US
sponsored resolution in the UNSC, the entire initiative was dubbed as a ―ploy‖ by the US to
delay UN actions. This single episode created most strained bilateral relations with US, and
Brazil for the very first time voted against the American interests at the UN Security Council.134
Besides China‘s entrance into the Latin America also proved to be a game changer for Brazil and
the region. It has reduced US leverage in the region, given Beijing willingness to finance projects
and engage with leaders. Talk of economic and political ―decoupling‖ from the US is becoming
prevalent in the region. Predicting that Latin America or for that matter Brazil will become a
region with much reduced US leverage is neither impossible nor improbable. Post-hegemonic
transition has started unfolding in key regions as well.
Ibid., 30.
Daniel Flemes, ―Brazil‘s Cooperative Leadership in Southern Latin America‘s Security Policies‖ (Doctoral
Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 2006), 243, accessed March 15, 2012, http://www.dissertation.de/englisch/index.php3?active_document=bunch.php3&sprache=2&buch=4580. Flemes, ―IBSA in the New Global Order,‖ 408.
Julia E. Sweig, ―Getting Latin America Right,‖ The National Interest 123 (Jan/Feb 2013): 26-27.
Julia E. Sweig, ―A New Global Player: Brazil‘s Far-Flung agenda,‖ Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2010): 176-179.
144
3.2 Power in Transition – Analyzing US-China Relations within the
Context
The post-1945 international order which rested on US overwhelming power to shape and direct
global events, is drawing to a close as country‘s relative power declines along with its ability to
manage global economy and security. A looming great-power rival – China – is already on a
trajectory towards closing the gap that might bring this unprecedented era of American
dominance to an end. Besides along with the US, the transition in progress will also bring the
end of almost 500 years of Western dominance over world events. As Christopher Layne notes:
―The impending end of the Old Order – both Pax Americana and the period of Western
ascendency – heralds a fraught transition to a new and uncertain constellation of power in
international politics.‖135
The final shape of the new configuration of great powers might be ambiguous at the moment but
there can hardly be a scholar or policy analyst that denies the power transition in progress.
Interestingly every academic debate centering American decline involves comparison with
China, by even those who otherwise believe US to be undisputable leader for long times to come.
Among them Kevin Cooney bluntly rejects the notion that the US is in decline relative to China,
seeing no prospect of a hegemonic shift during this century.136
Zhu Feng also considers China‘s
power disparity with the US to be ―insurmountable‖.137
Those who accept the proposition that China is leaping forward, mostly have a bleak future to
predict. Among them neo-realist perspective predicts that China is predestined to exercise its
power to alter the status quo. Mearsheimer asserts: ―China cannot rise peacefully, and if it
continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China
are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.‖138
Liberals, on the other hand, with a contradictory vision believe that China‘s enmeshment into the
Christopher Layne, ―The Global Power Shift from West to the East,‖ The National Interest 119 (May/June2012):
Nigel Cox, ―Managing the Rise of China (Review Article),‖ Asian Affairs 40, no.2 (2009): 271, DOI:
1080/03068370902871615. Ibid.
John J. Mearsheimer, ―Better to be Godzilla than Bambi,‖ Foreign Policy 146 (January/Feburary2005): 47.
145
world system will help her to appreciate the values of cooperation as well as the obsoleteness of
war.
The strategies forwarded to deal with China vary, depending upon whether those advocating
their stance view China as a revisionist or a status quo power. Warren I. Cohen remarks
―historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak – and there is no reason to expect it to act
differently in the future, to behave any better than other great powers in the past.‖139
The rising China is inevitably changing the American-centered East-Asian security order.
Besides steadily growing across economic, political and military domains, its diplomatic resolve
to engage the region is evident through involvements in groupings like the ASEAN Regional
Forum, ASEAN plus 3 and the Six-Party talks over North Korean denuclearization and crisis
prevention. Its forward engagement is already turning the region away from the uncontested
American hegemony to a bipolar order organized around Chinese and American rivalry.
Countries in the region will find themselves facing strategic choices as to which regional
coalition to join. A glimpse into the future can be seen through this recent article headline
published in Foreign Policy magazine which read as, ―Time to Choose between U.S. and China,
American Officer Tells Australia.‖140
The possibility, that China might gradually replace US as regional hegemon in East Asia with its
own distinct East-Asian political order organized around Beijing and its own bilateral ties;
through the incremental reorientation of economies in the region towards the booming Chinese
market and strengthening already existing social and cultural ties, is not implausible. In such a
scenario the region might willingly accept gradual replacement of American with Chinese
hegemony.141
Whenever US bilateral (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and countries to the South East Asia),
trilateral and multilateral mechanisms to contain China in the Asia-Pacific are mentioned, the
possibilities of other Asia-Pacific actors beyond South Korea, India, Japan and Australia to
―bandwagon with an emerging Sino-centric hegemonic order rather than balance against it with Cox, ―Managing the Rise of China,‖ 269.
Paul Mcleary, ―Time to Choose between US and China, American Officer Tells Australia,‖ Foreign Policy, September 1, 2016..
G. J. Ikenberry, ―American Hegemony and East Asian Order,‖ Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no.
(2004): 361-363, DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000260129.
146
the declining hegemon-the US‖ is ignored. They also overlook ―Chinese economic and soft-
power diplomacy further afield amongst the micro-states in the Pacific basin (which) could
outflank US military advantages in the second island chain.‖142
ASEAN states at the same time
reserve the judgment whether China will ultimately remain benign and also prefer the USA to
remain strong power in the region. Besides there is an unspeakable fear that an increasingly
assertive China might probe US willingness to engage China in its sphere of influence and
testing of waters might occur over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Michael Lumbers has aptly summed up the dilemma confronting the states in the region. He
remarks: ―Anxiety over Beijing‘s recent saber rattling in the East and South China Seas and over
its long term intentions has stirred widespread endorsement of a reassertion of American
influence in the region‖143
but at the same time there is an understanding among these states
that, ―their future prosperity is inextricably linked to continued trade with an economically
vigorous China, as well as an unspoken fear that a sustained American presence in the region
cannot be guaranteed, rendering a choice to make an enemy out of the mainland foolhardy.‖144
However, the questions involving ―China‘s Rise‖ suffer from a basic flaw. China‘s rise is usually
assessed from a regionally confined lens which generally places her in the regional context of
―East-Asia‖ or the ―Asia-Pacific‖ thus confining it to an unduly geographically restrictive
framework. Such a confined lens offers a biased analysis of a country that border areas such as
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Siberia along with its important regions located on
the coast. No matter how rival powers might want to confine this giant but its undeniable fact
that this is one country whose future actions will have important repercussions through-out the
Asia-Pacific, South Asia and even the entire world.145
Besides this bipolar lens focused on East-
Asia/ Asia-Pacific region also distorts the complete picture, which seems no more than as a
struggle between a solitary regional power striving for hegemony; and a geographically distinct Scott, ―US Strategy in the Pacific-Geopolitical Positioning,‖ 624.
Michael Lumbers, ―Whither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China‘s Rise,‖ Comparative Strategies 34, no.4 (2015): 313, Doi:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069510.
Ibid., 313-314.
C. Dale Watson, ―Beyond China: The Geopolitics of Eastern Eurasia,‖ Comparative Strategy 21, no.3 (2002): 204, DOI:10.1080/01495930290042976.
147
hegemon, attempting to balance would-be-hegemon and safeguarding security of its East Asian
allies.146
The larger picture presents China to be much potent international player with interests far beyond
Asia-Pacific. As a party to over 300 international treaties and a member of more than 130
intergovernmental organizations or regimes, China has taken in international cooperation from
nuclear non-proliferation to mitigating global climate change.147
China‘s role has gradually changed from a passive adherent to existing global order, to an
increasingly participatory and sometimes aggressive stakeholder. To promote its national
interests ―China has inadvertently and inevitably challenged the existing norms and rules that
govern inter-state relations, inducing some countries to modify their original compliance to these
norms and rules so as to please Beijing.‖148
Being a strong advocate of state sovereignty and
non-intervention but recently China has modified its traditional adherence to these norms and
eventually succeeded in creating new norms of international intervention centering on
involvement of a relevant regional organization. This was particularly witnessed in case of
Darfur where authorization of the African Union was an important condition to be satisfied
before intervention.149
UN Security Council authorization has always been insisted mandatory
by China.
Even the ―Chinese model of the development‖ gained apologists after it came unscathed through
the 2008 global financial crisis. Beijing offers a distinct model of development that privileges the
building of economic and social infrastructure and satisfaction of basic human needs. It founded
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to support regional infrastructure projects
besides the New Development Bank to finance emerging economies; they both serve as
alternatives to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Assistance offer is made
through these without imposing harsh ―good governance‖ conditions as demanded by the West,
OECD, World Bank or the IMF.
Ibid.
Ren Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 2, no. 1 (July 2013): 90, DOI:10.1007/s40320-013-0030-7.
Gerald Chan, ―China Face the World: Making Rules for a New Order?‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 2, no. 1 (July 2013): 106, DOI:10.1007/s40320-013-0022-7.
Ibid., 107.
148
Whether or not a ―Beijing Consensus‖ exists but those who believe it does see it as a threat to US
hegemony.150
China‘s success demonstrated that ―it is not true there is only one model of
development in the world. In fact, there are alternative development patterns‖151
and one can
gain if one has understanding of one‘s own national situation meanwhile referring to other
countries experience for learning something. China in fact has effectively offered an alternative
to the Western way of doing things, at least in the development sector. As Gerald Chan elaborates:
―In international development, China does not go about deliberately making rules for others to
follow. China does things its own way, according to its own circumstances. It does things by
exemplifying rather than by laying conditions in politically intrusive ways, even when it extends
aid investments to the Third World.‖152
China is proactively pursuing regional multilateral organizations or mechanism. Amid the
financial crisis, China together with Japan and South Korea initiated ASEAN plus 3 and since
formed a web of cooperative mechanisms in a range of functional areas and at various levels.
Besides the China, Japan and South Korea has since then organized them into a trilateral
cooperation which has been institutionalized through annual summit meetings on rotational
basis. At the same time the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is being
pursued as alternative regional trade structure to the US sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade agreement.153
Meanwhile the ―Shanghai Five‖ have grown into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).154
Organization‘s stated security goal is combating ―three evils‖ of terrorism, separatism and
extremism but it aims at limiting US influence in the Central Asia and beyond. Similarly the
―New Security‖ framework proposed at the 2014 meeting of the Conference on Interactions and
Confidence-Building measures in Asia (CICA) is widely understood to be a critique of US
regional security institutions and how they might be replaced.155
The formation of G20 summit
against the backdrop of 2008 financial meltdown is particularly significant. ―As a founding
Stefan Halper, Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 86.
Chan, ―China Faces the World,‖ 117.
Richard Fontaine and Mira Rapp-Hooper, ―The China Syndrome,‖ The National Interest 143 (May/June 2016):
Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 91.
Fontaine and Rapp-Hooper, ―The China Syndrome,‖ 15.
149
member, a shaping force, and a core participant, China sees this as an institutional recognition of
its major power status as well as of its crucial role.‖156
As China rises to a global power status, its military modernization driven by its large overseas
interests and existence of Taiwan issue is simply a matter of time. US-China military spending
ratio show how China is gradually catching up with US. In 1994 US spent 19 times as much as
China which was reduced to 9 times in 2004. A recent analysis of defence figures show that gap
has been reduced to 3 times as of 2014157
while the Economist is projecting that China‘s defence
spending will be equal to that of US by 2025.158
In spite of all the hype about military
modernization, a Chinese military analyst Ren Xiao himself admits, ―the process of
informatization in the PLA [People‘s Liberation Army] remains at an initial stage, and
modernization level still lags substantially behind that of the world‘s military power.‖159
But
there are others who admit no doubt US military forces are ―bigger and better‖ than China‘s but
―what matters…is not what forces China and America possess, but what they can do with them
where and when it counts.‖160
China‘s new assertiveness in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) has raised alarms about her
―peaceful rise‖ regardless of the quality of its military modernization. Besides hypothesized
potential confrontation of the two superpowers and other stakeholders could take place in
China‘s near coast, the South China Sea, China‘s lane of sea transportation to the Middle East
and China naval patrol in the sea off the east African coast, as their interest collide.161
As Daniel
Blumenthal, a former US defense official noted: ―As (China) grows more powerful, it desires to
change international rules written when its weak.‖162
Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 92.
Tweeted by @intlspectatator
Layne, ―The Global Power Shift,‖ 22.
As quoted in Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, ―Informatization and the Chinese People‘s Liberation Army Navy,‖ in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 263. ; Three structural barriers to China‘s path to peer status with US in military modernization has also been elaborated Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth,
―The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China‘s Rise and the Fate of America‘s Global
Position,‖ International Security 40, no.3 (Winter 2015/16): 39-44. Hugh White as quoted in Yuen Foong Khong, ―Primacy or World Order? The United States and China‘s Rise-A
Review Essay,‖ International Security 38, no.3 (Winter 2013/14): 156. Chan, ―China Face the World,‖ 114.
D. Blumenthal, ―The US stands up to China‘s bullying,‖ Wall Street Journal Online, 2010, accessed July 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703700904575391862120429050.html.
150
This new assertiveness has also been interpreted as China‘s arrival as a great power onto the
international theater. This has sparked a fierce debate between those who believe in
accommodating China‘s territorial ambitions without taking firm position of its affect on
regional power balance.163
There are differences between advocates of US grand strategy of
―restraint‖ or ―offensive balancing‖ versus those who aim for ―deep engagement‖ in the
region.164
The United States pursued a strategy of reorientation towards Asia – Asia pivot, with
the aim to dissuade China from making a bid for hegemony and thereby preserving the existing
balance of power in the region.165
The containment and engagement strategies are simultaneously being pursued by the US to
integrate China into the existing liberal international order and hence bind it to the extent where
its bid for hegemony might not dislodge US from its pre-eminent position too. The launch of the
US –China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009 indicated US willingness to deepen
diplomatic engagement strategy166
but internal and external balancing strategies are side by side
pursued. Internal balancing focus on a military buildup to enhance US capability to operate in the
Asia-Pacific while the external balancing involves a shift away from the hub-and-spokes167
model of asymmetrical bilateral alliances in vogue in the region since the Korean war, with a
federated network model in which US would lead a web of more powerful allies and partners
with links to one another168
David Shambaugh, however, asserts containment strategy is not viable even if it were decided
that this was a wise course of action, noting ―precisely because of China‘s existing integration in
163
See Robert S. Ross, ―China‘s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects and the US Response,‖ International Security 34, no.2 (Fall 2009): 78. ; and Charles L. Glaser, ―A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation,‖ International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015), 83. The sample literature on debate see Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2014). ; Christopher Layne, ―From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America‘s Future Grand
Strategy,‖ International Security 22, no.1 (Summer 1997): 86-124. ; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C.
Wohlforth, ―Don‘t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,‖
International Security 37, no.3 (Winter 2012/13): 7-51. ; and Campbell Craig et al., ―Correspondence: debating American Engagement- The Future of US Grand Strategy,‖ International Security 38, no.2 (Fall 2013):181-199.
On the existing power balance see Michael Beckley, ―China‘s Century? Why America‘s Edge will Endure,‖
International Security 36, no.3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78. ; Khong, ―Primacy or World Order,‖ 155-157.
Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 22.
On hub-and-spokes model see Kent E. Calder, ―Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective,‖ Pacific Review 17, no.1 (March 2004): 135-157.
For details on three strategies see Nina Silove, ―The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power balance in Asia,‖ International Security 40, no.4 (Spring 2016): 45-88.
151
the global system. The genie cannot be put back into the bottle‖.169
Any effort to weaken
Chinese economy would ignite fierce protest from politically powerful US domestic
constituencies with vested interests in sustaining economic links to the mainland.
There are others who maintain that contrary to the belief propagated by critics of the rise of
China, it is acting like a ―status-quo‖ power, cautious, responsible, focused on its internal
problems and willfully avoiding conflict.170
To counter ―China threat theory‖171
, ―Peaceful Rise
(heping jueqi)‖172
, ―Peaceful Development (heping fazhan)‖173
and Harmonious World (hexie
shijie)‖174
concepts has been promoted by the Chinese official discourse. The ―Peaceful Rise‖
concept was first floated officially by Zheng Bijian in 2003 and it was then introduced to the
domestic audience by China‘s President Hu Jintao during a regular meeting of the Political
Bureau in Feb 2004.175
But the concept recognizes and accepts the apprehension that a rising
China could pose for the rest of the world. Hence some prefer the term ―Peaceful Development‖
to ―Peaceful Rise‖ as the former would be ―bloodless‖, less aggressive and much less
controversial.
Regardless of the official jargon being employed by Chinese officials, Beijing is well entrenched
on a path towards the great-power status with the potential to act as competitor to the mighty US.
However there are equally large barriers to its bid for hegemony: these include its relative
poverty in per capita terms that hinders Beijing‘s ability to successfully conduct a consistently
aggressive foreign policy; inefficiency in certain sectors of economy; military backwardness and
David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford Cambridge University Press, 2013), 315.
Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China‟s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2005). ; Alastair Iain Johnston, ―Is China a Status Quo Power?‖ International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5-56.
D. Roy, ―Hegemon on the horizon? China‘s threat to East Asian Security,‖ International Security 19, no.1 (1994): 149-168.
Bijian Zheng, ―China‘s ‗Peaceful Rise‘ to Great-Power Status,‖ Foreign Affairs 84, no.5 (September/October2005): 18-24.
S Kang and L Gung, Zhongguo heping fazhan guoji zhanlue yanji [Studies on International Strategies for China‘s
Peaceful Development] (Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe [Chinese Central Party School Press], Beijing, 2007).
X Yu, ―Hexie shijie‘ yu zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu,‖ [‗Harmonious world‘ and the road to China‘s peaceful development], in Shijie Dashi yu hexie shijie (World Trends and Harmonious World), ed. D Xu (Zhishi chubanshe, Beijing, 2007) 31-43. ; J Xu, ―Jiashi hexie shijie de lilun sikao.‖ [Theoretical Thinking Behind the
Development of Harmonious World] in Shijie Dashi yu hexie shijie (World Trends and Harmonious World), ed. D Xu (Zhishi chubanshe, Beijing, 2007): 44-54.
Raviprasad Narayanan, ―The Chinese Discourse on the ‗Rise of China‘,‖ Strategic Analysis 31, no.4 (2007): 646, DOI: 10.1080/09700160701559326.
152
its resultant inability to project power regionally; and potential internal political instability that
could even threaten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain power.176
These daunting problems, however, cannot stall China to a regional size portfolio. With even 7%
annual growth, the Chinese economy is all set to account for more than half of the global output
by 2050- something never achieved by US even in its post-World War II heydays too.177
The
power transition in the global hierarchy is already being witnessed and scholars like Christopher
Layne are warning US policy elites to come to terms with the undeniable reality. He asserts:
―American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined
supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of
time.‖178
Beijing is clearly accepting some rules, rejecting others and seeking to re-write still
others. As a result there is no single answer to what kind of superpower China aspires to be but it
is destined to be one indisputably.
3.3: Post-Hegemony begins…
History in the long run will remember 2008 as a year that heralded post-hegemony in the
International Relations. Globally the arrival of post-hegemony corresponded with three
significant international developments that shook the very foundations of hitherto undisputed US
leadership and its ability to shape political, economic and financial future of the globe with
respect to these episodes especially. They included 2008 global financial crisis; Russian
belligerence and reassertion in its ―near-abroad‖; and the Arab Spring.
The power in transition in the global hierarchy curtailed US ability to affect desired outcomes in
either of the aforementioned cases and emboldened many to bid assertively to regain their
previous place in the international hierarchy or try to carve a place for them to affect future
configuration of power at the systemic level. Thomas Wright discussed the significance of these
Watson, ―Beyond China,‖ 205.
Salvatore Babones, ―The Once and Future Hegemon,‖ The National Interest 138 (July/August2015): 57.
Layne, ―The Global Power Shift,‖ 31.
153
episodes under the title of ―demise of the unipolar concert‖179
but in this analysis their
significance is attested to the arrival of ―post-hegemony‖.
3.3.1. Global Financial Crisis 2008
One of the most significant events of the first quarter of the twenty-first century which even
reignited decades-old debate about the distribution of power in the international system, was the
fall 2008 global financial crisis. Worst in 70 years, it was dubbed as a major geopolitical setback
for the US and Europe. In its first year, the global crash of 2008 was actually worse than the
1929 crash with respect to all the major economic metrics- industrial production, world trade and
equity markets.180
Debate centered on whether the core of US primacy – its financial and economic resilience –
may be unraveling and whether it may ultimately change the face of the global power being
speculated for a long time. The fact that the collapse of Lehman Brothers which triggered a full
scale global financial crisis occurred only six weeks after the Russian invasion of Georgia, gave
another boost to ones already speculating end of Pax Americana.
Conventional wisdom blamed the collapse of the housing prices and the subprime mortgage
market in the US for the crisis. But ―the crisis‘ underlying cause was the combination of very
low interest rates and unprecedented levels of liquidity.‖181
Christopher Layne aptly summed up
the causes in his recent analysis as ―too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent
trade and current-account deficits; deindustrialization; sluggish economic growth; and chronic
federal-budget deficits fueling an ominously rising national debt.‖182
The US GDP fell in the
third quarter of 2008 and was forecast to drop precipitously by nearly four percent in the fourth
quarter. 183
Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 17-22.
Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O‘ Rourke, ―A Tale of Two Depressions: What Does the New Data Tell Us,‖
VoxEu, March 8, 2010, accessed May 30, 2016, http://www.voxeu.org/article/tale-two-depressions-what-do-new-data-tell-us-februrary-2010-update#jun09. Roger C. Altman, ―The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,‖ Foreign Affairs 88, no.1 (Jan/Feb 2009): 3-4.
Layne, ―Global Power Shift‖, 27.
Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 6.
154
Reacting to the enormity of the events, Pan Wei of the Center for Chinese and Global Affairs
remarked: ―My belief is that, in 20 years, we will look the Americans straight in the eyes - as
equals. But maybe it will come sooner than that.‘184
Gaiser and Kovac rated the bankruptcy of
the Lehman brothers (September 15, 2008) as an event of unprecedented significance placing it
higher than September 11, 2001 because of the huge and unavoidable ―structural consequences‖
not even witnessed in the former case.185
Friedberg went far in declaring that Wall Street‘s
inability to police itself, showed devastating consequences for the rest of the world and could
also diminish America‘s soft power by discrediting its model of liberal capitalism.186
Criticism
kept pouring from all corners and the editorial of the Italian Journal Limes referred to the
financial meltdown as ―……the tombstone of the grandiose project to center the world on only
one pole‖187
While much of the world blamed US financial excesses for the global recession that brought its
model of free-market capitalism out of favour; others were equally concerned that US will now
be inward focused and more likely to be constrained by its own domestic concerns i.e.
unemployment and fiscal pressures. Many feared nationalization of financial sectors will be done
in a search for stability by the US and Europe. World seem to be heading towards a period which
again called for expansion of role of the state as compared to the private sector, against the
fiercely preached tenets of modern capitalism propagated by the US itself. The crisis exposed the
weaknesses within the European Union too. Economic divergence was on the rise - the three
largest EU economies - Germany, France and UK- failed to form consensus on a response to the
crisis and refused pleas for emergency assistance from the most vulnerable Eastern Europe.
Roger Altman, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, expecting prolonged severity of the
global recession wrote: ―The world‘s three largest economies, the United States, the EU and
Japan – will not be able to generate a normal cyclical recovery. The pervasive financial damage
will prevent it. As a result, nations dependent on those markets for growth, such as those in D. Rothkopf, ―9/11 Was Big. This Is Bigger,‖ Washington Post, October 5, 2008.
Gaiser and Kovac, ―From Bipolarity to Bipolarity,‖ 58.
Friedberg, ―Same Old Songs,‖ 35.
Quoted in Jason W. Davidson and Roberto Menotti, ―American Primacy by Default: Down but Not Out,‖ The International Spectator 44, no.1 (2009): 13, DOI:1080/03932720802692855.
155
Eastern Europe, will also face long recovery.‖ 188
Even the international financial system was
devastated with the IMF estimating loss for the global financial institutions to eventually reach
$1.5 trillion189
Without a doubt the crisis shook the world‘s trust in US business and policy elites but whether
alternate leaders were stepping up to the plate, was another most heated aspect of the debate
generated on the issue. It was acknowledged that nations with insulated financial systems, such
as China, Russia and India had suffered the least economic damage. Especially China‘s unique
political-economic model came through unscathed in 2008. No country was speculated to benefit
economically from the financial crisis but China with its ability to make key investments in other
nations‘ natural resources and to assist them at a time when West cannot, was expected to be in a
relatively stronger position. It could take bold political initiatives and expand its diplomatic
presence in the developing world in order to further its model of capitalism.
With the passage of time a consensus has gathered momentum that the weaknesses will
eventually be repaired but that would not be able to arrest the trends that are shifting the world‘s
center of gravity away from the United States. 2008 economic meltdown is a painful reminder of
the limitations of the US power and as Roger Altman asserted, it has ―inflicted profound damage
on its financial system, its economy, and its standing in the world.‖190
September 15, 2008
might eventually and most likely will go down in the history as the date that triggered post-
hegemony. We might be only a few decades away from the final verdict.
3.3.2. Russian Reassertion in its “Near Abroad”
―With the Cold War‘s demise, the menacing Russia that long loomed over Europe
seemed to vanish. The Russia of 1992 was just a fragment of its historic self in
military punch and economic weight. Not even Russia‘s still-formidable nuclear
arsenal deflected perceptions of decline. It was inevitable, then, that Western
policy makers would feel that this shrunken Russia was more to be ignored than
feared. They were wrong.‖191
Roger C. Altman, ―Globalization in Retreat: Further Geopolitical Consequences of the Financial Crisis,‖ Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4, (July/August 2009): 3.
Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 7.
Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 14.
Leslie H. Gelb, ―Détente Plus,‖ The National Interest 138 (July/August 2015): 9.
156
Russia will be one of the important players in post-hegemonic international system, though
without the economic prowess and depth of China but still with significant conventional military
might that can act as counterweight to US allies in the Eurasian theater. Post-hegemonic
transitions provide incentives to states like Russia which are aggressively seeking a place for
themselves in the global hierarchy and trying to reassert themselves as one of the key global
players. Dissatisfaction with the established status quo places Russia comfortably in the camp
with China, India and Brazil who are looking for a reconfigured international system that
understands their unique and enhanced global standing, even if not out rightly rejecting or over
writing the status quo.
US overwhelming interest in the Asia-Pacific theatre and its rebalancing strategy along with its
comparatively diminished presence in the Middle East and Europe, emboldened Russia to get
itself registered once again as a power with its own ―sphere of influence‖ and ―privileged
interests‖192
. The diffusion of economic power around the world suggest that the idea of ―sphere
of influence‖ no matter how unfashionable in Washington, has to be incorporated to lessen the
risk of conflict in both Chinese and Russian cases especially.
The second Bush administration‘s inability to reconcile the expansion of Euro-Atlantic
institutions (EU and NATO) into the former Soviet space- especially when viewed as a direct
threat by the Kremlin- with the previously stated objective of maintaining a partnership with
Russia, caused deep resentment in the Kremlin and pushed to adopt direct confrontational
attitude to safeguard what it considered its vital national interest.
Post-hegemony is still characterized by US military preponderance as one of the central facts of
international politics but US willingness and resolve to use this power is being watched
nervously by its allies in three crucial regions i.e. Europe, the Middle East and East Asia.
Russian role in the Eurasian and Middle East has particularly led to speculations of its re-
emergence as a vital player on the global theatre and its actions are being viewed as acts of overt
hard-balancing against American predominance in Europe.
192
This was the term used by President Dmitri Medvedev in the aftermath of Russia‘s war with Georgia. See President of Russia, ―Interview Given by Dmitri Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One Rossiya, NTV,‖ August 31, 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml.
157
When Saakashvili came to power in Georgia in early 2004, with strong European aspirations and
intention to seek NATO membership following the footsteps of Central and Eastern European
countries, Europe already was developing ―enlargement fatigue‖ but what was more ominous
was ―the Russia of 2005 was not the Russia of 1995. No longer dependent on Western loans,
Russia was now buoyed by an oil windfalls, was in the midst of a self-aggrandizing effort to
restore its great power status.‖193
Vladimir Putin was determined to roll back ―color revolutions‖
that brought pro-western leaders power in Tbilisi and Kiev, but had also put Georgia and Ukraine
on a trajectory toward NATO membership. Viewing former as a direct result of Moscow‘s
weakness in the 1990s, Kremlin readiness to flex its muscles began in Georgia.194
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 represented first such forcible action since the end of
WWII on the European continent and its intervention in Ukraine directly led to movement of
NATO troops into the Baltic States on a rotational basis. Besides it did result in another
contentious debate regarding relevance of Article 5 to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
should they ever come under attack by Kremlin. This is coupled with overt nuclear threats from
Russia and talk of a new Cold War.195
What heightens Western alarm is Putin‘s seeming
unpredictability and his apparently unlimited internal power to get his way through.
Putin alone isn‘t their biggest concern. Ukrainian crisis has also exposed ambivalence of US
NATO allies and the division within them as per reaction to Moscow is involved. With Balts and
Poles leading the hawks and calling for tough American response to Russian provocations;
Germany is in the opposite camp, clearly opposed to supplying weapons to Ukraine and thus
further antagonizing Russia. A recent Pew survey clearly captures the spirit of this rift. When
asked to respond to a question whether they supported using military force to a NATO ally,
neighboring Russia, that ―got into a serious military conflict with Moscow‖, less than the
majority in Poland and as low as 38% in Germany supported the proposition as against to 58%
Americans in favour of using military force.196
Economic sanctions against Russia have not done enough to make Putin back down, though they
have seriously harmed its economy to the extent to squeeze some dubious cease-fire agreement Svante E. Cornell, ―War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,‖ Current History 107, no. 711 (October 2008): 309.
Ibid., 309.
Gideon Rachman, ―Preserving American Power,‖ The National Interest 141 (Jan/Feb 2010): 18.
Ibid., 21.
158
on Ukraine. US European allies prefer to press ahead with a weak diplomatic hand and are
reluctant to expand sanctions for fear of prompting Russian military response and further
complicating their dependence on Russian oil and gas. Nothing has highlighted this diplomatic
impotence more than Obama distancing himself from this and letting Germans take the charge.
West‘s limp hand is painfully evident with its narrow options that includes no more aid to
beleaguered friends, even in the face of escalating Russian provocations; more diplomacy
without leverage; calls for NATO military buildup with no prospect of realization and more
tough sanctions that hurt but not humble Russia. While on the Russian side its military
superiority over NATO on its western border because of conventional forces backed by potent
tactical nuclear weapons and its stated willingness to use them to avoid defeat or sustain
advantages- is further inducing reluctance in US European NATO allies.
While in the Middle East US reluctance to put ―boots on the ground‖ in case of Syria especially
has signaled a power vacuum and the extent to which US has lost control of the region following
upheavals of Arab Spring and troops withdrawal from Iraq. Russia moved quickly to fill in and
the clarity of Russian support for Bashar-al-Assad marks a sharp contrast with US policy
confusion in Syria.197
Russian provocative actions in Ukraine and its support to Syrian dictator
may be viewed as signs of revisionism in Washington but for Kremlin it is the US that is the real
revisionist power in the world politics with its overt agenda of regime change in countries like
Ukraine and Syria – the ones not otherwise ready to tow the American line.
Besides Russian and Chinese resentment dates back to Libyan conflict where they believed they
have been fooled by the Obama administration; when instead of alleviating threats to civilians as
was agreed in the UNSC resolution 1973 the Western-led intervention entered the Libyan
conflict as cobelligerents on sides of the opposition, resulting in the capture and ultimately
violent death of the Libyan despot. There is a very genuine fear in both China and Russia that
unless they push back against US power, they too might ultimately fall victim to US-backed
regime change.198
Ibid., 18-19.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, ―Drifting to 2016,‖ The National Interest 142 (Mar/Apr2016): 32-33.
159
West has reluctantly realized that the correlation of forces in the Greater Middle East is moving
against them. Many of their time-tested friends are demoralized and most of their enemies are
emboldened. Any meaningful movement towards Iranian nuclear crisis would also require
Russians on the same page with the West. As Moscow‘s potential to affect Tehran‘s calculation
is greater than the combined efforts of Europe and the US.
Vice President Joe Biden February 2009 announcement to press ―reset‖ button in bilateral
relationship and adopt an approach that engage Russia on shared threats and where interests
converged and push back where Kremlin actions contradict US interests,199
has so far not been
able to achieve the desired outcomes. One of the major obstacles in bilateral relations is
conflicting approach to major international security issues ranging from future of the Euro-
Atlantic security structure to missile defense. Besides Russian insistence on its ―sphere of
privileged interests‖ conflicts with equally adamant US stance that countries in the region should
be free to make their own foreign policy choices.
US itself is realizing its overextension in the world and strategies like ―offshore balancing‖ and
―retrenchment‖ are making a comeback in the policy circles, especially for the regions not considered
as vial a US interest as Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century. With Washington currently debating
the extent of its focus here, EU itself preoccupied with its own problems, limited Chinese reach in
Eurasia given Bejing‘s peripheral geographical location and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey‘s
competition for influence in the larger Middle East rather than in Eurasia are all helping Russia to
offset competitive influences and even initiate regional integration under its leadership. Launch of
Customs Union in 2010 is a step forward in the same direction.200
Besides along with China, Russia want to break out of a new ―dual containment‖ policy and is
looking forward to reshape a global political and economic system they view created to benefit US
and the West particularly.201
Other emerging regional players seem to share these sentiments. No
matter how short-lived and unlikely this Sino-Russian alliance may be based on their
Samuel Charap, ―The Transformation of US-Russia Relations,‖ Current History 109, no. 729 (October 2010):
Andrei P. Tsygankov, ―Moscow‘s Soft Power Strategy,‖ Current History 112, no.756 (October 2013): 262.
Graham Allison and Dimitri K.Simes, ―Beware Collusion of China, Russia,‖ The National Interest 126 (July/August 2013): 7.
160
particular strategic interests but even such a temporary tactical arrangement could have huge and
lasting impact on global politics.
―Regardless of how Americans view their country, Russians see it as a great power.‖202
Kremlin
is reasserting and reemerging politically far more forcefully than its economic weight might
entitle. As stated earlier political choices do make a difference and even reflect a country‘s
intention to play a more assertive role on the international political sphere. Putin‘s doctrine that
Russia would assume its domination and control over the states of the former Soviet Union203
and claim to defend Russian citizens abroad through military means if necessary (the exact
pretext used by Russia when it attacked Georgia), leaves no doubt that Russia refuses to be
written off. Post-hegemony definitely is in pipeline and Russia is determined to be a vital player
in announcing its arrival.
3.3.3. The Arab Spring
When 2010 drew to its end, no one could believe that a revolutionary fervor was about to seize a
region where firmly placed authoritarian regimes would be shaken and dictators toppled by
fearless and determined street protesters. This landmass had been frozen in time with populations
that had not only been tamed but grappling with already daunting economic problems and
political stagnation. These momentous events in history witnessed the revolutions in Tunisia and
Egypt, subsequently followed by the descent of Libya, Syria and Yemen into varying degrees of
civil war. What made these events even more historic was the fact that the biggest challenge to
the ossified Arab political order came not from without but from the within.
The self-immolation of a street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi triggered country-wide protests that
brought an end to Zine-al-Abedine Ben Ali, Tunisia‘s President and his long-standing regime.
Ben Ali had been ruling country since 1987 and less than a month of unrelenting public protest
made him flee the country by Jan 14, 2011. This was the first time ever in the Arab history that a
sitting head of a state was deposed not by a military coup but through massive popular uprising.
The Arab world was still grappling with the reality of the unprecedented abdication of power by
a long-reigning autocrat, when within two weeks another revolution shook Arab streets – this Graham Allison and Dimitri K.Simes, ―Stumbling to War,‖ The National Interest 137 (May/june2015): 11.
Cornell, ―War in Georgia,‖ 309.
161
time in Egypt. Again hundreds of thousands of democracy activists organized a grassroot
movement with the aid of social-networking platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and
were able to bring the whole of Egypt to a standstill with mass protests in Cairo, Alexandria,
Suez, and Ismailia along with other major towns and cities throughout the country. After
Tunisia‘s ―Jasmine Revolution‖, Egypt‘s ―January 25 movement‖ toppled another despot- Hosni
Mubarak on February11, 2011 amid jubilations and wild celebrations in Tahrir Square.
Both the men in Tunisia and Egypt had been in power for the last 23 and 30 years respectively
and no one in their wildest imagination could dream about the possibility of a slogan like al-
shaab yurid isqat-al-nizam – ―The people want the fall of the regime‖.204
The urge to remove
corrupt despots, was so strong that it resonated across the Arab world and emboldened by the fall
of these regimes popular demonstrations erupted throughout Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen
while ruling elites in other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco kept
keenly and nervously watching the ―unthinkable‖ developments in the region.
These unprecedented developments within the Arab world took the United States as much by
surprise as the local Arab regimes. The very regimes, with which America has entwined its
interests with, were shaken from the seats of power including some of its most ardent followers.
The Arab countries in the West Asia and the North Africa for long had remained core
geostrategic interest of the US. The region endowed with natural resources like petroleum and
natural gas and increasing energy demands across the world, compelled US to sustain close
relations with the ruling clans, overlooking their undemocratic characters, thus often discrediting
America in the eyes of populace in many parts of the Arab world. Besides US baggage of its
misadventure in Iraq in 2003 and unrelenting support to Israel, was already plaguing Arab public
perceptions about Washington.
Instead of following a coherent regional strategy, US seemed to be trapped in a reactive mode
responding to the events that no one was in a position to predict. The Obama administration
opted for a selective country-to-country strategy when it came to Arab revolutions. This seems to
validate the perception that some of the previous friends and allies were dispensable while others
Eugene Rogan, ―The Arab Wave‖ The National Interest 113 (May/June 2011): 48-56.
162
were not. Besides US support for the protestors in the Arab Awakening came almost when it
became quite apparent that Tunisia‘s Ben Ali and Egypt‘s Mubarak had to go.
While American strategists had been aware about the vulnerability of the region and threats to its
stability as well as the rising discontent among the majority of the Arab populations, but the
sheer pace and scale of the popular uprisings made the situation far more complicated. ―In short,
it would appear that America was perhaps unprepared for uprisings to take place this soon‖.205
America was accused of resorting to acute selectivity. With Bahrain as home to the US Fifth
Fleet and the vital role it plays in sustaining US strategic leverage in the Gulf, the alliance in the
face of massive street protests was read as backing to a regime that was disliked by the majority
of its Shiite population. Besides Saudi military intervention to back an unpopular regime did not
meet any rebuke from Washington, they only asked for ―restraint‖ from King Hamad involved in
brutal suppression of his protestors, besides designated him as ―a friend and ally‖ in the same
tone.206
Situation in Yemen was also as bleak, where the country went out of control of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh amid mass protests, fighting, defections and factionalism, and stage
was set for a protracted civil war beyond the control of any major player.
The US response to developments in Libya and Syria were in a marked contrast to its response
elsewhere. A full scale NATO bombing campaign was initiated against 44 year old Muammar
Gadhafi‘s regime while Syrian President Bashar-ul-Assad‘s fate remained uncertain as his
security forces started violent crackdown on protestors across the country. US seemed caught in
a dilemma: ―The leadership changes in the region have puzzled US who its friend and partners
are going to be, and till what point they should support an embattled ruler or throw in their lot
with the protestors. As the autocrats topple one by one, the US has been taking contrary
positions-sometimes giving moral arguments for airstrikes on Libya, while on the other hand
giving Bahrain‘s King a pass.‖207
The Arab Revolutions though not initially about ―Anti-Americanism‖ had the full potential to
degenerate into one if US seemed to continue to support corrupt, unaccountable regimes Anjan Roy and Amit Kumar, ―US grapples with political developments in the Arab world,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 404.
Girish C. Mallik, ―American Perceptions on the Anti-Government Demonstrations in Bahrain,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 416.
Shreya Upadhyaya, ―Arab Spring: Implications for Iran, Israel and the US,‖ World Focus 379 (July 20110): 457.
163
selectively. Would such a strategy serve long term security interests in the region were being
questioned too? Lack of a unified and coherent policy response in the face of rapid developments
involving sweeping away of old regimes in the region prompted few to question to American
resolve to remain dominant player in the region. It was noted: ―The United States is frantically
struggling to formulate a consistent response to developments in the Middle East and the Arab
world, otherwise called the Arab Spring, as that region seems to be moving imperceptibly away
from American influence.‖208
Many speculated that even military superiority would not be able
to arrest waning US influence in the region and would affect its capability to achieve its
objectives in such a vital region. Washington‘s leverage to prevent crackdown in Syria and its
inability to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambition along with failure to restart the Arab-
Israeli peace process was being cited as few examples.
The turmoil in the Arab world had in fact raised far more significant questions. Thomas Wright
asserted: ―The Arab Awakening was the breaking point and was to create huge uncertainty about
several basic questions: who would rule the Middle East, what would the make-up of the
governments be, and would the United States serve as the linchpin for the region‘s security
through its bilateral alliances.‖209
Obama‘s policy speech on the region which came almost six months after the Arab Spring
reflected the same ambivalence. While admitting ―the status quo is unsustainable‖ and ―societies
held together by fear and repression may offer the illusion of stability for a time, but they are
built upon fault lines that will eventually tear asunder‖, he also conceded that ―there will be
times when our short-term interests don‘t align perfectly with our long-term vision for the
region‖.210
Rhetoric about support to American democratic values and American ―real‖ interests in the Arab
countries were bound to clash and hence it was certain charting such a difficult path would place
limits that would adversely affect its legitimacy in the region. With erosion in legitimacy,
American influence in the region was bound to suffer a setback too. The years following the Roy and Kumar, ―US grapples with political developments in the Arab world,‖ 405.
Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 21.
Excerpt of the Obama Speech on the US Policy towards the Middle East, published in World Focus, July 2011, 408-410.
164
Arab Spring revealed that the ―unlikely‖ events yielded undesirable results when the flux in the
region‘s status quo empowered Tehran much to the dislike of Israel and US.
After playing role of dominant arbiter of region‘s affairs for decades, US reluctantly realized it
had little ability directly to influence events on the streets of the Arab world. Post-hegemonic
Middle East and North Africa has arrived on the world stage and now decades old familiar
patterns of international politics were rupturing, making room for new regional status quo. The
declining hegemon would now, may have to adjust to the new regional reality where time tested
friends would not be occupying a key region‘s top slot.
Conclusion
One of the leading challenges that a declining power has to confront when a power transition is
taking place at the global level is the ‗crisis of its legitimacy‘. With the emergence of new
powerful actors and competing interests, the actions of a declining hegemon come under
increased scrutiny. Approval of the domestic public assumes importance especially when it
involves spending taxpayers‘ money and no adventurous foreign expedition could be undertaken
without having public‘s back. ―Any system of world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as
just – not only by leaders, but also by citizens‖.211
US assertive and militant unilateralism in the
first decade of the twenty-first century made its legitimacy disputed and made it questionable
even to those Western allies which have so far been ardent followers of US led order. ―If the
approval of those whom its policies affect is the test of a government‘s legitimacy, then the
United States, in its capacity as the world‘s government, looked distinctly illegitimate‖.212
But
the rising speculations of US impending decline made all these assertions even more vocal. This
―legitimacy crisis‖ will constantly figure in post-hegemonic phase, when public fatigue with
protracted Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts linger into Libyan, Ukrainian and Syrian cases.
How strong had been the perceptions of American decline in public can be gauged by the Pew
Poll surveys of 2002 and 2013. In 2002 survey about US place in the world about 55% of
Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 8.
Ferguson, Colossus, 144.
165
Americans felt it was more important and powerful than it had been a decade before while 17%
felt contrary. By 2013 those figures had been almost been exactly reversed.213
Nye notes that
even though America is not in absolute decline but American century may still end simply
because of the rise of others. No single country is set to replace US but alliances among them
might bring an end to US pre-eminence and its ability to maintain an international order.214
The questions of ―American century‖, ―primacy‖, ―hegemony‖ and ―decline‖ are all inter-
related. Those who still find US at the top of the global hierarchy refuse to accept its waning
influence and its reduced ability to affect desired outcomes while those signaling its demise are
as extreme in their assertions with less room for US ability to steer through this phase. Viewing
US from exclusive primacy/declinist perspective can be misleading as it distorts the bigger
underneath emerging picture about changing international structure. Power is getting diffused in
more than one sector. The fact that world‘s 500 largest companies generated $31 trillion revenue
in 2014, more than the combined GDP of the US and China215
, tell us that power is getting
diversified in a lot different ways than we can possibly speculate. In such an environment
comparison of US power potential to individual emerging actors will distort facts as much as any
ambitious speculation on their combined ability to project themselves as counterweight to US
hegemony and primacy.
Question is not whether China, Russia, India and Brazil can construct an alternative collation
with ability to overwrite rules centering US, EU and Japan priorities. Such a proposition hinges
on the assumption that changing international environment has kept previous loyalties intact or is
unable to interfere much with already established political fault lines. One of the timeless facts
associated with international politics is that it had always been in flux. This flux introduces
unpredictability element into the equation. Fierce enemies might become staunch allies or the
vice versa. If history is any guide than case of Japan and Germany would testify to afore-stated
hypothesis. This argument only suggests that counting Japan and EU in the American camp can
be as misleading as placing China, Russia, India or Brazil in the opposite camp. The only thing
which distinguishes former from the later is that they have underwritten rules of the established
international order and hence their satisfaction with the status quo rests higher than the later. America‟s Role in the world (Washington: Pew Research Centre, 2013), 4 and 10.
Nye, ―Is American Century Over?,‖ 23.
Tweeted by @intlspectator on August 22, 2016 at 1:30 am.
166
While the later still are struggling for their rightful place where their newly earned positions have
placed them and they might be willing to cooperate with each other on this single indicator even
if nothing else provides enough incentive to be in the opposite camp.
Post–hegemony characterizes this ambiguous situation. If, on the one hand, time tested friends
are getting beleaguered due to US inability to comprehensively address their concerns in their
respective regions and these erstwhile allies are assessing their neighborhood and maneuvering
their options; On the other hand, US ability to affect desired outcomes is increasingly coming
under strain and deepening the ―legitimacy crisis‖ it is already facing. It is not the material
factors alone which could be bringing an end to US hegemony, but the political decisions taken
by US, its allies and even competitors have already heralded post-hegemony in international
relations.
Not only is the unipolar era visibly drawing to a close but a drift towards post-hegemony is
simultaneously underway.
167
Chapter 4: Middle East & North Africa (MENA) in
Transition
The dramatic events of 2011 heralded unprecedented changes in MENA (Map 4.1) that not only
shook the very foundations of long-established undemocratic governments but were bound to
affect fragile regional hierarchical structure in place since the end of the Cold War. However,
what made apparent extreme vulnerability of the entire region was the inability of the US to
direct events on the Arab streets. This vulnerability created space for ―dissatisfied‖ US global
challengers, who for almost two decades had been written off from the region after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, to register their presence once again within the region. While at the global
level ‗China‘s rise‘ had given impetus to literature speculating ―post-American world‖.1 The
pace and scope of changes in MENA were also giving credence to the argument that America no
longer would be able to serve as the sole dominant arbiter within MENA.
The hegemonic decline of the US while creating incentives for the major powers created equally
powerful opportunities for the major regional players within a key regional hierarchy undergoing
transition. Free from the hegemonic constraints of the global dominant power, they felt free to
pursue their self-identified regional agendas with more vigor and hence the unfinished transition
in MENA in the wake of the Arab Spring gave rise to competitive environment regionally. This
competition for the configuration of a new regional hierarchy has manifested itself in ongoing
regional conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen where all the major regional players Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Turkey could be seen vying for influence. But before undertaking a detailed study of the
dynamics of conflict in Libya and Syria, it is important to understand the changes occurring in
the regional hierarchy.
This chapter will delineate the changes taking place in MENA post-Arab Spring period and how
it had drawn major players into pitched battles for influence within the region. The first section
will identify key pivotal players in MENA; explain how their foreign policy behavior had
undergone changes in the post-Arab Spring period and what are their stakes in the new emerging Already discussed in detail in the Chapter 3.
168
scenario. Relationship of each player with the US would be discussed in detail to determine the
extent of US influence in a regional hierarchical structure in flux. The second section will focus
on Russian re-entry in the region. It has emerged as the dominant major power besides US,
playing pivotal role in re-drawing regional hierarchical configuration. It will also explore
whether Russian overt balancing is a logical result of US drift towards post-hegemony in global
hierarchy. The third section will discuss the US role in overall transition in MENA. How far has
US been able to arrest undesirable changes and how far her traditional standing in MENA has
been compromised. The last section will deal with the overall power transition in MENA and
how the conflicting and competing interests of traditional allies and foes have engaged them in a
regional transforming conflict and ruptured traditional alliances triggering new power hierarchy
within the region.
Map 4.1. Political Map of Middle East and North Africa (MENA)2
Analysis of MENA in transition would then place Libyan military intervention and situation
emerging in Syria within the context to be explored at length in the subsequent chapters. It will
simultaneously delineate why political discourse employed for military intervention and threat
construction had to take the path specified in ‗Threat Securitization for Military Intervention‘
model.
The map is taken from the website http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/north-africa-map.htm accessed November 21, 2016.
169
4.1. Pivotal Regional Players in MENA
Any analysis of ―MENA in transition‖ has to start with exploration of pivotal regional players
and their foreign policy pursuits within the region. US have enjoyed overwhelming influence
throughout the region even during the heydays of intense ideological bipolar superpower rivalry
of the Cold War. The sudden demise of Soviet Union and display of unmatched military
superiority in the First Gulf War again put US at the helms of affairs in MENA in the post-Cold
War period but without a rival with commensurate abilities this time.
However, the equally unprecedented developments during the Arab Spring in 2011 seemed to
have torn the fragile regional hierarchical balance apart and now not only the regional players are
engaged in enforcing a new power hierarchy in accordance with their self-identified national
interests but extra-regional players are also actively pursuing a greater role for themselves within
the region that will ultimately enhance their global standing and prestige. Hence, this section will
explore each pivotal player standing in post-Arab Spring MENA and their respective relations
with the US.
4.1.1. Iran
Iran, a country of nearly 80 million people and sitting over one of the largest oil reserves in the
world, occupies strategic position in the heart of the Persian Gulf and has traditionally played
pivotal role in the Middle Eastern politics. But the recent unprecedented developments following
the Arab Spring has assigned unusual importance to Iran as a regional player and placed it in an
envious position to effectively bid for enhanced position within the newly emerging regional
power hierarchy.
4.1.1.1. Iran in post-Arab Spring MENA
As in the wake of Arab Spring long-established Arab regimes teetered and got toppled one after
another, the specter of democracy haunted the local ruling elite. Amid speculations of its effect
on Iran, whose regional influence already peaked in the first decade of the twenty-first century as
US got embroiled in insurgency and two protracted wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, concerns
mounted among surviving regimes that the seemingly empowered new Arab publics might alter
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the usual course of bilateral relations with Iran and the new democratically elected governments
may forge a closer working relationship with the Islamic Republic.
Iran especially seemed eager to capitalize Egypt‘s Hosni Mubarak‘s exit from the political scene
and his policy of seeking anti-Iranian coalition in the Arab world. Traditionally the bilateral
relations had been strained for decades spanning various Egyptian regimes. Sunni-dominated
Egypt has usually sided with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
The new Cairo‘s desire to maintain normal ties with the prominent Persian Gulf players, rather
than being embroiled in anti-Iranian axis, suited Iranian renewed approach towards the region.
In a meeting with Iranian Interest Section in Cairo on April 4, 2011, the new Egyptian Foreign
Minister Nabil Al Araby ―affirmed that Egypt is opening a new page with all countries including
Iran…..provided they are based on mutual respect for the state sovereignty and the non-
interference whatsoever in the internal affairs.‖3 A further positive response arrived on April 17,
2011 when Egyptian foreign ministry spokeswoman Menha Bakhour asserted, ―We are prepared
to take a different view of Iran. The former regime used to see Iran as an enemy, but we don‘t.‖4
However the initial glee over fall of long reigning despots like Mubarak and Ben Ali proved
short-lived. NATO led airstrikes against Muammar Gaddafi evoked specter of strong Western
military presence within the region with potential to play spoilsport to Tehran‘s plan to
consolidate its standing in the emerging post-Arab Spring scenario. Besides Iran‘s strong support
for Bashar Al-Assad of Syria during the uprising against him was interpreted as an attempt to
quash the revolt and it further complicated relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Jordan who had already been weary of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The region currently is fraught
with challenges for increased Iranian influence.
Egypt: To start with Egypt, that enjoys strategic alliance with the US and other Arab states
staunchly opposed to increased Iranian influence within the region. The earlier enthusiasm in
Iran with the election of first Islamist President Mohammed Morsi corresponded with news
published in Iran‘s news agency FARS that claimed Morsi was ―interested in closer ties with 3 Ahmed Morsy, ―An Eager Iran and Hesitant Egypt: Relations Before & After the Arab Spring,‖ Muftah,
September 13, 2012. Will Fulton, ―After the Arab Spring: Iran‘s Foreign Relation‘s in the Middle East,‖ Iran Tracker, September 28, 2011.
171
Iran‖ and ―sought revisions to the Camp David Accords with Israel‖. Egyptian government not
only denied news but the report received another blow when Morsi made public pledge to ―honor
all international treaties.‖5
Morsi‘s outreach to Iran despite persistent differences demonstrated a robust and pragmatic
foreign policy and a bid to reestablish Egypt‘s former position as a regional player.6 With the
military return to power in Egypt, Iran lost the opportunity to have Sunni Egypt as its partner.
Egypt-Iran current relations remain plagued by Iran‘s support for Palestinian militias particularly
Hamas which the government of Abd al Fattah Sisi views a potential Islamist threat, its influence
in Iraq and Iran‘s nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia: Iranian relations with Saudi Arabia have traditionally evolved around maintaining
binary balance of power in the region and seeking to maximize their positions with respect to
regional and outside players. The two countries despite having a common Islamic history are
divided by sectarian, ethnic and linguistic differences. Iran has always been apprehensive of
Saudi bid for seeking hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and denial to Iran and Shiite
Muslims in general any influence in the region. Resultantly Iran‘s aid to Shiite-dominated
governments and Shiites in Sunni-dominated countries has further stoked tensions between the
two countries and got them embroiled in a virtually existential war by proxy against each other
and in an attempt to thwart drive for regional hegemony by either.
During the Cold War both Iran and Saudi Arabia facilitated US Twin Pillar policy in the region
in spite of their latent rivalry and shared anti-Communist positions. However, Iran‘s Islamic
revolution accentuated core strategic tensions by bringing ideological and religious differences
between the two into sharp contrast. However, in the wake of Iraqi aggression against
neighbouring Kuwait in 1990s, Iran was viewed in less hostile terms during the period. But the
US invasion of Iraq in 2003 upended the prevailing security balance in the Gulf. Post-Saddam
Iraq has increased Iranian influence compared to its traditional archrival Saudi Arabia, where its
influence has been more direct and substantial. Even President Obama in an interview published
in Atlantic in April 2016 reportedly told Saudi leadership that they ―need to share the Middle Morsy, ―An Eager Iran.‖
For details see Dina Esfandiary, ―Iran and Egypt: a complicated tango?‖ European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 18, 2012.
172
East with their Iranian foes‖ and that both ―need to find an effective way to share the
neighbourhood and institute some sort of cold peace.‖7
Saudis have consistently accused Iran of inciting trouble among its restive Shiite-populated
Eastern Province and hold Tehran responsible for the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.
Besides Iran‘s nuclear program, its ballistic and cruise missiles forces, its unconventional naval
forces capabilities and its support of non-state actors especially Hezbollah pose a credible threat
in the minds of Saudi security officials.
The Saudi-Iranian relations touched a new low in January 2016, when reaction to execution of
Shia cleric, Nimr Baqar al Nimir in Saudi Arabia triggered violent attacks and vandalism against
Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad, Iran. Subsequently Riyadh severed
diplomatic relations with Tehran followed by Bahrain. Then Qatar, UAE and Kuwait also
recalled their ambassadors from Iran subsequent to the attack on Saudi diplomatic facilities.8
Saudi Arabian officials repeatedly cite past Iran-inspired actions within the kingdom including
violent demonstrations in Mecca during Hajj of 1980s and 1990s that lead to break in bilateral
relations from 1987 to 1991, as a reason for distrusting Iran.
Yemen: More recently, the bilateral relations between two nations are also tensed because of
Saudi Arabia‘s military campaign against Iranian backed Shiite Al Houthi rebel group in
northern Yemen. Iran is reportedly backing the Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as the
―Houthis‖ to seize the capital and assisting them with weapon shipments.9 Though Yemen has
never been perceived as core Iranian interest in the region but the conflict within the country and
its vulnerability has offered an opportunity to Iran to acquire additional leverage against its main
Arab adversary. A ten-country Arab coalition assembled by Riyadh with logistical help from US
has been helping pro-Hadi forces to recapture key territory since 2015.10
This conflict has again
brought fears of proxy conflict between the archrivals back into focus.
In spite of the fact that Iranian support for the Houthis appears far less systematic than its support
to Assad in Syria or the government in Iraq, its interference in Yemen has intensified hostility Jeffrey Goldberg, ―The Obama Doctrine,‖ Atlantic, April 2016.
―Qatar recalls ambassador to Iran in wake of Saudi execution crisis,‖ Middle East Eye, January 7, 2016.
Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention (CRS Report, R43960, October 2, 2015), 3.
Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor, ―Yemen Rebels Defy Saudi-led Attacks,‖ Washington Post, March 28, 2015.
173
between Riyadh and Tehran. No firm estimates of Iranian aid to the Houthis exit either, but if it
is supplying them with weapons that could reach into Saudi Arabia. Riyadh thus safely assumes
that they are being considered as potential ally or proxy force with which Iran can project force
on the southwestern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.
Bahrain: Other than Saudi Arabia, Bahrain consistently blames Iran for fomenting unrest among
its Shiite community and trying to overturn the country‘s power structure as it reportedly
attempted in 1981 and 1996. Bahrain‘s ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family is still in the throes of
unrest following hard-line policy taken against dissidents after October 2010 parliamentary
elections. Once again Iran was blamed for plotting to otherthrow the government. Since then
Tehran‘s role has come under strident criticism from the tiny Gulf Kingdom.11
The Arab
Awakening provided impetus to Shiite-dominated opposition that had already been demanding
political and constitutional reforms. For the first time however, US State Department country
report on international terrorism for 2015 asserted direct Iranian involvement in providing
support to Shiites militias in Bahrain.12
Hence, Iran‘s bid to increase its influence in the tiny
kingdom though fraught with challenges remains a reality.
United Arab Emirates: UAE13
, which has a longstanding territorial dispute with Iran over the
Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb, also acts in concert with
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to blunt Iranian influence within the region. It has not
only refused urgings by US to ease its own sanctions against Iranian banks or to increase
diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic14
but has vocally detested Iranian drive for
greater regional influence. UAE ambassador to USA wrote in an op-ed for the Wall Street
Journal on April 3, 2016 that ―Iran we have long known – hostile, expansionist, violent – is alive
and well, and as dangerous as ever.‖15
Currently UEA-Iran diplomatic relations are downgraded
because of Saudi-Iranian dispute over execution of Nimr al Nimr16
and they are expected to be
driven by GCC perceived threat by Iranian expansionist designs in future too.
11
―Bahrain accuses Iran of training rebels,‖ Al Jazeera , January 3, 2014. For details see http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257520.htm For detailed information on UAE-Iran relations see Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues
for US Policy (CRS Report, RS 21852, May 23, 2011), 1-16.
Kenneth Katzman, Iran‟s Foreign and Defence Policies (CRS Report, R44017, October 21, 2016), 22.
Yousef Al Otaiba, ―One Year After the Iran Nuclear Field,‖ Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2016.
Caline Malek, ―UAE recalls ambassador to Iran,‖ The National (UAE), January 2, 2016.
174
Qatar: Among the GCC countries, Qatar occupies a middle ground between the anti-Iranian
animosity of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain and frequent engagement exhibited by Oman with
Iran. It has traditionally pursued foreign policy strategy of playing off Iran-Saudi‘s conflicting
agendas to advance its own geopolitical interests.17
One the one hand, Doha maintains high-
level contacts with the Islamic regime; on the other hand it pursues policies opposed to Tehran
by aiding factions in Syria opposed to Iranian-backed Assad and by becoming part of the Saudi-
led military intervention in Yemen.18
Besides unlike its counterparts, Doha has never felt threatened by Iranian-inspired Shiite
revolution in Qatar because its small Shiite population has never succumbed to Iranian influence.
Instead of perceiving Tehran as a threat to regional security, it considers it as a part of solution to
regional security dilemmas and it was the only UNSC member to vote against Resolution 1696
that called halt to Iranian uranium enrichment program. However, the extent to which it can
continue to balance conflict between Saudi-Iran interests remain to be seen, though neither
approves of its independent foreign policy pursuits.19
Kuwait: Similarly Kuwait20
is walking on a tight rope in its relations with Iran. While fully
backing US efforts to contain Iranian nuclear ambitions, it simultaneously views Iran as helpful
in stabilizing Iraq. Kuwait consistent engagement with Shiite Iraqi leaders has also been met
with criticism. Yet by only recalling its ambassador in January 2016, but not severing diplomatic
relations with Iran it has kept the door opened for bilateral relations in future. Any improvement
in relations with Saudi archrival will have major implications for Kuwait‘s relationship with
Riyadh as it will reflect Tehran‘s ability to project strategic influence with states on the
kingdom‘s borders – a development bound to be fiercely resisted by the former.21
Qatari-Iran relations improved significantly between 1995-2013 during reign of Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa
al Thani. Its overreach to Iran, support for Muslim Brotherhood and ownership of Al-Jazeera has all infuriated Riyadh who accuse Doha of pursuing its own interests at the expanse of GCC unity and solidarity and collective security.
For detailed information on Qatar-Iran relations see Kenneth Katzman, Qatar: Governance, Security and US Policy, (CRS Report, R44533, June 9, 2017).
Giorgio Cafiero, ―Qatar‘s precarious position between Saudi Arabia and Iran,‖ Al-Monitor, February 4, 2016.
For detailed information on Iran-Kuwait relations, see Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Governance, Security and US Policy (CRS Report, RS21513, May 15, 2017).
Giorgio Cafiero and Cinzia Miotto, ―Kuwait-Iranian Relations: The Energy Angle,‖ Atlantic Council, September 29, 2016.
175
Oman: Among the GCC states Oman, however, maintains the most consistent and extensive
engagement with the Islamic Republic. It believes in engaging Tehran rather than isolating it and
threatening it with military action. In 2013 Sultan Qaboos visited Iran which was reciprocated
with Hassan Rouhani‘s visit in 2014 – the only GCC state he has visited as President. Both
countries have accelerated their joint development of Omani port of Duqm since the lifting of
sanctions on Iran, which is envisioned as trade and transportation outlet for Iran. Oman has also
kept its neutrality intact by neither supporting any faction of Syrian war nor joining Saudi
coalition in its war against Yemen and subsequently undertaking the role of mediator in both
conflicts. It was again the only GCC country that didn‘t downgrade diplomatic relations with
Iran over Nimr execution dispute of 2016 between Iran and Saudi Arabia.22
Iraq: Apart from making inroads into GCC, Iraq23
has been the most prominent state where Iran
clearly emerged as a beneficiary with the ousting of long-established antagonist Saddam Husain
in 2003. His replacement with government led by Shiite Islamists, who have long-standing ties to
Iran, has improved prospects of Iranian influence not only within the country but earned support
for Tehran‘s regional goals also. However, Islamic State (IS) organization threat brought the
offensive close to Iranian border in June 2014 and forced Iran to replace longtime ally Maliki by
Haydar Al Abbadi who pledged to be more inclusive of Sunni leaders,24
a move approved by US
also. Besides Iran-backed Shiite militias formed since US withdrawal have been militarily
assisting Assad as well as remaining engaged in Iraq. Iran is likely to remain engaged in Iraq in
future also and that will have significant impact on emerging regional hierarchy.
Syria: Nothing reflects Iranian resolve to be a major player affecting outcome in post-Arab
Spring MENA than its foreign policy behavior being pursued in case of Syria25
. Syrian President
Bashar Al-Assad is a key ally whose regime survival is number one Iranian priority at the
moment. Iranian interest in Syria can be traced back to Assad‘s Alawite community which
practices a version of Islam akin to Shiism. Besides being Iran‘s closest Arab ally, the regime For detailed information on Oman-Iran relations, see Kenneth Katzman, Oman: reform, Security and US Policy
(CRS Report, RS21534, April 26, 2016). ; Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman: A Unique Foreign Policy Produces a Key Player in Middle Eastern and Global Diplomacy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995).
For more information, see Kenneth Katzman and Carla E. Humud, Iraq: Politics and Governance (CRS Report, RS21968, March 09, 2016).
Babak Dehghanpisheh, ―Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to confront Islamic State,‖ Reuters, September 2, 2014.
For more information on the conflict in Syria, see Christopher M. Blanchard et al., Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response (CRS Report, RL33487, September 17, 2014).
176
survival is also linked to the arming and protection of another most cherished Middle Eastern
ally i.e. Lebanon‘s Hezbollah. Both Iran and Syria have reportedly used Hezbollah as leverage
against Israel and sought territorial and regional aims through them. The prospect of Assad being
replaced with an Islamic State or any other Sunni extremist is also too distasteful to Iranian
interests – an outcome that needs to be averted through overt and covert military and diplomatic
backing to Syria. The extent of this relationship and its impact on the overall emerging power
structure will be explored at length in the subsequent chapters.
Israel –Palestine: Simultaneously linked with Iran‘s support for Hamas and Hezbollah is the
issue of Palestine and question of Israel‘s existence, which the Islamic Republic considers to be
an illegitimate creation of the West. The clerical regime policy towards Israel is a complete
contrast with the one pursued by the earlier Shah of Iran that maintained extensive economic ties
with the former. Iran‘s open hostility to Israel is manifested through labeling of Israel as a
―cancerous tumor‖ by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamene‘i.26
Tehran‘s unabashed support for
Hamas and Hezbollah is already a source of grave concern for the Israeli leadership and prospect
of a nuclear-armed Iran is nothing less than an ―existential threat‖ to the State of Israel.27
While Iran also considers that Israel poses a serious strategic threat to its security and stability. It
has repeatedly accused international community of employing ―double standards‖ and treating
Israel‘s presumed nuclear arsenal differently than that of Iran‘s quest for nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Israel‘s repeated assertions to retain the option of unilateral strike on its
nuclear facilities have also prompted Tehran to cite Israel as a nuclear threat to Iran. Israel and
Iran are expected to be involved in fierce competition against each other within the region as
long as the Iranian nuclear program remains contentious and Iran‘s support for militant anti-
Israel groups continues as indicated by annual US State Department reports for the past two
decades.28
Lebanon: Apart from the nuclear issue Tehran‘s links with Lebanon‘s Hezbollah is another sore
issue in Israel-Iran relations. They are employed as a proxy to pressure Tel Aviv and Washington
Greg Tepper, ―Israel a ‗cancerous tumor‘ and Middle East‘s biggest problem, Iranian supreme leader says,‖ Times
of Israel, August 19, 2012.
