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Introduction Cognitive iinguistic approaches
to humor
GEERTBRONE ^KURT
FEYAERTS ^
and TONY VEALE^
Ever since the publication of Victor Raskin's seminal work on the
Seman
tic Mechanisms of Humor
(1985), l inguistic humor research has had a de-
cidedly cognitive orientation. The cognitive psychological roots of the Se-
mantic Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) presented in the aforementioned
book, have been adopted in a large number of studies that have appeared
since. In this respect, Attardo, in a recent discussion on the cognitive tum
in literary studies, points out th at linguists w ho study hu m or may well
be pleased to find out that they were doing cognitive stylistics all along
(2002: 231). Indeed, the two most influential linguistic humor theories of
the last two decades, the SSTH and the General Theory of Verbal Humor
(GT VH , Attard o and Rask in 1991; A ttard o 1994, 1997, 2001a), along
with a num ber of other theoretical studies (Gio ra 1991; Ko tthoff 1998;
Yus 2003) share some significant features with the broad Hnguistic frame-
work that is the methodological angle of the present thematic issue, viz.
Cognitive Linguistics (CL).
What is Cognitive Linguistics? Although introducing a highly diversi-
fied research endeavor like CL is a book project in itself (see e.g. Taylor
2002; Croft and Cruse 2004; Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2006), we necessar-
ily limit ourselves to the pinpoint motto of the
Cognitive Linguistics Series
(Mouton de Gruyter) :
Cognitive Linguistics subsumes a variety ofconcernsand broadly compatible the-
oretical approaches that have a common basic outlook; that language is an inte-
gral facet of cognition which reflects the interaction of social, cultural, psycho-
logical, communicative and functional considerations, and which can only be
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G Brone et al
The brief
mission st tement
above can be interpreted as a reaction on two
levels against the formalist, Chomskyan tradition. First, rather than hy-
pothesizing that language is a separate cognitive module in the mind,
with its own principles, CL approaches language as part and parcel of
cognition, guided by general cognitive principles that are not restricted
to linguistic organization. In consequence, one of the major objectives of
cognitive linguists is the study of the reflection of general conceptual
mechanisms in language and linguistic structure. Second, the phrase a
realistic view of acquisition, cognitive development and mental process-
ing can be interpreted as a reaction against the generative-linguistic hy-
pothesis that grammar is essentially innate ( Universal Grammar ), and
exposure to language in use only plays a secondary role in language de-
velopment. CL argues, in contrast, that an individual's knowledge of a
language is based in knowledge of actual usage and of generalizations
made over usage events (Taylor 2002: 27). In other words, grammar is
considered to beusage-based grounded in experience (and hence not as
schematic as the generative gramm ar). This claim has important method-
ological consequences relevant to the present issue. If language acquisi-
tion is a bottom-up process of generalization over usage events, then lin-
guistic analysis should equally be bottom-up and data-driven, starting
from actual language in use and making generalizations/schemas on the
basis of patterns in the usage (rather than working the other way around,
formulating transformations of abstract principles so as to fit the surface
appearance of language). The further methodological implications of this
general CL claim of a usage-based grammar are elaborated in the next
section ( humor theoretical interest in cognitive linguistics ).
Given this somewhat simplifying description of CL, it should be noted
that the SSTH and GTVH both share with cognitive linguistics the funda-
mental interest in the interrelationship between language and cognition in
language use. In general, most recent linguistic humor research makes the
same basic assumption with respect to humor that cognitive linguistics
does with respect to linguistic structure in general, viz. that (humorous)
language is not to be treated as an isolated, autonomous cognitive phe-
nomenon. On the face of it, this observation may appear trivial, since
there seems to be general agreement that understanding verbal (as well
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ntrodu tion 205
artificially drawn boundaries between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
that have been proposed in formalist theories of language. This question-
ing of traditional boundaries in linguistic structure is one of the comer-
stones of cognitive linguistics, since it aims at uncovering the role of do-
main general conceptualization principles at all levels of linguistic
structure.
This overlap in the basic philosophy of both traditions opens up re-
search perspectives for both cognitive linguists and humor researchers.
Thus ,
the aim of the present issue, dedicated to studies that analyze vari-
ous semantic aspects of verbal humor from the perspective of cognitive
linguistics, is essentially twofold. First, by embedding the linguistic study
of humor within a larger terminological-conceptual framework that
claims a cognitive-functional perspective, like cognitive linguistics, htim or
researchers are urged to treat htmiorous language in relation (and in con-
trast) to general patterns of hnguistic and cognitive structure rather than
in isolation. In o ther w ords, ad op ting the too ls developed in cognitive lin-
guistics can shed new light on the specific semantic construal of humorous
texts an d the m ar k ed chara cter tha t these texts are generally considered
to have (Giora 1991,
2003;
Kotthoff 1998). Second, from the perspective
of cognitive linguistics, a linguistic framework that claims a focus on the
cross-cognitive and conceptual aspects of language use should be able to
natura lly cover cases of linguistic expressivity tha t are mo tivated thro ug h
the marked, non-prototypical use of the everyday cognitive mechanisms
described in that paradigm. After all , humor is interpreted on the fly in
everyday discourse, just hke the other cases of figurative lan gu ag e cog-
nitive linguistics has given center stage to, l ike metaphor, metonymy and
conceptual integration. And just l ike these other cases, the study of hu-
mor can yield interesting insights into some of the specifics of cognitive
processing, insights that extend beyond the perspective of linguistic hu-
mor theories alone. In the following paragraphs, both the htimor theoret-
ical interest in cognitive linguistics and the cognitive linguistic importance
of studying humor is discussed in more detail, in order to give an overall
picture of this mutual interest.
