Developing a Versatile Rescue Engineering Capability
And How It was Applied in the Canterbury Earthquakes
Dave Brunsdon [email protected]
Engineers Australia Workshop: Supporting Humanitarian Outcomes
Sydney, 20 October 2011
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering
Presentation Overview
1. Overview of NZ’s rescue engineering capability
2. The engineering response to the 4 September 2010 earthquake
3. The engineering response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake
4. Engineering issues in the recovery phase – where are things now?
Overview of NZ’s Rescue Engineering Capability
Urban Search and Rescue
Building Safety Evaluation
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What is USAR?
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) involves:
The location, rescue and initial medical stabilisation of victims trapped in confined spaces following a structural collapse
It is an integrated multi-agency response beyond the capability of normal rescue arrangements
Led by the NZ Fire Service
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Origins of USAR
Internationally
1985 Mexico earthquake
New Zealand
Prompted by NZ Earthquake Engineering Society reconnaissance visits following the 1994 Northridge and 1999 Turkey and Taiwan earthquakes
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NZ Risk Context
consequence
likel
ihoo
d
Single collapse
•Impact •Structural collapse •landslip
A few collapses Multiple structural collapse
•Landslip •Distant or moderate earthquake
•Urban earthquake •Overwhelming earthquake
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Newcastle Worker’s
Club
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Operational Role of the Engineer
Engineers provide key advice to USAR Task Force teams conducting rescue activities
• Determine potential for further collapse
• Monitoring of building movements
• Identify hazards
• Determine point of entry for search and rescue teams
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Focus of USAR Engineer Training
USAR Engineering Awareness
Target – engineers of any technical discipline and level of experience
Focus – awareness of USAR arrangements and engineering involvement at a collapse site
NZ USAR Engineering Specialist (national operational resource)
Target - Chartered Professional structural & civil engineers (incl. geotechnical)
Focus - operating within a structural collapse site (overall structure & element stability)
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Graduate Engineers With active interest in rescue engineering
Structural/Geotech Engineers At or near CPEng
USAR Support Engineers (~20 Nationally)
NZ USAR Engineering Specialist (Contracted)
(3-4 per Task Force incl. Geotech; ~12 nationally)
USAR Engineering Capability Objectives
USAR Engineering Specialist Training Course
USAR Engineering Awareness Course
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Current USAR Engineering Capability
24 USAR Engineering Specialists
17 Structural, 3 Civil, 4 Geotechnical
10 contracted to Task Forces
Other support engineers in regional centres
Plus ~60 other Engineers nationally trained for USAR Awareness
Building Safety Evaluation
Scope of Building Safety Evaluation
Overall Damage Survey
Within hours after the event
Emerg Services & Council staff
Rapid Assessment
During period of state of emergency
Volunteer engineers, architects, bldg professionals
Detailed Engineering Evaluation
Immediate for critical structures; longer term for others
Contracted engineers, architects, loss adjusters
• INSPECTED: No restriction on Use or Occupancy
• RESTRICTED USE: No entry except on essential business
• UNSAFE: Do Not enter or occupy
Rapid Assessment Placards Based on ATC-20
Post-Disaster Building Safety Evaluation
‘Inspected’
This building has been briefly inspected on the EXTERIOR ONLY and no apparent
structural hazard has been found
Post-Disaster Building Safety Evaluation
‘Restricted Use’
Some risk from damage in all or part of building
Post-Disaster Building Safety Evaluation
‘Unsafe’
For damaged buildings that are unsafe for occupancy
Newcastle December 1989
Gisborne December 2007
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Padang, West Sumatra September 2009
Epicentre 7.6 RS 30 September 09 17:16 hrs
Padang Earthquake Overview
• Mw 7.6 earthquake on 30 September 2009 at 1716 hours
• The earthquake caused ~1,195 deaths and significant damage to ~140,000 houses and 4,000 other buildings
• Ten NZ structural engineers volunteered to undertake rapid post-earthquake building safety evaluations of damaged buildings
Enhancing Level 2 Assessment
Assessment Category
Usability Category (Safety Focus)
Light Damage/ Green – Inspected
G1 – Occupiable, no immediate further investigation required
G2 – Occupiable, repairs required
Medium Damage/ Yellow –
Restricted Use
Y1 – No entry to parts until repaired or demolished
Y2 – Short-term entry
Heavy Damage/ Red - Unsafe
R1 – Significant damage – repairs/ strengthening possible
R2 – Significant damage – demolition likely
Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction - AusAid • “Strengthen national and local capacity in
disaster management in Indonesia and a more disaster resilient region” – Training and outreach – Risk and vulnerability modelling – Research and innovation – Partnerships
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The Engineering Response to the 4 September 2010
Earthquake
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4 September 2010: Magnitude 7.1 The Wakeup Call