Raphael Ahren, ―Would a nuclear Iran truly pose an existential threat to Israel?‖ Times of Israel, February 21, 2015.
Katzman, Iran‟s Foreign and Defense Policies, 35-38.
177
and represent its ―axis of resistance‖ against the West. Though Iran is one of the many countries
vying for influence in Lebanon but it enjoys particularly close relations with its Shiite population
and their militia organization Hezbollah which receives funding, training and support from
Tehran. Besides, Iranian support for Hezbollah serves as a counterpoint to Saudi Arabian support
to Sunni groups. Riyadh growing frustration with increasing Iranian influence is evident through
its reversing of decades-long support to Lebanese government and its suspension of four billion
dollar security package. It has recently received a further set-back when Lebanon defied fellow
Arab States and rejected labeling of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.29
While others argue that Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 has left a power vacuum that is
filled by Iran through its proxy Hezbollah. Hezbollah‘s war with Israel in 2006 and its siege of
Beirut in 2008 reflect that it‘s gaining domestic strength and has the potential to act as a spoiler
of Western interests in the region. As regional influence of Iran grows, so does Hezbollah‘s
strategic depth and hence the prospect of instability in this part of the region along with
increasing animosity towards Israel.30
Turkey: Lastly, Turkey-Iran relations are the key to emerging regional hierarchical structure and
have implications for whether Iran would have an easy walk over in the Persian Gulf or will it
face competition for increased influence from its neighbour. The bilateral economic and political
ties between Turkey and Iran are quite extensive and both share concerns about their respective
restive Kurdish populations which enjoy safe haven in northern Iraq. But Turkey‘s membership
of NATO and its close relations with US limit prospect of cooperation. Turkey had been
advocate of Assad‘s ouster from Syria but post- military coup in July and mutual concerns over
Syrian Kurdish forces have resulted in narrowing of differences between the two. From outright
exit, Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdgoan has accepted Assad in power through a period of
political transition in August 2016.31
Competing regional ambitions, however, will keep them
away from comprehensively aligning their foreign policy ambitions.
David Daoud, ―Iran‘s Power Play in Lebanon,‖ National Interest, March 19, 2016
Shai Oseran and Stephane Cohen, ―Don‘t be Fooled. Hezbollah IS Bigger and Badder Than Ever,‖ The Tower Magazine 12, March 2014.
Ali Hashem, ―What‘s behind the Turkey-Iran Tango?‖ Al-Monitor, August 22, 2016.
178
While Iran‘s position within the region may be enhancing but its bilateral relations with US will
also determine how far its growing political influence within the region will be countered by the
US and her allies.
4.1.1.2. Iran-US Relations
US enjoyed cordial relations with Iran during the Cold War when Muhammad Reza Pahlavi‘s
government acted as a bulwark against Soviet influence expansion in the Persian Gulf and as a
counter-weight to pro-USSR Arab regimes and movements within the region. The toppling of
this key US ally on February 11, 1979 opened a period of ongoing rift and confrontation in US-
Iranian relations. The Carter Administration‘s initial bid to engage the Islamic regime ended
when the takeover of US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by pro-Khomeini students
resulted in taking hostage of 60 US diplomats for 444 days. US severed diplomatic relations with
Iran on April 7, 1980, prior to a failed US military attempt to rescue the hostages.32
From then onwards relations further deteriorated during Regan‘s Administration that designated
Iran as ―a state sponsor of terrorism‖ in January 1984 primarily because of Iranian support for
Lebanese Hezbollah. This also signified US tilt towards Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 1980-88 war and
Iran suffered because of US diplomatic efforts to block conventional arms sales to Iran.33
During
the same period US forces in the Gulf shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Gulf on July 3,
1988 killing all 290 on board. It then claimed that the plane was mistakenly hit and was an
―accident‖ but the Iranians saw the attack to be ―purposeful‖.34
When the inaugural speech of George H. W. Bush stated ―goodwill begets goodwill‖ with
respect to Iran; the comments were interpreted as offering to improve bilateral relations pending
Tehran‘s help in obtaining release of US hostages in Lebanon. However no thaw in relations
followed even after release of all hostages by December 1991.35
Announcement of ―dual
containment‖ strategy of keeping both Iran and Iraq weak instead of tilting to either by Clinton
Administration further aggravated tensions.
For a complete Chronology of US-Iran relations see https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-us-timeline.html. Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein‟s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1991), 168.
Max Fisher, ―The forgotten story of Iran Air Flight 655,‖ Washington Post, October 16, 2013
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, ―Why doesn‘t Iran trust the US?‖ Al-Monitor, June 22, 2015.
179
The trend continued during George W. Bush Administration too. Despite limited cooperation on
post-Taliban Afghanistan,36
Iran was included in the ―axis of evil‖ in January 2002 State of the
Union message along with Iraq and North Korea. Iranian President Khatemi rebuffed Bush‘s
rhetoric as ―intervening, warmongering, [and] insulting.‖37
Later that year, Iranian nuclear
program became major US policy concern when it was confirmed that Iran was building a
uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.
When Obama entered the White House, he asserted that there was potential for rebuilding US-
Iran relationship and Tehran can be persuaded through diplomacy to limit its nuclear program
after decades of mutual animosity. In spite of expressed skepticism from within the
administration US pursued a strategy of engaging Iran. However, at the end of 2009, Iran‘s
crackdown on election-related unrest once again soured bilateral relations38
and its refusal to
accept limitations on its nuclear program prompted Obama Administration to shift to ―two track
strategy‖ i.e. stronger economic sanctions coupled with negotiations on nuclear program that
offered the prospect of sanctions relief.39
The first direct contact since the 1979 revolution between the two countries‘ Presidents took
place on September 27, 2013 when Obama telephoned Hassan Rouhani.40
However concern
over Iran‘s nuclear program has never faded in the bilateral relations. There is increasing
speculation within the administration that a nuclear armed Iran would likely be more assertive
regionally and internationally and might conclude that US might be reluctant to use military
option against it. Besides this might induce an intense arms race within the already volatile
region and the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups or
countries cannot be ignored either in the US official policy circles.41
Successive US Administrations have identified Iran as key national security challenge, citing its
missile and nuclear program and its attempts to counter US objectives in the region including its
persistent hostility to Israel. February 2016 annual threat assessment testimony by Director of
Robin Wright, ―U.S. In ‗Useful‘ Talks With Iran,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.
Alex Wagner, ―Bush labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an ‗Axis of Evil‘,‖ Arms Control Association, March 1, 2002.
Nazila Fathi, ―Protesters Defy Iranian Efforts to Cloak Unrest,‖ New York Times, June 17, 2009. ; Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman, ―Iran Stepping Up Efforts to Quell Election Protest,‖ New York Times, June 24, 2009.
For details see Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (CRS Report, RS 2087, June 07, 2017).
Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, ―Obama, Rouhani hold historic phone call,‖ Reuters, September 28, 2013.
Katzman, Iran: Politics, Gulf Security,19.
180
National Intelligence James Clapper again cited Iran as ―enduring threat to US national interests
because of its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and the Assad regime, as well as
its development of advanced military capabilities.‖42
Iran‘s military-to-military relationships with Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus and North Korea;
its asymmetric warfare capacity and power projection capability through allies and proxies leave
no doubt that it will continue to be a key security challenge to US objectives within the region.
4.1.2. Saudi Arabia
As a birthplace of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and as a home to two of the holiest sites of Islam
(cites of Mecca and Medina), Saudi Arabia has always enjoyed a unique and distinct position
particularly within the broader Middle East and the entire Muslim world at large.
4.1.2.1. Saudi Arabia in post-Arab Spring MENA
The Arab upheavals of 2011 caught Saudi Arabia amidst an uncertain predicament as it was not
only preparing for a potentially complicated monarchical succession but was already engaged in
fending off an ideological and strategic challenge from a resurgent Iran in its immediate
neighbourhood. The Arab Awakening could also be said to constitute the third most potential
challenge to its stability and security, as the first two Nasserism of 1950s and Iranian Revolution
of 1979, failed to dent fairly Saudi regime‘s domestic and regional standing within the Middle
East.
As the most ardent defender of the existing fragile regional balance-of-power, Riyadh
aggressively campaigned for preserving status-quo reflected through its offer of sanctuary to the
ousted Ben Ali of Tunisia and by speaking in favour of ―stability‖ in Egypt, Bahrain and other
countries when their restive publics were calling for tearing down of corrupt prevailing domestic
orders. The unprecedented events of 2011 created a series of diplomatic setbacks for the ruling
Saudi regime particularly. Not only there was political change in Egypt and Tunisia, protests in
Bahrain, collapse of pro –Saudi Saad al Hariri government in Lebanon, instability in Yemen and
Katzman, Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, 18.
181
conflict in Libya but the prospect of Iran emerging as the most unaffected and the prominent
beneficiary of the Arab upheaval was the most distasteful to the Saudis.
History of Saudi-Iran mutual hostility for each other and how they are engaged in Bahrain,
Yemen, and Syria etc. has already been under discussion but apart from Saudi apprehension
about Iranian subversive activities within the region was the fear of the potential ramifications of
Shiite freedom movements on its own Shiite minority population. The regime‘s top priority had
been to safeguard domestic and regime stability and the Arab upheavals posed a significant
threat to both. It immediately adopted ―tried and tested strategy of buying social peace through
co-optation of the population.‖43
Large-scale benefits were announced catering to the lower and
middle income groups by King Abdullah on February 20, 2011-who just landed after a three
month medical absence.44
Estimates of the total costs for the social welfare programs introduced
since outbreak of the Arab Spring differs; Al-Arabia put the number at $93 billion by mid-April
201345
while Kamrava claimed them to be $130 billion.46
Iran: The impact of the Arab Awakening for Saudi regional foreign policy behavior was,
however, substantial. The Saudi-Iran bilateral relations worsened continuously since 2003 but
the Arab Uprisings accelerated the downward trend. The developments seriously threatened
Saudi Arabia and its allies, and the apprehension about the final outcome on the stability of
region‘s monarchies kept the ruling elites nervous. As Riyadh has lately been interpreting events
in the region first and foremost through the lens of its conflict with Tehran; it has displayed
sensitivity to both real and perceived Iranian ―incursions‖ within the region and suspected that
Iran might exploit instability prevailing in the region for enhanced influence – apprehension that
might not be altogether unfounded.
Tehran‘s nuclear ambitions and a Shiite-dominated Iran-friendly government in Baghdad have
jointly triggered aggressive foreign policy posture of Riyadh since 2005 but the concerns about
the nuclear program had caught Saudi ruling family in a dilemma. They neither wanted a nuclear
armed Iran within this region nor could get over the apprehension that US might be too
Bernard Haykel, ―Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,‖ Gulf Analysis Paper, CSIS, February 2013, 3.
―Saudi King Boosts Spending, Returns to Country, ― Voice of America, February 22, 2011.
―Saudi King Tells Ministries to Facilitate Huge Housing Program,‖ Al-Arabiya, April 16, 2013.
Mehran Kamrava, ―The Arab Spring and The Saudi-led Counterrevolution,‖ Orbis 56, no.1 (2012): 98.
182
conciliatory and accept Iranian regional supremacy in return for concessions on its nuclear
program. The uprisings of 2011 amplified these fears. In an attempt to block real or perceived
gains in Iranian influence in the region, Saudis initially started with three fundamental
objectives: firstly, bolstering allies and limiting Muslim Brotherhood influence in the states
undergoing transformation in post-Arab Spring environment; secondly, intervened militarily in
Bahrain to protect their interests and send message to Iran that Gulf remains primarily Saudi
sphere of influence; and thirdly, backing insurgents in Syria since 2012 who are fighting for the
exit of key Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad.47
All these actions undertaken to protect vital Saudi
interests have simultaneously accelerated tensions with Tehran and further widened arenas for
proxy war between the two, now engulfing Yemen also.
Egypt: Regionally, the biggest blow to Riyadh came when the Arab uprising swept away its most
staunch ally, Egyptian President Mubarak; but as the revolutions unfolded within the region,
Saudi Arabia emerged to be the primary defender of the status quo. Bewildered by the pace of
the events and deeply inimical to political change itself; it was seen scrambling to extend
political and financial support to embattled allied rulers from Morocco and Egypt to Bahrain and
Jordan. Riyadh welcomed the Tunisian president after the successful revolution toppled the first
long-established Arab regime in MENA and he fled his country.48
Prior to Mubarak‘s departure,
the uprising against him was bitterly criticized by Riyadh who termed the revolt as ―blatant
interference‖ by outsiders.49
In addition, it tried its best to convince Obama Administration to
continue its political support for Mubarak.
However, after failing to save Egyptian President, it ensured new Egypt‘s political order and
strategic orientation might not contradict its interests. In mid-May 2011, Egypt‘s economy was
provided with ―soft loans, deposits and grants‖ amounting $4billion.50
The huge financial aid
might have been intended to reduce Muslim Brotherhood‘s growing appeal among the masses,
against which Riyadh had deep-rooted ideological rivalry. Prospect of either rapprochement
between Egypt and Iran or increased hostility towards Israel, once Muslim Brotherhood controls Guido Steinberg, ―Leading the Counter-Revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring‖ (SWP Berlin, June 2014),
―Ben Ali gets refuge in Saudi Arabia,‖ Al Jazeera, January 16, 2011.
Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, March 10, 2011), 2.
Nayla Razzouk, ―Egypt to Receive $4 Billion Economic Aid from Saudi Arabia, SPA Reports,‖ Bloomberg, May 21, 2001.
183
Egypt‘s foreign policy, was also contrary to Saudi strategic interests.51
The former would have
strengthened Iran‘s relative power in MENA while the later would have put considerable
pressure on Riyadh because of its close strategic alliance with the US.
However, following the Brotherhood‘s electoral victories in parliamentary and presidential
elections in 2011/12, Saudis made an effort to enter into a working relationship with the new
government. However, when Morsi‘s government was toppled following popular unrests in early
July 2013, the Saudi regime emerged Egyptian military‘s strongest foreign supporter.52
As Saudi money bankrolled the coup by General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, its aggressive
diplomacy and support for the Salafist movements reflected a determined bid to safeguard its
interests in the region. The return of military rule has subsequently proved unfounded the initial
fears prevalent within Saudi elite that the toppling of a close personal ally might call into
question the strategic orientation of the most populous Sunni Arab state. Unlike Iran, the military
coup was welcomed by Riyadh as it considerably narrowed Qatar‘s regional influence which
gained momentum after it emerged supporter of protest movements since 2011.
Bahrain: One might disagree with the extent of Vijay Prashad statement that ―The Arab Spring
was defeated neither in the byways of Tahrir Square nor in the souk of Aleppo. It was defeated
roundly in the palaces of Riyadh. From there came the petro-dollars to scuttle the ambitions of
the people.‖53
But Saudi Arabian militarily intervention in Bahrain was equally unprecedented
and if there was a moment to be identified as death knell to Arab Spring and region‘s quest for
broad and representative government across MENA it was the day Saudi tanks moved into
Bahrain to help put down the mass uprising against the ruling regime.
The aggression was clearly intended to send a loud and clear message not only to restive
domestic Shiite minority who were protesting in the eastern city of Qatif where violent clashes
were reported between Saudi security officials and the protestors as the Saudi Press Agency brief
dated October 4, 2011 acknowledged, as well to the ―foreign country‖ believed to be behind
them. In words of John Bradley: ―The brazen move was a clear signal from Riyadh to every state
For more information see Saud Mousaed Al-Tamamy, ―Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security,‖ Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea 2, no. 2 (2012): 143-156.
―King Abdullah Congratulates New Egyptian Leader,‖ Arab News, July 4, 2013.
Vijay Prashad, ―Why Saudi Arabia Still Needs An Arab Spring,‖ Alternet, February 8, 2016.
184
in the Middle East that it would stop at nothing, ranging from soft diplomacy to full-on military
engagement, in its determination to lead a region-wide counterrevolution.‖54
The unrest and
resultant instability, however, provided a proxy arena for competition between Iran and Saudi
Arabia that possesses a key strategic value for both and continues till date. 55
Jordan and Morroco: Besides intervening in Bahrain, Riyadh also lobbied within GCC in favour
of extending membership to Jordan and Morocco. This move clearly reflected the Gulf States
shifting their strategic and political alliance in face of changed political environment due to
December 2011 Tunisian uprisings and adapting to changes in their basic security framework.
While Morocco never expressed its desire to join the club, but Jordan‘s request of 1980s and
1996 has been twice rejected before. The offer, however, was quickly downgraded to a ―strategic
partnership‖ and this might be because both states are economically much weaker than their Gulf
partners and might had quickly become economic burden for them. Analysts speculate that US
policy towards Mubarak was the turning point. Shadi Hamid asserts: ―The Saudis worried that if
the U.S. was able to turn its back on one of its closest allies in the region when former President
Hosni Mubarak left, will they do it again if unrest erupts somewhere else in the region? Who will
they throw under the bus next?‖56
The move might thus be interpreted to diversify defense allies
and reduce dependence on the West.57
The Gulf States: Even before the proposal of a Gulf Union became public, Saudi support for
financially weaker partners in the GCC was apparent at the first sign of protests in North Africa
in 2011. Aid totaling $20 billion was promised to Bahrain and Oman, to make it easier for
governments to keep the protests in check, prompting the specter of a GCC ―Marshall-type Plan‖
for the region.58
Oman which frequently has maintained much better relations with Tehran has
also played an obstructive role in GCC since 1980s. January 2011 protests in the Omani capital
of Muscat provided Riyadh an opportunity to exploit Oman‘s dependency on aid from its allies
to deepen integration. Consequently King Abdullah proposed in December 2011 that GCC states
John R. Bradely, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Invisible Hand in the Arab Spring: How the Kingdom is Wielding Influence Across the Middle East, ― Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2011.
For details see Simon Mabon, ―The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry,‖ Middle East Policy Council Journal 21, no.2 (Summer 2012).
Sara Hamdan, ―Gulf Council Reaches Out to Morroco and Jordan,‖ New York Times, May 25, 2011.
For more details see Dr. Saud Al Tamamy, ―GCC Membership Expansion: Possibilities and Obstacles,‖ Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, March 15, 2015.
Mohammad Al Asoomi, ―Oman and Bahrain have lot to gain from GCC plan,‖ Gulf News, June 19, 2013.
185
join together more closely in a political and economic union. While it was being hailed as a
visionary move by the pro-Saudi press, it was no less than an embarrassing blunder by the King,
who failed to consult ambitious proposal with his ministers too.59
Only Bahrain responded positively to the proposal because it perceived the same kind of threat
from Iran as Riyadh. On the other hand, resistance to the proposal was spearheaded by Oman
who saw it nothing more than another Saudi attempt to entrench their strength within GCC. UAE
and Qatar probably shared similar reservations but they held back public expression of criticism.
Finally Oman rejected the proposal in December 2013 triggering strong words on the Saudi
side.60
Thus Saudi efforts to form a unified front against Iran within the region that might
entrench their supremacy met a failure. Mutual suspicions between political elites of GCC
mitigated against closer ties.
Libya: Saudis reaction to the uprisings in Libya was, however, totally different to the popular
unrest witnessed in Egypt and Bahrain. Here, contrary to the prevalent view it didn‘t side with
the counter-revolutionary forces but on the other hand supported the popular fervor against
Gaddafi. When Arab League requested UNSC for no-fly zone to be imposed on Libya in the
light of massive attacks against protestors by pro-Gaddafi forces on March 21, 2011, Riyadh
reportedly played pivotal role in bringing about this landmark decision. Eleven out of twenty-two
Arab League member states were present the day UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted and
among the nine Arab League states that voted in favour of the resolution six were GCC countries
along with Saudi Arabia.61
However, Saudi jets did not participate in enforcing the no-fly zone
like Qatar and UAE.
In short the civil unrest in Libya presented an opportunity rather than a challenge to Saudi‘s
interest in the region. It is also reported that the Saudi regime also supported the rebels through
the much needed arm supplies. Besides settling the score with a long-standing adversary, the
move was also connected to developments in Bahrain. In words of Rene Rieger: ―….throwing See ―The Federal Gulf Countries?‖ an-Nahar (Beirut), December 21, 2011.
―Oman goes blunt ‗against‘ a Gulf Union,‖ Al Arabiya English, December 7, 2013. ; Madawi Al-Rasheed, ―Omani rejection of GCC union adds insult to injury for Saudi Arabia,‖ Al-Monitor, December 9, 2013.
Pepe Escobar, ―Exposed : The US-Saudi Libya Deal,‖ Asia Times Online, April 2, 2011.
186
Gaddafi under the proverbial bus was a price the Al-Saud would have been more than willing to
pay to contribute to the stability of Bahrain.‖62
While investigative journalist Pepe Escobar wrote in Asia Times Online in April 2011 that the
Arab League resolution arrived as a deal between Washington and Raiyadh. ―You invade
Bahrain. We take out Muammar Gaddafi in Libya …. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their
neighbor in exchange for a ―yes‖ vote by the Arab League or a no-fly zone over Libya- the main
rationale that led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.‖63
Syria: Labeling Saudi policy during the Arab Spring as counterrevolutionary won‘t do justice to
the ostensibly contradictory policy pursued by Riyadh. The primary interest of the Saudi
government throughout the period till now has been the regime security and regional stability as
well as containment and ideally rollback of Iranian regional influence. True that Riyadh has been
making significant efforts to guard political status quo in Arab monarchies unaffected by the
Arab upheaval but it simultaneously supported revolutionary factions in Libya and Syria.
Damascus since the Arab uprisings has become the most intensely contested proxy battleground
between Iran and Saudi Arabia and both are engaged in a consistent struggle to safeguard their
interests in the civil war still going on to dislodge Bashar al-Assad from Syria. The outcome of
the Syrian civil war will play a pivotal role in the emerging hierarchical structure. How intensely
Riyadh and Tehran are vying to affect the outcome will be discussed at length in the subsequent
chapters.
Iraq: Apart from Syria, Iraq also occupies significant position in the emerging equation. Saudi
Arabia that historically has enjoyed tensed relations with Baghdad, except for a brief period of
cooperation during Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, is now busy to preserve its strategic interests in the
country that include: limiting Iranian influence in the region; preventing repression of Sunnis by
newly empowered Shiites; and preventing instability and conflict in Iraq to threaten Saudi
internal security. 64
Saudi Arabia reopened its diplomatic office in Iraq in December 2015 after a
25 years absence marking a milestone in relative normalization of bilateral relations. Change of Rieger, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring, 13.
Escobar, The US-Saudi Libya Deal.
For the Saudi cabinet‘s statement of its key principles for Iraq, see ―King Abdullah Chairs Cabinet‘s Session,‖
Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), November 20, 2006.
187
Iraqi leadership from Nori al-Maliki to Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi in 2014 was the reason
because the former was perceived as unduly influenced by Iran in Riyadh. Iraq-based IS
supporters still threaten Saudi leaders but Saudi Arabia has not participated in air strikes in Iraq
as a part of counter-IS coalition. Similarly empowerment of lran-linked Shiite militia groups in
Iraq will continue to be perceived with suspicion in Riyadh. So Iraq will remain a major concern
for Saudi foreign policy elite in coming years too.
Yemen: Apart from Iraq and Syria, another country now caught between Saudi-Iran proxy war is
Yemen. Traditionally Riyadh has exercised strong role in Yemen and sought to mitigate potential
threats through liaison relationships and security interventions. But the course of developments
since 2014 has challenged transitional set-up backed by Riyadh and GCC countries as an alliance
of northern Yemen insurgents under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh asserted itself.65
Situation worsened when Houthis and pro-Saleh forces continued military operations in
contravention of the agreed power sharing arrangement signed in September 2014.66
Houthis
unwillingness to withdraw from capital and unilateral moves renewed conflict and led to
President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi‘s resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015.
In the period since, Saudis claim Houthis have attacked their borders and targeted Saudi
nationals. Even Scud missile attacks reportedly have been intercepted on several occasions.67
Even the United Nations efforts to facilitate intra-Yemeni negotiations in Kuwait in April 2016
failed in August, resulting in once again intensification of war. A catastrophic humanitarian
crisis has engulfed this extremely poor state but the conflict is far from near any resolution.
Israel – Palestine: The flux in MENA has not only realigned Saudi relations with the Arab states
and other regional players but Saudi-Israel relations had also exhibited some deviation from
traditional policy postures that up till now has reflected extreme enmity between the two states.
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed as a central policy problem in the Middle East by the Saudi
regime and they had been stressing to US that it should support a solution to the conflict that
addresses various Palestinian and Arab concerns. Riyadh, unlike several other GCC states, hasn‘t
For background on Yemen, its transition process and the conflict there see Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL34170, February 11, 2015).
―Yemen rivals sign peace agreement,‖ Al Jazeera, September 22, 2014.
―Houthis fire scud missiles at Saudi Arabia : Reports,‖ Middle East Eye, August 26, 2015.
188
established open trade or liaison channels for communication with Tel Aviv so far; nevertheless
kept supporting US policy initiatives for Israel-Palestine peace agreements since 1990s.
But recently overt contacts have occurred between Saudi Arabia and Israel that have been
criticized by Hamas.68
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserted in January 2016 that
―Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel is an ally rather than an enemy because of the two principle
threats that threaten them, Iran and Daesh [ISIS]‖.69
In spite of this rhetoric official Saudi
statements are routinely critical of Israeli policies and IS has been described as Israeli tool by the
Grand Mufti Abd al Aziz al Sheikh.70
Thus the shared antipathy to Iranian regional pursuits,
parallel cooperation with the US and shared terrorism hasn‘t so far contributed to tangibly close
bilateral relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in recent years.
Apart from increasing apprehension with enhanced Iran‘s role in the region and how flux in
MENA are changing traditional alliances, Saudi Arabian relations with US are also undergoing
significant changes and these may have lasting impact on the newly emerging power hierarchy
within the region.
4.1.1.2. Saudi-US Relations
Early formal Saudi-US diplomatic relations can be traced to the Second World War though US
recognized King Abd Al Aziz as the ruler of Hejaz and Nejd in 1931. However the discovery of
substantial oil reserves in 1938 in eastern Saudi Arabia and their management and production
during the inter-war period resulted not only in gradual replacement of UK but also in the
deepening of bilateral relations71
that progressed gradually in spite of recurring difference of
opinion on regional issues especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. Successive American
administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon kept viewing the
monarchy as the bulwark against the spread of Communism within the Persian Gulf region and
beyond. The latent tensions in the bilateral relation came forward in the October 1973 Arab-
Israel war that became instrumental in changing the prevailing political and economic dynamics Dov Lieber, ―Hamas asks Saudis to prevent ‗normalization‘ visits to Israel,‖ Times of Israel, July 31, 2016.
―Netanyahu urges to adopt policy of moderate Arab states on Israel,‖ i24 News, January 22, 2016.
―Islamic alliance will defeat Daesh: Grand Mufti,‖ Saudi Gazette, December 28, 2015.
For details see Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian oil and American foreign policy, 1939-1949, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). ; and Simon Davis, ―Keeping the Americans in line?
Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-45: Inter-Allied Rivalry in the Middle East Revisited,‖ Diplomacy
& Statecraft 8, no.1 (1997): 96-136.
189
of the relationship. Both re-anchored the relationship, however, and during Carter and Regan
administrations Saudis actively coordinated with US policy and supported anti-Communist
causes throughout the world.72
The shared anti-Communist interests that helped define Saudi-US relations since the late 1940s
got eliminated with the end of the Cold War. But US interests in the uninterrupted flow of Saudi
oil and maintenance of political status quo in the Persian Gulf region remained strong. These
shared interests however were unable to bridge the persistent differences on the Arab-Israel
conflict and other regional issues. In the post-Cold War period traditional defense cooperation
survived but the gulf widened in other areas. The direct involvement of 15 Saudi nationals in
9/11 terrorist attacks - the worst of its kind on the American soil, however kindled strong
criticism in the US of Saudi involvement in terrorism. Others however criticized the Saudi policy
decisions that had been responsible for a certain type of religious extremism and international
terrorism over the decades either directly or indirectly. The same ideology had proved to be an
asset for the US during 1980s and was also embraced by US in its struggle against Soviets in
Afghanistan.73
The bilateral relations have been subjected to severe pressure but Saudi government denied any
knowledge of or involvement in 9 /11 and instead sought to project since 2003 its domestic threat
from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Members of this group have carried out
attacks within the kingdom but the 9/11 Commission Report released on July 23, 2004 described
Saudi Arabia as having been ―a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism‖.74
Appreciating Saudi government counter-terrorism as ―significant‖ but urging at the same time to
do more particularly with regard to terrorist threats beyond Saudi borders and asked Riyadh to
―exercise oversight of fundraising activities in the Kingdom and Saudi charitable activities
For details see Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America‟s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 168-190.
For details see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan, and Ben Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
Quoted in Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, November 16, 2009), 7.
190
abroad.‖75
Throughout the period terrorist financing concerns have proven to be a persistent
point of contention between the two countries.76
Saudi Arabian government has described Al Qaeda it affiliates, the Islamic State and other
Salafist-jihadist groups and their supporters as direct threat to its own national security. Shared
security challenges have long defined US-Saudi relations but time and again they have been put
to severe test based on diverging regional foreign policy priorities. Saudis are already not happy
with US-Iranian nuclear deal.77
It remains to been seen how long this relationship could endure
considering a change in US Administration and replacement of Barack Obama with Donald
Trump.
4.1.3. Turkey
A state, which during the Cold War was not more than a peripheral member of the Atlantic
community, is now at the centre of the world that spans the Middle East, North Africa, the
Balkans, Caucasus and beyond. Analyzing changes in the post-Arab Spring MENA without
taking into account the strategic calculations of Turkey and its foreign policy behavior, would
present not more than a distorted picture of the region.
4.1.3.1. Turkey in post-Arab Spring MENA
As the dramatic developments in Turkey‘s neighbourhood were jostling long-established Arab
and North African authoritarian regimes and along with it disrupting the established regional
order; Turkey though much like the West got off guard, but nevertheless, viewed them as
presenting Ankara with both long-term opportunities and threats. This regional opportunity was
equated with the ―global turmoil‖78
unfolding at the systemic level, corresponding with the
hegemonic decline of the United States and created incentives as well as room for maneuvering For details visit http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122411.htm . For more information see Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues (CRS Report RL32499, September 14, 2007).
Gene Gerzhoy, ―How to manage Saudi anger at the Iran deal,‖ Washington Post, May 22, 2015. ; Carlo E. Lee and Gordon Lubold, ―U.S. Seeks to Allay Concerns of Allies on Iran Nuclear Deal,‖ Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2015.
Zibgniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).
191
for the other regional powers. Turkey‘s regional activism and the Arab Spring are subsequently
to be analyzed in this broader geopolitical context.
Traditionally perceived as an actor that jumped on the US bandwagon during the Cold War, and
adopting a low-profile posture in the Middle East, Turkey saw in the US hegemonic decline an
unprecedented opportunity to bid for greater influence within the region as well as felt the
greater freedom and autonomy to realize its objectives.79
However, at the same time its declared
policy of ―zero problems with neighbours‖ was to be put to severe pressure and it had to be
revised and adjusted to adapt to the new realities. Turkey‘s desire for a role as an influential
regional power though within grasp, was also fraught with unique challenges.
When the rest of the world was experiencing democratization, MENA had to cope with
decolonization after the WWII. Even after the Cold War, the region seemed to be frozen in
history as the pro-western monarchic rulers maintained the status quo and addressed Western
concerns. The ―war on terror‖ further strengthened these authoritarian regimes and their relations
with the US in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However the Arab Spring offered
unique opportunity to Arab publics, who were no longer willing to have their destiny hijacked by
these corrupt regimes. Turkey with its democratic credentials, thriving economy and
modernization program presented a desirable model to be emulated and a more receptive
audience for a larger Turkish role in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring was
speculated. Thus it would be not overstatement to claim ―that the myth of Turkey as a ‗bridge‘
between East and West has finally outlived its usefulness. Instead of deferring to American or
European interests in the Middle East, Turkey has begun to promote its own agenda. Where it
coincides with western ones, fine. Where it does not, too bad.‖80
While critics claim that the sheer pace of developments in MENA largely invalidated Turkey‘s
drive to become an influential regional power as the resultant changes severed Ankara‘s ties with
the very neighbours with whom it had earlier sought to develop unlimited cooperation. But its
ambivalent and at times contradictory stance during the Arab Spring came under intense scrutiny
and posed to be the most serious challenge to Turkey‘s aspiration as a regional leader to date. For details on how Turkish policy changed in the Middle East in the 1990s see Sabri Sayari, ―Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no.3 (Spring 1997): 44-55.
Piotr Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower: Turkey Goes It Alone,‖ World Policy Journal 27, no. 4 (Winter 2010/2011): 102.
192
With no particular commercial or geopolitical interests at stake with regime continuity or change
in either Tunisia or Egypt, it was quick to side with the popular demand and asked Egypt‘s
Mubarak to heed the demonstrator‘s call and leave office.81
But with significant number of
workers, companies and investment at stake in Libya, the decision to out rightly oppose Gaddafi
became quite difficult.82
Syrian Bashar al Assad‘s opposition proved to be even more
problematic. Though its policy in Libya and Syria finally converged with that of US and NATO
allies but not without significant loss of public face. Post-Arab Spring MENA had additional
challenges to offer to Turkish regional activism.
Egypt: The Arab Spring in Egypt first brought jubilation among the Turkish policy circles when
the Islamists emerged as the ultimate winners in post-Mubarak period. However, ever since
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took over power by overthrowing former President Mohammed Moris- a
close Turkish ally in 2013, Turkey-Egypt bilateral relations are going from bad to worse.
Erdogan criticized the military Egyptian regime in a speech to the UN General Assembly by
labeling its rise as a coup d‘état.83
The Egyptian diplomatic corps highly angered by Erdogan‘s
remark accused him of funding terrorists and deviated for the first time from usual diplomatic
wordings.
Tensions renewed when the Egyptian Parliament on July 26, 2016 approved a resolution to
recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks, making a new turn in the
bitter row that has already severed diplomatic ties between the two.84
Besides throwing light on
the detrimental influence of regime hard-liners on Egypt‘s regional policies, the remarks
threatened to damage relations with Ankara beyond repair after failed coup attempt in Turkey
which prematurely was reported successful in the Egyptian media.85
―Turkish PM Erdogan urges Mubarak to heed Egyptian outcry,‖ Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), February 01, 2011.
By March 2010, Turkey had $15 billion worth of outstanding contracts with Libya, $1.5 billion worth of equipment in the country and some 30,000 expatriates working there. Figures quoted from Philip Robins, ―The
Foreign Policy of Turkey,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, 2nd
ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 336. Aswat Masriya, ―Egypt Condemns Turkish President Erdogan‘s Speech at the UN,‖ Egyptian Streets, September 25, 2014.
Safa Joudeh, ―Why Egypt and Turkey won‘t reconcile anytime soon,‖ Al-Monitor, August 2, 2016.
―Egyptian media prematurely declares overthrow of Erdogan,‖ Mada Masr, July 16, 2016.
193
Egypt appears to have escalated crisis with Turkey with no clear strategy or end in sight. It
remains to be seen how Erdogan and Sisi reconcile their strong mutual dislike for each other in
order to address the more serious local and regional agendas. The bilateral ties are unlikely to be
restored even if Israel plays the mediator role and Saudi Arabia continues to bring the both in its
fold to contain Iran. Turkey is viewed as a rival in Levant affairs including the Palestinian theatre
where Ankara supports the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Hamas. Besides backing fellow Sunni
and the Islamist movements like MB is a moral obligation for the AKP elites and Egypt-Turkey
bilateral relations are not likely to heal anytime soon.86
Iraq: The Gulf War87
of 1990-91 was a critical catalyst for Ankara‘s re-entry into the Middle
East. In spite of dissentions within the government, the then-President Turgut Ozal threw
Turkey‘s full support behind the US campaign with a view to further strengthening ―strategic
partnership‖ with the US and increasing prospect of Turkey‘s entry into EU. However, his hopes
proved illusory and his dreams didn‘t materialize. Instead Turkey had to pay high price in the
shape of loss of billions of dollars in pipeline fees and trade. Since the end of the first Gulf War
and the extension of the American no-fly zone over the northern Iraq, Ankara‘s greatest concern
in the neighbouring country had been the emergence of an independent Kurdish state across its
southern border that serves as a model for its own separatist Turkish Kurds.88
Over the period of time Turkey‘s worst fears were confirmed. Not only Iraq became a breeding
ground for International terrorism but the apprehension about excessive Iranian influence over a
Shiite-dominated Iraq was also well founded. But what is jeopardizing Turkey‘s internal security
is the strengthened Kurdish nationalism and upsurge in violence in PKK over the past few years.
Ankara at the moment is caught between a territorially intact, democratic and stable Iraq without
being dismembered or dominated by any ethnic or sectarian group and also motivated to preserve
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) viability in the face of both IS threat and weak
central government in Iraq even if this eventually lead to KRG independence.
Soner Cagaptay and James F. Jeffrey , ―Turkey‘s Regional Charm Offensive: Motives and Prospects,‖ the Washington Institute, June 27, 2016.
For information on how the First Gulf War affected Trukey and what were its impacts on domestic issues see Haldun Canci and Sevket Serkan Sen, ― The Gulf War and Turkey: Regional Changes and their Domestic Effects
(1991-2003),‖ International Journal on World Peace 28, no. 1 (March 2011): 41-65. ; and Meltem Muftyler-Bac,
―Turkey and the United States : The Impact of the War in Iraq,‖ International Journal 61, no. 1 Turkey: Myths and
Realities (Winter 2005/ 2006): 61-81. F. Stephen Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (Jul-Aug, 2007): 104-05.
194
Battle in Mosul will further complicate Turkish bilateral relations with Iraq. Mosul, with a Sunni
majority population, represents Turkish ―sphere of influence‖ which might fall under the control
of Iraqi Shiite troops, an outcome Erdogan is determined to avoid as his recent interview to
Saudi-based Television channel Rotana validated: ―After Mosul will be rescued from [IS], only
Sunni Arabs, Turkmen and Sunni Kurds should remain there.‖89
Erdogan also warned against
―any forceful change in the demographic composition of the region.‖90
Turkey‘s regional
activism has already sounded a death knell for the cherished ―zero problems with neighbours‖
approach.
Saudi Arabia: Historically Turkey-Saudi relations have been established on the common ground
of safeguarding peace and stability in the region. The bilateral relations have been primarily
viewed through the economic lens and their mutual regional and global policy views aimed at
creating synergy and supporting each other. Similarly, King Abdullah‘s visit to Turkey in August
2006, the first of its kind in 40 years highlighted strengthening of bilateral relations as well as
convergence on issues like Arab-Israel peace process. Though their views on foreign policy do
not always coincide but up till now they have kept the bilateral relations away from regional
squabbles but the Arab Awakening that literally tore the previous regional balance was about to
bring changes in this bilateral equation too.91
Aware of the intense rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey had been successful in
maintaining good relations with both countries but the crisis in Syria meshed their interests.
Turkish-Qatari axis in Syria competes with Saudi Arabia in Syria, even though both agree that
Assad must go and the failure of the Syrian opposition to effectively succeed has been blamed on
this competition for influence within the anti-Assad circle. However, in spite of being in the
opposite camps Turkey has not criticized government in Riyadh while disparaging other Rikar Hussein, ―Turkey-Iraq Tensions May Complicate Battle Against IS in Mosul,‖ Voice of America, October 5, 2016.
Mark Lowen, ―Battle for Mosul: A row between Turkey and Iraq could derail the offensive,‖ BBC News, October 13, 2006.
For more information on Turkey-Saudi relations during the Arab Spring see Muhittin Ataman, ―Turkish-Saudi
Arabian Relations During the Arab Uprisings: Towards a Strategic Partnership?,‖ Insight Turkey 14, no. 4, (2012): 121-136.
195
countries though the attempts had been made to portray the divergence as the cold war for Sunni
hegemony.92
A new controversial dimension was added to the unblemished Ankara-Riyadh relations when
Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia in early 2015 and met the new King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al-
Saud and reached a new agreement with regard to Syria, where Salman promised to support
Turkey in declaring a no-fly zone. Besides Syria, their agreement of views on Iran, Egypt,
Yemen and Palestine illustrates that Turkey might be dragged into the much more dangerous
game of regional influence involving Iran. But the Turkish-Iran relations have never deviated
from stability in the past and they have never been engaged in a border conflict since 1963 and
somehow getting along in spite of having divergence of outlook on regional issues. This new
polarization may negatively affect relations between Tehran and Ankara.93
While Salman‘s concern might be in forming a Sunni block against Iran but Sisi-Erdogan mutual
hatred for each other will make it cumbersome for Riyadh to bring both Egypt and Turkey in its
fold against Iran.94
Turkey it appears, says Michael Stephens, ―have concluded that the best
position for them is to balance the Gulf States and Tehran, not fully committing to either side,
yet seeking economic benefit from both.‖95
How long Turkey can delicately balance this
strategy when another factor Israel and Russia is addition to the equation, only time can tell.
Iran: Turkey‘s greater activism in the Middle East had also been reflected through its effort to
strengthen ties with Iran and Syria. Relations were strained with both Damascus and Tehran over
their support for PKK in 1980s and 1990s96
but relations improved significantly after the shared
commitment to contain Kurdish nationalism was expressed and a security cooperation agreement
branding PKK a terrorist organization was signed when Prime Minister Erdogan visited Iran in
July 2004.97
Being the second largest supplier of Natural Gas to Turkey after Russia, energy also
Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi, ―The Saudi-Turkey cold war for Sunni hegemony,‖ Al-Monitor, April 1, 2014.
Fehim Tastekin, ―Are Turkey, Saudi Arabia working together against Iran?,‖ Al-Monitor, March 5, 2015.
―Turkey-Saudi relations turn ‗a new page‘, says top Turkish advisor,‖ Middle East Eye, March 5, 2015.
Ariel Ben Solomon, ―Analysis: Turkey trying to balance relations between Iran, Saudis,‖ Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2016.
For details see John Calabrese, ―Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, no.1 (May, 1998): 75-94.
Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 107.
196
had been a major driver behind the warming of Iranian-Turkish relations and energy-related
deals signed in 2007 have also brought the two countries together.98
More recently its approach towards Turkey has oscillated between two competing visions. On
the one hand, Ankara seeks to establish relatively normal political and economic ties with Tehran
not only for regional stability but for maintaining Turkish access to Iranian oil and gas; on the
other hand, it has been competing with Tehran for geopolitical influence.99
When the US and its
allies championed tougher measures against Iranian nuclear ambitions, Turkey tried to play the
role of a mediator. The Turkish-Brazilian scheme to swap Iranian nuclear fuel, though
unsuccessful, but at the same time displayed Turkey‘s independent approach and pragmatic
leadership to produce confidence in mediation efforts.100
The mediation efforts does not reflect that Ankara endorse Iranian nuclear drive. In fact, Turkey
kept viewing Tehran‘s nuclear ambitions with apprehension as they had the potential to
destabilize the Persian Gulf region and may even had forced Ankara to take countermeasures for
its own security if NATO‘s guarantees seemed less credible and EU rejected Turkey‘s
membership. Any serious drive by Iran to obtain the nuclear capability might undercut its
rapprochement with Turkey. Besides bilateral tensions also exist on questions of Iraq and Syria
where Iranian ties with the sitting governments in Baghdad and Damascus give it additional
leverage and its ties with Kurdish groups also provides a number of potential points of friction
with Ankara.101
Thus an emboldened Iranian presence in the region will always be a cause of
concern for the leadership in Turkey.
The overall bilateral Ankara-Tehran relations will remain evolving around much controversial
issues like Turkey‘s ongoing war with Kurds; its support for Sunni rebels in Syria; alliance with
Saudi Arabia on certain regional issues; and crisis with Russia particularly when later enjoys
close relations with Iran. Hence, up and down in bilateral relations along with cooperation will
continue to be the norm.
Ibid., 108.
For more on Turkey –Iran relations see Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, ―Power Play: Turkey‘s Bid to Trump Iran,‖ World Affairs 173, no. 5 (January / February 2011): 6-15.
Alon Ben Meir, ―Turkey and Iran‘s Nuclear Challenge: Mediating With The Mullahs,‖ The World Today 66, no.
(November 2010): 27-28. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, Turkey: Background and US Relations (CRS Report, R41368, August 26, 2016), 36.
197
Syria: Strained in 1980s and early 1990s, the Syria-Turkey bilateral relations reached a crisis
point when turkey threatened to invade Syria if Damascas did not cease its support for PKK. But
Syria‘s responded positively, not only closed PKK training camps but expelled its leader Ocalan
too; the shift opened the way for gradual improvement in bilateral relations finally culminating in
Bashar al-Assad‘s visit to Ankara in Janurary 2005 – the first such trip to Turkey by a Syrian
president since its independence in 1946. This rapprochement was also underscored by Syria‘s
growing concern about its own Kurdish population that an economically robust Kurdish
government in northern Iraq could stimulate102
Turkey‘s attempt to develop closer ties with Damascus created strains with US under the Bush
administration which sought to isolate Syria. Tensions intensified in 2005 when US failed to
convince Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to cancel his visit to Damascus. Later, when US
tried to initiate dialogue with Syria, the Turkish ties proved fruitful into bringing closer
alignment between Syria and US.103
Ankara boasting about its ―inclusionary foreign policy‖ and
claiming that ―we engaged with them‖ when ―other countries isolated the Syrians,‖ did not prove
misplaced.104
In the wake of the Arab Spring when civil war ensued in Syria; Turkey sided with US, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf members to oust Assad from Syria; it entered into a regional proxy war
whose outcome will have far-reaching impact on the future regional hierarchy. This conflict has
created dangerous regional polarization among contending players. Currently, Turkey not only
offers safe heavens and support to Syrian dissidents and high-ranking Syrian Army defectors but
to show its military might conduct military exercises next to its borders with Syria but the fact
remains save direct military intervention, which seems unlikely Turkey has little leverage left to
shape course of events in Syria. 105
Israel – Palestine: Turkey had maintained a close relationship with Israel since 1996 especially
in defense and intelligence areas when it gave Tel Aviv ―a way of breaking out of its regional
isolation and a means of putting pressure on Syria‖ and ―for obtaining weapons and advanced
techqnology at a time when it faced increasing restrictions on weapons procurement from the Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 109.
Ibid.
Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 99.
For details see chapter on Syria.
198
United States and Europe.‖106
In spite of the fact that Turkey was first Muslim country to
recognize independence of the state of Israel and establish diplomatic relations with it but its
policy towards Israel underwent a shift when it began to adopt a more active pro-Palestinian
policy. Following Israel‘s bloody bombing campaign in Gaza in 2008, Turkish Prime Minister
publicly accused Israeli President Shimon Peres of ―knowing very well how to kill people‖ and
labeled the Israeli military operation as ―crime against humanity‖ and an act of ―state terror‖ and
again calling Israel ―the main threat to regional peace‖ just three months later.107
Ankara then hosted a high ranking Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mashal after their win in the
elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006. As the visit was arranged without
consulting either Washington or Tel Aviv, it irritated both governments.108
Erdogan refused to
classify Hamas as a terrorist organization but made western observers uncomfortable with his
statement that ―the world now perceives the Star of David alongside the swastika‖; while eroding
Western sympathy simultaneously boosted his image among the Arab public.109
According to a
poll conducted in November 2009, among those surveyed in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan,
Egypt and the Palestinian Territories, 75 % hold a ―very positive‖ and ―positive‖ view of
Turkey.110
After nearly six years of downgraded diplomatic ties, which worsened after 2010 Mavi Marmara
incident,111
both Turkey and Israel have announced to restore full diplomatic relations in June
2016. The rapprochement which many attribute to proposed natural gas pipeline shows Turkish
desire to reduce its dependence on Russian imports; while on the Israeli side there is a search for
energy partners to develop its Leviathan natural gas field.112
The rapprochement includes Israeli
Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 110.
Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 100.
Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 110.
Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 100.
Ibid., 101.
The incident took place in international waters under disputed circumstances and resulted in the deaths of nine Turks and an American of Turkish descent. See Gonul Tol, ―The ‗Turkish Model‘ in the Middle East,‖ Current History 111, no.749 (December 2012): 352.
Fulya Ozerkan, ―Turkey, Israel to examine building gas pipeline,‖ Times of Israel, October13, 2016. ; Selin Girit, ―Gas pipeline hopes heal rapture in Israel-Turkey ties, BBC News, October 19, 2016.
199
compensation to victim families of flotilla incident but whether it curtail Hamas ties with Turkey
is far from clear.113
Similarly a return to previous civil-military and intelligence cooperation also seems to be
unlikely.114
Previously in apparent retribution to flotilla incident Turkey blew cover of Iranians
acting as Israeli intelligence sources back in 2011115
and even led to congressional rejection of
Turkish request to purchase drone aircraft to counter PKK.116
However, Turkey-Israel trade
continued to grow in spite of political differences.
Turkish bid to become highly influential regional power can become sustainable if it is able to
reconcile its liberal ethics of foreign policy with its realpolitik concerns in the region.
4.1.3.2. Turkey-US Relations
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk‘s revolutionary changes put country on a long march towards the West
in 1920s. ―Rejection of Turkey‘s Islamic, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern roots became state
policy.... The pursuit of modernity redefined the country‘s relationship with itself. A faithful ally
to the US and a NATO member, the Cold War sealed Turkey‘s transformation into a Western
nation and ensured almost unquestioning support from Washington.‖117
The statement published
in Foreign Policy has recently been severely tested after the failed coup attempt against the
Turkish President Erdogan in July 2016, with roots in moderate Islamism.
The bilateral relation can be traced back to the Second World War where Turkey remained
neutral until February 1945 and when the US battleship U. S. S. Missouri arrived in Istanbul
harbor in 1946, it signaled the formation of a long-term partnership with Turkey. Since then
Turkey has occupied a very special place in US foreign policy and throughout Cold War had
acted as the southeast bastion of NATO and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union. The
Rory Jones, et.al., Turkey, Israel Trumpet Benefits of Deal to Normalize Relations, Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2016.
Yossi Melman, ―A long way off,‖ Jerusalem Post, August 8, 2016.
David Ignatius, ―Turkey blows Israel‘s cover for Iranian spy ring,‖ Washington Post, October 16, 2013.
―Report : US canceled delivery of Predators to Turkey,‖ Today‟s Zaman, October 21, 2013, citing report in Taraf
―A Rising Star,‖ Foreign Policy 151 (Nov-Dec, 2005): 3.
200
bilateral relation endured compilations of the Cold War era, centered most of the time on issues
related to Cyprus.118
For the first Gulf War, Turkey sided with US and allowed US-led coalition to use its bases to
strike Iraqi territory but after the end of the Cold War, the rationale of providing large amounts
of grant aid to arm the Turkish military was questioned from few quarters.119
But following 9/11
it once gained new importance as possible staging ground for US-led military action in the
region. But the second Gulf War created tensions in the bilateral relations when in a surprise
move Turkish Parliament rejected US request to station ground troops at Turkey‘s border with
Iraq to open second front in 2003.120
Few analysts pointed that the rejection from Turkey was
because US ―asked for more in 2003 than it did in 1991‖; others referred to the benefits it
received for cooperation in 1991 as ―significantly fewer than expected‖.121
The damaged relations somewhat recovered when Turkey allowed US overflights into Iraq after
the coalition occupied the country and began stability, counterinsurgency and reconstruction
operations but the resumption of PKK attacks into Turkey form safe heavens in northern Iraq,
raised concerns about a core internal security issue. Since 2007 it had received direct US
cooperation in countering PKK. Anti-American sentiment within Turkey was also strengthened
owing to US involvement in the Middle East.122
The Obama Administration from the outset
sought to illuminate ties clouded during the Bush era. Signaling a change in policy both
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton visited Turkey on their first overseas trips and
Obama hailed the ―model partnership‖ with Turkey in efforts to overcome ―challenges of our
time‖ while addressing Turkish Parliament.123
After crisis over Israel‘s interception of the Turkish ship intending to break Gaza blockade in
May and then its vote against increased UN sanctions against Iran in June 2010, Turkey was
Jim Zanotti, Turkey-US Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (CRS Report, R41761, April 8, 2011), 38-39.
Ibid., 40.
Harry de Quetteville, ―US troops pack up and go as Turkey refuses any help,‖ Telegraph, March 24, 2003.
Zanotti, ―Turkey-US Defense Cooperation,‖ 40.
For details see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ―Friends No More? The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,‖
Middle East Journal 64, no.1 (Winter 2010): 51-66. ; Aylin Guney, ―Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,‖ Middle Eastern Studies 44, no.3 (May 2008): 471-87. Remarks by President to the Turkish Parliament, April 6, 2009, accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
201
severely criticized in the US and was asked to demonstrate its commitment to NATO, Europe
and US.
In spite of the persistent differences, Turkey-US continue to enjoy extensive trade, aid and
defence relations with US that endured for decades but post-coup bilateral relations have become
complicated with requests from Turkey to extradite Gulen whom Erdogan blames for coup
attempt.124
US still enjoy access to Incirlik air base and other bases in Turkey but Ankara
maintains the right to cancel US access to Incirlik with three days notice.125
Without debating
the importance of US-Turkey elations, domestic issues and trends in Turkey raise questions
about future of the bilateral relations as their values and interests evolve and at times diverge but
they are too important to be permanently hijacked by a single incident or personality.
4.1.4. Egypt
A country whose geopolitical position distinguishes the importance it enjoys in MENA, as its
land bridges two continents and serve as a link between two principal waterways - the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Positioned astride the eastern and the western wings of
the Arab-Islamic world, and with a rich modern history of the long independence struggle
against the foreigners it naturally seeks a leadership role for itself within the region. The dream
was realized when Gamal Abdul Nasser harnessed these sentiments not only to challenge
Western dominance and to consolidate his regime but made Egypt a regional power too. His
successors were unable to keep Egypt on the path that peaked in Nasser‘s era. Among them,
Hosni Mubarak who already prioritized economic survival over nationalist ambitions in Egypt‘s
foreign policy faced an unprecedented challenge at the beginning of 2011 – an unrest that finally
brought end to his three decades long rule.
4.1.4.1. Egypt in post-Arab Spring MENA
Egypt was already undergoing uneasy transition when following rigged elections of 2010, the
National Democratic Party (NDP) not only gained massive victory, a transition that was likely to Jessica Durando, ―Turkey demands extradition of cleric Fethullah Gulen from U.S.,‖ USA Today, July 19, 2016.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Erin Cunningham, ―Pentagon‘s top general seeks to cool anti-American sentiment in
Turkey,‖ Washington Post, August 1, 2016.
202
bring his son Gamal to power, but resulted in further weakening of the opposition. However,
within a span of just 18 days the long-established authoritarian Mubarak regime ended due to
popular pressure, bringing massive changes to Egyptian politics and put the country on an
uncertain, bumpy road to more open political system, from which it has neither fully recovered
nor gotten used to it yet.
The Arab Spring and its impact in Egypt was significantly different from the other pivotal
players analyzed. While others were either indirectly affected or drawn deeper into the region to
shape the outcomes of unprecedented developments taking place on the Arab street, Egypt was
the one pivotal player that itself had to go through the transition. Thus instead of acting as one
powerful player bidding for greater influence and position within the regional hierarchy in flux,
it had first to cope with massive internal challenges of her own that emerged with the abrupt
departure of Mubarak, and secondly had to safeguard its interests, lest internal challenges are
exploited by competing regional powers.
The euphoria that was attached with the revolution has finally faded as the country ―whiplashed
form one political extreme to another‖, from the oppressive Muslim Brotherhood government to
the military regime that now rules, writes Ashley Fantz of CNN. An analysis of the revolution
after five years would place country on a shaky ground financially. Not only people are angry
and unemployment rampant but ISIS-linked insurgency is growing along with more frequent
terror attacks. She further adds, ―Nothing seems sure in Egypt today, except that there‘s bound to
be more fitful change ahead‖.126
Public political activism declined since military ouster of Morsi
in July 2013 but internal security situation remain volatile. The Egyptian economy hasn‘t
recovered fully in the aftermath of Arab Spring and government‘s effort to improve economic
growth to stave off public unrest has produced mixed results only.
The domestic instability and challenges has affected Egypt‘s ability to shape rapidly evolving
situation in MENA. Being one the ten non-permanent members of the UN Security Council
(term ending in 2017) its role has been pivotal in brokering a unity government in Libya but in
regions like Syria and Iraq its role has been minimal in countering Islamic State (IS) as it has a
homegrown terrorist threat such as Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SP) to counter.
Ashley Fantz, Egypt‘s Long , bloody road from Arab Spring hope to chaos,‖ CNN, April 27, 2016.
203
The unprecedented success of Egyptian revolution and then equally epic failure of the Muslim
Brotherhood as a governing alternative have but strengthened the forces of status quo throughout
the region. Cairo is not in a position to aggressively pursue an independent course due to its
growing financial dependence on the Gulf States but even then it showed reluctance to provide
ground troops for Saudi-led collation against Yemen, adding the request to be considered ―if
necessary‖.127
Saudis since July 2013 are actively trying to make Egypt a part of Sunni-lead
alliance to counter resurgent Iranian threat in the region. Even though their goals and priorities
diverge, Egypt still supports the Saudis bid to curtail Iranian influence in the region.128
Besides Gulf Arab monarchies, Morsi‘s forceful exit has also brought marked improvement in
Egypt-Israel relations as Tel Aviv had serious reservations about the long-term prospects of
having an Islamist-governed Egypt. The two nations though at peace since the historic 1979
peace treaty but the bilateral relations are not without challenges. The diplomatic relations were
re-established after a span of four years in 2015, the first time after 2012 when Morsi recalled
Egyptian ambassador as protest over Israel‘s Gaza operation, followed by similar action by
Israel.129
They view Hamas as a common enemy that assists anti-government militias in Sinai
Peninsula. Egypt since July 2013 is trying to create a ―buffer zone‖ to curb underground weapon
smuggling to Hamas and the decision was criticized as ―serving global and regional politics
against Palestinian people and will only increase suffering in the Gaza Strip‖ by Yahya Moussa,
the head of the Palestinian Legislative Council‘s Oversight Committee.130
Till the time Egypt‘s domestic security and stability is fraught with challenges, its prospects to be
an effective regional player will remain limited. It will keep interfering in Libya to affect a
favourable outcome in the conflict and to help seculars succeed so that domestic threat from
extremists could be curtailed. But in MENA its overall capacity will be extremely constrained
besides the trajectory of its relations with US will also determine whether it will get the kind of
limelight it had enjoyed till Anwar Sadat and Mubarak era. David D. Kirkpatrick, ―Egypt Says It May Send Troops To Yemen To Fight Houthis,‖ New York Times, March 26, 2015.
―Saudi Arabia Consolidates Its Alliance Against Iran,‖ Al Akhbar, March 7, 2015.
Isabel Kershner and Tim Arango ―Israel and Turkey Agree to Restore Diplomatic Ties,‖ New York Times, December 17, 2015.
Adnan Abu Amer, ―Egypt‘s buffer zone expansion hurts Hamas‘ arm supplies,‖ Al-Monitor, January 9, 2015.
204
4.1.4.2. Egypt-US Relations
Egypt traditionally had occupied distinctive place in US foreign policy calculations owing to its
geography, demography and diplomatic posture. It is the country where US has invested heavily
i.e. $76 billion since 1948 because it not only controls 8% of global maritime shipping through
Suez Canal critical for US and the global trade but apart from that it is the most populous Arab
state that is at peace with Israel and has traditionally provided logistical support for American
forces operating in and around the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.131
Besides it enjoys
significant ―soft power‖ in the Islamic world, its Cairo Al-Azhar university is the oldest and
leading source of Islamic scholarship. Up till Mubarak period it enjoyed distinctive position in
US Middle East policy orientation and calculations but the period following Arab Spring has
somewhat reduced the strategic importance of Egypt to US national security interests. The first
major blow to bilateral relations in recent history came after September 2001 when not only one
Egyptian was among 9/11 attackers but Egyptian cleric Ayman al-Zawahiri remains head of al
Qaeda worldwide and several Egyptians form core of the world leading terrorist organization.
The Arab Spring of 2011 briefly elevated the country towards the top of US foreign policy
agenda when it was assumed that a transition to democracy would provide prosperous
opportunity to people but the hopes proved misplaced. The coup d‘état that replaced Morsi with
Sisi has brought neither stability, prosperity nor the democracy in Egypt. The return of the
military rule in Egypt has left US policymakers in a quandary. On the one hand to maintain
stable partnership with Egypt is still considered vital for regional security and stability; on the
other hand, the authoritarian government and its quashing of public dissent through brutal tactics
is again making conditions conducive to the growth of violent extremism within this most
weighty Arab state.
After July 2013 military coup, the Obama Administration launched a lengthy review of US
foreign assistance policy toward Egypt and to register its disapproval of military‘s reassertion of
power,132
US announced to withhold the delivery of certain large-scale military systems pending
credible progress towards democracy. A major shift in policy occurred in March 2015 after a Statement Prepared by Steve A. Cook, before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 16, 2015 available online at http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypt-two-years-after-morsi/p37380. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt, July 03, 2013.
205
phone call between President Obama and President Sisi when due to terrorist attacks against
Egypt certain lawmakers pleaded Administration to end its weapon suspension.133
But a significant turn in the bilateral relations has occurred and one analyst asserted: ―In
Washington, Egypt‘s cash-flow financing had lost support from both parties and is not likely to
be reinstated no matter who moves into the White House in 2017.‖134
Thus current US-Egyptian
relations remain on an uncertain path. Besides US criticism of its recent policies to impose order
in a fragmented, unstable society has led Cairo to diversify its partnerships and alliances. Instead
of traditional reliance on US, it has turned to the like-minded Arab governments in the Gulf
region as well as Russia and China as an alternative. A lengthy quote of Michael Wahid Hanna
would sum up the entire situation:
―For decades, the partnership between Egypt and the United States was a linchpin of the American role in the Middle East. Today, it is a mere vestige of a bygone
era… no longer any compelling reasons for Washington to sustain especially close ties with Cairo. What was once a powerfully symbolic alliance with clear
advantages for both sides has become a nakedly transactional relationship….The time has come for both sides to recognize that reality and for the United States to
fundamentally alter its approach to Egypt.‖135
4.1.5. Israel
Israel exists in the heart of the Muslim Arab Peninsula with roots in the British government
issuance of Balfour Declaration in 1917 that aimed at ―establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people‖136
and finally came into being in 1948 through a UN resolution 181
that divided Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.137
This ‗illegitimate‘ partition was never
accepted by both Palestinians and the Arabs who since then have engaged in military conflict
with Israel a number of times most notably in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. After the peace
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President‘s Call with President al-Sisi of Egypt, March,31 2015.
―The Politics of Restoring Egypt‘s Military Aid,‖ Washington Post, April 2, 2015.
Michael Wahid Hanna, ―Getting Over Egypt: Time to Rethink Relations,‖ Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2015).
For complete text of the Balfour Declaration visit http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/balfour.html. For a contradictory view see Jeremy R. Hammond, ―The Myth of the U.N. Creation of Israel,‖ Foreign Policy Journal, October 26, 2010.
206
treaty with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994, Israel has made another multi-front war
against it less likely but major security challenges exist with Iran and states allied with it.
Unpredictable developments in the Arab states following Arab Awakening and the ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian conflict have further complicated its regional position.
4.1.5.1. Israel in post-Arab Spring MENA
Israel has faced significant challenges to its security in MENA since the day of its establishment
but the developments in 2011 added further anxiety in the Israeli policy circles when an Egyptian
scaled the exterior of Israeli embassy in Cairo and replaced the Star of David with a Palestinian
flag in August 2011. To many in Jewish land it only demonstrated that democratic change across
the region masked a regional irredentism implacable in its hostility towards Israel.138
It found
itself trapped in diplomatic, strategic and political upheaval across several fronts with few
diplomatic means to influence the outcome of events. At the same time there was an increasing
realization that US power across the Middle East was finite and hence Washington would be
unable to use its leverage to help shape a regional environment more benign to Israeli
interests.139
The removal of Morsi‘s government and its replacement with a military dictator brought relief in
Tel Aviv as Israel prefers the devils they have always known but the terminal decline of Arab
autocratic rule was apparent. Besides Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu never saw these uprisings
more than an ―Islamic, anti-western, anti-liberal, undemocratic wave‖ a view he expressed
before the Knesset in November 2011.140
Hence the developments in the Arab world like
uprisings in Syria, Bahrain and continued violence in Iraq was framed by reference to Islam as
monolithic danger and it became a catchall epithet to explain regional threats to their security as
an Israeli official is reported to have remarked: ―When some people in the West see what‘s
happening in Egypt, they see Europe 1989. We see it as Tehran 1979.‖141
Ari Shavit, ―Arab Spring Showed Its Real Face in Attack on Israeli Embassy in Egypt,‖ Haaretz, September 11, 2011.
Efraim Inbar, ―Israeli Defense: The Arab Uprisings Impact,‖ Middle East Quarterly 19, no.1 (2012): 41-42.
Brice Lynfield, ―With West Focused on Iran, Netanyahu Moves to Expand Israeli Settlements,‖ Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 2012.
Daniel Bayman, ―Israel‘s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,‖ Washington Quarterly 34, no.3, (2011): 123.
207
Even with conventional military superiority relative to its neighbours, it remains unclear how far
shifts in regional order and developing asymmetric threats affect its security. Israel has serious
reservations about Iran‘s nuclear program and any enhancement in Iranian regional influence is
inimical to Israeli security interests. Similarly US pursuit of diplomacy with the clerical regime
also exacerbates Israel‘s anxiety over the extent to which it can rely on its distant superpower
ally to actively thwart the potential threat it faces. Such a concern is attributable in part to
reduced US influence within the region.142
Besides Israel faces significant terrorist threats from ungoverned spaces which spread across its
borders and include security vacuums that exist in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt‘s Sinai Peninsula, Iraq
and Libya, giving momentum to terrorists groups like IS besides traditional threats from
Palestinian militant groups. Hence MENA in flux is a significant Israeli interest and it will keep
monitoring developing situation in post-Arab Spring environment. Though not in a position to
considerably affect outcomes of regional conflicts but the emerging new power hierarchy will
directly relate to its security.
4.1.5.2. Israel-US Relations
Israel is the staunchest US ally in the region and its security has significant relevance for US
Middle Eastern interests. They have enjoyed decades-long strong bilateral ties in defence,
diplomatic and economic sphere. The vital security cooperation exists in the realm of military
aid, arm sales, joint exercises, and information sharing including periodic cooperation in
developing military technology. Successive US Presidents and members of the Congress have
expressed firm commitment to Israeli security since 1948 and the question of Israel‘s security
have not only influenced US policy considerations regarding Middle East but has been the pivot
of its overall policy towards the region.
Besides perceptions of shared democratic values, religious affinities and security interests, the
US support to Israel has helped shape a regional security order through support to Arab countries
and Israel that has discouraged outbreak of an Arab-Israel interstate conflict for more than 40
years. Beyond temporary geopolitical considerations, Israel has substantial and multifaceted Jim Zanotti, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33476, June 1, 2015), 10.
208
worth as US ally and the strong bilateral bond based on shared ideas and values holds.143
Given
the unprecedented changes in the Middle East, US commitment to Israeli security will sustain
and the inability of US to affect the configuration of a new regional order will not affect either
the mutual bilateral cooperation or US commitment to ensure Israel‘s ―qualitative military edge‖
in the region to enable Israel to defend itself against all perceived threats.144
4.2. Russia Re-enters the Region
The upheavals of Arab Spring not only brought dramatic changes in the region‘s power hierarchy
but helped bring about a revival in the Russian fortunes in the region too. Since the Soviet
Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the 1991 Gulf War, Moscow‘s influence in the
region was drastically reduced. The 2003 US-led Iraq war and resultant removal of Saddam‘s
regime resulted in loss of a key Arab ally for Russia. Up till the unprecedented developments of
2011 only Syria and Algeria were left as last big Russian defence clients in the Arab world, with
Syria already facing increasing isolation within the region.145
Besides major changes in the US
foreign policy pursuits during the same period and the focus of its attention away from Middle
East to Asia Pacific created additional incentives for extra-regional players to re-enter the region
and enhance their position in the overall global hierarchy.
―European and American leadership since the end of the Cold War has been operating on the
false belief that geopolitics had come to an end; they doubled down on that delusion as
geopolitics came roaring back in the Obama years,‖ writes Walter Russell Mead in the American
Interest.146
Russian entry on the side of Bashar-al-Assad has not only changed dynamics of the
conflict and thwarted Washington‘s diplomatic efforts but has simultaneously made Russia a
lead player in area‘s geopolitics. Besides its rapprochement with Turkey and developing ties with
Iran has also elevated its role as a major actor in the region where since the days of Soviet Union
such activism from Moscow had been missing.
For the debate see Michael Eisenstadt, ―Resetting the U.S.-Israel Alliance,‖ War on the Rocks, February 5, 2015. ; and Richard Klass, ―Is Israel Becoming a Strategic Liability,‖ War on the Rocks, January 28, 2015.
For more information on US-Israel relations see Zanotti, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, RL33476.
Frank Gardner, ―Russia in the Middle East: Return of the bear,‖ BBC News, November 14, 2013.
Walter Russell Mead, ―Russia Re-Emerges as a Great Power in the Middle East,‖ American Interest, September 12, 2016.
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Moscow‘s desire to gain a foothold in the region has been interpreted differently. For some the
region‘s turmoil present an important opportunity to Russian President Vladmir Putin who not
only wants ―to revive Russia‘s long-faded image as a world power, restore its status as
America‘s main geopolitical foil, and gain bargaining chips with which to promote his more
immediate concerns in Russia‘s near-abroad.‖147
But for others its initiatives in the Middle East
especially in Syria clearly stretches far beyond its regional goal and ―has much to do with setting
the boundaries of what the Kremlin considers a struggle to shape the world order‖.148
The power
transition in the global hierarchy and the ―rise of the rest‖ especially ―rise of China‖ thesis has
contributed to this school of thought. Russian reassertion in the Middle East and in its ―near-
abroad‖ through traditional hard balancing strategies also gives credence to this argument.
The burgeoning relationship between Russia, Iran and Syria was quoted in the Time as a ―new
‗axis of evil‘‖ when Iran in an unprecedented move allowed Russia to fly its bombers from one
of its bases to attack rebels in Syria the first time since 1979 revolution. Besides it was also the
first time Russia used a third nation (other than Syria and Russia itself) to attack Syrian rebels. It
quoted a retired Army lieutenant general, David Barno, about Moscow‘s flexing military muscle
―this time from Iran‖ as Russia once again desired to be seen as a military power ―and one that
will not shy about poking the United States and its friends in the eye at every opportunity.‖149
Syria is the focus of Russian resurgence in the Middle East and it has largely altered dynamics of
the conflict in Assad‘s favour since the entry of Russia on his side. Critics of the overall US
Middle East strategy and the developing dynamics of the Syrian conflict view this as a clear sign
of waning US influence in the region. Especially Obama-Putin deal on Syria was bitterly
criticized and Walter Mead went to the extent of terming it as ―closest to..Donald Trump‘s plan
for the Middle East‖ and Putin‘s ―temporary alliance with the United States on Russia‘s
terms‖.150
The extent of Russian involvement in the region and its impact in the Syrian conflict
will be explored at length in subsequent chapters.
Besides Syria, another area where Russia is registering its presence within the region is the
Israeli-Palestinian issue where US has failed to break the intractable impasse for decades but a Shlomo Ben Ami, ―Russia‘s Ephemeral Middle East Alliances,‖ Project Syndicate, October 5, 2016.
Maxim A. Suchkov, ―Russia‘s plan for the Middle East,‖ The National Interest, January 15, 2016.
Mark Thompson, ―Russia and Iran Fly Across a Key Threshold in the Middle East,‖ Time, August 16, 2016.
Mead, ―Russia Re-Emerges as a Great Power in the Middle East.‖
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Russian special envoy was found shuttling through the region in September 2016, trying to
arrange a meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister Nethanyhu and Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas. While Russia surely lacks the leverage, economic or otherwise to produce a
deal but for few analysts Russia‘s newfound Middle East peace push is ―everything but finding
peace in the region‖ and, more about ―Moscow‘s ambition and competition with Washington,
exemplified by its intervention in Syria.‖151
Putin‘s intent on taking the lead in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is a show of Russian
significance within the region when it is already having tensions with Washington over Syria and
Ukraine. As a former Israeli ambassador to Russia, Zvi Magen asserts: ―The idea is not to reach
any specific results, but it‘s good for Russia. They don‘t need results. The need the process
itself.‖152
Even Israeli officials like Avi Ditcher who is chairman of Israel‘s foreign policy and
defense committee, are apprehensive about the divergence of interests in the Russian and Israeli
approach towards the region. While Russia considers Iran as the stabilizing force and the US-
Iranian nuclear deal as largely positive, Israeli views are completely opposite on this and same
goes for Syria‘s Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah.153
The Turkey-Russian rapprochement will also positively enhance Russian leverage in the region.
Turkey currently is walking on a tight path with US and the sign of Donald Trump President-
elect in the White House will further complicate this feverish transition in the Turkey-US
relations as Ankara is seen pursing a too independent path in its international policy. The
worsening of relations both with EU and US pushed Turkey to reactivate its ties with Russia.
Since August 2016, Erdogan and Putin conducted two state visits and both seemed to have
reached an agreement over the most significant regional issue i.e. the Syrian conflict, although it
is too early to talk about an alliance. In short Turkish independence in its foreign policy pursuits
though problematic for all regional players including Russia, is generating hope for better
Russia-Turkey relations in the future.154
Peter Baker and Isabel Kershner, ―Russia, Already Reinserting Itself in Middle East, Enters Israeli-Palestinian
Fray,‖ New York Times, September 9, 2016. Ibid.
―Israeli official: Russia has long-term ambitions in the Middle East,‖ Reuters, November 16, 2016.
Vladimir Avatkov, ―How Russia views Turkey‘s role in Syria,‖ Al-Monitor, November 18, 2016.
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Besides Turkey, Russian-Egyptian ties are also ―picking up‖ across all areas of cooperation since
Sisi ousted the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi155
and in the wake of
cooling of decades-old US-Egyptian ties. A brief analysis of Russian initiates in the Middle East
leaves no doubt that Kremlin has successfully re-entered the region and with the decline of the
US hegemonic influence and the change of strategic shift of US policy away from the region the
scope for greater Russian influence is not very unlikely. Thus it would not be wrong to claim that
Russian resurgence in the Middle East regional hierarchy is the direct result of waning US global
influence and its hegemonic decline. The move towards post-hegemony is strengthening
assertive behaviours of US global challengers.
4.3. US- The Declining Hegemon in MENA
The crisis of hegemony is astonishing reality of our times and the period is fraught with both
risks and opportunities at the systemic and sub-systemic level. Hegemonic periods are equated
with stability and they dominate political relations leaving little room for regional actors to
maneuver outside boundaries determined by the hegemon itself. The post-Cold War period that
was initially triumphant with slogans of US unprecedented hegemony has seen the gradual
emergence of hegemonic crisis. The diminishing power of the US in world politics while giving
rise to rampant speculations about its causes has also emboldened regional actors to increasingly
bid for enhanced position within the regional hierarchy vital to their strategic interests. The
impact of this gradual US hegemonic decline has not been felt stronger in any region more than
MENA. According to Bulent Aras and Sevgi Akarcesme, ―[the] region had been stuck with a
static order predicated on three interrelated pillars: ensuring Israel‘s security, serving the oil
industry‘s interest and maintaining the status quo.‖ 156
The fall of the Mubarak regime, who acted in close concert with its hegemonic pattern raised
pertinent question about the US ability to influence developments occurring within the region.
For a general outsider, the Arab ―spring‖ seen to be coinciding with the ―global turmoil‖ and
hegemonic crisis. The signs of weakening hegemonic control soon pitted regional actors against For details see Vitaly Naumkin, ―Russia and Egypt‘s ‗new partnership‘,‖ Al-Monitor, February 11, 2015.
Bulent Aras and Sevgi Akarcesme, ―Turkey and the Arab Spring,‖ International Journal 67, no. 1, Charting the new Turkish foreign policy (Winter 2011-12): 43.
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each other who not only asserted after experiencing emancipation from the limiting influences of
the hegemonic order but the uncertainty about the new direction of the regional order forced the
regional powers to adopt a more proactive, assertive and at times aggressive foreign policy
postures. These regional players are utilizing sense of freedom of action and increasing room for
maneuver to affect an outcome that aligns with their strategic interest within the region.
The decline of the hegemon creates power vacuum, generating opportunity for medium-sized
countries, to grab this historic opportunity to leap forward and consolidate their position within
the new power hierarchy. MENA in the post-Arab Spring period has been a classic example of
this. Not only traditional US allies are increasingly and aggressively pursuing independent
foreign policy paths at times in direct conflict with the US interests but have also started
diversifying their relations with potential challengers to US global order. Though other major
powers also have interests at stake in the evolving regional hierarchy but Russia‘s assertion is
most overt, and directly contravening and threatening to US interests. It would be incorrect to
make an over-ambitions statement that American days within the region are numbered but it
would not be incorrect to assert that MENA precisely is the region where opposition to US
hegemonic practices is most prevalent and other major powers especially Russia is a factor
without whose consent, the most pressing Syrian crisis cannot be resolved.
The Age of US hegemony in MENA in the post-Cold War period was the result of the global
triumph of neoliberal capitalism over socialism and the resultant global economic crisis that led
to economic liberalization and structural adjustment opened MENA economies to the West and
made them more dependent on Western trade and loans. ―The consequent favoring of crony
capitalists and foreign investors ushered in a ‗post-populist‘ form of authoritarianism in which
the republics abandoned their former popular bases…[and] states increasingly omni-balanced
with the United States to contain domestic threats.‖ The trend that started in 1980s was
accelerated in 1990s with the establishment of US military hegemony over the region after the
First Gulf War.157
A Pax Americana in the region which appeared to have been established with the spectacular
swift victory of the US after the First Gulf War could not materialize into significant resolution
Raymond Hinnebusch, ―The Middle East Regional System,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd
ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushirvan Ehteshami (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2014), 53.
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of pressing Arab problems especially the Arab-Israel conflict. On the contrary it generated new
threats, the most threatening in the form of al-Qaeda which starkly exposed US to terrorism from
the Middle East. A more robust attempt to impose its hegemony was then seen through US
invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) when abandoning its traditional ―offshore
balancing‖ strategy US entered the region as direct occupying force. US was warned by Arab
League chief Amr Mousa that the Iraq war would ―open the gates of hell‖158
- a warning not
heeded by the US officials.
An unintended consequence of the second Gulf war was the formation of a ―resistance front‖
which sought to delegitimize the Washington alignments of pro-Western Sunni states like Egypt
and Saudi Arabia and was championed by Shiite Iran, Shiite-controlled Iraq and Hezbollah as
well as Sunni-majority Syria and Hamas movement of Palestine. The war that was supposed to
strengthen those who accepted US hegemony in the region inadvertently empowered the axis
that opposed it and US hegemony faltered over the region.159
Americans have traditionally seen the Middle East through the regional balance of power lens.
For them a more moderate pro-American camp containing Saudi Arabia and Egypt that out to be
bolstered against a militant, pro-Iranian camp that needs to be contained. But such a flawed
assessment underestimates and misunderstands the role of Turkey that do not fit within either
camps and whose guiding principle is to blur the line between two. There was a prophetic
warning that ―the United States might soon awake to a Middle East that it will find even harder
to understand or influence.‖160
The massive challenges confronted by US in post-Arab Spring
MENA and its inability to decisively address them validate the statement.
Even before the Arab Spring, Robert Malley and Peter Harling writing in the Foreign Affairs
stated: ―For decades, the West has been playing catch-up with a region it pictures as stagnant.
Yet the Middle East evolves faster and less predictably than Western policymakers imagine.‖
They further added that US and European governments ―eventually grasp their missteps, yet by
Anne Penketh, ―Attack on Iraq will open gates of hell, Arabs warn,‖ Arab News, September 06, 2016.
Hinnebusch, ―The Middle East Regional System, 59-67.
Robert Malley and Peter Harling, ―Beyond Moderates and Militants: How Obama Can Chart a new Course in the Middle East,‖ Foreign Affairs 89, no.5 (Sep/Oct 2010): 20.
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the time their belated realizations typically occur, their ensuing policy adjustments end up being
hopelessly out of date and ineffective.‖161
The Arab uprisings which initially were seen as a reaction to post-populist mass exclusion inside
regional states were also reflection of the global power transition in progress. US was seen
caught off guard and was unable to affect outcomes on the Arab streets as decades-old allies
crumbled one after another within the region. The toppling of Mubarak regime came as a rude
shock to staunch US allies in the region especially Saudi Arabia which became disillusioned with
exclusive reliance on US support and for the first time in decades became more assertive in its
foreign policy pursuits with or without US approval as seen in case of its intervention in Yemen.
An analysis of the US relations with the pivotal MENA players highlights how the traditional
friends and foes are re-evaluating their foreign policies and behaviours with the US and the trend
overall has reflected more independence and friction with the US in the attainment of regional
goals and foreign policy pursuits. American bilateral relations with its erstwhile staunch allies
like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are all-time low and its ability to get their cooperation on
vital Middle Eastern issues is being constrained.
With the departure of Obama administration and the arrival of Donald Trump President-elect in
the White House, the bilateral relations with each of these allies are speculated to become more
uncertain and the prospect of further waning US influence seems a more imminent reality.162
Trump‘s previous remarks haven‘t been too assuring for the allies like Saudi Arabia about whom
he remarked he ―wasn‘t a big fan‖ of the country and US has paid too much to ―back them up‖.
He at the same time predicted that the oil-rich Kingdom ―is going to be in big trouble pretty soon
and they‘re going to need help…the primary reason we‘re with Saudi Arabia is because we need
the oil. Now we don‘t need the oil so much.‖163
But at the same time Trump‘s negative
assessment of the Iran‘s nuclear deal which Trump criticized as ―horrible and laughable‖ and
―one of the most incompetent contracts‖ may make them see eye-to-eye on few issues of vital
regional concern.164
Ibid., 18 .
―Arab states congratulate Trump as anxiety stalks region,‖ Middle East Eye, November 9, 2016.
Sultan al-Qassemi, ―What a Trump Presidency Means for the Gulf,‖ Middle East Institute, February 25, 2016.
Ibid.
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However, there is a consistent decrease in US influence in the region and the trend seems
irreversible with the entry of Russia and its desire to carve a ―sphere of influence‖ in the region
as well as the increasingly independent and assertive behavior of regional allies to bid for
enhanced position for themselves within the regional order in flux.
Conclusion: Regional Hierarchy in Transition
As explained in Chapter 2 the drift towards post-hegemony send signals to potential global
challengers who want to exploit vulnerable local / regional hierarchies. Not only major powers
get emboldened, but regional challengers also attempt to re-write configuration and rules of the
regional hierarchy. The declining hegemon‘s reduced ability to arrest the scope of these changes
encourages potential challengers to make a bold bid to achieve their objectives within the region.
Great powers seldom interfere in local territorial disputes within a region lest their core interests
are threatened or outcomes of the conflict are consequential to them. They then intervene with
the objective of restoring status-quo amenable to their national interests.
MENA is one such region where significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy in the
wake of Arab Spring of 2011 has given rise to new dynamics, made possible through conflict,
instability and erosion of traditional structures of power hierarchy. This breakdown of the
traditional hierarchical power structure have not only pitched major players within the region
against one another to carve a greater role for themselves in the post-conflict period but have
opened avenue for interference / intervention by extra-regional players including great powers.
These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link
between local/regional and global hierarchies in post-hegemony. Unlike Power Transition
Theory that explores the potential for systemic transforming great power war between the
reigning dominant state and the potential dissatisfied challenger that has obtained almost 80%
power parity with the leading state165
; this model explores the conditions for great power
competition against each other and intervention in local/regional hierarchy when the power
parity gap hasn‘t been abridged but the drift towards post-hegemonic phase is apparent. Such
For details refer to Chapter 2 where Power Transition Theory has been discussed in detail.
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regions simmering in conflict; and uncertainty and instability prevalent among them, then
becomes more vulnerable as play ground where potential challengers to declining hegemon
could be seen with their assertive foreign policy behavior and traditional hard and soft balancing
strategies.
In post-hegemony the global hierarchy undergoing power transition is relatively stable. The bid
to maintain and alter the established global status quo between the declining hegemon and
potential challengers is simultaneously in progress but none displays willingness to upset the
status quo through overt traditional great power confrontation. As can be seen, US-China along
with other emerging players are engaged in a power struggle but, US with overwhelming
military superiority, the odds are in its favour so the systemic transforming great power war is
still a far-fetched reality. However regional hierarchies without dominant leaders and conflict-
ridden mechanisms such as MENA in post-Arab Spring phase, are open for great power
intervention and disturbances. It has already drawn in both US and Russia heavily in the local
settings. It has effectively been turned into a play ground for proxy wars where both regional and
extra-regional players are vying for influence.
The Arab Awakening gave new impetus to the power struggle within regional players competing
to shape post-Arab Spring regional order and to affect the internal struggle for power in states
undergoing transition as a result of uprisings. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - the three pivotal
regional players with resources enough to shape the emerging regional order were speculated to
play decisive role in the new power hierarchy. While former key actors like Egypt and Syria
became the main prizes in the contest. Other states experiencing transitions like Tunisia, Libya,
Yemen and Bahrain also became vital in securing leadership of the ensuing order. States like Iraq
and Lebanon where unconsolidated regimes ruled fragmented societies became objects of power
struggle as the prevailing instability made them vulnerable for external penetration.
The detailed foreign policy analysis of these pivotal states and their evolving relations within the
states in the region demonstrates that the bid for enhanced regional role has pitted these players
against each other. While the lesser players are also flexing muscles as the declining US
influence in the region has emancipated them from the limiting influence of hegemonic order and
enabled them to pursue a more pro-active and aggressive foreign policy to secure their strategic
interests within the region. The ongoing conflict in Syria, Libya and Yemen are all prime
217
examples of how each player is eagerly implementing its strategy even at the cost of long-time
friends and allies both within and outside the region. A detailed analysis of Libya and Syria in
subsequent chapters brings out dynamics of these regional conflicts as well as delineates impact
of regional power hierarchy in transition.
US, what once used to be the sole arbiter in the region‘s disputes, has lost its hegemonic position.
Even traditional US allies especially Saudi Arabia is now not exclusively banking on US. MENA
is in transition but only time will tell what the new configuration of power would be and whether
US is able to re-establish its hegemony or it will have to share MENA with other regional and
extra-regional players.
MENA in transition validates the theoretical arguments made in Chapter 2 regarding the impact
of power transition in a regional hierarchy. The regional hierarchies are directly affected by the
power configuration at the systemic or global level. When the system is undergoing a power
transition, as witnessed in today‘s world when the American hegemonic influence is in decline,
certain vulnerable regional hierarchies also get more intervention and penetration from other
regional and extra-regional players. MENA in the post-Arab Spring period went through this
extreme vulnerability which is being exploited by all players vying for influence within the
region.
This chapter has not only outlined how old and traditional alliances are fracturing due to new
developments within the region and even regional players are re-evaluating their approach
towards each other. Similar re-structuring of relationship is occurring with the US - the declining
hegemon and other major players interested in playing key role in the new power hierarchy
within the region. The impact of this reassessment is most easily discernible in the ongoing
conflicts within MENA. The next case studies will establish the link between global and regional
hierarchies and explain how changes at the apex of the global hierarchy trigger and affect events
in a key regional hierarchy.
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Chapter 5: Libya – US “Leading From Behind”
Drift towards post-hegemony not only triggers power transition in the global hierarchy, certain
unstable regional hierarchies also get affected by ambiguity prevailing at the systemic level.
Previous chapter explained MENA as region where uncertainty, instability and conflict rendered
local states vulnerable and this vulnerability is being exploited by both regional and extra-
regional players to re-write the regional hierarchical structure in accordance with their self-
identified national interests.
The Arab uprisings of 2011, which had previously been cited as one of the events that could be
explicitly linked to declining American influence in the world, tore apart already fragile regional
hierarchical structure and seemed certain to alter region‘s dynamics and alliances. With
breathtaking speed and massive youth mobilization, the Arab awakening not only swept away
old regimes of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak but it also forced US to recalibrate
its relationships and policies in the region. The unsettling developments came with further rude
shock as US reluctantly realized, though long being the region‘s dominant arbiter; it had little
ability to directly influence the outcome of the events on the streets of the Arab world.
Libya presented a particularly interesting case to be further explored as Mummar al-Qaddafi,
previously a pariah, had recently been embraced by the Western governments after he renounced
his coveted nuclear weapons program in 2003.1 However, the indigenous mass protests against
more than four decades old dictatorial regime offered a unique opportunity to US, to get itself
registered once again as the dominant superpower with interests at stake within the ensuing new
regional hierarchical structure. The reconfiguration of regional hierarchy contrary to the global
dominant state‘s interest was an outcome that ought to be avoided at all cost. With existing
legitimacy of the declining hegemon already in question, a contrary development would cast
further doubt on US ability to affect desired outcomes. As stated in previous chapter, a
reconfiguration of an important region has to be in line with expectations of the dominant power. Joel Roberts, ―Libya Renounces WMD Program,‖ CBS News, December 21, 2003, accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/libya-renounces-wmd-program/.
219
This reaffirms that international system is still very much the product of hegemon‘s preferences
and influence, and the undesirable developments send strong signals to potential challengers that
long awaited systemic changes are in progress and embolden them to more assertively project
their own interests.
US refused to allow such an outcome that would embolden other autocratic regional dictators
that with repression and violence they might not only suppress their domestic population but at
the same time can internationally get away with it. Hence comes an international military
intervention in Libya apparently to support the indigenous uprising but it underlie an elaborate
plan for the region‘s emerging hierarchical structure. These underlying dynamics with impacts
on regional emerging structure would be further explored in the chapter.
It will be divided into five sections. First section will give a brief introduction to Libyan pre-
Qaddafi history. Next section will shed light on Muammar al Qaddafi‘s era, with exclusive focus
on US-Libya relations and chronological developments of 2011 unrest, to place US intervention
in Libya within the context. The third section will discuss interplay of systemic and unit-level
variables for international military intervention in Libya identified in ―Military Intervention
Threat Securitization‖ model in Figure 2.14 (Chapter 2).
5.1. Pre-Qaddafi‟s Libya2
The North Western territory that now makes up Libya is a union of three historically distinct
regions – northwest Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica or Barqa, and the remote southwestern
desert region of Fezzan (Map 5.1). The region came first under the Ottoman Empire in the mid-
16th
century with near constant resistance from tribal confederations. Beginning in 1711 a semi-
independent state under Ahmed Qaramanli - a Turkish official emerged in the Ottoman
provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with Fezzan remaining contested.
However, with the decline of Qaramanli naval power, Ottoman authorities reoccupied Tripoli in
1835, but their political penetration remained incomplete and resistance to Ottoman reforms and
For details see Christopher M. Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL 33142, Washington DC, 2011), 34-36, available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157348.pdf.
220
central authority persisted till it was invaded by Italy in 1911 under the pretext of liberating it
from the Ottoman control. It subsequently became an important battleground in the WWII and
finally emerged from the fighting as a ward of the Allied powers and the United Nations. The
three disparate regions were then united in a single, independent state through UN General
Assembly Resolution 289 in November 1949.
Map 5.1. Libya consisting of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica3
Libya finally emerged as one of the Africa‘s first independent state on December 24, 1951 under
a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris Al Sanussi.
Throughout first decade infighting continued over taxation, development and constitutional
powers; and subsequently federal government was replaced with unitary monarchy which further
centralized royal authority in 1963. However, significant national and regional developments
contributed to gradual marginalization of the monarchy; When King Idris left Libya for Turkey
in mid-1969 on medical grounds, conditions were already ripe for a military coup in September
by a devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qaddafi.
3Source-http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_p3IpH_m9s8/UT_l0K3E7fI/AAAAAAAAOX4/d0jOm-
U8ND0/s1600/Libya_Map_25.gif accessed September 29, 2016.
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5.2. Libya under Qaddafi
The military coup initially did not elicit any negative response from US, which appeared to
support an anti-Soviet and reformist agenda. However, Qaddafi actively sought not only to
secure full and immediate withdrawal of British and US forces from the military bases in Libya
which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970 respectively; but went for renegotiation of oil
production contracts with foreign companies including US and the British, eventually
nationalizing some. Besides Qaddafi also reversed its initial cold relations with Soviet Union and
adopted more vocal anti-Western and anti-Israel attitude in early 1970s that rapidly soured US-
Libyan relations for decades to come.4
Besides Qaddafi‘s Green Book and his ―Third Universal Theory‖ which blended all pan-Arabic,
Islamic and socialist values into one acquired great significance in the early 1970s. He and his
regime carried out drastic reorganization of Libyan political and economic life, in line with
Qaddafi‘s declared principles which aimed at direct governance rather than through elected
representatives and the more equitable redistribution of land and wealth thus reshaping Libya‘s
socio-political landscape. Beginning in 1977 his government restricted private ownership and
commerce and subsequently nationalized or confiscated and redistributed housing, businesses
and real estate in 1978 and 1981.
At the international level he championed his ―Third International Theory‖ for the developing
third world countries, which he presented as an alternative to both communism and capitalism of
Soviet Union and USA respectively. Qaddafi‘s ideological fervor and his confrontation with the
US were ultimately responsible for his drift in Soviet sphere of influence and further away from
both the US and the West.
5.2.1. US-Libya Relations
US-Libya relations from the very beginning struggled when Qaddafi championed cause of anti-
colonial, separatists, Islamic movements and other groups labelled as terrorists in US eyes, in
line with his cherished ideological percepts. These pursuits were categorically rejected by the US
and her allies in the West as unacceptable sponsorship of illegitimate terrorism and subversive 4 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Libya Revolt of 2011", accessed October 02,
2016,https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011.
222
violence. U.S. designated Libya as a state that sponsored terrorism in 1979 and imposed
economic sanctions, which then were expanded several times as the bilateral confrontation
intensified in the 1980s.
While Libya had long been accused of assassinations and killings of Libyan dissidents but what
especially widened the gulf between the two countries were Libyan bombings of Pan Am Flight
103 and UTA Flight 772 in the late 1980s. Besides Libya‘s role in Africa was equally subjected
to severe criticism, when Libyan-trained individuals led brutal movements throughout the
continent that included Foday Sankoh‘s Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone and Charles
Taylor‘s Liberian National Patriotic Front.5
Another pointed source of tension between Libya and US was the Arab-Israel conflict where
Qaddafi had remained distinctly opposed to any negotiation or reconciliation throughout the
Cold War period and even in 1990s. Except for a temporary pause during the first Palestinian
Intifada in 1987, Qaddafi continued to voice his opposition to the Oslo peace process.6 These
differences were already plaguing bilateral relations when US imposed diplomatic and economic
sanctions along with reports of some limited covert US efforts at regime change that created
more suspicion and rifts.7
2003 was marked as the beginning of new era in Libya‘s history as it took a number of steps
toward economic and diplomatic engagement with the international community. In August 2003,
Libya accepted responsibility for ―the actions of its officials‖ and agreed to a settlement
agreement for families of Pan Am 103 Flight victims following the termination of UN and US
sanctions.8 In order to register its change of attitude towards US, Libya offered counterterrorism
and intelligence cooperation after the 9/11 attacks on US soil. Qaddafi‘s policy reversals on See Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones (Broadway Books: New York, 2004), 23-25. ; Paul Richards, ―War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2, 1994-5, 1995-6,‖ Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 377-402. ; ―Foday Sankoh,‖ Economist 351, April 24, 1999. ; ―Qaddafi Says Farewell, Arabia, and Sets his Sights on Africa,‖ Economist 351, April 24, 1999. ; Scott Anderson, ―The Makeover,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003. ; and Douglas Farah, ―Gaddafi ‗Meddling‘ in Africa,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2003.
Ihsana A. Hijazi, ―Gaddafi and Arafat Mend Fences‖, New York Times, March 10, 1987.
Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Regan‟s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Naval institute Press, 2003). ;
Bernard Gwertzman, ―Shultz Advocates U.S. Covert Programs to Depose Qaddafi,‖ New York Times, April 28, 1986. ; Clifford Krauss, ―Failed Anti-Qaddafi Effort Leaves U.S. Picking Up the Pieces,‖ New York Times, March 21, 1991.
Letter from the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to the President of the Security Council, reprinted in United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office Release- ―UK Calls for Lifting of UN Sanctions on Libya,‖ August
15, 2003.
223
WMD and long range missile development programs in 2003 and 2004 opened room for further
steps in improving the bilateral relationship. Libya returned to the international stage with its
election as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in October 2007- the seat
which it then held in 2008 and 2009 also.
The Bush Administration hailed Libyan renunciation of terrorism and her reintegration as model
for potential rapprochement for other states that were ready to break away from their previous
record of sponsoring terrorism. The Obama Administration was engaged with modest foreign
assistance requests of Libya9 when Arab uprisings of 2011 erupted abruptly and political
changes in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt stirred long-simmering Libyan reform debates to
boiling point within the country.
5.2.2. Anti-Government Unrest 2011
Libya is a complex society and Muammar al-Qaddafi during his four decade long reign proved to
be a controversial, complex and often contradictory political survivor; though personally he
identified himself to be mercurial, charismatic, shrewd and reclusive. Even in the face of
numerous internal and external challenges, he managed to exercise nearly complete, even if at
times, indirect control over the country‘s intricate political dynamics. Libya has since then been a
country whose domestic and foreign policies nominally had been based on Qaddafi‘s personal
ideology and political change remained elusive even when shifting national political
environment and international reengagement begged for drastic reforms in country‘s changing
socio-political dynamics.
When the Arab uprisings were shaking neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, Qaddafi was the first
leader to publicly and vociferously react to demise of Ben Ali‘s regime. The Libyan government,
however, fearing domestic unrest, tried to pacify the public simmering discontent by initiating
reforms and announcing mega housing benefits and price controls.10
Even dozens of members of
the opposition including the former Al-Qaeda affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)11
and Muslim Brotherhood were released to placate public and as a part of government‘s political
reconciliation program. However, the Libyan government was seen broadly inattentive to the
Blanchard and Zanotti, ―Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ 13-15.
―Libya sets up $24 billion fund for housing,‖ Reuters, January 27, 2011.
David Witter, ―Fact Sheet: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,‖ Institute for the Study of War, April 08, 2011.
224
repeated calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for drafting of a constitution amid
opposition from hardliners.
Major anti-government protests broke out in mid-February, triggered by a chain of events in
Benghazi and other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qaddafi‘s control. With zero
international media presence in Libya, other sources (communicating anonymously online or
opposition groups working in exile; reports from human rights organizations) cited killing of at
least a dozen people on February 17 when crowds were fired with live ammunition.12
Peaceful demonstrations soon escalated into full scale civil war. Demand for Qaddafi‘s ouster
unified ragtag groups of revolutionaries. As the unrest intensified, Reuters on February 18
quoted President Barak Obama as saying ―I am deeply concerned by reports of violence in
Bahrain, Libya and Yemen. The United States condemns the use of violence against peaceful
protesters in those countries and wherever else it may occur.‖13
The sudden escalation of violence against unarmed protesters and other civilians drew strong
condemnation from human rights organizations and foreign leaders. As broader unrest emerged
in other regions, government gradually lost control of major cities among news of defections by
a number of military officers, and senior Libyan diplomats. Among them were also the Libyan
Ambassadors to the China, India, Poland, Indonesia and Libyan representatives to the Arab
League and most of the United Nations missions.14
The regime seemed to be losing its
coherence as support for Qaddafi wavered among segments of military.
The ragtag opposition took form of coherent, organized armed rebellion as demonstrators
acquired weapons from defected military units and government arms depots. Qaddafi‘s hold on
power weakened as pro-Qaddafi troops were expelled from most of eastern Libya including
Benghazi and some cities in the Western region by February 23. The regime continued its efforts
to hold the capital amid more violence and increased international pressure for Qaddafi to step
down. The UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1970 and decided ―to refer the
―Deadly ‗day of rage‘ in Libya,‖ AlJazeera, February 18, 2011.
Ross Colvin, ―U.S. alarmed by Bahrain violence, appeals to gov‘t,‖ Reuters, February 18, 2011.
See ―More disciplined Libyan opposition force emerges,‖ CBS News, April 1, 2011. ; ―Five Top Generals Defect from Qaddafi‘s Army,‖ Fox News, May 30, 2011. ; John Hopper and Ian Black, ―Libyan defectors: Pilots told to bomb protesters flee to Malta,‖ Guardian, February 21, 2011.
225
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court‖.15
While he claimed that he was still loved by Libyans, prominent figures among rebels established
a Benghazi based Transitional National Council (TNC) on February 27, to coordinate military
and political activities of rebellion and seek foreign support including freezing and transfer of
Qaddafi‘s assets outside Libya.16
The conflict appeared to have entered a stalemate after rebels
succeeded in taking control of eastern Libya and a number of cities in the West. Pro-Qaddafi
forces seemed once again gaining momentum, launching successful assaults to retake strategic
areas around Tripoli and on the coast of the Gulf of Sidra. By March 10 advantages in weaponry,
training and organization earned Qaddafi loyalists Al-Zawiyah and the oil-export centre of Ras
Lanuf. When Qaddafi forces were gaining the upper hand, the international community was
debating possible diplomatic and military response to the rapidly developing conflict.
The divisions of the international community over possible military intervention- most likely by
imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, persisted. Over expectations of the imposition of a no-fly
zone, the chilling warning came from the veteran ruler that much blood would be shed in
―another Vietnam‖ if Western powers intervened : ― We are ready to hand out weapons to a
million, or 2 million or 3 million, and another Vietnam will begin. It doesn‘t matter to us. We no
longer care about anything.‖17
In spite of stern warnings of ―bloodshed‖ from Qaddafi, the rebels received extensive support
through unrelenting television coverage from the Arab world. The Arab League (AL) and
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) not only condemned violence against civilians
but urged for UN-enforced no-fly zone. France and the United Kingdom were unanimous for
such an operation but other countries like Turkey and Germany expressed their reservations,
emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen
consequences of international military intervention. Even African Union (AU) rejected military
―TEXT-Excerpts from UN sanctions resolution on Libya‖ Reuters (Africa), February 27, 2011.
For details see Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) https://www.temehu.com/ntc.htm accessed October 04, 2016. ―Gaddafi threatens bloodbath in Libya‘‖ ABC News, March 03, 2011.
226
intervention option asserting the crisis to be resolved through negotiations. But it also failed in its
mediation efforts to either sway Qaddafi or to even obtain rebels approval.18
The prospect of rebel‘s military setbacks, mass atrocities and unprecedented Arab advocacy for
intervention pressured Western governments to act. US President Barack Obama eventually
sided with the British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at
the UN Security Council that voted 10-0 (with five abstentions from China, Russia, Germany,
India and Brazil) to authorize military action against Libya on March 17.19
5.2.2.1. The NATO Military Campaign
The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing ―all necessary measures‖ – except
occupation by ground forces – to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya, and imposing a
no-fly zone,20
came at a point with Qaddafi regime was on the verge of defeating rebels in
Benghazi. Imposition of no-fly zone started with French air attacks on regime‘s armoured
column on the road to Benghazi on March 1921
; while US-led operations began shortly
afterwards.22
Qaddafi termed collation attacks as act of aggression against Libya and vowed to
continue fighting.23
Handover to NATO came among debates where several countries objected that coalition‘s
aggressive targeting of ground forces loyal to Qaddafi had exceeded mandate set by the UN
Security Council to protect civilians. Even the NATO cover was unable to boost rebels‘ position
and as fighting progressed hopes of their decisive success against Qaddafi‘s professional troops
receded. As the stalemate persisted, UK announced on April 19 to send a team of military
advisers to aid rebels on military strategy, organization and logistics; followed by France and
Italy to do the same. These countries however specified that their officers would not participate
in fighting. The decision came amid news that poorly organized and underequipped rebels cannot
―The Arab Awakening,‖ The Strategic Survey 2011: The Annual Review of World Affairs, (September 6, 2011): 68-69.
―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ Security Council, SC/10200, March 17, 2011, accessed
October 04, 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. ―Libya UN Resolution 1973: Text Analyzed,‖ BBC News, March 18, 2011.
Liz Sly, Sudarsan Raghavan and Joby Warrick, ―France fires first shots against Libya after Gaddafi‘s forces enter Benghazi,‖ Washington Post, March 19, 2011.
―Obama: US launches military action against Libya,‖ Fox News, March 19, 2011.
Ibid., “Encyclopaedia Britannica Online‖
227
win a decisive victory without foreign help. It was strongly condemned by Libya as it would
only prolong the conflict.24
NATO attacks continued and even sites associated with Qaddafi family and inner circle were
targeted, resulting in deaths of his son Sayf al-Arab and three of his grandchildren on April 30.
Libyan officials protested that NATO was actively pursuing a strategy of trying to kill
Qaddafi.25
While rebels claimed full control over the western city of Misratah, an arrest warrant
was sought by ICC against Qaddafi, his son Sayf al-Islam and their intelligence chief Abdullah
Senussi for ordering attacks on civilians during the uprising. Some observers expressed concerns
that the move would not facilitate Qaddafi to relinquish power voluntarily who continued to hold
Tripoli in spite of international isolation, NATO attacks and rebel advances in the eastern and
western regions.26
Libya kept blaming foreign elements for aiding unrest but it was not until June 29 when France
became the first NATO country to publicly admit that it shipped light arms and ammunition to
rebels in June to help break the stalemate in Libya. The rebels were under sustained attacks from
loyalist forces until roughly the same time and it also seemed to coincide with the weapons
drop.27
Even though the stalemate persisted, TNC was formally recognized by the US on July 15
as the legitimate governing authority in Libya paving way for TNC access to $30 billion in
frozen assets being held in the US.
The capital Tripoli and other western cities remained under control of government forces till
August 2011. But the tide turned against pro-Qaddafi forces when balance of power shifted and
rebel forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, taking control of strategic areas including city of
Zawiyah. Finally coordinated offensive of NATO airstrikes against military targets, rebels in
Tripoli and from across Western Libya sent Qaddafi and his supporters into retreat and exile.
Qaddafi whereabouts remained unknown but he urged his supporters to put up resistance in an
audio statement broadcast on Libyan radio on August 25. $1.7 million reward was announced for David Stringer and Frances D‘Emilio, ―U.K. will send military advisers to Benghazi to help Libya rebels,‖ The Star, April 19, 2011.
Harriet Sherwood, ―Gaddafi compound hit in Nato attack,‖ Guardian, April 25, 2011.
Ibid., “Encyclopædia Britannica Online.‖
David Jolly and Kareem Fahim, ―France Says It Gave Arms to the Rebels in Libya,‖ New York Times, June 29, 2011.
228
anyone killing or capturing Qaddafi by TNC.28
On the international front, rebels gained a major
victory when the UN General Assembly voted to recognize TNC as representatives of Libyan
people on September 16 and some of the Qaddafi era sanctions were also lifted.29
While NATO struck targets in Sirte, Qaddafi‘s hometown, as rebels prepared major ground
assault on the last remaining centres of support for Qaddafi and in an attempt to wear down
supporters of the fugitive leader holed up inside.30
However sporadic and often intensified
fighting continued in and around Sirte and other military districts throughout September and
early October 2011. The revolt was brought to an abrupt close by grisly demise of Qaddafi at the
hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20, 2011 bringing a violent end to a ―dark‖ chapter in
Libyan history, leaving an uncertain path ahead.
5.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Libyan
Military Intervention
As already detailed in Chapter 2 it is the power transition in the global hierarchy principally
which renders vulnerable local hierarchies open to intervention by regional and extra-regional
players in a bid to affect the outcomes of the conflict amenable to their regional agendas. Great
power intervention takes place to arrest the increasing speculation about the impending power
shift in the global hierarchy and to re-establish itself as the predominant state to affect outcome
of the new local hierarchy.
A brief history of Qaddafi‘s era till his gruesome death, already discussed, at the hands of rebel
fighters during the revolt will help us unfold interplay of both unit and systemic level variables at
work for military intervention in Libya. Analyzing Libyan intervention in the post-Qaddafi era
has solved few of the puzzles but the complete picture is still far from clear, considering its only
five and a half years old phenomenon. Analysis of ―threat securitization political discourse‖ for
military intervention in Libya also requires elaboration of these key variables in Libyan context.
See Kristen Chick, ―Libyan rebels announce $1.7 million bounty for Qaddafi,‖ The Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 2011. ; ―Rebels Continue Hunt for Qaddafi As UN Unfreezes Funds,‖ Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, August 26, 2011 .
―UN gives Libya‘s seat to NTC,‖ CBC News, September 16, 2011.
―NATO Airstrikes Hit Qaddafi‘s Hometown,‖ Fox News, September 26, 2011.
229
5.3.1. Geography
Geography is an important variable in military intervention model. A great power seldom
intervenes in any area strategically unimportant to her interests or in minor power bilateral
territorial disputes. Great power military intervention takes place in such countries when
outcomes of an intra-state or inter-state dispute might threaten national interests of those powers
or contrary developments might prove consequential to them. International politics designates
flux as the only constant. Hence, assigning a permanent place to a local state or hierarchy is not
possible. Some regions may assume unusual importance at time and might become irrelevant at
another.
International military intervention in Libya took place at a moment when U.S. prestige and
influence suffered a deficit owing to Global Financial Crisis 2008 and Russian belligerence in its
―near-abroad‖ unnerved US Western allies as they nervously watched US indecision and lack of
will to decisively assert in the ongoing transition. This international scenario was followed by
abrupt changes in MENA and resulted in terminating recent US apathy to the region as the pace
and scope of the changes unfolding also took US by surprise. Contemporary global and regional
environment assigned immediate spotlight to a region neglected for the past few decades.
While a super power might elevate or reduce the importance it assigns to a small state, a country
in its local environment is a permanently hostage to its immediate neighbours either friends or
foes. Hence, the role of neighbours and regional dominant state assumes great importance when
an international military intervention takes place in the target state. Geographically it won‘t be
correct to assert that it occupies a key strategic position for great powers especially for US but
abrupt and unprecedented changes in the overall regional scenario during the period assigned
unusual focus to events in Libya. Though Libya - the fourth largest country in the continent - had
for long occupied a prominent position within the African context. 95% of its territory consists of
the Sahara desert that extends into Tunisia and Algeria in the west, has Egypt in the east and
across the southern frontiers into Niger, Chad and Sudan.
The neighbouring countries had for long feared that instability in Libya would destabilize them
and bid for increasing influence by regional and extra-regional players would further spill the
entire region into chaos, a speculation that is corroborated by facts in the post-Qaddafi era.
230
However, Libyan military intervention took place at a time when local hierarchy had already
been torn apart by Arab uprisings in neighbouring states. Tunisia on the West and Egypt on the
East of Tripoli had de-seated their decades old authoritarian regimes that so far had been staunch
American allies, providing stability and continuity to US policies in the region. These startling
developments led to destabilization in the region.
Libya gained an unusual importance because of its dual affiliation also. Its Arab roots had always
rendered Libya as an important player in the Middle Eastern politics. Whereas the long-
established Western friendly allies couldn‘t stand the popular uprising, anti-West Libya seemed
to be on a determined path to contain the rebellion. A victorious and more defiant Qaddafi that
survived such a major onslaught on his regime was the least desirable US option. The impact of
such an outcome for the MENA region would have been far-reaching as Qaddafi‘s Libya had the
full potential to be one of the contenders for shaping regional hierarchy contrary to US interests.
Hence, the unexpected and unforeseen overthrow of familiar regional hierarchal structure was
determined to not only plunge the region into chaos but it also created a power vacuum that
pitched local, regional and extra-regional players against each other for affecting an outcome in
line with their self-identified interests. Military intervention in such an environment was, thus,
not a farfetched outcome.
5.3.2. Intra-State Conflict
Aside from external factors, internal domestic political-military situation and socio-economic
conditions also pave way for overt military intervention. A particular form of government rarely
makes a country more vulnerable to intervention, until it has satisfied, stable, thriving and
functioning polities. But when internal set-up already in transition or triggered by unforeseen
incident, it might leave a country more vulnerable. Especially when state‘s established status quo
is being contested and internal dissatisfied challengers are co-opted by interveners, overt military
intervention by regional and extra-regional players becomes a reality. Extension of power
transition research program to domestic situation is possible. Here again degree of satisfaction
with state‘s established status quo and potential dissatisfied challengers make the environment
more conducive to overt external military intervention (Chapter 2).
231
In Libyan case during Qaddafi‘s era its contradictory political dynamics emboldened competing
interest groups within the country to seek to influence domestic security and foreign policy
within the confines of its authoritarian political system. While Qaddafi‘s ideology permeated the
political discourse on security and foreign policy issues, economic front remained flexible for
reform and new frameworks to meet society‘s changing needs. Libya particularly sought to
project resistance to foreign domination and preserving sovereignty in rhetorical references.
5.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies
In a country where tribal relations precede any other affiliation, Qaddafi preserved the balance
with regard to distribution of leadership role in government ministries and in political-military
relations. His strategy of frequent re-balancing of roles and responsibilities of his lieutenants
made it difficult for outsiders to understand Libyan politics. Overlapping portfolios were
assigned to several key political figures where they frequently switched roles. This was
significant in a country where personalities and relationships often played more important roles
than official titles. His own tribe, the Qadhafa, held key government positions while larger rival
tribes like the Warfalla resented Qaddafi regime for tribal discrimination. These grievances had
been responsible for limited coup attempts in 1984, 1993 and 1996, based in part on tribal and
familial rivalries. Following failed coup attempts Qaddafi started extensive purging of military
periodically, eliminating potential rivals and replacing them with loyal followers in their place.31
However, political parties and all opposition groups were banned in Libya under law number 71
of 1972. Most frequently cited laws in Libya were the 1971 and 1972 ―Protection of the
Revolution‖ laws. They criminalized activities based on political principles inconsistent with
revolutionary ideology. Though arbitrary arrest and detention was prohibited by law but, in
practice, security services detained individuals without formal charges and held them indefinitely
without court conviction. 32
The inability to acknowledge greater popular participation would
later turned out as one of the main driving force for revolutionaries in 2011 uprising.
Libya‘s unique political system though nominally decentralized with participatory levels of
government under Qaddafi was largely regarded by external observers as authoritarian and
31
―Politics Under Gaddafi,‖ Global Security Organization, accessed October 8, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/opposition.htm. Ibid.
232
undemocratic. A major cabinet reshuffle along with Secretary (prime minister-equivalent) took
place in March 2006 which brought former Health Minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi to
power. The move was interpreted as reassertion of control by conservative and hard-line
elements of Libyan political establishment.33
Understanding of the basic government structure under Qaddafi is very important to assess the
kind of dissatisfaction prevailing within the country and how it challenged the established status
quo when opportunity arrived in February 2011. The unique political system practiced in Libya
failed to give popular participation to the citizens. The regime was stagnating economically too
and voices of opposition were subtly rising across the country, particularly from the poorer,
eastern areas. There had been simmering discontent with slow pace of constitutional reforms
which registered itself in the anti-government unrest when people overwhelmingly came out in
public against Qaddafi‘s regime.
5.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups
The festering grievance and discontent was also because of the way opposition leaders and
groups had been harshly dealt with over the last four decades. Establishment of ―people‘s courts‖
and ―revolutionary committee‖ was done to enforce ideological and political discipline and to
punish violators and dissidents. Throughout Qaddafi‘s era opposition to regime both within
Libya and outside can be broadly categorized as either Islamist, royalist or democratic in
orientation but neither posed a credible threat to Qaddafi‘s regime because their activities had
been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry and ideological differences. When 2011 anti-
government unrest took place neither of the exiled groups or leaders were in a place to present an
alternative to the Qaddafi regime.
Opposition groups in exile included the Islamist Rally, the National Libya Salvation Front
(NLSF), the National Alliance, the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Libyan
National Movement (LNM) and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. Among them
NFSL and LNM were the two most important external opposition groups. The latter was
composed of dissidents of former POWs in Chad while NFSL had importance because of its
BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Libyan leader says cabinet must be dismantled,‖ March 2, 2008. ; and ―Libyan Leader Addresses Libyan People‘s Congress: Dissolves Cabinet,‖ OSC Report GMP 200803005864001, March 3,
2008.
233
financial strength and it was the one that organized 1984 raid on Qaddafi‘s residence at Tripoli
Bab-al-Azizya barracks. The abortive coup attempt led to a short-lived reign of terror in which
thousands were imprisoned, interrogated and an unknown number executed. Otherwise internal
opposition was not that apparent other than Islamic opposition groups that emerged largely in the
eastern region in 1990s.34
Internally the main threat to Qaddafi always came from army itself and he often adopted policy of
shifting senior officers from one post to another to prevent officer corps from closing ranks. In spite
of that numerous coup attempts were uncovered in his four decades rule. Distrust of the professional
military also led him to entrust his personal security to a handpick detachment of his own region.
Dissent from government policies was deemed contrary to the spirit of revolution and severe punitive
measures were then adopted to counter them. One of the reasons why internal opposition remained
disorganized and ineffective was because of the comprehensive internal security system that involved
police, secret service and local revolutionary committees.35
5.3.2.2.1. The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood
From the late 1980s anti-Islamic fundamentalist policy agenda dominated domestic politics as
Qaddafi realized fundamentalism might prove to be a rallying point for opponents of his regime.
He had conflicts with traditional religious hierarchy but apart from them the Muslim
Brotherhood was prominent whose membership went into exile or underground during Qaddafi‘s
tenure especially when its activists were jailed in 1973. To stem the tide of this religious,
fundamentalist opposition, country‘s forty-eight Islamic institutes were also closed in late 1986.
They reemerged and kept clandestine operations for next two decades. Sayf al Islam Qaddafi
publicly characterized the group as non-violent and non-seditious in an attempt to reach out to
Muslim Brotherhood in 2007.
5.3.2.2.2. The Libyan Fighting Group (LIFG)
Another fundamentalist group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was co-opted by
Qaddafi regime and over 100 members were released in the secret reconciliation program in
2009 to encourage them to renounce violence but concerns about group‘s domestic and
―Qaddafi Era Opposition,‖ Global Security Organization.
Ibid.
234
international activities persisted. US froze the LIFG‘s US assets in September 2001 and formally
designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2004.36
Members of the group had also been
linked to Al-Qaeda, though LIFG refuted the claim in July 2009 statement. But it was being
speculated that eastern Libya could serve as a stronghold for LIFG members and hence pose a
threat to Libyan security.37
However, with respect to unrest in 2011 it would not be wrong to claim neither internal nor
external opposition, both religious and secular, was in a position to pose a credible threat to
regime. The opposition based in UK and Egypt was also neither active nor cohesive. The tension
between eastern and western parts of the country was apparent though, probably partly because
of strong fundamentalist presence in the east of the country. Nevertheless, opposition kept
expressing desire to rid country of autocratic regime. In July 2005 opposition groups held a
conference in London and issued a ―national accord‖ that called for removal of Qaddafi from
power and voiced support for the establishment of a transitional government.38
A follow-up
meeting was then held in 2008.39
When opportunity arrived in February 2011 these internal and external groups, that for decades
had resented and resisted the established status quo, were ready to avail it and immediately a
Transitional National Council (TNC) was set up to chalk out a unified plan for ouster of Qaddafi.
Simmering discontent had been brought to the boiling point and both regional and extra-regional
players sensing a historic opportunity got involved in the domestic situation to affect the desired
outcome. However, absence of indigenous ground based opposition was bound to embroil post-
Qaddafi Libya into mad struggle for power and influence, witnessed till date of this writing.
5.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players
Another variable that plays a significant role in the international military intervention and that
explicitly links the unit and systemic levels is the role of regional and extra-regional players. As
explained in Chapter 2, the conflict within the relevant dyad may or may not even involve ―Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ CRS Report, 21.
Ibid. 21,22.
May Youssef, ―Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,‖ Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo) 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005. ;
―Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,‖ Al Jazeera (Doha), June 25, 2005. ; ―Libya‘s Fractured Opposition,‖ Middle East Mirror, July 29, 2005. ―Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London to Reiterate Commitment to save Libya,‖ OSC Report
GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.
235
regional intervention. But when a great power intervenes in the target state, it always triggers
other local, regional and extra-regional players with interests at stake over the outcome of the
conflict. Every player wants a favourable end-result amenable to her security environment and
coinciding with self-identified national interests.
While local and regional states are concerned with the new configuration of power to emerge
within the country once the conflict ends and its impact on regional hierarchical structure; so few
of those states may or may not play a very active role when the power is still in transition and
may resort to more active role once the signs of extinction of existing set up becomes apparent.
Such local and regional states want to limit any damage if by chance the target state emerges
resilient and ruling regime survives the onslaught or if the great power intervention gets
terminated half-way. But once the impending transition is more than a reality, they actively
lobby and their interference becomes even more intrusive.
However, great powers role become apparent from the very start of the conflict. Especially those
extra-regional players who want to enhance their standing in the global hierarchy by shaping
local/regional status quo, they want to register themselves as important global players with
ability to re-write regional hierarchy. The stakes of the declining global hegemon are different
from other great powers; once the hegemon enters the conflict, its legitimacy as a global leader is
at stake. A protracted conflict or the contrary result may affect her global standing more than any
other player and send a very strong message to dissatisfied potential challengers that long-
awaited systemic changes are in progress. Though it may not dent her international standing
immediately; a swift conclusion of the undertaking, however, signify that the power parity gap
with the declining hegemon is still potent and their ability to undercut hegemon‘s international
political influence still negligible.
In the light of this analysis role of regional and extra-regional players in the Libyan intervention
will be ascertained; this involves all the major actors in both the African and Middle Eastern
context also. With the civil war in Libya still in progress, all the major players both internal and
external are deeply involved to affect the outcome. A final result will not only heavily alter
local/regional hierarchical structure, by empowering few players but will also determine where
US stands in MENA after advocating intervention in a second Muslim country within a decade.
236
5.3.3.1. North African Libyan Neighbours
The overthrow of Qaddafi though an event of major significance for the Sahel and North African
regions, was largely ignored and little scholarly or policy attention was paid to Libya‘s
relationship with respect to sub-Saharan Africa during and after the conflict. Their recent history
has been checkered and in modern times Libyan-African relations had been closely identified
with the person of Muammar Qaddafi who tried to buy influence in the continent after being
rebuffed by Arab leaders while also promoting grandiose visions of himself as the leader of the
continent. According to a popular perception his support for insurgents and some legitimate
liberation movements (such as the South African ANC) earned him approval of the largesse sub-
Saharan Africans in general and the AU in particular. Many black Libyans fighting on behalf of
the Qaddafi during the unrest were also stigmatized as ―African mercenaries‖. Fact is geography
cannot be overcome and Libyan stakes in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be overlooked and vice
versa.
5.3.3.1.1. SUDAN
The Sudanese role in the Libyan crisis of 2011 was pivotal and their support to Libyan
opposition was immediate and generous through effective collaboration with the TNC and the
international community. Sudan had visible interest in the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime as
their bilateral relations had been far from cordial owing to Qaddafi‘s negative interference in its
internal affairs, his logistic support to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Darfur
rebel movements. Qaddafi‘s support to Sudan‘s political opposition including the Sudan People
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) later led to the secession of southern Sudan in July of
2011, forming the state of South Sudan. Throughout this period Khartoum had been trying to
neutralize impact of Qaddafi‘s interference in its internal affairs by trying to increase activities of
the internal Libyan opposition to make her engrossed in her own internal troubles.40
Events of
February 2011 provided Sudan with rare opportunity to achieve its objectives in Libya by
toppling Qaddafi and subsequently protecting its national security from further Libyan
intervention and help her achieve internal stability too.
Asim Elhag, ―The Sudanese Role in Libya 2011,‖ World Peace Foundation: Reinventing Peace, December 17, 2012.
237
They provided Libyan opposition with logistical assistance, training and supply of arms,
ammunition and combat equipment, and security and intelligence cooperation. Their role in
facilitating TNC communication with the Government of Niger was especially significant as
Niger leadership had been supporting the ex-Libyan regime.41
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
also played decisive role in the city of Kufra by expelling Qaddafi elements from the city. This
overwhelming supporting role to topple Qaddafi regime was later revealed by the Sudanese
President, Omar Al Bashir, himself on October 26, 2011.42
Khartoum‘s interference in the post-
Qaddafi period hasn‘t subdued either. They are now being accused of supporting Islamists in the
country which resulted in the subsequent expulsion of Sudan‘s defence attaché by Libya in
September 2014.43
5.3.3.1.2. NIGER
Libya-Niger relations had also gone through ups and down. In 1980s and 1990s the Tuareg
insurgency in Niger and Mali was supported by Qaddafi‘s Libya but bilateral relations improved
significantly after 2000. Niger migrant workers along with Tuaregs fought on sides of the pro-
Qaddafi forces against the revolutionaries.44
It was one of the last African countries to recognize
the transitional set up in Libya.45
The extent of close relations could be ascertained by the fact
that prominent members of Qaddafi family including his son Saddi Qaddafi took refuge in Niger
until it was extradited to Libya in March 2014.46
Niger was concerned about the unrest in Libya as its own vital interests were at stake. It serves as
a transit route for Libya and Mali for AQIM, other jihadists as well as the Tuareg groups. This
cross-border terrorist activity and movement along with proliferation of arms undermines already
fragile stability. Recently Boko Haram, increasingly active in southern Niger, also used the
Ibid.
James Copnall, ―Sudan‘s Bashir says his country supported Libya rebels,‖ African Review, October 27, 2011.
―Libya accuses Sudan of arming terrorists,‖ Times of Israel, September 8, 2014.
Peter Gwin ―Former Qaddafi Mercenaries Describe Fighting in Libyan War,‖ Pulitzer Center, August 31, 2011.
Peter Clottey ―Libya To Question Gadhafi‘s Son, Says Niger Official,‖ Voice of America, October 01, 2011.
― Gadhafi‘s Son al-Saadi extradited to Libya,‖ USA Today , March 6, 2014.
238
transit route to get to and from Libya. Furthermore, the conflict in Mali and its spillover effect is
threatening its strategically important uranium mines by AQIM and its splinter groups.47
5.3.3.1.3. ALGERIA
Qaddafi sustained amicable relations with Algeria most of the times that enjoys a powerful
influence throughout the Maghreb and the Sahara; they stood neutral during 2011 unrest. Even
several of Qaddafi‘s family members also sought refuge there when events took serious turn in
Libya which led to antagonism on part of the new Libyan government.48
Both have shared same
stances on regional issues likes the wish to wrest the Western Sahara, controlled by the
Polisario49
, form Morocco and hostility towards Israel since 1980s. The African Press Agency
even claimed during the uprising that the Algerian government supported Qaddafi‘s attempt to
recruit mercenaries, especially from the Polisario to repress the insurrection.50
This issue also
sparked tension between TNC and Algeria.
Algerian bilateral relations with Libya had been heavily influenced by her own vital security
interests, affected in turn by current chaos in Libya. Fezzan is used as a safe haven by Al-Qaeda
in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadists operating in Algeria. Certain areas of the region
close to borders with Niger and Algeria serve as logistic zones by terrorists and for launching
combat operations in neighbouring countries.51
Algeria at the moment is employing both diplomacy and military to safeguard its interests from
the fallout of Libyan chaos by facilitating negotiations between Libyan warring factions and
through UNSMIL mediation process along with Tunisia, Egypt, France, Italy and the US. Their
security service enjoys a reputation for penetration in all armed and political formations both
― Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States in Libya‘s Civil War,‖ Le Courrier du Maghreb et de I‟Orient
The Maghreb and Orient Courier 26 (July & August 2016) , accessed on October 3, 2016. http://lecourrierdumaghrebetlorient.info/focus/libya-the-interests-of-the-neighbouring-states-in-libyas-civil-war/. Ibid.
The Polisario is a politico-military organization based in Algerian town of Tindouf, currently fighting Morocco to take control of the former Western Sahara, currently under Morocco‘s sovereignty and win independence for that region.
Anna Mahjar-Barducci, ―The Role of Algeria in Libya,‖ Gatestone Institute, September 16, 2011.
―Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States,‖ Le Courrier du Maghreb et de I‟Orient.
239
inside and across the border making them a formidable presence to be employed for stabilizing
the region.52
5.3.3.1.5. CHAD
Chad leaned towards Qaddafi during Libyan crisis of 2011. They enjoyed friendly relations once
the conflict over Libyan sponsorship of particular leaders of Chadian civil wars, the territorial
dispute over Aouzou strip and the Libyan annexation of Chad was over in 1994. Chad President
Idriss Deby, brought to power in 1990 by Qaddafi himself through financial and military support,
was apprehensive of TNC ability to expel Africans and their rigid Islamist tendencies. Hence
Libyan tendency to destabilize its neighbour was a major concern.
During the revolution many Chadian mercenaries fought for Qaddafi. Libyan revolutionaries
accused Chad for playing key role in preventing fall of Qaddafi in February 2011. Chad
reluctantly recognized TNC only under international pressure in August 2011 but kept
expressing concern that political turmoil in Libya would have its impact on Chad.
5.3.3.1.5. TUNISIA
The smallest state in North Africa, Tunisia had vital interests in Libya. Surviving under the
shadow of its wealthy neighbour, it had always been concerned about impending instability in
Libya after Qaddafi. The 2011 uprisings started with Tunisia; before the unprecedented
developments the two countries had been at ―a historical high point‖, making Libya Tunisia‘s
biggest trade partner in the region. It also benefitted from oil imports at a preferential price that
accounted for almost 25 % of its recorded oil imports from its neighbour.53
In the wake of Libyan crisis, the links of domestic terrorist outfit the Ansar al-Sharia (AST) with
across the border western branch of Ansar al-Sharia (ASL) and the Islamic State presence were
unnerving Tunisian security apparatus. Tunisia recognized the transitional TNC as the sole
legitimate representative of the Libyan people on August 20, 2011 in a significant policy shift,
which has remained neutral in the months-long civil conflict.54
So far Tunisia has kept itself
Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States,‖ The Maghreb and Orient Courier.
Youssef Cherif, ―Libya and Tunisia, For Worse or for Better,‖ Institut Arabe des Chefs d‟Eterprises , 2014.
―Tunis recognizes Libyan rebels as country‘s rep,‖ Yahoo News, August 21, 2011.
240
away from Libyan internal quarrels and its ability to influence events in its eastern neighbour
remains limited.
5.3.3.1.6. EGYPT
Libya and Egypt have enjoyed strong historic ties and they have vital security and economic
interests tied to each other which had been seriously affected by the instability prevailing in
Libya following 2011 Arab awakening. While on the one hand, return of hundreds of thousands
of migrant workers and discontinuity in their remittances back home had put additional pressure
on all segments of Egyptian economy.55
On the other hand, the chaos following Libyan uprising
has affected domestic security interests of Egypt, especially with regard to its fight against its
own domestic counter-terrorism campaign.
Eastern Libya is used for weapons supply and staging attacks on Egypt by domestic jihadists
groups like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), who claimed to have pledged allegiance to ISIL too.
Cario responded by significantly reinforcing troops on its western border.
During the time of Libyan revolution, Egypt itself was going through settling period after the
overthrow of Mubarak regime. However, once Qaddafi departed from the scene and al-Sisi
replaced Morsi as Egyptian President, Cairo has actively supported General Khalifa Hafter‘s
fight against Islamists including more moderate Libyan Muslim Brotherhood.56
A radical
Islamist state on its border would be a nightmare for Egypt. As a result, the assistance to Haftar
has been comprehensive and has included training and delivery of all kinds of ammunition,
weapons and military equipment including fight jets and attack helicopters.57
Depending upon
the number and intensity of terrorist attacks on Egyptian soil, an intrusive intervention into Libya
by Cairo is always a possibility and Egypt will most likely remained engaged in the conflict till it
shapes the outcome favourable to its strategic interests.
55
Hannah Gurman, ―Migrant Workers in Libya,‖ Asia Pacific Migration Network, International Labour Organization, accessed October 12, 2016, http://apmagnet.ilo.org/news/migrant-workers-in-libya. ―Egypt supports Haftar and his efforts to secure Libya‘s oil wealth,‖ Middle East Monitor, September 16, 2016.
―Libyan MP says Egyptian planes strike Benghazi as Haftar mounts attack,‖ Middle East Eye, October 15, 2014.
241
5.3.3.2. Key Regional Players in Libyan Crisis
Apart from local/neighbouring countries having their stakes directly involved in the ongoing
crisis in Libya; certain regional players also try to affect the outcome of the conflict so as to
improve their standing in the emerging local hierarchy. These players are also significant in
shaping war narrative emerging out of the conflict. In Libyan intervention context, role of UAE,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would be analyzed.
5.3.3.2.1. UNITED ARAB EMIRETS (UAE)
The fall of Qaddafi regime quickly dissipated the centralized power, leaving Libya into chaos
and allowing a wide range of armed groups to assert control over large swathes of the territory in
the oil-rich nation. Since then, it became a battleground for local, regional and extra-regional
powers with competing interests and conflicting visions. The UAE was the Gulf exception in the
sense that it enjoyed cordial relations with Qaddafi‘s Libya, ties that dated back to early 1970s
and reciprocated by the ruling Emirates family. Other than strong family and business ties, both
shared their strong aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood.58
The change in UAE public posture towards Libyan regime came in March 2011 when it declared
that it will contribute 12 jetfighters to help impose UN Resolution 1973.59
This was not a
principled change of heart on part of UAE but an attempt to offset the rumors that UAE along
with Algeria was transporting mercenaries from African locations to Libya to help Qaddafi put
down the revolt, the charge Emiratis always denied; and to counter Qatari moves that had already
been advocating military action against the regime along with France.60
However, in the post-Qaddafi Libya, the Emirati-Qatari rivalry have asserted itself in fierce
geopolitical struggle with UAE along with Egypt backing Tobruk-based government while Qatar
along with Turkey and Sudan supporting the Islamist-led government in Tripoli. This proxy war
is proving highly influential in shaping Libya‘s post-Qaddafi political order and also throws light
on how GCC ruling families react to grassroots democratic Islamist movements like the Muslim
Ahmed Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War,‖ Middle East Eye, September 5, 2014.
