The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78

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Migration stage and household income inequality: Evidence from theValle Alto of Bolivia

Richard C. Jones ∗

Department of Political Science and Geography, The University of Texas at San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249-0648, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 11 December 2011Received in revised form 1 August 2012Accepted 2 August 2012Available online 23 October 2012

a b s t r a c t

A three-stage diffusion model of international migration and inequality posits that house-hold income inequality first increases, then decreases, and finally increases again as acommunity’s migration experience deepens. Analysis of data from a survey of 417 house-holds in the Valle Alto region of Bolivia supports this model. Concomitant with the region’soverall position in the middle stage, the results indicate that income inequality amongactive migrant households is less than that of non-migrant households, suggesting that

Keywords:International migrationInequalityMigration stageBolivia

migration reduces inequality. Furthermore, income inequality between urban and ruralareas is diminished by migration. Individual towns in the region, however, illustrate allthree stages of the diffusion model. The study supports other research showing that themiddle stage of migration generates the most remittances, the highest commitment ofresources to the home community, and the lowest inequalities among households.

ocial S

© 2012 Western S

1. Introduction

The explanation of inequality and its impacts is theprime concern of much of the social sciences. The liter-ature on gender inequality, racial segregation, linguisticand religious diversity, spatial differentials in educa-tion and income, and many other topics, validates thisstatement. Typing in “inequality” on the EBSCO Social Sci-ences and Psychology search engine generates over 40,000peer-reviewed research articles. Inequality is of particu-lar importance in the economic development literature,where it is viewed as a cause, a consequence, and anindicator of development itself. In a subset of this lit-erature – that dealing with migration and development– inequality in less-developed countries both generatesmigration, creating feelings of relative deprivation among

the poor, and springs from migration, resulting from thesituation in which remittances are channeled into house-holds in the upper part of the local income distribution.

∗ Tel.: +1 210 458 5612.E-mail address: richard.jones@utsa.edu

0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2012 Western Social Science Association. Publihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2012.08.001

cience Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Thus inequality is an important recursive variable in themigration-development system.

Inequality is conceptually complex, subsuming differ-ent types and different units and scales of analysis. Thisstudy addresses economic inequality between householdsand towns as a result of international migration, in a high-emigration sub-region of Bolivia – the Valle Alto, nearCochabamba. It postulates that migration stage, the vintageand propensity of emigration from a place, is an impor-tant determinant of where in the local income distributionmigrating households are found. Specifically, as migrationexperience increases, migrant households should, in theearly stage, be drawn from above the mean income of theirvillages; later in the middle stage from below the mean;and finally, in the late stage from above the mean oncemore. This pattern is articulated and explained in a diffus-ional model of migration and inequality, the evidence forwhich appears in Section 2. The results from analysis of asurvey of over 400 households in the Valle Alto, a region

that is arguably in the middle stage, show that inequali-ties among households and between rural and urban areasdecline as a result of migration. The underlying reasonsfor this are found in the relationship between migration

shed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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R.C. Jones / The Social Sc

tage, local employment structure, local investments, andommunity class structure. When the19 towns that werehe focus of the survey are analyzed separately, however,ncome inequality is found to vary in a non-linear fash-on with the migration propensity of a town. Specifically,nequality is found to increase, then decrease, and finallyncrease once more, in support of the diffusional model.

. Migration stage and inequality: a review of theiterature

Stage models of development and inequality at theational and regional levels are prevalent in the liter-ture. Regarding regions within the national space, aeneral conclusion is that development and globaliza-ion create inequalities in the distribution of incomehat initially increase and later decrease, as a functionf (1) initial growth points that absorb capital, skilledabor, and government investment, followed by (2) laterrowth in which congestion, labor costs, and low returnsn investment lead to dispersal of growth to the lag-ing regions (Bruno, Ravallion, & Squire, 1998; Hirschman,958, pp. 183–195; Hoover & Yaya, 2010; Kuznets, 1955;illiamson, 1965).Analogously, there exist stage mod-

ls of migration and inequality at these same levels. Aajor potential force in the stabilization and growth of

nderdeveloped countries and regions around the worlds international wage labor migration (Jones, 1998a), andesearch suggests that stage of migration may determinehether remittances increase or decrease inequalities at

hese scales. For example, Koechlin and Leon (2007), work-ng with 2005 World Bank and U.N. data for 78 countries,raph remittances as a percentage of GDP, which is anndicator of a country’s migration stage, against the Ginioefficient for household incomes, which is an indicator fornequality, finding evidence for an “inverted U” in whichnequalities increase and then decrease as the remittanceate goes up. This inverted U complies with that first pos-ulated by Kuznets, although Kuznets’ corroborating dataere temporal rather than spatial and involved only three

ample countries (Kuznets, 1955). The authors attributehis relationship to network effects and the costs of migra-ion initially, and the lessening of these effects as migrationetworks mature. Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzylber, and Lopez2007) uncover a positive relationship between change inhe percentage of per capita income from remittances andubsequent change in the Gini index of inequality. Whats especially interesting is that Latin American countrieshow a generally negative relationship, compared to a posi-ive relationship found elsewhere in the world. The authorsuggest that networks are better developed in Latin Amer-ca than elsewhere, and that distances tend to be shorter,oth of which enable households in poorer regions to sendigrants and receive remittances, thus reducing inequal-

ty. It is worth noting that Latin American countries are inmiddle or advanced stage of migration compared to the

est of the world.

Country studies are useful, but at this scale there is so

uch variation in remittances and inequality from placeo place that national averages do not carry much expla-ation. Furthermore, at the international scale there are

urnal 50 (2013) 66–78 67

many additional variables, differing from country to coun-try, that have to be considered – unique national histories,cultures, values, and policies – that explain inequalitiesindependently of remittances.