22 February 2011: Magnitude 6.3 The Real Tragedy
13 June 2011: Magnitude 6.3 Another Setback
26 December 2010: Magnitude 5.1 The Warning
The Canterbury Earthquake Series
ESC Meeting, Montpellier, September 9, 2010
Darfield, Canterbury 4 September 2010
M7.1
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• INSPECTED: No restriction on Use or Occupancy
• RESTRICTED USE: No entry except on essential business
• UNSAFE: Do Not enter or occupy
Rapid Assessment Placards Based on ATC-20
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The Engineering Response to the 22 February 2011
Earthquake
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12:51pm Tuesday 22 February M6.3
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The NZ USAR Response
TF 2 mobilised within an hour of the earthquake
Most of TF 1 and TF 3 arrived via Air Force Hercules late evening
TF 1 and TF3 equipment and additional personnel via road and ferry arrived in ChCh next morning
A total of 170 Task Force members and National Management Team personnel were active over the following four weeks
Support from the Civil Defence Response Teams and their volunteer members
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The International USAR Response
Teams from a range of countries arrived over the next few days:
Australia (Queensland and NSW, followed by a composite Aust team)
United States (California TF2)
United Kingdom
Japan
Taiwan
Singapore
China
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The USAR Engineering Response
14 USAR Engineers responded to Christchurch by the end of Tuesday 22nd; a peak of 19 were involved on the Thursday and Friday
Over the following four weeks, more than 260 person days were worked by 23 USAR Engineers
Plus three USAR Engineers travelled to Japan with the NZ team
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The USAR Response – Phase 1
Location, medical treatment and extrication of live victims (~70)
PGC - 28 NZ
CTV Building - 18
The Press Building – 4
plus ~ 20 from buildings by crane and helicopter
The last live extrication was on the afternoon of Wednesday 23 February
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PGC Building
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PGC Building
CTV Building
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CTV Building
Hotel Grand Chancellor
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The USAR Response – Phase 2
Full search of all buildings within the Four Avenues for live victims and the deceased
- Recovery of bodies where encountered (including prolonged operations at PGC and CTV buildings)
- Checking every room in every building was necessary to meet Police Disaster Victim Identification (coronial) requirements
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The USAR Response – Phase 3
All streets and remaining buildings checked and cleared of live victims and the deceased
- Using controlled deconstruction to access spaces too dangerous for direct USAR access
- Commenced 2 March (Day 9)
- Included supervision of deconstruction to make CBD streets safer for emergency personnel
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Roles of the USAR Engineers
CBD Buildings
• Direct support of rescue and recovery operations
• Least dangerous and quickest access routes to likely void spaces; stabilisation measures, etc
• Arranging for surveyors to monitor buildings of concern
• Initial accessing of significantly compromised multi-storey buildings, and advising on stabilisation measures
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Roles of the USAR Engineers (2)
Port Hills Landslides
• Checking out premises directly affected by rockfalls and landslips for victims
• Establishing which properties required evacuations
• Establishing monitoring arrangements
• Working with CCC and local Geotechnical engineers to evaluate the stability of hillsides and set criteria for re-occupancy
Unstable rock outcrop (rockfall source)
Rock Bounce into House
Building Evaluation Data Totals As at 0900 4 April 2011
Red Yellow Green Total inspected
Commercial 977 1,093 3,221 5,291 CBD (4 Aves) 1,058 1005 2,253 4,316 Residential 1,776 Not recorded Not recorded 60,951 Heritage 377 Not recorded Not recorded 1,086
Total assessments entered 66,242 (being the total of Commercial and Residential zoned buildings in Christchurch). Light Search and Rescue Teams visited a further 72,000 houses in lesser affected areas.
Engineering Issues in the Recovery Phase
Where are things at now?
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Department of Building and Housing Engineering Advisory Group
• Two workstreams: Residential and Commercial • Representation from:
– Department of Building and Housing – Earthquake Commission – Building Research Association of NZ (BRANZ) – GNS Science – Structural Engineering Society (SESOC) – NZ Society for Earthquake Engineering – NZ Geotechnical Society
DBH Engineering Advisory Group Objectives
• Preparing technical guidance for assessing, repairing and reconstructing buildings in Canterbury
• Promoting common and consistent approaches
• Aiming to keep engineers, councils and insurers on the same page
• For residential properties, maximising the use of generic solutions and minimising the extent of specific engineering input (geotech and structural) required for the majority of cases
Hazards – Liquefaction and no build areas
Case Study:
Clarendon Towers
Elongation of the beams – pushes out the columns
•Loss of connection: floor - supports
? ?
