Download - Deployable Forces (Air) Handbook (2003)
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FOREWORD
The Reaction Force Air Staff (RFAS) is a multinational staff whose
primary purpose is to support the Strategic Commanders with central
air expertise. The staff is responsible for deployment-related aspects
of strategic and operational air planning throughout the full range of
NATO operations.
The key elements of this mission are to provide central air planning
expertise in the fields of deployment, beddown, integration,sustainment and redeployment of NATOs High Readiness Forces
(Air) and other deploying land-based air assets.
This handbook is issued by the Reaction Force Air Staff as a reference
book based on the planning considerations for Deployable Forces
(Air). It is necessary to note that this is not a formally agreed NATO
document.
This unclassified handbook is part of our continuing efforts to provide
easily referenced information for use by educational institutions and
the Nations forces. NATO is currently undergoing significant
changes. The implementation of the new NATO Command Structure
(NCS), the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the
expansion of NATO membership, the changing relationships with
the European Union and many other factors are causing NATO
policies and programmes to evolve at an unprecedented pace andscale. These processes will continue beyond publication of this
document, which will therefore avoid speculation and concentrate
on known air power concepts.
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The Handbook provides a brief background on Deployable Forces
(Air). It also reviews the Operational Plan development, force
activation, and deployment processes. Finally, the Handbook outlines
command and control principles, communication and informationsystem (CIS) requirements, ground-based air defence (GBAD),
logistics support, force protection, movements, training and evaluation.
RFAS will continue to update the handbook periodically.
The handbook is also located at our CRONOS web site at
http://nww.rfas.nato.int/RFAS. We value your comments and solicit
your suggestions for improvements. Please contact the Chief of
Staff RFAS if you have any suggestions for improvements or wouldlike to request an additional copy.
Commercial: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2202
Insecure Fax: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2274
Secure Fax: (ID 01967) 218 - 1215
IVSN: 234 or 239 2202
Horst Martin, Lieutenant General, GEAF
Director, Reaction Force Air Staff
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Foreword i
Contents iii
1. NATOs Graduated Readiness (Air) Forces 1-1
Why High Readiness Forces are needed 1-1
The High Readiness Forces 1-5
HRF Essential Parameters 1-5
GRF (Air) Packages 1-8
2. NATO Response Force (NRF) Capability 2-1
Guiding Principals 2-1
NRF Missions 2-2
NRF Structure 2-3
3. NATO Force Activation 3-1
Political/Military Decision Making 3-1
4. Operation Planning 4-1
Planning Tools 4-2
Operational Planning Principles 4-2
The Operational Planning Process (OPP) 4-5
Stages of the OPP 4-6
5. DF(A) Deployment Planning 5-1
6. DF(A) Command And Control 6-1
7. Communication And Information Systems 7-1
CIS for deployed DF(A) 7-1
DF(A) Resource Planning 7-4
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8. Ground Based Air Defence 8-1
SHORAD 8-3
SAM 8-3
9. Force Protection 9-1
Active Defence 9-2
Passive Defence 9-4
Recuperation 9-4
10. Logistics 10-1
Multinational Logistic Concepts 10-2
Logistics Doctrine and Procedures 10-4Logistics Command and Control 10-5
Logistic Phases 10-7
Logistic Aspects 10-8
11. Movement And Transportation(M&T) 11-1
Movement And Transportation Principles 11-2
NATO Structure for M&T 11-3
Sequence of M&T Planning 11-5Air Transport 11-8
Sea Transport 11-10
Inland Surface Transport 11-11
12. Air To Air Refuelling 12-1
13. Training, Exercise & Evaluation 13-1
Training 13-2Exercise 13-4
Evaluation 13-7
14. Reaction Force Air Staff 14-1
Background 14-1
Mission 14-1
Organisation 14-3
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Annex:
A. Abbreviations
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CHAPTER 1
NATOS GRADUATEDREADINESS (AIR) FORCES
WHY HIGH READINESS FORCES ARE NEEDED
0101. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change.
