Malicious Code Detection and
Security Applications
Prof. Bhavani Thuraisingham
The University of Texas at Dallas
October 2008
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What is Data Mining?
Data MiningKnowledge Mining
Knowledge Discoveryin Databases
Data Archaeology
Data Dredging
Database MiningKnowledge Extraction
Data Pattern Processing
Information Harvesting
Siftware
The process of discovering meaningful new correlations, patterns, and trends by sifting through large amounts of data, often previously unknown, using pattern recognition technologies and statistical and mathematical techniques(Thuraisingham, Data Mining, CRC Press 1998)
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What’s going on in data mining?
0 What are the technologies for data mining?
- Database management, data warehousing, machine learning, statistics, pattern recognition, visualization, parallel processing
0 What can data mining do for you?
- Data mining outcomes: Classification, Clustering, Association, Anomaly detection, Prediction, Estimation, . . .
0 How do you carry out data mining?
- Data mining techniques: Decision trees, Neural networks, Market-basket analysis, Link analysis, Genetic algorithms, . . .
0 What is the current status?
- Many commercial products mine relational databases
0 What are some of the challenges?
- Mining unstructured data, extracting useful patterns, web mining, Data mining, security and privacy
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Data Mining for Intrusion Detection: Problem
0 An intrusion can be defined as “any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource”.
0 Attacks are:
- Host-based attacks
- Network-based attacks
0 Intrusion detection systems are split into two groups:
- Anomaly detection systems
- Misuse detection systems
0 Use audit logs
- Capture all activities in network and hosts.
- But the amount of data is huge!
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Our Approach: Overview
TrainingData
Class
Hierarchical Clustering (DGSOT)
Testing
Testing Data
SVM Class Training
DGSOT: Dynamically growing self organizing tree
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Hierarchical clustering with SVM flow chart
Our Approach
Our Approach: Hierarchical Clustering
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Results
Training Time, FP and FN Rates of Various Methods
MethodsAverage
Accuracy
Total Training
Time
Average FP
Rate (%)
Average FN
Rate (%)
Random Selection
52% 0.44 hours 40 47
Pure SVM 57.6% 17.34 hours 35.5 42
SVM+Rocchio Bundling
51.6% 26.7 hours 44.2 48
SVM + DGSOT 69.8% 13.18 hours 37.8 29.8
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Introduction: Detecting Malicious Executables using Data Mining
0 What are malicious executables?- Harm computer systems- Virus, Exploit, Denial of Service (DoS), Flooder, Sniffer, Spoofer,
Trojan etc.- Exploits software vulnerability on a victim - May remotely infect other victims- Incurs great loss. Example: Code Red epidemic cost $2.6
Billion
0 Malicious code detection: Traditional approach- Signature based- Requires signatures to be generated by human experts- So, not effective against “zero day” attacks
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State of the Art in Automated Detection
OAutomated detection approaches:0Behavioural: analyse behaviours like source, destination address, attachment type, statistical anomaly etc.
0Content-based: analyse the content of the malicious executable- Autograph (H. Ah-Kim – CMU): Based on automated
signature generation process- N-gram analysis (Maloof, M.A. et .al.): Based on mining
features and using machine learning.
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Our New Ideas (Khan, Masud and Thuraisingham)
✗Content -based approaches consider only machine-codes (byte-codes).
✗Is it possible to consider higher-level source codes for malicious code detection?
✗Yes: Diassemble the binary executable and retrieve the assembly program
✗Extract important features from the assembly program
✗Combine with machine-code features
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Feature Extraction
✗Binary n-gram features- Sequence of n consecutive bytes of binary
executable
✗Assembly n-gram features- Sequence of n consecutive assembly
instructions
✗System API call features- DLL function call information
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The Hybrid Feature Retrieval Model
0 Collect training samples of normal and malicious executables.
0 Extract features
0 Train a Classifier and build a model
0 Test the model against test samples
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Hybrid Feature Retrieval (HFR)
0 Training
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Hybrid Feature Retrieval (HFR)
0 Testing
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Binary n-gram features- Features are extracted from the byte codes in the form of n-
grams, where n = 2,4,6,8,10 and so on.
Example: Given a 11-byte sequence: 0123456789abcdef012345,
The 2-grams (2-byte sequences) are: 0123, 2345, 4567, 6789, 89ab, abcd, cdef, ef01, 0123, 2345
The 4-grams (4-byte sequences) are: 01234567, 23456789, 456789ab,...,ef012345 and so on....
Problem: - Large dataset. Too many features (millions!).
Solution: - Use secondary memory, efficient data structures - Apply feature selection
Feature Extraction
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Assembly n-gram features- Features are extracted from the assembly programs in the form
of n-grams, where n = 2,4,6,8,10 and so on.
Example:
three instructions “push eax”; “mov eax, dword[0f34]” ; “add ecx, eax”;
2-grams
(1) “push eax”; “mov eax, dword[0f34]”; (2) “mov eax, dword[0f34]”; “add ecx, eax”;
Problem: - Same problem as binary
Solution: - Same solution
Feature Extraction
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0 Select Best K features
0 Selection Criteria: Information Gain
0 Gain of an attribute A on a collection of examples S is given by
Feature Selection
)(
)(||
||)(),(
AValuesVv
v SEn tropyS
SSEn tropyASG a in
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Experiments
0 Dataset- Dataset1: 838 Malicious and 597 Benign executables- Dataset2: 1082 Malicious and 1370 Benign executables- Collected Malicious code from VX Heavens (http://vx.netlux.org)
0 Disassembly - Pedisassem ( http://www.geocities.com/~sangcho/index.html )
0 Training, Testing- Support Vector Machine (SVM)- C-Support Vector Classifiers with an RBF kernel
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Results
0 HFS = Hybrid Feature Set0 BFS = Binary Feature Set0 AFS = Assembly Feature Set
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Results
0 HFS = Hybrid Feature Set0 BFS = Binary Feature Set0 AFS = Assembly Feature Set
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Results
0 HFS = Hybrid Feature Set0 BFS = Binary Feature Set0 AFS = Assembly Feature Set
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Future Plans
0 System call: - seems to be very useful. - Need to Consider Frequency of call- Call sequence pattern (following program path) - Actions immediately preceding or after call
0 Detect Malicious code by program slicing- requires analysis
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Data Mining for Buffer Overflow Introduction
0 Goal- Intrusion detection. - e.g.: worm attack, buffer overflow attack.
0 Main Contribution- 'Worm' code detection by data mining coupled with
'reverse engineering'.- Buffer overflow detection by combining data mining with
static analysis of assembly code.
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Background
0 What is 'buffer overflow'?- A situation when a fixed sized buffer is overflown by a
larger sized input.
0 How does it happen?- example:
........char buff[100];gets(buff);........
buff Stackmemory
Input string
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Background (cont...)
0 Then what?
........char buff[100];gets(buff);........
buff Stackmemory
Stack
Return address overwritten
buff Stackmemory
New return address points to this memory location
Attacker's code
buff
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Background (cont...)
0 So what?- Program may crash or- The attacker can execute his arbitrary code
0 It can now- Execute any system function- Communicate with some host and download some 'worm'
code and install it!- Open a backdoor to take full control of the victim
0 How to stop it?
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Background (cont...)
0 Stopping buffer overflow- Preventive approaches- Detection approaches
0 Preventive approaches- Finding bugs in source code. Problem: can only work
when source code is available.- Compiler extension. Same problem.- OS/HW modification
0 Detection approaches- Capture code running symptoms. Problem: may require
long running time.- Automatically generating signatures of buffer overflow
attacks.
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CodeBlocker (Our approach)
0 A detection approach
0 Based on the Observation:- Attack messages usually contain code while normal
messages contain data.
0 Main Idea- Check whether message contains code
0 Problem to solve:- Distinguishing code from data
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Severity of the problem
0 It is not easy to detect actual instruction sequence from a given string of bits
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Our solution
0 Apply data mining.
0 Formulate the problem as a classification problem (code, data)
0 Collect a set of training examples, containing both instances
0 Train the data with a machine learning algorithm, get the model
0 Test this model against a new message
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CodeBlocker Model
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Feature Extraction
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Disassembly
0 We apply SigFree tool - implemented by Xinran Wang et al. (PennState)
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Feature extraction
0 Features are extracted using- N-gram analysis- Control flow analysis
0 N-gram analysis
Assembly program Corresponding IFG
What is an n-gram? -Sequence of n instructions
Traditional approach: -Flow of control is ignored
2-grams are: 02, 24, 46,...,CE
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Feature extraction (cont...)