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G. roneet al
which promotes the exchange of insights in two directions. The true chal-
lenge for both traditions is to explore some of the waste land tha t can
be covered through this cooperative effort (for an argument in favor of a
take-what-you-need strategy, see Ritchie 2004). In this section, we focus
somewhat more on the two cornerstones of the cognitive linguistics para-
digm introduced above, and the interesting implications these assump-
tions have for humor theories.
The first pillar of cognitive linguistics, the one that most clearly sepa-
rates CL from truth-conditional and generative approaches to language,
is the hypothesis thatmeaning isessentially conceptualization (Langack
1987). This view runs counter to the classic formalist belief th at there is a
one-to-one mapping between extemal world and linguistic-conceptual
structure. Rather, dynamic semantic theories like CL argue that situa-
tions can be construed in different ways [. ..
and different ways of en-
coding a situation constitute different conceptualizations (Lee 2001: 2).
In other words, situations can be framed in diflferent ways and these dif-
ferent framings result in a different semantic structure. Bearing in mind
this cognitive linguistic view on language as a recipe for constructing
meaning, a recipe which relies on a lot of independent cognitive activity
(Saeed 1996: 319), the notion of conceptualization processes is of central
importance. Or as Croft and Cruse (2004: 42) put it, in cognitive linguis-
tics conceptualization is the fundamental semantic phenomenon; whether
altemative construals give rise to differences in truth conditions or not is a
derivative semantic fact. So one ofth e tasks cognitive linguists set out to
do is to uncover the conceptualization processes that are used in everyday
language use. Over the last two decades, a whole range ofconstrual
oper
ations
or conceptualization mechanisms have been uncovered (Langacker
1987;Talmy 2000; Taylor 2002; Croft and Cruse 2004). These operations
are considered to be cognitive in nature in that they are active on all levels
of linguistic and conceptual organization, and are instances of more gen-
eral cognitive processes as described in cognitive psychology (Croft and
Cruse 2004: 45). Croft and Cruse present an overview of the vast litera-
ture on construal and propose an altemative, more encompassing (in
comparison to Talmy and Langacker) typology of construal operations,
including the general categories of attention and salience, comparison,
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Introduction
207
humor. And indeed, linguistic humor researchers have focussed on the
functionality of some of these operations in the semantics of jokes and
other humorous texts. For example, one of the fundamental construal
mechanisms that underlie various semantic phenomena, is
comparison
which has been developed in phenomenology and cognitive psychology.
And the most powerful reflection of this basic cognitive faculty is the hu-
man need for categorization or
framing
i.e. viewing a linguistic expres-
sion against the background of a frame of reference or prior experience.
The hypothesis
that frames
(or scripts) as structured categories grounded
in experience (Fillmore 1982) play an essential role in producing and
comprehending linguistic utterances has not only been extremely influen-
tial in the development of the semantic theory of cognitive hnguistics, but
is also the foundation ofthe SSTH and GTVH . The SSTH (Raskin 1985)
basically argues that jokes revolve around the opposition, overlap and
switch between two (or more) scripts or frames. Jokes, on this view, are
partly or fully compatible with two diflerent, (con)textually opposed
scripts, only one of which is saliently activated in the flrst part of the
text. The punch line of
th
joke turns out to be incompatible with the flrst
script interpretation incongruity), but there is a lexical cue in the text
(script-switch trigger) that enables the switch or shift from the first inter-
pretation to the second, backgrounded script
resolution).
Coulson (2000)
and Coulson et al. (this issue) elaborate on this idea with a discussion of
frame shifting within a larger cognitive linguistic framework of language
comprehension, labeled thespace structuringmodel. It is argued that this
model better accounts for the influence of context in meaning construc-
tion and the flexib le mechanisms that are involved in that process than
the SSTH and GTV H. The psychological reahty of frame-shifting is sub-
sequently tested in a num ber of psycho- and neurolinguistic experiments.
The minimalist description above of the basic semantic idea of the
SSTH and Coulson s approach touches upon a second principle of con-
strual that has gained increasing interest in both cognitive linguistics and
humor research, viz.
salience.
Jokes, it is argued, typically have a first,
contextually salient interpretation that is discarded at the punch line in
favor of a more marked reading (Giora
1991:
470). But as Giora has ex-
tensively argued, salience, defined as the coded meanings that are fore-
grounded in our mind, plays a central role not only in humor, but in a
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G. Brone et al.
general (Giora 2002, 2003). According to Giora'sgr ded s lience hypoth-
esis salient information is always accessed before any other, less salient
information, and this very general organizational principle is exploited
in many types of expressive language use, like novel metaphor, pun-
ning, irony, and humor.
Apart from the function of salience and framing, other general concep-
tualization mechanisms have been treated, directly or indirectly, at vari-
ous places in the humor literature, likefigure groundconstellations (Hof-
stadter and Gabora 1989: 422; Attardo and Raskin 1991: 303; Attardo
2001a: 19; borrowed from Talmy 1978), metaphor (Pollio 1996, based
on Lakoif's conceptual metaphor theory), and conceptual mappings in
general (Attardo et al. 2002). But since it is not our intention to give a
full review of all of these points of contact in the domain of semantic
principles, we will not further explore these issues here (for a more de-
tailed overview, see Brone and Feyaerts 2003). The basic intention of this
rough sketch is to illustrate some of the commonalities in the semantic
construal of different types of language use and open up new perspectives
for research exploring exactly this question of how everyday cognitive
mechanisms are exploited in various ways for humorous, stylistic, or
other purposes.
Despite this obvious movement towards cognitively motivated seman-
tic humor analysis, the tension between marked and unmarked semantic
construal, which can be plotted using the meaning construction mecha-
nisms of CL, and which accounts for the effect of unexpectedness or in-
congruity (Kotthoff 1998: 50), has not been explored to its fullest in
most of the linguistic humor research. The contributions to the present
issue are intended to open this debate. As mentioned above, the implica-
tions of these studies are not relevant to humor research alone, in that
they illustrate one of the central claims of CL, viz. that the human con-
ceptual system is prototypically structured and highly flexible (see also
the section on cognitive linguistic interest in humor ). The contributions
by Veale et al. and Kotthoff especially draw attention to the heuristic im-
portance of prototypicality for describing humor in terms of ubiquitous
cognitive categories of construal and communication.
One central aspect of construal that has been widely discussed in CL,
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209
defined as the conceptualization of one domain (target) in terms of an-
other domain (source), can be considered as a construal operation, since
the choice of a particular domain for conceptualizing a target inherently
onstrues
the target in a specific fashion (cf. Croft and Cruse 2004: 194).
Although it has been repeatedly pointed out that there is a theoretically
interesting (vague) conceptual boundary between humor and metaphor/
analogy (Koestler 1964; Hofstadter and Gabora 1989), humor theorists
have, until recently, only focused on the potentially humorous ambiguity
of a literal vs.figur tivereading of a metaphorical expression (Alexander
1997; Attardo 1994). Pollio (1996) explores the boundaries in humor and
metaphor, using insights from the interaction theory of metaphor (Black
1962) and the Lakovian approach (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff
1987). It is argued tha t humorous bisociation (to use Koestler s 1964
term) differs from metaphorical conceptualization in the profiling of do-
main boundaries. Whereas metaphors essentially fuse the source and tar-
get to form a single entity (Gestalt), suppressing the obvious domain
boundaries, hum orous stimuli (un)intentionally emphasize the dissimilar-
ities between domains. Veale et al. (this issue) follow a similar argument,
in that they illustrate that in many cases of interactional humor, utter-
ances with an underlying metaphorical (and/or metonymical) structure
are used as a cue for a
trumping strategy
This strategy consists of a
speaker B subverting a speaker A s utterance, e.g. by distorting the
source/target structure of the initial metaphorical utterance.
etonymyin a cognitive hnguistic approach, is generally viewed as a
cognitive mechanism enabling the selection of a salient reference point in
a frame to refer to a different concept in the same frame or to the frame
as a whole (Langacker
1993;
Panther and Radden 1999). This conceptual
approach to metonymy covers phenomena that were previously treated in
pragmatics as inferences or conversational implicatures (Gibbs 1999; Pan-
ther and Thomburg 2003). Given the general agreement that humor in-
terpretation involves complex inferential activity, metonymy can be ar-
gued to play a substantial role in this process. Barcelona (2003) argues
that the inferential work in joke interpretation is facilitated by pre-
existing metonymic connections in a cognitive frame. Metonymic con-
nections, on his account, are the driving force behind the script switching
process (Raskin 1985) that yields the resolution. Brone and Feyaerts
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G
Brone
etal.
de automatization
results in a balanced processing difficulty, which is ar-
gued to contribute to the humorous effect (see also Giora 1991, 2003).
Another construal operation that has only very recently received scru-
tiny in humor research is
viewpoint
If meaning, as advocated in the CL
framework, is essentially construed from a specific perspective, then
adopting a different viewpoint automatically entails a different conceptu-
alization. Of particular interest for humor researchers is the treatment of
viewpoint in mental
spaces
theory(Fauconnier 1994 [1985], 1997). The
theory of mental spaces was introduced to linguistics and cognitive science
to coherently deal with a wide range of problematic semantic phenomena,
such as indirect reference, pragmatic functions (Nunberg 1979), referen-
tial opacity, (counterfactual) conditionals, compositionality, etc. Mental
spaces, on Fauconnier's account, are small conceptual structures that
proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning
of our discourse and knowledge structures (Fauconnier 1997: 11). On
this account, viewpoint is dealt with in terms of different mental spaces:
the viewpoint space is the structure from which others are accessed.
Humor research has only very recently touched upon the relevance of
mental spaces. Ritchie (this issue) argues that the accepted dichotomy be-
tween referential and linguistic jokes is not satisfying, since both create
an event which is open to alternative interpretations, albeit by different
means. By the same token, the generally accepted view that a reader/
hearer of a joke is forced into a reinterpretation from an incorrect to a
correct interpretation of a lexical element or grammatical construction,
thus performing a frame-shifting operation , does not account for all (or
even the majority) of verbal jokes. Ritchie explores a number of jokes
that revolve around a misinterpretation by a story character, and proposes
an account of viewpoint shifts/reinterpretations in terms of mental spaces
(see also Brone forthcoming for a systematic account). Attardo (2001b)
uses a mental space account of
ironical
mode adoption.Mode factive
utterances (i.e. utterances allowing mode adoption), such as irony, meta-
phorical utterances, fiction, etc., trigger the construction of a new mental
space (next to the base/reality space) so as to allow the hearer to avoid
having to reject the utterance as ill-formed. In accordance with dLa-
conmtr s
presupposition
float
principle
(1994 [1985]: 61), it is argued tha
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Introduction
211
indeed provides some articulate tools that have not been fully explored
in linguistic humor theories. Uncovering patterns in the semantics of hu-
morous texts, using these mechanisms, can provide useful insights into
the essentially marked character of these texts. The tension between
normal and marked use (or between prototypical and peripheral use) of
semantic-pragmatic devices seems to play an essential role in the humor
game. One of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the papers
in the present issue is that a prototypical model is needed for the use of
conceptualization operations, differing core cases in conventionalized lan-
guage use from more marked uses. Analogously, from a more pragmatic
point of
view,
the contribution by Kotthoff advocates a highly flexible de-
scription of communication principles in terms of prototypical categories.