In spite of some positive developments in recent years, the security
of the Alliance remains subject to uncertainties and to a wide varietyof risks that can suddenly develop into a crisis. At present, the risks
to NATO are multifaceted and less predictable in nature and location
than previously. The use of asymmetric warfare in the form of terrorist
attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction is an
emerging risk to NATO and the rest of the world.
NATO developed and introduced the NATO Response Force to meet future mission
requirements.
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0102. In order to reflect the requirements of the full spectrum of
Alliance missions, a combination of In-Place Forces (IPF) and
Headquarters (HQs), and a pool of Deployable Forces (DF) and
HQs are required. These forces and HQs must have the necessaryflexibility for effective planning and force generation/activation and
be available at graduated levels of readiness. Asymmetric threats
may require the Alliance to engage in combat operations varying in
intensity. Flexible employment of both rapidly deployable multinational
forces and reinforcement forces is necessary, to counter this type of
aggression.
0103. Following unilateral force reductions by nations, NATO nowneeds a higher degree of multinationality in order to field a balanced,
appropriate force in a crisis area that may be outside NATOs area
of responsibility. Therefore, mobile, flexible and highly responsive
multinational forces at a high readiness are required.
NATO requires mobile, flexible and highly responsive multinational forces.
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0104. The guidance provided by the Military Committee foresees
that the architecture and the posture of Allies forces must be built
on the strengths of different national structures. These forces will
be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements ofcollective defence and other Alliance missions and held at appropriate
and specified graduated readiness. The aim is to achieve an optimum
balance between forces at high readiness, forces at different levels
of lower readiness and a longer-term build-up and augmentation
capability. With the introduction and development of the NATO
Response Force (NRF) following the Prague Summit in 2002, a new
higher readiness status for NATO forces was created that is evolving
to meet future mission requirements.
0105. The key to NATO mission success is force availability,
sustainability and multinationality. To ensure availability, NATO forces
must be generated quickly and be mission ready and deployable. As
part of the quick generation process, NATOs Readiness Forces
form a single set of Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF). The GRF
consists of High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces of Lower
Readiness (FLR). Nations allocate air assets to the different
Readiness categories. They are further categorised into Deployable
Forces (DF), capable of the entire spectrum of missions and
operations, and the In-Place Forces (IPF), designated to operate
within a specific geographical area of the Alliance predominantly
The key to NATO mission success is force availability, sustainability and multinationality.
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for Article 5 operations. Longer Term Build-up Forces (LTBF)
provide an augmentation capability and a force posture to cope with
the remote scenario of large-scale air operations for Article 5 collectivedefence. Developed independently of the GRF structure, the NRF
air components will consist of designated units that meet specified
criteria similar to HRF/DF concepts during their period of NRF
service. When required for an Article 5 operation or a non-Article 5
Crisis Response Operation (CRO), the selected force structure from
the pool of HRF will be identified, tailored, packaged and made
available upon Transfer of Authority (TOA), from the Sending Nation
(SN) to the appropriate NATO commander.
0106. This handbook concentrates on how deployable HRF(Air)
(HRF(A)) are presently defined and employed in the NATO Force
Structure (NFS) and how they relate their functions to the FLR and
LTBF. First we look at the emerging NRF capability. Then we
follow with the more traditional force activation processes, operational
and deployment planning, and how NATO conducts Command and
Control of its forces to include the required Communication and
Deployable forces meet the full range of NATO missions.
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Information Systems (CIS). We conclude the handbook by discussing
the specific mission capabilities of Ground Based Air Defence
(GBAD), Force Protection (FP), Logistics, Movement &
Transportation, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), and Training, Exercisesand Evaluations.
THE HIGH READINESS FORCES
0107. HRF are land, air and maritime forces that are designated to
be available on short notice in order to react as quickly as necessary
to a collective defence or non-Article 5 CRO.
HRF ESSENTIAL PARAMETERS
0108. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) can call
upon HRF to respond very quickly to meet an Article 5 Collective
Defence operation anywhere in the NATO area of interest. HRF
can also be tasked to support non-Article 5 CROs. The implementation
method that SACEUR would use for such activation is detailed at
Chapter 2. The three essential parameters that provide the framework
High Readiness Forces have to react and deploy quickly.