0 Control-flow Based N-gram analysis
Assembly program Corresponding IFG
What is an n-gram? -Sequence of n instructions
Proposed Control-flow based approach -Flow of control is considered
2-grams are: 02, 24, 46,...,CE, E6
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Feature extraction (cont...)
0 Control Flow analysis. Generated features- Invalid Memory Reference (IMR)- Undefined Register (UR)- Invalid Jump Target (IJT)
0 Checking IMR- A memory is referenced using register addressing and
the register value is undefined- e.g.: mov ax, [dx + 5]
0 Checking UR- Check if the register value is set properly
0 Checking IJT- Check whether jump target does not violate instruction
boundary
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Putting it together
0 Why n-gram analysis?- Intuition: in general,
disassembled executables should have a different pattern of instruction usage than disassembled data.
0 Why control flow analysis?- Intuition: there should be no invalid memory references or
invalid jump targets.
0 Approach- Compute all possible n-grams- Select best k of them- Compute feature vector (binary vector) for each training
example- Supply these vectors to the training algorithm
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Experiments
0 Dataset- Real traces of normal messages- Real attack messages - Polymorphic shellcodes
0 Training, Testing- Support Vector Machine (SVM)
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Results
0 CFBn: Control-Flow Based n-gram feature0 CFF: Control-flow feature
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Novelty, Advantages, Limitations, Future
0 Novelty- We introduce the notion of control flow based n-gram- We combine control flow analysis with data mining to
detect code / data- Significant improvement over other methods (e.g. SigFree)
0 Advantages- Fast testing- Signature free operation - Low overhead - Robust against many obfuscations
0 Limitations- Need samples of attack and normal messages.- May not be able to detect a completely new type of attack.
0 Future- Find more features- Apply dynamic analysis techniques- Semantic analysis
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Analysis of Firewall Policy Rules Using Data Mining Techniques
•Firewall is the de facto core technology of today’s network security•First line of defense against external network attacks and threats
•Firewall controls or governs network access by allowing or denying the incoming or outgoing network traffic according to firewall policy rules.
•Manual definition of rules often result in in anomalies in the policy
•Detecting and resolving these anomalies manually is a tedious and an error prone task
•Solutions:•Anomaly detection:
•Theoretical Framework for the resolution of anomaly; A new algorithm will simultaneously detect and
resolve any anomaly that is present in the policy rules
•Traffic Mining: Mine the traffic and detect anomalies
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Traffic Mining
0 To bridge the gap between what is written in the firewall policy rules and what is being observed in the network is to analyze traffic and log of the packets– traffic mining
=Network traffic trend may show that some rules are out-dated or not used recently
FirewallFirewallLog FileLog File
Mining Log File Mining Log File Using FrequencyUsing Frequency
FilteringFilteringRule Rule
GeneralizationGeneralization
Generic RulesGeneric Rules
Identify Decaying Identify Decaying &&
Dominant RulesDominant Rules
EditEditFirewall RulesFirewall Rules
FirewallPolicy Rule
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Traffic Mining Results
Anomaly Discovery ResultAnomaly Discovery Result
Rule 1, Rule 2: ==> GENRERALIZATIONRule 1, Rule 16: ==> CORRELATEDRule 2, Rule 12: ==> SHADOWEDRule 4, Rule 5: ==> GENRERALIZATIONRule 4, Rule 15: ==> CORRELATEDRule 5, Rule 11: ==> SHADOWED
1: TCP,INPUT,129.110.96.117,ANY,*.*.*.*,80,DENY2: TCP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,80,ACCEPT3: TCP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,443,DENY4: TCP,INPUT,129.110.96.117,ANY,*.*.*.*,22,DENY5: TCP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,22,ACCEPT6: TCP,OUTPUT,129.110.96.80,ANY,*.*.*.*,22,DENY7: UDP,OUTPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,53,ACCEPT8: UDP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,53,*.*.*.*,ANY,ACCEPT9: UDP,OUTPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,ANY,DENY10: UDP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,*.*.*.*,ANY,DENY11: TCP,INPUT,129.110.96.117,ANY,129.110.96.80,22,DENY12: TCP,INPUT,129.110.96.117,ANY,129.110.96.80,80,DENY13: UDP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,129.110.96.80,ANY,DENY14: UDP,OUTPUT,129.110.96.80,ANY,129.110.10.*,ANY,DENY15: TCP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,129.110.96.80,22,ACCEPT16: TCP,INPUT,*.*.*.*,ANY,129.110.96.80,80,ACCEPT17: UDP,INPUT,129.110.*.*,53,129.110.96.80,ANY,ACCEPT18: UDP,OUTPUT,129.110.96.80,ANY,129.110.*.*,53,ACCEPT
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Worm Detection: Introduction