N-W corner column
Corner pushed
out
Cold-drawn wire mesh fractures
•Middle bay
Interesting Issue . . . . Demolition and Rubble Disposal
• Vast difference in cost of disposing ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ demolition material
• Challenges in resolving the difficulties between owners, insurers and councils
• Including how to handle otherwise undamaged neighbouring buildings
Hotel Grand Chancellor
Neighbouring Hotel
Engineering Issues - Commercial
• Critical Structural Weaknesses typically cause collapses – Critical Configurational Weaknesses – Critical Detailing Weaknesses
• Configurational Weaknesses include
– Vertical Irregularity – Plan Irregularity
Vertical Irregularity Severe Significant Insignificant
Soft Storey Lateral stiffness varies > 150%
Lateral stiffness varies 100– 150%
Lateral stiffness varies < 100%
Mass Discontinuity
Mass varies >150% between adjacent floors
Mass varies 100 to 150% between adjacent floors
Mass varies <100% between adjacent floors
Vertical Discontinuity
Any element contributing > 0.5 stiffness of the lateral force resisting system discontinues vertically
Any element contributing > 0.3 stiffness of the lateral force resisting system discontinues vertically
Elements contributing to the lateral force resisting system are continuous vertically
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Moderate Earthquake Risk
Low Earthquake Risk
High Earthquake Risk Earthquake Prone Building -
Improvement required under Building Act 2004)
Equivalence to New Building (% of current code)
Earthquake Risk Category
100%
67%
33%
Earthquake Risk Buildings
Engineers and Risk Reduction Think Resilience
• Designing resilience into key facilities and infrastructure networks
• For buildings as a whole, the significance of Importance Levels
• Giving special consideration to parts of buildings that should have particular resilience
Building Importance Levels Table 3.2 AS/NZS 1170 Part 0:2002
1 Structures presenting a low degree of hazard to life and other property
<30m2; farm buildings; isolated structures
2 Normal structures and structures not in other importance levels
Houses, office buildings, car parking buildings
3 Structures that as a whole may contain people in crowds or contents of high value to the community or pose risk to people in crowds
Areas of assembly; health care facilities; emerg. facilities not designated as post-disaster
4 Structures with special post-disaster functions
Essential facilities with post-disaster functions
Building Importance Levels Table 3.2 AS/NZS 1170 Part 0:2002
1 Structures presenting a low degree of hazard to life and other property
<30m2; farm buildings; isolated structures
2 Normal structures and structures not in other importance levels
Houses, office buildings, car parking buildings
3 Structures that as a whole may contain people in crowds or contents of high value to the community or pose risk to people in crowds
Areas of assembly; health care facilities; emerg. facilities not designated as post-disaster
4 Structures with special post-disaster functions
Essential facilities with post-disaster functions
Importance Level 4 Structures With Special Post-Disaster Functions
Buildings and facilities designated as essential facilities
Utilities or emergency supplies required as backup for buildings and facilities of Importance Level 4
Buildings and facilities with special post-disaster function
Designated emergency centres and ancillary facilities (emergency power, phone or radio)
Medical emergency or surgical facilities
Designated emergency shelters
Emergency service facilities such as fire, police stations and emergency vehicle garages
Buildings and facilities containing hazardous materials capable of causing hazardous conditions that extend beyond the property boundaries
Concluding Observations (1)
• Building a core rescue engineering capability is essential for public safety
• Must be strongly linked into relevant institutions • USAR – Fire • Building Safety Evaluation – Emergency Management
and Building Control • Broader objective: seek to embed professional
engineering within emergency management arrangements
Proposed Key Elements of Post-disaster Building Evaluation Arrangements
1. Appropriate legal mandate 2. Central government agency providing a focal point,
guidance and support for preparedness activities 3. Criteria and process for building re-occupancy
established 4. Local authorities appropriately prepared to set up
and manage a building evaluation operation 5. Appropriate numbers of trained and warranted
building professionals 6. Effective mobilisation arrangements for warranted
building professionals (locally and nationally)
Concluding Observations (2)
• Take every opportunity to demonstrate the value of this capability
• Use offshore deployments to provide assistance and build experience of individuals
• So get prepared, and get involved! – Incident Management training is a good place
to start
Concluding Observations (3) • Engineers must put appropriate emphasis
on the consequences of failure • Maintain focus of
designing resilience into key facilities and infrastructure networks
Developing a Versatile Rescue Engineering Capability
And How It was Applied in the Canterbury Earthquakes
Dave Brunsdon [email protected]
Engineers Australia Workshop: Supporting Humanitarian Outcomes
Sydney, 20 October 2011
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering