International ConferenceInternational Conference««Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security
EnvironmentEnvironment» »
VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE
DEFENSE ISSUESDEFENSE ISSUES
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian FederationFederation – – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation, Army General NFederation, Army General N..EE..MAKAROVMAKAROV
Moscow, 2012
Russian Core BMD Guidelines
Equal and indivisible
security as crucial feature of regional
and global security
Solid linkage between strategic
offensive and defensive
weapon systems
Mutual nuclear deterrence is key to global security
and stability
1
FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972
The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committedThe Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed:: to limit their Missile Defense systemsto limit their Missile Defense systems;; not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense systemnot to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system;; not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areasnot to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas;; not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD
systemssystems;; not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.
2
US SDI PROGRAM
The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .
3
GRAUND-BASED RADAR
GRAUND-BASED
INTERCEPTOR
BATTLE MANAGTR
GRAUND-BASED LASER
BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE &
TRACKING SYSTEM
HIGH ENDO-ATMOSPHERIC
DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR
SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE &
TRACKING SYSTEM
BOOST-PHASE SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM
SPACE-BASED LASER
FRONTING MIRROR
NEUTRAL PARTICLE
BEAM
SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR
RELAY MIRROR
ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-sJoint US-Russian statement on
global protection system(Washington, 17th of June 1992)
Joint US-Russian statement on global protection system
(Washington, 17th of June 1992)
Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the
United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic
Missile Defense(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)
Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the
United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic
Missile Defense(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)
First agreed statement regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
First agreed statement regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding
Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of
ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972
General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding
Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of
ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972
Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
General understanding to the second agreed statement
dated 26th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.
General understanding to the second agreed statement
dated 26th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.
Agreement on confidence-building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic
Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles
(New-York, 25th of September 1997)
Agreement on confidence-building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic
Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles
(New-York, 25th of September 1997)
Provision on Standing Consultative Commission
(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
Provision on Standing Consultative Commission
(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997
Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997
4
PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA 5
Kozelsk
Tatistchevo
TPA defense zone
Radar ‘s range in Czech
Republic
Possible trajectories of Russian ICBMs
DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD)
Phase I(2011)- deployment of MD ships with «Standard-3» 1А interceptors in Aegean, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas.
PhaseII (2011-2015)-deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» interceptors 1B in Romania.
Phase III (2015-2018)-deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors in Poland. Outfitting deployed MD shooters with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors.
Phase IV (2018-2020)- outfitting deployed MD shooters in Europe with «Standard-3» 2B interceptors.
Protection of South European States from
shorter range missiles
Protection of South and South-East European
States from shorter range missiles
Protection of European states from
intermediate range missiles
Protection of European states from
ICBMs
6
7RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH
NATO area of responsibility
(NATO BMD assets only)RUSSIAN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
(RUSSIAN BMD assets only)
NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL(information exchange and target distribution)
BM trajectories do not cross NATO BMD
area of responsibility
Territoies of European states (NATO members)
covered by Russian BMD, where deployment of
NATO BMD challenges Russian Strategic Nuclear
Force capabilities
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE8
European MD system element
The Russian Federation proposal («sectoral
approach»)
NATO approach («cooperative system»)
Concurrence of views
Defense areaJoint sector wise area Two independent areas
No
ResponsibilityResponsible for interception of any BM attacking Europe in its «sector»
NATO responsible for NATO territory,
Russia – for Russian territoryNo
Information
Full data sharing on shooter performances, missile threats, target distribution, results assessment
Limited data sharing on missile threats, joint exercises
No
Missile killsAll BMs within the area of responsibility
Only the BM attacking the area of responsibility (including adjacent area)
No
Decision to engage
National level National levelYes
«Buffer» zoneNot required (possible outside of Russian BM trajectories)
Possible ( with NATO and Russian areas overlapping to embrace Russian territory)
No
RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS
9
CRITERIA LIST:technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.), deployment sites, capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight.
joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities
development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities
legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all
participants
to increase defense of fixed launching sites,
to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,
to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,
to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,
to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,
to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets,
to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,
to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means).
RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION
All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO
deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.
10