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of the NFS are: Types of Forces, Readiness of Forces and
Designation of Forces.
0109. Types of Forces. Based on the requirement to conduct both
Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 CROs, High Readiness HQs/
Forces can be grouped into two types that reflect their availability to
the NATO commander and, in particular, their ability to be deployed:
a. Deployable Forces are available for the full range of NATO
missions, fully deployable throughout Alliance territory and beyond,composed of primarily multinational HQs and forces and held at the
appropriate readiness level.
b. In-Place Forces are predominantly HQs and forces required
for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation
providing them. Therefore, IPF need not be fully deployable but are
also held at appropriate readiness levels. With the acquisition of new
equipment, there will be an increase in reach-back capabilities,
Force capability packages will be developed based on mission and type of operation.
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therefore the value of IPF HQs should improve for non-Article 5
out-of-area operations.
0110. Readiness of Forces. This parameter defines the period oftime measured from an initiation order to the moment when the HQ
or unit is ready to perform its task, or is ready to deploy from its
peacetime location. Readiness Levels, Ranges and Categories further
clarify Readiness of Forces. Readiness Levels were described earlier
as HRF, FLR and LTBF. The time range that all HRF, FLR or LTBF
must meet is given by Readiness Ranges. The Readiness Category
breaks down the HQs and forces into more refined time ranges for
planning purposes.
0111. Force Designation. The Force Designation Category (FDC)
is used to describe the degree of assurance with respect to the
availability that nations are willing to declare for their forces. The
FDC provides NATO commanders and planners with as much
assurance as possible of the availability of NFS HQs and forces for
any NATO operation. The FDCs are broken into four categories:
a. NATO Command Forces. Forces/HQs which nations have
already placed under operational command (OPCOM) or the
operational control (OPCON) of the NATO commander.
b. NATO Assigned Forces. Forces/HQs which nations agree
to place under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander within
an agreed readiness time.
c. NATO Earmarked Forces. Forces/HQs which nations
intend to place under OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander at
some future time.
d. Other Forces for NATO. Forces/HQs which might be
placed under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander.
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GRF (AIR) PACKAGES
0112. The composition and size of force capability packages will be
variable, based on the nature of the situation creating the requirement(Article 5 or non-Article 5 CROs), and inherently the mission and
type of operation. As a reference, air packages would normally
include Command and Control (C2), Air Combat, Special Operations
Forces, Electronic Warfare (EW), Support Jamming (SJ), Suppression
of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), Reconnaissance, Surveillance
Target Acquisition (RSTA), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),
Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) and Tactical Airlift.
0113. Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)
elements, such as Logistics, Communications & Information Systems,
Medical, Security, Strategic Airlift, etc, should also be available and
be maintained on the same readiness level as their supported unit.
The arrangements for this support are generally a responsibility of
the individual Sending Nations (SN).
0114. NATOs concept for modular Response Forces will draw onthe operational capabilities provided through the GRF concept. They
also will be mission-tailored, however, due to the envisioned
deployment and employment concept, force packaging will have to
be more flexible and rapid. The NRF will consist of air, land and
maritime components brought together for a joint and combined
campaign of limited duration.
0115. Also, with the realisation of NATO out-of-area (OOA)
operations in recent years, the necessity to tailor operations to
consider concerns and participation by non-NATO members has
become more evident. Therefore, as the situation warrants, force
packages may be developed that include Partnership and other non-
NATO Nation participation.
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CHAPTER 2
NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)CAPABILITY
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
0201. A key element of the NRF is the ability to move quickly to
whatever areas in the world where NATO influence may be required.
NATOs operations and interests have been continuing to extendbeyond typical Cold War era boundaries. Airpower with its rapid
response, range and diversity of capabilities, will be a crucial
component to NRF mission success. To attain the quick
responsiveness required in todays asymmetric threat environment,
projecting forces will be required on even shorter notice than ever
before. This responsiveness will be provided by the rotation of forces
to ensure the burden is shared and that forces are trained and ready
for action at a moments notice. The ability to deploy a capable NRFon short notice could act as a deterrent and aid in the quick resolution
of an emerging crisis.
NRF air missions include tactical air lift.
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0202. Another key element of the NRF is its flexibility. The NRF
will be capable of performing some missions on its own as well as
participating in an operation as part of a larger force. It will be
limited in size, composition and capabilities to ensure responsiveness,but can also be tailored once a specific operation has been identified.
The NRF consists of only a limited selected group of NATO forces
and other units can be tasked to expand force packages.
0203. Command and Control of the NRF is based on the principles
and structures described in the NATO Force Structure (NFS), in the
NATO Command Structure (NCS) and in the Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) concept. They result in a joint NRF C2 capabilityembedded in NATOs 3-level C2 structures. When the NRF HQs
are deployed, it will be carried out in accordance with the CJTF HQ
concept.
0204. Another key contribution of the NRF concept is the influence
it will have to be a catalyst for transformation of capabilities in the
Alliance. To reach the predetermined standards of military capability
and interoperability, nations wishing to contribute forces to the NRFwill need to update their capabilities in order to efficiently integrate
their operations with the entire NRF package. In addition, it will
provide a forum for evaluation of transformational concepts.
NRF MISSIONS
0205. The NRF missions will mirror the requirements of rapid
response in the initial phase of a crisis situation. Some types ofmissions which the NRF may execute include:
a. A stand-alone force for crisis response.
b. An initial entry force into a Joint Operation Area (JOA) to
include a hostile environment without Host Nation Support (HNS).
c. A demonstrative force to show the resolve of member nations.
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0206. NRF (Air) Missions. The NRF(A) component will provide
a rapidly deployable capability able to conduct the appropriate air
tasks to include the use of precision-guided munitions. NRF air
missions include Air Defence, Offensive Counter Air, AirReconnaissance, SEAD/SJ, Close Air Support, Air Interdiction,
CSAR, Airborne Early Warning, Tactical Airlift, AAR and Special
Operations.
NRF STRUCTURE
0207. The NRF HQs and forces will not be a standing force. Bothwill be periodically committed by nations during NRF Generation
Conferences to meet the Military Committee (MC) approved
Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Once trained
and certified as combat ready and capable of deploying, HQs and
forces will be placed on Stand-by and will be ready to deploy at very
short notice. All NRF forces should be capable of operating in a
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment.
Support elements should be maintained at the same readiness level as their
supported unit.
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0208. Joint Force Command (JFC). The CJTF HQ capabilities are
drawn on a rotational basis from the JFC HQs/JHQ at the operational
level of command of the NCS. The rapid deployment capability
requires a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) HQ staff element.This staff element will offer a standing capability to deploy forward
on short notice and should be able to cover J1 through J9 disciplines.
It will be critical to the success of the NRF capability. Subordinate
to the DJTF, there will be component command HQs tailored to the
mission. For Air, it will be a CJFACC with an embedded Air
Operations Centre (AOC).
0209. Whilst the NRF capability is the worst-case scenario with
regard to time available to respond, other capabilities must bemaintained for those occasions where sufficient time is available to
plan a full military operation in response to an emerging threat to
NATO interests. The following chapters address the legacy
capabilities within NATO to respond to the traditional threats
envisaged throughout the recent past.
Airpower with its rapid response is a crucial component to NRF mission success.
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CHAPTER 3
NATO FORCE ACTIVATION
POLITICAL/MILITARY DECISION MAKING
0301. In order to set the stage for NATO involvement in military
action, NATO must activate the military forces provided by the
nations. Three different Directives from the political level are required
at three critical stages:
a. Initiating Directive. The Initiating Directive is issued by
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to SACEUR. It contains planning
guidance and initiates the process leading to the analysis of several
response options, until one or more of them is chosen in response to
the situation. Once an option is chosen, it will normally be refined
into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).
The Initiating Directive issued by the NAC will lead to the development of a Concept of
Operations.
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b. Force Activation Directive. Once the CONOPS is
approved, the NAC issues the Force Activation Directive (FAD),
which directs SACEUR to conduct the force activation process.