Community-level studies, especially those in emigrantregions, enable researchers to consider regions whereremittances matter and where cultural and political fac-tors are controlled for. At this scale, the stage of migrationat which a migrant community finds itself may influ-ence the inequality of income among households in thatcommunity. Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986) postulate arelationship in which, much like the national-level studies,inequality rises at first and then drops over time, and theyoffer a comprehensive explanation for this difference:

Migration can be conceived of as a diffusionprocess. . .The first households to adopt a migra-tion ‘investment’ are likely to be from the upper endof the village income distribution, since they are theones best equipped to assume a high-risk, high-return‘investment’. If remittances to these households aresignificant, they can have a notable negative effect onthe village income distribution by size. The effect ofremittances on inequalities over time depends criticallyupon how migration-facilitating information and con-tacts become diffused through the village population.If contacts and information are not household-specific,that is, if there is a tendency for them to spread acrosshousehold units, then migration and receipt of remit-tances by households at the lower end of the incomedistribution is likely to occur. This would erode andpossibly reverse any initially unfavorable effects ofremittances on income inequality.

Jones (1998b) develops a diffusional model of migrationand inequality at the community scale of analysis that hasthree stages instead of two (Fig. 1). At the innovator stage(Fig. 1a), only a small group of ambitious and resourcefulhouseholds send migrants, the income distribution is pos-itively skewed, and income inequalities increase (Fig. 1b).At the early adopter stage (Fig. 1a), migrant success storiesconvince a wider set of families to migrate, the income dis-tribution is normalized, and inequalities decrease (Fig. 1b).To this point, the Jones model is identical to that of Starket al. However, Jones envisages a final, late adopter stage(Fig. 1a), in which an elite international migrant class con-stitutes a majority of households and stands apart froma relatively poor, non-migrant class. The income distribu-tion now skews to the left and continued migration causesinequalities to increase once again (Fig. 1c). In summary,the Jones model extends the Stark et al., Acosta et al.,and Koechlin and Leon findings to a third stage in whichinequalities trend upward for places with long migrationhistories and high migration saturation.

Regarding Stage 1, in which inequalities increase earlyon in the migration process, support is found in Ahmed’s(2000) study of a sample of over 100 households in theHargeisa area of Somaliland. A civil war in 1988 createdinternal as well as international refugees who migrated to

the Persian Gulf and Europe, especially the UK. Owing tohigh costs of external migration, migrants tend to be moreeducated and wealthier, and migration results in a brain

68 R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78

gration

Fig. 1. A diffusional model of mi

drain that nevertheless promotes considerable invest-ment, at the same time leading to pronounced inequalitybetween migrants and non-migrants. Another example ofStage 1 is that of Burkina Faso, where Wouterse (2010)surveyed over 200 households in four villages in the cen-tral plateau of the country. Intercontinental migration, asopposed to migration to other African countries, is foundto be the major source of local remittances, and it is rela-tively recent – dating from the 1970s. Because of the highcosts involved, this migration has selected the landed andhigher-income households, thus accentuating householdinequalities in the region. The author suggests that as for-eign labor markets become more accessible, though thegrowth and elaboration of migrant networks, the unequal-izing effect of migrant remittances is reversed. A finalexample of Stage 1 is Salas’ (2007) interviews with fam-ilies in San Miguel del Valle, Oaxaca, Mexico. The state ofOaxaca is outside the historic migration area (Durand &Massey, 2003) in the indigenous south where linguisticand income barriers have inhibited migration until rela-tively recently; most migration to the U.S. has been after1970.The author finds that total income, including remit-tances, is more unequal than non-remittance remittanceincome in the town because it is the better-off families whohave migrated.

Concerning Stage 2, a middle stage in which inequalitieslessen because of the diffusion of migration to families ofmore modest means, there is considerable evidence fromthe historic migrant hearth area of west-central Mexico(Jalisco, Michoacán, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Durango, SanLuís Potosí, and smaller adjacent states). Significant Mex-ican migration to the United States dates from the 1880s

and has exhibited a generally upward trend interruptedby periods of U.S. economic crises and repatriation poli-cies. Mexican migrant networks are now deeply embeddedin most parts of the U.S., and despite the role of border

and inequality for a community.

militarization in raising the cost and risk of migration,poorer households continue to send migrants. Some sub-regions and towns of Mexico illustrate an advanced stageof migration, but the country is best placed toward the endof Stage 2. In general, remittances tend to reduce inequal-ities. For example, in villages of the Lake Pátzcuaro areaof Michoacán, several earlier studies (Adelman, Taylor, &Vogel, 1988; Stark et al., 1986; Taylor, 1987; Taylor & Wyatt,1996) find that US dollars were funneled into families ofbelow-average incomes, tending to level the income dis-tributions of these villages. Villanueva municipio, in thestate of Zacatecas illustrates the same phenomenon (Jones,1998b). At the time of interviews, the decision to migratediffused down the social hierarchy from innovating pio-neer migrants to early and late-adopting migrants. Thisappears to be broadly the case in villages and small towns inthe west central region of Mexico. McKenzie and Rapoport(2004) analyze data for 71 communities surveyed fromthis region as part of the Mexican Migration Project. Theyfind that migration is associated with reduced inequali-ties in places with relatively high levels of past migration.Beyond Mexico, Adams finds that Pakistan (Adams, 1992),Guatemala (Adams, 2004), and Ghana (Adams, 2006) can beplaced along with Mexico among those with a moderatelylong history of international migration, and the poverty gaptends to be reduced by remittances.