The second cornerstone of the cognitive linguistic philosophy of lan-
guage is that linguistic structure is
usage based.
Usage-based models of
language essentially state that a speaker's linguistic system is grounded
in usage events, and hence is experientially driven (Langacker 1987,
1988; Barlow and Kemmer 2000). Langacker (1988: 131) notes concisely
tha t [i]n describing cognitive gra m m ar as a 'usage -base d' m odel of lan-
guage structure, I have in mind the 'maximalist ' , 'non-reductive', and
'bottom-up' character of the general approach (as compared to the mini-
m alist, reductive an d top-dow n spirit of the generative tra dit ion ). If the
linguistic system is indeed inherently tied to usage ( bottom-up ), then
the primary source of information is the actual use of language
in context.
In contrast to most formal approaches to language, CL argues that lin-
guistic and non-linguistic context both play an essential role in the pro-
duction and processing of language. There is no strict boundary between
linguistic and contextual information, in that features of contextual (and
pragmatic) information can, through conventionalization, become part of
the linguistic system as such. The linguistic uttera nce as such merely func-
tions as a cue the processor uses as a starting point in the meaning con-
struction process (supra).
Uncovering the tight interaction between contextual and linguistic un-
derstanding is the main research goal of the steadily growing field of cog-
nitive discourse analysis (La nga cke r 20 01; V an H oe k et al. 1999). One of
the adv anta ges of such a perspective is tha t it can provide a va luable
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212 G. Brone et al.
obvious interest to hiiinor researchers studying the interpersonal and in-
ferential nature of
humor.
On the level of interpersonal dynamics, it needs
to he ohserved that many cases of humor directly or indirectly draw on
collaborative Kotthoff, this issue) and adversarial (Veale et al., this
issue) strategies in interaction. Speakers in running (humorous) discourse
often huild on previously introduced strands or themes (Davies 1984),
and thus either proceed on a humorous topic in collaboration with other
participants, or counter another participant's utterance hy means of ad-
versarial humor strategies (cf. Davies 1984 on the thematic principles of
contradiction and elaboration). The semantics of multi-agent forms of
hum or has been poorly analyzed in hum or research, especially in compar-
ison to the hulk of literature on (canned) jokes, which often does not refer
to the context these jokes are delivered in. Cognitive linguistics explicitly
states that language is grounded in discourse and social interaction (Lan-
gacker 2001: 143), which means that the context of speech and shared
knowledge all play a central role in semantics, and they cannot he sepa-
rated from the core meaning of an utterance. Langacker's notion of a
current discourse
space
defined as a mental space com prising those ele
ments and relations construed as being shared hy the speaker and hearer
as a hasis for com munication at a given moment in the flow of discourse
(2001: 144), illustrates this unified treatment of semantics. On this view,
meaning arises in discourse through a range of
cues,
rather than by sim-
ply processing stored semantic information (see also the papers by Kotth-
off and Coulson et al., this issue).
Apart from the general theoretical importance, positing a usage-based
model of language and conceptualization has major
methodologic l
impli-
cations
as well. Usage-based theories hypothesizing a tight relationship
between linguistic structures and real usage necessarily need to base their
claims on the observation of actual data, rather than on constructed ex-
amples. This has led to a renewed attention to the empirical support of
theoretical claims, both on the level of production and processing.
Pro-
duction
data
can be drawn from corpora collecting usage material. This
way, corpus analysis can chart linguistic variation at all possible levels,
including sociolectic, dialectic, idiolectic, but also expressive variation.
As a central instance of linguistic variation, expressivity and creativity
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213
Data on the
processing
of linguistic input can be drawn from simula-
tion experiments like reading times, priming tests, ERP-analyses, etc.
Vaid et al. 2003) provide an overview of the various accoun ts that hav e
been prop ose d of the different stages of m ean ing ac tivation in jok e com -
prehension. In order to test empirically the conflicting hypotheses in the
literature, the authors used a lexical decision semantic priming experi-
ment to measure the time course of meaning activation. Coulson et al.
this issue) report on a number of studies that test the psychological real-
ity
of frame shifting
supra) in joke com prehens ion. Self-paced reading
times for one-line jok es see also Co ulson a nd K uta s 1998) show th at
jokes that require frame-shifting take longer to process than straight end-
ings.
These da ta suggest th at frame-shifting requires an extra processing
cost. A com plem entary ER P-exp erime nt event-related brain potentials)
was conducted to get a more fine-grained view of the cognitive process
involved in frame-shifting see also Co ulson a nd K ut as 2001). It is argu ed
that a sustained negativity 500-900 ms is the ERP effect that indexes the
frame-shifting needed for joke comprehension. In a third experiment,
Coulson et al. measure eye movements to examine whether the reinterpre-
tatio n process of frame-shifting involves an increased am ou nt of regres-
sions leftward eye mo vem ents) in com parison to non-joke endings. The
eye tracking data show that total viewing duration is longer for jokes
than for non-joke controls, and that participants make more regressive
eye movements when frame-shifting is required for the interpretation. In
general, these empirical studies show a renewed awareness of the need for
experimental backup of theoretical hypotheses, a need that has been ex-
pressed, am on g others , by Atta rd o 2001a: 208). Nevertheless, this field
is still in its infancy pa rtly beca use it is no torio us ly difficult to design
methodologically sound tests), and needs a fair amount of basic data.
In sum, in this first section we have connected some of the basic con-
cepts of the Cognitive Linguistics framework to the specific linguistics
of humor in an at tempt to uncover common ground and new perspectives
for both cognitive linguists and humor researchers. As a stepping stone,
we used two of the key ideas in CL. First, the broad, dynamic view on
meaning as comprehensive conceptualization leads to a focus on the re-
flection of higher-level construal mechanisms or conceptualization opera-
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G. Brone et al.
including these general cognitive mechanisms may contribute to the de-
velopment of a genuinely cognitive account of verbal (as well as non-
verbal) humor. A second trigger in the discussion is the cognitive hnguis-
tic view on linguistic structure as usage-based. The implications of this
basic claim for the scope of semantic analysis and for the methodologies
that are used, are not trivial. From the perspective of production, a cog-
nitive semantic analysis needs to take into account the rich conceptual
landscape in which meaning emerges, including semantic, pragmatic, con-
textual, cultural, and even (inter)personal information. This multidimen-
sional perspective may contribute to a better understanding of the way
in which different cu es join tly trigg er a hu m or ou s effect. O n the level of
processing, a cognitive linguistic account generates direct hypotheses that
can be tested in a simulation setting. This may provide a new impetus
for the much-needed interaction between descriptive-theoretical work and
empirical testing in linguistic humor research.
This general account of the potential contribution of a cognitive lin-
guistic perspective on humor does not, as such, motivate why cognitive
linguists interested in linguistic structure in general may find the study
of humor compelling and worthwhile. In the next section, we pursue the
question why cognitive hnguists should (occasionally) deviate from the
accepted path of conventional language use to study more creative cases.
To a large extent, this interest arises from looking at the arguments pro-
posed in this section from a different angle.
2
Cognitive linguistic interest in humor
There are several levels on which a cognitive linguistic theory of meaning,
defined in a broad sense, might benefit from the inclusion of humor and
creative language as an object of research. Not claiming any exhaustive-
ness in this regard, we will restrict our observation to those matters which
appear most relevant to the aim and set-up of this issue.
Vis-a-vis its characterization as a
usage-based
dynamic theory of
meaning as conceptualization, treating language on a par with other cog-
nitive abilities. Cognitive Linguistics is urged to take creativity into ac-
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215
this m ost hu m an of cognitive behaviors d o we do justice to our theories of
language. Artificially restricting language data to that which is considered
core or central can only serve to keep our models of language blind to the
realities of human language knowledge, and thus hobbled with respect to
the scientific method." Generally, the analysis of creative language use
used as a cover term including all kinds of verbal humor and witallows
a more accurate picture to be drawn of the way in which our experience is
structured by cognitive construal mechanisms such as metaphor, meton-
ym y, figure/ground-arrangement, frames, etc. In the following, the im-
pact of this observation will be discussed in more detail both with respect
to descriptive semantic theory as well as regarding psycholinguistic ex-
periments on the processing of language.
From the perspective of semantic theory, we draw attention to four di-
mensions of semantic structure, in which the functionality of analyzing
non-conventionalized, creative language use for CL theory becomes ap-
parent. A first aspect pertains to the basic CL claim concerning the non-
restrictive,
encyclopedic
nature of the meaning of an utterance. In many
hu m oro us con texts like joke s, collaborative o r adversarial interaction ,
wordplay etc. (see
Kotthoff
Veale et al., this issue), the successful pro-
cessing of the intended meaning heavily depends on the activation of
experiential (cultural, social, embodied .. .) knowledge shared by both
speaker and hearer in the current discourse space (Langacker 2001). The
witty effect in an exchange like (1), for instance, hinges only partially on
the exploitation ofthe linguistic structure ofthe verb
to aim for.
Crucial is
the activation of encyclopedic knowledge concerning Von Braun's early
career as a scientist at the service of Nazi-Germany (see Veale et al., this
issue).
(1) Vo n Bra un (S): I aim for the stars
title of coffee-table book)
Boo k critic (H ): I aim for the stars, but I keep hitting Lo nd on .
title of book review)
A
second aspect of meaning construal which is inherent to any semantic
structure, but frequently exploited in creative language use, concems the
varying degrees of s lience displayed by different meanings of a single
word with respect to its usage in a given context or frame. Salience of a
word or utterance is defined in Giora (1997: 185) as "a function of its
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216 G
roneet al.
scripts against the background of which meanings are being profiled. In
humorous utterances like (1), it is apparent that at any moment in unfold-
ing discourse, interlocutors may decide to realize the cognitively salient
meaning by altering the conceptual background.
A third aspect, in which the analysis of humorous material might add
to a more comprehensive view on conceptualization concerns the inclu-
sion ofdiscourse as a relevant dimension for an adequate determination
of semantic structure. With regard to a discursive-cognitive analysis of
jokes,
Giora (1991: 469) formulates the
marked
informativeness require
ment
according to which jokes and point-stories are markedly infor-
mative. Their final informative messages are marked in that they are too
distant, in terms ofth number of similar features, from the messages pre-
ceding them . As such, they provide a cognitive link to the preceding
text, but at the same time they violate the expected, conventional pattern
of gradual increase in informativeness (see also Coulson
2000:33ff;
Coul-
son and Kutas 2001). In her pragmatically oriented contribution, Kotth-
off (this issue) emphasizes the impact of discursive elements on the gener-
ation of a humorous meaning in collaborative conversation. In CL, this
observation parallels a broadening ofth analytical scope, integrating dis-
course elements into the paradigm of Cognitive Grammar as apparent in
the Current Discourse Space model, as proposed by Langacker (2001).
Finally, the analysis of creative language use (humor) highlights proto
typicality
as a major structural characteristic of semantic-conceptual or-
ganization. Although since the very beginning, CL has embraced prototy-
picality as a basic feature of categorization, which integrates fiexibility
with structural stability (see, among others, Geeraerts 1989, 1997), most
studies in the field have related this notion to the structure of lexical-
semantic categories. Linguistic studies of creative language demonstrate
that humorous effects tend to be generated through the exploitation of
prototypical categories throughout the current discourse space. Interest-
ingly, these categories are not restricted to the level of lexical semantics
(Veale et al., this issue), as they are also identified on the pragmatic plane
Kotthoff,
this
issue).
In their survey of different kinds of verbal as well as
non-verbal humor, Brone and Feyaerts (2003) demonstrate that even on a
meta-linguistic level, construal mechanisms appear as prototypically or-
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ntroduction 217
well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is sa-
lient and easily coded, and thereby evoke essentially au tom atic ally a
targe t tha t is either of lesser interest or har der to nam e (L an gac ke r 1993:
30).
Such manipulations may rely on, for instance, the profiling of non-
essential side elements in a visual setting or an event structure as reference
points, or also the non-profiling of highly salient elements ( profile gap ,
Brone and Feyaerts
2003:
3Iff). The analysis of these phenomena in
terms of non-prototypical cases of metonymic construal, rather than
humor-specific logical mechanisms, strongly invites an integrated, non-
modular CL account of humor. At the same time, however, it calls upon
CL to further refine its heuristic tools in order to live up to its name as the
framework most suitable for the analysis of dynamic meaning construc-
tion. More specifically, as instances of creative language use show, con-
strual mechanisms seem to require a more elastic definition in terms of
prototypical characteristics in order to bring evenfull creativity (Bergen
and Binsted 2003) within reach of basic cognitive construal mechanisms.
By adopting a construal approach to incongruity resolution, the linguistic
interest in humor interpretation might stretch beyond the purely humor
theoretical perspective. Instead of focusing on the uniqueness of the hu-
mor phenomenon (e.g. in logical mechanisms), a CL account may reveal
the way in which day-to-day cognitive capacities are explored and pushed
to the limit for humorous purposes.
Besides its relevance for descriptive sem antic theo ry, the analysis of cre-
ative language use (humor) also promises new insights to psycholinguistic
studies on the processing of language. In the context of this issue, we
briefiy refer to two observations whose relevance extends beyond the se-
mantic structure of humorous utterances alone. A first benefit of tackling
humorous material through the application of experimental methods con-
cems the psychological reality of frames, more specifically, the process of
frame shifting. In their observation of regressive eye movements, Coulson
et al. (this issue) confirm earlier reading time findings by Coulson and
K utas (1998, 2001) as they note that peop le were m ore likely to m ake
regressive eye movements when they read the joke than the straight end-
ings,
as if they wanted to re-examine earlier parts of the sentence for clues
to which altem ative frames should be retriev ed (Cou lson et al., this
issue).
A second, related observation pertains to the multifold interaction
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218
G
rone
etal
psycholinguistics. Whereas the traditional psycholinguistic approach to
meaning construction focuses on the way in which context determines
the processing of lexical items (rather than how these items may have
any impact on the representation of the broader discourse event (context,
frame, message ...), Coulson et al. (this issue) use frame-shifting jokes to
demonstrate the need for a model of message-level processing prom pted
by language .
3 Outline of the issue
In the opening paper of the issue Seana Coulson, Thomas Urbach and
Marta Kutas present thespace structuringmodel a cognitive linguistics
inspired model of linguistic comprehension that focuses on the interaction
between sentence processing and text processing. Using insights from that
model, the authors report on a number of experiments that test the psy-
chological reality
oi
frame-shifting the semantic and pragmatic reanalysis
that is necessary for the interpretation of the punchline of a joke. In the
case of frame-shifting, the lexical processing of the punchline triggers the
construction of cognitive models in working memory. Previous self-paced
reading and ERP (event-related brain potentials) experiments both sug-
gest tha t frame-shifting involves an additional processing cost in com par-
ison to non-joke controls. The eye-tracking study presented in this issue
confirms the results of previous studies under the more natural reading
conditions this methodology provides. In addition to the other studies,
the eye movement data show that the extra cognitive cost is not simply a
question of word recognition, since the length of the readers' initial gaze
duration of a word did not differ significantly for jokes and controls.
Rather, the cost is related to higher-level processing, as indexed by the
longer total viewing duration of words in jokes. The fact that jokes elicit
more regressive eye movements upon encountering the punch word than
straight controls provides additional evidence for the psychological reality
of a reanalysis process like frame-shifting.
Graeme Ritchie starts from the widely accepted idea in humor theories
that many jokes consist of a set-up phase, which has a salient interpreta-
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ntrodu tion 219
the reader/hearer or a character in the joke. In order to capture this strat-
ification, Ritchie presents an account in terms of viewpoints or belief sets,
formalized by means of
ment l sp ces
(Fauconnier 1994 [1985]). It is ar-
gued that the reinterpretation process does not necessarily have to be di-
rectly in the mental space of the audience, but rather, it suffices that it
happens in a viewpoint that is accessible to the audience (nested view-
point).
An in-depth analysis shows that the change of interpretation can
occur in the hearer's viewpoint, in the narrative viewpoint or in the view-
point of a story character, hence widening the canonical view that the
reinterpretation process involves a hearer making a revision from a previ-
ously false to a correct interpretation. What is more, the higher-level, for-
mal treatment of forced reinterpretation provides a generalization that
can not be captured by some other taxonomies (like e.g. the widely ac-
cepted verbal-referential distinction). In using a mental space account to
capture this generalization, Ritchie seems to corroborate one of the basic
claims of cognitive hnguistics, viz. that it is possible to account for a wide
range of phenomena, verbal as well as non-verbal, using a restricted set of
basic conceptual mechanisms.
Although Helga Kotthoff's analysis of conversational humor formally
figures as a pragmatic approach, this contribution also provides valuable
input to the recent discussion in Cognitive Linguistics to pursue the con-
cept of 'usage-based hnguistics' to the full (see, among others, Geeraerts
2003).
Specifically, three key notions of CL-theory may be identified, mo-
tivating the relevance of this paper for the theoretical orientation of the
present issue. First, and most importantly, Kotthoff highlights flexibihty
as a crucial characteristic of semantic/pragmatic categories such as com-
munication principles. By doing so, she adopts an ecological view on (lin-
guistic) categorization, which basically boils down to the adaptation
of prototype theory to linguistic analysis. This theory still represents one
of
th
methodological cornerstones of CL, providing a structural explana-
tion for the differentiation between, among others, preferred (salient) and
non-preferred (less-sahent) meaning structures. Although she does not
explicitly argue in terms of 'prototypicahty,' a major point of Kotthoff's
paper concerns the flexible extension of communicative principles, thus
rejecting an explosion of maxim s in favor of maxim exploitation
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220 G Brone et al
be an exclusive characteristic of CL, it does represent an essential facet of
its characterising semantic structure in terms of conceptual structure.
Third, Kotthoff's approachalthough mainly articulated in terms of a
pragmatic modeladheres to Langacker's description (2001) of the
viewing frame (or: immediate scope of predication ) being built up
through different channels of conceptualization which, next to the objec-
tive content, also contain features such as gesture, intonation, sequencing,
etc.As Kotthoff puts it: In order to describe the production of meaning
in concrete sequences, other sorts of knowledge must be referred to (e.g.
knowledge of sequencing, stylistic expectations, discursive genres and
contextualization procedures) which constitute a collateral system of
communication. To put it the other way around: in recent years, Lan-
gacker (CDS-model) and CL have themselves embraced a more discur-
sive approach of meaning description, thus complementing the traditional
CL-focus on lexical-semantic and grammatical constructs.
It is clear that on the basis of each of these three notions alone, a lin-
guistic analysis cannot be claimed to be part of the Cognitive Linguistic
paradigm, especially since the two latter may be characteristic for other
approaches as well. Yet, it is the combined application of these three
features that renders this contribution particularly relevant for a CL-
approach of humor.
Tony Veale, Kurt Feyaerts and Geert Brone pursue a similar argument
for the case of adversarial hum or in conversation, using the cognitive lin-
guistic notion of construal operations. A specific adversarial humor strat-
egy is singled out, which revolves around the subversion of the linguistic
forms of exchange. Based on a technical definition of this phenomenon
they label trum ping , the authors illustrate how agents in a conversa-
tional setting can reflect and dis tor t the linguistic-conceptual con-
strual set up in a prior tum in conversation. A typology of trumping
mechanisms is presented, based on the different levels of linguistic organi-
zation on which the reflection or parallelism in the trumping game can be
situated. More specifically, the use of insights from cognitive linguistics
reveals that adversarial agents exploit the various conceptual mechanisms
underlying an opponent's utterances in order to tum the tables in the hu-
mor game. In doing so, an agent can trump an adversary by demonstrat-
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ntroduction 221
up in the previous utterance s) Langacker 2001). On the basis of the
analysis, the au thors conclude that a cognitive semantic account in terms
of general principles of conceptual organization provides an adequate ac-
count of the tension between markedness and transparency in humor and
exhibits an ecological validity that is lacking in most linguistic humor re-
search. The issue finishes with a thought-provoking epilogue article by
Salvatore Attardo, who, from the point of
vi w
of the GT VH , points out
a number of potential strengths and weaknesses of the cognitive linguistic
endeavor.
4 Perspectives for future research
If cognitive linguistics is to live up to its reputation as a framework of dy-
namic meaning construction, it should be demonstrably capable of han-
dling the most dynamic aspects of humorous meaning. The papers in
this special issue, we believe, go some way toward providing such a dem-
onstration. However, many key questions remain either unanswered, or
worse, unasked, and cognitive linguistics must prove its value on these
questions also. For instance, how does humor relate to other cognitive
and social phenomena that appear to have a strong family resemblance?
Such phenom ena include:gossip jokes, like scandalous stories of
th
mis-
behavior of others, are amongst the most contagious memes that human
society has evolved; what makes these forms such compelling vehicles
for dynamic meaning, and what meaning-construction and meaning-
grounding mechanisms do they share?); insults not always humorous,
but the most valued are always creative; why does society prize indirect
and ambiguous assaults on character as clever over more direct and un-
ambiguous attacks?); underst tement surely some mechanism of under-
specification is shared with humor?); overst tement like metaphors, hu-
mor often exploits literal mistruth); and so on. Since cognitive linguistics
refuses to box language and meaning into strict modular compartments
of mind, we should expect the cognitive ecology it fosters to have direct
application to all of these questions.
In line with this cognitive ecology, according to which humor figu res
among other cognitive phenomena requiring a holistic, integrated ap-
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222 G. Brone et al.
the awareness of prototypicality as an inherent property of conceptual
and linguistic categories is of crucial importance. To what extent and in
what ways a fiexible category structure may be stretched for humorous
purposes represents a complex research topic. Ultimately, pursuing this
approach must lead to the conclusion that humor is a marked {deautom-
atized
yet structurally not irregular kind of language use. In terms of
specific research questions further elaborating this general hypothesis,
several topics of interest may be discerned. Finishing off, we therefore
offer a survey of four such topics, located on a theoretical/descriptive as
well as an empirical/methodological plane. Each of these topics com-
prises an indicative, yet non-exhaustive list of concrete research questions.