―UAE sending 12 planes on Libyan mission,‖ Khaleej Times, March 26, 2011.
Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War.‖
242
Brotherhood. Whereas, Abu Dhabi‘s concern reflect about movement‘s potential to challenge the
status quo in the UAE‘s poor emirates where it has maintained a support base for years.61
As long as the rise of Qatari-based Islamist groups in Libya and other MENA nations are viewed
as unsettling developments to their long-term political and economic order by Abu Dhabi,
prospects for a diplomatic settlement aimed at securing long-term resolution of the dispute
between rivals groups in Libya are very low. By further militarizing the conflict, the proxy war
will further diminish the prospects for stability in Libya and will keep actors within and without
the region engaged in the imbroglio.
5.3.3.2.2. QATAR
The small gulf state signaled its outsized geopolitical ambition after a period of initial caution in
January 2011 as the evolving contours of the political upheavals cascading across MENA
asserted themselves. Their decision to embrace the direction of change was unique in the sense
that most of the other regional states viewed popular pressures unleashed by the Arab Spring as
inherently threatening. Qatari role in Qaddafi‘s Libya got prominent since the beginning. With
little at stake in Qaddafi‘s Libya, officials in Doha realized that their interests would be better
served by his departure.
It played key role in galvanizing GCC and Arab support for UN Security Council resolution that
mandated NATO to defend civilians in Libya and subsequently recognizing NTC. During the
uprising, it actively supported the rebels with weapons and ammunition on a large scale. Not
only its air force took part in NATO-led attacks but it later admitted assisting rebels through
hundreds of ground troops as well.62
However, what got Qatar into trouble with neighbouring Gulf states was its backing of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2011, Doha has emerged as one of the key backers of political Islam
by supporting the movement in MENA and other Islamist outfits from Tunisia to Syria.63
Qatar
relationship with the Islamist groups, including Hamas and Jabhat al-Nusra etc., though publicly 61
Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner, ―The UAE and Qatar Wage a Proxy War in Libya,‖ Huffington Post, December 14, 2015. Ian Black, ―Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels,‖ Guardian, October 26, 2011.
Ishaan Tharoor and Adam Taylor, ―Here are the key players fighting the war for Libya, all over again,‖
Washington Post, August 27, 2014.
243
questioned by the US, had privately become the go-to US partner for indirect communications
with these very groups. Beyond the Middle East Doha had facilitated talks between the US and
Taliban in Afghanistan though ended without success. Qatar viewed their contribution as the
natural outgrowth of their belief in nonjudgmental dialogue.64
In the post-Qaddafi period, Qatar had failed to leverage its control into tangible outcomes and
failed to translate short-term gains into long-term influence. But both UAE and Qatar are
expected to remain engaged in long term proxy war till outcomes align with their charted path
but that definitely alienates larger public. It becomes harder for players to avoid appearance of
taking sides and picking winners when political spoils were handed out.
5.3.3.2.3. TURKEY
Turkey was among one the few countries who maintained links with the Qaddafi regime during
the time of the crisis. On this account it was criticized by both the pro and anti-Qaddafi factions
for not taking a clear stand and sacrificing one‘s interests for the sake of other. With business
interests worth $15.3 billion at stake, it was particularly difficult for Turkey to out rightly oppose
Qaddafi.65
When NATO started military campaign against Libya, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan,
expressed his conditional support and publicly stated: "NATO should go in with the recognition
and acknowledgement that Libya belongs to the Libyans, not for the distribution of its
underground resources and wealth."66
Throughout the crisis, Turkey kept pressing for finding a
political solution and proposed a plan in the fourth Libyan Contact Group meeting.67
However, the crisis in Libya seemed to place Ankara in a difficult situation while balancing its
aspirations to become an effective major player in the Middle East and simultaneously
maintaining its traditional alliances intact became problematic. Besides it wanted to be seen on
the right side of history and position itself reflecting people‘s aspirations in the region. The crisis
64
Adam Goldman and Karen DeYoung, ―Qatar played now-familiar role in helping to broker U.S. hostage‘s release‖ Washington Post, August 25, 2014. ―Turkey wants Libyan intervention over quickly,‖ Reuters, March 21, 2011.
Ibid.
Susan Fraser, ―Turkey proposes ‗road map‘ to end Libyan Crisis,‖ Associated Press, July 14, 2011.
244
opened the fissures between Turkey and NATO as well as some of the alliance‘s member
countries, in particular France.68
In the post-Qaddafi period Turkey‘s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood has landed it in the
proxy war being played in the region. Along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has joined forces
to squash the Muslim Brotherhood while on the other hand it has joined the Qatar-Turkish bloc
along with Sudan by playing a role in Qatari weapons shipments to Libyan Dawn, a
superstructure of militia forces dominating Tripoli.69
Given Turkish stakes, it will not be
ambitious to state that it is likely to remain engaged in the proxy war till its ultimate conclusion.
5.3.3.2.4. SAUDI ARABIA
When the Arab uprisings unfolded in 2011, the Saudi monarchs looked on with horror as series
of Arab autocrats backed by Riyadh were replaced by chaotic, fledgling democracies. When
pressured to back airstrikes on Libya by Western Allies, it tried to deflect US criticism of Saudi
Arabian intervention in Bahrain. A Saudi official admitted: ―We backed air strikes on Libya in
exchange for the US muting its criticism of the slaughter in Bahrain‖.70
Saudi role in Libya became more apparent in post-Qaddafi Libya. Riyadh along with UAE has
launched a campaign across the region to roll back what they regard existential threat to their
authority by Islamists groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Military ouster of the Islamist
President in Egypt not only served as a hope, but has pitched the regional players against each
other. This regional polarization has resulted in the formation of opposing blocks – Saudi Arabia
and UAE on one side, Turkey and Qatar on the other side- and so far has proved to be gigantic
impediment to international efforts to resolve Libyan crisis.71
Currently Saudia has competing regional priorities, with focus on the protracted Operation
Decisive Storm in Yemen; it is expected to play more of a supporting role in the Libyan conflict; Yigal Schleifer, ―Libyan Crisis a Missed Opportunity for Turkey,‖ World Politics Review, March 28, 2011.
Fehim Tastekin, ―Turkey‘s War in Libya,‖ Al-Monitor, December 4, 2014.
Adrian Blomfield, ―Bahrain hardliners to put Shia MPs on trial,‖ Telegraph, March 30, 2011.
David D. KirkPatrik and Eric Schmitt, ―Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.,‖ New York Times, August 25, 2014.
245
thus leaving UAE and Qatar as the main GCC players with contradictory aims in the Libyan
crisis.72
5.3.3.3. Key Extra-Regional Players in Libyan Crisis
When a local/regional hierarchy undergoes power transition, it produces a power vacuum and
extra-regional players get involved. Some of these players may have deeper strategic interests
related to the region while others just try to reinforce their global standing. Libyan crisis of 2011
saw France and the United Kingdom as other extra-regional players that played pivotal role in
Libyan military intervention along with US.
5.3.3.3.1. FRANCE
When unrest broke out in Libya in February 2011, there was an array of hostile political actors
happy to see prospect of getting rid of Qaddafi forever. His rapprochement with the West,
surrendering of weapons of mass destruction program and willingness to cooperate on counter-
terrorism had failed to undo years of distrust and hostility. However, France had more than just
one score to settle with Qaddafi. The mercurial leader rising influence in the African continent in
decades preceding revolution and especially his willingness to bankroll regimes in West Africa
had direly threatened not only France‘s economic interests but its cultural influence was also at
risk of being further curtailed till Qaddafi occupied the mantle of power in Libya.
With no significant trade or other interests at stake in Libya, France took a lead role along with
other like-minded states interested in seeing Qaddafi go at the earliest possible time. France
eventually led the aerial campaign that precipitated international military intervention.73
Their
interests shaped their post-Qaddafi behavior too, with France leaning towards Mustafa Abd al-
Jalil- a lawyer with Islamist slant, when the US and the Emiratis were favouring Mahmoud Jibril.
This competition to promote their local allies complicated already existing complex maze of
ideological and tribal interests. However, unlike the regional competing states of Qatar and UAE,
France preferred to work behind the scenes aimed at securing lucrative business deals.74
The
Total French Energy Company was taking advantage of Paris leading role to augment its position ―A larger role for Saudi Arabia in Libya?,‖ Means Associated Limited (Blog), August 19, 2015.
―Libya: US, UK and France attack Gaddafi forces,‖ BBC News, March 20, 2011.
Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War.‖
246
in Libyan oil sector once the conflict ends at the expense of oil companies of other countries.75
Similarly Paris Conference held on September 1, immediately after the fall of Tripoli, also
helped secure French interests in the aftermath of the conflict. They secured the right to exploit
35% of Libyan oil resources in exchange for total support during the conflict by NTC, an
agreement later denied by both.76
The French government of Nicholas Sarkozy, is also reported to have used the Libyan campaign
to sell Rafale fighter. Developed at a great expense but unable to secure export orders, despite
strenuous efforts; the French were trying to sell them to Qaddafi also as late as 2010, though
successfully. During the Libyan revolution the very first aircraft to attack Qaddafi forces was
Rafales. It even led many analysts to speculate that whether the operation, as in words of the
Foreign Policy magazine, was ―an advertisement for the Dassault Rafale fighter jet‖. Thanks to
the Libyan campaign, now the export prospects have improved considerably.77
Recently disclosed emails from Hillary Clinton‘s adviser Sidney Blumenthal have unearthed
more disturbing motives of NATO Libyan intervention, including Qaddafi‘s plan to create a
gold-backed currency to compete with euro and dollar. With regard to French motives it was
claimed that Nicholas Sarkozy led the attack on Libya with ―five specific reasons in mind: to
obtain Libyan oil, ensure French influence in the region, increase Sarkozy‘s reputation
domestically, assert French military power, and to prevent Qaddafi‘s influence in what is
considered ―Francophone Africa.‖78
Most astounding revelation about the true French motives was the threat posed to French franc
(CFA) circulating as a prime African currency. Qaddafi‘s estimated 143 tons of gold and similar
amounts of silver were intended to be used to establish a pan-African currency based on the
Libyan golden Dinar. If implemented the initiative would have provided the Francophone Africa
with alternative to the French franc (CFA).79
A higher degree of North African economic
independence under the new pan-African currency led by Libya was to be avoided at all cost.
David N. Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention,‖ Counter Punch, September 15, 2011.
Richard Rousseau, ―Libya: A Very Long War over Competing Energy Interests,‖ Foreign Policy Journal, November 19, 2011.
Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention.‖
Brad Hoff, Hillary Emails Reveal True Motive for Libyan Intervention,‖ Foreign Policy Journal , January 6, 2016.
ibid.
247
Given immense French stakes in post-Qaddafi Libya, it is expected to remain engaged in the
post-conflict re-building and re-construction. French would most probably want to avoid another
scenario with a hostile regime in Libya is again in a position to threaten its wider economic and
strategic interests in the region.
5.3.3.3.2. UNITED KINGDOM (UK)
Apart from France, another extra-regional player with most prominent role in Libya at the time
of intervention was the United Kingdom. Tony Blair government was one of the first in the West
to reopen a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime following its renunciation of terrorism and nuclear
and chemical weapons programs. UK maintained its close relationship with Qaddafi until his
hold on power got doubtful following massive unrest against his regime. Qaddafi government
had been working closely with both US and British intelligence services in the distasteful process
of ―extraordinary rendition‖ – a process that allowed transportation of suspected terrorists
overseas and whereby they were interrogated and tortured by Libyan operatives.80
Besides
British oil firms benefitted from lucrative contracts and also from Qaddafi‘s family billions of
dollars in assets to London, estimated around £20 billion in liquid.81
The unrest in Libya in February 2011 quickly saw a shift in UK policy towards Qaddafi already
marked by a number of contradictions. It then became one of the leading states to enforce no-fly
zone on Libya following UNSC resolution 1973 passed to enforce protection of civilians through
international use of force.82
On the first anniversary of the start of the Libyan revolution, Prime
Minister David Cameron remarked Britain was ―proud‖ of the part played in the revolution.83
Cameron said that the military action against Qaddafi was "necessary, it is legal and it is right."
Right, "because I don't believe that we should stand aside while this dictator murders his own
people."84
However, a recent scathing report published by the Foreign Affairs Committee held Cameron
―ultimately responsible‖ for instability in Libya following the death of Qaddafi and remarked Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention.‖
Simon Hooper, ―A brief history of UK-Libya relations,‖ Al Jazeera English, December 11, 2015. ; Robert Winnett and James Kirkup, ―Libya: Gaddafi‘s billions to be seized by Britain,‖ Telegraph, February 24, 2011.
Ewen MacAskill, Nicholas Watt, Ian Black, Ed Pilkington and Luke Harding, ―Libya crisis: Britain, France and US prepare for airstrikes against Gaddafi,‖ Guardian, 17 March 2011.
―Britain ‗proud‘ of part played in Libyan revolution,‖ BBC News, February 17, 2012.
Michael Elliott, ―Viewpoint: How Libya Became a French and British War,‖ Time (USA), March 19, 2011.
248
that resultant bloodshed and chaos had not only sparked ―violent reaction‖ fuelling conflict
across MENA but conversely strengthened ISIS and al Qaeda too in the region. Libyan weapons
have been found in more than 20 countries, while its conflict has fuelled war, insurgencies and
terrorism in at least 10 other nations.85
Another recently published Hansard Report , Suart Blair Donaldson, member Scottish National
Party, criticized UK government policy in Libya and described it as ―an unmitigated disaster‖
reminding ―(you) reap what (you) sow‖. Government catastrophic involvement had even
attracted criticism from US President Barak Obama who suggested that Prime Minister had taken
his eye off Libya after being ―distracted by a range of other things‖86
UK has both short-term
and long-term interests at stake with both the conduct and outcome of the civil war, hence it
could be expected to be a persistent player in the ongoing transition period too.
5.3.4. Legitimacy
As stated in Theoretical Framework Chapter 2, legitimacy of the dominant state (in this case the
global hegemon) is at stake when internal disturbances within a state upset hierarchical balance
in a key regional hierarchy and outside interference by both regional and extra-regional players is
apparent. If the outcome of the conflict alters regional status quo contrary to the vital interests of
the dominant state, it amounts to acceptance of overt loss of influence in a regional hierarchy - an
outcome that ought to be avoided for sake of maintaining credibility as the sole dominant state
with ability to lead the system.
Hegemons usually co-opt leading international organizations and institutions to assume
semblance of international support, if and when they want. The military intervention in the target
state is thus framed as an untoward situation, externally imposed through ―irresponsible‖ actions
of the target state rather than a matter of choice that could be avoided. Threat securitization
becomes implicit in this stage. Local disturbance in the local setting then assume ―existential
threat‖ character, expressed through political speeches of the elite actors.
85
Lizzie Dearden, ―How David Cameron‘s intervention in Libya is fuelling war and terror around the world,‖ Independent, September 15, 2016. ; Rupert Stone, ―In Libya, Britain‘s ignorance triumphed over caution,‖ Al Jazeera, September 15, 2016. ―UK Foreign Policy on Libya,‖ House of Commons, Hansard 609, May 03, 2016, accessed October 15, 2016, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-05-03/debates/1605032000002/UKForeignPolicyOnLibya.
249
A detailed analysis of the international military intervention in Libya also reveals an underlying
pattern identified in Threat Securitization Model (Figure 2.13). Not only were major regional and
international organizations co-opted but analysis of the speeches reveals the dominant state‘s
actors were able to generate the normative structure for international military intervention while
discourse from the target state was de-legitimized as propaganda.
An analysis of Obama speeches of March 18 and 28 (Table 5.1) clearly show how American
superpower identity was superimposed while constructing threat for Libya. One thing that
remained prominent during the period was Washington‘s hesitation and the time it took before
choosing a position in the Libyan crisis. Dominant opinion within Washington argued that
intervention was a bad idea but Senator John McCain (R) and Senator John Kerry (D) advocated
for US action.87
Others like Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, Vice President Joe Biden,
National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and Counterterrorism Chief Jhon O. Brennan
however, urged for caution.88
Considering that public opinion also remained skeptical for
dominant US role in the crisis in spite of the concern shown about the deteriorating conditions
within Libya,89
made the task of leading from the front very problematic for the Obama
Administration.
Table 5.1: Obama on Libya
(Obama, March 18) ―…the United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. American
leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone – it means shaping the conditions
for the international community to act together.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Now the United States did not seek this outcome. Our decisions have been driven by
Qaddafi‘s refusal to respect the rights of his people, and the potential for mass murder of
innocent civilians. It is not an action we will pursue alone. Indeed our British and French
allies, and members of the Arab League, have already committed to take a leadership role in
the enforcement of this resolution, just as they were instrumental in pursuing it…… And, this
is precisely how the international community should work, as more nations bear both the
responsibility and the cost of enforcing international law.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―We have made clear our support for a set of universal values, and our support for the
Ben Smith, ―The Security Council‘s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya,‖ House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011. ; Simon Tisdall, ―Obama is being driven towards Libya‖, The Guardian, March 7, 2011. ; J. McCormack, ―McCain Praises Obama‘s Libya Speech,‖ Weekly Standard, March 28, 2011.
Smith, ―The Security Council‘s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya.‖
See Polling Report, ―Libya‖. http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm.
250
political and economic change that the people of the region deserve.‖
(Obama, March 28) ―I said that America‘s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya;
that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we
would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―To brush aside America‘s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our
responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a
betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other
countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refuse to wait for the
images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―There will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and
values are. Sometimes, the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common
humanity and our common security……….In such cases, we should not be afraid to act – but
the burden of action should not be America‘s alone. As we have in Libya, our task is instead
to mobilize the international community for collective action. But contrary to the claims of
some, American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all the burden
ourselves. Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to set up as well; to
work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of burden and pay their share of the
costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all.‖
Though Obama called on Qaddafi to relinquish power on March 03 citing he had lost legitimacy
but his low profile throughout proceedings to the military campaign earned him a lot of
criticism.90
This cautious and reluctant approach simultaneously frustrated US European
partners especially Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy, who anticipated a more
forward stance from US considering the stakes involved for them.91
The uncertainty displayed
by Obama led one analyst to conclude: ―The days leading up to Obama‘s decision were
perplexing to outsiders. American Presidents usually lead the response to world crisis, but
Obama seemed to stay hidden that week. From the outside, it looked as though the French were
dragging him into the conflict.‖92
It was, however, after the Arab League requested action from the UN Security Council on March
12 that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed to have worked actively for imposition of NFZ 90
Jeanette Torres, ―Obama a Hesitant Crisis Manager,‖ Human Events, March 21, 2011. ; Frank W. Hardy, ―Reluctant President becomes Eager partner in UN No-Fly Resolution,‖ Suite 101, March 19, 2011. 91
Nigel Morris and David Usborne, ―Cameron frustrated with Obama‘s refusal to act over no-fly zone,‖ Independent, March 17, 2011. Rayan Lizza, ―The Consequentialist,‖ The New Yorker, May 2, 2011.
251
and pressed for intervention in Libya.93
Clinton‘s assertive role for Libyan intervention could
have to do with her vision of the US ―indispensible‖ leadership role that she expressed at the
Council on Foreign Relations94
(Table 5.2). Even with explicit acknowledgement of ―a different
world‖ where nations gain ―influence through the strength of their economies rather than their
militaries‖ Clinton‘s assertion was that US is the only state to lead the world and ―to act alone
whenever necessary‖. Thus, the declinists speculations about US ability to lead were brushed
aside. In spite of the lofty claims, Libyan campaign presented a picture where US instead of
leading was unreservedly in a back-seat role. If it was leading it no doubt was ―leading from
behind‖.
Table 5.2: Clinton‟s Remarks on American Leadership
(Clinton, January ―You know why we have to do all of this? Because we are the indispensible nation. We are
31, 2013) the force of progress, prosperity and peace. And because we have to get it right for
ourselves…. So because the United States is still the only country that has the reach and
resolve to rally disparate nations and peoples together to solve problems on a global scale, we
cannot shirk that responsibility. Our ability to convene and connect is unparalleled, and so is
our ability to act alone whenever necessary. So when I say we are truly the indispensible
nation, it‘s not meant as a boast or an empty slogan. It‘s a recognition of our role and our
responsibilities. That‘s why all the declinists are dead wrong. It‘s why the united States must
and will continue to lead in this century even as we lead in new ways.‖
Conclusion
This chapter traces the developments of events in Libyan uprising and the interplay of unit and
systemic level variables that played part for threat securitization in the next chapter. Libyan crisis
is just not one isolated incident that culminated in regime change in the context of the Arab
uprisings. The events in Libya had to be connected with unprecedented changes taking place in
the global and regional hierarchy. Before analyzing that link it was imperative to discuss in detail
93
Joanathan Alter, ―Woman of the World,‖ Vanity Fair, June 2011. ; Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, ―Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton,‖ The New York Times, March 18, 2011. Hillary Rodham Clinton, ―Remarks on American Leadership at the Council on Foreign Relations,‖ Washington,
DC, January 31, 2013 accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203608.htm.
252
the stakes of the regional and global players involved in the Libyan intervention. Libyan
geopolitical importance; its government structure and policies; its internal and external
opposition; and its national and global standing all contributed to the course of events that
eventually displaced the four decades-old Qaddafi regime.
In spite of the up-front role played by France and Britain, the US was deeply committed to
shaping the outcome of events. Its image as the ―indispensible nation‖ that led the world during
times of crisis was at stake. But the waning US power and influence and its over-commitment in
Middle Eastern theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq and its publics‘ war fatigue made the task of yet
another military intervention problematic. US preferred to go for the strategy of ―burden sharing‖
and let its European partners run the show. However, this strategy of ―leading from behind‖ had
important global implications too. With both the allies and the partners already skeptical of US
commitment to consistently undertake the leadership role in crisis affecting their core interests,
the back-seat role emboldened peer challengers who read this as a sign of a waning hegemon
with constrained resources to put its global agendas into action. The Libyan episode had a
decisive effect on the Syrian crisis, which led to even more disillusionment on part of allies and
overt resistance form challengers like Russia. For the peer competitors the long-awaited systemic
changes were on the horizon.
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Chapter 6: Threat Securitization for International Military
Intervention in Libya
The international military intervention in Libya in 2011 ignited a new debate in the academic
circles as US back-seat role in the entire episode was dubbed as ―leading from behind‖1. US
reluctance to lead the anti-Qaddafi campaign and President Obama‘s clear assertion that mission
would be limited in both ―nature, duration and scope‖2 spread skepticism especially in the
Western circles that interpreted this as shift of US focus eastwards, leaving Europe to handle its
own neighbourhood. While in another simultaneous debate analysts and scholars kept arguing
that the unprecedented era of US preponderance is already drawing to a close and drift towards
post-hegemony has forced US to take a back-seat role in the Libyan campaign.3
This dissertation supports the argument that post-hegemonic transition in the systemic hierarchy
has caused a change in the intervention behavior and anti-Qaddafi campaign had been the prime
example of how US recalibrated its identity of global responsibility and unique superiority
towards a strategy of ―burden sharing‖, ―engagement‖ and ―leading from behind‖ that leaves US
less directly militarily engaged but more aligned with its allies and others. This chapter also
explores the link between the global and regional hierarchies and how extraordinary events in
MENA triggered great powers involvement. The threat securitization for Libyan campaign
explains the contradictory fusion of US identity of American leadership with a US foreign and
security policy that anticipates but has yet not fully arrived in a post-hegemonic international
system.
However, the military intervention in post-hegemonic international system follows a distinct
path that has already been theoretically elaborated in Chapter 2. Libyan case study will
The term was first coined in Ryan Lizza, ―Leading From Behind‖ The New Yorker, April 26, 2011 accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind. See also max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ―Did Libya Vindicate ‗Leading From Behind?‘‖, Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2011. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Letter from the President regarding the commencement of
operation in Libya,‖ March 21, 2011. Argument about post-hegemonic drift has been dealt at length in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.
254
empirically corroborate whether variables identified for military intervention and path delineated
can be substantiated. The post-hegemonic international system and the conditions it trigger in
vulnerable hierarchies have also been explained in preceding chapters. This chapter will deal
with ―threat securitization through political discourse‖ for international military intervention and
it considers the period from the onset of uprisings (February 17, 2011) until NATO officially
ends Operation Unified Protector (October 31, 2011) in Libya.
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will deal with ―discursive threat
securitization‖ and explain how political discourse has been employed for constructing threat for
military intervention in Libya. For this purpose political statements from Libyan leadership as
well as US-led coalition will be analyzed. The analysis of news stories during the period will
also help us understand how narrative for war was framed and constructed to legitimize anti-
Qaddafi coalition and actions they undertook to justify ―their violence‖. Besides this section will
help us determine how international organizations were co-opted to legitimize military
intervention against a regime that threatened to kill its own population. The next section will
further elaborate the ―war legitimation discourse‖ and shed light on its significance in the post-
hegemonic system. The third section will help us understand that US reliance on legitimation
discourse increased as its ability to lead became compromised because of gradual erosion in
perception of US legitimacy as the undisputed leader of the international system. Last few lines
on Post-Qaddafi will tell us what NATO actually achieved as compared to the lofty claims anti-
Qaddafi coalition boasted before and during intervention.
6.1. Threat Securitization for Libyan Military Intervention
As stated in Chapter 2 great powers seldom interfere in local hierarchies inter/intra-state disputes
until and unless the outcome of events is consequential to them. But when a key local hierarchy
is in transition like MENA after the Arab uprisings rocked the entire region, extra-regional
players get involved to shape the regional environment amenable to their interests. When the
peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt replaced decades-old staunch allies, US was caught in a
dilemma. On the one hand, long-held popular aspiration for democratic rule was asserting itself
in a region still immune to these developments while on the other hand, the pace and scope of
255
events was harbinger to the configuration of a new regional hierarchy not necessarily aligned
with US short and long-term interests.
While the allies were losing, Qaddafi regime in Libya seemed determined to nip this nascent
movement in the bud through its long-practiced repressive policies. Survival of anti-US regime
was an outcome that ought to be avoided as it would send wrong signals to potential global
challengers who already saw US decline in a region where it held undisputed and unprecedented
sway since the end of the Cold War. It would simultaneously put a question mark on US ability
and its legitimacy as the global sheriff that it had been acting since the initiation of unipolarity in
the international system and displayed in its global military campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan
and Iraq. Besides removal of Qaddafi will reiterate that international system is still very much
the product of hegemon‘s preferences and influence and contrary to the prevalent speculations
US is well-entrenched at the apex of the international system.
As stated in threat securitization model this question of legitimacy of the declining hegemon is
directly linked with how the dissatisfied members within the international status quo perceive US
leadership role. Though not in a position to directly challenge the declining hegemon on one-to-
one basis; the challengers resort to power display by supporting regimes not acceptable to the
state occupying apex of the international system. Russian and Chinese role in the Libyan
campaign reflects the skepticism whether the drift towards post-hegemony is inevitable. Later
Syrian case in the subsequent chapters will confirm that this reluctance and hesitation to take US
head-on in matters vital to their interests would be overcome, especially by Russia and hence to
construct ―war legitimation discourse‖ for Syria would be even more difficult for US.
The resort to unilateral use of coercive force is not the most preferable intervention behavior
sought by the intervening state i.e. US, even if it still retains predominance in key sectors of
power. Hence, the intervention logic is built around ―existential threat‖ that gains acceptance and
audience within unit and systemic levels. As delineated previously, role of the securitizing actor
is key to constructing ―war legitimation discourse‖ which consistently generates narrative
pertaining to the securitization of threat. Hence, political statements issued by US President
Barack Obama, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other US officials and departments as
well as those of US coalition partners during the Libyan unrest will be analyzed for Libyan
intervention threat securitization.
256
As stated in previous chapter, the positioning of the securitizing actor (US) within the systemic
level and its ability to manage a successful securitized move within the relevant (domestic and
global) audience plays the key role. With US was at the helm of the international affairs ―war
legitimation discourse‖ generated by US and its allies resonated more closely with relevant
audience while the alternative dissenting discourse by Qaddafi and his team was discredited and
delegitimized as propaganda and an attempt to divert attention away from atrocities being
committed during the unrest by the ruling regime. Obama and his team then aggressively
campaigned for construction of threat narrative against Qaddafi by employing relevant means
(electronic and print media). The ―war legitimation discourse‖ then followed the path identified
in Figure 6.1. whose subsequent delineation will help us understand the role discourse played in
constructing ―legitimate‖ narrative for military intervention in Libya.
Regional hierarchy in transition
Arab Spring 2011
Target State
Intervener
Post-Hegemonic Phase
Intervener
US
(declining hegemon)
Libya
Unrest against the Qaddafi regime
Threat Legitimacy
Securitization Crisis
International & regional Institutions
UN, Arab League, African Union, ICC
Extra-Regional involvement
Mainly UK & France
Intervener
Post-Hegemonic Phase
Figure 6.1: Libyan Military Intervention Threat Securitization
257
For countries like US, UK and France who played key role in the Libyan military campaign, the
rationale of political discourse employment is intrinsically rooted in the consent of their
audience. Being leading members of the democratic club, the need to take relevant audience on
board and to have genuine display of their formal sanction is pre-requisite for political systems
that define themselves as democratic. Considering the fact that Arab uprisings came against
stagnant repressive authoritarian regimes, the relevant audience in states advocating intervention
in Libya could easily identify with the urge to exercise democratic rights among masses.
Thus by employing ―existential threat‖ discourse to an endangered object (Libyan protestors) and
constructing a shared understanding of what it is to be considered and collectively responded as a
threat by the ones advocating intervention, war against Qaddafi regime in Libya was presented as
most urgent and justified. Once the threat posed to protestors by Qaddafi was securitized it was
easier for political elites to operate in a different mode than they would have otherwise. This
inter-subjective construction of threat squarely resonated with their domestic audiences; hence
once the threat seemed imminent and genuine, the military intervention in Libya was accepted as
the logical possible outcome even though it wasn‘t employed as a ―last resort‖ and without full
exploration of ―other means‖.
A detailed analysis of political statements issued during Libyan intervention by parties to the
conflict, will help us validate three assumptions initially presented in Chapter 2 as they
correspond with the threat securitization model identified above (Figure 6.1).
6.1.1. Target State‟s Ruling Regime as a Threat to international Peace &
Security
Assumption 1: Target state‘s ruling regime is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international
peace and security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide
acceptance while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed as
propaganda) and discredited internationally.
258
Libya that had been on US list of countries sponsoring terrorism since December 29, 1988
bombing of Pan Am103 Flight till May, 20064 when the State Department announced to remove
it, had been a pariah all along. When the Arab uprisings in Libya made headlines across the
world and news of Qaddafi forces opening fires against unarmed peaceful protestors demanding
release of a human rights activist emerged; anti-Qaddafi Arab and World Media quickly
highlighted the grave risk posed to unarmed civilians because of excesses committed by Qaddafi
and his ―shoot-to-kill‖ policy. Al-Jazeera placed the dead toll to be more than 100 in initial six
days of unrest. It quoted a local businessman in Benghazi stating: ―It‘s a big, big massacre‖ and
hospitals ―overwhelmed‖ with the number of dead and injured.5 The Guardian (UK) quoted
local newspaper Al-Zahf al-Akhdar to highlight Qaddafi regime‘s resolve to ―violently and
thunderously respond‖ to protests.6
Since the start of the uprising, Qaddafi‘s image in the international media was projected as a
grave threat to unarmed civilians who was willing to go to any extent to safeguard his regime.
The UNSCR 1973 validated the assertion that ―the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.‖7 Qaddafi had to ―go‖
8 to
remove the threat he himself posed; though regime change was never explicitly authorized by the
UNSC resolutions. Throughout the period of uprising ―the threat to civilians‖ in Libya would
then be juxtaposed with the very person of Qaddafi so that his regime could become the
―legitimate‖ target and international intervention has a justified and legitimate basis.
And when the debate started among coalition partners whether he himself was a legitimate target
or not within the mandate of UNSCR 1973, after British missiles hit Qaddafi‘s compound. The
later view prevailed though dissenting opinion persisted in UK military.9 Thus the scope of
UNSCR 1973 was expanded without authorization from the body itself. Analyses of the
statements made during the period reveal how the gap in the interpretation of the UN resolution
facilitated intervening parties to exceed mandate. Similarly the same UNSCR 1973 was used to Kirit Radia, ―Libya Is Off US Terrorist List,‖ ABC News, May 15, 2006.
―Libya forces ‗open fire‘ at funeral,‖ Al-Jazeera, February 20, 2011.
Jo Adetunji, Peter Beaumont and Martin Chulov, ―Libya protests: More than 100 killed as army fires on unarmed demonstrators‖ Guardian, February 20, 2011.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, accessed April 30, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011). President Obama also voiced his views in his tour to South America quoted in Patrick Wintour and Ewen
MacAskill, ―Is Muammar Gaddafi a target? PM and military split over war aims,‖ The Guardian, March 22, 2011. Wintour and MacAskill , Is Muammar Gaddafi a target?
259
relax arms embargo on Libya imposed by previous UN resolution to selectively facilitate rebel
groups. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated after a conference on Libya in London in
March 2011 that: ―It is our interpretation that 1973 amended or overrode the absolute prohibition
of arms to anyone in Libya so that there could be legitimate transfer of arms if a country were to
choose that,‖ thus opening avenue for arms transfer to rebels.
Throughout the London conference on Libya Qaddafi was projected as a heartless leader who let
people bleed in the streets of Misrata. Even though the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
indicated that he kept receiving ―disturbing reports‖ about ―various abuses of human rights by
the parties to the conflict.‖ The picture in international media was predominantly one-sided and
military intervention was justified as it averted massacre by Qaddafi‘s killing machines. Earlier
Clinton had reiterated the same point by stating that ―We have prevented a potential massacre.‖
David Cameroon addressing the conference said:
―Gaddafi is using snipers to shoot [the people of Misrata] down and let them bleed to death in the street…..That is why there has been such widespread support among the Libyan people – and in the wider Arab world – for the military action
we are taking. It has saved lives, and it is saving lives.‖10
Similarly, it was altogether ignored that some of the anger that Qaddafi loyalists directed at the
West stemmed from the belief that after Qaddafi abandoned Libya‘s nuclear and chemical
weapons program and opened country to Western investment in oil, telecommunications and
other sectors in the past decade, even then he had drawn Western wrath in the shape of NATO
ceaseless bombing campaign. It was anticipated by analysts that ―As Tripoli goes, so goes the
nation‖ so the rebels were being provided with ―additional support‖ without thought to the
problem it would create ―for the end game politically.‖11
Though Tripoli was under firm government control but Obama kept insisting that Qaddafi‘s
departure was inevitable. While speaking about the Middle East, Obama reiterated that, ―Time is
working against Qaddafi. He does not have control over his country. The opposition has
Nicholas Watt, ―US paves way to arm Libyan rebels,‖ The Guardian, March 29, 2011.
Carolyn Presutti, ―Libyan Resistance Fighters Make Presence Known in Tripoli,‖ VOA News, May 18, 2011.
260
organized a legitimate and credible interim Council.‖12
The reality on ground presented a
different scenario. Actually the conflict by that time had entered a deadlock in military terms and
Western governments were left with counting on Qaddafi‘s administration collapse from within
after defection of high profile figures like former Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa, Interior
Minister Abdul Fattah Younis, Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Libyan Oil Minister Shurkri
Ghanem and a number of ambassadors.13
Libyan authorities were confident when they kept
reminding US: ―It‘s not Obama who decides whether Muammar Qaddafi leaves Libya or not. It‘s
the Libyan people.‖14
For West, the only way to ascertain the choice of Libyan people was to
first remove Qaddafi at all costs.
Apart from defections of high profile figures in the Libyan government, the rebels in the east and
anti-Qaddafi coalition were hoping that as one of Africa‘s largest oil producer country, where
gasoline had been plentiful and cheap – less than 50 cents a gallon, was now experiencing fuel
shortages and other hardships; they hoped it would motivate people in the west to rise up against
Qaddafi where he still enjoyed support. Besides, according to Libyan officials NATO continued
bombing telecommunications and other civilian infrastructure, thus making it more difficult for
the regime to run and manage cities under its control.15
During the uprising Qaddafi kept asserting the rebels were elements of al-Qaeda and the action
was taken against those criminals rather than civilians but the West denied that rebels ―are not a
bunch of Al-Qaeda fanatics‖ adding ―there is an Islamic element in the politics of Libyan
opposition at the moment, but it is a mild Islamic political trend, which is welcome and will have
a role in the national dialogue which they envisage. Their focus is national, it‘s a liberation
struggle and they are doing their best to expand representation in the Council of the cities still
under regime control.‖16
Libya officials were apprehensive that NATO had become a party with
Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,
May 20, 2011. ―Libya: Oil Minister Shukri Ghanem ‗defects‘,‖BBC News, May 18, 2011.
Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,
May 20, 2011. Patrick J. McDonnell, ―Gas lines and empty roads in an oil-producing nation,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011.
Valentina Pop, ―EU gears up for post-Gaddafi role in Libya,‖ EU Observer, May 19, 2011.
261
the rebels and exceeded their mandate. ―They are claiming that they are protecting civilians, but
what they are doing, they are siding with the rebels.‖17
Time and again the theme of Qaddafi as the ultimate threat to his own population was invoked
by the US. In a bilateral meeting with Italian Foreign Minister, Clinton reiterated that ousting the
Libyan leader was the best way to protect population. She said: ―The best way to protect
civilians is for Qaddafi to cease his ruthless, brutal attack on civilians from the west to the east,
to withdraw from the cities that he is sieging and attacking and to leave power.‖18
The military intervention model thus illustrates the domestic political, military and economic
conditions of a state along with its geopolitical location and regional/international standing may
make it more prone as a target for military intervention. In case of Libya, during 2011 unrest the
simmering discontent of decades had been brought to fore by extraordinary circumstances
prevailing in the region. As the events in Libya gained momentum at a time when democratic
fervor in the region was at its peak and the whole world stood in awe for a region where such
indigenous movements were unthought-of because of the sheer absence of independent political
activity and strict hold of region‘s ruling dictatorships. Hence, the heavy handed measures
adopted to bring a swift end to this nascent movement, unexpectedly brought unnecessary
spotlight and attention on the ruling regime.
The Qaddafi regime already was suffering from decades of diplomatic isolation and had been
associated with terrorist activities especially against US and the West. When the opportunity
arose to permanently get rid of a person who had been consistent source of irritation for the
West, it was not to be overlooked. Besides it was easier to construct narrative employing his past
transgressions and harnessing sentiment for popular aspiration both in the region and abroad.
Hence, the regime and its actions were successfully ―securitized‖ and with UNSCR 1973 in
place it was easier to construct the regime as the very threat not only for its people and the region
but for the international peace and security too.
6.1.2. “Us” versus “Them” Binary Employed
―Libya: Govt troops may pull out of Misrata,‖ NDTV (India), April 24, 2011.
―Libya Rebels Get Cash Injection From Contact Group,‖ VOA News, May 04, 2011.
262
Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention
are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.
The previous chapter discussed in detail the role regional and extra-regional players played in the
Libyan episode. However, apart from their individual relations with Qaddafi and interests at
stake the countries supporting and opposing the Libyan campaign were projected through ―Us‖
versus ―Them‖ binary. Those that supported the Western governments in their desire to ―protect
civilians‖ by ―all necessary measures‖ and to demand Qaddafi‘s exit from the scene were all part
of the international community seeking to rid world of a tyrant that brutalizes his own subjects
and those opposing were otherwise. Resultantly the actions taken by the anti-Qaddafi regime
were to be endorsed and justified while any attempt to hinder them would place the opposing
parties in the opposite camp.
This assertion can be gauged from the fact that one month after French, British and Italian
military trainers were sent to help rebels, clearly becoming a party to the conflict in flagrant
violation of the UNSC resolutions, the EU announced to open its own liaison office in Benghazi
to give long-term institutional support to TNC. It also leaves no doubt then that the invading
parties were not looking to just settle for ceasefire by mid-May but had already been gearing for
a post-Qaddafi role in Libya.19
Those representing ―Us‖ had the same goals and hence every single success that was achieved in
the intervention was presented as not only the combined success of the anti-Qaddafi coalition but
reflected the resolve of the international community to protect civilians. The ―Us‖ category
gained further legitimacy when countries that previously refused to become part of the anti-
Qaddafi collation came forward to join the alliance. Italy that initially stated that it would not
take part in any airstrikes reversed the decision and announced it would make four of its Tornado
jets available for airstrikes against ―specific and selected‖ military targets in Libya. The change
of heart was prompted by regime‘s sustained attacks against civilians in Misrata.20
The ―Us versus Them‖ binary also facilitated construction of a framework where ―Them‖ oppose
the legitimate aspiration of the people by siding with a ruthless dictator. Especially with UN
Pop, ―EU gears up for post-Gaddafi role in Libya.‖
―UN Takes Libyan Human Rights Mission to Tripoli,‖ CBC News, April 27, 2011.
263
Security Council Resolution mandating international community to employ ―all necessary
measures‖ to stop the ongoing bloodshed in Libya; the opposition to clear directive would place
dissenting parties endorsing illegal actions of an unpopular and discredited regime. Thereby,
Germany that initially abstained in the United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing
military action against Libya could not go too far in its opposition and did not make any
significant effort to hinder action when NATO took command of the military campaign.
Nevertheless when anti-Qaddafi coalition exceeded their mandate, parties not in favour vocally
registered their discontent. That‘s why, when Britain planned to send over military officers to
advise Libyan rebels to help improve their fighting capabilities; China stopped short of directly
accusing London of violating the UNSC resolution over the Libyan conflict. Reuters quoted
Chinese Foreign Ministry‘s stern response: ―China believes that the United Nations Security
Council has primary responsibility for protecting international peace and security, and the
various sides should strictly abide by the Security Council mandate in handling matters.‖ It
further added: ―China disapproves of taking any actions that exceed the mandate of the Security
Council.‖21
Similarly Russian Foreign Minister slammed Britain and French decision to send military
advisers, warning it would pull ―the international community into a conflict on the ground‖.
Russia clearly stated that ―the choice of Libya‘s path of development is without question the
prerogative of the Libyan people‖ and ―the international community must cooperate to help
resolve the conflict by peaceful means without interference in the internal affairs of this state.‖22
The Libyan military intervention shows that though the post-hegemonic transition has started in
the global hierarchy as reflected in the US reluctance to get involved militarily in the third
Muslim country within a decade and in its decision to let France and Britain take the lead and
assuming itself a back-seat role, it could still assert significant influence and without US backing
neither the military campaign nor the toppling of Qaddafi could had been possible. Hence, the
―Us versus Them‖ binary was effectively employed and the resistance to military intervention
was not very pronounced due to the legal sanction of the United Nations Security Council
―China warns Britain over Libya advisers,‖ Reuters, April 23, 2011.
Alexei Anishchuk, ―U.N‘s Ban urges Libyan authorities to halt violence,‖ Reuters, April 21, 2011.
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Resolution giving explicit mandate to protect civilians though ―all necessary measures‖. But the
same reluctance could not dispel image of waning US leadership role.
The Syrian episode that erupted simultaneously and reflected US inability to deal with yet
another dictator engaged in similar and in certain cases worst abuses against civilians; left no
doubt that the post-hegemony has arrived. Besides Russian and Chinese opposition that had been
less explicit in the Libyan conflict, would assert more vocally in the later case. The lack of
credible and vocal opposition in Libyan case and successful securitized discourse in case of
atrocities committed by Gaddafi regime made threat construction for Libya relatively easy.
6.1.3. Co-opting International/regional Institutions
Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts
international/regional institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for
authorization of force against the target state.
Co-opting international/ regional institutions provide irrefutable basis of legitimacy as it reflects
the combined will of the international community. US had received scathing criticism for by-
passing international institutions in case of both Kosovo and Iraq. But the conditions in 2011
were different than they had been either in 1999 or in 2003. The unprecedented era of undisputed
US leadership had been drawing to a close, and US public war-fatigue and reluctance to take
unilateral military interventions was also asserting itself. Domestic constraints were being
reflected in active opposition to yet another military campaign in the Middle East23
and US
Congress was simultaneously not forthcoming.
Although Obama had already demanded that Gaddafi ―must go‖ on March 3; he didn‘t make a
public case for military intervention till March 17 when the UNSCR 1973 came. That eventually
happened on March 28 when the rationale for the Libyan intervention was put before the public.
Though the speech was well received but it still fell short of convincing public of US
involvement in the military campaign, polls showed. According to Jeremy Mayer, an Associate
Professor of Political Science in George Mason University, ―This was the lowest level of support The poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre between March 10-13 found that 63% stated that ―US does not have responsibility to act in Libya‖ as compared to 27% that said it had. Figures quoted from ―Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya: Broad Concern that U.S. Military is Overcommitted,‖ Pew Research Centre, March 14, 2011.
265
for a large-scale use of American military forces in early stages of an engagement that we have
seen.‖24
Similarly in Congress both Republicans and Democrats remained unconvinced of the US role
too. Some criticized Obama for doing too little too late, other opposed for attacking without
Congress approval and more specifically without the authorization of the controversial War
Powers Act of 1973. In such a scenario approval of the international / regional institutions
assumed greater importance and played a role in not only deflecting public criticism but placed
an undisputed stamp on the legal legitimacy of the intervention that theoretically violated the
―sovereignty‖ of a UN member state.
The most forceful and legally justified authority in the said case was that of the UN and its
Security Council. The interveners continued stressing that military action had the full backing of
regional bodies, especially Arab League. Later African Union was co-opted to grant broader
legitimacy to the mission. Similarly prestigious international institutions like the International
Criminal Court‘s verdict against Qaddafi and his inner circle laid the basis for forced regime
change as it constrained already narrow space for negotiations between Qaddafi and the
opposition and further isolated Qaddafi internationally. Besides being implicated in ―war crimes‖
by ICC rendered AU attempts of ceasefire void while it encouraged defections within the Libyan
regime thus facilitating the installation of TNC as a proxy government including ex-Qaddafi
officials. By insisting that he must leave the country and stand trial in the ICC, the choice left to
Qaddafi was go down fighting. It only left military option for him and thus in prospect many
more civilian casualties.
In the UNSC 1973 resolution the point was stressed that this intervention was the unanimous
decision of the will of the international community, ―particularly through the League of Arab States‘
call on the Security Council to enact a no-fly zone and the African Union‘s strong call for an end to
the violence.‖25
It was easy to get sanction of regional institution like the Arab League for
intervention in Libya as Gaddafi was already controversial in the Arab world.26
Consequently when
the demand for imposition of a no-fly zone (NFZ) came from the Arab League to UNSC Michael Knigge ―US Public, Congress remain skeptical of Libyan Mission,‖ DW News, April 1, 2011.
UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ March 17, 2011.
Michael Slackman, ―Dislike for Qaddafi Gives Arabs a Point of Unity,‖ New York Times, March 21, 2011.
266
on March 12, 2011 it projected the stakes of regional states into the initiative. Rather than a
Western-led campaign against another oil-rich Muslim country, it was highlighted as a collective
international effort where the world community came together to protect the civilian population
of Libya under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1973.
Similarly when the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced in mid-
May that he was seeking arrest of Qaddafi and two senior figures for ―widespread and systematic
attacks‖ on civilians; thus co-optation of a prestigious international body facilitated coalition
members to achieve their target that by said time had effectively turned into ―a regime change‖
campaign. The ICC press release made frequent reference to ―direct evidence‖ but failed to cite
any of this evidence in detail.27
Besides these regional / international bodies provide validity to
the pretext on the basis of which an international military intervention against a sovereign
member of the United Nations was undertaken. The reliance on these bodies also helped US to
dispel the negative image that the intervention in yet another oil-rich Muslim country was for the
sake of US vested interests. Rather the invocation of international humanitarian laws and
international bodies and organizations centered the narrative on the theme for the protection of
the unarmed civilians.
6.2. War Legitimation Discourse
Chapter 2 explained in detail the need to employ war legitimation discourse for intervention in
the post-hegemonic system. As discussed ―legitimacy‖ is one of the key variables identified for
both the declining hegemon and for undertaking a military campaign against a target state. The
declining hegemon seek to reinvent and reinforce its superpower identity in the world.
Legitimation may not be necessary in normal course of events when no challenges to
institutional power and authority are imminent.28
But the drift towards post-hegemony and
waning US influence especially its ability to direct events on the Arab streets necessitates the
resort to legitimacy criteria. The legitimation discourse then involves developing rapport with
both the domestic and international audience through ―positive self-perception and
Andy Dilks, ―The ‗International Criminal Court‘: Prosecuting Gaddafi With Questionable Evidence While
Ignoring NATO-Israeli Atrocities,‖ Global Research, May 17, 2011. See T. A. Van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications, 1998).
267
representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖; thus providing the
intervening parties under the US leadership supporting conditions for effective policy.
Constructing war legitimation discourse through invoking ―existential threat‖ not only provides
the necessary basis for the use of coercive force against the target state but simultaneously
establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the system whose rules and norms had been shaped by the declining
hegemon. Thus perpetuation of the system, its stability and security is constructed as the
principal duty of the most powerful nation on earth, along with its duty to take timely action
against threatening culprits. The Libyan crisis was thus presented as a kind of threat where
persuasive (or manipulative) discourse not only became acceptable but morally justified and
politically defensible too.
As stated before, the responsibility of presenting case and justifying intervention is often carried
out by political actors. In case of Libyan conflict the war legitimation discourse will be traced
through utterances and political statements of key political figures of pro and anti-Qaddafi actors
through the categories identified below:
6.2.1. Legitimation by reference to authority
According to Van Leeuwen it is the form of legitimation that derives from ―because I say so‖
theme, where the ―I‖ is someone in whom some authority is vested.29
It can also be authority of
tradition, custom and law which is then referred to, to legitimize violence and to construct
narrative for war.
In case of Libyan military intervention the ―authority‖ reference had been repeatedly invoked to
legitimize military action and thus the violence that accompanied it. Apart from the international
humanitarian law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its recent extension into pragmatic
humanitarian, the most forceful and legally justified authority was that of the UN and its Security
Council. The interveners continued stressing that military action had full backing of regional
bodies, especially Arab League. Later African Union was co-opted to grant broader legitimacy to
the mission. Similarly prestigious international institutions like the International Criminal
Court‘s verdict against Qaddafi and his inner circle laid the basis for forced regime change as it
T. Van Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ Discourse & Communication 1. no.1 (2007):
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constrained already narrow room for negotiations between Qaddafi and opposition. Lastly, the
TNC‘s recognition by the international community accorded the kind of legitimacy to the rebels
and opposition that made them ―credible and legitimate interlocutor‖ for negotiating a Libyan
future sans Qaddafi.
Once UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, agreed to send his special envoy to Libya and stated
that it is clear: ―…the Libyan regime has lost both legitimacy and credibility, particularly in
terms of protecting its people and addressing their legitimate aspirations for change‖ and ―the
Libyan people want to determine their own political future – they must be given the chance to do
so‖30
the legitimacy of the Qaddafi regime and its resolve to stick to power as well as the claim
to act on behalf of the public became questionable. It got further boost when the UN team started
probe to look into whether what was happening in Libya amounted to ―crimes against humanity‖
and to ask Libyan government ―a number of questions dealing with indiscriminate bombing of
civilians and civilian areas, civilian casualties, torture and use of mercenaries,‖31
the narrative to
legitimize violence against such a reckless and insensitive regime had already been in place.
During the uprising it was asserted time and again that Qaddafi regime was disregarding
humanitarian law and was blocking humanitarian aid to people in besieged towns. It was alleged
regime bombed vessels containing humanitarian aid. Similarly once TNC was accepted as the
legitimate government of Libya and recognized internationally; it gave further boost to anti-
Qaddafi coalition and legitimized their mandate to act against an unpopular and de-legitimized
regime. US-led coalition members went beyond normal procedures to grant acceptance to the
TNC which came into effect on March 5. Importance of recognition of the TNC could also
gauged by the fact that moments after Obama‘s speech on Middle East and North Africa on May
20, Libyan Ambassador to the US, Ali Suleiman Aujali resigned and assumed immediate
responsibilities as the US representative for the Libyan rebels, who then insisted on US to
recognize the group as it ―would give us the credibility to deal with the international
community.‖32
―UN chief says special envoy for Libya traveling to Benghazi on Friday,‖ Xinhuanet, April 26, 2011.
―Libya: UN team to start probe of human rights abuses,‖ BBC News, April 27, 2011.
―Libya Opposition Rep Responds to Obama Middle East Speech,‖ ABC News, May 20, 2011.
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Thus the authority of custom, law and tradition were all employed to discredit Qaddafi regime
and lay the basis of a justified intervention into Libya as a mark of responsibility of the
international community to protect the people of Libya from a ruthless tyrant. While the majority
of the international community felt the need to respond to grave humanitarian crisis emerging in
Libya, the legal basis of UNSC, ICC and the ―legitimate‖ opposition through TNC provided the
basis for military intervention to be launched against the Qaddafi regime.
6.2.2. Legitimation by reference to values
To analyze moralized legitimation for war, the ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ category use negatively
valued nouns and processes almost exclusively to represent ―Them‖ and their actions while
relatively positive / neutral nouns and processes are used to represent ―Us‖ and our actions.
Through these categories the use of force is then justified while at the same time diminishing or
euphemizing the killing that this use of force compels. These value-laden words then enact clear
identities for Us versus Them and it operationalizes positive Self-presentation and negative
Other-presentation. This kind of lexicalization then assigns war/intervention a kind of
legitimacy.33
One of the most consistent themes, continuously evoked throughout the Libyan operation was
the will of the masses to exercise democratic power. As Arab Uprisings came against autocratic
regimes and dictators who had denied their subjects the freedom of expression and the right to
choose their own representatives; the values that are considered fundamental rights and duly
incorporated in the United Nations Charter, it was easy to draw legitimacy for the intervention
employing language expressing democratic aspiration of the people and Qaddafi‘s resolve to
brutally suppress this demand. Obama kept justifying US intervention by stating: ―When Gaddafi
inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end and the
transition to a democratic Libya can proceed.‖34
Excesses committed by the intervening forces were painted in a different context and language
used to justify ―Our‖ violence portrayed an alternate reality that resulted from ―Their‖ provoked
John Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse: Representing ‗US; and ‗them‘ in four US presidential addresses,‖
Discourse & Society 22, no.3 (2011): 294, 296. Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,
May 20, 2011.
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violence. For example, when NATO forces destroyed eight Libyan ―warships‖ in the ports of
Tripoli, Al-Khums and Sirte in May 2011, Libyan officials were adamant that they hit the
commercial port - the main food and supply line for Libya and not the nearby military port, thus
leading to humanitarian crisis. But NATO‘s military spokesman Mike Bracken justified the
military assault by stating: ―He was using maritime forces to lay mines. These were legal
targets,‖35
thereby denying allegations from Libyan government that NATO exceeded its
mandate and was now targeting Qaddafi and its forces to oust the regime.
Similarly when British chief of defence staff, General Sir David Richards, was quoted saying
that NATO would have to broaden its bombing campaign to include infrastructure targets like
telecommunication sites to prevent Qaddafi from ―clinging to power‖ and to ―demonstrate that
the game is up and he must go‖.36
Even this was justified through Libyan official assertions of
posting ―human shields‖ at sites under threat of NATO bombing. The Libyan strategy was
dubbed as ―borrowing a page from Saddam Hussein‘s old playbook,‖37
thus equating Qaddafi‘s
savagery with that of Saddam. In the same breath Qaddafi regime attacks against rebels were
condemned by the British Foreign Minister Alistair Burt as ―wanton disregard‖ for international
law.38
French position in the UNSC was that while revolutionary transitions in other countries had not
met with extreme violence, Qaddafi was mercilessly targeting his own population and the will of
the Libyan people had been ―trampled under the feet of the Qaddafi regime‖.39
Qaddafi and his
troops were framed in worst possible scenario. When the ICC arrest warrant against Qaddafi and
two senior officers was issued for ―crimes against humanity‖, it was alleged that Qaddafi forces
were using sexual enhancement drugs as a ―machete‖ and gang-raping women as they stopped at
checkpoints.40
Thus the worst possible wartime abuse was attributed to pro-Qaddafi forces. But
the abuses by rebels were toned down and didn‘t receive wide coverage in the international
media. Although stories kept emerging that rebels in Misurata were involved in desecration of
Jomana Karadsheh, ―Libya says NATO causing humanitarian crisis,‖ CNN, May 21, 2011, accessed April 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/21/libya.war/. Martin Chulov and Richard Norton-Taylor, ―Koussa among defectors ‗helping Nato bomb secret Gaddafi sites‘,‖
Guardian, May 15, 2011. John F. Burns, ―Libyan Officials Threaten to Use ‗Human Shields‘,‖ New York Times, May 16, 2011.
―Cameron and Sarkozy restate Libya ‗determination,‖ BBC News.
UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya.‖
―Rebel forces in Libya‘s western mountains issue call for help,‖ CNN, May 18, 2011.
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dead Libyan soldiers. It was reported some fighters disposed of dead Qaddafi soldiers by
dumping them in the sea- a behavior that would mimic accusations the rebels themselves have
made against Qaddafi government of hiding and defiling dead bodies.41
The anti-Qaddafi coalition tried to legitimize even those actions explicitly out of the mandate of
UNSCR 1973. In May, 2011 rebels wanted Qaddafi ―propaganda‖ TV silenced as it was alleged
to incite ―hate and violence‖. According to Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, vice-chairman of the NTC
―without a doubt [the regime had] used media as a weapon, as a bullet,‖ thus they were broadly
viewed as an extension of the regime. While rebels were urging them to be targeted, Mohammed
Abdel Dayem, programme coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the New York-
based Committee to Protect Journalists stated: ―While Libyan state broadcasts have certainly
been engaged in propaganda and at times provocative and instigator acts, they do not currently
constitute legitimate targets for disruption.‖42
However, when the conflict in Libya entered a stalemate and chances for a quick victory receded
in spite of unceasing NATO bombing campaign, Qaddafi held ground and his message kept
constantly reaching the public; NATO struck Libyan TV in August, killing three people and
injuring 15 in violation of international law and UN resolutions.43
This time NATO
spokeswoman Carmen Romero asserted that there was evidence that TV was increasingly used
by regime to incite violence against civilians. However, Brussels-based International Federation
of Journalists‘ Secretary-General Beth Costa dismissed the explanation. She said: ―Our concern
is that when one side decides to take out a media organization because they regard its message as
propaganda, then all media are at risk.‖44
Everything associated with Qaddafi was a legitimate target and interpreted the same way even if
it involved his children and grandchildren. For example, when a NATO strike unabashedly killed
Qaddafi‘s son Saif al-Arab who was a student in Germany and three of leader‘s grandchildren in
May; the head of NATO‘s military operations in media stated that the attack was on a ―command
and control building‖ and all targets were ―military‖ in nature. He refused to comment on killing
C.J. Chivers, ―Libyan City Buries Its Attackers Respectfully,‖ New York Times, May 17, 2011.
―Libya rebels want Qadhafi ‗propaganda‘ TV silenced,‖ DAWN, May 07, 2011.
The International Federation of Journalists stated that this bombing was in contravention of the Security Council Resolution of December 2006 that explicitly condemned such attacks against journalists and media.
―Media Group Condemns NATO Bombing of Libyan TV,‖ CBC News, August 3, 2011.
272
of Qaddafi family members. Though China and Russia clearly expressed concern that alliance
had gone beyond the mandate, British PM Cameron insisted targeting was ―in line with the UN
resolution.‖ The operation was actually a direct attempt to assassinate the leader.45
The impact of using such moralized discourse can also be analyzed by focusing on representation
of ―Our Violence‖ and the most common violent material processes for which ―We‖ are
represented, implicitly or explicitly as responsible actors through selection of relatively positive
or neutral lexical resources. The impact is not only justification of the use of force by ―Us‖ but
simultaneously diminishing or euphemizing killing associated with ―Our Violence‖, which then
doesn‘t seem violent at all. Table 6.1 analyzes statements uttered by the Obama Administration
as a build up to Libyan intervention and during the length of campaign, and explains how the
narrative for intervention was constructed – ―Our violence‖ involved protection of the group
against which the Qaddafi regime and his militias were engaged in unprovoked violence.
Table 6.1: Positively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions
Process Prototypical example
Strike ―On March 19, 2011, at President Obama‘s direction, U.S. military forces began a series of
strikes in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to enforce UN
Security Council Resolution 1973.‖ (Harold Hongju Koh, March 26)
―We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the people within it.‖
(Obama, March 28)
Protect ―And that‘s why the United States has worked with our allies and partners to shape a strong
international response at the United Nations. Our focus has been clear: protecting innocent
civilians, and holding the Qaddafi regime accountable.‖ (Obama, March 18)
―…..the reason we intervened in Libya, was to protect the people on the ground and to give the
Libyan people the space that they needed to bring about a change towards democracy.‖ (Obama,
May 25)46
―Nato Strike ‗Kills Saif al-Arab Gaddafi‘, Libya says,‖ BBC News, May 01, 2011.
―Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2011, accessed April 27, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-.
273
By contrast, when it comes to representing Their Violent actions, relatively negative material
processes are selected and their violence is so moralized that it appears unprovoked, inexcusable
and maximally lethal. Thus their ―violent‖ material processes are so constructed that implicitly or
explicitly portray them as responsible actors (Table 6.2). The prototypical examples quoted
below leaves no doubt that ―Their‖ side was involved in deliberate violence with explicit aim to
suppress resistance to Qaddafi regime at all costs.
Table 6.2: Negatively moralized processes representing „Their‟ violent actions
Process Prototypical example
Threat ―The suffering and bloodshed is outrageous and it is unacceptable. So are the threats and orders
to shoot peaceful protestors and further punish the people of Libya.‖ (Obama, February 23)
―And so we are strongly committed to seeing the job through, making sure that, at minimum,
Qaddafi doesn‘t have the capacity to send in a bunch of thugs to murder innocent civilians and
threaten them.‖ (Obama, May 25)
Attack ―Hospitals were attacked and patients disappeared.‖ (Obama, March 18)
―His attacks on his own people have continued.‖ (Obama, March 19)
―Faced with this opposition, Qaddafi began attacking his people.‖ (Obama, March 28)
―In the face of the world‘s condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a
military campaign against the Libyan people.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Kill ―Innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in cases killed.‖ (Obama, March 18)
Imprison ―Innocent people were targeted for killing….. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and
killed.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Bomb ―Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to
Destroy rubble.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Exploit ―He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and
Murder abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world – including Americans who were killed
Terrorize by Libyan agents.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Torture ―…the deeply troubling actions by the Libyan government and its security forces – including
incidents in which Qaddafi forces fired at civilians, reports of torture, rape, deportations,
enforced disappearances, the use of cluster munitions and heavy weaponry against civilian
targets in crowed urban areas, and blocking humanitarian supplies.‖ (Susan E. Rice, May 3)
Violate ―These actions violate international norms and every standard of common decency.‖ (Obama,
February 23)
Intimidate ―A campaign of intimidation and repression began.‖ (Obama, March 18)
Repress
274
Similarly, our and their sides are represented with highly moralized titles, attributes and
qualifiers.47
Thus in ―Us category‖ are the words used to describe Us: the attributes we naturally
posses; the concepts we value, promote and protect; and the qualities that are threatened when
they attack us (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Our side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions
Free / Freedom ―And throughout this time of transition, the United States will continue to stand up for
Justice freedom, stand up for justice, and stand up for the dignity of all people.‖ (Obama,
Dignity February 23)
Global Security ―For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor
of global security and as an advocate for human freedom.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Peace ―But the United States will not stand idly by in the face of actions that undermine
Security global peace and security. ―And that‘s why the United States has worked with our
allies and partners to shape a strong international response at the United Nations. Our
focus has been clear: protecting innocent civilians, and holding the Qaddafi regime
accountable.‖ (Obama, March 18)
Liberty ―This is Libya‘s moment. This is Libya‘s victory and the future belongs to you. The
Revolution United States knows something about revolution and liberty. That is how our nation
was born more than 230 years ago.‖ (Clinton, October 18)
Democracy ―The democratic values we stand for would be overrun.‖ (Obama, March 18)
Rights ―The United States also strongly support the universal rights of the Libyan people.
That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech and the ability of the
Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not
negotiable. They must be respected in every country. And they cannot be denied
through violence and suppression.‖ (Obama, February 23)
On the contrary, the negative value-laden words are often used in noun groups associated with
them in way that reflects the attributes they naturally posses; and the goals they value and
promote or they aspire to bring about (Table 6.4).
M. A. K. Halliday and C. Mattiessen, An Introduction to Functional Grammar, (London: Hodder Education, 2004): 311-335.
275
Table 6.4: Their side‟s negatively moralized titles, attributes, ambitions
Fear ―Last month, Qaddafi‘s grip of fear appeared to give way to the promise of
freedom.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Danger / Dangerous ―Qaddafi has not yet stepped down from power, and until he does, Libya will remain
dangerous.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Violence ―This violence must stop.‖ (Obama, February 23)
―Like all governments, the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from
violence.‖ (Obama, February 23)
―In this particular country- Libya – at this particular moment, we were faced with
prospect of violence on a horrific scale.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Tyrant ―For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant-
Muammar Qaddafi.‖ (Obama, March 28)
Oppression / suppression ―…. voices are being raised together to oppose suppression and support the rights of
the Libyan people.‖ (Obama, February 23)
―Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qaddafi chose the path of brutal
suppression.‖ (Obama, March 18)
No mercy ―…. he threatened, and I quote: ―We will have no mercy, no pity‖…no mercy on his
own citizens.‖ (Obama, March 18)
―Qaddafi declared that he would show ―no mercy‖ to his own people. He compared
them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment.‖ (Obama,
March 28)
Thus the strategy of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation is clearly at work
in these speeches48
through which ―Our side‖ is glorified and sanitized while ―Their side‖ is
vilified and demonized assigning the war/intervention a kind of legitimacy. Thus as ―Our‖ war is
for all good things and against all evil then it is the war that has to be waged, not for the sake of
our vested interests but for the good it will bring. Libyan conflict and analysis of statements
above reveals how the threat posed by the Qaddafi regime was constructed in moralized terms to
justify military intervention in Libya.
See Van Dijk, Ideology.
276
6.2.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization
Rationalization legitimation is also analyzed by referring to effect-oriented legitimation where
―purposefulness is looked at from the other end, as something that turned out to exist in
hindsight, rather than as something that was, or could have been, planned beforehand.‖49
It typically involves overview of negative consequences of previous practices and foreseen or
expected benefits. As stated in Chapter 2 here legitimation is done ―by reference to the goals, the
uses and the effects of institutionalized social action.‖50
As Van Leeuwen elaborated they legitimize actions ―because they correspond to the criterion of utility, namely ‗in reference to the
purpose or function they serve, needs they fill‘‖.51
―In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a
thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the
city. We knew that if we wanted – if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city
nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated
across the region and stained the conscience of the world……. I refused to let that
happen……I authorized military action to stop killing and enforce UNSCR
1973.‖ (Obama, March 28)
The speech Obama delivered to explain to American public why the decision to intervene in
Libya was taken had to rely on rationalization legitimation too. The American public was
presented with a context that forewarned a scenario unacceptable to any human being based on
Qaddafi‘s tendency to employ violence in the past. By painting the horrific prospect of mass
murder by a ruthless dictator with no regard for human lives, the urgency of the extreme action
was justified. American public was informed that the delay of a single day could have cost a
thousand lives, thus making the very human conscience to shudder thinking about such a
probability.
Though the justification to American public came as late as March 28, there were countries like
France who had been calling for enforcement of a no-fly zone on Libya as early as February
2011.52
In a surprise move France also became the first country to recognize the National
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of Libya. When French jets fired first Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ 103.
Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 105.
Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, ―Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron‘s backing,‖
Guardian, February 23, 2011.
277
shots against Qaddafi troops and initiated the campaign on March 19, the hasty step here too was
interpreted as ―time running out‖ as Qaddafi tanks were advancing on and subsequently
attacking Benghazi civilians. The city which was the base of the NTC was about to fall and there
was believed to be a real threat of massacre.53
Poll conducted in April 2011 also showed that
support for military action was greatest in France where almost 64 per cent voted in favour.54
The move was also rationalized as France displayed responsibility as a permanent member of the
UNSC.55
Other controversial actions like arming and training Libyan rebels were again rationalized for the
purpose they were supposed to serve once Qaddafi was removed from the scene and internal
political situation was bound to become messy because of non-existence of any political training
and institutions during Qaddafi‘s era. The narrative in the international media rationalized
NATO bombing campaign even though it would have inevitably caused collateral damage and
altered empowering narrative of the revolutions.
James Zogby, president of the Washington-based Arab American Institute cautioned: ―This isn‘t
people liberating themselves…. It alters the course of the movement‖. Los Angeles Times quoted a blog where the writer enthusiastically sends ―group hug to everyone‖ over authorization of
UNSCR 1973 and writes: ―It was some weird alternative reality where you‘re asking people to
through bombs on your own country.‖56
Through such narrative Western-backed media aimed to
dispel the negative perception that people‘s liberation was hijacked by anti-Qaddafi collation to
settle its old scores.
Many other absurd actions undertaken by the anti-Qaddafi coalition were in a similar way
rationalized for the purpose they were supposed to serve. West chose to ignore the grave threat
posed by terrorists associated with al-Qaeda who were speculated to be assisting anti-Qaddafi
forces. As the grip of Qaddafi loosened over rebel-held areas and the ceaseless war gave rise to
chaos within the country, the thought of al-Qaeda‘s Sahara wing getting its hands on Libyan
Madelene Lindstorm and Kristina Zetterlund, ―Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO,‖ Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R-3498-SE, October 2012, 18.
Ipsos, ―Military action in Libya- Ipsos polling in Great Britain, USA, France , Italy: Topline results 12th
April 2011,‖ http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Reuters-Libya-topline-Apr11.PDF ―French president‘s military interventions are logical,‖ Financial Times, Editorial, April 10, 2011.
Raja Abdulrahim, ―Libyan Americans feel caught in the middle,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011.
278
surface-to-air missiles became chilling for the West. Especially after speculations from
governments in the Sahel that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who was increasingly
active in the Sahara region, had received convoys of weapons including SA-7 missiles from
Qaddafi‘s abandoned arms caches, leaders in Mali and Chad were fearful that those weapons
would then make AQIM the best-equipped force in the region.
It was not just Qaddafi‘s weapons that were a threat to region‘s peace but his recruited fighters,
especially Tuareg nomads.57
The historical images of the past and bitter memories of 1990s
rebellions in Mali and Niger were invoked to de-legitimize Qaddafi‘s survival strategy. These
mercenaries by default then became legitimate targets for West-backed rebels who strived to take
their country back from a despot and his foreign agents.
The anti-Qaddafi collation was so eager to stage exit of Qaddafi that they employed questionable
means that could only be legitimized through ―rationalization- for the purpose they serve in the
end.‖ One such incident included enlisting of former prisoner turned American ally –Abu Sufian
Ahmed Hamuda bin Qumu – a ―dangerous man with no qualms about committing terrorist acts‖-
captured from Pakistan after US invasion of Afghanistan. According to released classified
documents by Wiki Leaks, he was a ―former member of the [al-Qaeda-linked] Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG), [a] probable member of al Qaeda and a member of the North African
Extremist Network.‖ He was among those jihadists in Afghanistan who were funded, armed and
trained by US before turning against it and many American officials believed he represented a
―medium-to-high risk‖ and ―likely to pose threat to US, its interests and allies‖. He was sent to
Libya in 2007 to lead a band of anti-Qaddafi rebels known as the ―Darnah Brigade‖.58
This opportunist US policy was aptly explained by the New York Times: ―The former enemy and
prisoner of the United States is now an ally of sorts, a remarkable turnabout resulting from
shifting American policies rather than any obvious change in Mr. Qumu.‖59
Qumu wasn‘t the
only terrorist turned ally, another was Abdul-Hakim al-Hasidi whose Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG) was still on US State Department‘s terror list posing ―one of the most immediate David Lewis, ―Analysis: Stray Libyan small arms may threaten region,‖ Reuters, May 11, 2011.
Alex Newman, ―Former Guantanamo Prisoner Now U.S. Ally In Libya,‖ New American, April 26, 2011.
Rod Nordland and Scott Shane, ―Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts,‖ New York Times, April 24, 2011.
279
threats‖ to US security. He turned out to be another prominent leader in the Libyan rebellion.60
Thus by supporting dictators and terrorists across the globe and later turning against some of
them illustrated absurdity of America‘s foreign policy that only sought Qaddafi‘s exit from
power at that time.
6.2.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality
In this type of legitimation representations of time also legitimize violence rhetorically and the
technique is referred as ―temporal proximization‖ by Piotr Cap which he explains as ―a construal
of events…. as momentous and historic and thus of central significance to the discourse
addressee.‖61
It involves construal of impact of past events in such a way that they seem to effect
the current situation.62
But this is not the only type of temporal proximization as rhetors might
shift from what will happen in the future to what must happen now.63
Particularly significant is
the way ―utterances are modalized to enact interpersonal relationships with the audience‖.64
When politicians speak they speak with a high level of conviction to make what is possible to
appear certain. Their political language intends to remove the doubt because a well-defined
future action plan rather hypothetical abstraction is the demand of the people. Both the degrees
of commitment and certainty, and levels of modality are represented in the Table 6.5 and Table
6.6.
Table 6.5. Modality – degrees of commitment and certainty65
Must, have to, will, ought Highest degree of commitment to truth or obligation
May, could, should, might, Lowest degree of commitment to truth or obligation
Should not, could not, must not Negative degree of commitment to truth or obligation
Newman, ―Former Guantanamo Prisoner Now U.S. Ally In Libya.‖
Piotr Cap, ―Toward the Proximization Model of the Analysis of Legitimation in Political Discourse,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008): 35.
Ibid.
P. Dunmire, ―The Rhetoric of Temporality: The Future as Linguistic Construct and Rhetorical Resource,‖ in
Rhetoric in Detail: Analyses of Rhetorical Text and Talk, ed. B. Johnstone and C. Eisenhart (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008): 83. Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 297.
Jonathan Charteris-Black, Analyzing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 112.
280
Table 6.6. Levels of modality66
Truth Obligation Modal verb
High certainly required to must/ have to
Medium probably supposed to could/would/should
Low possibly allowed to may/might
Here we will analyze two types of modalities i.e. epistemic and deontic modality. While
epistemic modality refers to the level of commitment a speaker can express in relation to truth,
certainty or accuracy of what he is saying and is concerned with how likely, possible or probable
something has happened, will happen or is happening. According to Coates epistemic modality is
not only ―concerned with the speaker‘s assumptions or assessment of possibilities‖ but also
―indicates the speaker‘s confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of proposition
expressed.‖67
While deontic modality expresses speaker‘s belief about the ―necessity or probability of acts
performed by morally responsible agents‖68
i.e. the extent to which he is obliged to do
something, needs to do something or has permission to do something. These ideas of obligation,
necessity and permission assume that shared norms exist for evaluating right or wrong without
even making those norms explicit.69
Legitimacy of military action against Qaddafi required that ―temporal maximization‖ technique
to be employed as well. Qaddafi regime‘s propensity to violence was invoked through references
to his troubled past (Table 6.7). This technique left no room for negotiated settlement to the
crisis. It demonstrated that Qaddafi drawing from his own past and prevalent international
practices would settle not less than massacre of his population if he is given room enough to
survive. That‘s why when US public was not forthcoming about US military involvement in
Libyan mission, references form grim historical episodes of the past were invoked. As expressed
in the statement of a political science professor in George Mason University. He said: ―The Ibid., 113.
J. Coates, The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 18.
J. Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 823.
Charteris-Black, ―Analyzing Political Speeches,‖ 114.
281
specter haunting the White House was Rwanda. This was a 550 million dollar intervention to
prevent a massacre in Benghazi.‖70
Table 6.7: Temporal Maximization in Obama Statements
(Obama, March ―For decades, he demonstrated a willingness to use brute force through his sponsorship of
18) terrorism against the American people as well as others, and through the killings that he has
carried out within his own borders.‖
(Obama, March ―….when people were brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community
28) more than a year to intervene with air power to protect civilians. It took us 31 days.‖
(Obama, May ―We have a broad range of partners under an international mandate designed to save lives and
25)71
ensure that we did not have the sort of massacre that would lead us then to look back and say to
ourselves, why did we stand by and do nothing.‖
(Obama, June ―Muammar Qaddafi, who prior to Osama bin Laden, was responsible for more American deaths
29)72
than just about anybody on the planet, was threatening to massacre his people…..we would be
supportive of it because it‘s in our national security interest and also because it‘s the right thing
to do.‖
Even France sought legitimation by reference to temporality in advocating imposition of no-fly
zone over Libya. French Ambassador presented the Arab revolutions as ―a breath of fresh air‖
that would ―change the course of history‖ and asserted ―this new Arab springtime is good news
for all‖.73
But the situation in Libya was painted as grim. French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe,
while introducing the resolution asserted: ―the situation on ground is more alarming than ever,
marked by violent re-conquest of the cities that had been released‖ and ―We have very little time
left – perhaps only a matter of hours,‖74
thus implying if UNSC failed to take the decisive action
Knigge, ― US Public, Congress remain skeptical.‖
―Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2011.
72―Press Conference by President,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 29, 2011, accessed April
26, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/press-conference-president. UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ March 17, 2011, accessed
April 26, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya.‖
282
the nascent uprising against Qaddafi is finished earlier than anticipated along with prospect of
large scale massacre.
Time theme was invoked to provoke Qaddafi loyalists to defect. On April 27, the U.S.
Ambassador to Libya in an interview with Fox News said: ―It has become clear that Qaddafi and
his henchmen have no intention of stopping the violence.‖ Thus he urged members of Qaddafi
government, ―the time is fast approaching where they have to make a decision. And they have to
decide whether to go down with the ship.‖75
While the ones advocating intervention showed higher commitment to truth and obligation, and
painted grave threatening scenario if they didn‘t act in time and decisively. The ones opposing
reflected lowest level of certainty and truth in their assertions as evident in Germany‘s negative
vote in the UNSCR 1973. Thus the successful utilization and legitimation through temporality
accorded wider acceptance to anti-Qaddafi coalition and its extreme measures to protect
civilians.
6.2.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them
category
One of the most important categories invoked for war legitimation is usually ―Us‖ versus
―Them‖ demarcation. Through this demarcation friends/allies and enemies are identified and
placed in their respective categories. As the war against Libya was led by US so ―We are the
World‖ category was constantly invoked to construct this side: that is vast and inclusive of all
civilized world. It legitimizes violence by reference to conformity76
and it implies if all the good
civilized people are participating in violence the audience must too. This is the category that was
constantly invoked as by reference to the ―international community‖ representing the will of the
people of the world.
This category is then juxtaposed with the ―Dangerous Minority‖ theme which is few dangerous
naysayers among Us opposed to Our plans. They thus are delegitimized and discredited for
opposing something being done for the collective good. For ―Their‖ side, ―They are Fringe‖
theme is invoked to convey the point how this small segment threat entire humanity. Since they ―U.S. Ambassador to Libya on Qaddafi: ‗He Has Got to Realize That The Game is UP‘,‖ Fox News, April 27, 2011.
Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ 91-112.
283
are in minority it is achievable to defeat them. ―Co-Conspirator‖ theme is also invoked to
describe their connections with other enemies or their intention of connecting to them. This is the
most dangerous assertion as mere implication of a relation between two makes violence and
aggression legitimate against non-aggressors as it is easier to link future potential enemies with
the one already constructed and whose recent transgressions against Us are obvious.77
The buildup to Libyan intervention shows how Obama Administration and those supporting
them consistently presented their actions by making reference to international community.
Qaddafi‘s regime was constructed as a threat not only to his own subjects but his actions
constituted threat to the ―peace and security‖ of the global community. Thus the military action
taken against his regime and those on his side was not only justified but a necessary evil to rid
the world of a ruthless and dangerous despot. By juxtaposing statements of ―Us‖ and ―Them‖ the
contrast brings forward the difference in our and their approach for bringing an end to escalating
violence. Qaddafi, through his adamant and ceaseless violence left ―international community‖
with no other choice except military intervention (Table 6.8 & Table 6.9).
Table 6.8: We – the International Community
―The entire world is watching and we will coordinate our assistance and accountability measures with the
international community‖ and ―… we join with the international community to speak with one voice to the
government and the people of Libya.‖ (Obama, February 23) ―In the face of this injustice, the United States and the international community moved swiftly. Sanctions were put
in place by the United States and out allies and partners.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Yesterday, in response to a call for action by the Libyan people and the Arab League, the U.N. Security Council
passed a strong resolution that demands an end to violence against citizens.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―…the United States is acting with a broad coalition that is committed to enforcing UNSCR 1973…. And it brings together many of our European and Arab partners.‖ (Obama, March 19) ―But make no mistake: Today we are part of a broad collation. We are answering the calls of a threatened people.
And we are acting in the interests of the United States and the world.‖ (Obama, March 19) ―In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition.
This includes our closest allies - nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain,
Greece, and Turkey – all of whom have fought by our sides for decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar
Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 303-304.
284
and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.‖
(Obama, March 28) ―In just one month, the United States has worked with our international partners to mobilize a broad coalition...‖
(Obama, March 28) ―This is an important effort that has garnered the support and the active participation of nations who recognize the
significance of coming together in the international community, through the United Nations, to set forth a clear
statement of action to be taken in order to protect innocent civilians from their own government.‖(Clinton, March
24)
Table 6.9: They against Us-the International Community
―Once again, Qaddafi chose to ignore the will of his people and the international community. Instead, he launched a
military campaign against his own people. And there should be no doubt about his intentions, because he himself
made them clear.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Even yesterday, the international community offered Muammar Qaddafi the opportunity to pursue an immediate
cease-fire, one that stopped the violence against civilians and the advances of Qaddafi‘s forces. But despite the
hollow words of his government, he has ignored that opportunity.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the international community offered Qaddafi a
final chance to stop his campaign of killing, or face the consequences. Rather than stand down, his forces continued
their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women and children who sought
their freedom from fear.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―But Colonel Qaddafi and those who still stand by him continue to grossly and systematically abuse the most
fundamental human rights of Libya‘s People.‖ (Susan E. Rice, March17)
Germany risked the label of ―dangerous minority‖ when Berlin chose to abstain on the vote on
UNSCR 1973, landing itself in the company of Russia and China on the matter of military
intervention in Libya.78
It is interesting to note that emerging powers like Brazil and India also
chose to be ―on the wrong side of the history‖ when they refused to become part of US-led
collation of willing to eventually ―de-seat‖ Qaddafi. Domestically too German government faced
severe censure when former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called the abstention a
78
UNSCR 1973 was adopted by 10 votes in favor (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, UK, South Africa and the US) and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). United Nations Security Council, press release, 17 March 2011.
285
―scandalous mistake‖, adding ―Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the
Middle East‖.79
When German vote was negatively being interpreted in the international media, German Defence
Minister de Maiziere rhetorically asked in a Television show ―Could the fact that we are
suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil?‖ This was an interesting observation
considering the fact that TNC‘s first sale of oil was to a US oil refiner.80
He simultaneously
exposed selective international approach against Qaddafi by stating ―We cannot remove all the
dictators in the world with an international military mission‖.81
While Development Minster
Dirk Niebel also commenting on Western hypocrisy stated: ―It is notable that exactly those
countries which are blithely dropping bombs in Libya are still drawing oil from Libya.‖82
However, Berlin was not ready to go too far in its opposition, lest the world see it squarely in
bed with the Libyan dictator. After facing stinging criticism from within Germany and
internationally, Chancellor Merkel at the Libyan Summit that followed UNSCR1973 vote stated
that the resolution was now ―also our resolution‖83
and on another occasion said, ―We share the
goals of the resolution unreservedly. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality.‖84
Similarly, AU was discredited for failing to bring kind of pressure on Qaddafi to step aside. Its
efforts to negotiate with opposition were undermined. It was highlighted that AU‘s efforts to
handle crisis either in Libya or Cote d‘Ivoire illustrated that hopes that decade-old AU was
improvement over its predecessor the Organization of African Unity were over-stated. The road
map presented by AU during the Libyan crisis was termed as ―a classic OAU formula-save our
shaggy dog‖ referring figuratively to phrase ―a shaggy dog, but our dog‖. As AU didn‘t respond
to overwhelming Western desire to force Qaddafi relinquish power, hence neither their formula
nor their narrative was accepted by anti-Qaddafi coalition.85
Helen Pidd, ―Germans voice disquiet over absence from Libya military action,‖ guardian.co.uk, 24 March, 2011.
Jamie Crawford, ―Libyan rebel group sells first oil to U.S.,‖ CNN, June 8, 2011.
Ralf Beste and Dirk Kurbjuweit, ―SPIEGEL Interview with Defense Minister De Maizere ‗We Will Not Get Involved‘ in Sibya,‖ Spiegel Online International, June 20, 2011.
―German Minister Hints at Libya Mission Hypocrisy,‖ Spiegel Online International, March 25, 2011.
Wittrock Philipp, ―Paris and Berlin at Odds over Libya Operation,‖ Spiegel Online International, March 24, 2011.
Quentin Peel, ―Merkel explains Berlin abstention,‖ Financial Times, March 18, 2011.
―AU fails in bid to strike deal on Libya conflict,‖ Daily Nation, May 15, 2011.
286
This ―dangerous minority‖ theme was simultaneously invoked for internal dissenters too - those
who didn‘t back Obama and were creating hurdles citing War Powers Resolution of 1973. In a
letter from Obama to Congressional leaders, President defended the Libyan operation by stating:
―Congressional action in support of the mission would underlie the U.S. commitment to this
remarkable international effort‖ which he labelled as ―important national security matter.‖86
Thus the violation of the resolution was justified ―in the national interest‖ and thus those
objecting were endangering nation‘s interest.
While on the one side there was ―international community‖ that saw those fighting against
Qaddafi and forces loyal to him, acting on behalf of the international society to save unarmed
civilians. Qaddafi‘s threatening narrative was quoted to describe him and those fighting for him.
Even as late as August 2011, in an audio message on Al-Arabiya TV Qaddafi was seen urging
his loyalists to stay in Tripoli and resist invaders. He said: ―Don‘t leave Tripoli for rats. Fight
them, fight them and kill them.‖87
With the passage of time, numbers of countries endorsing Qaddafi‘s exist from political power
increased and that further accorded legitimacy to the anti-Qaddafi collation‘s ongoing military
assault. In May 2011, Senegal‘s President Abdoulaye Wade termed the process of Qaddafi‘s
removal from power ―irreversible‖ and recognized Benghazi-based rebels as legitimate
opposition. He urged they should get international support to lead country‘s transition to
democratic elections – a position that went further than AU which had urged ceasefire but hadn‘t
recognize rebels then.88
One of the chief reasons of increasing international pressure was Qaddafi‘s diplomatic isolation.
While countries advocating intervention and strict measures against Qaddafi were vocal, those
like China and Russia did not publicly assert themselves until the regime change agenda was in
full display and the mandate of UNSCR 1973 had been effectively stretched without the
council‘s formal approval. For example, when Russia hosted a representative of Qaddafi
government in May, 2011 and called on Tripoli to stop using force against civilians and fully
comply with UNSC resolutions- ―The answer we heard cannot be called negative,‖ stated Michael J.K. Bokor, ―Libya: A major test case for Barack Obama,‖ Modern Ghana, May 22, 2011.
John Throne, ―Rebels, regime in fierce fight; Qaddafi says ‗kill them‘,‖ The National (UAE), August 26, 2011.
―Senegal‘s Wade: rebels should lead Libya transition,‖ Reuters, May 20, 2011.
287
Foreign Minister Sergie Lavrov. But the West and the rebels were not ready to look into
ceasefire proposals suggested by the AU and the only deal they said they would accept was one
under which Qaddafi relinquished power.89
6.3. Leading from Behind
In the Libyan intervention, US undertook a back-seat role that was inconsistent with its previous
stunning military adventures in the Middle East within a decade. The last two performances had
in their foundation an eternal belief in American exceptionalism reflected in the discourses and
narratives that reproduced this exceptionalist definition of the American Self. According to
Trevor McCrisken: ―This belief in American exceptionalism provides an essential element of the
cultural and intellectual framework for the making and conduct of US foreign policy.‖90
The
discourses generated through belief in this exceptional identity then formulate a geopolitical
vision of American hegemony, superiority and national mission.91
This nation that had a strong belief in not only being ―unique but also being superior among
nations,‖92
thus exercised its equally ―exceptional‖ leadership role in the world and more so
during the crisis that confronted the world. The belief in exceptional US identity rested not only
on American material power base i.e. both economically as well as militarily but ideationally
from the belief in the American values of freedom and liberty. For decades this fusion of
hegemonic identity and superior power was reflected in the political utterances of American
political elite.
With Obama in the White House, the exceptionalism of America was framed not only on its
outstanding military and economic power, but more on a strategy of cooperative engagement that
relies less on military power centric approach to world politics. But the very approach was
fraught with contradiction that instead of creating discursive interlinkage between American
Joseph Logan and Tarek Amara, ―Libya‘s top oil official defects: Tunisian source,‖ Reuters, May 17, 2011.
Trevor McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2.
James Ceaser, ―The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,‖ American Political Thought 1, no. 1 (2012): 13-21.
McCrisken, American Exceptionalism, 4.
288
exceptionalism, hegemony and its selective engagement strategy, generated debate for a post-
American, post-hegemonic century. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century –
the onset of global financial crisis, US dragged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the mounting
domestic challenges from healthcare to public debt, brought cherished American global
leadership role under intense scrutiny.
In the same circumstances, the Arab uprisings caught Americans as off guard as the rest of the
world. The question that had been in circulation for a while if America can still be ―the
indispensible nation‖ with the ability to act as ―a policeman of the world‖, surfaced again with
US hesitant, reluctant, uncertain and delayed response to unprecedented Arab developments. In
the military intervention that followed in Libya, US did not seek spotlight for itself but sought to
exercise its role in a more limited fashion through allies and partners. The new restrained
American approach was then named ―leading from behind‖ that seemed to encapsulate a new
geopolitical vision, a new way to exercise American power. According to the author of the term,
Ryan Lizza, ―At the heart of the idea of leading from behind is the empowerment of other actors
to do your bidding.‖93
However, everyone in America or abroad was not ready to buy this definition and for
Republicans especially this meant an acknowledgement of diminishing American power globally
and acceptance of its decline.94
According to George Lofflmann: ―On Libya, the discursive re-
framing Obama applied to the world political role of the United States was matched to a new
material reality of less exposed US assets, and greater constraints on the use of military power, in
order to save money.‖95
Leaving aside the debate if American financial condition and constraints
led to this decision, the approach has definitely altered the way America was being perceived in
the world.
The declinist narrative has increased acceptance and US selective approach towards Libya and
its non-existent and irregular policy in Syria has doubled these assertions. For those, depicting Rayan Lizza, ―Leading from Behind,‖ New Yorker, April 27, 2011. ; see also Charles Krauthammer, ―The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind,‖ Washington Post, April 28, 2011. ; Michael Boyle, ―Obama: ‗Leading from Behind‘ on Libya,‖ Guardian, August 27, 2011. ; Katy Steinmetz, ―Top 10 Buzzwords: 10. Leading from Behind,‖
Time, December 7, 2011.
Krauthammer, ―The Obama Doctrine.‖ ; Roger Cohen, ―Leading from Behind,‖ New York Times, October 31, 2011.
95George Lofflmann, ―Leading from Behind – American Exceptionalism and President‘s Obama‘s Post_American
Vision of Hegemony,‖ Geopolitics 20 (2015): 322, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2015.1017633.
289
the drift towards post-hegemony, Libyan intervention was the first global military campaign that
left no doubt about waning US influence and hegemony. The allies and partners who were
supposed to get emboldened with new global leadership role, seemed frustrated with American
reluctant approach and this frustration since then has been a source of friction between America
and its Arab allies over developments in Syria too.
6.3.1. Post-Qaddafi Libya
Alan J. Kuperman says; ―Indeed, the United States seemed to have scored a hat trick: nurturing
the Arab Spring, averting a Rwanda-like genocide, and eliminating Libya as a potential source of
terrorism.‖96
But in retrospect the verdict proved to be immature and Libyan intervention was an
―abject failure, judged even by its own standards….failed not only to evolve into a democracy; it
has devolved into a failed state…. Libya now serves as a safe haven for militias affiliated with
both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).‖97
The intervention which was supposed to bring peace, democracy and exercise of universal rights
for the Libyan people has conversely left Libyans in a far worse situation. The most recent
House of Commons report on Libyan intervention lay thread bare the overstated threat and the
objective of NATO intervention. It states:
―This policy was not informed by accurate intelligence. In particular, the
Government failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated and that
the rebels included a significant Islamist element. By the summer of 2011, the
limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunist policy of
regime change. That policy was not underpinned by a strategy to support and
shape post-Gaddafi Libya. The result was political and economic collapse, inter-
militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread
human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region
and the growth of ISIL in North Africa‖98
Alan J. Kuperman, ―Obama‘s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,‖ Foreign Affairs 94, no.2 (March/April 2015): 66-77.
Ibid.
For details see ―Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK‘s future policy options,‖ Foreign
Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Third Report of Session 2016-17, HC 119, published on September14, 2016.
290
Thus the NATO intervention inadvertently created the very conditions, it was precisely launched
to thwart in Libya. And it is difficult to disagree with Obama‘s pithy assessment that described
post-intervention Libya as a ―shit show‖ in April 2016.99
Conclusion
Being the fourth largest country in Africa by area, Libya had also been one of the richest in the
region because of its large petroleum reserves until recent protests and social unrest has plunged
it into deadly civil war. It was a regional power hub in North Africa, shaping in part the policy of
the African Union. Its booming economy attracted thousands of workers from the neighbouring
countries, a fact of high importance for the weak labour markets in Tunisia and Egypt. But
events in 2011 brought those regional and extra-regional players in the Libyan conflict who for
decades had been coping with a regionally unpopular despot Qaddafi.
The uprisings started as a genuine expression of the democratic aspiration of the people of Libya
but the trajectory of events led to the involvement of regional and global players with interests at
stake at systemic and local levels. Ben Ali and Mubarak‘s exit from power had upset the fragile
hierarchy in place since the end of the Cold War. US allies were deposed by peaceful protestors.
The armies in respective countries stood aside as they saw decades-old authoritarian regimes
crumbling before eyes.
Libya was a different society. The tribal structure in place and the non-existence of institutional
structures made it more difficult for Libyan protestors to get rid of Qaddafi. Besides the
country‘s west enjoyed significant Qaddafi hold, though east simmered with disturbances and
revolution. However, the stakes for the regional and extra-regional players were too high to let
Qaddafi reach a negotiated or otherwise solution to the uprising. A historic opportunity to get rid
of Qaddafi was not to be wasted. Hence, without applying all diplomatic tools to resolve a crisis,
a hasty military intervention was launched with implicit objective of a regime change.
The Libyan military intervention revealed the link between regional and global hierarchies. At
the systemic level US power that had already been subjected to scrutiny by peer challengers, kept
99
Jeffrey Goldberg ―The Obama Doctrine,‖ The Atlantic, April 2016.
291
assessing American resolve and will to enter into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. With US
―leading from behind‖ campaign, the peer challengers like Russia assessed that long-awaited
systemic changes are due, at least in the Middle East. Hence, the Syrian crisis would deepen the
fault lines that first appeared with US reluctant and back-seat role in Libya.
The global implications of the Libyan crisis could be summed in a single line – we are officially
in the post-hegemonic international system.
292
Chapter 7: Syria – The US quandary
As already discussed in the previous chapters, post-hegemonic transition at the systemic level
while triggering significant changes within the global hierarchy, affects unstable, conflict-prone
and diffused regional hierarchies too. MENA has seen unprecedented changes recently. The
region‘s landscape has always been fluid, and power relations had remained uneven which
changes rapidly, and external pressures can affect regional balance of power in dramatic and
often unpredictable ways. The case study of Syria sheds light on how with the dawn of post-
hegemonic phase in the international system, why the same military intervention model has not
been replicated against another dictator, accused of similar brutal and at times worst tactics and
suppression against its own population.
While analyzing Syrian case regional realities stayed the same but considerable changes in the
global hierarchy affected threat construction for military intervention. US could not even enlist
token Russian and Chinese cooperation as was done in case of Libya. As the power transition
from a US centered unipolar world to a more uncertain international order is taking place, US
hegemony is also fastly eroding. With the waning of unparalleled power potential, come the
limitation of US influence to direct events on the international stage. The rise of peer challengers
and countries with significant financial and economic clout are increasingly frustrating
acquisition and implementation of US policy goals in key regions like MENA.
Syria case-study is particularly interesting as it is meant to explore the linkage between global
and regional hierarchies explicated in Military Intervention Threat Model in Chapter 2. It
establishes further clarity about how the diminishing US power and hegemony will create power
vacuum, to be attempted to fill up by other resurgent global and regional actors like Russia and
Iran. Besides Iran, the trajectory of conflict is being shaped by other regional states like Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Qatar etc for whom Syria serves an arena for proxy war. The threat
securitization model through political discourse will also be discussed in Syrian civil conflict
case and with reference to the international dimension the conflict has taken.
293
This chapter will also follow the pattern similar to the one in case of Libya. It will be divided
into three sections. First section will deal with Pre-Bashar al-Assad era to place contemporary
Syria in historical perspective. The second section will trace developments in Bashar al-Assad
period till the massive unrest against government and the bloody civil war till date ie mid 2017.
The chronological development of Syrian unrest traced in the previous section will then help us
understand the interplay of unit and systemic level variables as identified in Military Intervention
Model in the third section. However, this will remain limited to key regional players, considering
the number of actors involved in the conflict. Extra-regional players will be analyzed in the next
chapter. An in-depth analysis of these variables will then help us ascertain why Syrian conflict
still has lingered on with neither full scale international military intervention nor near end in
sight.
7.1. Pre- Bashar al-Assad Syria
One of the oldest countries in the world, Syria always enjoyed a distinctive position in the
Muslim Middle East. The country has been crucial in the development of all the three main
Arbahamic religions, amid being a site of contestation between ideologies, religions, and sects.
The Ottomans ruled it from 1516 until 1917 but modern Syria is a recent phenomenon; a product
of Western imperialism after it was carved out of the historical and geographical Syria (bilad al-
sham)1 in 1920 and doesn‘t coincide with ancient Syria that occupied the region between the
eastern Mediterranean coast and the desert of northern Arabia.2
Syria was the place that gave birth to Baathism – the movement that aimed at unifying the Arab
states. This Arab nationalism was inclusive in nature and fact that all Sunni, Shiites, Christians,
even rural and urban populations could identify together, added to its wide appeal to all segments
of society. The dissatisfaction with the truncated Syria and this nationalist tide was such that
Syria even surrendered its sovereignty to Egypt in 1958 in the name of pan-Arabism and
throughout 1960s focused its struggle for Palestine. However, the loss of Golan Heights to Israel
‗Bilad al-sham‟ was a cultural and qusai-administrative unit under the Ottoman Empire and included current states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Jordan and parts of southern Turkey.
Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 4-5.
294
in 1967 gave a ―Syrian territorial dimension to Syria‘s Arabism‖, as its recovery became single
most important objective in Syrian foreign policy.3
Map 7.1. Map of Syria (Source: CIA The World Factbook accessed online
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html)
By 1990s the pan-Arab identity in Syria underwent further transition owing to distinctive
regional realties that included series of setbacks like separate deals struck by Egypt, Jordan and
the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) with Israel at Syria‘s expense; cost of its own
persistent struggle with the Jewish state; simmering anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon besides
failure of hitherto much cherished pan-Arab projects. Raymond Hinnebush rightly asserts: ―If
identity and geopolitics shaped a fairly constant agenda for Syria‘s foreign policy makers, their
capacity to pursue it varied according to Syria‘s level of state formation.‖4
3 Raymond Hinnebush, ―The Foreign Policy of Syria,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd ed.
Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 208. Hinnebush, The Foreign Policy of Syria, 210.
295
As against the first quarter century of its independent existence when foreign policy shifted
according to the consequent balance of domestic power,5 Hafez al-Assad enjoyed wide latitude
in foreign policy making. With consolidation of power, Hafez in 1980s steered the foreign policy
himself with little interference from either hawkish or dovish factions within bureaucracy.6
Consequently public opinion ceased to be the major driver behind the foreign policy making
which hitherto had been an important factor. Under his leadership, Syria was seen to ―punch
above its weight‖ in regional politics and he was seen adept in maintaining the delicate balance
between Syria‘s limited resources and vulnerable geopolitical position and responding to the
looming external threats to its national security.7
Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami aptly sum up Hafez al-Assad‘s Syria as ―fascist in the
most correct sense of the word. It sought to replace class conflict with devotion to the absolute
state….Beneath the froth, Syria‘s was a one-party system,…controlled by one man. The state cultivated a surveillance society, everyone spying on everyone else and no one in secure
position, not even the top generals and security officers.‖8 By the end of his reign most of the
political opposition had either been crushed or co-opted and quiescent. Consequently when
succession fell on an unlikely candidate like Bashaar al-Asad due to the accidental death of most
favoured eldest son Bassel, the absolutist regime built by Hafez was about to dominate the
country‘s life until 2011 when the unprecedented uprisings in the entire region would drag Syria
in a bloody civil war still going on with no nearby end in sight.
7.2. Syria under Bashaar al-Assad
The death of Hafez al-Assad was announced on June 10, 2000 and Bashaar al-Assad inherited
the powerful presidency forged by his father and in spite of all the apprehension and speculation
that it may lead to a violent change and contested between Rifaat, his brother and Hafez‘s
Generals, the transition went smooth. Before coming to power, Bashaar‘s personal image was
5 For more information on Syria in its initial years see Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965). Patrick Seal, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 340-344.
Hinnebush, The Foreign Policy of Syria, 216.
Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country,14.
296
skillfully constructed as outward-looking modernizer through his role as head of the Syrian
Computer Society that is credited with the launch of internet within the country. The image led
to the hopeful speculation about the dawn of a new age in Syrian politics as the elected President
called on ―every single citizen to participate in the process of development and modernization,‖
and for ―constructive criticism‖ to this end.9
A significant change was observed in the country when by the end of 2000, a number of forums
(muntadiyat) established in and beyond Damascus led to hotly debated reform ideas and it was
soon hailed as ―Damascus Spring‖ in the international media. This unprecedented tolerance
displayed by a regime that usually thrives on brutally suppressing political dissent proved short-
lived. The participants within these discussion forums were quickly dubbed as foreign agents – a
smear campaign was launched that we were soon to witness again in 2011 uprising. Soon
Bashaar himself joined the official circle denouncing this embryonic movement.10
Hence effectively by autumn 2001 the ―Damascus Spring‘ had deteriorated to winter. Despite
these measures, Bashaar retained his personal popularity as many believed the old guard to be
behind regime‘s sadistic approach. He was able to capture the Syrian public and the wider Arab
street through his anti-Western, anti-Zionist and pro-Arab rhetoric. Amid regional turmoil of
2003 Iraqi invasion and Hizbullah-Israel war of 2006, Bashaar was credited not only for
maintaining domestic stability but simultaneously hosting around 500,000 Iraqis and 200,000
Lebanese refugees.11
The regime even tried to enlist US cooperation by collaborating in the ―war on terror‖ and
became a popular destination for ―torture by proxy‖ policy where terror suspects were illegally
extradited by US to third countries. But instead of bridging the gap between the two, Syrian
international isolation increased during Bush era and further sanctions were imposed in 2004
citing issues like Syrian regime undermining security in Iraq, its persistent occupation of
Lebanon, its support for militant Islamic groups and its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. The intensification of bilateral hostility gave further impetus to fears that Syria Speech delivered by Bashaar al-Assad on his inauguration as President of Syria in 2000, full text available at http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=438:president-assad-2000-inauguration-speech-july-17-2000-3&catid=106&Itemid=496 (accessed January 16, 2017). Bashaar al-Assad was interviewed by Ash-Sharq al-Awsat in February 2001 and also quoted in Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country, 20.
Figures quoted in Ibid., 25.
297
might be next on the US invasion list and it probably became a factor in shoring up domestic
support for Bashaar.
The regime suffered a huge blow when the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-
Hariri in February 2005 threatened to seriously damage the President. The Damascus regime‘s
widely speculated implication in the murder gave rise to unprecedented protests throughout
Lebanon and finally led to Syrian withdrawal in April, bringing an end to its three-decade
occupation and significantly denting Bashaar domestic standing.12
His forced evacuation from
Lebanon along with his inability to respond to Israeli and US provocations during this period not
only squandered the wider Arab public support that he earned when he stood against US invasion
of Iraq in 2003 but was seen loosing ―geopolitical cards‖ his father had accumulated throughout
his tenure. It was not until Syrian stand against Israel in its war against Hezbollah (2006) and
Hamas (December 2008) and its claim as a bulwark of stability against the rising Islamist threat
created by US in the wake of its war against Iraq that aided recovery of Bashaar‘s image
internationally and especially among the wider Arab public.
On the other side, Bashaar‘s economic agenda introduced by him after gaining power stifled
because of high levels of corruption, nepotism and economic inertia. Resultantly, inequality grew
up to the extent that 5 percent of the population had almost 50 percent of the country‘s wealth in
its possession.13
The severe drought plaguing country since 2006 worsened the situation and by
2010 between two and three million Syrians had been pushed in extreme poverty, forcing
hundreds of thousands off their lands.14
The massive internal displacement, the mismanagement
and neglect resultantly alienated the cross-sectarian peasant constituency, once loyal to Bashaar.
By 2011, Bashaar regime failed to fulfill any set of political, economic or national bargains that
it claimed to bring. The system erected through all these years was unable to either contain or
absorb dissent when the country was shaken by uprising. Finally when the region was embroiled
in unprecedented upheavals, the calls for reform within the country quickly turned into vocal
cries for revolution. Ibid., 26.
Omar S. Dahi and Yasser Munif, ―Revolts in Syria: Tracking the Convergence between Authoritarianism and Neoliberalism,‖ Journal of Asian and African Studies 47, no. 4 (2011): 323-32.
―SYRIA: Drought Pushing Millions into Poverty,‖ IRIN, September 9, 2010.
298
7.2.1. Anti- Bashaar al-Assad Unrest 2011
Bashaar was on its way to put Syria on its international image recovery path following years of
diplomatic isolation over Iraq and Lebanon; and seemed to have gained significant regional clout
by virtue of its close relations with Hezbullah, Hamas, and Iran when the winds of change
touched Syrian shores after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. It was an unexpected development
because initially the uprising was read as a resistance against the pro-Western regimes and
Bashaar administration with its vocal anti-Western stance especially against the United States
and Israel, his proximity with his people and recent reforms undertaken expected it would be
spared such a fate.15
It ironically speculated to gain from the uprisings as a regional rival and a
long-term US-ally Mubarak was brought down within months and events seemed to be unfolding
in favor of its staunch regional ally-Iran.
Even though when two main economic and urban centres like Damascus and Aleppo remained
relatively calm and quiet initially due to heavy security presence but their suburbs and other
cities saw large anti-Bashaar protests by mid-April and occurred in cities like Baniyas,
Lattaqiyah, Deir El-Zor, Homs, Hama and the Kurdish area in the northeast. To suppress the
dissent military units deemed loyal to the regime were heavily mobilized while conventional
army units, whose loyalty could be questioned, were kept away from these centres of protests.
The regime‘s public response since the eruption of early protests had been couched in security
discourse and conspiracy theory; and it refused to acknowledge presence of genuine resentment
among public against government‘s discriminatory policies and prevailing social-economic
conditions. It kept blaming ―infiltrators‖, ―armed gangs‖, ―foreign parties‖ and ―Salafist
terrorists‖.
Though, the uprising against Bashaar united people across religious, sectarian and ethnic
boundaries but regime continued to read the revolution through ethnic and religious lens. It
absolutely side-lined role of non-Islamist civil activists that represented the greatest threat to
regime‘s avowed secular credentials. Even after the repeal of the hated Emergency Law, large
demonstrations against the government went ahead in almost every region of the country and
people started demanding fall of the regime. While both US and European Union tightened
Such a conviction was expressed by Bashaar in an interview with the Wall Street Journal as Egypt was undergoing massive upheaval.
299
sanctions against Bashaar and his senior officials and imposed arms embargo also. The UN
reported on June 3 that almost 1000 people died in the first three months of the uprising.16
In August 2011, international pressure kept mounting on the regime and President Obama for the
first time explicitly called for Bashaar to step down while simultaneously freezing Syrian
government assets.17
UK and European Union backed US call while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and
Kuwait recalled their ambassadors during this month. While in October 2011 attempts to pass a
UNSC resolution condemning Bashaar regime was vetoed by Russia and China.18
In another
major development Arab League in an unprecedented move suspended Syrian membership in
November upon failure of Bashaar to implement Arab peace plan.19
Situation kept getting worse and in another UN resolution Bashaar was asked to step down in
February 2012, which was again vetoed by Russia and China.20
UN during this month sought
services of Kofi Annan as Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League (AL) to the crisis.
Annan resigned in August 2012 after he failed to broker a cease-fire and was then replaced with
Lakhdar Brahimi.21
The flux in situation on ground prompted a very harsh statement till date by
the US President Obama on the Syrian crisis in August 2012 when he asserted that the use of
chemical and biological weapons by regime would be a ―red line‖ to which America may
respond militarily.22
The statement intensified speculation of yet another military intervention by
the US in the Middle East and started a heated polarized debate both politically and
academically.
Syrian government was increasingly seemed on a back foot when rebels made gains in Damascus
suburbs taking over military bases in December 2012 and started closing in on the city‘s
airport.23
2013 started with another pledge from Bashaar to introduce reform to end the civil war
within the country but violence surged with bombings in Aleppo and Damascus. The number and
―UN Chief Voices Alarm at Escalation of Violence in Syria,‖ UN News Centre, June 3, 2011.
Jason Ukman and Liz Sly, ―Obama: Syrian President Assad must step down,” Washington Post, August 18, 2011.
―Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime,‖ Guardian, October 5, 2011.
Anup Kaphle, ―Timeline: Unrest in Syria,‖ Washington Post, Jan 20, 2014.
―Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting
Arab League‘s Proposed Peace Plan,‖ February 4, 2012, accessed February 17, 2017, http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. ―Syria: Lakhdar Brahimi replaces Kofi Annan as UN envoy,‖ Telegraph, August 17, 2012.
John Beck, ―Syria After Four Years: Timeline of a Conflict,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2011.
Kaphle, ―Timeline: Unrest in Syria.‖
300
influence of foreign jihadists kept growing as the conflict entered in its advanced stages. There
were increasing reports that Jabhat al-Nusra was imposing Islamic Law in areas under its control
and then came audio statement from Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq
in April 2013 that al-Nusra was extension of their group and would soon be merged with it. Their
advances, however, were spurned by al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani. While on the
other hand Bashaar support also got emboldened as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasurallah openly
pledged support for the regime and admitted fighters from his group were fighting for Bashaar.24
In one of the most significant developments in the conflict, Bashaar was accused of using
chemical weapons in Damascus suburbs that had reported to kill nearly 1500 Syrians in August-
September 2013. Before Syria was accused of using chemical weapons in April 2013 against
rebels and Britain and France had informed UN of the existence of credible evidence to the
effect. President Obama blamed the regime for the attack and expressed willingness to consider a
military strike option of limited scope and duration, designed to serve as punishment for
Bashaar‘s alleged use of chemical weapons and as deterrent. He also stated that US had
responsibility to respond forcefully in Syria but not without Congressional approval.25
However,
David Cameron, UK Prime Minister, who simultaneously called for a military response, was
blocked in a parliamentary vote.26
On the other hand, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared a self-styled Islamic
―caliphate‖ in territory form Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala in June 2014. It also took
control of the largest oil field, Omar, after fierce battles with al-Qaeda‘s Syrian affiliate – al-
Nusra Front. Brutal practices and serious human rights abuses by ISIS made headlines
throughout the world when it released video of beheading American journalist James Foley; the
first of five westerners to be beheaded by the group on August 19.27
It then began offensive
against Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border in mid-September. The town‘s
defence became a symbol of resistance against ISIS involving the FSA, collation airstrikes and
Peshmerga fighters from Iraq‘s Kurdish Regional Government. The consistent advance of ISIS
Beck, ―Syria After Four Years.‖
Catherine E. Shoichet and Tom Watkins, ―Strike against Syria? Obama backs it, but wants Congress to vote,‖
CNN, September 1, 2013. ―Syria Crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action,‖ BBC, August 30, 2013.
Chelsea J. Carter, ―Video shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley,‖ CNN, August 20, 2014.
301
forced US and five Arab countries to launch air strikes around Aleppo and Raqqa against ISIS
targets.
The OPCW reported in September 2014 that it had ―compelling confirmation‖ that a toxic
chemical had been ―systematically and repeatedly‖ used by Bashaar troops as a weapon against
anti-government rebels.28
Kurdish fighters with the help of US coalition were able to retake
control of Kobani in January 2015 after four months of fighting.29
As the Islamists kept making
progress throughout 2015 and Bashaar acknowledged serious setbacks for his military, Russia
entered the conflict on the side of regime and launched its first air strikes in September 30.30
Though Russia claimed it targeted Islamists but West and the Syrian opposition blamed that the
attacks were principally targeting anti-Bashaar rebels.
The year 2015 ended with the adoption of Vienna road map for transitional period by the UNSC
Resolution 2254 on December 18.31
However, by the end of the year government forces
achieved significant victory when the Syrian Army allowed rebels to evacuate remaining areas of
Homs, returning country‘s third-largest city to regime‘s control after four years of conflict.
Indirect peace talks between the Syrian government and opposition collapsed after a few days in
Geneva on February 3, 2016 over a Russian-backed army offensive in Aleppo. UN Syrian envoy
indicated that indirect talks to be resumed in Geneva on March 14.32
US and Russia announced a
partial ceasefire on February 22 and Vladimir Putin announced on March 14 that his armed
troops will begin withdrawing from Syria.33
While in December 2016, one of the greatest
victories came to Bashaar when government troops with the help of Russian air power and
Iranian-sponsored militias retook Aleppo, driving rebels of their last major urban stronghold.34
In January 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to enforce a ceasefire between the government
and non-Islamist rebels after talks between the two sides in Kazakhstan.35
However, another Beck, ―Syria After Four Years.‖
―Kurdish forces retake 70 percent of Kobani,‖ Al-Bawaba News, January 1, 2015.
Ed Payne, Barbara Starr and Susannah Cullinanae, ―Russia launches first airstrikes in Syria,‖ CNN, October 1, 2015.
―Syrian civil war timeline,‖ Independent (UK).
Hugh Naylor, ―Syria peace talks open in Geneva with no ‗Plan B‘ on table,‖ Washington Post, March 14, 2016.
―Putin says Russians to start withdrawing from Syria, as peace talks resume,‖ Reuters, March 15, 2016.
―‘Aleppo is back,‘ Syria TV declares after army completely retakes city from rebels,‖ CBC News, December 22, 2016.
Raja Abdulrahim, ―Russia, Turkey and Iran Agree on Syria Truce Monitoring,‖ Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2017.
302
chemical attack in Idlib in April 2017 has reignited Syrian intervention debate in international
media and its repercussions for the Syrian regime are still being assessed.36
The civil war in
Syria continues to date and the various factions and Syrian government are engaged in fierce
battles to gain decisive upper hand in the ongoing conflict. The decisive victory in favour of any
is still a far-fetched reality. However, the chronological development of the unrest in Syria traced
in this section will help us explore the linkage between the interplay of systemic and unit level
variables involved in the Syrian conflict in the following section.
7.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables
As stated in previous chapters the interplay of systemic and unit-level variables are important in
facilitating the construction of securitized discourse for international military intervention. A
detailed analysis of key variables identified in Military Intervention Model (Chapter 2) will help
us understand how the case of Syria could be compared and contrasted with that of Libya.
The US hegemonic decline and its increasing realization not only among the emerging global
competitors but within the US administration itself had been significant in not undertaking overt
military intervention against Bashaar‘s regime in spite of crossing stated ―red line‖ threshold.
Besides the power transition in the global hierarchy, resurgence of Russia in the Middle East and
its resolve to play a major role in the ongoing conflict with already reduced US presence in the
regional affairs leaves no doubt that the post-Cold War decades of undivided US influence in the
region are over.
Using the same variables for analysis in both Libyan and Syrian case will help us shed light on
how far drift towards post-hegemony has taken place within the international system; thus
making it more difficult for US to employ a unilateral use of military offensive against Bashaar
al-Assad. It will help us determine how the declining US influence within the region along with
resurgence of peer competitors like Russia and Iran have changed dynamics of conflict in Syria.
Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, “Syria Chemical Weapons Attack Toll Rises to 70 as Russian Narrative is Dismissed,” Guardian, April 05, 2017.
303
Civil war in Syria is still in progress with no nearby end in sight. The dynamics of conflict are
constantly in flux due to emergence of new actors and shifting loyalties of existing players. This
chapter covers changes occurring in Syria since the start of 2011 uprising to February 2017.
However, the political discourse threat securitization will evolve around the period when US
speculated undertaking overt military intervention option against the Syrian regime and how it
failed to materialize it. Again the analysis of these variables is significant for understanding US
non-intervention in Syria.
7.3.1. Geography
With a limited manpower base, lack of strategic depth, non-existent natural boundaries and
exposition to stronger states, what nevertheless distinguished Syria have been its geopolitical
location and its pivotal position in the Arab-Israel conflict and peace process. As a noted
American journalist observed: ―Syria has no strategic minerals and produces relatively little oil.
It has no important seaports or military bases. But it has something any real-estate agent would
envy: location‖.37
Over the years Syrian assumption of a ―swing‖ position between the
conservative and revisionist camps within the Arab world has tilted the region decisively to one
or the other side as witnessed first in 1950s Baghdad Pact and then in the Gulf War in 1990-
1991. The similar pivotal position has attracted increased interference from international and
regional players in Syrian domestic politics too. But with the assumption of power by Hafez al-
Assad the vulnerable geopolitical location was utilized to strike alliances and to seek material
resources from diversified sources that could allow Syria to balance threats and evade
isolationism or submission to enemies.38
The mid-1950s saw successive nationalist governments aligning with both Nasser‘s Egypt and
Soviet Union for arms procurement and protection from both Western, Israeli and conservative
Arab pressures. Initially Syria had adopted balanced approach between pro-US Middle Eastern
allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and anti-US Iran and Lebanon‘s Hezbollah. But the US drive
to further isolate Syria under Basher al-Assad finally pushed it closer to Iran and Hezbollah in
2003 while still trying to maintain a modicum of balance by courting US ally Turkey
37
Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (Prometheus Books, 2014). Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 1-9.
304
simultaneously. The Syrian uprising of 2011 finally allowed Iran to emerge as the greatest
beneficiary of the squeezing geopolitical space to Bashaar while at the same time reverting Syria
as an arena for rival forces.39
The Syrian geopolitical location and its significance in the Middle East would again be a
significant factor in the ongoing Middle Eastern power transition. If Bashaar survives the
disastrous civil war like he had been for the past six years and able to protect political and
territorial integrity of the country, its strong inclination towards Iran and Russia will draw a clear
dividing line in the emerging bipolar structure within the regional hierarchy. Iran stands to gain
the most from the emerging scenario as it would be able to assert power and influence within the
Arab world denied to it for decades since the Iranian Islamic revolution. The influence in Syria
would simultaneously allow Tehran edge over other major Arab players like Egypt previously
firmly aligned with the archrival Saudi Arabia as well as non-Arab Israel.
The battle for Syria is the battle for the regional hegemony and for re-drawing configuration of
the Middle Eastern hierarchy which had been in transition since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The Arab Uprisings of 2011 have accelerated the trend as old alliances and loyalties fracture and
evolving regional dynamics give rise to new trends. Besides reduced US presence and influence
in the region has made the competition among regional rivals existential for their national
interests. In such a scenario, because of its strategic geopolitical location, Syrian prize will
remain hotly contested among all competing players and amicable solution to deadly civil war
remains elusive.
7.3.2. Intra-State Conflict
As detailed in previous chapters, another very important variable for international military
intervention involves state‘s internal domestic political-military situation and social-economic
conditions. A thriving stable state with public standing firmly behind it rarely becomes open
target for external military intervention. The detailed analysis of Syrian domestic situation just
before and during the 2011 unrest will tell us conditions were already ripe for mass discontent
within the general public and the situation was at boiling point when external factors triggered
call for reform within the country which eventually subsided into long, bloody, protracted civil
Hinnebush, ―The Foreign Policy of Syria,‖ 210.
305
war due to regime‘s failure to acknowledge genuine resentment prevailing within the society and
inability to adopt concrete policies aimed at the amelioration of public discontent.
7.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies
After independence several attempts were made at establishing constitution in Syria from 1950
to 1966. But finally the constitution of March 12, 1973 embodied principles like Syria to be
considered a socialist republic, head of the state to be a Muslim and recognized Islamic law to be
the main source of legislation. The constitution vested strong executive power in the President, to
be elected by a popular vote to a seven-year term and nominated by the Ba‘ath party. The
president then appointed the cabinet headed by a Prime Minister, and served as secretary-general
of the Ba‘ath party and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The unicameral Majlis al-shaab
(People‘s Assembly) consisted of 250 members who were elected for a term of four years but
lacked real powers. The country had been under a state of emergency since 1963 (except for
1973-74) which proved to be a major source of discontent during the civil unrest of 2011 and one
of the initial public demands included lifting of this law, which Bashaar did comply to placate
the public.40
Freedom of political activity, assembly and association remained negligent in Syria. The Arab
Socialist Ba‘ath Party remained country‘s dominant political institution and remained far
dominant and influential than five of its partners in the National Progressive front (NPF) which
included the Communist Party of Syria (SCP) and small leftist parties like the Arab Socialist
Party (ASP), the Democratic Socialist Union Party (DSUP), the Socialist Unionist Movement
(ASUM) and the Syrian Arab Socialist Movement (ASU) besides the Ba‘ath Party. The Ba‘ath‘s
were dominated by the minority Alawi sect, who had been awarded key and influential official
positions within the government and rural sector of the population generally.
The economy, which mainly thrived on oil prices and foreign aid, continued to be dominated by
the state despite repeated announcements of economic reforms. The time before the civil unrest
depicted a period of meager GDP expansion at a rate of 1.5% per year. The major socioeconomic
dislocations including droughts, black market activity, the declining oil production, depopulation
in rural areas, dramatic increase in semi-urbanization and informal housing, the hostile political 40
The info on the section on government structure and policies has mainly been retrieved from http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/asia/syrian-political-geography/syria.
306
environment and government‘s inability to attract foreign investment made the future outlook of
the economy bleak. The regime‘s efforts to satisfy the demands of the populace remained
inadequate, as well as its ability to train and absorb growing workforce in country‘s weak
economy.41
Besides the frail economy the human rights situation remained worse and arbitrary
arrests and incommunicado detentions remained widespread. Human rights organizations
remained banned within the country and public criticism of the Ba‘ath party officials was not
allowed. Besides nearly all communication facilities were owned and operated by government
that included postal service, telegraph, radio, television and telephone.42
It would not be wrong to assert that the interests of minority-led Alawi regime were divorced
from the majority of those citizens it ruled. It was not accountable to any meaningful
constituency save few individuals who held reins of power in the society. It had little incentive to
enact democratic reforms or to improve public services. Bashaar initial steps to implement
economic reforms and eventually allowing greater political freedom failed on both counts and
only contributed to even greater cronyism and concentration of resources among the ruling elite.
Though the elder and junior Assad had been effectively controlling public discontent through a
combination of politico-military tools for decades but the combination of political repression,
deteriorating socioeconomic standards and spillover effects of Arab uprisings did not leave
Syrian regime unaffected and the unlikely city of Deraa became the channel through which
decades of unspent grievances manifested themselves.
7.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition groups
At the onset of Syrian uprising, the Bashaar regime seemed strong and deeply entrenched and
initially was confident that it was not vulnerable to significant popular unrest due to its powerful
domestic security apparatus.43
Even though the opposition to the regime was multifaceted but
the ruling regime had little to suspect; it was confident that with the very credible threat of arrest,
torture or death in place, nothing could induce public to mass protests. The regime was also
confident it enjoyed loyalty of minority communities such as Alawis, Druze and Christians who
were apprehensive that a popularly elected Islamist government would infringe upon their
Lindsay A. Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 418.
Ibid., 420.
David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 39-54.
307
religious right by instituting some form of Islamic law and hence they would lose the real or
perceived spoils they already enjoyed under the secular Bashaar regime.
Nevertheless opposition existed; secularists, socialists and communists that enjoyed affinity with
the Baath ideology decried regime for infringement on their basic rights such as those of free
speech and assembly. Kurdish activists, who were fighting for their civil rights such as the right
to speak their native language, were routinely incarcerated. While Islamists like Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood were harassed, suspected and imprisoned for their alleged revolutionary
inclinations.44
Unlike their North African and Jordanian counterparts, Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood had never been part of the political process for decades and hence never been
―tamed‖. Damascus regime accused them that they had never left their militant phase. After 1982
defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, a few of their leaders went in exile in London and Paris while
the actual fighters with their goals intact had nurtured their wounds and grudges for decades and
were ready to exact revenge.45
On the top of this US invasion of Iraq has bred new generation of jihadists who went east to fight
Americans and their Shiite allies. From 2003-2007 Bashaar support for these jihadis against
Americans was clearly there. These jihadists had valuable urban warfare skills and were
significant in offering tough resistance to Damascus regime. Moreover, between 2012 and 2013
a ―new‖ Syrian opposition emerged in the context of the uprising, consisting of both local and
exiled activists as well as armed elements in the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Unfortunately, the
creation of these political and military wings did not lead to unification of opposition and its
fracturing and inability to bring about a political change is one of the chief reasons why Bashaar
regime has proven so resilient till date.
When the uprising started, organizing and mobilizing protestors became extremely difficult in
the absence of central authority that could provide political, logistical and financial resources to
sustain protests. To address this challenge, Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) started
organizing whose initial members were mostly media activists who viewed these committees as
opportunity to collect and disseminate information to Syrians and the outside world about Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖421.
For more details see Yvette Talhamy, ―The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship,‖ Middle East Journal 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 561-80.
308
protests. Soon LCCs became more than media centers and became pivotal in organizing and
mobilizing protestors which gave them increasingly national character.
While the exiled Syrian political opposition mobilized to support uprising and represent them
before international community. It led to the establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC)
around August 2011 consisting of nationalists, liberal and Kurdish oppositionists; the Muslim
Brotherhood and independent activists joined too.46
SNC soon gained international community
support which entertained it as a potential government in waiting in case the regime collapsed.
However, it suffered from same political, financial and logistical shortcomings as in case of
internal opposition and soon became the battleground where regional powers like Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Qatar could vie for control and influence over the Syrian opposition. Resultantly, it
has undergone dramatic changes in their core alliances and membership as the conflict
progressed.47
By the summer of 2011, sustained repression from regime resulted in organization of citizens
and army defectors under the banner of FSA. It actually had been a lose structure of various
armed groups and its attempt to portray itself as parallel national army in both command and
composition was never successful. The units fighting under FSA did not coalesce into a parallel
army and its command structure remained vague and fluid that failed to facilitate distribution of
resources among brigades. The failure was then reflected in the armed opposition that emerged
in the latter half of 2011.
FSA, the LCCs and SNC represented the main arms of the uprising but the weakness of the
institutional linkages between these three was apparent. Shift in regional powers (Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Qatar) responses to Syrian conflict from reform to regime change and availability of
significant resources from these players gave further momentum to opposition forces on ground
as well as fostered infighting, mistrust and lack of coordination among them. Besides SNC also
suffered from legitimacy crisis as most of its exiled leadership was far removed from the
uprising and shared little in terms of social background with the protestors. The rapidity with
which the events unfolded and the absence of preexisting institutional structures, both SNC and
For more on SNC see Seda Altug, ―The Syrian uprising and Turkey‘s ordeal with the Kurds,‖ Dialectical Anthropology 37, no.1 (March 2013): 124.
Abboud, ―How Syria Fell to Pieces,‖ 338.
309
LCCs proved incapable to marshal resources to sustain protests. Besides very little material
support was offered to LCCs from the Western countries and they provided little but moral
support to SNC.
Such realities exposed both LCCs and SNC, while the former was unable to sustain its
momentum of organizing society amid the tumult, SNC proved incapable to generate resources
to overthrow regime. FSA which had heavy reliance on light weapons stolen from government
depots or smuggled from neighbouring countries won initial battlefield victories, also proved
unsuccessful to maintain territorial control in the face of regime counterattacks. Thus the FSA-
LCC-SNC opposition umbrella movement did generate tremendous political and military
pressure on Damascus regime initially but not enough to bring about a political transition or a
regime change thus paving way for further militarization of the conflict and general
fragmentation of the Syrian territory into competing sites of authority.48
As the opposition failure to manifest control and bring about political change registered itself,
more armed groups vied for territorial control of northeastern and northwestern part of the
country from where regime had retreated. By 2012, the borders with Turkey were free of regime
control and take over of key border crossings by elements of FSA or Islamist brigades portended
further fragmentation of Syrian territory into micro-sites of armed rebel control. While the FSA
model faltered, the scope of violence in the conflict also increased significantly.
But the greatest challenge emerged in the shape of Islamist brigades by 2012 that had ample
regional sponsoring too and today there are well over a thousand armed groups operating in
Syria whose loyalty to a particular group is at best tenuous and extend beyond ideological
boundaries such as wartime economic opportunities. According to Samer Abboud, ―it is perhaps
more appropriate to think of armed rebel groups not as cohesive fighting units in which the
loyalty of the rank and file ensures the stability of a central leadership, but rather as networks of
violence in which different fighting units and individual fighters support certain armed groups
based on their specific needs and opportunities at particular moment.‖49
Ibid., 339.
Ibid., 340.
310
These fighting units typically emerged in a particular neighbourhood to offer security to
residents and were largely immobile and locally focused. In some cases they would morph into
brigades of few dozes or several hundred fighters and would then adopt flag, slogans and a loose
command structure in which leaders enjoyed nominal control over fighters. The FSA, a mere
conglomeration of smaller brigades, for example, cooperated with central leadership in some
circumstances but not in others. These patterns were replicated in formation of fronts that served
as centralized commands for brigades but here too the loyalty of brigades is tenuous at best. The
Islamic Front (IF) created in 2013, for example, has seven large Islamist brigades including
Salafi elements and brigades like Ahrar as-Sham and Liwa al-Haqq joined IF after defecting the
Syrian Islamic Front. IF then became the Levant Front which brought other Islamist-leaning
brigades into it by 2014. Another front the Syrian Revolutionaries Front formed in 2013 was
later dissolved when most of its fighters defected to brigades associated with Jabhat al-Nusra.50
The regime‘s retreat from more than half of the country did not lead to the monopolization of
authority by one group. It on the other hand accelerated political, geographic and administrative
fragmentation of the country into competing zones of authority with almost four large areas
under different groups: the regime controlled areas, Kurdish areas under autonomous
administration, areas held by ISIS and those under the control of FSA. According to BBC news,
ISIS has lost almost a quarter of the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria over a period of 2016.
They were in control of about 60,400 sq km in December 2016 as compared to 78,000 sq km of
January 2016, making a loss of 14% compared to 2015.51
In such conflicts group‘s ability to
control captured territory depends upon governance and provision of services. LCCs suffered
from lack of financial resources then armed groups took control of key institutions and assumed
more responsibility of governance and financed these governance projects through participation
in Syrian war economy.
The fall of Aleppo in December 2016 means now Bashaar controls Syria‘s four biggest cities,
though still large parts almost 15% of Syria territory held by other armed groups including rebel
fighters and allied jihadists according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Kurdish
forces, who are neither with government nor the opposition, also control much of Syria‘s border 50
A detailed study on the presence of jihadi groups in Syria is done by Aron Lund. Details can be viewed at http://www.ui.se/up/files/77409.pdf. ―Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps,‖ BBC News, January 20, 2017.
311
with Turkey as well as large part of the country‘s north-east.52
The role of these opposition
groups is very important as the conflict entered in its sixth year. Their inability to present a
unified front against Bashaar has provided the life-line to Damascus regime which is
simultaneously being exploited by both anti and pro-Bashaar regional players. Besides the
excesses committed by few of rebel armed groups has strengthened Bashaar‘s narrative against
Islamists and it had posed difficulty in constructing credible securitized threat against Bashaar to
be explained in subsequent sections.
7.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players
As stipulated in the Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model (Chapter 2) the regional
and extra-regional players are a key variable. An inter-state or intra-state conflict may or may not
involve regional and extra-regional intervention but when the state has geopolitical significance
like Syria; having the ruling regime on its side can tilt regional balance of power in anyone‘s
favour. Hence, role of key regional and extra-regional players become more pronounced in such
a scenario. The ongoing civil war has thus activated key actors who are determined to carve a
larger role for themselves in both the global and regional hierarchy in transitions. The outcome
of the Syrian conflict will not automatically trigger a new configuration of the international
system but it can definitely enhance standing of global and regional competitors determined to
bid farewell to US hegemony. The Syrian conflict can be considered as the prime example of
post-hegemony in advance as it has already brought a considerable advantage to Russia and Iran
in both global and regional scenarios and enhanced their respective standing.
7.3.3.1 Key Regional Players
The MENA region has been in flux since Arab uprisings rocked region‘s long-established
authoritative regimes. After unparalleled peaceful change of dictatorial regimes in Egypt and
Tunisia, the region witnessed a bloody civil war in Libya that ultimately brought an end to four-
decades-old autocratic establishment through an international military intervention. The removal
of old regimes upset the fragile balance of power in place since the end of the Cold War and
simultaneously created incentives for a new power hierarchy to be established within the region.
―Why is there a war in Syria?‖ BBC News, March 13, 2017.
312
The Syrian civil war has just added to the stakes of the major stakeholders determined to secure
the new balance of power in their favour and its geopolitical significance has made the Syrian
prize all the more worth fighting for. This section will discuss key regional players and their
stakes involved in the Syrian conflict.
7.3.3.1.1. Iran
Among the regional players Iran has been the most prominent in shaping the outcome of the
ongoing civil conflict in favour of ruling Bashaar regime. In fact, Syria-Iran bilateral relations
since the last 30 years had been the mainstay of the Middle Eastern politics that had evolved
around such contentious issues like the Islamic Revolution in Iran 1979, the joint opposition to
Saddam Hussain during 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, support and training of Shiite militias in Lebanon
since 1982 Israeli invasion and the Palestinian groups like Hamas which had deepened the
strategic partnership between the two on basis of shared interests rather than just cultural and
religious affinity.53
Basically an economically and militarily weak state, Syria has gained a
disproportionately larger role for itself based on its regional activism. Over the period of time the
partnership went through significant changes, as the profile of Syria changed from the one
dominating the alliance to that of Iran‘s junior partner in the ―axis of resistance‖ and as non-state
proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah has also steadily gained an upper hand and now exercise
considerable influence on the politics of the region.
Even before the unrest against the Bashaar regime in 2011, debate continued in academic circles
whether Syrian alliance with Iran depended on pragmatic or revolutionary approach and if an
agreeable solution to the Arab-Israel issue was to be tabled, would it dent the strategic Iranian-
Syrian alliance, with optimists favouring the odds. While the pessimist school argued that the
bilateral relations were much deeper and based upon the geopolitics of the region that evolved
around shared concerns over Iraq, support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and countering Israel54
.
These shared strategic interests have the tendency to survive temporary hiccups in the bilateral
relationship. Thus ―ideas of ‗flipping Syria‘ out of the Iranian orbit seem superficial in
For details see Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power in the Middle East (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).
For a skeptical analysis of long-term prospects of Iran-Syria relations see Yair Hirshfeld, ―The Odd Couple: Ba‘athist Syria and Komeini‘s Iran,‖ in Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, eds. Moshe
Ma‘oz and Anver Yaniv (New York: Routledge, 1986), 105-124. ; For the exceptional work that considered Syria-
Iran relations to be deep rooted see Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East, 349-363.
313
hindsight.‖55
Another dilemma that Syria faced in recent history has been that it is surrounded
by strong US allies like Israel, Turkey and Iraq in the region whom Syrian regime tried to
counter through seeking its own alliances particularly with Iran.
The desire to control Lebanon either directly or indirectly, which always had been viewed as
artificial creation by the French colonists by the hard-line Syrian nationalists, brought Bashaar
closer to Iran. Since the evacuation of Syrian forces from Lebanon after Rafiq Hariri‘s murder,
Iranian-backed Hezbollah serves as Syria‘s primary local partner and indispensible tool for
influencing favourable outcome in Lebanese domestic politics. While it‘s a win-win situation for
Iran too; Without Syrian territory as a transit point for weapons bound for Hezbollah,56
Iran
would be denied an entrée into the Levant and its long cherished desire to project power far
beyond its immediate borders and to threaten Israel by proxy could not be materialized. In
November 2009, the Israeli Navy claimed to intercept a ship Francop carrying hundreds of tones
of Iranian weapons for Hezbollah in Lebanon.57
More recently, Israel again captured the
merchant ship Klos C on its way to Palestinian forces in the Gaza strip in March 2014, which the
former claimed carried Iranian weapons, thus highlighting the risks involved in alternative route
by sea.58
With Golan Heights still under Israeli occupation, the bilateral arrangement with Iran
serves Syrian interests too.
As the major breakthrough in either of the two cases – a major change in Lebanese domestic
politics and the Arab-Israel process – was not very likely, the bilateral relation remained strong
throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century and both signed a defence cooperation
agreement in December 2009, despite Arab and Western attempts to cause a split between the
two. However, tensions may have risen over issues of Syrian talks with Israel when the former
attended US-sponsored Annapolis Peace Conference in November 2007. But the opaque nature
of both regimes did not let the differences highlighted much in the media.59
However, Saudi-
owned Al Hayat pan-Arab daily based in London reported in 2008 that Bashaar‘s recent trip to
Glenn E. Robinson, ―Syria‘s Long Civil War,‖ Current History 111, no. 749 (December 2012): 334.
US State Department‘s 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism says that Syria allows Iran to use its territory for weapons bonds for Hezbollah.
―Israelis ‗seize Iran arm ships‘,‖ BBC News, November 04, 2009.
Isabel Kershner, ―Israel Says It Seized Ship in Red Sea with Load of Iranian Rockets Headed to Gaza,‖ New York Times, March 5, 2014.
Jeremy M. Sharp, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress, R40849, October 07, 2009), 31.
314
Iran had been a ―failure‖ as he was unable to ally Iranian concerns about the indirect Syrian-
Israeli peace talks.60
In spite of the entire negative reporting in the foreign media over the 2011
unrest in Syria against Bashaar, Iran decidedly sided with the ruling lot against the popular
uprising due to religious, cultural and above all strategic concerns.
Iran publicly asserted that the fate of Syrian regime should be exclusively determined by its own
people without interference from outside and throughout the civil war which continues unabated
Iran seemed determined to keep Bashaar in power despite his secular ideology and the kind of
excesses committed by his forces to quash the insurgency. Tehran seeks to end the civil war in
Syria that establishes Iran as a leading participant in any political process and what it considers
on acceptable terms.61
It was speculated as early as May/June 2011 that Iran was poised to walk
away from the Arab Spring as winner.62
By securing Bashaar regime, Iran purposely gain
another equally important objective of securing Hezbollah from attacks of Sunni extremist
groups from across the border in Syria, as both the territorial and regional ambitions of Syria and
Iran require Hezbollah as leverage against Israel.
Syria without Bashaar may well remain hostile to Israel but Iran would definitively lose the kind
of coordination it currently enjoys with existing regime and transfer of equipment and weapons
to Hezbollah might undergo unprecedented hurdles, not easily to be overcome by government in
Tehran. Besides Tehran has strong reasons to oppose potential replacement of secular Ba‘athist
regime by the powerful anti-Shiite Islamists currently dominating the Syrian opposition among
them groups like Al-Nusra Front and its splinter, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are
irreconcilably hostile to Iran. These groups have registered their staunch opposition to Shiite
faith through destruction of Shiite mosques and holy places.63
Iran has provided the Syrian regime with substantial amount of material support and it covers
funds, weapons, Islamic Revolutionary Guard - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) advisors, recruitment of
BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Iran concerned about Israel-Syria talks Arabic article,‖ August 10, 2008, AL-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 10 Aug 08/BBC Monitoring.
For details see W. Andrew Terrill, ―Iran‘s Strategy for Saving Asad,‖ Middle East Journal 9, no.2, (Spring 2015): 222-36.
Michael Scott Doran, ―The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution?,‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 17-20, 21-25.
Anne Barnard, ―Muslim Shrine Stands as Crossroads in Syria‘s Unrest,‖ The New York Times, April 8, 2014. ; Ali Mamouri, ―Shiite Faithful Day Defy Danger to Visit Shrines,‖ trans. Pascale Menassa, Al-Monitor, February 15, 2015.
315
Hezbollah and non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters according to US reports.64
As recently as
November 2015, a regional security source quoted by Israeli authorities claim that around 1300-
1800 personnel including some regular army special forces, had been deployed by Iranian forces,
although actual numbers might fluctuate somewhat.65
The most unprecedented, however, is the
deployment of regular army special forces as they historically had been confined to operations
within Iran only. According to a report in Telegraph, almost 700 troops and militias fighters have
been killed in Syria to preserve the regime up till May 2016.66
However, the National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) in a report entitled, ―How Iran Fuels Syria War‖ quoted that Iran
deployed 70,000 Iranian and non-Iranian forces in Syria. According to them non-Iranian
mercenaries number around 55,000 men and includes Hezbollah, Iraqi, Afghani, Pakistani and
Palestinian Shiites while composition of IRGC forces are around 8,000 – 10,000 men and the
regular Iranian Army numbers 5,000 – 6,000 personnel.67
Similarly the amount of economic and military assistance provided by Iran to prop up Bashaar
regime has been staggering too. According to Staffan de Mistura, from the office of the U.N.
Special Envoy to Syria, reported in June 2015 that Iran‘s aid which includes both military and
economic aid, totaled $6 billion per year. While the director of the Fares Center for Middle
Eastern Studies, Nadim Shehadi at the Tufts University claimed that his research showed Iran
spent between $14 and $15 billion in military and economic aid to the Damascus regime in 2012
and 2013, though there is no independent way to corroborate any estimate.68
But at the same
time it can‘t be overlooked that Iranian material and diplomatic support was one of the main
drivers behind Bashaar aggressive posture in curbing the uprising against his regime, especially
at a time when it faced increasing regional and international isolation.
Iran‘s relevance and significance for any solution to the Syrian conflict had been established
beyond doubt few years back when the conflict seemed to have entered a stalemate. US also had
to drop its objections against Iran in the wake of JCPOA and invited Tehran to participate in
Vienna process as it potentially had been in the best position to contribute to a Syrian solution. It Details and analysis on the full spectrum on Iranian assistance to Bashaar al-Assad is provided by the Institute for the Study of War. ―Iranian Strategy in Syria,‖ by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, May 2013.
Dan Williams, ―Israel says 55 Iranians killed in Syria‘s war,‖ Reuters, November 19, 2015.
David Blair, ―Almost 700 Iranian troops and militia fighters ‗Killed in Syria‘ to preserve Bashar al Assad,‖
Telegraph, May 10, 2016. Majid Rafizadeh, ―Iran‘s Forces Outnumber Assad‘s in Syria,‖ Gatestone Institute, November 24, 2016.
Eli Lake, ―Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Asad,‖ Bloomberg View, June 9, 2015.
316
was the first time Tehran was invited to attend an international summit- then the four year long
war.69
Till the time of writing Bashaar regime seemed to have made significant gains on the
ground though still rebels and Islamists hold key places and territory under control and regime‘s
authority in the entire country is far from established.
For Iran, Bashaar and Syria represent a key tool in the ongoing regional transition undergoing
since 2011 Arab Uprisings. The struggle against their arch-rival Saudi Arabia for regional
ascendancy in the Muslim Middle East depends to a larger extent on the outcome of conflict in
this key Arab state that Iran is determined to keep within its fold even at considerable cost. Iran
is committed to stop the emergence of a Gulf-backed, Sunni-led successor to Bashaar regime that
most likely had hostile intensions to Iranian resurgence and its enhanced regional activism.
Besides Bashaar defeat would politically and diplomatically benefit Saudi Arabia since they are
the most active and vocal supporters of the Syrian opposition. With Iraq already under pro-Iran
government, a stable unified Syria though under Bashaar‘s secular regime will entrust the kind of
leverage to Iran in the Middle East, not available to it since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and
Iran could emerge with a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the
Mediterranean (the latter via Hezbollah).70
It goes without saying that Syrian role and access to Hezbollah through Syrian territory had
already been significant in pressuring Israel and checking its nefarious designs vis-a-vis Iran.
Thus Iran will continue spending billions to prop up the Damascus regime in open-ended
commitment as to abandon Syria would now not undermine a great deal of Iran‘s credibility as a
revolutionary regional power but potentially cost Tehran its only Arab ally in the region. It has
invested decades into this strategic alliance and removal of a pro-Iranian regime may partially
close its access to Lebanon, depriving it of its frontline state against Israel.
Besides the prospect of Islamist Sunnis or even secular Sunnis gaining foothold in Damascus,
would bedevil Tehran for decades. Following seizure of vast tracts of territory by ISIS in
northern Iraq in 2014, which Iran considers a national security threat and anathema to Iranian
religious values, the most nightmarish scenario for Iran had been the permanent safe haven for Sam Wilkin and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, ―Iran Accepts Invitation To Syria Peace Talks in Vienna,‖ Huffington Post, October 28, 2015.
George Friedman,‖Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East,‖ Geopolitical Weekly, November 22, 2011.
317
Islamists in northern Iraq and eastern Syria that would pose a direct threat to Iran and its interests
on both Iraq and Syrian fronts. For Iran, the battle for Syria isn‘t over and it won‘t till Bashaar
regime regains control over whole of Syria and tilt regional balance decisively in Tehran‘s
favour.
7.3.3.1.2. Saudi Arabia
Since 2003 Saudi Arabia and Iran had been grooming themselves as region‘s dominant local
powers and also been increasing their respective stakes in the Levant and the Arab-Israel theatre.
Traditionally Iran and Israel are perceived as ―missionary‖ actors in terms of having a clear
mission in their conceived roles and in their drive to achieve their objectives. But Arab Spring
changed region‘s dynamics; on the one hand, it reduced Egyptian and Syrian role as leading
Arab powers to considerable extent; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to adjust to the new
dynamics and the region simultaneously witnessed enhanced Saudi assertiveness in bid to carve
a larger role for itself. Riyadh‘s game can be summed up to consolidate its position as the ―first
among equals‖.71
The polarization and rapid fragmentation of the Arab region followed by Iraq‘s invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990 increased the tendency of uneven distribution of power, and following
2003 US-led intervention in Iraq new power lines are being firmly drawn cementing intense
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. But the Arab uprising of 2011 expanded their jockeying
from their immediate neighbourhood and effectively turned it pan-regional. Syria occupies a key
place in realization of Iranian regional ambitions; a firmly aligned Syria with Tehran could
decisively boost latter‘s credentials as regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is determined to thwart
any such development that can compromise its standing and effectively curtail room for
maneuvering in regional politics.
Syrian conflict has so far proved to be the most intense and vicious playground for Saudi-Iranian
proxy war in the region other than Yemen where Saudi role is more pronounced. Saudi relations
had been conflictual with Syria since Bashaar al-Assad‘s accession to power in 2000. The fact
that an Alawite minority had been ruling over Syria‘s Sunni majority had since long been a thorn
for Al-Sauds. Besides Riyadh deemed Syria‘s strong backing of Hezbollah along with its close Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 400.
318
ties with Iran, detrimental to its core interests. Murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri,
a close Saudi ally and Syrian regime‘s alleged involvement in the murder further increased rift in
bilateral relations.
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia simultaneously had interest in Bashaar regime‘s stability too because
of border-transcending ethno-sectarian civil war that might have followed his overthrow without
reducing Iranian influence. Such intra-Syrian conflict besides affecting Iraq would have fueled
precarious domestic situation in Lebanon too. An escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict could
also be not ruled out. Bashaar‘s political survival could then be considered as the lesser evil for
Al-Saud. Hence, efforts were being made to normalize bilateral relations before the Arab Spring
and Saudi King Abdullah made a historic visit to Syria in October 2009 and resumption of
normal ties and enhanced investment was speculated in Saudi-Syrian relations.72
When Arab Spring touched Syrian shores, Saudi Arabia‘s initial reaction was a statement of
support for Bashaar,73
followed by public silence on Assad troops‘ excesses against mostly
peaceful demonstrators. This public silence finally ended in the summer of 2011 when King
Abdullah in unusually strong criticism stated: ―What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for
Saudi Arabia‖ and announced recall of Saudi Ambassador to Damascus.74
This change in stance
can be associated with concurrence of major development like the formation of Free Syria Army
(FSA) and the refusal of protestors to give up less than the change of regime in Damascus. A
new political order appeared to be written on the horizon and Saudi Arabia from strategic point
of view considered switching side with Syrian opponents to be in its best interest.75
Subsequently, Saudis became one of the strongest and most active supporters of Syrian
opposition.
Riyadh supported suspension of Syrian membership from Arab League in November 2011 and along
with Qatar started providing FSA with financial aid for procurement of weapons.76
Reports appeared
in February 2013 that Saudi weapons purchased from Croatia were reaching rebels via shipments
shuttled through Jordan and resulted in small tactical gains by them. This also ―Syria and Saudi end tariff war,‖ The National (UAE), November 2, 2009.
Neil MacFarquhar,‖Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region‘s Upheaval,‖ New York Times, May 27, 2011.
―Saudi Arabia calls for Syrian reforms,‖ Al-Jazeera, August 8, 2011.
Rieger, ―In Search of Stability.‖
Karen De Young and Liz Sly, ―Syrian rebels get influx of arms with Gulf Neighbor‘s Money, U.S. Coordination,‖
Washington Post, May 15, 2012.
319
reflected a marked shift in Saudi activist support to Syrian opposition.77
Riyadh‘s arm shipments
were reportedly intensified in late spring 2013 and included anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons.78
These developments while on the one hand increased Saudi backing to rebels, it
simultaneously enhanced Tehran‘s support for Bashaar and effectively turned Syrian civil
conflict into a proxy war between two arch-rivals. Fall of Assad could give rise to a Saudi-
friendly Sunni government in Damascus that could tilt regional balance of power in Saudi
favour. Conversely if Bashaar survives this gravest threat to his regime‘s stability it will further
cement Damascus-Tehran axis, and instead of curtailing Iranian presence and influence in the
region, it will be markedly augmented.
However, the battle for Syria isn‘t just the quest for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi
Arabia; it has serious political ramifications for Riyadh even if they emerge victorious in this
hitherto hotly contested conflict. A Sunni victory in Syria also means strengthening of the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood which ought to be avoided at all costs by Al-Saud because of irreconcilable
politico-ideological differences.79
Riyadh effectively lobbied for reducing Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood‘s influence within the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces; several new rebels groups were accepted as part of Syrian opposition in May 2013 thus
weakening Muslim Brotherhood‘s influence within the organization. About the same time in a
policy reversal Riyadh started supporting Salafi groups in the fall of 2013 because of gradual
loss in power and strike strategy of FSA. Saudis blamed US and its inadequate support through
weapon shipments and military action, especially after August 2013 chemical attack, for
disintegration of FSA as its splinter groups left the organization to join other groups.
With the decline of FSA, al-Qaeda and other Islamists groups were gaining upper hand in the
conflict and Riyadh thought it prudent to adjust its Syria policy as the heterogeneous opposition
groups against Bashaar and radical Islamist factions against more secular groups and civilian
population engaged in pitched battle against each other. Subsequently, almost 43 rebel groups
operating mainly around Damascus and ranging from more moderate to Islamist fundamentalist
groups formed Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam) on September 29, 2013 thus undermining
C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, ―Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with Croatian Arms,‖ New York Times, February 25, 2013.
Ian Black, ―Saudi Arabia: Syria Rebels Must be Armed,‖ Guardian, June 24, 2013.
See Haykel, ―Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution.‖
320
FSA‘s dominance in its previous stronghold Syrian ―southern front‖. Liwa al-Islam, which is the
leading faction of the Army of Islam, had backing of Riyadh. It led to the marginalization of
other radical militias like Ahrar ul-Islam supported by Qatar and al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-
Nusra as well as the FSA but simultaneously intensified the struggle between extremists and
moderates and religious moderates.80
What Riyadh wanted to achieve was to stimulate overthrow of Bashaar and to rollback gains and
influence of al-Qaeda associated affiliates in Syria. However, large parts of Jasih al-Islam
themselves being radical Islamists were involved in sectarian war crimes like the Latakia
province incidents documented by Human Rights Watch.81
The fact that new groups and
alliances keep emerging and previous allies turns into deadly foes, points to the inherent dangers
involved in promoting salafist groups. Riyadh is also simultaneously concerned about
fundamentalist blowback hitting the Kingdom and hence, wants to reduce the likelihood where
Saudi volunteers join the Syrian rebels and later return as radicalized threats to Kingdom‘s
domestic security.82
Aptly stated by Yezid Sayigh ―The Saudi leadership should be careful what
it creates in Syria: Muhammad‘s Army may eventually come home to Mecca.‖83
While on the one hand within the Arab world Saudi Arabia had been projecting its image as
patron and protector of Sunni interests in the region; On the other hand spared no effort to
safeguard its own core national interests viz a viz Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey and Qatar. In
September 2015 King Salman and President Obama jointly reiterated their call for lasting
solution to Syrian conflict for which Bashaar has to leave power as the only way forward to
―preserve unity and territorial integrity of Syria‖.84
Saudi Arabia had been most consistent
advocate of increasing pressure on pro-Bashaar forces and had even agreed to train vetted Syrian
opposition members prior to Obama Administration‘s decision to alter Syrian train and equip
program in October 2015.Kingdom‘s stance on Assad had been his removal from seat of power
either through negotiations or through military means and this formulation is taken as Saudi
Hassan Hassan, ―The Army of Islam is Winning in Syria and that‘s not necessarily a bad thing,‖ Foreign Policy Magazine, October 1, 2013.
Edward Dark, ―Syrian FSA Fades in Shadow of Saudi-Backed Opposition Front,‖ Al-Monitor, December 11, 2013.
Asma Alsharif and Amena Bakr, ―Saudi Steers Citizens Away from Syrian Jihad,‖ Reuters, September 12, 2012.
Yezid Sayigh, ―Unifying Syria‘s Rebels: Saudi Arabia Joins the Fray,‖ Carnegie Middle East Center, October 28, 2013.
Adam Stump, ―US withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen planning,‖ Reuters, August 19, 2016.
321
commitment to provide continued military support to anti-Bashaar elements.85
Up till now Saudi
Arabia has shown consistence in providing additional support to armed opposition forces in the
face of failing negotiations and the cessation of hostilities.
Saudi most assertive and aggressive involvement on the side of insurgents in Syria since 2015
has up till now produced unintended consequences. Instead of Syrian allies defeating Bashaar or
luring US to do it for them, Saudi greater military pressure has only made him seek more help
from Russia and Iran and precipitated Russian intervention in Syria in September 2015 which US
was not prepared to oppose. Saudi allies had been defeated in their big last urban centre in east
Aleppo in 2016 and instead of Iranian influence being curtailed by direct Saudi involvement
within Syria and the region, the exact opposite has happened.86
The most cherished Saudi desire
and prospect of getting a chance to enact post-Bashaar order at Tehran and Hezbollah‘s expanse
through using its religious authority and economic resources over 74 percent of Syrian Sunnis is
dwindling day by day. Besides Riyadh‘s has no means or inclination to intervene directly in
Syria and its capacity to ensure its money end up in hands of intended recipients barring specific
Islamist extremists is limited, specifically when Jabhat al-Nusra is being funded by wealthy
Saudis.87
Hence, Syrian ongoing civil unrest will continue to shape region‘s dynamics and as well as
foreign policy orientations of Saudi Arabia and Iran viz a viz each other and other players
involved in the conflict. The competition will only intensify existing deep-rooted ethno-political
and sectarian fault lines and will make the quest for seeking regional hegemony worth fighting
for by both Tehran and Riyadh.
7.3.3.1.3. Turkey
Syria and Turkey share a 511 mile long common border with no geographical boundaries and
their bilateral relations had been marred due to differences over Kurdish militants that Damascus
harbored throughout. When 1980s were drawing to a close, their belligerent attitude towards
Christopher M. Balanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, September 20, 2016), 25.
Patrick Cockburn, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Dream of Becoming the Dominant Arab and Muslim Power in the World has Gone Down In Flames,‖ Independent (UK), January 6, 2017.
Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Dark Role in the Syrian Conflict,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/saudi-arabias-dark-role-i_b_3402447.html.
322
each other intensified as Ankara expressed growing dissatisfaction over Damascus failure to rein
in Armenian and Kurdish militants from carrying out attacks against Turkish targets.88
Besides
launch of Anatolian Project in Turkey in late 1980s brought the water problem which had been
on the backburner for decades to the fore also. However, Syria took a sharp turn away from
confrontation with Ankara in October 1998 in the wake of crisis that erupted between two
states.89
In the face of Turkish saber-rattling, Damascus vowed to stop supporting the Kurdistan
Workers‘ Party (PKK), to establish links between internal security services of both countries and
take steps to enhance bilateral economic activity by reducing long-standing barriers. The Adana
Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria then paved the way for a new era in the bilateral
relations and two countries took measures to build trust and used diplomacy to encourage
cooperation.90
The bilateral relations kept accelerating in the months following the death of Hafez al-Assad in June
2000 and Turkey stopped viewing Syria as a threat to its territorial intergrity. A ―memorandum of
understanding‖ was being contemplated that was supposed to consolidate the bilateral ties.91
A group
of senior Syrian military officials travelled to Ankara to propose full restoration of bilateral ties in
January 2001.92
By spring 2002 the bilateral relations had improved to the point that strong
speculation was being made for joint military exercises between Syrian and Turkish armed forces.93
An unprecedented crisis management pact was signed between the two countries after discussions
between Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Syrian President Bashaar al-Assad in Damascus in
January 2003. Besides certain regional developments also intensified the cooperation.The two
governments expressed willingness to organize a regional conference in Istanbul to promote foreign
policy coordination among six Middle Eastern states
88
Suha Bolukbasi, ―Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey‘s Kurdish Secessionism,‖ Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no.4 (Summer 1991): 15-36. Mahmut Bali Aykan, ―The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View,‖ Middle East Policy 6, no. 4 (June 1999):174-191. ; Yuksel Sezgin, ―The October 1998 Crisis in Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Prospect Theory Approach,‖ Turkish Studies 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 44-68. ; and Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, ―From
Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,‖ Security Dialogue 37, no.2 (2006): 229-48.
Kilic Bugra Kanat, ―Continuity of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government: The Cases of Bilateral Relations with Israel and Syria,‖ Arab Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall 2012):238.
―Damascus and Ankara Make Up,‖ Daily Star, November 13, 2000.
―Syria: Onward March,‖ Middle East International, February 9, 2001.
Yusif al-Sharif, ―Turkish-Syrian Relations Remain Steady,‖ Al-Hayat, March 1, 2002.
323
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey) to review the situation in the light of US
escalating threats to carry out military operations against Iraq.94
Just before the Arab Spring President Bashaar al-Assad in an interview to Turkish Television
cited three positions for enhanced Turkish-Syrian ties i.e. Turkish support for the Palestinians; its
refusal to allow Turkish territory to be used by US to invade Iraq in 2003; and its steadfastness to
stand by Syria when pressure was being exerted to isolate Damascus internationally.95
By 2009,
the bilateral trade between the two countries had totaled $ 1.8 billion. Turkey was actively
pursuing its ―zero problems with neighbours‖ policy when the Arab Spring of 2011 created a
dilemma for Ankara‘s foreign policy between ethics and self-interest. The Syrian crisis
especially forced Turkey to shift its idealistic foreign policy and engage actively in the Middle
Eastern politics because Syria has traditionally been viewed as a matter of national security, one
that affects its ―strategic depth‖ towards the Arab and Islamic worlds.96
Turkish concerns about security risks from Syrian Kurds whose nationalism got a boost in the
ensuing crisis and connections with Iraqi and Turkish Kurds were enhanced. It actively
supported regime change in Syria when the winds of change were blowing against Bashaar and
sought to be ―an active agent of a post-Assad political order in line with its own domestic and
regional political and economic realities, especially with respect to the management of the
Kurdish issue.‖97
Turkey‘s Erdogan calculated that his regional aspirations obliged him to ride
wave of popular revolution and revolutionary change.98
Turkey calculated that ―when Assad
falls, as he must, Turkey will have a chance to play a central role in the economic and political
restructuring of its neighbour.‖99
But its Syrian policy aggravated tensions with Iran and Russia. The former retaliated by
brokering a ceasefire agreement with PKK‘s (Kurdistan Worker‘s Part) branch in Iran by 94
Sa‘ti Nur al-Din, ―The Istanbul Conference: A New Role for Turkey,‖ Al-Safir, January 23, 2003. ; Oxford Business Group, Syria: Weekly Briefing, January 26, 2003. 95
―Turkish Television (TRT) Interviews Syrian President on Regional Issues,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 7, 2010. Ibrahim Natil, ―Turkey‘s Foreign Policy Challenges in the Syrian Crisis,‖ Irish Studies in International Affairs 27 (2016): 75-94.
Altug, ―The Syrian uprising,‖ 124.
Oray Egin, ―The Game Changer: Syria, Iran, and Kurdish Independence,‖ World Affairs176, no.1 (May / June 2013): 65.
Jenna Krajeski, ―Taking Refuge: The Syrian Revolution in Turkey,‖ World Policy Journal 29, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 67.
324
reversing its anti-Kurd policies to bolster Asaad, thus prompting it to focus its fight against
Turkey.100
These shifting alliances provide Kurdish fighters with degree of logistical support
and free passage unimaginable few years ago. Once thought to have been defeated, the Kurds‘s
are stronger than ever.While the confrontation with Russia got more serious over its intervention
in Syria and its unflinching support for Bashaar regime in December 2015. During this period a
Russian plane that allegedly violated Turkish air space was shot down by Turkey. Russia also
kept blaming that Turkey through its INGOs was sipping weapons and supplies to ISIS and other
jihadist groups in Syria.101
Apart from tensions with Russia and Iran, Turkish relations with US over Syria weren‘t
comfortable either. Turkey sought Washington‘s intelligence and air support and diplomatic
backing to create 10k-wide safe zone or ―secure strip‖ inside Syria but it failed to persuade either
US or its NATO allies, which created extreme tensions in the bilateral relations.102
In July 2015,
Turkey allowed Turkish territory and airspace to be used by US-led coalition for attacks against
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.103
Erdogan‘s decision to overtly oppose Bashaar brought both countries on the brink of armed
conflict. Things got worse when Syrians shot down a Turkish military jet. Turkey‘s NATO allies
persuaded Ankara to refrain from direct military response that might spread the war but when
Syrian forces (accidently, Syria claimed) fired a shell into Turkey, Turkish Parliament passed a
resolution authorizing government to send troops if needed.104
Turkey and Syria nevertheless,
avoided direct military conflict but continued to engage in war by other means. Turkey gave safe
harbor to refugees flowing from Syria including the Free Syrian Army headquartered inside
Turkey. However, when Turkey suffered major terrorist attacks in 2016 appeared to be ISIS-
linked, it took direct military action against the Islamic State in Syria and detained hundreds of
terrorism-related suspects.
Soner Cagapaty, The rise of Turkey: the twenty-first century‟s first Muslim power (Nebraska, 2014), 8.
Chase Winter, ―Russia claims Turkish NGOs are main supplier of extremists in Syria,‖ Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany‘s International Broadcaster, April 1, 2016.
Soner Cagaptay and Cem Yolbulan, ―A Turkish ‗secure strip‘ in Syria: domestic concerns and foreign limitations,‖ Policy Watch 2565, (Washington institute, February 19, 2016).
Chris Kozak, ―Turkey Expands Campaign Against ISIS and the PKK,‖ Institute for the Study of War, July 25, 2015.
Daren Butler, ―Turkey fires artillery into Syria after shelling,‖ Reuters, October 7, 2012.
325
Besides tensions with regional and extra-regional players Syrian crisis created additional
pressures on Erdogan government in domestic and economic spheres also. The most significant
development so far had been that it breathed new life into Turkish Kurd‘s long struggle for
independence. Turkey had failed to stem the further advancement of Kurdish PYD in the north,
to allow or accommodate Syrian refugee problem and to provide ground for Ankara-based rebels
being bombed by Russian airstrikes and ground advances of Damascus regime and its allies. The
Kurdish Nationalist People‘s Democratic Party (HDP with 59 seats in the parliament) rejected
proposal to renew authorization for the government to continue fight against PKK or to create
safe zone in northern Syria in December 2015. Besides the conflict aggravated sectarian tensions
within Turkey too.
Turkey is particularly worried about US coordination with and recent gains by the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) – an umbrella organization led by the People‘s Protection Units
(Yekineyen Parastina Gel or YPG) composed of various Kurdish, Arab and other Syrian militias.
With SDF gains comes the possibility of enhanced YPG control over most, if not, all of northern
Syrian border. Though Turkey claimed to have US assurance that YPG will not occupy territory
west of the Euphrates River, but this proposition was tested in the wake of YPG‘s participation
in capture of Manbij from IS in August 2016.105
However, Turkey‘s capacity to direct events in
Syria was greatly affected as a result of July 2016 failed military coup and military shakeup.106
In August 2016, US supported Turkish incursion into the Syrian town of Jarabulus across the
border and nominally intended to clear town of IS fighters but even US official was cited as
saying that the operation simultaneously intended to ―create a buffer against the possibility of the
Kurds moving forward.‖107
Clearly Turkish operation ―Euphrates Shield‖ aimed at neutralizing
threats from the Islamic State and the YPG which are both viewed as direct threats in Ankara.108
In the beginning of 2017, Turkey made public its shift in Syrian policy as rapprochement with
Russia took place and differences with US heightened over failed coup attempt. Turkish Deputy
Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek while speaking at the World Economic Forum on Iraq and Syria ―Turkey expects Syrian Kurdish forces to withdraw after Manbij operation: minister,‖ Reuters, August 15, 2016.
Yaroslav Trofimov, ―Fallout from Turkey Coup Leaves Syria Rebels in the Lurch,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2016.
―IS conflict: Turkey-backed Syrian rebels take Jarablus,‖ BBC News, August 24, 2016.
Amberin Zaman, ―Turkish Troops Enter Syria to Fight ISIS, May also Target U.S.-Backed Kurdish Militia,‖
Woodrow Wilson Center, August 24, 2016.
326
stated: ―We have to be pragmatic, realistic. The facts on the ground have changed
dramatically…Turkey can no longer insist on a settlement without Assad. It is not realistic.‖109
Turkish stance on Syria remains in flux and more local and regional developments will affect
future course of action with regard to Syria.
Turkey‘s interventionist attitude towards Syria is not primarily driven by its ideological and
religious proximity with the Sunni Syrian Islamists as popularly speculated rather than its fantasy
to shape the post-Assad Syria in accordance with its own domestic and regional, political and
economic priorities. Preventing the emergence of ―an autonomous Kurdish
political/administrative [unit] in Syria has become a key marker and a top priority item
….together with securing regional ideological hegemony and post-war subcontracting in
Syria.‖110
Oray Egin, a Turkish journalist, aptly remarks: ―If the Arab Spring was a stone
dropped in the waters of Middle East politics, the waves it created, passing through Syria, now
lap upon the shores of Turkey‘s domestic politics, creating uncertainty even more than
conflict.‖111
Considering the importance of Syrian conflict for Turkish local, regional and
international standing, it is bound to remain an active and effective player in the Syrian crisis
shaping its outcome.
7.3.3.1.4. Qatar
In the wake of unprecedented 2011 regional developments Saudi Arabia and Qatar adapted
polices that served their cherished twin purpose of extending regional influence vis-à-vis Iran
and preserving regime security. Their role is a marked contrast compared to other GCC members
where UAE expresses fear of Islamist rise within the region, Bahrain‘s preoccupation with its
internal crisis, Kuwait‘s sensitivity because of its on restive Shiite population, Muscat‘s
traditional non-interventionist, non-sectarian, neutral foreign policy and Oman‘s cordial ties with
Tehran bar them from playing more assertive role in Syrian conflict. These regional realities
have conversely enabled Qatar to project its role as a new player whose active regional
interventionism has redefined its relations with Saudi Arabia. Qatar which held Arab League‘s
―Turkey Softens Stance Towards Bashar ul-Assad in Syria Settlement,‖ DW, January 20, 2017, accessed April 02, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-softens-stance-towards-bashar-al-assad-in-syria-settlement/a-37211975. Altug, ―The Syrian uprising,‖ 127.
Egin, ―The Game Changer,‖ 72.
327
rotational presidency in 2011 played a lot more active public role and resultantly overshadowed
Saudi Arabia which nonetheless remained active behind the scenes.
Qatari-Saudi competition shaped the development of Syrian opposition in exile in subsequent
period where Qataris gained initial upper hand and were successful in installing many of their
allies in influential positions within the Syrian National Council founded in August 2011 and the
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces established in November
2012. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was backed by Qataris while the more secular rivals were
cultivated by Riyadh. Finally after months of infighting, Saudi candidate Ahmad Jibra was
chosen as leader of the National Coalition. The alliance then occupied Syria‘s place in the Arab
League in Doha‘s summit in March 2013.
This Qatari-Saudi competition followed similar trajectory for Syrian insurgents where Qatar and
Turkey preferred groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood but simultaneously provided
assistance to salafists and jihadists by early 2012. During this time Riyadh waited for meaningful
decision by Washington112
and there were isolated reports of meager Saudi assistance to Syrian
deserters. Other than Saudis, Doha up till now has been most ardent backers of Syrian rebels and
time and again expressed resolve to continue supporting them with material assistance even if
Trump ends US role in Syria.113
Doha‘s interest in Syrian conflict is divergent from Saudi Arabia. While simultaneously viewing
Iran‘s growing influence as a strategic threat; its focus is on enhancement of its own role within
the Arab world as a promoter of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic causes and views ―the Sunni-majority
country as an area for the Persian Gulf emirate to empower the local Muslim Brotherhood and
boost the Qatari-backed movement‘s franchises elsewhere.‖114
In spite of its desire to de-seat
Bashaar from the seat of power, it has had minimal direct military involvement in Syria and
participated only in US-led campaign against IS where its role was mainly logistical. Unlike
Libyan conflict where the Arab Gulf Sheikdom was able to sway the outcome by using its
financial resources, Syrian conflict involvement has not paid off yet.
Adam Entous, Nour Malas and Margaret Coker, ―A Veteran Saudi Power Player Works To Build Support to Topple Assad,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2013.
―Qatar Will Help Syrian Rebels Even If Trump Ends US Role,‖ Reuters, November 26, 2016.
Giorgio Cafiero, ―Qatar‘s Diminishing Returns in Syria,‖ Lobelog Foreign Policy (weblog), accessed March 24, 2017, http://lobelog.com/qatars-diminishing-returns-in-syria/.
328
It remains to be seen how Doha will maintain it rigid stance against Damascus regime while
Russia and Iran are demonstrating willingness to beef up Bashaar even by incurring risks to
considerable extent and US continuing unwillingness to step up substantial support for anti-
Bashaar elements. Nevertheless, Doha will remain relevant actor shaping region‘s dynamic till
the time Syrian conflict takes a decisive turn.
7.3.3.1.5. Egypt
Egypt for decades had been the central axis towards which Arabs had traditionally gravitated but
the vacuum had deepened in 1990s; the Arab region became more atomized and fractured and
non-Arab states like Iran and Israel became more influential in regional power politics. Even
before the events of 2011 Arab Spring could alter region‘s dynamics significantly, Egypt‘s
traditional standing in the region had been dented by its ―inability to bring order to Palestinian
ranks, to help stabilize Lebanon, to rebuild Arab partnerships in the Maghreb and with the Gulf
Arab states, and to moderate the impact of the Iranian-Syrian alliance in the Levant‖.115
With regard to Arab Awakening it was precisely the uprising in Egypt and January 2011 events
that inspired the revolution in Deraa in mid-March 2011. The initial popular aspirations were
similar to those in Egypt and were first and foremost ―Syrian‖ in character. Hence, as early as
March 2011 Egypt‘s diplomatic stance was based on twin principles of Syrian people universal
right to decide their own fate through free political process and preserving territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the Syrian state. Thus the government in Cairo advocated bringing all parties
on negotiating table and ending bloodshed and suffering of the Syrian people. ―Armed Syrian
Opposition‖ in their view was basically made up of terrorist groups devoid of any mercy or
conscience towards civilians, who wanted to topple Assad even if it means obliterating Syrian
state.116
When all the regional players were igniting the conflict in Syria, Egypt was the only country that
did not contribute to the mayhem taking place there by siding with neither government nor the
opposition. It was the only player with good relations with both peaceful opposition and the
Damascus regime. Cairo kept channels of communication open with all to find a peaceful and
Ehteshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ 398.
Hani Ghoraba, ―On Egypt‘s Towards Syria,‖ Al-Ahram Weekly 1316 (20-26 October), accessed March 26, 2017, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/17635.aspx.
329
practical solution to the Syrian conflict and kept insisting al-Assad has to be part of the solution
so as to realistically preserve the territorial integrity of the Syrian state. Thus Egypt was
subjected to incredible amount of diplomatic and economic pressure to modify its pragmatic
stance in the Syrian conflict and put its weight behind the so-called opposition.
During Egyptian President Morsi‘s short stay in power, he seemed more inclined towards Iran
and Syria, suggesting at one time that Iran should join Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form four-
way commission to handle Syrian crisis without seeking opinion first from either the Kingdom or
Turkey. The move was intended to restore Egypt as regional power centre and diplomatic
mediator but the initative went nowhere as Riyadh not only rejected working with Tehran but
was more than a little suspicious of Morsi‘s intentions too.117
One of the first policy shifts after
Morsi‘s overthrow in July 2013 by the interim government was to downgrade profile of Syrian
opposition in the country. The association of mainstream Syrian opposition with Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood prompted the new government to discontinue support as they suspected
Morsi had discrete contacts with Damascus. Diplomatically Cairo continued supporting political
settlement without defining Bashaar‘s potential role in Syria‘s future.118
However, in a marked turn of events, Egyptian ―Yes‖ vote for both French and Russian
resolutions on Syria in October 2016 was taken as a conflicting position that angered traditional
allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. It also reflected Cairo‘s desire to forge independent
political decisions regardless of pressure from friends and foes. Nevertheless, that approach had
limitations and constrained by Egypt‘s desire to stay on good terms with both Saudis and
Emiratis. But in November 2016, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi moved openly to
support Syrian army by taking a position at odds with country‘s Gulf benefactors in a surprise
move. He said: ―Our priority is to support national armies, for example in Libya, to exert control
over Libyan territory and deal with extremist elements. The same with Syria and Iraq.‖119
Egypt
took considerable risk by incurring wrath of Saudi government who had so far pumped around
Marc J. Sievers, ―Question‘s About Egypt‘s Syria Policy,‖ The Washington Institute, January 12, 2015, accessed March 26, 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/questions-about-egypts-syria-policy. Ibid.
―Egypt‘s Sisi Express Support for Syria‘s Military,‖ Al-Jazeera, November 24, 2016.
330
$25billion in financial assistance since Sisi took power in military coup in 2013 to prop Cairo‘s
struggling economy.120
Subsequently the Kingdom suspended oil shipments to Egypt in October.
Such a turn in Egyptian foreign policy could be the result of its burgeoning relations with Russia
at a time when relations with decades-old ally US is at its lowest ebb. Besides according to Ofir
Winter, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies Muslim Brotherhood is
considered the principle threat in Egypt and not Iran. ―In Egypt‘s view, a victory for the Syrian
opposition could give a push to Brotherhood in Egypt. And a defeat of the Syrian military regime
could be an introduction to similar occurrences to the regime in Egypt.‖121
Sisi still tends to
count on Saudi support despite his backing of Bashaar regime because an alternative to him is
Brotherhood which Al-Saud can‘t afford. With Egypt‘s - the most populous Arab nation -
support for Bashaar, the dynamics of regional conflict are again in flux, intensifying Saudi-
Iranian drive for attaining regional ascendancy.
7.3.3.1.6. Iraq
Syria‘s relations with Iraq had been characterized by animosity since the split in Baath party
leadership and ideology in the 1960s, a split that widened with the assumption of power in Iraq
by Saddam Husain in 1979. At the time of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Syria
immediately condemned and joined Saudi Arabia and Egypt in orchestrating the emergency
summit meeting of the Arab League to resist Iraqi occupation by force on the pretext that Arab
governments should not devolve responsibility to handle inter-Arab conflicts to outside powers
and secondly Baghdad‘s aggression weakened Arab world as a whole in its struggle against
Israel.122
―Syria‘s ardent stand was all the more blatant against the background of the hesitant
and dithering attitudes taken by most Arab countries in the first stage of crisis.‖123
However, a brief period of rapprochement followed in the bilateral relations during the late with dramatically marked improvement in 2000-1. By January 2001, some
15,000
Ben Lynfield, ―Egypt Shifts to Open Support For Assad Regime in Syrian Civil War,‖ Jerusalem Post, November 26, 2016.
Lynfield, ―Egypt Shifts to Open Support for Assad Regime.‖
Gerald Butt, ―Seizing the Opportunity,‖ Middle East International, August 31, 1990;
Eyal Zisser, ―Syria and the Gulf Crisis – Stepping on a New Path,‖ Orient 34, no. 4 (December 1993): 567.
Murhaf Jouejati, ―The Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement,‖ Middle East Insight, November-December 1997. ; Ed Blanche, ―Syria and Iraq Find Common Cause,‖ Jane‟s Intelligence Review, October 1, 2001. ; and Ahmad S. Moussalli, ―The Geopolitics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations,‖ Middle East Policy 7, No. 4 (October 2000): 100-109.
331
1990s
124
barrels of oil per day started to flow through long-abandoned pipeline that linked northern Iraq to
the docks at Baniyas.125
Damascus tried to resuscitate relations with Iraq after the exit of
Saddam Husain from the political scene as 2003 progressed and re-established transportation and
commercial links to post-war Iraq.126
Syrian gesture to repatriate some $200 million in 2004
deposited in Syrian banks was also in the same direction.127
Another substantial improvement in
bilateral relations took place when Iraqi Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for National
Security Affairs were welcomed by Bashaar in July 2004.128
Problems persisted, however, in bilateral relationship and after two massive bombings rocked
Baghdad on August 19, 2009, killing almost 100 people, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry blamed
Syria. It was alleged that Damascus regime harbors insurgents loyal to ex-President Saddam and
militants pass with impunity over the Iraq-Syria border as no organization unbeknownst to the
country‘s security forces can operate. This led observers to speculate that these foreign groups
had de facto approval of Syrian authorities and they might have made a deal with the militant
Islamic groups that they would not attack minority Alawi community in exchange for freedom of
passage through these territories.129
When the dramatic events of 2011 jostled Syrian politics, Iraq was in no position to affect
outcomes of events in a country which had traditionally been important as it was itself battling
with immense domestic security problems. It initially took a minimalist non-partisan stance so as
not to aggravate cleavages within its own population but soon the overriding concern of Shiite
dominated government of Nuri al-Maliki was that a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus
would strengthen its already alienated Sunnis in Iraq‘s western provinces. It therefore abstained
from Syrian suspension vote from Arab League in 2011, rejected US call for toppling of Bashaar
regime, opposed further sanctions and toppling of Damascus regime by force and argued for
resolution of Syrian crisis through political reforms. Similarly, instead of downgrading ties with
Mona Ziade, ―Iraq-Syria Pipeline Opens Soon, With Tripoli Next,‖ Daily Star, November 13, 2000. ; Barbara Plett, ―Syria and Iraq Strengthen Ties,‖ BBC, January 29, 2001. ; Gary C. Gambill, ―Syria‘s Foreign Relations: Iraq,‖ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 3, no. 3 (March 2001), accessed May 25, 2016, https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0103_s1.htm. Nabil Yassin, ―Normal Relations, Not Just a Card,‖ Al-Hayat, December 12, 2003.
―Syria to Return $200 Million,‖ Bloomberg News, January 9, 2004.
Sha‘aban Abbud, ―A Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement,‖ Al Ra‟i al-Amm, July 23, 2004. ; Zeina Karam, ―Allawi Plans to Restore Syria Ties,‖ Associated Press, July 24, 2004. : Cilina Nasser, ―Baghdad-Damascus Ties Improve Despite US-Syria Rift,‖ Daily Star, July 26, 2004.
Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖422.
332
Bashaar regime, Iraq conversely expanded ties, providing Damascus with much needed material
support and diesel fuel and also evaded US and EU demand to cut Iranian arm deliveries to
Syria. Baghdad kept its lines of communications opened with some opposition groups too and
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari tried to dispel the image that Iraq‘s foreign policy towards
Syria was shaped by Iran.130
However, with the passage of time it left no doubt that Syrian conflict had rapidly spilled into
Iraq, with each affecting the other. Public opinion in Western Iraq‘s Sunni majority areas
gravitated towards support for uprising. The Euphrates River Valley intimately connected Syrian
and Iraqi tribes and they soon became conduits of Gulf States‘ anti-Bashaar and anti-Iranian
policy.131
ISIS after gaining the momentum in Iraq surged back across the border and put its
rivals on the defensive. Resultantly, it left no one guessing that the escalating sectarian violence
between ISIS, Iraqi forces and the Syrian civil unrest were intertwined. Neither can be resolved
without the other. ISIS advancement from its existing base and seizure of key Iraqi cities
including Mosul made them control ―a swath of contiguous territory form Raqqa in Eastern Syria
to Bagdad‘s doorstep‖ in 2014 that highlighted more clearly than ever the growing symbiosis
between the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.132
US inability to reach a security arrangement with Iraq before complete withdrawal of American
forces from region, coupled with its reluctance to provide assistance to Syrian rebels to blunt
Bashaar‘s onslaught have brought the convergence of al-Qaeda and Islamists forces that
subsequently led to the horror we are witnessing today. The bloody civil conflict raging in both
countries and resulting chaos enabled ISIS to establish an Islamic Sunni state encompassing Iraq
and Syria. ISIS threat has brought non-Sunni dominated Iraqi and Syrian governments not only
closer to each other but simultaneously increased their dependence on Iran. It has also pushed
Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to assume the leadership of their respective sects and wage
proxy wars in Iraq and Syria to preserve the hegemony if not the survival of their regimes. Even Raymond Hinnebush, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and The MENA State System (LSE Middle East Center, Paper Series /04, October 2014).
See Mohammed Abeer, Sunni-dominated Anbar province in aid fundraising drive in support of Syrian rebels (ICR issue 3897, February 2012).
Juliien Barnes-Dacey, ―Syria and Iraq: One Conflict or Two?,‖ European Council of Foreign Relations, June 27, 2014, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syria_and_iraq_one_conflict_or_two280.
333
if ISIS is defeated in Iraq and lose much or all of its territorial gains there, it would still hold
large swaths of Syrian land from where it can continue to fight for the realization of its goals.133
The Syrian uprising has also strengthened Kurdish separatist ambitions, which have effectively
become independent of Damascus and with trans-state links with Kurdish Regional Government
in Iraq. Although Sunni regional involvement in Iraq is insignificant as compared to Syria but it
could escalate because if Syria is ground zero, Iraq is more important in the grand regional
struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia once Syrian conflict subsides. Hence, the sectarian
mobilization will intensify as the civil unrest in Syria enters into a stalemate and it has widened
the prospect of full-fledged sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites engulfing both Syria
and Iraq in what would be the most dangerous of mergers. Thus the domestic-politico situation
and role of external actors will keep both Iraq and Syria relevant to each other as long as the
situation gets settled in either or both the countries.
7.3.3.1.7. Lebanon
Lebanon is a country most direly affected with repercussions of the Syrian conflict as it rages on
and possible fallout once the conflict ends. In the course of uprising, it has become the country
with the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the world.134
Besides this exploding refugee
situation the Syrian conflict has intensified political tensions in a country already marred by
political stagnation and sectarian tensions for years. The most pressing question at the moment
being how the thousands of Hezbollah fighters fighting currently in Syria for Bashaar, will affect
the delicate political balance in Lebanon once the conflict ends.
Lebanon currently has a power-sharing system between various sectarian communities following
the devastating Lebanese civil war between 1970 and 1990 that left almost 15000 dead. While
the post-civil war system ensures inclusion of all communities in the political process and public
institutions to stop domination by any group but simultaneously it led to systemic corruption and
patronage networks. Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri‘s murder in 2006 has curtailed Syrian
interference in Lebanese politics but nevertheless, polarization continues unabated as reflected in
133
Alon Ben-Meir, ―Deconstructing the Iraq and Syria Conflicts,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/deconstructing-the-iraq-a_b_5508517.html. Almost a quarter of the total population in Lebanon represents Syrian refugees. Figures quoted from Lina Khatib,
―Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict,‖ Carnegie Middle East Center, June 09, 2014, accessed April 03, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/09/regional-spillover-lebanon-and-syrian-conflict-pub-55829.
334
division of political parties into broadly two camps with diametrically opposite views on foreign
policy. The so-called ―March 8‖ coalition includes main Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal
movement, the Christian Free Patriotic Movement along with other smaller parties traditionally
aligned to Syria and Iran. While the ―March 14‖ alliance contains the strongest Sunni party
Future Movement and the two Christian parties Kataeb and Lebanese Forces with closer
relations with Saudi Arabia, Western countries and the Syrian opposition groups. A division, that
not surprisingly is reflected in their approach towards the Syrian conflict.135
Parliamentary elections initially scheduled for June 2013 have been postponed twice and now
also unlikely to take place according to the new date: June 2017. The current caretaker
government of Prime Minister Tamman Salam is as deeply divided which nearly collapsed
several times. Government‘s ability to provide limited administrative services have forced
sectarian groups to look towards their own communities for support. This fragile
administrative/political setup has exacerbated tensions between political factions in Lebanon.
The influx of more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees has strained economic resources while the
memories of Palestinian militias groups in Lebanese civil war are already fresh. But the most
worrying aspect regarding Syrian refugees is that they are mostly Sunnis and if permanently
settled they can significantly alter demographic balance jeopardizing delicate balance of power
between sects. These concerns might have been the reason behind Lebanese decision to close
border with Syria in January 2015 and introduction of visa system for Syrians.136
There are increasing concerns that ISIS will gradually encroach into Lebanon as November 2015
bombing in Shiite neighbourhood of Beirut reflected that resulted in 40 deaths.137
A dilemma for
Western policies in such a situation involves their approach towards Hezbollah designated as a
terrorist organization by US because of its targeting of Israel and close relations with Iran.
Indeed, Hezbollah is an unavoidable political and social reality and with its popular social
welfare service holds the ability to take control of Lebanon. While Sunni community is too
fragmented and its inability to gel together has frustrated traditional ally Saudi Arabia to the
extent that it has also turned away from them. Aptly remarked by John Bell: ―Whether through Dominik Tolksdorf, ―Lebanon in the Light of the Syria Conflict: Resilience Despite Polarization and Tensions,‖
Heinrich Boll Stiftung (blog), October 31, 2016, https://us.boell.org/2016/10/31/lebanon-light-syria-conflict-
resilience-despite-polarization-and-tensions. Tolksdorf, ―Lebanon in the Light of the Syria Conflict.‖
―How Exposed is Lebanon to Syria War?,‖ Al-Jazeera, November 14, 2015.
335
clever manipulation, veiled or less-veiled threat, its considerable military might and the more
considerable disorganization of its opponents, the political future of the country has fallen into
[hezbollah‘s] hands.‖138
No doubt the situation in Syria has made Iran the conquering shadow in both Syria and Lebanon
and considering the stakes involved for Iran in the ensuing conflict. Iranian dominance will
continue to shape domestic, regional and international dimension of its allies in both countries.
7.3.3.1.8. Jordan
Since the outbreak of Syrian unrest, the official Jordanian position seems to be characterized by
hesitation, uncertainty and controversy and remains unclear till date. ―Its calculated position has
been described as one of the most difficult balancing acts that the [Jordanian] regime has had to
play.‖139
Amman has tried to limit its official role in the conflict by giving advice to Syria and
accepting refugees‘ influx while distancing itself as much as possible from directly being
involved. The popular opinion in Jordan, however, appears to be starkly different from the one
being professed by the government. While the former are in favour of Bashaar departure and
providing full support to uprising; the latter group, until 2012 upheld belief that survival of
Syrian regime is a better option rather than salafists gaining control over Damascus with the
potential to turn Jordan‘s northern border with Syria, extending until Iraqi city of Anbar, into a
political hotbed for Salafists and al-Qaeda.140
Being a staunch US ally, Jordanian position traditionally reflects Washington‘s stance on the
conflict. King Abdullah of Jordan had been among the first leaders to ask Bashaar to resign but
his stance at the same time reflects political realities on ground as he regularly affirms his
support for both Syrians and peaceful transfer of power. Jordan threw its full weight behind the
Arab League and supported Syrian opposition to take Syrian seat in the council. But the
overriding Jordanian concern had been to safeguard its own political, social and economic
stability directly at risk because of unabated Syrian conflict, the advancement of ISIL, the Iraqi
paradigm, the unceasing Israeli and Palestinian conflict and the complicated management of
Syrian and Palestinian migration flows. Thus the Hashemite Kingdom tries to maintain John Bell, ―The blending of Lebanon and Syria,‖ Al-Jazeera, October 23, 2016.
Osama Al-Sharif, ―Jordan‘s Balancing Act on Syria,‖ Al-Monitor, January 27, 2014.
Khaled Waleed Mahmoud, ―Where does Jordan Stand on the Syrian Crisis?,‖ Middle East Monitor, January 24, 2014.
336
harmonious relationship with regional and international players as well as Damascus regime.
Amman has serious concerns in military and security domains as Syria‘s Daraa province in
proximity with the Kingdom began to fall to Islamist forces. The repercussions of deteriorating
situations in Syria on Jordan‘s national security will determine the deeper involvement of Jordan
in the conflict.141
Jordan as an actor has such credibility that when plans to bring stability in and around Damascus
were being speculated and if gone into effect under UN Charter Chapter VII, Lord David Owen,
former British Foreign Secretary, wrote: ―Such a mandate for Damascus cannot be physically or
politically run by the UN or NATO, nor by Russia…..It can only come from one country in the region – Jordan – with a credible military and administrative capacity that could be supported
and backed by regional countries.‖142
In the ongoing crisis too Amman is expected to keep
offering its dual role of buffer zone and mediator, a role accorded to it because of it geographical
and strategic collocation.143
Besides since the rules of the game of have changed in Syria due to
intense Russian involvement and US reluctance, Jordan King Abdullah met Russian Putin in
Moscow to negotiate future of Southern Syria.144
Outstanding Syrian issue still, however, remains refugees‘ problem. Jordan hosts 635,000 of the
4.6 million Syrians registered as refugees with the UN and now seems to be at ―boiling point‖.
The government says more than one million other Syrians live there including the ones who
arrived before 2011.145
More than Bashaar regime‘s survival or demise, Jordan will remain
occupied with its own resilience as Syrian conflict enters into its seventh year. Humanitarian
crisis and risk of Jordanian jihadists returning with extremist ideology will haunt Hashemite
Kingdom and hence they would be more perturbed by the risk of state collapse in Syria and
country‘s potential transformation into an ungovernable space – with threat of breeding ground
for jihadists.146
Ibid.
Lord David Owen, ―How Jordan Is Key to Ending the Syria Crisis,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lord-david-owen/jordan-syria-crisis_b_8118734.html. Federica Fanull, ―The role of Amman in the Middle East crisis,‖ Mediterranean Affairs, Nov 28, 2014.
Osama AL-Sharif,‖Has Jordan Acquiesced to Assad Regime Offensive in Southern Syria?,‖ Middle East Institute, January 12, 2016.
―Syria Conflict: Jordanians ‗at boiling point‘ Over Refugees,‖ BBC News, February 2, 2016.
Julien Barnes-Dacey, ―Syria: The View From Jordan,‖ European Council on Foreign Relations, June 17, 2013, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syria_the_view_from_jordan138.
337
7.3.31.9. Israel
For Israel the issue of conflict in Syria is linked to its wider implications on the regional balance
of power and how the outcome might affect Iran‘s regional standing. A much weakened Iraq
sans Saddam Hussein was a welcoming development initially but coming at the cost of enhanced
Iranian influence which was reflected in the intense one-month Israel-Hezbollah war widely
interrupted as Arab world‘s first victory over Israel in 60 years, created a dilemma. The Shiite
organization sponsored by Iran emerged as the champion of the ―Arab street‖. The Shiite
penetration of the dominant Sunni order has not let up since and Syrian conflict has become
impetus for enhanced Iranian influence within the region further.
Israel and Syrian bilateral relations had a long hostile history and since the Arab defeat of 1967
and capture of Syrian Golan Heights by Israel, it has been the prime Syrian foreign policy focus
for decades. Tensions heightened with Israel again in 2006, as Bashaar precluded any resumption
of peace talks with Israel. He told Arab Bar Association convention in January that ―targeting
Syria and Lebanon is a part of an integrated project to destroy the identity of the region in order
to reshape it under new titles to meet Israeli aspirations with aim at imposing its hegemony on
the region and its resources.‖147
The steady deterioration of relations prompted Israeli
Ambassador to United Nations to charge both Iran and Syria as constituting a ―new axis of evil
and terror‖ that was sowing ―the seeds of the first world war of the twenty-first century.‖148
By
mid 2006, hostility had spiked in bilateral relations when Israeli warplanes bombed a training
camp for Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon.149
Tel Aviv drew a harsh response
from Damascus when Israeli forces pushed across the border into southern Lebanon and Syrian
Minister of Information warned that Damascus ―will not stand with our hands tied‖ in the face of
Israeli aggression.150
Syria is viewed in Tel Aviv as the last remaining potential strategic threat to Israel with shared
borders but since the start of Syrian civil unrest, Israel has mainly stood on the sidelines,
―Assad Speaks about International Plot against Syria, Says No Chance of Peace with Israel,‖ Al-Bawaba, January 21, 2006.
Edith M. Lederer, ―Israel Warns that New ‗Axis of Terror‘ Iran, Syria and Hamas is Sowing Seeds of War,‖
Associated Press, April 18, 2006. Anthony Shadid and Scott Wilson, ―Israel Blockades, Bombs Lebanon While Hezbollah Rains Rocket Fire,‖
Washington Post, July 14, 2006. ―Syria Threatens to Act if Israel Approaches its Territory,‖ Xinhua News Agency, July 24, 2006.
338
intervening sporadically for rather limited objectives. The events of Arab Spring caught Israelis
by complete surprise too as the initial reaction was one of curious spectator expecting Bashaar to
quickly crack down dissenters. ―When this failed to materialize, a realization sunk in that Israel
could only play a marginal role in such a complex and unpredictable conflict. It could neither
impact the overall outcome nor the direction this country was taking.‖151
Hence, it was reluctant
to get embroiled in this horrific regional war and left with no option but to watch whether the
developments in Syria and a potential regime change in Damascus will strengthen or weaken the
Damascus-Tehran-Hezbollah axis.152
One cynical view suggests that Israel continues to prefer the ―devil they know‖- Bashaar al-
Assad and thus they are perfectly content to watch Syrians continue to suffer.153
In fact the
Israeli position is far more complex. The idea of a Sunni government controlled by the Muslim
Brotherhood on their northeastern frontier was frightening enough to prefer Assad but the shift in
regional balance of power and reconfiguration in regional hierarchy is prompting novel approach
to the Syrian conflict. Now they have to choose between the hostile Sunni force in Syria and an
emboldened Iranian presence on Israel‘s northern frontier. As aptly remarked by Yossi
Mekelberg: ―The current strategic thinking in Israel is that the worst outcome for it would be that
through the fog of war in Syria, the Golan Heights would gradually become Israel‘s border with
Iran.‖154
However, a change in Israeli policy towards Syria was advocated with Russian intervention in
the conflict which has tilted the scales of conflict in Bashaar‘s favour. Damascus regime‘s
victory would actually be an Iranian victory, which is least desirable option for Israel. Hence,
Israeli officials advocated to intervene in favour of moderate rebels in early 2016.155
Regardless
of its preferred outcome, Israel is in no position to influence events inside Syria. In fact Tel Aviv
now has to adjust to the reality where threat of Iran shaping politics of the region will become
paramount.
Yossi Mekelberg, ―Five Years That Changed Israeli-Syrian Relations Forever,‖ Al-Arabiya English, March 13, 2016.
Nicos Panayiotides, ―Is The ‗Arab Spring‘ Israel‘s Winter? Strategic Instability in the Middle East,‖
International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 1 (March 2012): 25. Erlich, Inside Syria.
Mekelberg, “Five Years That Changed Israeli-Syrian Relations.”
Amos Harel, “Israel Is Changing Its Approach to Syria War Amid Assad’s Battleground Advances,” Haartez, February 21, 2016.
339
Conclusion
The dynamics of the Syrian conflict are constantly in flux with the entrance of a number of
regional and extra-regional players. All have vested interests and the parties opposing Bashaar
regime are unable to align their basic priorities in a way that they could get Bashaar out of the
Syrian political picture. While on the other hand those supporting Bashaar have upped their ante
too. The stakes involved in the survival of the Damascus regime are too high to let Bashaar
relinquish power at the moment. This chapter analyzed the unrest against Bashaar in depth and
involvement of the key regional players. This lays basis for the next chapter that helps us explain
not only the intricate dynamics of the more than seven-year old civil war but simultaneously help
us determine why threat securitization for Syria could not follow the path delineated in case of
Libya.
340
Chapter 8: Syria and Threat Securitization for Military
Intervention
The Syrian civil war up till now has proved to be US quandary as its incoherent and inconsistent
policy, and confused and disjoined response has failed to clarify US role in the conflict that is all
set to change region‘s balance of power and its dynamics forever. Libyan and Syrian conflicts
are usually juxtaposed with one another to analyze why US selective engagement strategy could
not materialize in case of Syria, even though the excesses committed by the Bashaar regime
against his own civilian population has long crossed the atrocity and barbarity threshold set for
Libya. The fact that Libya was ―doable‖ since it was a country constituting 90 percent of desert
and well suited for air combat, has less to do with Syria‘s geography and more with the intricate
pattern of conflict raging within the country and the role regional and extra-regional players are
playing to pursue their interests.
The Syrian conflict, more than the Libyan episode explains the link between the regional and
systemic levels. The dawn of post-hegemonic era in international relations has coincided with
US diminished role in effecting the outcome of events on the Arab streets. Arab world for more
than a decade has been seething with anti-American sentiment and the result of two ambitious
military campaigns before Libya has already significantly tarnished American image in the
Muslim Middle East. However, now the pronounced changes in the global hierarchy in the form
of rise of peer challengers and their assertive policies in their respective regions have tested US
resolve to exercise its global leadership role with the vigor it was pursed in the decades after the
demise of the Cold War.
The global changes and their impact on regional hierarchy in transition are not clearer than in the
MENA region where Arab Awakening has already upended the regional balance. With entry of
extra-regional great players like Russia into the Syrian conflict and other unwavering regional
actors like Iran and non-state actors like Lebanese Hezbollah on the side of the Bashaar regime
has frustrated US and her allies to shape the emerging regional hierarchy in line with their
341
desired regional objectives. This chapter is meant to explore the intricate and complex pattern of
unceasing Syrian conflict in the context of post-hegemonic drift in the international system.
It will be divided into four sections. First section will deal with key extra-regional players
involved in the conflict and discuss how their equation with the Syrian regime is changing the
dynamics of the conflict. The second section will discuss ―legitimacy‖ variable and explain the
way US under the Obama Administration made American legitimacy questionable after failing to
implement ―crossing the red line‖ threat. Next section will delineate how threat securitization for
military intervention within Syria is being consistently framed and why it so far has not
succeeded whereas the much dubious threat construction for Libya did. Last section will dwell
on failed ―war legitimation discourse‖ in Syrian case and its implications in the post-hegemonic
system.
8.1 Key Extra –Regional Players
Besides neighbours and regional players having dire stakes in the emerging Syrian scenario, key
extra-regional players have their vital interests involved too. Considering the extent to which
these players have directly implicated themselves in the civil war, the outcome of the Syrian
conflict will significantly alter their global standing. Thus they are determined to either shape the
conflict dynamics in their favour or reduce the damage in case of undesirable outcome.
8.1.1. France
French role within the Syrian conflict became pronounced at the earliest stages and The Voice of
Russia reported on September 19, 2012 that France mulled arms for Syrian opposition after its
ambassador to Syria, Eric Chevallier stated that he had been instructed by President Francois
Hollande to get in touch with opposition cells within Syria in a bid to get them better organized
in their fight against Bashaar.1 France even invited Syrian opposition the National Council to
appoint an ambassador to France after rebels seized control of Hamadan airport in Deir Ezzor on
―France mulls arms for Syria opposition,‖ Voice of Russia, September 19, 2012.
342
November 2012.2 It became the first European country to recognize the Syrian Coalition as a
legitimate opposition to Bashaar al-Assad. As the stalemate entered in 2013 French government
reiterated its resolve to stand with the Syrian opposition and ―strengthen‖ them in their battle
against Bashaar regime.3
Previously France enjoyed cordial relations with Baathist Syria. Bashaar‘s takeover of power
was trumpeted as a new era for Syrian politics, who was praised for protecting Syrian Christians
by the former French President Nicholas Sarkozy. But the shift came with August 2011 French
statement that ―irreparable damage‖ had been done by Bashaar‘s violence against his citizens. In
one of the harshest condemnations in January 2012 France demanded resignation from Bashaar
after the massacres caused ―disgust and revulsion around the world‖. France then proposed a UN
resolution against the Syrian regime and was the only country that demanded military
intervention in Syria for its alleged use of Chemical Weapons in 2013.4
French staunch support for the Syrian opposition in the ongoing civil war led to vociferous
condemnation by Syrian regime. Bashaar blamed French Syrian strategy for deadly attacks in
Paris in November 2015 that left 129 dead. Proclaiming he already warned the West of such
repercussions; he presented himself as fighting the menace of extremism and tried to justify his
excessive use of violence, besides fishing for Western support including French on the issue.
French President Hollande, however, at that time resisted opening any channel of communication
with the Syrian government.
France had already taken an unprecedented step of launching airstrikes in Syria on September
27, 2015 even when other European governments like Germany and Britain had yet to legally
authorize it. This hawkish attitude towards Syria has been interpreted as an attempt to reinforce
French self-perception as a great power, its international identity; to fulfill its historic role as
alternative foreign policy to that of US where its rapid military escalation in contrast to US
incremental approach is drawing widespread international attention; and to bolster security
―Syrian rebel collation sends ambassador to Paris,‖ Voice of Russia, November 18, 2012.
―France, three Arab countries to ‗strengthen‘ support for Syria rebels,‖ Voice of Russia, September 13, 2013.
Samuel Ramani, ―Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria,‖ Washington Post, November 19, 2015.
343
cooperation with anti-Bashaar Sunni countries within the Middle East, who share French deep
distrust of Iran as well.5
Moscow-backed Syrian offensive had simultaneously soured French relations with
Russia. President Vladimir Putin cancelled his visit to Paris after his French counterpart
Hollande labelled Russian airstrikes in Syria as ―war crimes‖.6 French government was seemed
to be taking a u-turn on Assad when Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated in December 2015
that he no longer believed that Bashaar al-Assad‘s departure is necessary before any political
transition in Syria.7 In spite of the obvious u-turn French position of Bashaar‘s future is clear. By
recognizing the Syrian opposition as the true representative of the people of Syria, France is
looking for an enhanced role in post-Assad Syria, which to them is the most-likely scenario no
matter how much more time it may take.
France recognizes diminished American presence in the Middle East and more assertive Russian
presence will contradict its vital interests in the region. Considering the staunch stance it has
already taken on the issue, France is expected to remain involved in the Syrian conflict and
continue to actively shape the strategic environment in line with its interests.
8.1.2. Britain
British relationship with Syria over the last decade has been created through a web of personal
links based on Bashaar‘s British education and his marriage to a British-born woman.8 Based on
this history, when the uprisings started against Assad, British Foreign Sectary, William Hague
still viewed Assad as a reformer and expected him to ―do the right thing‖ by implementing the
reforms its people were calling for and avoid sanctions being imposed. Contrasting the ―very
different situation‖ in Syria from that of Libya in a BBC Radio program, he asserted that Syria
was at a ―very different stage‖ and could still choose the path of reform. Critics accused that tone
was much softer for Bashaar though by that time 400 civilian casualties had been reported in a
Ramani, ―Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria.‖
Karina Piser, ―Will Tensions Over Syria Derail France-Russia‘s Long Term Relations?‖ World Politics Review, October 14, 2016.
―France: Assad‘s departure not necessary before transition,‖ Times of Israel, December 5, 2015.
Julian Borger, ―Bashar al-Assad‘s crackdown kills UK hopes of a new dawn,‖ Guardian, April 27, 2011.
344
month of protests in Syria.9 With the passage of time this long history of British overtures to
Damascus would prove to be a source of embarrassment.
Gradually British tone and approach towards the Damascus regime hardened and by June 2011,
William Hague was calling for the Security Council to act against Bashaar al-Assad. Britain
circulated a draft for the SC resolution asserting ―the security council has a responsibility to
speak‖ and condemning the regime attacks on anti-government protestors but it fell short of a no-
fly zone mandated against Libya a year earlier that launched NATO intervention against Qaddafi
forces. But regime change call was embedded in the message "President Assad is losing
legitimacy and should reform or step aside."10
Before that William Hague had outlined Britain‘s policy on Syria in the House of Commons on 6
February 2012 and asserted that Britain would continue to support the Arab League‘s mediation
efforts; intensify contacts with the Syrian opposition; play an active role in the Friends of Syria
Group meetings; and continue to raise the issue at the UNSC.11
By February 2012, UK was all
set to recognize the Syrian National Council as a ―legitimate representative‖ of the country after
Assad regime had ―forfeited the right to lead‖ by ―miring itself in the blood of innocent
people.‖12
Despite recognition, it opposed arming the rebels initially.13
Like Libyan case, UK‘s participation and its acquiescence in the Western narrative on Assad
regime has significant importance in threat securitization for Syria. But British action in Syria
has been constrained by US policy and its response to the evolving situation. The fact that US
does not want any of the three main contending parties - the ISIS, the forces headed by al-Qaeda
affiliate al-Nusra Front or the Bashaar forces – to gain upper hand in the conflict, has made
things complicated for UK too. In this scenario the only alternative for Washington had been to 9 Helene Mulholland, Julian Borger and Ian Black, ―Not too late for Syria to do the right thing, says Hague,‖
Guardian, April 27, 2011. ―William Hague calls for UN security council to act against Syria regime,‖ Guardian, June 8, 2011.
W Hague (UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), ―Syria,‖ United Kingdom, House of
Commons, Debates, February 6, 2012, columns 23–25, accessed May 08, 2017, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120206/debtext/120206-
0001.htm#1202063000001. ―UK boosts Syria opposition ties, William Hague reveals,‖ BBC News, 24 February 2012.
W Hague (UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), ―Written answers: Syria,‖ United
Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, 19 March 2012, columns 483–486, accessed May 09, 2017,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120319/text/120319w0002.htm#12031939
000090.
345
pretend that ―a moderate Syrian constituency opposed to these three parties capable of taking
power in Damascus‖ exist. Following the same narrative David Cameron numbered this force to
be 70,000 and claimed that many of them were the members of the Free Syria Army- an
umbrella group that largely disintegrated way back.14
Chair of the Commons Defence Committee, Julian Lewis, in recently published report
highlighted the lack of moderate rebels in Syria, in whose support the UK could act and warned
against military action under the current circumstances.15
By mid October, 2016 even amid the
news that Russian campaign in Aleppo had ―pulverized‖ neighbourhoods, military intervention
was mostly off the table.
As a response to Syrian regime‘s yet another chemical attack that killed dozens of civilians in
Idlib in April 2017, US hit the al-Shayrat airbase near Homs, allegedly responsible for the deadly
chemical attack. The immediate response from the Downing Street hastily issued statement
―fully supported‖ the actions of the US President and added they believed the action was ―an
appropriate response to the barbaric chemical weapons attack launched by the Syrian regime, and
is intended to deter further attacks‖. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson insisted that ―all the
evidence‖ pointed to Assad‘s regime ―using illegal weapons on their own people.‖16
The Syrian
civil war in the seventh year continues unabated; but UK by becoming an active party to the
conflict has been unable to offer political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict. As in words
of Andy Baker, who leads the Syrian response team for Oxfam: ―It‘s not only Russia, it is other
nations too, Britain among them, that have fuelled the fire of this conflict, continuing to support
one side or another and failing to deliver peace.‖17
8.1.3. Russia
Syrian civil conflict assumed more than local and regional dimension once Russia entered the
fray on the side of the Damascus regime. Moscow had long been flexing its muscles to reassert Patrick Cockburn, ―Syria air strikes: Britain is only dipping a toe in this war on Isis,‖ Independent, December 5, 2015.
Joe Watts, ―UK and US both consider military options amid warnings Russia will ‗flatten‘ Aleppo,‖ Independent, October 13, 2016.
―Arab League: Syria chemical attack a ‗major crime‘; UK says all evidence point to Assad,‖ Arab News, April 5, 2017.
Adam Withnall, ―UK Government must stop ‗fuelling the fire‘ of Syrian civil war, says Oxfam,‖ Independent, March 15, 2016.
346
its presence and to register itself once again as a great power with interests at stake in key
regions. This reassertion drive started in its own backyard even before the annexation of Crimea
in 2014 and on-going Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts. However, Syrian conflict proved that
other than the European theatre, Kremlin was ready to spread its tentacles deep into the Middle
East as well. Russian re-entry into the region more than anything else is the harbinger of post-
hegemony in the international system. US diminished presence and its unwillingness to get
embroiled in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, gave Russia a much larger space for
manipulation and now the stakes involving the final resolution of the Syrian conflict has become
so intricate that no final durable resolution of the Syrian conflict is conceivable without active
Russian involvement.
Moscow and Damascus have enjoyed close, quasi-alliance relations from 1960s to the
early 1990s when Syria was under Hafez al-Assad, Bashaar‘s father. A treaty was signed
between Syria and Soviet Union in 1980s that provided for consultation in case of threat to peace
and for military cooperation but overall Hafez remained a full master in his own house and in
Syria‘s ―near abroad‖ as evident in Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Syria titled to Soviet
camp after defection of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to US in 1972 and remained as
Soviet Union‘s staunchest ally in the Middle East till 1991. The close bilateral relations thrived
even after the break-up of Soviet Union.
The period following Soviet Union‘s demise, Russia withdrew from geopolitical competition
from the region; its approach towards the region also became more balanced after restoration of
relations with Israel. However, the dramatic developments in the wake of the Arab Spring drew
mixed response from Russian policymakers who feared Islamist takeover might lead to
overthrow of secular authoritarians or a more brutal regime following the ones public did away
with. The fear was even more pronounced in case of Syria where the opposition consisted of
jihadi elements with links to al-Qaeda and a danger of a sectarian war between Sunnis and
Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, Muslims and Christians was very real. Even Arab Spring to some in
Russia ―was but the newest form of Western-inspired, Western-led regime change.‖ 18
Ibid.
347
After few initial setbacks especially in the latter part of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 when
Bashaar al-Assad appeared increasingly vulnerable and likely to fall to a domestic insurgency;
the Syrian regime has benefitted from intervention from friendly foreign forces like battle-
hardened Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shias and far more important has been substantial Iranian
on-the ground support. To this background, the flow of Russian arms had been crucial to keep
Syrian regime afloat with which Assads‘ decade-old ties had survived and kept it shielded from
Western and Arab-backed sanctions in the United Nations Security Council. Russia significantly
increased its military presence in Syria in support of Bashaar, thus further negating any chance of
sustained Western military intervention, long advocated by FSA and the external opposition.
When Moscow sent its only aircraft carrier to the Syrian coast in January 2012 and Russian
guided-missile destroyer – the Smetlivy – arrived at the Syrian port of Tartus in the first week of
April to carry out unspecified tasks,19
it was more than apparent that Kremlin was all set for
more penetrating regional presence denied to it since the end of the Cold War.
In August 2013 when Syrian government‘s highly publicized use of chemical weapons made
Obama to threaten to launch a punitive military strike – a move that got indefinitely postponed
due both to Obama‘s failure to obtain Congressional approval and Russian initiative of placing
Syrian chemical weapons under international control - it was Moscow that eventually got
Damascus regime out of existential threat to its survival. According to Mark N. Katz, a professor
of government and politics at George Mason University: ―In short, as a result of not just Russia‘s
own actions, but also the actions, inactions, and preferences of others, Moscow‘s policy towards
Syria appears to be working , at least for now.‖20
As the civil conflict is getting long-drawn-out, the Kremlin leadership has been successful in
conveying the impression that Russia ―won‖ and the West and the US ―lost‖ in Syria – the
impression that further strengthens the perception that American ability to successfully run the
global affairs has considerably been reduced and hence the world is gradually drifting towards
post-hegemonic phase. Without Russia, Syrian regime might have been in a totally different
position now. It was the arrival of the Russian warplanes in September 2015, along with its
Ribal al-Assad, ―Syria and The Arab Spring: The Middle East on the Verge of War,‖ India International Centre Quarterly 39, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 85.
Mark N. Katz, ―Is Assad‘s Syria a ‗Win‘ for Moscow?‖ Current History 112, no. 756 (October 2013): 283.
348
ferocious bombing campaign that breathed new life into Bashaar‘s ground forces and turned the
tide of the war in his favour.
There were speculations that Russian military intervention has never been as substantial as
Moscow claimed and Assad forces failed to earn decisive on ground victories around Aleppo and
even retreated in few cases. But six months later, having turned the tide of the war in his ally's
favour, President Vladimir Putin ordered the "main part" of Russia's forces to withdraw, saying
their mission had "on the whole" been accomplished. Russian air campaign and missile strikes
went on to play a major role in the government's siege of rebel-held eastern Aleppo, which fell in
December 2016.21
However, Russia since then has paid the price for such sustained involvement
in Syrian conflict. A Russian civil plane was blown by ISIS and the Turks shot down a military
jet in November 2015 that drastically deteriorated bilateral relations between the two countries
for the time being. It could have produced unintended disastrous consequences for entire region,
had Moscow and Ankara not deliberately de-escalated the tensed situation.
Russia has tried to play the part of peacemaker too by brokering a ceasefire agreement between
opposition‘s main advocate-Turkey, Syrian chief ally-Iran, Syrian government and opposition in
Astana, Kazakhstan in January 2017 even after Russian ambassador to Turkey was assassinated
to sabotage the process. However, after the second chemical attack in Syrian province of Idlib in
April 2017, US, UK and France again blamed Bashaar regime as the international reaction to the
horrific development escalated; Russia insisted that the rebels had been behind these attacks,
asserting the poison gas contamination resulted from rebel-held chemical weapons hit by
government airstrikes – a theory not deemed credible by senior White House officials. Moscow
simultaneously threatened to veto a draft resolution proposed by US, UK and France to
―condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons," terming it "unacceptable" based
on "fake" information and reflecting "anti-Syrian" bias.22
Russian approach towards the Syrian conflict has been decisively in favour of Assad regime and
it has not shied away from taking a strong disagreeing position from that of the US and Europe.
Kremlin believes its approach is evenhanded as it has refused to use its influence to force
Bashaar to step aside while simultaneously working towards reconciliation. This approach, in ―Why is there a war in Syria?‖ BBC News, March 13, 2017.
Connor Sephton, ―Donald Trump: Russia‘s role in Syria atrocities ‗disappointing‘,‖ Sky News, April 06, 2017.
349
fact, reflects Moscow‘s vision of a global order that ties the use of force with the explicit
authorization of the UNSC and rejects regime change from abroad using any pretext, as is visible
through its vocal disapproval of extension of UNSCR 1973 to affect regime change in Libya.
Besides Moscow had voiced concerns about the tendency of the Arab Spring to be dominated by
extremists and the region becoming more radicalized – a perception not wholly unfounded that
later developments in the region confirmed.
Overall, Russian intervention in Syria has enhanced its international standing. Russia cannot be
ignored in international calculus, especially with respect to latest developments in the Middle
East. Whether it has long-term regional designs, only time will tell but at the moment a durable
and sustainable resolution of the Syrian conflict without Moscow‘s role and approval remains
elusive. Besides Russian entry into the region has tilted regional balance of power and enhanced
Iranian bid for more assertive regional leadership role too.
8.1.4. US
US policy in the Middle East for more than half a century has evolved around several core
strategic objectives i.e. preventing any regional power from attaining hegemony within the
region; ensuring the free flow of still vital to the world economy energy resources; and to broker
a durable peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours along with settlement of the
Palestinian issue. In the post-Cold War Middle East, US was running the show till the emergence
of Iran in the past decade as a principle challenger to all three core objectives.23
On the top of
that, Arab Spring toppled decades-long US allies and regional dynamics changed to an extent
that prompted concern in US policy circles that American influence within the region was being
tilted in favour of its adversaries. Any upheaval that ends with regional governments either too
weak or too anti-Western in their orientation was naturally unwelcomed and had to evoke US
strategic concerns.
Syrian uprising and Iranian assertiveness in the region to re-write the regional hierarchy that
might have undesirable effects on US interests in the region, had to be viewed through this lens.
Syria is a country that already had an acrimonious past with the US and successive Syrian
regimes were always suspicious of the Americans. Being in the Soviet camp, strained bilateral Henry A. Kissinger, ―A new doctrine of intervention?‖ Washington Post, March 30, 2012.
350
relations existed during the Cold War and hence seeking Syrian cooperation in the first Gulf War
in 1991 was a watershed event as Syria itself was eager to establish cordial relations with the
West.
However, the thaw did not last long between US and Syria even though Syria immediately
condemned 2001 terror attacks and provided significant intelligence sharing on al-Qaeda Syria.
The simmering differences between the two nations were once again brought to the fore in 2003
US invasion of Iraq where both drastically diverged in their approach towards Saddam‘s Iraq.
Nevertheless Syria‘s pivotal position in the Middle East and its determination to lead the struggle
against Israel in the region despite its weak military and lackluster economy, kept it relevant to
US policy calculus. Especially its ability to act as a ―spoiler‖ to US interests by hosting
Palestinian militant groups like Hamas and facilitating the rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon
had also been a thorn in the bilateral relations.
Another sore point between the two had been very cordial Syrian-Iranian relations. Syria has
served as a conduit for Iranian interests in the Middle East for decades. Some analysts had been
describing this relationship as a ―marriage of convenience‖ and others opine that the common
goal is ―not to be the next Iraq‖.24
Both countries have been designated as states that sponsor
terrorism by the US State Department and along with North Korea constitute the ―axis of evil‖ as
per President Bush. Thus the stakes of the survival of Bashaar regime are far too much for the
Iranian strategic interests that led to unprecedented Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war.
This Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah troika and its ability to create mess for Israel has kept US engaged
in the region.25
However, there had been efforts to ease the tensions within the bilateral equation
before the unrest in Syria. Obama administration made no secret of its intention to renew
dialogue with Syria and by December 2009 had already dispatched seven official delegations to
Syrian capital. But these gestures did not last long as the Arab Spring caught region‘s long-
reigning despots in bloody upheavals.
Just as the back-seat role in Libyan intervention came under intense criticism by those who
thought such an approach raises question on US ability to lead the world engulfed in crisis. Dr Stuti Banerjee, ―The United States and Syria: The Way Ahead,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 424.
For more details see Alfred B. Prados, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After the Iraq War (CRS Issue Brief for Congress, RL32727, updated February 28, 2005). ; and Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues ( CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB92075, updated March 13, 2006).
351
Similarly for critics ―US policy towards Syria since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 has been a
litany of miscalculation, frustration and tragedy.‖26
Instead of a military intervention initiative in
Syria, just like Libya, the response to the evolving situation in Syria has been disappointing for
US Arab allies who wanted to see quick Assad‘s departure like Qaddafi. Throughout his term
Obama expressed ambitious goals regarding Syria that involved removing Bashaar; destroying
ISIL and stabilizing Syria but the tension between these lofty ends and incoherent, limited effort
to achieve those ends further wounded Obama‘s ailing credibility with regional allies. Even after
claiming in August 2011 that ―the time has come for President Assad to step aside,‖ it appeared
to be a rather casual statement ―reflecting the moment rather than genuine determination to oust
Assad‖.27
The US approach during the conflict seemed hamstrung to pursuing a diplomatic path that is the
most obvious alternative to military engagement and use of force. It initially worked with UNSC
members in approving a joint UN-Arab League six-point peace plan but US insistence on
Assad‘s departure as a pre-condition turned this into faux diplomacy that was doomed from the
start. Second option pursued was replicating ―leading from behind‖ strategy by delegating
Middle East to regional allies and letting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fight and remove
Bashaar. But here the divergence in allies‘ objectives with that of US and their failure to
harmonize their efforts to outdo Iran made the achievement of Assad‘s departure goal
unattainable.
A less ambitious alternative had been to contain Syrian conflict without trying to fix it by
supporting immediate neighbours like Iraq, Turkey, Jordon, Lebanon and Israel; and by
preventing the conflict to spilling over into their territory through support for refugees. The final
option had been to arm Syrian opposition with sufficient power to remove Assad. Here too US
hasty withdrawal from Iraq and its slow program to arm the opposition ended up in emergence of
groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front. Besides, the debate surrounding so-called
moderates remained simplistic and self-deceptive as the groups involved in the conflict are ―far
more interested in co-opting the American power than adopting American values.‖28
Michael O‘ Hanlon, ―Deconstructing Syria,‖ The National Interest 140 (Nov/Dec 2015): 23.
Paul J. Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ The National Interest 141 (January/February 2016): 5-6.
Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ 7-8.
352
The greatest challenge to American credibility came in summer of 2013 when in spite of earlier
clear assertions form Obama Administration that a chemical weapons attack is a ―red line‖ for
US, he failed to implement the threat and to launch punitive strikes for Damascus regime‘s
documented war crimes and chose to settle for Assad willingness to turn over its chemical
arsenal to the United Nations. This neither isolationist nor idealistic approach not only
questioned American credibility as a great power but revealed US skepticism about its ability to
shape events in the Middle East.29
Under the undeniable rubric of ―humanitarian intervention‖
Obama in case of Libya, established a precedent of the authority of the president to intervene
virtually anywhere without the consent or approval of the congress, at his own discretion and as
long as he wishes. In spite of this humanitarian precedent employed in case of Libya, Obama
throughout his term remained reluctant to invoke it for direct military intervention in Syria.
It is also widely held that US disjointed and confused response failed to tilt the battlefield
balance in favour of anti-Assad forces. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta among other officials insisted to train and arm non-jihadist Syrian opposition
forces, which the President rejected in December 2012, could have changed dynamics of the
conflict at that time. Turkey, several Gulf States as well as private donors in the Gulf at that time,
were providing extensive support to jihadist militias but their strategic interests were divergent
from that of Washington. Chemical weapons attacks in April 2017 has rekindled debates on
Syrian policy but world has failed to see any drastic deviation from its already practiced Syrian
policy. Currently US operations in Raqqah are focused on the recapture of the city from ISIS.30
As the conflict will drag on, it will continue to complicate diplomatic priorities of US with Iran
over its nuclear program; will threaten to weaken global norms with international humanitarian
law as well as straining international humanitarian response system but the greatest challenge
would be the questions raised on its credibility and effectiveness of its foreign policy
commitments and international institutions like the UNSC.31
America can‘t afford to back off
from its global responsibilities but responding to global threats with the vigor seen in the first
two decades after the Cold War is also not possible. World has changed in far more ways than Augustus Richard Norton, ―Obama‘s Middle East Headaches,‖ Current History 113, no. 767 (December 2014):
Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response (CRS Report, RL33487, May 16, 2017), 1.
Ibid., 25.
353
even most in the US policy making circles would acknowledge and US ability to shape the world
and direct outcomes of events is far constrained with the emergence of equally assertive peer
challengers. It may be interpreted as drift into post-hegemonic era where US reliance on friends
and allies as well as international / regional bodies has increased. The longer Syrian conflict
lasts, the more visible would be the signs of this post-hegemonic drift.
8.2. Legitimacy
George W. Bush era unleashed US military might into the most turbulent region and entire world
is still saddling with the consequences of those imperialistic policies and hegemonic practices. It
is one of such crucial world regions where external powers have strong presence yet they have
been unable to regulate its policies. US military interventions had critically impacted on the
regional system adding to underlying tensions as aptly analyzed by Anoushiravan Etheshami that
―the US intervention in Iraq disrupted the region‘s notoriously contested and nebulous balance of
power and, not surprisingly, reinforced anarchical behavior patterns. A power vacuum in the
Arab world invited al Qaeda into Iraq. It also emboldened Iran, Israel and Turkey to become
more assertive in their regional dealings.‖32
Iran among the regional players identified has gained the most leverage in recent years, resulting
in region-wide apprehension compounded by concerns over its ambitious nuclear program. Iran‘s
rise has alarmed Israel, Turkey and core Arab states in equal measures, giving rise to further
networking of regional balance of power. Containment of Iran has become a major driver of
regional balancing either through confrontation or appeasement. Regional US allies attribute the
rise of Iran to US invasion of Iraq which they vociferously supported but to their dismay, ―non-
Arab Shiite Iran overnight acquired an unrivaled voice and presence in the historically and
strategically important Iraq. The Arabs‘ ‗eastern gateway,‘ which Saddam Hussein had so
painstakingly strengthened in order to check Iran, had suddenly become a paved highway over Anoushiravan Etheshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 395.
354
which Tehran could spread its influence and unique brand of political Islam to the heart of the
Arab world.‖33
When Obama stepped into White House as American President, he seemed to present a new
outlook and promising set of priorities but the inability of US to separate the Iranian and Israeli
theaters in the region and their persistent aggressive intent toward each other with zero-sum
approach to regional diplomacy has created difficulties. Even before the unprecedented
developments of Arab Spring rocked the region, US ability to shape events was increasingly
questioned. US though region‘s dominant external actor and simultaneously acknowledged as the
greatest outside ―local‖ power because of considerable local political and military presence; its
actions had for long proved decisive in tipping the balance of power among regional rivals.34
When Arab Spring, displaced decades-old allies like Ben Ali and Mubarak, region‘s surviving
authoritarian allies developed skepticism towards US commitment to defend allies. United States
was already widely being perceived as ―non-committal, wavering, ‗fatigued‘ and thus an
unreliable partner and protector‖ in the Arab world.35
The US inconsistent policies toward the
Arab uprisings (the varying response to Bahrain, Libya and Syria) offered more fodder for Iran‘s
resistance narrative. For local public, it simultaneously highlighted the illegitimacy of Arab
rulers by stressing their dependence on US and their impotence on pan-Arab issues (Palestine,
Iraq, Lebanon etc). A US back-seat role in the Libyan campaign gave further boost to this
narrative but Syrian conflict more than anything else in recent history has let US regional allies
to question American willingness and ability to direct events in the Arab theatre. ―Perhaps the
contest for predominance in a post-Arab Spring Middle East concerns whether the United States
could end up losing more than Iran wins, and thus, Washington needs to be careful not to create
opportunities for Iranian mischief.‖36
Iran figures so prominently in regional calculus that for regional allies any existential threat in
the region including that of ISIS is less threatening than Iranian victory in Syria. Toppling of
Bashaar is thus important for the sake of delivering a staggering blow to Hezbollah and
Ibid., 398-399.
Ibid., 396.
Abdullah Al Shayl, ―Gulf allies are losing faith in the US,‖ Gulf News, October 27, 2013.
Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey and Michael Scott Doran, ―Arab Spring, Persian Winter: Will Iran Emerge
From the Arab Revolt?‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July / August 2011): 186.
355
especially Iran.37
Besides as Saudi Arabian King Abdullah pointed in 2011: ―Nothing would
weaken Iran more than losing Syria.‖ The view was reflected by Obama‘s national security
adviser, Tom Donilon, when he asserted that the ―end of the Assad regime would constitute
Iran‘s greatest setback in the region – a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power
in the region against Iran.‖38
Thus regional US allies want decisive American interference in the
region that could drastically constrain Iranian maneuverability. For them American legitimacy lo
lead partly rests on its ability to nip Iranian evil that has posed existential threat to their regimes.
US Arab allies got disillusioned with delayed and reluctant American response to developments
in the heart of the Middle East. For them US was doing too less and too late. US on the other had
had been stressing interference in the internal affairs of states through humanitarian lens and
actions against Bashaar regime has also been justified citing grave human rights violations.
That‘s why Obama‘s decision of June 13, 2013 to send light weapons and ammunitions was an
attempt to reflect ―a fundamental reality in the dialectic of American foreign policy‖ that view
humanitarian intervention as the inevitable default position for policy makers. This is underlined
with a belief that ―America must act to salve the wounds of humanity wherever suffering is
intense and prospects for a democratic emergence are even remotely promising.‖39
The
opposition to the Damascus regime has consistently relied on this narrative throughout the six-
year war.
American approach and policy has so far failed to impress upon the allies. Dramatically evolving
situation in Syrian conflict and increased intervention of Bashaar allies has further constrained
US ability to shape the outcomes of the conflict. However, US prestige suffered a serious blow
when after declaring itself committed to a change in battlefield dynamics in the wake of first
chemical attacks in August 2013, it proved more difficult to achieve than anticipated. In the first
chemical attack on August 21, 2013 White House claimed 1,429 civilians were killed and after
asserting attack crossed the ―red line‖, it failed to launch a punitive military strike. For US The similar thoughts had been expressed in the Arab Islamic American Summit in May 2017. For details see
―Trump accuses Iran of fuelling ‗fires of sectarian conflict and terror‘,‖ Dawn, May 22, 2017. John J. Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ The National Interest 129 (January/ February 2014): 14.
Robert W. Merry, ―America‘s Default Foreign Policy,‖ The National Interest 127 (September/October 2013):5.
356
critics, this development has serious consequences for Iran too that could now count that US
threats of attack if Tehran acquires nuclear weapon would be equally hollow.40
Facing severe criticism for failing to implement the threat, Obama‘s national Security Adviser
Susan Rice stated in September 2013 that US cannot be ―consumed 24/7 by one region,
important as it is.‖41
The US strategy resultantly emboldened regional actors to make
independent bid to achieve their objectives and their actions at times had drastically been at odds
with US interests. Even the second chemical attack in Idlib that reportedly killed 72 people failed
to bring a decisive change in the course of its practiced policy on Syria. Though President
Donald Trump in a rare criticism on Russia urged Moscow ―to think carefully‖ of its support to
Assad after the attack ―crossed many, many lines‖ but stopped short of specifying how he would
tackle the crisis.42
Then there are others who believe that American credibility hasn‘t suffered after backing down
from ―red line‖ implementation because according to Daryl G. Press: ―A country‘s credibility, at
least during crises, is driven not by its past behavior but rather by power and interests.‖43
Just as
American defeat in Vietnam did not prompt Soviet Union to think its commitment to defend
Western Europe isn‘t credible. Fact remains that by broadcasting his reluctance to use force,
President Obama vitiated Syrian warlords chief motivation to speak and act like moderates and
thus the most formidable threat that they could lose US support in case of non-compliance was
rendered null and void. For the world counting on US lead role, the principal product of Obama‘s
policy had been more terrorism, more destruction, more casualties, more refugees and more
spillover effects on the region as reflected in destabilizing flood of refugees into Europe; terrorist
bomb attack on a Russian plane; murder of Russian ambassador; horrific Paris attacks; and
threatening Turkish-Russian confrontation.44
The protracted Syrian conflict and US inability to coordinate and influence its allies and
adversaries has multiplied challenges posed to US national and global interests. The brutal civil
war has descended into a multifaceted regional security crisis, emergence and empowerment of Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 15.
Norton, ―Obama‘s Middle East Headaches,‖ 371.
Sephton, ―Donald Trump: Russia‘s role in Syria atrocities,‖
Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ 8.
357
violent armed Islamist extremist militias and groups, mass displacement of civilians, gross
human rights violations and war crimes, proliferation of arms as well as use of chemical
weapons, and overt and covert intervention of outside players. The regional allies and opponents
have diversified their approach and no longer look only towards US as the ultimate arbiter of the
conflict. The realization that without Russian consent and approval, a viable solution to the
conflict is unlikely, already point to the acknowledgment of a peer presence in the Middle East
conflict.
The years of ineffective policy on Syria has already dealt a blow to its legitimacy as a world
leader. In 2012 State of the Union address, Obama asserted ―America remains the one
indispensible nation in world affairs – and as long as I‘m President I intend to keep it that
way.‖45
But throughout his term he failed to implement this notion of indispensability with
regard to Syria. The vision conceives America to be de facto global hegemon hence it would be
calamitous for Washington to step back from its current global role and will damage US interests
as well as global peace and prosperity.
However, with major regional powers in disagreement over the likely solution to the Syrian
conflict, no credible or legitimate political process could lead to a negotiated solution. Hence,
political and military stalemate continues along with territorial fragmentation of the country and
the proliferation of the networks of violence. Humanitarian crisis is beyond imagination. US
ability to bring about a political transition process remains immensely restricted as long as
Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are committed to propping up Bashaar regime. In Middle East at least
the post-hegemonic international era has registered its presence and any likely Russian-Iranian
gains in the Syrian conflict will further strengthen this perception.
8.3. Threat Securitization for Syrian Conflict
Syria is geopolitically and strategically too important to be ignored by players interested in re-
writing the configuration of the region in flux since the first Gulf War. The Saudi / Iranian
rivalry and decades-long quest for hegemony was finally brought to the fore when Arab Spring
Ted Galen Carpenter, ―Delusions of Indispensability,‖ The National Interest 124 (March/April 2013): 47.
358
upended the regional balance of power and key Arab players like Egypt and Libya were left to
grapple with their own domestic imbalances and upheavals. Syrian proximity to Israel and its
importance for Iranian grand designs in the region, threatening US and her allies‘ interests,
quickly led a civil war to be converted into a proxy battleground for parties to the conflict.
To build narrative for response to the Syrian conflict in line with that of Libya proved more
difficult than was being anticipated. The deadly conflict has entered in its seventh year and still
US and its allies have been unable to securitize Syrian threat that could have produced a
unanimous UN resolution for a decisive millary action against the Syrian regime. Russian
forceful entry on the side of Bashaar al-Assad, with a veto card in the United Nations Security
Council shows that only a negotiated solution rather than a direct military intervention would end
the conflict.
The conflict is thus testing not only credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations,
especially its Security Council but those of the players involved too especially US to play its
traditional hegemonic role. The result had seen both sides incessantly involved in presenting
alternative narrative that so far has failed to establish credibility of any player. US and its allies
have painted Bashaar regime involved in gross human rights violations against unarmed civilians
but the dynamics of conflict quickly evolved and registered a number of armed players, some of
them involved in worst war crimes and human rights violations than the Damascus regime. Fact
that groups that loathe US dominate the armed opposition to Assad has left Washington with few
choices to maneuver on-ground situation and manufacture a credible threat securitization for
Syria too.
Another reason why it has been so difficult to securitize threat for Syria has been the way
American public responded to the speculations of punitive strikes against Syria after the first
chemical attacks in 2013. The resistance to the initiative had been so apparent that Obama
refused to go for Congressional approval even after announcing that strikes would be limited. As
columnist Peggy Noonan puts it, it seemed as ―a fight between the country and Washington,
between the broad American public and Washington‘s central governing assumptions.‖46
The
analysis seem to be corroborated by the Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll in September Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 29.
359
2013 when some 74 percent voted for the belief that their country was ―doing too much in other
countries, and it is time to do less around the world and focus more on problems here at home.‖47
When America was busy to construct narrative to implicate Syrian government for chemical
attacks, others projected alternative view refuting US claim. Reese Erlich, an American
journalist, in his book Inside Syria, judiciously concluded ―Both sides quite possibly used sarin.
Both sides lied and manipulated evidence. At a minimum, the Obama administration exaggerated
its case to justify a military attack on Syria. At worst, the White House fabricated intelligence.
Bottom line: No one has yet presented convincing evidence of who perpetrated the horrific Al
Ghouta attack.‖48
Apart from lacking public endorsement, the attempt to paint Bashaar regime involved in
systematic genocide also failed. According to John J. Mearsheimer: ―Regardless of what is
happening in Syria is not genocide or anything close to the systematic murdering of a particular
group.‖ Those who are trying to portray Assad ―as a modern-day version of Hitler and arguing
this is the West‘s ‗Munich moment,‘ implying he will engage in mass murder if not dealt with
immediately. This is hyperbole of the worst kind.‖49
On top of that Obama Administration‘s
assertion that if strikes were to be conducted against Assad they would be ―unbelievably small‖
as per Secretary of State John Kerry, that would not definitely topple or end civil war; thus
rendering strategy certainly at odds with previous claim that denounces Assad as a contemporary
version of Hitler who must be dealt with immediately.50
Assad regime came up with its own very strong anti-rebel narrative that reverberated throughout
the region especially among the Shia community. It says: ―Local people taking up arms in self-
defense is a far cry from CIA/Israeli/Saudi-sponsored rebels attacking the Assad government,‖
which is what Syrian media incessantly kept reporting.51
The more the conflict in Syria took a
sectarian turn, the more it favoured Assad who then capitalized it by drawing Shias from across
the Muslim world. They are ready to fight this ―existential threat‖ to Assad regime because
Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 29-30.
Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, (Prometheus Books, 2014).
Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 20.
Ibid., 21.
Max Weiss, ―Syria in the Abyss,‖ Current History 113, no. 767 (December 2014): 372.
360
Assad‘s ouster is equated with bitter historical memory of centuries of persecution under ruthless
Sunni rule.
Regional hierarchy in transition
Arab Spring 2011
Target State
Intervener
Post-Hegemonic Phase
Intervener
US
(declining hegemon)
Syria
Unrest against the Bashaar regime
Threat Legitimacy Securitization
Crisis
International & regional Institutions
UN, Arab League, ICC
Extra-Regional involvement
Russia UK
France
Intervener
Post-Hegemonic Phase
Figure 8.1. Syrian Military Intervention Threat Securitization
Considering the fact American ―allies‖, some of which may not be so moderate or dependable,
constitute perhaps the fifth largest force in the conflict other than Bashaar troops, al-Nusra Front,
ISIS and even Hezbollah, has further weakened threat securitization that stresses Assad as the
single largest evil in the conflict. Given the complexities of the conflict dynamics, an actual
large-scale US military intervention or even the one on pattern of Libya, appears to be off the
table for the time being. However, the US still is the most dominant actor within the systemic
level and had wider credibility to securitize Syrian conflict then the Russian counterpart. But
with active resistance in narrative construction in both systemic and unit levels from Russia and
Iran, Syrian conflict so far has proved to be difficult for threat construction. This difficulty
registers itself in construction of ―war legitimation‖ discourse as identified in Figure 8.1. The
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Libyan case revealed that the threat securitization was mostly unidirectional that facilitated
interveners but here the resistance to US-backed narrative is equally compelling, hence Syrian
conflict continues unabated with all contending actors projecting and protecting their interests in
the fog of the war and still neither in a decisive position to prevail yet.
8.3.1. Target State‟s Ruling Regime as a Threat to international Peace &
Security
Assumption 1: Target state ruling regime is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international
peace and security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide
acceptance while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed
as propaganda) and discredited internationally.
Uprising against the ruling Bashaar regime and its sudden violent character led prospect of
another regime change in a geopolitically vital Middle Eastern state whose leader‘s staunch anti-
Israel policies proved to be a source of irritation in the West. Though the whole region was
shaking with democratic fervor in the wake of Arab Spring and people were protesting against
economic stagnation, prevalent poverty and corruption in their societies, and their
marginalization in the political processes but rulers in respective countries chose to respond
through token measures that could subdue and suppress resistance temporarily. Bashaar al-Assad
turned out to be no different from his lot and as expected resorted to extreme measures when the
popular will for change gained momentum within the country.
Considering the importance Syria possessed in geopolitical terms and its alliance with the Iranian
regime that frantically sought to expand its regional clout, the threat construction in Syrian case
was bound to be problematic for those interested in making another intervention case like Libya.
Syria was not only Iran‘s staunchest Arab ally, its loss could have seriously dented the upward
thrust that Tehran had recently gained in regional politics, empowering arch-rival Saudi Arabia
and those aligned with her. But it was not just Iran, Russian entry in the Syrian theatre enlarged
the stakes of outcome of this civil war more than its indigenous parties to the conflict initially
could have calculated.
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On the other hand, the US and foreign partners taking part in the Syrian conflict on the side of
insurgents aimed not to defeat the insurgency but to support and empower them to bring about
defeat of Bashaar regime. This strategy produced partial success initially and then settled into a
stalemate. After Obama‘s ―red lines‖ demarcation, it was expected that firm and resolute US
policy and position on the civil war would halt advance of Bashaar troops and may even result in
the formation of another ―coalition of willing‖ with the aim to de-seat Assad. But once the
Americans failed to implement their overly stated threat in case of chemical attack on civilians, it
emboldened pro-Syrian forces and made framing of Syrian regime as ―existential threat‖ to
international peace and security more difficult. The more time Damascus regime got, the more
rift in international narrative on Bashaar posing as threat emerged.
The West got its golden opportunity to frame Bashaar regime as ―existential threat‖ to world
peace and security when the first chemical weapons attack was reported in August 2013. Those
seeking a pretext for Libyan type intervention could not have missed it. A detailed analysis of the
statements issued during the period could draw the similarity between Libyan and Syrian case
threat construction. For example, UK government made its position clear on the legality of
military action in Syria:
―The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime is a serious crime of
international concern, as a breach of the customary international law prohibition
on use of chemical weapons, and amounts to a war crime and a crime against
humanity. However, the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian
intervention; the aim is to relieve humanitarian suffering by deterring or
disrupting the further use of chemical weapons.
The UK is seeking a resolution of the United Nations Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations which would condemn the use of
chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities; demand that the Syrian authorities
strictly observe their obligations …… ; and authorise member states .... to take all
necessary measures to protect civilians in Syria….. ; and refer the situation in
Syria to the International Criminal Court.‖52
―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ (Prime Minister‘s Office, 10 Downing
Street, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 29 August, 2013), 1-2.
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The use of ―humanitarian intervention‖, ―crimes against humanity‖, ―all necessary measures‖
and the ―International Criminal Court‖ all rung familiar bells in the mind and a military
intervention very similar to Libya was on the table. But what the interveners failed to realize that
apart from those Libyan ingredients for military intervention, the changes in the global and
regional environment had outdated previous action plan. Syrian context was much complicated
than Libya. Syria though suffering from larger diplomatic isolation still had staunch allies like
Russia and Iran who were as aggressively involved in constructing a counter-narrative for
Bashaar regime.
US and the allies‘ frustration to come up with a unanimous UNSC resolution is evident from
implicating Russia in Syrian government crimes. In a UNSC emergency session on Aleppo the
UK, US and France openly accused Russia and stated that it is the Bashaar and Russian side that
has ―plunged to new depths and unleashed a new hell on Aleppo‖.53
While US criticism was
even sharper, Samantha Power told the meeting: ―Instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad
make war. Instead of helping get life-saving aid to civilians, Russia and Assad are bombing
humanitarian convoys, hospitals, and first responders who are trying desperately to keep people
alive.‖ Russia in a firm response told that it will not put up with US and UK ―tone and rhetoric
used‖, finds it ―unacceptable‖ and warns it ―can seriously damage the settlement process and our
bilateral relations‖.54
In spite of all the attempts of anti-Assad camp the UN Security Council
could not even agree on the wording of a statement condemning Syrian government violence.
Russian role was most pronounced that said ―events in Syria do not pose a threat to global
peace.‖55
Presently the world and more specifically those involved in the Syrian conflict could be seen
divided into two camps. Pro-Assad camp is hell bent to save the regime at all costs and reject any
narrative that implicates Bashaar in gross human rights violations as propaganda to force him to
step down. While anti-Bashaar camp would want to see Assad gone and would settle for less
than nothing. Since the conflict has raged for more than six years now, the parties to the conflict
has adopted non-negotiable positions and resultantly the discourse generated from both sides has
also hardened and failed to bridge the gap between the parties. ―Syria conflict: US and UK rhetoric ‗unacceptable‘-Russia,‖ BBC, September 26, 2016.
Ibid.
―How Syria and Libya compare,‖ Guardian, April 28, 2011.
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8.3.2 “Us” versus “Them” Binary Employed
Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention
are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.
It was far easier to construct ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary in case of Libya whose regime was
internationally isolated and lacked credible allies to support it diplomatically in international
bodies and forums. But the case of Syria is not just linked to its own local and regional standing.
The allies supporting Bashaar espouse a distinct worldview which has been their guiding
principle in their approach towards the civil war. Russia particularly has increasingly diverged
from the West and has not shied about offering alternative solutions to international issues. With
veto power in the United Nations Security Council, it can effectively block US policies at the
Security Council, rendering them illegal from International law‘s perspective, should
Washington chose to still proceed with the body‘s consent.
Besides Russian determination to take overt stand in the UNSC has important ramifications too.
China which up till now has been reluctant to oppose the West alone on issues not directly
affecting its own immediate interests, has occasionally joined Moscow in opposing selected
issues. Though in such scenarios Russia takes both the lead and the heat but it eventually give
rise to a pattern of Sino-Russian opposition to the US and Europe. Both have been vocal in their
support for traditional ―state sovereignty‖ and ―nonintervention‖ principles and have
vociferously opposed Western practice of ―humanitarian intervention‖ and ―regime change‖
what they profess West carries out under the garb of humanitarian intervention.
The general chaos in post-Qaddafi Libya witnessed after NATO no-fly zone campaign gave rise
to a de facto breakup of the country and proliferation of the deposed regime‘s weapon stocks
throughout MENA. Probably more important were the lessons learnt when Russian companies
contracts were not renewed while Western companies were quickly back in business in Libya.
This material injury along with NATO exceeding its mandate has been instrumental in shaping
the response towards Syria. Without Russia, the international community‘s narrative that
unanimously condemns another ruthless dictator killing its own civilian population for sake of
prolonging its regime can‘t get through UNSC and hence loses its significance. Conversely,
staunch Russian support has given rise to wide international coverage of Assad‘s perspective and
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exposed ―Islamist extremists and fundamentalists‖ dubbed as ―rebels‖ involved in worst kind of
human rights abuses too.
This Russian lead has frustrated US and its allies efforts to present Syrian case chiefly through
evil representation of the Syrian regime in Us versus Them binary. Rather it gave rise to debates
centering around the views of an alternative global order, on the issues of sovereignty and human
rights, on the use of force and the responsibility to use force. Syria exemplifies, in many ways,
the quintessential struggle that is harbinger of a new world order reflecting waning US
hegemony and the rise of peer challengers who challenge the narrative being constructed by US.
This confrontation and contestation is being reflected in terms of Syrian war narrative by the US
and the Russia and has pitted Russia against the West and the Arab world at the Security
Council.
Nevertheless, US continue to employ ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary especially after the first
chemical attacks made headlines in the world and anti-Assad parties to the conflict squarely
blamed Bashaar for the horrific attacks. It had been repeatedly asserted that those with Us are on
―the right side of the history‖ and by voting against Assad regime this side fulfills its moral
obligation but those who are ―unable to, or unwilling to, then that will be their responsibility to
bear,‖ told Susan Rice, US ambassador to UN in a closed Security Council meeting on Syria.56
This moral responsibility theme was invoked by British PM too who told MPs in London, ―If
anyone votes against that resolution or tries to veto it, that should be on their conscience.‖57
British PM in a telephonic conversation with President Obama stressed for ―the need for a tough
and robust response to the appalling war crime committed by the Assad regime in Ghouta‖ but
made simultaneously clear the House was against British military action.58
Although a letter
from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Jon Day, published on August 29, 2013
about reported chemical weapons use in Syria in the early hours of August 21, 2013 that resulted
in at least 350 fatalities and to assess Assad regime‘s responsibility for the attack, had clearly
stated that the Syrian regime had used lethal chemical weapons on 14 occasions since 2012 and
Ian Black and Nidaa Hassan, ―UK and France seek UN action on Syria as thousands flee,‖ Guardian, June 8, 2011.
Ibid.
―Prime Minister‘s Phone Call with President Obama‖ (Prime Minister‘s Office, 10 Downing Street, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 30 August, 2013)
366
the judgment was made ―with the highest level of certainty‖ and it established a clear pattern of
regime involvement.59
It further stated: ―Unlike previous attacks, the degree of open source reporting of CW use on 21
August has been considerable.‖ And the JIC concluded that ―it is highly likely that the regime
was responsible for the CW attacks on 21 August.‖ While the Syrian regime narrative of the
attacks ―either faked or undertaken by the Syrian Armed Opposition‖ was rejected altogether. It
asserted: ―There is no credible intelligence or other evidence to substantiate the claims or the
possession of CW by the opposition.‖60
Both the sides are still constructing their narrative and justifying their approach towards the
conflict. While swing actors like Egypt and Turkey and their contradictory stances on few
occasions made things difficult for anti-Assad coalition. After more than six years of war and
two deadly chemical attacks reported in the media, the humanitarian argument got weakened
with more players getting involved and taking contradictory stances. Syrian conflict has long
out-grown its local and regional dimension and involvement of extra-regional players has made
it crucial for long-term effects on evolving global hierarchy too.
8.3.3. Co-opting International/Regional Institutions
Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts
international institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for authorization of
force against the target state.
The case of Libya revealed that it is far more convenient for the interveners to legitimize
intervention if the regional and international institutions and bodies could be co-opted. The
unanimous narrative generated through these bodies legitimize not only the threat constructed for
military intervention but it simultaneously signal the influence and ability of the hegemon to get
things done through these bodies.
―Syria: Reported Chemical weapons Use- Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)‖
(Cabinet Office, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 29 August, 2013), 1-3 , accessed May 25, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-reported-chemical-weapons-use-joint-intelligence-committee-letter. Ibid.
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The Arab League‘s role had been very pronounced in Libya and its call for a no-fly zone
ultimately resulted in NATO military campaign. In case of Syria, it took a lead role again in
urging UNSC to act. It not only acted through its intermediaries in Syria but once the
government crackdown resulted in violent deaths, it suspended Syria from organization‘s
meetings.61
However, first public response condemning Syrian government‘s actions came in
mid-June 2011with Amr Moussa, the Secretary General, stating that Arab countries were ―angry
and actively monitoring‖ the crisis situation.62
But the member states differed in their views63
and it was difficult to come up with a strongly worded condemnation against the Syrian regime.
However, the next Secretary General of the Arab League, Nabil el-Araby, issued a stronger
statement on 6 August 2011, expressing the League‘s ―growing concern and strong distress over
the deteriorating security conditions in Syria due to escalating violence and military operations in
Hama and Deir al-Zor [sic] and other areas of Syria.‖64
During this period an Arab League ―mission‖ announced for Syria was postponed on September
07, 2011 for unknown reasons65
that a London-based Arab newspaper later claimed because of
el-Araby meeting with Syrian dissidents in late September.66
Later a 13 point peace plan67
announced by Arab League in September was accepted by Damascus regime that called for a
comprehensive cease-fire, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from civilian areas, the release of
prisoners and the beginning of a ―national dialogue‖.68
The Syrian government was then accused
of non-adherence to the plan and was suspended in mid-November form Arab League. By end
November economic sanctions were also imposed on Syria.
Another prominent attempt in Syrian crisis was the signing of an agreement regarding
deployment of the Arab League observers to monitor the situation in Syria on December 19,
More detail on the Arab League‘s response to the Syrian uprising is available in M, Küçükkeleş, ―Arab League‘s Syria policy,‖ SETA Policy Brief 56, April 2012, accessed May 09, 2012, http://setadc.org/policy-briefs/434-arab-leagues-syrian-policy. Cited in M. Chulov, ―Arab League issues first condemnation of Syria violence,‖ The Guardian, 14 June 2011.
―Excerpts: Arab League's Mussa angers Syria: Syrian crackdown intensifies,‖ Independent Media Review Analysis, 15 June 2011.
Ibid.
―Arab foreign ministers to meet on Syria after League visit delayed,‖ Haaretz, 7 September 2011.
S. Abu-Husain and S. Jumaa, ―Syria‘s Arab League membership under threat,‖ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat , 9 August 2011.
A. Blomfield, ―Arab League presents Syria peace plan to Bashar al-Asad,‖ The Telegraph , 11 September 2011.
―Syria agrees to end crackdown, Arab League says,‖ CNN, November 3, 2011.
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2011.69
However, by end January 2012, all observers were withdrawn, with Arab League
Secretary General al-Araby citing the ―deterioration of the situation in Syria and the continued
use of violence‖ as the reason for the suspension of the observers‘ activities.70
By the time first Chemical weapons attacks were reported by Syrian regime, Arab League
condemned the ―horrible crime carried out with internationally prohibited chemical weapons‖
and put ―entire responsibility‖ on Assad‘s government. In spite of Arab League being in the US
list of allies ―ready to respond‖ to alleged attacks according to Secretary of State, John Kerry;
influential League members like Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria expressed opposition
to foreign military intervention in Syria.71
A failure to get a unified green light from this
prestigious Arab body significantly weakened whatever military intervention plan US had in its
box at that time.
Even in March 2017, the Arab League chief Ahmad Abul Gheit urged Arab governments to do
more to resolve the Syrian crisis and "find an effective way of intervening to stop the shedding of
blood in Syria and end the war", rather than to let ―this kind of terrible crisis gets passed over to
international and regional powers to manage as they like and control according to their own
interests‖.72
Even after the Idlib chemical attacks in April 2017 that Gheit called ―a major crime
and a barbaric act‖ but he failed to specify who should be held responsible when he stated:
―Whoever carried it out will not escape from justice, and must be punished by the international
community according to international law and international humanitarian law.‖73
Apart from Arab League, the UNSC has also been not very forthcoming in Syrian case. Libyan
episode and extension of NATO‘s mandate has kept Russian and China away from any other no-
fly zone implementation resolution. Another difference from Libyan case could be observed the
way Syrian regime is perceived by Russia and China. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist and
extremists groups in Syria and their active backing by anti-Assad actors has weakened their
position in international bodies and they have failed to frame Bashaar al-Assad as the single most
threat to be eradicated first of all from Syria. Pro-Assad actors particularly Russia and Iran have
―Syria signs deal to allow Arab League observers into country,‖ The Guardian, December 19, 2011.
A. Samir, ―Arab League suspends Syria mission as violence rages,‖ Reuters, January 28, 2012.
―Arab League discusses Syria crisis,‖ Al-Jazeera, September 01, 2013.
―Arab League chief urges action on Syria,‖ Al-Araby, March 28, 2017.
―Arab League: Syria chemical attack,‖ Arab News.
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refused to condone this narrative. Hence, as a permanent member of UNSC Russia is giving full
backing to Assad and has threatened to veto drafts of resolution inconsistent with its policy on
the Syrian conflict.
US and her allies strived to implicate Bashaar in human rights violations and war crimes through
US resolution; In response Russia and China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution in October 2011
that would have strongly condemned Syrian regime for its alleged ―grave and systematic human
rights violations and the use of force against civilians‖. Russia in rejecting the resolution stated:
―Today‘s rejected draft was based on… the philosophy of confrontation. We cannot agree with
this unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus. We deem unacceptable the threat of an
ultimatum and sanctions against the Syrian authorities. Such an approach contravenes the
principle of a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of a full Syrian national dialogue.‖74
Libyan UNSCR 1973 and the way it was imposed, was also cited as a reason.75
Then the second draft resolution in February 2012 was again vetoed by both Russia and China
that likewise would have condemned the Syria regime for ―the continued widespread and gross
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms‖. On this occasion, the Chinese
representative at the UNSC justified its veto by arguing that Security Council members were
attempting to ―put undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian Government‖ and were aiming for a
―prejudged result of the dialogue‖ (meaning regime change).76
Russia argued that:
―In the Security Council, we [Russia] have actively tried to reach a decision for an
objective solution that would truly help to put a prompt end to violence and start a
political process in Syria. The decision of the Security Council should be just that,
but from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis some influential members of the
international community, including some sitting at this table, have undermined
any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, encouraging
the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed
struggle.‖77
UNSC, 6627th meeting: S/PV.6627: provisional, New York, UNSC, 4 October 2011, pp. 3–4, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627. Ibid., 4. ; on UNSC Resolution 1973 see N Brew, N Brangwin, M Harris and N Markovic, Libya and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, FlagPost, Parliamentary Library, 24 March 2011, http://parliamentflagpost.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/libya-and-united-nations-security.html. UNSC, 6711th meeting: S/PV.6711: provisional, New York, UNSC, 4 February 2012, p. 9, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711. Ibid., 9.
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Finally the third draft resultantly was vetted to avoid third Chinese / Russian veto and the
UNSCR 2042 adopted on April 14, 2012 condemned the ―wide spread violations of human rights
by the Syria authorities‖, as well as ―any human rights abuses by armed groups‖.78
Russia‘s
representative told the Security Council that ―the initial draft resolution underwent substantive
changes to make it more balanced, appropriately reflect realities‖.79
Thus the inability of the
Western nations to unanimously construct Assad regime as either the sole perpetrator of human
rights violations or to get the unanimous world opinion behind it made threat securitization even
more problematic. It could be gauged from the fact when Houla massacre took place that resulted
in killings of dozens of children, women and men and the wounding of hundreds more, only a
press statement – which is weaker than a presidential statement and does not go in the council‘s
record- was issued condemning the massacre.80
Thus the threat securitization for Syrian conflict
by co-opting regional / international bodies and organizations has also remained problematic so
far, pointing towards yet another failure of anti—Assad camp.
8.4. War Legitimation Discourse
The need to employ war legitimation discourse has been discussed in previous chapters. The
more post-hegemonic drift in the global affairs becomes apparent, the more reliance on war
legitimation becomes eminent. With the waning of US hegemony and rise of peer challengers in
global and regional politics, declining hegemon seeks approval of regional and international
bodies and war narrative reflects increased reliance on ―positive self-perception and
representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖.
However, Syrian case shows that when resistance in both the regional and global hierarchy
manifests itself openly and aggressively, then war legitimation discourse becomes problematic.
In this conflict US can still be seen imposing its superpower identity but active and aggressive
UNSC, Resolution 2042 (2012), New York, UNSC, 14 April 2012, accessed May 09, 2017, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/295/28/PDF/N1229528.pdf?OpenElement. UNSC, 6751st meeting: S/PV.6751: provisional, New York, UNSC, 14 April 2012, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6751. UNSC, Security Council press statement on attacks in Syria, media release, 29 May 2012, accessed May 09, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10658.doc.htm.
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resistance from Russia and Iran has successfully generated counter-narrative that has provided
Bashaar regime with its breathing space even after six years of conflict.
8.4.1. Legitimation by reference to authority
As narrated before legitimation by reference to authority derives from ―because I say so theme‖
and it can be the authority of any tradition, custom or law which can be referred to legitimize
violence against the target state and construct narrative for war. Analysis of Syrian conflict
shows that failed war legitimation by reference to authority could be seen as the highest
international body authorizing the use of force and thereby making legitimation through
―international humanitarian law‖ and ―responsibility to protect‖ norm could not be utilized
without sanction of the United Nations Security Council. This failure is manifested in failed
UNSC attempts to implicate Syrian regime in past six years since the start of the uprising.
Here Russia had been playing the lead role in negating US and Western narrative that squarely
lays the blame on Assad regime for excessive and gross human rights violations and war crimes.
Russian veto and opposition from China has so far frustrated US and her allies to come up with a
Security Council resolution that binds Syrian government for ensuring a swift end to the
protracted civil war. Arab League being the most important regional body has also failed to
produce the kind of pressure on the Syrian regime in spite of annulment of its membership. Even
in the recent chemical attacks in Idlib in April 2017, the statement from Arab Leagues did not
pin the responsibility on Damascus regime and condemned the horrific attacks by stating
―whoever carried it out‖ thus without overtly laying the blame on the regime.81
The chemical attacks in Syria gave employment of anti-chemical weapons conventions to be
employed against the regime. Chemical weapons are banned under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) 1997. It bans the development, production, transfer, stockpiling and use of
chemical and toxin weapons. 189 countries are signatory to this convention but Syria along with
Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea and South Sudan are not parties to the CWC.
However, Syria signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol that asks for the Prohibition for the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare bans the
―Arab League: Syria chemical attack a ‗major crime‘; UK says all evidence point to Assad,‖ Arab News, April 5, 2017.
372
use of chemical or biological agents in warfare against other states. The Geneva Protocol does
not address the use of these weapons in internal conflicts. But when Syria gave up its chemical
weapons stock under international monitoring and Russian backing, war legitimation employing
this convention has now dubious significance.
Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict could be gauged from the fact that when President
Donald Trump ordered direct military strikes in Syria over chemical weapons episode in April
2017, this first major Trump foray opened up a serious rift between Moscow and Washington.
Russian deputy UN envoy, Vladimir Safronkov, in a meeting of the UN Security Council
expressed Kremlin response by stating: "We strongly condemn the illegitimate actions by the
U.S. The consequences of this for regional and international stability could be extremely
serious.‖82
Even US, like its allies from Asia, Europe and the Middle East who somewhat expressed
cautious support for the attacks, called this intervention to be interpreted a ―one-off‖ intended to
deter future such chemical attacks rather an expansion of US role in the Syrian civil war.83
It
clearly reflects US recognizes Russian stakes involved in the survival of Bashaar regime and
Kremlin determination to go all out for its ally‘s defence. All this has further complicated a
unanimous response to condemn violence by Syrian regime from UNSC forum and thus war
legitimation narrative by reference to authority of international humanitarian law.
Besides in Libyan case there was an umbrella opposition during the uprising against Qaddafi that
was presented as an alternative to the ruling regime during the conflict. But Syrian opposition is
not only fragmented but most active and most-effective anti-Bashaar groups are also the most
staunch fundamentalists and extremists involved in worst humanitarian abuses as well. Even the
moderate rebels referred by US, are not so moderate and have raised concerns in US policy
making circles over their ability to take on the Syrian regime and avoid extremist Islamist
tendencies too. The dynamics of the Syrian conflict are far more complex and involvement of
regional and extra-regional players and their competing and irreconcilable interests are providing
Michelle Nichols, ―Andrew Osborn and Tom Perry, ―Russia warns of serious consequences from U.S. strike in Syria,‖ Reuters, April 8, 2017.
Ibid.
373
not only breathing space to Bashaar but simultaneously has made it difficult to get international
bodies sanction for an international military intervention on the pattern of Libya.
8.4.2. Legitimation by reference to values
Legitimation by reference to values evolves through representation of relatively positive and
neutral nouns and processes for ―Our‖ actions while negatively valued nouns and processes are
used to represent ―Their‖ actions. This lexicalization then operationalizes positive Self-
representation and negative Other-representation as discussed in previous chapters. This category
has also been problematic in Syrian conflict. Instead of bifurcation of parties to the conflict in
evil versus good category that might have casted Bashaar regime as the prime evil involved in
abuses against its civilian population, emergence of armed hardliner Islamist groups with links to
al-Qaeda and ISIS has made representation of their violence problematic. Initially the term
―rebels‖ was coined to represent any armed group against Assad and this term then neutralizes
the presence of extremists groups and their violence perpetrated against their fellow community.
The chemical attacks in August 2013 provided US to squarely frame Bashaar regime as they
deemed fit. American President Obama in address to the nation said: ―…what happened to those
people, to those children, is not only a violation of international law, it's also a danger to our
security….Let me explain why. If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop
using chemical weapons.84
The barbaric and horrific acts of Damascus regimes were contrasted
with American values and American exceptional role in such circumstances was highlighted.
Obama in the same speech asserted: ― …after careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the
national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime's use of chemical
weapons through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad
from using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime's ability to use them and to make clear to
the world that we will not tolerate their use. That's my judgment as commander in chief.‖85
He
further added: ―What kind of world will we live in if the United States of America sees a dictator
brazenly violate international law with poison gas and we choose to look the other way?‖86
―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.
Ibid.
Ibid.
374
Rhetorically Bashaar and his regime have consistently been framed by anti-Assad camp in
deliberate violation of human rights and war crimes. This negative Other–representation involves
Syria and its allies like Russia and Iran who are providing material and logistical support to
Assad. For example, Amnesty International claimed in March 2016 that Syrian regime along
with Russia was ―deliberately‖ targeting hospitals with the aim to pave way for advance of
Syrian ground troops to northern Aleppo which is gross human rights violation as no government
should prevent people from accessing medical care. These actions amount to ―war crimes‖
according to laws of war that accord special protection to hospitals and medical units unless they
function outside their humanitarian domain to commit ―acts harmful to the enemy‖ such as to
store weapons. Since no evidence of military vehicles, checkpoints, fighters or front lines near
hospitals attacked were reported by AI,87
hence malicious intent of attackers was obvious.
During the siege of Aleppo by Bashaar troops, the narrative constructed by anti-Assad media
highlighted how the Syrian-Russian combination during bombardment targeted civilians and
civilian institutions, like hospitals, markets and like. Once the city was captured by Bashaar
forces they went door to door hunting for fighters‘ families, executing children and women and
whoever happened to be there. But in a debate on Russian role in Democracy Now, Stephen
Cohen busted this narrative by stating its ―only one of the two or three competing narratives.‖ He
explained how the terms ―terrorists‖ and ―jihadists‖ had been removed from the New York Times
and the Washington Post in the days following Assad‘s assault on Aleppo and replaced with the
word ―rebels‖ which had a positive connotation. Until September United States was telling that
terrorists were holding large parts of eastern Aleppo and not letting civilians use the multiple
corridors out of the city but with the Russian-Syrian victory all the terrorists and jihadists
apparently disappeared. By removing terrorists and jihadists from the equation the ―liberation‖ of
Aleppo was converted into ―slaughter‖ house by regime.88
The attempt by anti-Assad group has failed to construct war legitimation through values on a
number of counts: US has been seen reluctant to take a lead role in Syrian conflict. In September
11, 2013 speech, Obama clearly stated: ―I have resisted calls for military action because we
cannot resolve someone else's civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq ―Hospitals have become the new front line,‖ Amnesty International UK, March 03, 2016.
―Slaughter or Liberation? : A Debate on Russia‘s role in the Syrian War & the Fall of Aleppo,‖ Democracy Now, December 14, 2016.
375
and Afghanistan.‖89
When the state sitting at the apex of the global system is shying away from
lead role it will definitely put allies on a back foot. This reluctance has simultaneously given
room to pro-Assad group to frame their narrative where a military action against a sovereign
state is questionable. Secondly the rebels fighting Assad are Islamists who actually pose
―existential threat‖ not only to Damascus regime but to world peace and security too. West in
spite of focus of their narrative on ―moderate rebels‖ cannot disclaim that territory under control
of these rebels had seen worst human rights abuses comparable and at times exceeding in
magnitude to that of regime in Damascus. Pro-Assad camp is exploiting this lack of genuine
moderate opposition and even chemical attacks reported hitherto have been hotly contested if
Assad regime had actually perpetrated them. With the extension of the civil war into yet another
year and the involvement of complex number of players and their affiliations, war legitimation
through values will continue to be problematic.
Few examples will show how the attempt to present ―Our‖ positively moralized process and
―Their‖ negatively moralized process had been represented during the Syrian conflict so far (See
Table 8.1 and Table 8.2).
Table 8.1: Positively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions
Process Prototypical Example
Silence Assad‘s ―Our main focus and the focus that we have with our partners is on trying to get the guns
guns silenced, first and foremost, Asad‘s guns silenced and then, as Kofi Annan has said, as he takes
steps to implement the promises that he made, then Kofi Annan in the first instance, but
everybody with influence working with the opposition to make clear that their guns should be
silenced as well.‖ (A senior State Department official, March 30, 2012)90
Strike ―In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity, military intervention to strike specific targets with the aim of deterring
and disrupting further such attacks would be necessary and proportionate and therefore legally
justifiable. Such an intervention would be directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian
catastrophe, and the minimum judged necessary for that purpose.‖
(UK Government, August 29, 2013)91
―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.
Senior State Department official, Special briefing: senior State Department officials en route to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, media release, 30 March 2012, accessed May 27, 2017, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/187218.htm.
―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ Prime Minister Office.
376
Negative moralization of Assad regime and the rhetoric used remind us threat construction
employed against Qaddafi during Libyan intervention. (Table 8.2)
Table 8.2: Negatively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions
Process Prototypical Example
Attack ―Hospitals, water and electricity are always the first to be attacked. Once that happens people no
longer have services to survive.‖ (A doctor from Anadan, March 2016)92
Bomb ―We condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of ―barrel bombs‖, ballistic missiles and
heavy artillery by the regime against the Syrian people, in full contradiction with the Geneva
process as well as basic human rights principles.‖
(Media note, Washington, DC: January 31, 2014)93
Kill ―This was the systematic killing of peaceful and unarmed citizens by security forces.‖
(Radwan Ziadeh, head of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights, April 2011)94
Gass to death ―The situation profoundly changed, though, on Aug. 21st, when Assad's government gassed to
death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images from this massacre
are sickening, men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas, others foaming at the
mouth, gasping for breath, a father clutching his dead children, imploring them to get up and
walk.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)95
Massacre ―….tyrants like Bashar al-Assad, who drops barrel bombs to massacre innocent children….‖
(Obama, September 28, 2015)96
―We also warn the regime to not repeat the massacres of Houla, Banyas, and Baida and to not
use limited evacuations of civilians as an excuse to attack those residents who remain behind.‖
(State Department Spokesperson, October 18, 2013)97
Slaughter ―Nowhere is our commitment to international order more tested than in Syria. When a dictator
slaughters tens of thousands of his own people, that is not just a matter of one nation‘s internal
affairs—it breeds human suffering on an order of magnitude that affects us all.‖ (Obama,
September 28, 2015)
Execute ―They will shoot anything that moves. And if soldiers refuse to fire on people, they are
―Hospitals have become the new front line,‖ Amnesty International UK.
Washington, DC (Office of the Spokesperson), London 11 Communiqué, Media note, January 31, 2014, accessed May 29, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/221088.htm. Katherine Marsh, ―Syrian mourners say government snipers carried out massacre,‖ Guardian, April 03, 2011.
―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.
Polly Mosendz, ―Read: The Full Transcript of President Obama‘s Speech At the United Nations General Assembly,‖ Newsweek, September 28, 2015.
Jen Psaki (Department Spokesperson), Siege of Mouadimiya, press statement, October 18, 2013, accessed May 29, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215666.htm.
377
executed. These are all the fourth division soldiers in uniform.‖ (A
resident of Derra village under siege, May 1, 2011)98
―When Assad‘s forces captured al-Bustan al-Qasr neighborhood and al-Fardos neighborhood,
Assad‘s forces, when they entered—when they entered these neighborhoods, they executed 82
people. And the relatives of the victims, who are now with us, told us they were executed,
including like 13 kids and seven women. All of them were executed. And what we are now—
and what we worry about, about our [inaudible], that maybe the genocide—that genocide will
happen in the coming days, if nothing will stop them in the coming hours.‖ (Ismail Al Abdullah,
White Helmet, December 14, 2016)99
In Syrian conflict again ―Our side‖ is being expressed through the attributes, concepts and
qualities that is generally inherent in us and our societies as opposed to them (Table 8.3). The
struggle against Assad is thus for the preservation of those attributes we naturally posses, the
concepts like democracy we cherish and qualities like leadership we have displayed in times of
crisis.
Table 8.3: Our side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions
Peace ―And we hope that as long as America stands for justice that peace and harmony will in the end
Harmony prevail.‖ (Trump, April 06, 2017)
Security ―My fellow Americans, for nearly seven decades the United States has been the anchor of
global security. This has meant doing more than forging international agreements. It has meant
enforcing them. The burdens of leadership are often heavy, but the world's a better place
because we have borne them.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)
Leadership ―Our ideals and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria, along with our
leadership of a world where we seek to ensure that the worst weapons will never be used.‖
(Obama, September 11, 2013)
Humanity ―On Aug. 21st, these basic rules were violated, along with our sense of common humanity.‖
(Obama, September 11, 2013)
Exceptional ―But when, with modest effort and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death and
thereby make our own children safer over the long run, I believe we should act. That's what
makes America different. That's what makes us exceptional.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)
Civilized ―Tonight I call on all civilized nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and bloodshed
in Syria, and also to end terrorism of all kinds and all types.‖ (Trump, April 06, 2017)
―In Syria‘s rebel city ‗they will shoot anything that moves‘,‖ Guardian, May 1, 2011. 99
―Slaughter or Liberation?‖ Democracy Now.
378
Democracy “I'm also the president of the world's oldest constitutional democracy.‖ (Obama, September
11, 2013)
Again the negative attributes of Assad regime, equates him at par with dictators like Qaddafi
who naturally repress their citizens and employ brutality to suppress their genuine demands
(Table 8.4).
Table 8.4: Their side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions
Terror ―Tragically, Syrians are threatened not only by ISIL‘s grotesque violence and repressive
ideology, but also by the Assad regime‘s unrelenting campaign of terror.‖ (State Department
Spokesperson, February 24, 2015)100
Repress ―Assad reacted to peaceful protests by escalating repression and killing that, in turn, created the
environment for the current strife.‖ (Obama, September 28, 2015)
―Those who repress their own people in Syria will not survive. The time of autocracies is over.
Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people is coming.‖
(Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, September16, 2011)101
Imprison ―The regime continues to imprison tens of thousands of Syrians without fair trials, including
Torture women, children, doctors, humanitarian aid providers, human rights defenders, journalists, and
others who it routinely subjects to torture, sexual violence, and inhumane conditions.‖
(State Deputy Department Spokesperson, July 24, 2015)102
Dictator ―On Tuesday, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad launched a horrible chemical weapons attack on
innocent civilians using a deadly nerve agent.‖ (Trump, April 6, 2017)103
Brutality ―They have braved ferocious brutality at the hands of their government. They have spoken with
their peaceful marches, their silent shaming of the Syrian regime, and their courageous
persistence in the face of brutality—day after day, week after week. The Syrian government has
responded with a sustained onslaught.‖ (Obama, August 18, 2011)104
Death ―The United States strongly condemns the Syrian regime‘s continued siege of Ghouta and other
Damascus suburbs, …..This siege has led to unprecedented reports of children dying of
100Press Statement, Recent Attacks on Civilians in Syria, Jen Psaki, State Department Spokesperson, Washington
Dc, February 24, 2015, accessed May 17, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237871.htm. ―Syria's oppressors will not survive, Erdoğan says in Libya,‖ Today‟s Zaman, September 16, 2011.
Press Statement, Charges Against Syrian Activists, Mark C. Toner, Deputy Department Spokesperson, July 24, 2015, accessed May 17, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245261.htm. Kelcie Wills, ―Read: Full Transcript of Trump‘s speech on US Syria strike,‖ AJC.com, April 06, 2017.
B. Obama (US President), Obama on the situation in Syria, media release, August 18, 2011, accessed May 28, 2017, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/08/20110818094932su0.1070019.html#axzz1YiyXhh
379
malnutrition-related causes in areas that are only a few miles from Bashar al-Assad's palace in
Damascus.‖
(State Department Spokesperson, October 18, 2013)105
Murderer ―Assad choked out the lives of innocent men, women and children. It was a slow and brutal
death for so many. Even beautiful babies were cruelly murdered in this very barbaric attack.‖
(Trump, April 06, 2017)
8.4.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization
This effect-oriented legitimation typically involves overview of negative consequences of
previous practices and foreseen or expected benefits. As the actions fulfill the criteria of utility
for the purpose or function they serve, hence the war legitimation discourse relies on
rationalization. The diplomatic isolation of Qaddafi made it easier for anti-Qaddafi coalition to
construct war narrative by justifying actions against him through rationalization discourse.
Even before the chemical attacks in Syria in August 2013, President Obama made clear in
August 2012 that use of these weapons necessitate a response of some kind. Echoing similar
sentiments he against stated in an interview on August 28, 2013 that ―I have no interest in any
kind of open-ended conflict in Syria, but we do have to make sure that when countries break
international norms like chemical weapons that could threaten us, that they are held
accountable.‖ Similar views were expressed by Secretary Kerry on August 26 that ―all peoples
and all nations who believe in the cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that
there is accountability for the use of chemical weapons so that it never happens again.‖106
When possible intervention against Syria was being speculated, Secretary of State John Kerry
discussed hypothetical contingencies that presented intervention in Syria a not very unlikely
scenario. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said:
―in the event Syria imploded, for instance, or in the event there was a threat of a chemical weapons cache falling into the hands of al-Nusra or someone else, and it
was clearly in the interest of our allies and all of us – the British, the French and others – to prevent those weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of the
Press Statement, Siege of Mouadimiya, Jen Psaki.
Christopher M. Blanchard and Jeremy M. Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress (CRS Report, R43201, September 12, 2013), 14.
380
worst elements, I don‘t want to take off the table an option that might or might not
be available to a president of the United States to secure our country.‖107
This speculation had in its background a concern that Syrian allies such as Iran, Lebanese
Hezbollah or other non-state actors may gain access to chemical or biological weapons or
components. Thus Representatives Chris Van Hollen and Gerald Connolly circulated a draft
resolution for the use of military force authorizing American President ―to use the United States
Armed Forces to prevent and deter the further use of chemical weapons in Syria or by Syria
against any other group or country.‖108
Besides the potential of the proliferation of these chemical weapons to parties hostile to US other
reasons cited by US officials included the unacceptability of the use of chemicals weapons
because of international consensus on these weapons malicious qualities; large scale targeting of
civilian population, irrespective of the weapons employed; and the potential ramifications of
escalated or expanded violence in Syria, including their loss and/or use on neighbouring
countries and US interests in the region.109
These reasons could have been framed as compelling
enough for anti-Assad coalition, had US planned to go ahead with its punitive strike against
Syria. The failure to get through Congressional and UNSC backing, however, made war
legitimation through rationalization difficult.
8.4.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality
An aggression against a target state is usually justified using temporal maximization that
involves constructing events that are capable of exerting an impact on both the speaker and the
addressee and may involve construction of past events in such a way that they seem to effect the
current situation (discussed Chapter 6). The chemical attacks in August 2013 helped anti-
Bashaar camp to construct threat by reference to temporality by presenting the horrific attacks as
deliberate strategy of the regime. This legitimation helps in constructing ―their transgressions‖ as
responsible actors and present ―them‖ in unchallengeable ways that highlight their evil nature
Ibid., 11.
Draft circulated to legislative staff via email, September 03, 2013, accessed May 27, 2017, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/165278488-House-Van-Hollen-Connolly-Syria-Resolution.pdf. Blanchard and Sharp, Possible US Intervention in Syria, 12.
381
and our innocence. For example with regard to the attacks, it was stated: ―The U.S. intelligence
community assesses that the opposition has not used chemical weapons and the scenario in
which the opposition executed the attack on August 21 is highly unlikely.‖110
The brutality and atrocities of Bashaar regime were framed using both past and present. Najib al-
Ghadban, a US-based Syrian academic and political activist, equated the events in 2011 to a past
bitter legacy of 1982 when Hafez-ul-Assad carried out Hama Massacre. "You cannot separate
what happened in 1982 from what is happening now. It's the same trend, but of course the world
has changed so it cannot be on the same scale."111
Throughout the conflict actions of Assad regime and his allies are framed as evil. The fall of
Aleppo has been presented as a victory against terrorists and jihadists by Russia. But the United
States decried the Russian-backed offensive and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Samantha Power asserted: "Aleppo will join the ranks of those events in world history that define
modern evil, that stain our conscience decades later—Halabja, Rwanda, Srebrenica and now
Aleppo". The U.N. said at least 82 civilians, including women and children, were shot on sight
by Syrian government troops in recent days.112
Temporal maximization strategy helps interveners to construct war legitimation discourse by
presenting with a degree of certainty and authority the intention of the target state to continue
with its killing drive. The speaker needs to convince the audience that the target is bent upon
something contravening international law, norms and traditions. Assad regime and his actions
during the conflict are described in similar manner by anti-Assad group (Table 8.5). By
highlighting his killing tendency for the sake of regime survival, his legitimacy to stay in power
is made questionable. However, the international coverage of brutalities committed by extremist
groups like ISIL has made it easy for pro-Assad camp to justify their violence by framing it as
fight against Islamist fundamentalists and thus weaken Western narrative of Assad crimes
against humanity.
110
White House (Office of the Press Secretary), Government Assessment of the Syrian Government‟s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, press release, August 30, 2013, accessed May 29, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21. ―Syrian forces kill at least 34 protesters at anti-government protest,‖ Guardian, June 3, 2011.
―Slaughter or Liberation?‖ Democracy Now.
382
Table 8.5. Temporal Maximization for Syria
(White House, ―The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government
Office ofthe
carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We Press Secretary,
further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all -source assessments August 30,
2013)113
are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of
open source reporting.‖
(Prime Minister ―The Syrian regime has been killing its people for two years, with reported deaths now over
Office UK, 100,000 and refugees at nearly 2 million. The large-scale use of chemical weapons by the
2013)114
regime in a heavily populated area on 21 August 2013 is a war crime and perhaps the most
egregious single incident of the conflict. Given the Syrian regime‘s pattern of use of chemical
weapons over several months, it is likely that the regime will seek to use such weapons again.
It is also likely to continue frustrating the efforts of the United Nations to establish exactly
what has happened. Renewed attacks using chemical weapons by the Syrian regime would
cause further suffering and loss of civilian lives, and would lead to displacement of the civilian
population on a large scale and in hostile conditions.‖
8.4.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them
category
While it was easier to construct ―US versus Them‖ group demarcation in case of Libya because
those opposing the Libyan military intervention had already given token approval in the form of
abstention on UNSCR 1973 rather than outright veto. Syrian case got complicated with firm
Russian resolve to protect Bashaar regime and to overtly project Syrian case in different
international bodies. With time Russian involvement has gone to an extent where US and her
allies are juxtaposing both together. But instead of helping Moscow pull away from involvement
this juxtapositional narrative has hardened Moscow‘s stance on the conflict.
While US and allies were busy in diplomatically isolating Assad by recognizing rebels, Russia
continued to counter this by providing consistent diplomatic and military support to Syrian
regime and by asserting Bashaar currently represents the legitimate government of Syria and thus
asserted its sovereign rights to provide arms to regime under existing arm sales contracts.
113 White House (Office of the Press Secretary), Government Assessment of the Syrian Government‟s Use of
Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013. ―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ Prime Minister Office.
383
Following chemical attacks in August 2013, when anti-Assad camp came together to produce a
unanimous resolution condemning the Damascus regime; President Putin in an interview on
September 3, 2013 raised the possibility that the rebels may have gassed civilians to trigger
Western action against regime. The fact that faulty data had been presented by the US in the past
on Iraq Putin alleged, thus Russia would only be convinced to support a resolution if the
evidence was compelling beyond the shadow of doubt.115
Putin also tried to justify support for Bashaar by referring to the very norms and traditions
utilized by the West to build case against him. In the same speech he stressed Russia wasn‘t
defending Assad but upholding the norms and principles of the international law and warned if
the force was to be used against Damascus regime it again might be used ―against anybody and
on any pretext.‖ At that time it was made clear by the Russian President that Moscow would not
become militarily involved in the Syrian conflict.116
Later the next day Russian Foreign
Ministry exonerated Assad regime of chemical attacks in March 2013 and August 2013 by
blaming rebels.117
Similarly it was Russia that countered the narrative that Assad regime was the
gravest threat, asserting that US support to rebels indirectly strengthens Syrian terrorist groups
that will later expand their operations elsewhere in the Middle East.
Similarly to construct narrative for war against Syria Chinese support or abstention was
important in the UNSC. To Western dismay, China joined Russia in blocking draft resolution by
UK on August 28, 2013 that would have authorized use of force against Syria. China‘s Foreign
Minister, Wang Yi though emphasized that ―China firmly opposes any use, by anyone, of
chemical weapons in Syria,‖ nonetheless added: ―External military intervention contravenes the
purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and the basic norms of international relations, and
will add to turmoil in the Middle East.‖118
Asking UN inspectors to carry out their investigation
with ―no interference‖ and ―no prejudgment‖ of their results, China thereby out rightly rejected
Western narrative that squarely laid blame on Assad‘s regime. 115
Blanchard and Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria, 33. ; President of Russia, Interview to Channel One and Associated Press News Agency, September 4, 2013, at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5935 . 116
Blanchard and Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria, 33-34. 117
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the situation concerning the investigations into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, September 4, 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, ―Foreign Minister Wang Yi: China Calls on All Parties Concerned to Exercise Restraints and Calmness on Situation in Syria,‖ statement, August 28, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1070757.shtml.
384
When Obama Administration held Assad regime responsible on August 30 in its assessment with
regard to chemical attacks Chinese Ministry spokesman again asserted that ―any action taken by
the international community should be based on the results of the U.N. investigation, which will
answer questions like whether chemical weapons were used and who used them.‖ Adding China
was ―gravely concerned‖ about possible US unilateral action.119
China unlike Russia is not
interested in propping up Assad regime but its vetoes has only strengthened Russian stance on
the Syrian conflict.
With the passage of time US attempt to operationalize Us versus Them category got more
problematic as Russia increased its military presence in Syria and its stakes simultaneously
increased too. Russian tone became more aggressive after US airstrike took place on the Syrian
airbase in April 2017 after Idlib chemical attacks were reported. Even Bolivian ambassador to
UN strongly reacted to US strikes on Syria terming them as ―an extremely, extremely serious
violation of international law‖ and ―they represent a serious threat to international peace and
security.‖ 120
Till the time veto holding UNSC members Russia and China refuse to toe the US-led Western
line along with other influential members like India and Brazil, the ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ group
demarcation would remain problematic and more countries would find it convenient to remain
neutral rather than being alleged on the wrong side of history later on.
Conclusion
Syrian civil war has entered in its seventh year and such protracted civil wars have the potential
to shake foundation of regional orders. When the regional hierarchy is in transition, neighbouring
countries rush to provide arms to fighters or even intervene with militias to protect their interests.
This inadvertently not only increase the bloodletting but change the local conflict into a regional
one and draw extra-regional players too at times, thus spreading the conflict even further. Syrian 119
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, ―Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei‘s
Regular Press Conference on September 2, 2013,‖ transcript, September 2, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1072085.shtml . Joel Gehrke, ―Bolivia: US strike against Syria an ‗extremely serious violation‘ of international law,‖ Washington Examiner, April 7, 2017.
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case has to be understood in the light of its importance in linking the global and regional
transitions and how it has accelerated international trend towards post-hegemony.
Syria is a geopolitically important state. Its importance can be gauged from the way it played key
role in evolving regional dynamics even before the Arab Spring. It has been vital to the survival
of Hezbollah of Lebanon with land access only through Syria on the east and north, and Israel to
the south. Though Hezbollah‘s first loyalty is to Iran and its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei but access to Tehran has been possible because of links with Dasmacus. It would not
be wrong to claim their links with Syria are the linchpin of alliance between Tehran and
Damascus. Fall of Assad means, loss of Iran‘s only Arab ally in the region. Besides Damascus
hosts at least ten Palestinians factions, most prominently Hamas and Islamic Jihad which Assad
has used to play against US and Israel in negotiations to win back Golan Heights.
But Syria has troubled neighbourhood too. Iraq has accused Syrian regime of harboring former
Ba‘ath party‘s leadership and facilitating fundamentalists inside Iraq. Turkey is concerned about
its Kurdish problem besides side effects of mass exodus of refugees from Syria since the
uprising. Meanwhile, behind closed doors, leaders in Israel fear the replacement of the known
devil with alternative conservative Islamic regime, and end to their fragile stability since 1967. It
was rightly anticipated that upheaval in Syria will not only affect its immediate neighbours – it
will reshape the balance of power in the Middle East more than any event in the Arab Spring
thus far. The Syrian conflict has drawn other regional players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar deeply
into the fog of war.
The stakes involved for neighbours has increased their interference in Syrian politics but Syrian
politics is far from simple. Advancement by one external player and its domestic proxy is
counter-matched by another player. It would not be wrong to assert that nothing happens in Syria
in isolation form regional struggle between Shias and Sunnis and between Iran and Gulf
monarchies. Saudi policy in the region became more aggressive after successful US-led
negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. Their competing and irreconcilable differences
have left Syria in a regional mess.
Key players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are not only anti-democracy whose greatest fear is
arrival of democratic tide in the region but they are hoping to benefit from increased sectarian
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division and extremism. They are actively involved in undermining democratic wave as evident
in their injection of petro-dollars to accelerate cross-border arms to unstable nations emerging
from ―Arab Spring‖, even while they are playing lip-service to democracy. The battle for
regional hegemony is not limited to Saudi Arabia and Iran but Turkey is simultaneously
desperate to develop power-base across the Middle East. This Turkish ambition is bound to clash
with Iran grand regional designs with roots already in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain.
The recent developments have shown that this shifting regional balance of power is not confined
to regional sectarian alliances but has drawn in global players with Russia and China on one side
and US and its NATO allies on the other. The peer challengers to US-led international order see
the Syrian conflict as the opportunity to project their interests. The Russo-Chinese veto of draft
Security Council resolution asking Assad to step aside showed how the international spectrum is
being reshaped also. These complex and inter-woven interests have not only hardened views
inside regime in Syria but simultaneously strengthened the status quo with support of Iran,
Russia and China. It would not be wrong to claim that Syrian conflict has finally emerged as the
harbinger of post-hegemony in international politics. Keys regions like MENA are no longer
under US hegemony and rival powers as well as traditional friends now acknowledge loss of US
leadership and influence in the region and thus take more independent approach to safeguard
their regional interests.
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Conclusion
The study was undertaken with the aim to explore the problem of foreign direct military
intervention in an era when the global power hierarchy is in transition and the rise of China along
with other power centers have raised specter of impending arrival of post-hegemony in the
international system. War, conflict and foreign direct military interventions have kept scholars
and analysts engrossed with intricacies of the subject since time immemorial. These very
concepts are still being explored through historical and theoretical lens till date.
The study dwells on how the ―use of force‖ has given rise to prickly questions involving legal,
moral, operational and political dimensions; how the concept has been applied through centuries,
taking into account its timeless attributes as well as the changes which advancement in time and
practice have brought; and, finally theoretical perspectives pertaining to the subject were
explored through ―levels of analysis‖ framework. The research undertaken thus opens possibility
of further exploration of the subject through Power Transition Research program. It
simultaneously creates scope for exploration of discursive dimension in IR literature on war and
conflict. The detailed study creates possibility of formation of a model that could trace and test
declining hegemon‘s military intervention behavior in post-hegemonic international system.
Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model
The ―military intervention threat securitization model‖ developed within the study was
constructed with the elaboration of the Power Transition Theory of A. F. K. Organski and its
extension into Multiple Hierarchy Model by Douglas Lemke. The exploration of these two
theoretical models had been done with the view to identify the scope for further extension of this
lively research program. The study points out limitations of the existing theoretical constructs.
Power Transition Theory with its primary focus on major wars between great powers during
periods of power transitions at the systemic level, and the Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM)
with its limitation to exploration of regional hierarchy, left no space for joint exploration of the
concept linking global and regional power hierarchies in transitions. The former limits itself to
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the global system and has been concerned about systemic changes involving major powers only
while the latter‘s focus has been the regional sub-systems. MHM mentions that great powers
seldom interfere in regional set ups unless the changes occurring and the outcomes in the
regional hierarchy undergoing transition are consequential to them. A literature gap was
identified with respect to global and regional hierarchies‘ linkage. The detailed study of
Organski‘s and Lemke‘s model provided scope for exploring power transition and military
intervention behaviour of the declining hegemon when the system is still in flux and shape of the
new global order is far from clear.
The study elaborates how the contemporary global and regional environment has necessitated
scope for further investigation to be undertaken within the same research program. Structural
changes within the contemporary era are too important to be left aside till a new global power
hierarchy is evident. It elaborates by laying thread bare the dynamics surrounding this period we
can not only ascertain how the transition from hegemony to post-hegemony is taking place but
simultaneously find out what these changes have in store for important events like military
interventions; especially with regard to the scope and substance of a military intervention
exercised by a global power now in decline. It thus creates scope for emergence of a theoretical
construct for the investigation of the problem.
The gap between global and regional hierarchy has been bridged through formulation of the
military intervention model. This model which the study labels as ―Threat Securitization Military
Intervention Model‖ is the contribution of the study to existing International Relations literature
and has simultaneously provided scope for more research in the uncharted territory so far. This
model illustrates when there is a power transition at the global level; it affects conflict-ridden,
unstable strategic regions also. Such regions are more vulnerable to interference / intervention
from the top but post-hegemonic transition is evident in the shape of assertive behaviour of local
and extra-regional players. Free from the hegemonic constraints of the declining hegemon, these
players take a more aggressive and assertive stance, at times in contravention of the dominant
global state‘s strategic interests; thus giving indications of the arrival of post-hegemonic
international relations.
Thus the model developed within the study not only attempts to elaborate that periods of power
transitions within the global hierarchy give rise to competitive behaviour at the systemic level
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but these global changes are also significant in terms of regions. The vulnerability prevalent
within the global hierarchy emboldens regional actors to follow more assertive foreign policy
behaviour in line with their self declared foreign policy agendas. The dawn of post-hegemonic
phase within the contemporary international system has created scope for same assertive
dynamics by regional and global players.
Post-Hegemonic International System
At this point it is pertinent to remove the ambiguity whether the study announces the ‗end‘ of US
dominance or merely the transition is in progress. This confusion was specifically addressed at
length within the study. The frequent usage of terms like ―unipolarity‖, ―primacy‖,
―hyperpower‖ or ―empire‖ in international relations creates ambiguity. All these terms are used
to denote unprecedented US power and hence easily interchanged with the term ―post-hegemonic
international system‖ employed within this study. However, it is to be kept in view that terms
like ―unipolarity‖ refers only to the material primacy and the comparison with peer competitors
is based with respect to one‘s position in military, economic, technological, financial etc. sectors.
Post-hegemony on the other hand approaches the issue from the perspective of social legitimacy.
Besides a detailed analysis of the term ―hegemony‖ has been done within the study both in the
introduction and in the theoretical part. The attempt had been made to elaborate the term from
realist, liberal, constructivist, Gramscian and neo-Gramscian perspective. While earlier
perspectives take power relations as given and help maintain prevailing social relations with all
their injustices, critical theories explore the problem more deeply by questioning why these
hierarchies of social and power relations are consented by ones lacking economic power. It calls
them into question by taking into account origins of such social and power relations and whether
they might be in the process of changing. This study takes into account concept of power which
is not a relationship based on force and coercion but one resting on legitimacy of the leading
dominant state. The legitimacy variable takes into account hegemon‘s ability to obtain consent of
the members of the international community drawing on political and ideological leadership
rather than by blunt exercise of force. With respect to US the study elaborates this shows the
glaring discrepancy in America‘s self goal and image and others perception of it. Nothing more
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than US extraordinary military and economic strength and its increasing inability to get others do
what it wants, aptly characterizes this discrepancy. Thus this study explores the question of
hegemony taking Barry Buzan‘s concept rooted in social legitimacy. The ability of US to recruit
followers in the contemporary era is not directly corresponding with its material primacy in
political, economic and military sectors. Hence, this drift away from hegemony is a reality of the
international system and it is gradually becoming evident in the evolving dynamics of
international politics too.
The study first establishes conditions characterizing post-hegemonic international system
through a pentagonal pyramid (Figure 2.9) that explains global power hierarchy in contemporary
international environment, to be distinguished from pervious Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
It asserts that US still occupies the apex of the international system though its ability to obtain
―desired outcomes‖ is being increasingly constrained with the emergence of other key actors
with significant resources and power e.g. China, Europe, Japan, India, Russia and Brazil. Thus
analyzing US position within the contemporary international hierarchy based on material
primacy alone will give with a distorted image of the American power. Approaching the same
issue form social legitimacy places a greater emphasis on the ability of the hegemon to extract
outcomes too. This angle reveals the decreasing space being available to the erstwhile hegemon
to affect preferable outcomes. This ability is thus directly linked with hegemon‘s status as the
undisputed leader of the global system too. The dominant state‘s increasing reliance on assertive
unilateralism and blatant disregard of the norms and traditions that it itself created and
championed, leaves a void in the global leadership role. Besides ―America First‖ approach being
particularly evident in President Trump‘s administration has generated more resentment in
staunch allies too. Even traditional friends has started lamenting absence of US resolve to fulfill
its global leadership qualities with the kind of fervor displayed in the Cold War and Post-Cold
War era.
The rise of peer challengers has resulted in gradual shift in the dynamics of the international
system. Not only the shift has allowed peer challengers to assert themselves in political domains
but it is also gradually reducing US influence in other sectors too. This study specifically reflects
the impact of such a drift towards post-hegemony in the domain of foreign direct military
interventions taken under the leadership of the declining hegemon. It explains how the
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hegemon‘s legitimacy to claim the leadership of the system is at stake when peer challengers
start asserting themselves in local, regional and global theaters. Though the systemic changes are
still incremental as US still retains unprecedented dominance in the military sector but power in
the economic and financial sectors is becoming diffused as China and other actors are catching
up. These peer competitors can be seen lobbying individually as well as collectively for greater
voting rights in important international bodies. Increased presence of such actors will
automatically constrain US ability to frame agendas and affect outcomes as per its own interests.
We can already see actors as diverse and having contradictory interests like China, India and
Russia at times collaborating with each other though they might be actively competing in other
domains. This has constrained US ability to obtain desired outcomes in international bodies and
previous hegemonic practices like ―pre-emption‖ and assertive ―unilateralism‖, pursued with
vigor a decade before, have now given way to strategies like ―retrenchment‖, ―offshore
balancing‖ and ―leading from behind‖.
In the contemporary era, increasing effort by emergent and resurgent actors to aim for their
rightful place in changing global environment has increased US reliance on regional and
international bodies. Hence, a foreign direct military intervention strategy relies on securitization
of threat through political discourse. The study sheds light on how ―threat construction‖ for
military intervention takes place and how it assumes paramount importance in era of dwindling
legitimacy. Threat discourse though always employed by the intervener in a target state but when
the hegemon‘s ability to affect outcomes is constrained, it forgoes unilateral pursuits and prefers
multilateral approaches involving regional and global bodies. The endorsement of policies from
such platforms testify that the declining hegemon still enjoy considerable legitimacy to lead the
system.
The study also discusses how drift towards post-hegemony in the global system sends very
strong signals to regional / local hierarchies that try to take advantage of the vulnerability
prevailing in the global hierarchy. The effect of global power transition in unstable regions is
thus explored within the study. Previous studies undertaken have not dwelled at length on this
variable. The study establishes an indirect linkage between the two. Changes occurring at the
global level are significant and they do affect unstable, conflict-ridden regions. Power transition
within the global hierarchy keeps dominant state focus on countering peer challenger. Such a
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focus also diverts attention away from troubled regions as more pressing issues gain priority. The
diffused global power hierarchy and ongoing struggle among major players then emboldens
regional challengers to attempt to re-write the rules of the regional hierarchy as the threat of
fierce resistance from the declining hegemon subsides. Hence, these regional hierarchies become
the play ground where local, regional and global challengers to declining hegemon could be seen
with their assertive foreign policy behaviour.
It is then the inter-play of regional and global hierarchies which attains significant importance in
this post-hegemonic phase and these regional power struggles also expose dominant state‘s
ability to effectively lead the system. The study relies on variables of geography, intra-state
conflict, legitimacy of the declining hegemon and regional and extra-regional players to ascertain
the impact of interplay of unit and systemic level variables for international military intervention.
The detailed analysis of these variables explain also why certain states will become victim of
regional and global power intervention while others would be left alone by major powers to
affect outcomes of their intra-state and inter-state disputes. Hence, the study explains
inconsistency in the application of direct military interventions by great powers. Only
contemporary global politics and events assign significant importance to a state. A state that is a
victim of foreign aggression at one time may become irrelevant at other point in time. Conditions
specified through these variables then can also help us locate the reliance on threat securitization
discourse for direct military intervention.
As the changing global environment constrains application of pervious assertive foreign policy
behaviours like pre-emption, unilateralism etc., hence declining hegemon‘s reliance on threat
securitization for foreign direct military intervention increases. Barry Buzan‘s Securitization
Theory along with insights from Van Dijk and Van Leeuwen‘s discourse analysis technique
provides scope for threat construction for military intervention in post-hegemonic system (Figure
2.13), based on which case studies of Libya and Syria were undertaken. Threat securitization
helps bring critical perspective in the analysis of military interventions. Up till now the studies
on war, conflict and military interventions focuses on factors other than how threat is
constructed. They usually take into account political, economic, military or other tangible
factors. Usually power struggle is taken as a reality of international politics and threats
emanating from states are taken for granted too. Deconstruction of ―threat construction‖ adds a
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novel perspective, hitherto still less explored in literature. By explaining how sense of threat and
vulnerability is constructed, the study adds to the securitization domain. It seconds the assertions
made in securitization theory that no really endangered object is to be secured. By constructing
shared threat emanating from the target state, intervener articulates it as the object to be
countered through justified military intervention. Such a successful threat construction is
legitimized through active involvement of relevant regional and global organizations.
Political speeches are important in uncovering how they are helpful in uncovering social power
inequalities permeated and represented in societies. When political actors address they have the
audience in mind and they are cognizant of the fact how it is to be received and analyzed by
concerned sections. It is specially tailored to be simultaneously addressed to diverse sections of
society. Such speeches are also used to stroke strong emotions among audience. Similarly
addresses by the heads of states and important government representatives explain the intent and
motives of various states or how they want the world to interpret them. The use of political
speeches for analyzing threat construction also sheds light on the power of elite actors to utilize
their privileged position. These privileged actors are not only individual elites in states but
certain states too. Critical theory perspectives help uncover these actors and their abuse of power.
The language these elite actors use to construct ―threat‖ is intended to evoke strong emotion
among global audience. This emotion is related with respect to vulnerability and fear and
impressing upon the international community to the urgency of the foreign direct intervention.
Dominant state sitting at the apex of the international system enjoys far greater leverage to
present a target state as ―existential‖ threat though its material abilities can never pose a credible
threat to any great power. Elite actors then utilizing their privileged position have access to
leading regional and international platforms that they use to articulate threat from the target state
as real and tangible. This threat construction through ―war legitimation discourse‖ is at length
analyzed by the study. It is built around reference to authority, values, rationalization,
temporality and group demarcation. Employment of this war legitimation discourse helps in
constructing target state as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and security. It also helps
intervener in marginalizing target state‘s official discourse and dismissing it as propaganda.
Deliberate efforts are made to give wider coverage to dissenting opinion within the target state.
Any effort by the target state to retaliate is portrayed as aggression. This also helps in
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marginalizing regional and international actors determined to stand aggression against another
sovereign member of the international society. Through ―Us versus Them‖ demarcation the
international institutions and community are co-opted for authorization of force against the target
state. The world out there then actually becomes manifestation of the threat representation rather
than actually presented or present.
The argument developed in the rest of the dissertation is basically validation of the Threat
Securitization Model. It was imperative to first validate theoretical assertions made about the
arrival of the pot-hegemonic phase in the international system. The concept was explored
through academic debate between the ―primacists‖ and ―declinists‖ school. The ambiguous times
and the uncertainty prevailing about US ability to sustain leadership of the international system
have already led scholars to speculate about a ―post-American world‖. An increasing number of
scholars are coming forward with concepts like ―rise of the rest‖ thesis, ―three-dimensional
chessboard‖, ―age of nonpolarity‖, ―apolarity‖, ―no-one‘s world‖ , ―G-zero world‖ and a
―multiplex world‖ etc. These and other such concepts discuss how the mantle of US power is
gradually eroding and the world is moving away from US controlled and dominated patterns of
interaction. However, the opposite school has equally convincing arguments with regard to the
durability of the ―unipolar moment‖ and another ―American Century‖. But the fact cannot be
ignored that this school of thought too recognizes diminishing US ability to lead the world with
previous assertive display of power. It comes forward with concepts like ―retrenchment‖,
―offshore balancing‖ to arrest downward trend, which in itself is another recognition of a drift
towards post-hegemony.
It is not only the comparison of the material capabilities and whether others are catching up
especially in the military, economic and financial domains but it is the ―power over outcomes‖
that has visibly been reduced with the march of rest of the emerging and resurgent powers.
Though most of the major powers have showed reluctance to resort to traditional hard balancing
strategies but they have actively collaborated with each other when their vested self-interests
have been ignored. Especially emerging powers are really concerned about their newly hard-
earned place and their dissatisfaction with the established rules of the international system -
written before their present status – have time and again manifested in influential international
bodies. Though a direct major power confrontation with explicit objective to overturn or
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overwrite the existing international hierarchy and structure is still far from speculation but a
sectoral approach to key international issues is very much there. Even very recent episodes like
Paris Climate Accord, Iranian Nuclear Deal crisis, Jerusalem as Israel‘s capital etc have
validated this sectoral approach from friends and allies too. They are cooperating with US where
the interests are aligned and overtly resisting where they found them divergent. The study
provides room for further elaboration of this sectoral and divergent approach and explains the
coming decades will increase the trend as emergent and resurgent powers existing status quo
unable to accommodate their rising demands. The incremental approach by peers competitors
also explain their deliberate attempt to chaotic change within the global hierarchy that might
arrest their upward thrust also. These players display their intent to work within the existing
international structure as long as it is inadvertently also constraining its chief architect – the
declining hegemon.
Finally, this study resolves the debate that the international system is at the dawn of the post-
hegemonic era. As usual with previous power transition periods, this era too reflects the
ambiguity which accompanies such periods of flux. The abundance of available literature
previously analyzed explains that US was unable to realize the unipolarity of the international
system in the years immediately following demise of Soviet Union. This ambiguity was then
reflected in the preferred multilateral approach rather than the later assertive unilateralism of the
Bush junior period. Similarly, it will take a while for the peer competitors to resort to traditional
hard balancing strategies but sectoral approach in issues affecting their core national issues as
well as those aiming at countering American influence is already visible. A decade or two down
the lane 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 2011 Arab Spring and Russian coercive diplomacy will be
recalled as the events that heralded post-hegemony within the international system.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in Post-Hegemony
Three major events in the first decade of the twenty-first century i.e. the Global Financial Crisis
2008, Russian resurgence in its ―near abroad‖ and the Arab Spring had been cited as tangible
events within the study as manifestation of the dawn of post-hegemony within the international
system. The Arab Spring then was selected for detailed study and for exploring the interplay of
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unit and systemic variables developed in Chapter 2. It was thus important to establish if the
regional hierarchy was in transition and how post-hegemony in the global hierarchy was
affecting major regional players and their foreign policy behavior.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the Arab Awakening shook not only the long-
entrenched leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya but nowhere in the world, the Old World
Order under the US leadership felt the jolts as much as MENA. The region and its politics matter
because it continues to be strategically important as primary source of energy. It has significant
importance because of its financial power, geopolitical competition and of course, religion. But it
is simultaneously one of the most volatile regions which have acquired further strategic edge
because of increase in demand of its hydrocarbon resources due to surge in Chinese, Indian and
other pivotal economies. The region has always occupied a distinguished position in US strategic
calculations and ever since the days of Cold War, US has been the undisputed largest ―outside
power‖ and broker with stakes in regional disputes. The dramatic events of 2011 caught US as
off guard as rest of the world, though they for long had speculated about simmering discontent
and seething anger over prevailing corruption, unresponsive regimes and below par socio-
politico-economic conditions.
When the unprecedented events struck MENA, although US spoke of the need for democratic
change in lofty terms; it practically preferred to back these pro-American dictators for short-term
stability in their policies towards the region. This approach significantly dented its legitimacy
among the Arab publics and created strong anti-Arab sentiment even before the first Gulf War. It
won‘t be an overstatement to assert that the beginning of the end of the Old World Order within
the Middle East can be traced to US-led first Gulf War in 1990 against Iraq after Saddam
Hussein invaded the little oil sheikhdom of Kuwait. Though there were constant rumblings
beneath the surface against the established status-quo reflected in incidents like the bloody 1975-
1990 Lebanese civil war; the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
The invasion not only led to increased American military presence within the region but the
ensuing decade of US military actions and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq
deepened the anti-American sentiment already thriving within the region. It eventually became
evident with the emergence of a wave of Islamic civic expression suppressed for decades in
Egypt and Tunisia by their autocratic rulers.
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This expression and before it the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, in particular, upended the fragile
regional balance of power in place since the end of the Cold War, and inadvertently led to the
empowerment of anti-US Islamic Republic of Iran held in check for more than a decade by the
Iraqi counterweight. The regional balance tilted in Iran‘s favour with the expansion of its
influence in Syria, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and the new pro-Iran Iraqi government in Baghdad.
The street demonstrations in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring left region changed
forever and there is no reason to believe that the region has emerged from the state of flux it
entered in 2011. The outcome of Arab Spring instead of strengthening democratic tendencies
within the region as popularly speculated in the initial days, led to empowerment of extremist
and fundamentalist forces. Besides it inadvertently made anti-US regional actor as one of the key
players to affect outcome of the new regional power configuration. An outcome that US was then
determined to avoid as it would have send signals to competitors in regional and global hierarchy
that US ability to shape a strategic region is being constrained. However, the way things
unfolded in MENA after the Arab Spring it has wrested region away from its firm control and
had left it as a battleground where other great and middle powers are fighting for enhancement of
their respective sphere of influence.
While on the one hand, the Arab Awakening empowered anti-US forces in the region, it
simultaneously made staunch US allies like Saudi Arabia to question US resolve to stay engaged
in the region and shape its outcomes. US seemed at ease to do away with erstwhile allies like
Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali who remain fixated on the status quo and enforced the Old World
Order that swiftly got faded with the Arab Spring. Instead of US brokering another transition
from the top, the tendency of this crucial region being remade from the bottom up was evident.
The writing on the wall stated that not only will public opinion direct much of events in the
domestic as well as foreign policy but the political Islam will also be a major force in the
MENA, if Arab Spring successfully ushered in a new opening. Although all ambitious
speculations about drastic changes in a region yet frozen in history proved wrong as Egypt
returned to dictatorship after a failed experiment with democracy and drowning of the
revolutionary fervor in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain but it did give rise to unprecedented changes
in regional power hierarchy. With US already grappling with repercussions of its misadventures
in Afghanistan and Iraq and caught up amid domestic political concerns, it further dented its
legitimacy in reluctant Libyan intervention. This yet another ill planned foreign military
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intervention not only shifted focus away from chaos prevailing in Iraq that US failed to stabilize
for almost a decade but simultaneously let lose fundamentalist and extremist forces beyond
capacity of any single regional government to manage or control effectively.
Saudi Arabia and Iran through their overwhelming Sunni and Shiite orientations had been
battling a historic unending dispute since the departure of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon
Him), got this rare opportunity to play it out again as US presence and interest in the region
touched all time low. Both players are all set to affect outcome of regional conflicts that would
firmly place region in hands of its lead player. Removal of Saddam Hussain has provided rare
opportunity to Iran to aim for regional hegemony as it is no longer hostage to security dilemma
of its erstwhile enemy state. The government in Iraq has been replaced with a pro-Shia Iranian
government. This outcome in Iraqi politics has freed Iran to focus more on broader regional
conflicts and aim for consolidation of newly created political space.
US reluctance to involve itself in yet another disastrous Middle Eastern conflict emboldened not
only anti-US regional players like Iran but created unprecedented scope for extra-regional
players like Russia too. Russia had already displayed its resurgence through its belligerence in its
―near-abroad‖. Now the Syrian conflict along with alliance with Iran provided rare opportunity
to emerge as a bigger outside player within the regional hierarchical structure in flux since
fateful events of 2011. As the ―military intervention threat securitization model‖ postulated
involvement of extra-regional actors within inter-state and intra-state conflicts is either for
protection of their core interests or to enhance their position as global player with ability to alter
local status quo. Russia did not per se have any core interest threatened with an adverse outcome
in the Syrian conflict. Kremlin had been striving for a long time to reclaim its status as a major
global player. MENA with Arab Spring upheavals provided long-awaited opportunity to register
its presence within the region. Russian reassertion in the region had far reaching impacts. It will
definitely play a significant role in the emerging power configuration of the region once the
ongoing conflict in Syria ends. Russian eagerness and refusal to be written off from a strategic
region and US inability to stem the tide of this overarching Russian presence gave another proof
that US hegemony within the region has been effectively and irrevocably dented for at least the
coming few decades. These signals had impact on assertive foreign policy orientations of other
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regional players too. MENA more than anything explained the linkage of the effect of power
transition in global and regional hierarchy.
Battle for regional hegemony is not limited to Iran and Saudi Arabia but another major actor is
Turkey whose orientation to establish itself as influential Middle Eastern player became more
prominent as its outstanding differences with European Union became public and chances of
Turkey joining the EU as its first Muslim majority nation became negligible in the near future.
Turkey is too large, too powerful and too ambitious a regional player to permanently align itself
with either Saudi or Iranian camps. The desire to be a distinguished leader, effectively displayed
in the bold and challenging behavior of its leader Tayyip Erdogan made the regional battle for
hegemony even more complex. In case of Turkey too, as the conflict in Syria changed with overt
Russian interference on the Assad regime side, Ankara‘s relationships with Washington got
complicated. US support for Syrian Kurds have clearly been a significant threat to Turkish core
territorial interest. Hence, a NATO member and a staunch US ally is seen collaborating more
actively with Russian on the question of Syria rather than with the US. The divergent interests
brought a public condemnation of each other‘s stance and brought decades-long bilateral
relationship on all time historical low. This sectoral approach displayed by Turkey is not
exclusive and is visible with respect to other US allies too.
Besides Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, other regional actors like Qatar‘s desire to play a role
larger than its weight has landed it in direct conflict with Saudi Arabia which is determined to
keep hegemony of the Sunni block under its leadership. The resulting chaos and further Sunni-
Sunni rift will favour Iranian grand designs who for decades had been trying to carve a place for
itself in Sunni-led GCC. How far the intra-GCC rift empowers Iranian influence only time will
tell; as the region dynamics are so fragile since US invasion of Iraq 2003 that a single major
diplomatic row threatens stability of the entire region. Besides the Qatari crisis elaborates how
local players are always actively involved in craving an improved status for themselves when the
local hierarchy is still in flux and outcome of a conflict in lines with their agenda could
significantly enhance their position within the regional hierarchy. Qatari backing of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Saudi particular dislike for the group along with support of rival rebel groups in
Syria and Libya explains that Sunni-Sunni fault lines are fragile too and it did give Iran a greater
leverage to exploit the rift for its own ends. US so far again have failed to end the diplomatic
400
crisis and this is another proof that US hegemony in this oil-rich strategic region is a thing of the
past. This rupture in intra-GCC alliance has definitely constrained US ability to recruit followers
for anti-Iranian coalition in the region.
As the global power hierarchy is increasingly getting diffused with China on the march and
major players with their assertive foreign policy behaviours, visibly at odds with US strategic
interests; key US allies in strategic regions are simultaneously getting ambivalent of continued
US resolve to stand by them. The Arab Spring was a rude shock for staunch, traditional allies
and they kept speculating whom US would throw out of the bus, should similar circumstances
arise after Ben Ali and Mubarak. Hence, instead of pinning hope on US promises, as was a
practice for the last few decades allies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are all engaged in a
fierce regional battle at times overtly at odds with US declared strategic objectives.
The MENA is still in transition and hostile policies of US allies like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt against each other and sometimes against US interests along with traditional rivals
like Russia and Iran have created more problems for disjointed, directionless and incoherent US
regional foreign policy. The region has visibly shifted away from overwhelming US influence
and its ability to restrain either Iran and Russia on the one hand, or to force Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Turkey and Egypt, on the other hand, to align themselves collectively against the Russian-Iranian
nexus is extremely limited. Thus MENA in transition and the region‘s dynamics has validated
the study‘s hypothesis how US ability to effectively run the global system and obtain desired
outcomes has been constrained, making visible the first signs of the arrival of post-hegemony in
the international system.
Threat Securitization for Libya and Syria
The study outlines how these significant changes in global and regional hierarchies have
increased US reliance on securitization of threat through political discourse for military
intervention. The case-studies of Libya and Syria deal with the same assertion and the ―military
intervention threat securitization model‖ developed in Chapter 2 was applied to both cases. The
study elaborates how the promise of Arab nationalism stirred by the new leaders upended the
post-WWII order of the Middle East under colonial powers and their proxies but soon their
401
idealism gave way to dictatorial repression and corruption. This coupled with economic
stagnation, social frustration, unemployment and nepotism, turned into seething anger. The
status-quo exercised through the iron-fisted resolve of succession of state leaders held at least till
the start of the Arab Spring.
While loss of Ben Ali and Mubarak might not had been a very welcoming development as these
allies for decades have ensured stability of US endorsed policies for one of the most volatile and
restive region but it at the same time brought rare opportunity to get rid of offensive regimes like
Qaddafi of Libya and Assad of Syria. US tired to portray itself as champion of the peoples‘ cause
and endorsing their long-cherished desire to do away with corrupt and stagnant regimes
unresponsive to masses and their most basic and fundamental demands. But its selective
application especially in case of Libya and Syria, while simultaneously supporting the status quo
forces in Bahrain and Yemen, exposed lameness of US rhetoric.
Why Syria and Libya were singled out by global players while activists fighting for the same
human rights and democratic tendencies in Bahrain and Yemen were left at the mercy of their
respective rulers has been validated with respect to the assertions made for the choice of the
target state as identified in the model within the study. For a target state to attract foreign direct
military intervention especially from the top involving dominant state of the international system
and other major powers has to have a strategic value. As Multiple Hierarchy Model postulated
major powers rarely involve themselves in minor powers territorial disputes, but only when their
core interests are at stake or outcomes of the conflict are consequential to them. The Arab Spring
events in 2011 allocated unprecedented importance to both Libya and Syria. Had both these anti-
US regimes survived the onslaught on their sovereignty, the MENA region that already lost pro-
US allies like Mubarak and Ben Ali would have irreversibly shifted away from US influence at
least for few coming decades and would have made US presence in Iraq more complicated.
Already the reverses on ground in Iraq were making tall premature claims of victory of the Bush
Junior administration embarrassing for the ruling administration in White House then.
Besides the internal politico-military situation and economic conditions which had rendered both
Libya and Syria vulnerable to extra-regional interference / intervention, role of respective
regional players was also the key in determining outcome of the situation. As stated earlier
regional actors have different stakes. Being permanently caught in the geographical dilemma
402
which they can neither escape nor undo they try to affect outcome of the events in line with their
self-identified regional agendas. The disturbances in Libya and Syria provided opportunity to
local players to settle their scores with the ruling regimes and to actively get involved for
reconfiguration of the regional power hierarchy that was bound to change with departure of
decades-old regimes in power.
In case of Libya, regional regimes tried to equal the score with its vocal but disliked ―Brother
Leader‖ who had been at odds with majority of the ruling Arab regimes since decades. However,
anti-West Libya in the days after the uprising against Qaddafi seemed to be on a determined path
to contain the rebellion and anti-Qaddafi forces experienced heavy reverses. It became clear
without an overt foreign military intervention they did not stand a chance against a professional
army. While immediate neighbours were either neutral or too weak to militarily support rebel
forces, regional players did come to aid and played a role in toppling of the regime. But the role
of extra-regional players like UK and France was most prominent. Removal of Qaddafi could
have permanently removed the threat posed to Francophone Africa that his pan-Africa imitative
was posing. European players sensing US selective engagement strategy took the lead in
campaign against Qaddafi. US instead of leading from the front chose to ―lead from behind‖ - a
term coined to capture the magnitude of lesser US involvement in first foreign direct military
intervention in the wake of the Arab Spring. This strategy was viciously criticized by the
Republicans as abdication of American leadership role in the world. It provided substance to the
debate for a post-hegemonic, post-American world already announcing end of the unprecedented
era of US dominance. It is to be noted that American misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan and
resulting chaos in both countries was also the factor in opting for this back-seat role in Libya.
The study relied on political statements of US elite and its allies as well as those of Libyan
leaders to elaborate how threat to international peace and security was constructed through
discourse analysis technique. This discursive threat securitization gains special place in a society
that declares and frame itself as democratic. Exorbitant cost of military adventures in
Afghanistan and Iraq were making American public more inward focused as health care and
public debt has persistently occupied American domestic debates. Besides, the language of
security is not enough to automatically frame an issue into a security question. It has to be
accepted by the relevant audience too, which in the said case was both the American public and
403
the global audience. Hence, semblance of support from regional and global bodies was a pre-
requisite to re-establish US legitimacy as leader of the international system which had been
dented significantly because of militant unilateralist adventures of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The technique also exposed the gradual loss of global standing and how far US position and
circumstances have changed from rhetoric of ―either with us or against us‖ that aligned allies as
well as foes with US cause in Afghanistan after 9/11. At that time preferable foreign policy
behavior was pre-emption and unilateralism and no single major power chose to overtly register
her resentment against these novel concepts not covered through international legal norms and
practices. How the international chessboard was in flux could be gauged from the fact that Iraqi
invasion of 2003 and threat construction for it did not go as smooth as that of Afghanistan but
still US was able to launch military campaign against Saddam on a pretext that turned out to be
false later.
However, Libya was a different case. Global power hierarchy was in transition though the trend
was not very prominent. The financial and economic burdens of last two Middle Eastern
adventures had ignited fierce debate within the US domestic public about the legality and
morality of another direct foreign military intervention. Unable to get endorsement from either
public - as surveys conducted during the period revealed – or Congress, President Obama
launched a quick and short campaign without congressional approval to achieve another
controversial objective of regime change in Libya. However, the time it took before taking a
position and the hesitation displayed frustrated US European allies too. They were looking for a
more forward position as their core interests were at stake in Libya. The extra-regional
involvement of other major players was not just for enhancing their sphere of influence. But they
became more skeptical of the US commitment and willingness as the back-seat role emboldened
challengers as a sign of waning hegemony with constrained resources to put its global agenda
into action.
Once US consented to the foreign direct military intervention, action within Libya became a test
of dominant state‘s systemic legitimacy. The threat emanating from Libya has to be constructed
as imposed by the irresponsible actions of Qaddafi regime rather than something which could be
side-stepped. The study reveals how throughout the campaign the primary objective was
disguised under the garb of humanitarian intervention, and how the regime was constructed as
404
existential threat to its own people and the world peace and security. Elite actors within the US
administration played key role in labeling Qaddafi as existential threat. The analysis of the
political statements and the published new stories of the time period uncovered the subtle
campaign through which threat was securitized and sold to domestic as well as international
audience. The global power transition made it contingent upon US to seek approval of
international and regional bodies. Hence, the United Nations Security Council as well as the
Arab League endorsement for foreign military intervention was taken. To impose the urgency of
the military action international body such International Criminal Court was also involved and it
exaggerated the number of deaths occurred during the initial days. Though the later studies
exposed this threat amplification both in case of ICC and British Parliament Foreign Affairs
Committee Report also endorsed this exaggeration in terms of involvement of UK. The
intervention was undertaken though it was not employed as a ―last resort‖ or full exploration of
―other means‖.
The study substantiates the variables identified for the interplay of unit and systematic levels and
validates the ―threat securitization military intervention model‖ of Chapter 2. All regional and
extra-regional powers took advantage of the prevailing chaos in the wake of lack of established
independent local institutions in Qaddafi‘s Libya. Once the centrally concentrated local
administration collapsed because of the unrest and NATO‘s military campaign, the country
became open for proxy battle of the ambitious regional and extra-regional players. The study
discusses these players and their foreign policy orientations at length; and validates the assertion
that such regions ridden with conflict, instability and chaos then become arenas for power
struggle within region‘s contenders. The situation in Libya till date remains volatile and instead
of bringing ―freedom‖ and ―peace‖ to the country and the region, Libya has become one of the
most dangerous places on the face of this earth where groups like ISIS are thriving taking
advantage of prevailing anarchy. It is to be noted that successful threat securitization in case of
Libya did not prove it as a deviant case because the study at length elaborates US shift away
from pre-emption and assertive unilateralism of the 9/11 era. This ―leading from behind‖ strategy
was a quick short campaign of US that was limited in ―nature, duration and scope‖. Europe
basically was left to handle its own neighbourhood as US shifted its focus eastwards during
Obama Administration. Overall Libyan case established the link between global and regional
hierarchy and how period of power transitions affect outcomes in such cases.
405
Similarly, the Syrian case study was undertaken to test similar hypotheses as applied to Libya.
The study reveals why the selective engagement strategy could not materialize in case of Syria
through the excesses committed by Bashaar regime had long crossed atrocity threshold set for
Libya. The fact that Libya was doable and ninety percent desert and more suitable for air combat
has less to do with Syria‘s more complicated geography and more with intricate pattern of
conflict ranging within the country. Regional realities stayed the same but considerable changes
in global power configuration affected threat construction for foreign direct military intervention
in Syria. US was unable to enlist token Chinese and Russian cooperation as it had obtained in
case of Libya. The failure to securitize the threat posed by Bashaar testifies that the world is
transitioning from a US centered unipolar order to a more uncertain international order where US
hegemony has already eroded. With the waning of this unparalleled power potential and rise of
peer challengers, comes the limitation of US influence to direct events on the international stage.
These rising and resurgent actors are undoubtedly frustrating acquisition and implementation of
US policy goals in regions like MENA. This case established more than the previous case-study
that world has moved away from US controlled patterns of interaction and US capacity to direct
events on the Arab street has suffered significant loss.
What made a country like Syria with limited manpower base, lack of strategic depth and non-
existent natural boundaries, target of major powers had been its geopolitical location and its
pivotal position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israel conflict and the peace process. Besides Syrian critical
relevance to Iranian ambitions within the region, its access to Hezbollah through the Syrian
territory and subsequent role as Iran‘s frontline state against Israel made Tehran‘s commitment
to survival of Bashaar regime as tied to its own national interests. Syria is the only Arab ally in
the region and any prospect of Islamist Sunnis or even secular Sunnis gaining foothold in
Damascus was to be fiercely resisted by Tehran.
Besides Syria attracted greater regional and extra-regional involvement because of its
geopolitical significance and having the Syrian regime on its side could have tilted regional
balance of power in anyone‘s favour. The outcome of the Syrian civil conflict, hence, added to
the stakes of the major regional stakeholders and it made Syrian prize all the more worth fighting
for. Syrian conflict had proved far more intense and vicious playground for Saudi-Iranian proxy
war but it is not just a quest for regional hegemony between the two arch rivals. It has serious
406
political ramifications for Riyadh as any Sunni victory that empowers Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood with whom Al-Saud has irreconcilable politico-ideological differences would be as
distasteful as Iranian presence there. The regional battle for the Syrian prize got more
complicated with Sunni Turkey determination to safeguard its own interests. Turkish interest in
the outcome of the conflict means that Riyadh‘s desire to safeguard its image as patron and
protector of Sunni interests in the region would not go uncontested. Turkish interests in Syria has
brought it in direct confrontation with it NATO ally – US. Ankara is particularly worried about
any gains by Kurdish-led YPG. Turkey in conflict could be seen actively collaborating with both
Iran and Russia. Thus the outcome of a conflict when consequential to any power can
significantly alter its foreign policy orientation too. Similar approach brought Doha in conflict
with Riyadh who sees its interest in Syria as divergent form Saudi Arabia. The simmering
discontent brought the two in the first even major GCC crisis since its inception. The crisis
continues unabated and it is brought a re-alignment in regions players too. The competition has
already intensified existing deep-rooted ethno-political and sectarian fault lines and the quest of
regional hegemony is likely to keep major regional players embroiled in it. The role of these
regional actors validated ―threat securitization military intervention model‖. As all the players
interested in seeing Bashaar abdicate power are unable to align their basic priorities, hence those
interested in his survival has upped their ante. This shows the kind of smooth sailing for threat
securitization available in case of Libya would not be possible in Bashaar case.
Syrian case also revealed resurgence of other global players like Russia that did not shy away
from exhibiting traditional hard-balancing strategies against the declining hegemon. As already
stated Russian interference in Syrian conflict was to enhance its position as a major global
player. Outcome of events so far has raised Russian position and influence within the Middle
East. A durable and sustainable solution to the Syrian question without active Russian
involvement is neither possible nor desirable. Russian presence on side of Bashaar regime has
favoured Iran more. In order to counter negative repercussions of such a development Saudi king
visited Russia for the first time in history. A Saudi multi-billion dollar deal with Russian can also
be read that Riyadh not only acknowledges Russian enhanced influence within the region but it
is not ready to put all its eggs in the US basket alone. US policy responses in Syria have
bewildered one of its staunchest ally within the region too. The civil war in Syria continues
unabated and these seven years of conflict exposed US foreign policy‘s incoherence for as
407
important a region as Middle East. US so far seemed to be responding to case to case
developments within the conflict rather than acting like a hegemon with a clear vision and plan
for the region. Recent US decision to end CIA covert program to arm Syrian rebels is again
testimony that after more than six years into the conflict US has fairly limited chance of affecting
regime change in the face of determined Iranian and Russian efforts to prop up the Assad regime.
In the contemporary environment, not only global players like Russia have clearly taken a lead to
reshape region‘s emerging dynamics but local actors like Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
etc. are all independently battling the Syrian civil war and trying to affect the outcome that might
enhance their regional standing vis-a-viz each other. Syria is geopolitically so important that if
Iran is able to sustain Assad regime through this unprecedented turmoil, it will provide Tehran
with significant leverage in the Arab world. Besides Russia has already re-entered the region as a
major broker in the Middle Eastern disputes. So far the trajectory of the conflict has favoured
anti-US camp in the region and in spite of relentless effort of anti-Assad forces to wrest the
regime away from the House of Assad, he is still surviving and gradually recovering the lost
territory too.
The case-study reveals that with staunch regional and extra-regional allies like Iran and Russia
the threat securitization for military intervention in Syria had not been easy. Assad‘s allies have
provided him with both regional and international forums to construct counter-narrative. Besides
having a permanent Security Council member on its side, ensures that direct foreign military
intervention, if planned and executed would lack international legal basis and hence would
always be treated as an aggression against a sovereign member of the international community.
Hence, threat securitization model was modified to reflect contemporary situation. But even the
modification validated the original hypothesis that the drift towards post-hegemony is changing
international military intervention behavior of the US.
The Syrian case has exposed flaws in US threat securitization endeavors and how counter-
narrative continuously dispelled Assad‘s image as the only ruthless actor annihilating his own
population to retain a grip on power. The counter-narrative exposed existence of extremist
groups like ISIS and their funding and sustenance by US-allies in the region and their mass
murder campaigns have dented anti-Assad camp efforts to portray him as the ruthless monster.
Besides existence of these groups have cast doubts on involvement of Assad regime in such
408
gross incidents like use of chemical weapons against unarmed civilians and non-combatants.
Thus it has been elaborated in the study that an adverse final outcome of Syrian conflict will
fairly dent US standing in the global hierarchy and its legitimacy to lead will come under further
scrutiny if the regional hierarchy is structured to empower Iran at the cost of Saudi Arabia within
the region.
Both these case-studies validated the dissertation hypothesis that power transition within the
global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international system has led to the
marginalization of US military interventionist policy. The study contributes to the extension of
Power Transition research program and incorporates discourse analysis technique to view the
problem of foreign direct military intervention from a discursive perspective. This study has
created the linkage between global and regional power transitions. It validated that events
shaping the global hierarchy can directly impact regional power struggles too. Major regional
players sensing vulnerability in global hierarchy, free from hegemonic constraints of the
declining hegemon pursue their self-identified regional agendas with more vigor. It has extended
the burgeoning research program by looking at the effects of post-hegemony on foreign direct
military interventions in troubled regions like MENA in post Arab Spring scenario.
The study provides scope for further exploration of the post-hegemonic phase and its impact on
other significant domains like effect on US financial aid, US ability to set agendas in
international bodies and on any region other than Middle East undergoing transition. This study
also did not take into account nuclear weapons / capabilities of states as a variable because none
of the target states had nuclear weapons. However, this is a very important variable and its
incorporation can significantly alter ―military intervention threat securitization model‖. It was
beyond the scope of this study but any further research in the aforementioned direction will
further enrich this discipline and therefore begs to be explored at length interested in determining
effects of this variable. Any future research within the aforementioned fields will help us
broaden our understanding about post-hegemonic system and help us validate effectively the
dawn of this era in International Relations.
409
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Newspapers, Magazines & Media
Al Arabiya; Arab News; Al Monitor; An Nahar (Beirut); Al Akhbar; Al Jazeera; Al Hayat; Al
Jazeera Center for Studies; Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo); Al Bawaba; Al Sharq Al Awsat; Al Ra‘I
Al Anm; ; Associate Press; Asia Times; African Review; ABC News; American Interest;
Amnesty International UK; BBC News; Bloomberg; Carnegie Middle East Centre; CBC News;
CBS News; CNN News; Christian Science Monitor; Daily Star; Deutsche Welle (DW) News;
Democracy Now; Diplomat; Daily Nation; Dawn (Pakistan);Economist; Egyptian Streets; EU
Observer; Fox News; Gatestone Institute; Gulf News; Geopolitical Weekly; Global Security
Organization; Guardian (UK); Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey); Independent (UK); Iran Tracker;
Independent Media Review; Institute Arabe des Chafs d‘Eterprises; Institute for the Study of
War; Jerusalem Post; Jane‘s Intelligence Review; Khaleej Time; Los Angeles Times; Metro
Magazine; Mada Masr; Middle East Institute; Middle East Eye; Middle East Mirror; Middle East
International; Muftah; Newsweek;New York Times; Project Syndicate; Pulitzer Center; Policy
Watch; Reinventing Peace; Reuters; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Saudi Press Agency
(Riyadh); Saudi Gazette; Haaretz; Spiegel Online International; The Star; The Washington
Institute; Telegraph; The National (UAE); The Tower Magazine; Times of Israel; Time; Times
(USA); The New Yorker; The Atlantic; USA Today; Voice of America; Voice of Russia; Vox
Eu; Vanity Fair; World Politics Review; World Peace Foundation; Washington Post; War on the
Rocks; Wall Street Journal; Woodrow Wilson Center; World Politics Review; Xinhanet; Xinhua
News Agency; Yahoo News;
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