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Religious Freedom Jurisprudence
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I. Local Jurisprudence
Register of Deeds vs. Ung Si Su Temple
Facts:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record
a deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino
citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2,
block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered
religious organization UngSiu Si Temple, operating through three trustees all of
Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,
founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter
and its trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of
the Rizal Register of Deeds, stating that
this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the
provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said
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Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko
vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should
not be admitted for registration." (Printed Rec. App. pp. 17-18).
Counsel for the done UySiu Si Temple appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming:
(1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and
permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:
"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of
whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine
Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold
land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or
educational or charitable institutions.
"SECTION. 2.Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall
hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations;
. . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates Article III, Section 1 (7) or the
freedom of religion clause of the Constitution.
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Issue:
Whether or not the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is
authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission
Whether or not the refusal of the Register of Deeds to accept the Deed of
Donation violates Article III, Section 1 (7) of the Constitution
Held:
In view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution,
the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed
repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In
providing that,
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines",
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there
any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of
public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the
Philippines).
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The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not
suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of
foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to
ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit
natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos, and the spirit of the Constitution
demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be
composed of Filipino citizens.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the
freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means
convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the
Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee
simple. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
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Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., herein represented by Prof.
Abdulrafih H. Sayedy,petitioner, vs. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office
of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by Hon. Alberto G. Romulo,
Executive Secretary, and the Office on Muslim Affairs, herein represented by its
Executive Director, Habib Mujahab Hashim, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) a corporation that
operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a
non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic
organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional
Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World
Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications
in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,
orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal
and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules
and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection
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thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a
fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for
use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office
under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO
46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to
oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal'
Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In
said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal
certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis
and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to
food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they
violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers
stopped securing certifications from it.A petition for prohibition was filed by petitioner
praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the
prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
Issue:
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Whether or not Executive Order No. 46 violates Article II, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution on the separation of Church and State
Whether or not subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution
Whether or not respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the
integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino societywith due regard to their
beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,
the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it
violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found
in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
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believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General
argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By
delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks
to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health, and to instill health
consciousness in them.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even
on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning
to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of
the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered
to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market
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are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not
encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.
Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the power to
inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the
meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as "The Consumer
Act of 1992," gives to certain government departments the duty to protect the interests of
the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for
business and industry. To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is
required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned
department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards.
One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has
the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable
definition and standard of identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers
for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are not
adulterated.
Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales
acts or practices as defined in Article 50. DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair
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packaging to enable the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality
and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the
value of such products.
With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the
quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of muslim and
non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of
food products (Articles 74 to 85) of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the
State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food products released in the
market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements.
Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectlyaids muslim
consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the
meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile,
BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality
standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers
are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that,
according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular
steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to health is
protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come
forward as the official religious approvalof a food product fit for muslim consumption.
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We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central
administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for
profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact
that muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains
non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable
and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product,
they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the
concerned certifying organization.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. Executive Order 46, s.2011 is hereby declared null
and void. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same.
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Gil Balbuna, et al., petitioners and appellants, vs. The Honorable Secretary of
Education, et al., respondents and appellees
Facts:
The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s.
1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the
conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No.
1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it
allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights;
that it denies them due process of law and equal protection of the laws; and that it
unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the
petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the
issue ultimately boils down to the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which
promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not
having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act
638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an
undue delegation of police power
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Held:
In relation to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is
likewise true that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the
force of law. Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank
which provided for penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that
influenced the rationaleof those decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does
not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag
ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely
the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities
are bound to maintain.
As observed in Gerona vs .Secretary of Education, supra,
". . . for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag
salute, they were not being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally
prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the flag
salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. . . . Having
elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.
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Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for
being an undue delegation of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and
definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of
those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view
we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as follows:
"Section 1.All educational institutions shall henceforth, observe daily flag
ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include and playing
or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
"Section 2.The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to
issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of
the flag ceremony herein provided."
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard,
to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National
Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the
Courts: "public interest" (People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328): "public welfare"
(Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); "interest of law and order"
(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of
the case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pagil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and
efficient instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz.,
6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no
objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of
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standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the
statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to
destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.
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Iglesia ni Cristo, complainantvs. Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella, Court of First
Instance of Abra, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent judge was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming a member of the bench for including in a decision penned by him,
statements offensive to the members of the Iglesiani Cristo sect to wit: ". . . It cannot,
therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was retorted to as a gimmick of
showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general
that the Iglesia ni Cristo inhesitatingly helps its members of his/her problem."
In his comment, respondent judge alleged that such statements complained of
are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence presented.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judges remarks about the Iglesia ni Cristo were
offensive
Held:
Under the freedom of religion guarantee, no one, much less a public official, is
privileged to characterize the actuation of edherents of a religious sect in a derogatory sense.
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Respondent judge was admonished to be much more careful in the use of language likely to
offend an individual or religious sect.
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Gregorio Aglipay, petitioner, vs. Juan Ruiz, respondent.
Facts:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President
of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. Said
stamps were issued and sold, but a great part remained unsold. Petitioner seeks the issuance
from the Supreme Court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of respondent in issuing and selling said stamps is a
violation of the provisions of Article VI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
Respondent issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No.
4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view. Instead, it gave the Director of Posts
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discretionary power to determine if issuance would be advantageous to the government. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Church. What was emphasized is not
the Eucharistic Congress, but the City of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. Main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
completed.
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Martin Centeno, petitioner, vs. Hon. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and the People of The
Philippines, respondents.
Facts:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as
the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ngTikaylaunched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating
the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the
group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed
against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the
Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No.
2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for
a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court,
and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits
ensued.
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Issue:
Whether or not the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include religious solicitation
Held:
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in
the exercise of police power. However, in this case, considering that solicitations intended
for religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.
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American Bible Society,plaintiff-appellant, vs. City of Manila, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine
agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral
in said City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation)
throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May
29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing
itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to
secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in
the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Issue:
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Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and
2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid
Held:
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City
of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated
before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of beliefs, We find that
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation
of the plaintiff.
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Fernando Ignacio and Simeon De La Cruz, petitioners-appellants, vs. The
Honorable Norbeto Ela, Mayor of Sta. Zambales, respondent-appellee.
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly
known as Jehovah's Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those
professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "FACE THE FACTS", that society
branded the latter as a religious organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now
appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth." Desiring to hold a meeting in
furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to use the
public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent
allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He
adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious
denomination as it is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used "for legal purposes." And
when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners instituted the present action
for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an
abdrigement of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by the
Constitution
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Held:
The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though
guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it
may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious
to the rights of the community or society", and this power may be exercised under the
"police power" of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents
the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk, for the purposes
for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as
chief executive in connection with his specific duty "to issue orders relating to the police
or to public safety" within the municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised
Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been
adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public
property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3,
section 23, Article VI of the Constitution).
The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or
arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public
plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic
Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part
of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of
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untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any
religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted
by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent
never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the
northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were
denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to
regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering
that the tenets of petitioners' congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman
Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying their
request.
Verily, the pretense of petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that
portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it
to be contrary to the policy of the municipality.
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The Province of Abra, represented by Ladislao Ancheta, Provincial Assessor,
petitioner, vs. Honorable Harold M. Hernando, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance Abra; The Roman Catholic Bishop
of Bangued, Inc., represented by Bishop Odilo Etspueler and Reverend Felipe
Flores, respondents.
Facts:
The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed a petition for
declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes,
its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable
purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a
summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side
of petitioner. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial
of procedural due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued,
Inc., are exempted from taxation
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Held:
The petitioner was right in seeking necessary proof as the law frowns on
exemptions from taxation; hence respondent judges failure to accord a hearing
therefore was in violation of the constitutional command of procedural due process.
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ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA,
NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon.
NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc
City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO
LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO,
Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer
LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.
Facts:
A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council
with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to
Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a
plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the
saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast
day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the
custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to
return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a
replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and
his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions
relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay
council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay
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Held:
On petition for review, the Supreme Court held, that the absence of the
Kabataang Barangay chairman, despite due notice from the sessions of the barangay
council, did not render the resolutions then adopted void since there was a quorum;
and that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision
since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, and in
connection with a socio- religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities.
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Epicharis T. Garcia, petitioner, vs. The Faculty Administration Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, herein represented by Fr. Antonio B. Lambino,
respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975
to pursue graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology but was denied re-
admission in the following semester. She contended that the reason given by
respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties were
not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class," is
not a valid ground for her expulsion. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that
petitioner was admitted in the Summer of 1975 not to a degree program but merely
to take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree program requires
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School and no such acceptance
was given; that respondent has discretion to admit or continue admitting in said
school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards
but also other factors such as personality traits, character orientation in relation with
other students, space limitations, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size;
and that there was no clear duty to admit petitioner since the school of theology is a
seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying
for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
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Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to compel the Faculty Administration
Committee to allow her to continue studying in the said educational institution
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and held that the academic
freedom expressly granted by the Constitution to "institutions of higher learning" involves
two kinds of freedom: that which is enjoyed by the university as a corporate body to
determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admittedly to study, and that which is accorded to a university professor to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as he sees it in the field of his competence. Universities
and colleges, should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to
whom to admit or reject.
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MVRS Publications, Inc., Mars C. Laconsay, Myla C. Aguja and Agustino G.
Binegas, Jr., petitioners, vs. Islamic Da'Wah Council Of The Philippines, Inc.,
Abdul-Rahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F.P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, Al-
Fared Da Silva and Ibrahim B.A. Junio, respondents
Facts:
Respondents, the ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a
local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims, filed
a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit, against MVRS Publications,
Inc. (MVRS) arising from an article published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly
contained libelous statement that alluded to the pig as the God of the Muslims, and this was
published with intent to disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the article
were not specifically identified. The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the petitioners to
pay damages to private respondents Muslims to whom it was clear the defamation was
directed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners had the legal standing to institute a class suit against
respondents
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands,
petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO,
as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive
Minister, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
In 1933, private respondent, a corporation sole duly existing under Philippine
laws, acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez,
who had possessed the property since 1933 and had declared the same for tax
purposes. On September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an application for
registration of the two lots pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging
that it and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the ground that the
Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold
alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for is a public land.
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of
private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.
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United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines (UEUGIP),
petitioner, vs. Hon. Carmelo Noriel, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations;
George A. Eduvala, Representation Officer, Bureau of Labor Relations; and
National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the
Philippines (GATCORD), respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Union seeks to declare null and void the certificate election conducted and
supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations in Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc. on the
ground of irregularity, lack of fairness, and violation of procedural due process. Its objection
thereto was predicated on the wilful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice of
certification election and sample ballot by a non-contending party which caused confusion in
the minds of independent workers and demoralization in the ranks of those inclined to favor
it, and the electioneering of nuns and priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private
respondent union which garnered the highest number of votes in said election. This last
point was raised as a ground in a protest filed by petitioner.
Private respondent union stoutly denied the imputation of irregularity and clarified matters
by a factual presentation of what transpired.
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Issue:
Whether or not there was a willful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice
of certification election and sample ballots
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled for the respondents, it being obvious that the grievance
spoken of by the petitioner was more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and
demoralization based on conjecture rather than on reality and that petitioner did not choose
to press the point of alleged participation by nuns and priest.
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Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and Yiu Yek See,petitioners, vs.
Lydia Basa, Anthony Sayheeliam and Yao Chek, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria were
members of a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly
Hall), Incorporated" which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1973. The members of the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the
absolute power to admit and expel a member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board
of Directors observed that certain members of the church including petitioners herein
exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and
interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they persist in their highly
improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the Church. However,
petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners' conduct will
continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the Board of
Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership list
certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29,
1993, petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities
Investigation and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the
August 30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground
that it was made without prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer
Manuel Perea ruled, among others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church
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By-laws. In a petition for certiorari, the SEC en bancaffirmed the Perearuling. Petitioners
did not appeal the said decision. Since the said SEC en bancdecision pertained only to the
preliminary injunction incident, the SEC, through a hearing panel, conducted further
proceedings. Petitioners filed motions to dismiss/strike out the counterclaim and third-
party complaint, but those motions were denied. Upon denial of the separate motions for
reconsideration of both parties, the respondents filed with the SEC en banca petition for
review questioning the validity of the expulsion. The SEC en bancissued an order setting
aside the expulsion of certain members of the Church. The private respondents filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order
of the SEC en banc.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion made by the SEC en bancin its July 11, 1994 decision is
valid
Held:
The Court emphasized that the issue of the validity of the expulsion had
long been resolved and declared valid by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 11,
1994 in SEC EB Case No. 389. The petitioners themselves admitted in their present
petition that they did not appeal anymore from the July 11, 1994 decision of the SEC en
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banc, thereby rendering the same final and conclusive. As such, the expulsion order is
now inextricably binding on the parties concerned and can no longer be modified, much
less reversed.
Further, the provision on expulsion under the CHURCH By-Laws, as phrased,
may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior
notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed
that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the
latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases,
membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no
room for dissension in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a
religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and
teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is
that such action from the church authorities is conclusiveupon the civil courts.
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Alejandro Estrada, complainant,vs. Soledad S. Escritor, respondent.
Facts:
Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, who admittedly, while still married to another,
cohabited since 1980 to Luciano Quilapio, Jr., who was himself married to another. Escritor
and Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son. The private complainant herein was not personally
related to Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare
as immoral the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio in consonance with the pertinent
provision of the Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the
rules of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of which she is a member, the act of signing
a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise
be classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the
foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991,
and by virtue of such act, they are for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the
religious denomination of which they are devout adherents.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should be carved out as an
exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees are held administratively liable
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Held:
The Supreme Court resolved to remand this case to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General was ordered to intervene in the case where it will be
given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claim of
religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to
override respondent's religious belief and practice: and (c) to show that the means the state
adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
Court also ordered the setting of the rehearing of the case.
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Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, Tirso Santillan, Jr., Ma. Luisa Andal, Nieva
Malinis, Ricardo Lavina, Cesar Cortes, Danilo Reyes, Jose Reyes, Josefina
Mate, Lourdes Calma, Mildred Juan, Olive Guanzon, Fernando Cochico,
Sherman Cid, Nazareno Bentulan, Roslina Donaire, Mario Martinez, Beatriz
Teylan, Angelina Lapid, Rosemarie Flores, Daniel Van Soto, Edgardo
Mercader, Nelly Agustin, Marily Magcalas, David Chan, Arsenio Salansang,
Nelson De Guzman, Marciano Araneta, Cesar Meneses, Dionisio Rellosa,
Mario Santiago, Severino Santos, Leonora Santos, Nimfa Doronilla, Florence
Guinto, Rosalina Manansala, Percival Ostonal, Tommy Macaranas, Roger
Nicandro,petitioners, vs. Gen. Santiago Barangan and Major Isabela Lariosa,
respondents.
Facts:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of
about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street,
Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which
adjoins the Malacaang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the now familiar
inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched
fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were
barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-
respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that
St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. When petitioners'
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protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the church proved unavailing, they
decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given them by respondent
Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future
would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear
mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and
the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from
entering and worshipping at said church They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention
was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government
demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the
Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with
a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-
shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-
government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is valid
Held:
Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion,
but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This
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Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts of Iligan City (Office
Hours)
Facts:
In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M.
Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts
in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:
1.to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or
coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan;
2.to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to
hold office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan.
However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year.
Issue:
Whether or not Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city can be
excused from work on the periods aforementioned
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month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar
treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those
belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public.
Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with
reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year,
is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from
compliance with the prescribed government working hours.
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Dominador L. Taruc, Wilberto Dacera, Nicanor Galanida, Renerio Canta, Jerry
Canrta, Cordencio Consigna, Susano Alacala, Leonardo Dizon, Salvador Gelsano and
Benito Laugo, petitioners, vs. Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz, Rev. Fr. Rustom
Florano and Delfin Bordas, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the
bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by
Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de
la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano's wife
belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the
two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife's political camp. Bishop de la
Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.
Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. On
June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded to hold the open
mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant. cdtai2005
On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the Philippine Independent Church for reasons of:
(1)disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;
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(2)inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of
Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del
Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19,
1996; and
(3)for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and
fear among the general membership.
Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the above
decision
In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and
was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang. Like his predecessor, Bishop Timbang did not
find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. He issued a circular
denying petitioners' persistent clamor for the transfer/re-assignment of Fr. Florano.
Petitioners were informed of such denial but they continued to celebrate mass and hold
other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who had been restrained from performing any
priestly functions in the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao del Norte.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on
the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and
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excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it
was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo and ordered
the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being refiled before the proper forum.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution
Held:
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that:
Sec. 5.No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights. cdlaws06
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The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization
is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in
the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
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II. Foreign Jurisprudence
COX v. NEW HAMPSHIRE, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
312 U.S. 569
COX et al.
v.
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
No. 502.
Argued March 7, 1941.
Decided March 31, 1941.
Facts:
Appellants are five 'Jehovah's Witnesses' who, with sixty-three others of the same
persuasion, were convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for
violation of a state statute prohibiting a 'parade orprocession' upon a public street without a
special license.
After their arrest, the group sued the state for violating their Fourteenth Amendment
rights to freedom of speech, press, worship, and assembly.
Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of these appellants before a jury in the
Superior Court, the other defendants having agreed to abide by the final decision in that
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summary, "No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense
is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and
processions."
This decision allows states to impose licensing fees for people who want to have parades
or processions. The State faces increased costs in policing and overseeing parades so they are
permitted to pass some of these expenses on to the groups conducting these events. The requiring
of licenses is consistent with allowing time and place restrictions to prevent a public
inconvenience.
In the instant case, we are aided by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State which
construed the statute and defined the limitations of the authority conferred for the granting of
licenses for parades and processions. The court observed that if the clause of the Act requiring a
license 'for all open-air public meetings upon land contiguous to a highway' was invalid, that
invalidity did not nullify the Act in its application to the other situations described. Recognizing
the importance of the civil liberties invoked by appellants, the court thought it significant that the
statute prescribed 'no measures for controlling or suppressing the publication on the highways of
facts and opinions, either by speech or by writing'; that communication 'by the distribution of
literature or by the display of placards and signs' was in no respect regulated by the statute; that
the regulation with respect to parades and processions was applicable only 'to organized
formations of persons using the highways'; and that 'the defendants separately or collectively in
groups not constituting a parade or procession', were 'under no contemplation of the act'. In this
light, the court thought that interference with liberty of speech and writing seemed slight; that the
distribution of pamphlets and folders by the groups 'traveling in unorganized fashion' would have
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had as large a circulation, and that 'signs carried by members of the groups not in marching
formation would have been as conspicuous, as published by them while in parade or procession'.
There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair and
non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to require.
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Issue:
Whether or not a taxpayer has standing to sue the government to prevent an
unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds.
Held:
Surely it is plain that the rights and interests of taxpayers who contest the
constitutionality of public expenditures are markedly different from those of "Hohfeldian"
plaintiffs,including those taxpayer-plaintiffs who challenge the validity of their own tax
liabilities. We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs complain, just as the
petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as taxpayers, but as "private attorneys-
general."The interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal
or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at
random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.
Although various efforts have been made in Congress to authorize public actions to
contest the validity of federal expenditures in aid of religiously affiliated schools and other
institutions, no such authorization has yet been given.
The Court ruled that the taxpayers could sue the federal government if its spending
violated a specific limitation on its power.
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GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
401 U.S. 437
GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 85.
Argued December 9, 1970
Decided March 8, 1971
Facts:
Petitioner in No. 85, who was convicted for failure to report for induction, and
petitioner in No. 325, who sought discharge from the armed forces upon receipt of orders
for Vietnam duty, claim exemption from military service because of their conscientious
objection to participation in the Vietnam conflict, as an "unjust" war, pursuant to 6 (j) of the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967. That section provides that no person shall be subject
to "service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Petitioners also
challenge the constitutionality of 6 (j) as construed to cover only objectors to all war, as
violative of the Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=401&invol=437#f*http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=401&invol=437#f* -
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This decision limited itself to assessing the constitutionality of the Congressional
limitations on conscientious objection. Marshall stated "Of course we do not suggest that
Congress would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who
object to particular wars." People are now required to become religious pacifists if they wish
to be exempt from military service.
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HAMILTON v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF., 293 U.S. 245
(1934)
293 U.S. 245
HAMILTON et al.
v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.*
No. 55.
Argued Oct. 17-18, 1934.
Decided Dec. 3, 1934.
[293 U.S. 245, 246] Messrs. John Beardsley, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Gregory Hankin, of
Washington, D.C., for appellants.
[293 U.S. 245, 249] Mr. John U. Calkins, Jr., of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees. [293 U.S.
245, 250]
Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Facts:
Each of these minors registered, became a student in the University, and fully
conformed to all its requirements other than that compelling him to take the course in
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military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps which they assert to be an
integral part of the military establishment of the United States and not connected in any way
with the militia or military establishment of the state. The courses in military. The regents
require enrollment and participation of ablebodied male students who are citizens of the
United States. These courses include instruction in rifle marksmanship, scouting and
patrolling, drill and command, musketry, combat principles, and use of automatic rifles.
Arms, equipment, and uniforms for use of students in such courses are furnished by the War
Department of the United States government.
These minors are members of the Methodist Episcopal Church and of the Epworth
League and connected religious societies and organizations. For many years their fathers
have been ordained ministers of that church. Because the Methodist Episcopal Church in
her General Conference of 1928 has declared: 'We renounce war as an instrument of
national policy.' Because our nation led the nations of the world in signing the Paris Peace
Pact, and the Constitution of the United States, Article 6, Section 2, provides that: 'This
Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and
all treaties made under authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land'.
The regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt these students. Then,
because of their religious and conscientious objections, they declined to take the prescribed
course, and solely upon that ground the regents by formal notification suspended them from
the University, but with leave to apply for readmission at any time conditioned upon their
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States are permitted to, and have an interest in, creating a citizenry capable of serving
in the country's military. Attendance in the University of California is a privilege in which the
students want to partake. "Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants'
contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to be students in the
State University free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of
attendance." Such a position is not constitutionally supportable. Just as states have a duty to
protect their citizens, citizens have a reciprocal duty to aid in defending their states.
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JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)
316 U.S. 584
JONES
v.
CITY OF OPELIKA.
BOWDEN et al.
v.
CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARK.
JOBIN
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA.
Nos. 280, 314, and 966.
Argued Feb. 5, April 30, 1942.
Decided June 8, 1942.
Facts:
The City of Opelika, Alabama, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Lee County
charging petitioner Jones with violation of its licensing ordinance by selling books without a
license, by operating as a Book Agent without a license, and by operating as a transient
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agent, dealer or distributor of books without a license. Petitioner demurred, alleging that the
ordinance because of unlimited discretion in revocation and requirement of a license was an
unconstitutional encroachment upon freedom of the press. During the trial without a jury
these contentions, with the added claim of interference with freedom of religion, were
renewed at the end of the city's case, and at the close of all the evidence. The court overruled
these motions, and found petitioner guilty on evidence that without a license he had been
displaying pamphlets in his upraised hand and walking on a city street selling them two for
five cents.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation both of rights to freedoms of the press and
religion.
Held:
Freedom of press and religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least
be entitled to the same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that
the more general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce.
Whatever doubts may be entertained as to this Court's function to relieve, unaided by
Congressional legislation, from burdensome taxation under the commerce clause, it cannot
be thought that that function is wanting under the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech,
press and religion. In any case the flat license tax can hardly become any the less
burdensome or more permissible, when levied on activities within the protection extended
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by the First and Fourteenth Amendments both to the orderly communication of ideas,
educational and religious, to persons willing to receive them, and to the practice of religion
and the solicitation of funds in its support.
The Court upheld the statute because it only covered individuals engaged in a
commercial activity rather than a religious ritual.
Individual rights must be balanced against competing rights of the state. The fact that
a person is engaged in disseminating religious materials does not place his action above
regulation by the state. [W]hen, as in these cases, the practitioners of these noble callings
choose to utilize the vending of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds, the
financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disregarded. To subject any
religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their money-making activities does not
require a finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It is enough that money is
earned by the sale of articles.When traditional means of distribution are used by religious
groups, they can be held to the same standards as non-religious groups. Because Jones did
not have a license revoked arbitrarily by the state he has no standing to challenge that part of
the statute.
This decision forces religious groups to meet the same requirements as non-religious
groups engaged in a similar activity. The fact that they are selling religious materials does not
exempt them from statutes regulating commercial acts.
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(and its property) from the general church, or whether the local church is inseparably
integrated into and subordinate to the general church.
The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision by a 5-4 vote. The case was
ordered for re-argument before these lower courts.
The general principle of "Neutral Principles of Law" can be used to resolve
ownership disputes within a church. "The state has an obvious and legitimate interest in the
peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership
of church property can be determined conclusively." In this case, the state court did not
properly articulate the grounds for its decision because this dispute was not between the
church hierarchy and a local church but was between two factions of a local church. If the
laws and regulations of the general church matter, deference to the local church's identity
may be made by representatives of the church hierarchy. The NPoL can be used as long as
the courts do not consider any religious doctrines. The lower courts can independently
decide which criteria to use.