4 .1 . The relationship between creativity and hum or
Circumscribing the boundaries of humorous language is not a straight-
forward task. Although the mechanisms of humor on the one hand, and
those of metaphor, irony and linguistic creativity on the other are not
identical, neither are they are clearly demarcated categories of cognition.
To what extent does humor exploit different kinds of figurative and idi-
omatic language use? Is there a real difference between literal and figura-
tive humorous language use, or is the difference as elusive, and in some
ways ideological, as it is in the study of metaphor? Just as all metaphors
are neither literally ano m alo us no r false, neithe r should a jo ke rely on the
perception of an incongruity to force a humorous interpretation. Cer-
tainly, metaphors can be stretched so far as to cross the line from persua-
sive analogy into humorous juxtaposition, but metaphors can be perceived
as humorous without negating their truth-theoretic content. Humor, like
othe r forms of playful creativity, rely to som e exten t on the lu d ic spirit
of participants. Further research is required to elucidate precisely which
mechanisms of mind are shared by creative language and humorous lan-
guage, and which, if any, predates the other.
4.2.
Construal mechanisms in humor
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Introduction 223
interpretation of different types of humorous texts involve cognitive
mechanisms of construal? Do these mechanisms operate in the same, a
similar or a different way compared to non-humorous language use? To
what extent can conceptual mechanisms be characterized as essentially
flexible, prototypically organized categories?
4.3.
Interplay of quan titative and qualitative variables
Humorous utterances are extremely fragile linguistic and conceptual con-
structs, the meaning of which depends vitally on a nexus of quantitative
criteria such as the time of delivery, and the activation of key expecta-
tions) and qua litative criteria such as social conte xt, cultur al tab oo s,
shared world models, etc.). This fragility of humorous language makes it
an ideal linguistic form in which to theorize about the relationship be-
tween the quantitative and qualitative aspects of language and cognition.
How can we objectively determine the complexity of a given stimulus or
complexity of the intended cognitive resolution process? Should this be
based on degree of conventionahty, contextual expectation, complexity
of inferential wo rk, the cognitive m echa nism s th at are exploited e.g.
frame-shifting), or maybe a combination of all of these parameters?
4.4 . mpirical methods on the processing of humor
Many of the notions introduced in support of conceptual models of
hu m or are in serious need of experim ental i.e., psycholinguistic, neuro -
hnguistic and corpus-linguistic) support if they are to hold theoretical
water. Cognitive linguistics, in prescribing a usage-based model of lan-
guage, explicitly aims to develop a conceptual apparatus that is both a
beneficiary of insights from, and a source of testable hypothesizes for,
psycholinguistics To m asello 1998, 2002; Barlow and Ke m m er 2000).
With respect to this inherent symbiosis between theory and empiricism,
the analysis of humor elicits a set of compelling issues that present a
methodological and theoretical challenge to cognitive science. To what
extent do the existing empirical methods meet the requirements of testing
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224 G Brone et al
models be useful in delineating hypotheses testable in an experimental
environment?
Many of the questions raised here are still largely unsolved, though
they have an important catalyzing role to play in deciding the future
direction of our discipline. Indeed, we expect that in the short-term a
cognitive-linguistic approach to humor will raise as many questions as it
helps to answer. With this inevitability in mind, we conclude this intro-
duction with a question that is, for the most part, rhetorical, since we be-
lieve we already have a partial answer that is worth sharing. If the remit
of Cognitive Linguistics is considered in its broadest sense, as the Cogni-
tive Science of
language,
then no account of humor will be complete with-
out a computational dimension. This does not necessarily mean that re-
searchers should implement computational realizations of their models,
merely that the models are unambiguous to the extent that such realiza-
tions are at least possible. The goal of course is to take subjectivity out
of the loop and to somehow capture that aspect of a humorous meaning
that humans themselves cannot always quantify w ithout recourse to it's
funny because it makes me laug h. This is an immense challenge and one
that we should at least aspire to. Our question then is: how should one
engage of a computationally-viable program of humor research in a cog-
nitive linguistics framework? One should, we suggest, select a humorous
sub-phenomenon that is at once both small and easily circumscribed
(light-bulb jokes, puns, hyperbolic insults, etc.) ndconceptually scalable.
Scalability is the key issue here: having constructed a detailed model of a
very specific humorous niche, one will of course want to build on this
model to capture further aspects of the humor phenomenon, but one can
only scale if an upgrade path exists between the initial niche and the
broader picture. Note that scalability depends not only on the phenome-
non
itself
but also on how the phenomenon is tackled and on the as-
sumptions that are made in formalizing a model.
For instance, we would submit that while punning has the potential to
be a scalable phenomenon, the sub-phenomenon of w holly-homophonous
punning
is not
scalable yet that the sub-phenomenon of polysemous-
punning
is
scalable. We base this claim on the realization that polyse-
mous punning requires a conceptual as well as a phonetic understanding
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Introduction
225
a very limited model of deautomatized idioms, one can construct a
computationally-viable model of trumping that subverts well-known
idioms using just lexico-semantic inform ation. Th us, from this hum ble be-
ginning, trum ps like he is the cream in m y coffee; yes, sour c ream can
be understood and generated. From here it is a steep, but essentially
climbable upg rade pa th to trump s like I am a great believer in the idiom
'drown your sorrows', but I can never persuade my wife to go swimming
with m e. A nd from here it is an even steeper climb to hu m oro us sub -
version in gene ral, such as the w orld w ould ha ve a lot less litter if they
gave pointed sticks to blind people .
To this end, we believe that humor researchers should always have an
upgrade path, no matter how ambitious, and that we should always ask
the questions: ho w formalizable is this phe nom eno n, how scalable is
this phenom enon, and where does its upgrad e pa th lead?
^University of Leuven
^University College Dublin
ote
Correspondence address; [email protected]
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