With regards to Stage 2, in practice the channel-ing of remittances into poorer households often meansremittances are channeled disproportionately into ruralareas. In Mexico, for example, rural poverty and inequal-ity are the root causes of migration, even though in recentyears migration has spread to encompass urban centers

in response to broader disequilibria resulting from cor-poratism and a concentration of wealth. Nevertheless,international migration is still a potent urban–rural incomeequalizer, and occasionally it pushes rural incomes above

R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78 69

Table 1Theoretical migration stage and inequality for case studies based on vintage and prevalence.

Region of case study Source Vintagea Prevalenceb Migration stage Effect of migrationon inequality

Somaliland (northern Somalia) Ahmed (2000) 1988 15 Innovator IncreaseCentral valley of Oaxaca, Mexico Cohen (2004) 1970s 40 Innovator IncreaseCentral plateau, Burkina Fasso Wouterse (2010) 1960s 14c,d Innovator IncreaseRural Pakistan Adams (1992) 1940s 11 Early adopter DecreaseMichoacán and Jalisco, Mexico Massey et al. (1987) 1880s 47 Early adopter DecreaseValle Alto, Bolivia de la Torre and Alfaro

(2007)1930s ? Early adopter ?

Southern Mozambique de Vletter (2007) 1860s 75d Late adopter IncreaseHill Country, rural Nepal Seddon et al. (2002) 1820s 24d Late adopter IncreaseDoaba, Punjab, India Taylor et al. (2007) 1810s 50 Late adopter Increase

a Year(s) of earliest significant migration.b

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Percentage of households with international migration experience.c Intercontinental migration.d Percentage of households with active international migration experie

hose in adjacent urban places. Two studies in Mexicond that migration reduces inequalities between urbannd rural areas. In Zacatecas, Jones notes that among non-igrant families, urban areas have 40% higher average

ncomes than rural areas, but among active migrant fami-ies, rural areas actually have the higher incomes by morehan 10%. Migration has enabled poor rural families toatch up with and surpass their urban counterparts (Jones,995, p. 83). In Jalisco state, Canales and Montiel (2004)nd that remittances have reduced urban–rural inequal-

ty 5–15% in recent years. These studies are supported byarlier work on the Caribbean where in both Nevis and Bar-ados, remittances from offshore migration have enabledmall communities to survive in the face of competitionrom nearby urban centers (Rubenstein, 1982).

Stage 3, in which migration is prevalent and continu-us over a long period such that a migrant elite standsuxtaposed with a poor-non-migrating class, remittancesend to reinforce inequalities. Nepal (Seddon, Adhikari, &urung, 2002) is a mature migration economy where theill Regions have sent wage labor migrants to India for

ome 200 years, and where recent migration has includedhe Gulf region, the UK, and Japan. A migrant elite has devel-ped among the migrants to places farther a field and thislite has increased its income dominance over non-migrantouseholds. Such a situation also prevails in the East-rn Punjab region of India (Taylor, Singh, & Booth, 2007).he authors surveyed some 90 households in the Doabaegion of Punjab, finding that cultural factors viz., the casteystem tended to entrench the migrant elite and worsennequalities. Finally, in Mozambique (de Vletter, 2007), by

eans of remittances the poor rural south has become theealthiest region due to migration, which with contin-ed migration increases regional inequalities. Intrafamily

nequalities have also increased within villages of the Southecause a skilled elite class has over time entrenched itselfis a vis an unskilled class.

In summary, there is some evidence for the three-stageigration and inequality model. Table 1 presents a theo-

etical placement of those preceding case studies for whichata exist on the years of earliest significant internationaligration (vintage) and the percentage of householdsith international migration experience (prevalence). In

general, the areas with the earliest and the latest over-seas migration experience (Stages 1 and 3) have highermigration prevalence and experience increased incomeinequality. The areas with moderate migration vintage andprevalence (Stage 2) experience decreased income inequal-ity. In this last group are included rural Pakistan and thecentral west region of Mexico. The Bolivian Valle Alto,its migration stemming from the 1930s and its migrationprevalence equal to that of the Mexican hearth region 25years ago (de la Torre & Alfaro, 2007), fits into Stage 2,which leads me to predict decreasing inequality. However,prior to this study, the relationship between migration andinequality in Bolivia has not been tested.

3. Hypotheses

Based on the Valle Alto’s inferred position in the mid-dle stage of the migration/inequality model, I expect thefollowing hypotheses to hold true:

1. International migrants from the Valley Alto are selectedfrom households with below-average incomes for theregion.

2. International migration results in a reduction of inter-family economic inequality among households of theregion.

3. International migration results in a reduction of eco-nomic inequality between rural and urban areas in theregion.

4. Comparing the individual communities surveyed,inequality will be either low or high, depending onwhether the community is at an intermediate stage, orat an early or advanced stage of migration, respectively.

4. A Bolivian case study of migration and inequality

4.1. A brief history of Bolivian migration from the ValleAlto

The Valle Alto, a highland rural Bolivian region with thehighest rates of emigration in the country, is located about50 km south of Cochabamba, a city of 600,000 located mid-way between La Paz and Santa Cruz (Fig. 2). Labor migration

70 R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78

The stud

Fig. 2.

from the Valle Alto was first directed to the saltpeter minesof northern Chile early in the 20th century (Gonzalez,1996). This was important not only for the money thatmigrants sent home, but for their social remittances in theform of labor activism stemming from their participation inlabor unions in Chile, speaking Spanish that complementedtheir native Quechua, and the game of soccer, which waslater carried to Bolivian communities in Argentina and theUnited States (de la Torre & Alfaro, 2007, pp. 62–63; Price,2006). After 1950 migration focused on Argentina, initiallyto seasonal agricultural jobs in the northwest of the coun-try and later to construction jobs in Buenos Aires (de laTorre, 2006, pp. 59–86; Hinojosa, Pérez, & Cortéz, 2000).The Argentine economic crisis of the mid-1990s shiftedflows once again, this time to the United States. After 2000,economic recession and anti-terrorist policies in the UnitedStates re-directed the flows to Spain. Today, around half ofValle Alto absentee migrants go to Argentina, followed inorder by Spain, the U.S., and Brazil.