The Court asserted the interest in the state's settling of disputes regarding religious
property. However, it failed to explicate which criteria should be used. Rather, it stated that
one of these criterion cannot be religious doctrine.
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Issue:
Whether or not the State can exercise its reserved power to control this property
without invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses.
Held:
The State cannot exercise its reserved power to control this property without
invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses. I forbear
discussion of the extent to which restraints imposed upon Congress by the First
Amendment are transferred against the State by the Fourteenth Amendment beyond saying
that I consider that the same differences which apply to freedom of speech and .
The fact that property is dedicated to a religious use cannot, in my opinion, justify the
Court in sublimating an issue over property rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty
which alone would bring in the religious guaranties of the First Amendment. I assume no
one would pretend that the State cannot decide a claim of trespass, larceny, conversion,
bailment or contract, where the property involved is that of a religious corporation or is put
to religious use, without invading the principle of religious liberty.
The Supreme Court ruled that the New York statute improperly involved the state
with an internal church dispute.
The New York law violates the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting the parishioners'
rights to freely exercise their religion. In the statute transferring church control to American
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LEE v. WEISMAN, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
505 U.S. 577
ROBERT E. LEE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRINCIPAL OF
NATHAN BISHOP MIDDLE SCHOOL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. DANIEL WEISMAN ETC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 90-1014
Argued November 6, 1991
Decided June 24, 1992
Facts:
Principals of public middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island, are
permitted to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their
schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to
offer such prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the rabbi a
pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic ceremonies,
and advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. Shortly before the ceremony, the
District Court denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah's father, for a temporary
restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the ceremony.
Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and the prayers were recited. Subsequently,
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Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners, various
Providence public school officials, from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and
benedictions at future graduations. It appears likely that such prayers will be conducted at
Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing
the practice at issue on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or notthe graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause.
Held:
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the graduation prayer violated the
Establishment Clause.
The government's involvement in the religious exercise at graduation is 'pervasive'.
The prayers violate the earlier rulings preventing school sponsored prayer. The state places
both public and peer pressure on students to take rise for and remain silent during the
prayer.
Although a person might stand for the prayer merely as a sign of respect for others,
such an action could properly be construed as accepting the message. The control held by
teachers and principals over the students' actions forces those graduating to submit to the
standards of behavior.
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MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. v. GOBITIS, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
310 U.S. 586
MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. et al.
v.
GOBITIS et al.
No. 690.
Argued April 25, 1940.
Decided June 3, 1940.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Facts:
Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from
the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part
of a daily school exercise. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to
participate in this ceremony. The ceremony is a familiar one. The right hand is placed on the
breast and the following pledge recited in unison: 'I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the
Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.' While the
words are spoken, teachers and pupils extend their right hands in salute to the flag. The
Gobitis family are affiliated with 'Jehovah's Witnesses', for whom the Bible as the Word of
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God is the supreme authority. The children had been brought up conscientiously to believe
that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of scripture.
Issue:
Whether or not the Constitutional challenge to the law was under Article I, Section 8, to
spend for the general welfare as the expenditure is of a large sum of funds is valid.
Held:
The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil liberties and the
specificity of their command where freedom of speech and of religion are concerned require
some accommodation of the powers which government normally exercises, when no
question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties be
protected against the action of government itself. The state concededly has power to require
and control the education of its citizens, but it cannot by a general law compelling
attendance at public schools preclude attendance at a private school adequate in its
instruction, where the parent seeks to secure for the child the benefits of religious
instruction not provided by the public school. And only recently we have held that the state's
authority to control its public streets by generally applicable regulations is not an absolute to
which free speech must yield, and cannot be made the medium of its suppression. any more
than can its authority to penalize littering of the streets by a general law be used to suppress
the distribution of handbills as a means of communicating ideas to their recipients.
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The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the human mind and
spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them. They presuppose the
right of the individual to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free
expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach and persuade others by
the communication of ideas. The very essence of the liberty which they guaranty is the
freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say,
at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to
have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to
compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious convictions,
whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion.
In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the school district's interest in creating national unity
was sufficient to allow them to require students to salute the flag.
This case requires the Court to balance the religious interests of the Jehovah's
Witness children with the secular interests of the school district. "Conscientious scruples
have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual
from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs. The mere possess