0 What are worms?
- Self-replicating program; Exploits software vulnerability on a victim; Remotely infects other victims
0 Evil worms
- Severe effect; Code Red epidemic cost $2.6 Billion
0 Goals of worm detection
- Real-time detection
0 Issues
- Substantial Volume of Identical Traffic, Random Probing
0 Methods for worm detection
- Count number of sources/destinations; Count number of failed connection attempts
0 Worm Types
- Email worms, Instant Messaging worms, Internet worms, IRC worms, File-sharing Networks worms
0 Automatic signature generation possible
- EarlyBird System (S. Singh -UCSD); Autograph (H. Ah-Kim - CMU)
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Email Worm Detection using Data Mining
Training data
Feature extraction
Clean or Infected ?
Outgoing Emails
ClassifierMachine Learning
Test data
The Model
Task: given some training instances of both “normal” and “viral” emails, induce a hypothesis to detect “viral” emails.
We used:Naïve BayesSVM
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Assumptions
0 Features are based on outgoing emails.
0 Different users have different “normal” behaviour.
0 Analysis should be per-user basis.
0 Two groups of features
- Per email (#of attachments, HTML in body, text/binary attachments)
- Per window (mean words in body, variable words in subject)
0 Total of 24 features identified
0 Goal: Identify “normal” and “viral” emails based on these features
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Feature sets
- Per email features= Binary valued Features
Presence of HTML; script tags/attributes; embedded images; hyperlinks;
Presence of binary, text attachments; MIME types of file attachments
= Continuous-valued FeaturesNumber of attachments; Number of words/characters in
the subject and body- Per window features
= Number of emails sent; Number of unique email recipients; Number of unique sender addresses; Average number of words/characters per subject, body; average word length:; Variance in number of words/characters per subject, body; Variance in word length
= Ratio of emails with attachments
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Data Mining Approach
Classifier
SVM Naïve Bayesinfected?
Clean?
Clean
Clean/ Infected
Clean/ Infected
Test instance
Test instance
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Data set
0 Collected from UC Berkeley.- Contains instances for both normal and viral emails.
0 Six worm types:
- bagle.f, bubbleboy, mydoom.m,
- mydoom.u, netsky.d, sobig.f
0 Originally Six sets of data:
- training instances: normal (400) + five worms (5x200)
- testing instances: normal (1200) + the sixth worm (200)0 Problem: Not balanced, no cross validation reported0 Solution: re-arrange the data and apply cross-validation
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Our Implementation and Analysis
0 Implementation
- Naïve Bayes: Assume “Normal” distribution of numeric and real data; smoothing applied
- SVM: with the parameter settings: one-class SVM with the radial basis function using “gamma” = 0.015 and “nu” = 0.1.
0 Analysis
- NB alone performs better than other techniques
- SVM alone also performs better if parameters are set correctly- mydoom.m and VBS.Bubbleboy data set are not sufficient (very low detection
accuracy in all classifiers)
- The feature-based approach seems to be useful only when we have
identified the relevant features
gathered enough training data
Implement classifiers with best parameter settings
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Current Directions
0 Data mining for Botnet detection
0 Data mining for active defense