4.2. Study design

The Valle Alto was selected for several reasons. Themost important include its high emigration rate; pre-vious research on the region that laid the historic andethnographic groundwork for the present study; and theopportunity afforded by the author’s Fulbright researchgrant to travel to Bolivia in 2007, where he was affiliatedwith the University of San Simón in Cochabamba. The sur-vey targeted a representative sample of 420 households in

Esteban Arze and Punata, two of the three core provinces ofthe Valle Alto. Three municipios (counties) were selected:Punata and San Benito in Punata province and Tarata inEsteban Arze province. Each municipio has both urban and

y area.

rural places, an advantage because urbanization influencesmigration and inequality in numerous ways. Urban placesinclude the county seats of Punata (14,742 population in2001), San Benito (2029), and Tarata (3323). The rural areasof the three municipios accounted for 58% of their aggre-gate population in 2001. The three urban centers plus ageographically stratified sample of 18 rural towns wereselected for the survey.

Within the 21 selected communities, homes werechosen randomly by the interviewers, who were sociol-ogy students working on their bachelor’s theses at SanSimón University in Cochabamba. The seven page inter-view schedule was administered to the head of householdor to a son or daughter 15 years of age or older that wasknowledgeable about household migration and expenses.The questionnaire covered household characteristics suchas possessions and expenses, individual vital statistics andmigration experiences of all adult household members.It also asked for the opinion of the respondent concern-ing family values, the effectiveness of local institutions,and the role of migration in the community. A total of417 surveys were completed between September andNovember, 2007. In addition, in-depth follow-up inter-views in twenty households and some 40 interviews withcivic and NGO officials and business owners were carriedout by the author and an assistant, during the same timeperiod.

4.3. Operational definitions

The measurement of human inequality requires a con-siderable narrowing of focus to a type of economic, social,political, and cultural inequality and a particular indi-vidual, social group, organization, place, time units of

R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78 71

Table 2Inter-household inequality of income and possessions, Valle Alto, 2007.

Indicator and statistic Non-migrant HHsa Active migrant HHsb Non-migrant + active HHsc Ratio, active to non-migrant

(n) (167) (191) (358) –Household income (US $/year)

Mean 3052 3702 3398 1.21Coefficient of variatione 0.931 0.777 0.846 0.834

Possessions indexd

Mean 3.46 3.80 3.64 1.10Coefficient of variatione 0.532 0.445 0.486 0.836

Source: Based on an interview survey of 417 households in the municipios of Punata and San Benito (Punata province) and Tarata (Esteban Arce province).Only non-migrant and active migrant households are considered in this study (n = 358).

a A non-migrant household is one that has never sent a migrant abroad to work (but who may have sent an internal migrant).b An active migrant household is one with at least one migrant working abroad at the time of the survey.

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c Excludes returnee households (those with no active migrants, but whd Index records how many of the following possessions the household

ruck, car, telephone, non-dirt floor, more than 6 hectares of land, and moe The standard deviation divided by the mean.

nalysis (Babbie, 1989, pp. 82–87). In this study, economicnequality is the type, and both income and household pos-essions are the variables on which inequality is measured.egarding the unit of analysis, I take to heart the advice of

asso and Kotz (2008) and measure inequality on severalifferent units: household (social group) in hypotheses 1nd 2; urban or rural (place) in hypothesis 3; and townplace) in hypothesis 4. A household for the purposes ofhis analysis is defined as persons living together under oneoof, including members temporarily working elsewhere.rban places are those with a population greater than 2000eople based on the 2001 Bolivian census.

Economic inequality is measured by the coefficient ofariation (CV), defined as the standard deviation dividedy the mean. Separate CVs are calculated for income andossessions across subgroups of households in the region.

n tests utilizing different measures of inequality, the CVields basically the same relative outcomes as the Ginioefficient (Gakidou & King, 2002; Portnov & Felsenstein,010; Williams & Doessel, 2006). Household income isbtained from responses to detailed questions on house-old expenditures. Individual expenditures are summednd savings over the period is subtracted, to yield anstimate of household income during the previous yearOctober 2006–October 2007). This procedure results inmore accurate accounting of income than if the incomeuestion had been asked directly – a somewhat threaten-

ng approach that leads to under-estimates because theespondent fears that this information could get into theands of taxing authorities or extorters. Household posses-ions are measured by an index depending on how manytemized possessions the household had at the time of thenterview varying from 0 to 10, (footnoted, Table 2). Thisndex of household possessions gives us a somewhat longererspective on inequality than income alone, since currentossessions have been accumulated over a period of yearshereas income is considered for the previous year only.

International migration is defined in terms of activeigration. An active migrant household is one with at

east one migrant working or seeking work abroad at the

ime of the survey. Rather than a broader one of house-olds that have ever sponsored a migrant, this definitionies migration directly to household income. Only active

igrants send remittances, and remittances provide a close

migrant in the past who is now back in Bolivia).the time of interview: television, refrigerator, sewing machine, stereo,4 rooms in the house. The index can range in value from 0 to 10.

link between migration status and current income, mea-sured for the year immediately preceding the interview.To judge the effect of migration on inequality, I compareinequality for active migrant households with that for non-migrant households, defined as those that have never senta migrant abroad. Under the assumption that non-migranthouseholds represent the “before migration” and migranthouseholds the “after migration” effect, a more homoge-nous distribution of income among migrant householdsthan among non-migrant households would result in anequalizing effect of migration on incomes across house-holds of the region. Of course non-migrant households arenot immune to the influence of current migration, becausemultiplier effects from remittances will impact them eventhough they receive no remittances directly. Nevertheless,these indirect effects are likely to be small relative to thedirect remittance effects on migrant households.

In addition to active and non-migrant households, thereare returnee households; those that sent a migrant atsome point in the past but do not currently have an activemigrant. These households are excluded from analysis inthis study. Their inclusion would cloud the relationshipbetween migration, remittances, and income inequality forreasons implied above. Their migration experience mayhave taken place years ago and so their current income isonly peripherally related to migration.

5. Results: migration and inequality in the ValleAlto of Bolivia

5.1. Position of migrant households in the incomedistribution

Of the 417 households surveyed in 2007 in the ValleAlto, 167 (40%) had never sent a migrant abroad, 191 (46%)currently had at least one international migrant, a figurethat compares with 39% in Zacatecas, Mexicoin 1987. Inearlier discussion it was noted that significant internationalmigration from Bolivia began to Chile in the 1930s, 50 yearsafter such migration began from Mexico to the U.S. Never-

theless, Bolivian migration is of significantly longer vintagethan for countries in Stage 1, and less than those in Stage3. The Valle Alto, like Zacatecas and other states of the his-toric region in Mexico, is positioned in the middle stage

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72 R.C. Jones / The Social S

of the migration-inequality model. The expectation is thatinequalities are decreased by migration.

To definitively address the first hypothesis, predictingthat migrant households are drawn from the lower halfof the region’s income distribution, we ideally need aver-age migrant household income and total household incomeprior to migration. Unfortunately, this information is notavailable. However, an approximation – household incomein the absence of migration – can be obtained by subtrac-ting remittances received during the year from householdincome for the year. This approximation likely underes-timates local income because it does not account for anyshadow wages that migrants might have earned locallyhad they stayed home. At the same time, it underesti-mates remittance income because respondents in generalgive remittance figures that are below the actual amountsreceived. These factors balance each other out to somedegree. Income minus remittances approximates the posi-tion of migrant households in the income distribution ifthey sent no migrants. This figure can then be comparedwith the income of non-migrant households as a whole.

The results of these calculations bolster the first hypoth-esis. The income of non-migrant households in 2007was $3052, while the imputed income of active migranthouseholds excluding remittances was $1897, only 62%as high. Therefore, migrants were negatively selectedwith regard to income. If remittances are added backin, the active household averaged $3702 – 21% higherthan for non-migrant households and almost double theimputed pre-migration income. Migration effectively pro-pelled households from lower to middle class.

5.2. Migration and inter-household inequality

The second hypothesis, that inter-household inequali-ties in the Valle Alto are reduced by international migration,is also supported by the survey data (Table 2). Forhousehold income, the coefficient of variation among non-migrant households is 0.931; for active migrant householdsit drops to 0.777. The same trend is observable for house-hold possessions: their coefficient of variation is 0.532for non-migrant households and 0.445 for active migranthouseholds. For both income and possessions, inequalityamong migrant households is only 83% of that among non-migrant households. Thus migration helps to homogenizethe income distribution and even out the level of posses-sions among households in the region.

How does foreign migration experience help to equalizethe economic status of households in this way? Histogramsfor income provide some insights (Fig. 3). In Fig. 3a, theincome distribution for non-migrant households is skewedto the right (mean–median = $1058) by a small number ofwealthy households, and it exhibits a distinct peak in thethree categories to the left, where a majority of households(61%) are found. These households may be referred to asthe non-migrant poor. Next, moving toward the right thereappears a gap and pronounced drop in numbers for the next

three categories, representing a small non-migrant middleclass (22%). Spread thinly over the final 10 categories is thenon-migrant elite (17%). In Fig. 3b, the income distribu-tion for active migrant households, the situation is quite

urnal 50 (2013) 66–78

different. Compared to Fig. 3a, the migrant poor are muchless pronounced (44%). However, the next three categorieshave risen to prominence, forming a migrant middle class(35%). In effect, the former bulge of poor households hasshifted to the right and filled in the previous income gap.Finishing the picture is the migrant elite (21%) that is analo-gous in size to the non-migrant elite. Skewness in the activemigrant distribution has been reduced to $771. Finally,in Fig. 3c the two distributions are combined. The upperpart of each bar represents the active households. Thisjoint distribution suggests three economic classes: (1) anon-migrant-dominant poor class; (2) a migrant-dominantmiddle class; and (3) a mixed migrant/non-migrant elite.The changes between Fig. 3a and c (i.e., the addition ofmigrant households into the mix) help explain the dropin the CV from 0.931 to 0.846 (Table 2). It is worth com-menting that interviewees from migrant families in theValle Alto are well aware of the leveling effect of migra-tion in the region. Asked about their rationale for leavingtheir family and country, the answer they frequently giveis “Es para nivelarnos” (“It is so we can catch up”) (de laTorre & Alfaro, 2007, p. 11).

The substantive reasons for these results appear to liein the social selectivity of the migration process. Migrantfamilies are more homogenous than non-migrant fami-lies on variables such as education and type of jobs heldby family members in Bolivia, and this homogeneity maytranslate into relatively uniform earnings. For example, innon-migrant households, three years of schooling separatethe above and below average income groups, comparedto less than two years for the analogous income groupsin migrant households. Likewise, there is a job-status gapamong non-migrant households, with teachers, physicians,government workers, and business-owners in the highincome class, compared to agricultural and constructionworkers in the low-income class. This low income classincludes many agricultural workers who have migratedinto the region from the indigenous highlands (Potosí)or lowlands (the Chaparé), and who tend to be desti-tute and speak Spanish poorly. In contrast, among migranthouseholds the larger middle class is represented by smallbusiness owners, particularly in rural areas. It is likely thata certain proportion of these businesses were created as aresult of migrant remittances (see below).

5.3. Migration and rural–urban inequality

Compared to rural families, urban families in the ValleAlto are much better off on several criteria. Their incomeis higher and they have more possessions regardless ofmigration status (last panel of Table 3).

The third hypothesis proposes that migration helpsto correct this imbalance. To judge this, I compare theratios between urban and rural areas for active vs. non-migrant households (first two panels of Table 3). Note that,in support of this hypothesis, in all cases the ratios forincome and possessions are lower for the active migrant

households. Migration is an equalizer in which urban–ruraldifferences are smoothed out rather than accentuated. Thisis an interesting finding because, in the Valle Alto, migra-tion is actually more prevalent in urban areas than in rural

R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78 73

-migran

aata

ao

Fig. 3. Histograms of household income: non

reas. In our sample, 50% of our urban households have anctive migrant vs. 42% of our rural households. It must berue, therefore, that remittances arriving in rural areas have

greater impact than those arriving in urban areas.

What are some possible reasons for the disproportion-te impact of migration in rural areas? First, membersf active migrant households who live in these areas are

t, active migrant, combined: Valle Alto 2007.

employed at a much higher rate than members of suchhouseholds in urban centers, by 68–51% (Table 3).

The higher migrant employment rate in rural areas

is in spite of the fact that rural migrant households areolder and might be expected to have more age-relatedretirees. Second, rural migrants are apparently investingtheir remittances, whereas their urban counterparts are

74R

.C.Jones/The

SocialScienceJournal50

(2013)66–78

Table 3Urban/rural inequality of income and possessions, Valle Alto, 2007.

Indicator Non-migrant householdsa Active migrant householdsb Non-migrant + active householdsc

Urban (≥2000population in2001)

Rural (<2000population in2001)

Ratio, urban/rural Urban (≥2000population in2001)

Rural (<2000population in2001)

Ratio, urban/rural Urban (≥2000population in2001)

Rural (<2000population in2001)

Ratio, urban/rural

(n) (75) (92) (167) (98) (93) (191) (167) (191) (358)Mean HH income (US$ per year) 3606 2600 1.39 4192 3192 1.31 3937 2897 1.36Possessions index (0–10)d 3.92 3.10 1.27 4.16 3 .57 1.14 3.99 3.32 1.20% local adults working in Bolivia 61.0 71.2 0.86 51.3 67.7 0.76 55.5 69.4 0.80% of income spent on housing 8.6 15.7 0.55 13.2 14.6 0.90 11.2 15.1 0.74% of HHs with a family business 37.3 31.5 1.18 29.6 38.7 0.76 32.9 35.1 0.94% local adults who work in:

Ceramics 0.7 5.7 8.14 0 11.6 – 0.3 8.7 0.03Sewing 6.0 3.4 0.57 8.0 7.0 1.14 7.1 5.2 1.37Food and variety store 8.0 5.3 1.51 8.0 9.1 0.88 8.0 7.2 1.11Skilled trades 6.7 3.8 1.76 5.6 3.5 1.60 5.7 3.6 1.58HH business investment (US$/year) 737 340 2.16 553 427 1.30 634 384 1.65HH business investment

Tarata/Huayculi (US$/year)e391(19) 215(5) 1.82 293(23) 1141(8) 0.26 337(42) 785(13) 0.43

Source: Based on an interview survey of 417 households in the municipios of Punata and San Benito (Punata province) and Tarata (Esteban Arce province). Only non-migrant and active migrant households areconsidered in this study (n = 358).

a A non-migrant household is one with that has never sent a migrant abroad to work (but who may have sent an internal migrant).b An active migrant household is one with at least one migrant working abroad at the time of the survey.c Excludes returnee households (those with no active migrants, but who sent a migrant in the past who is now back in Mexico).d Index records how many of the following possessions the household had at the time of interview: television, refrigerator, sewing machine, stereo, truck, car, telephone, non-dirt floor, more than 6 ha of land,

and more than 4 rooms in the house. The index can range in value from 0 to 10.e The urban data on this line pertain to Tarata; the rural data, to Huayculi. The number of cases are indicated in parentheses.

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living off their remittances.” In support of these supposi-ions, we have the observation that in urban areas, migrantouseholds spend much more of their income on hous-

ng (often an indicator of conspicuous consumption) thanon-migrant households, but in rural areas, they spend

ess (Table 3). When it comes to family businesses, inrban areas the migrant households have less, whereas

n rural areas they have more than their non-migrantounterparts.

What types of businesses are present in these smallowns of rural Bolivia – so lacking in population, income,nd infrastructure, and at first glance, of commercial activ-ty as well? As it turns out, the appearance of inactivitys an illusion because cottage industries abound, tuckedway in the courtyards, backyards, and bedrooms of homes.herefore, a third reason for the impact of migration inural areas lies in the success of these cottage industries.he most prevalent of these are ceramics and garmentewing in addition to tiendas selling food and other sup-lies, and in all these cases migrant households are more

nvolved than non-migrant households (Table 3). Theseusinesses are not for the local market. Ceramic pots areroduced for weekend tourists from Cochabamba who visitearby towns such as Tarata, Cliza, and Punata. Tiendasppeal to the same clientele. Sewing operations are trib-tary to large garment plants in Cochabamba and Santaruz. The importance of such activities is further illustratedy the amount of money invested in rural household busi-esses. These investments echo the rural–urban patternf business ownership just discussed. In the urban cen-ers, the non-migrant class spends far more on businesseshan do the migrant households. In the rural areas, it is the

igrant class that holds an edge in business investments.e may speculate that through its political influence

nd entrenched economic position, the non-migrant eliteontrols business in the urban centers but migration cre-tes an emerging middle class of small business ownersn the rural centers. de la Torre (2006) and Ronckennd de la Torre (2009) discuss these Valle Alto cottagendustries, tourist ventures, and agro-industrial projects atength.

As an example of migration-spurred investment in ruralreas, take the case of Huayculi, a village of 500 persons inhe municipio of Tarata. In the municipal capital (Tarata),

town of 3300 that specializes in tourism (shops, mar-ets, colonial architecture and museums), old non-migrantamilies control the business and politics. In Huayculi,he migrant families have control and make the invest-

ents (Table 3, bottom row). Huayculi is renowned forts ceramics and pottery. Clay and firewood are collectedrom the mountains nearby, and the pots and figurinesre molded and tempered by the men in family-ownedilns and then decorated by the women. They are soldirectly to tourists by family members from Huayculiho lay out their wares in Tarata and other cities of thealle Alto to appeal to regional and national tourists whoisit on market days. This cottage industry in Huayculi is

eavily supported by remittances from family membersorking in Argentina and Spain. It has also attracted assis-

ance from the United Nations’ Industrial Developmentrganization.

urnal 50 (2013) 66–78 75

5.4. Migration stage and inequality across communitiesof the Valle Alto

There is ample evidence in the migration literature ofadjacent towns with different migrant experience and dif-ferent outcomes from this experience (Cohen, 2004; Fox& Bada, 2008; Jones, 1995; Rose & Shaw, 2008; Stark et al.,1986). The fourth hypothesis suggests that a town’s incomeinequality may stem from its migration stage. The ValleAlto is in Stage 2 of the Migration-Inequality model wherewe expect that inequalities are decreasing as a result ofmigration. However, it is possible that individual com-munities display a finer-tuned variation in inequality inresponse to differences in migration stage and other fac-tors. Here I address the relationship between (1) incomeinequality among households in each of the towns thatwere included in the Valle Alto survey, defined by the coef-ficient of variation; and (2) the prevalence of migration,defined as the percentage of the town’s households witha migrant currently working abroad. Only towns with 5or more completed surveys are included in the analysis,reducing the number of cases from 21 to 20, including5 towns in San Benito municipio, 7 in Tarata, and 8 inPunata.

The results are suggestive only, given the small num-ber of cases, but they imply that a community’s stage ofmigration works through family expenditures and localemployment to first exacerbate, then improve, and finallyexacerbate household income inequality. Although there isonly a negligible linear relationship between inequality andmigration stage across the 19 communities (rp = +0.092;rs = −0.037), the quadratic relationship shows an increasein inequality across places with below 35% active migranthouseholds (rp = +0.160), a decrease between 35% and 55%(rp = −0.400), and an increase beyond 55% (rp = +0.750)(Fig. 4).

Delving into the data helps interpret these trends.The early increase in inequality corresponds with emi-gration from relatively larger and more prosperous andbetter-educated places whose incomes rose relative tothose of less-advantaged places. The decrease in themiddle section of the graph is related to greater house-hold business investment in smaller places. The ultimateincrease is marked by a shift in family expendituresaway from businesses and into housing, a shift that leadsto fewer working adults in these places. This upwardturn in inequality implies that the Valle Alto is near-ing the end of Stage 2 of the migration-inequality cycleand may be facing a period of inequality-increasinggrowth in the near future as migration becomes moreprevalent.

These results are supported by a growing body of liter-ature that details the shift in a migrant household’s centerof gravity from origin to destination as its migration expe-rience deepens. As migrants achieve mobility and legalstatus abroad, buy a home there, and bring family andhave children abroad, economic ties to the origin tend to

atrophy (Cantú, Shaiq, & Urdaniva, 2007; Cornelius, 2007;Escobar, Hailbronner, Martin, & Meza, 2006; Jones, 2009;Jurgens, 2001; Marcelli & Lowell, 2005; Smith, 2001). Thefamily may build a new ornate home, but use it for visits

76 R.C. Jones / The Social Science Journal 50 (2013) 66–78

tive mig

Fig. 4. Household income inequality and ac

and vacations only. When family members return for moreextended periods, they may not work but instead live offtheir remittances.

6. Discussion

In this study, I pose a three-stage model of inter-national migration and inequality in which town levelincome inequalities are postulated to change as a functionof migrant households’ position in the local income dis-tribution. This model, from diffusion theory, argues thatinitially migrants are selected from better-off householdswith the resources to undertake such a risky venture,resulting in increasing inequality when remittances arechanneled back to their households. In the middle stage,the message of their success diffuses to households at theincome mean and below whose subsequent migration andremittances result in decreasing inequality in the town. Inthe final stage with continued migration, a migrant elitedistances itself economically from a non-migrant laggardclass, bringing increasing inequality once more. Analysis ofdata from a 2007 survey of 417 households in the ValleAlto, a rural region southeast of Cochabamba, supportsthis model. Concomitant with its position in the middlestage, active migrant households of the region demonstratelower household inequality and lower inequality betweenurban and rural areas than non-migrant households. Indi-vidual towns, however, illustrate the three-stage model ofincrease, decrease, and increase in inequality with the levelof active migration.

These results support research showing that the middlestages of migration are the most productive from the per-spective of the origin. Early in the process few households

are involved, and the creation of support networks and jobniches abroad has just begun. In this situation, remittancesmay be small and slow to come and tend to benefit house-holds that are already well-off. At the end of the process,

ration for 20 towns in the Valle Alto, 2007.

migrant households are firmly anchored abroad and remit-tances to the origin are curtailed owing to the cost of livingand supporting a family at the destination, in addition tothe fact that remittances are spent less on investment thanon homes, further exacerbating the differences betweenmigrant and non-migrant households at the origin. It is themiddle stage in which remittances are maximized, originties remain strong, and inequalities lessen.

Two limitations of the present research are worth men-tioning. The first is that it relies on cross-sectional data toinfer changes in household income inequalities over time.This procedure assumes that current structural conditionswill hold into the future, that the economic and politicalmilieu of the origin and destination(s) will not change sig-nificantly, which could affect remittance flows, patterns ofcirculation, and inequalities. For example, the deteriorat-ing job situation in the United States and Spain resultingfrom the great recession of 2007–2009 may have resultedin a shift in Bolivian migration streams to Argentina andBrazil, resulting in a drop in remittances and an increasein inequalities between migrant and non-migrant house-holds. There is no firm evidence to support or refutethis argument, but it is a possibility. A second, potentiallimitation of the research is that the diffusional modelof migration may not be generalizable to other sendingcountries whose migration streams are less multifacetedthan those of Bolivia, such as Mexico. On that point, how-ever, several studies have uncovered declining householdinequalities in Mexico as noted in Section 2. Future researchshould indeed be devoted to testing the model for differentcountries under different global economic conditions.

The fact that the Valle Alto region is in the middle stageof migration suggests that with ongoing migration, the cur-

rent income leveling will give way to worsening incomeinequalities as a growing migrant elite stands increas-ingly apart from a laggard, non-migrant class. However,other factors could intervene to promote continued income

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qualization and postpone the progression into Stage 3.ith an improving local economic situation, an expand-

ng middle class might invest in businesses and socialapital to create local opportunities that actually curtailigration and stimulate return migration (Roncken & de

a Torre, 2009). In addition, the social costs of migrationight come to weigh more heavily on migrant families

Ferrufino, Ferrufino, & Pereira, 2007), especially in lightf the new economic opportunities at home. A renewedommitment to the origin community could expand theiddle class, increasingly composed of former rather than

ctive or permanent migrants, over an indefinite period,urther reducing inequalities between the middle class andhe non-migrant elite.

Alternatively, the elite migrant households might movebroad in their entirety and remove themselves from theommunity altogether. This would result in a proportion-te increase in middle-stage households by default, withhort-term ameliorating impacts on inequality; but thisbandonment of the community by an upwardly mobile,isk-taking population could sow the seeds for long-termecline. In the absence of return migration, household flightould ultimately have an adverse effect on remittances,

nvestments, town growth, and eventually on incomeeveling itself. In the absence of other engines of com-

unity economic growth, reversion to an earlier stage inhich poor non-migrant households and elite non-migrantouseholds are juxtaposed and endemic inequalities high-

ighted could occur (Jones, 2009). Indeed, in the Vallelto, return migration appears to have decreased by 18%etween 1997–2001, and 2002–2006 (Jones & de la Torre,011).

Therefore, the future of inequality in the Valle Alto, asn other rural emigrant regions in developing countriesround the globe, may come down to whether migrantseek commitment to, and active involvement in, their homeillages (“voice”) or disengagement from their home vil-ages, to pursue their personal and family goals elsewhere“exit”) (Fox & Bada, 2008; Hirschman, 1970, 1981). In theormer scenario, inequality continues to decline as micro-nvestments benefit many formerly poor families, whereasn the latter scenario, inequality increases as poor fami-ies stand increasingly apart from a traditional non-migrantlite and a newly rich though diminishing migrant eliteho spend conspicuously on homes and possessions but

therwise show little interest in local development.

cknowledgments

The author benefited substantially from the researchnd insights of Leonardo de la Torre, a close colleague whos professor of social communication at the Catholic Univer-ity, Cochabamba. This research is the result of a Fulbrightenior Research Award to the author in fall of 2007. Grate-ul acknowledgement is extended to faculty members Carlascarrunz, Fernando Mayorga, and Carlos Crespo, and totudent interviewers Ernesto Albarado, Gabriela Gutierrez,

vi Sulcata, and Silvia Jaldín, all associated with the Centerf Higher University Studies at the University of San Simon,ochabamba, with which the author was affiliated.

urnal 50 (2013) 66–78 77

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Dr. Richard Jones is Discipline Coordinator and Professor of Geographyin the Department of Political Science and Geography at the Universityof Texas at San Antonio. Mexican and Bolivian emigration as well asIrish return migration have occupied his research agenda over the pastdecade. His edited book, Immigrants outside Megalopolis: Ethnic Trans-formation in the Heartland, was published by Lexington Books in Marchof 2008. He produced two previous books, Patterns of UndocumentedMigration (Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), and Ambivalent Journey: U.S.Migration and Economic Mobility in North-Central Mexico (University

fessional Geographer, Growth and Change, Economic Geography, IrishGeography, Latin American Politics and Society, Global Networks, Popula-tion Space and Place, International Migration, Urban Geography, CulturalGeography, and the Social Science Journal.