Upon receipt of the FAD, SACEUR commences the activationprocess through an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) to JFCs/JHQ
and the Nations informing them that a force is required. The type
and scale of forces and capabilities required are provided in the
form of a provisional Statement of Requirements (SOR) issued
together with the ACTWARN. The nations respond to these
requirements with informal force offers. These offers will be properly
discussed and balanced at a Force Generation Conference
culminating in the development of a draft SOR. After completion ofthe draft SOR, SACEUR issues the Activation Request (ACTREQ)
to nations, asking for the formal commitment of forces, which nations
will confirm in the Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message.
Eventual force shortfalls or excesses are detected and corrected in
a Force Balancing Conference, until a final set of forces is decided.
c. Execution Directive. Once the Operation Plan (OPLAN)
is approved by the NAC and the final force list is released, the NACwill release the Execution Directive. Based on that Directive,
SACEUR issues the Activation Order (ACTORD) to all participating
nations, which initiates the movement of the national forces to the
Theatre of Operations. To ensure the properly co-ordinated intra-
theatre movement of forces, including their transit to designated
staging or beddown locations, nations will normally authorise TOA
of these forces to SACEUR when operationally ready in theatre.
0302. In order for NATO to get to the force activation stage,
however, much preparation is required. Operational Planning for
NATO military action is one of the key initial functions that must be
carried out to ensure successful mission accomplishment.
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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
0401. Operational Planning is conducted for a wide variety of
reasons, ranging from routine training and exercises to an actual
aggression on NATO territory. Although military commanders are
expected to develop prudent military planning in response to possible
situations, the ultimate responsibility for initiating planning within
NATO rests with NATOs political leadership, the NAC. Even though
the Operational Planning Process in NATO is based upon the sameconcepts as found in national doctrines, certain aspects of it are
different since NATO is an Alliance of nations, and military forces
are made available to NATO through the contributions by the nations
in the force generation and activation process. In addition, current
changes in the NCS and creation of the NRF may alter command
relationships and provide new states of readiness factors for selected
forces, but the basics of operational planning remain valid.
Operational Planning will focus on the mission, the desired end states and the criteria
for success.
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PLANNING TOOLS
0402. The NATO military commanders planning tools include the
following:
a. Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The
GOP is the basic reference document for NATO military planning
staffs to assist in the development of all operational plans: Contingency
Plans (COPs), Standing Defence Plans (SDPs), Operation Plans
(OPLANs) and Support Plans (SUPLANs). It addresses all aspects
of an operational plan and provides guidance on the planning factors
to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. Italso specifies the standard structure and content of an operational
plan.
b. Functional Planning Guides (FPG). The FPG provide
specific guidance to air, land and maritime NATO military planning
staffs on the planning factors to be taken into consideration during
the development of a joint operational plan to optimise the synergistic
effects of the synchronised application of the combined capabilitiesinherent in a joint force. FPG also provide function-specific guidance
on matters such as airspace and waterspace management, etc.
c. Regional Planning Guides (RPG). The RPG provide
specific guidance to NATO military planning staffs on particular
regional planning factors to be taken into consideration during the
development of an operational plan. This includes factors such as
climate, geography, oceanography, terrain, etc.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES
0403. The Bi-SC GOP provides Commanders and their staffs with
the framework for Operational Planning. The broad principles guiding
planning within ACO are set out below.
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0404. General. Operational planning demands that a commander
and his staff answer four questions:
a. Which military conditions must be attained to achieve thestrategic and operational objectives?
b. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these
conditions?
c. How should military resources be applied to best accomplish
that sequence of actions?
d. Are the associated risks acceptable?
0405. Planning Focus. Planners should focus on:
a. The mission.
b. Desired end states and the criteria for success.
The Planning process enables the staff to translate strategic political objectives into an
appropriate military plan.
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THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS
0407. The Operational Planning Process (OPP) is a co-ordinated
staff process to determine the best method of accomplishing assignedtasks or of planning for possible future tasks. The OPP is applicable
to any Strategic, Operational or Tactical HQ conducting planning
for any theatre, for any kind of plan and with any size of force.
Whereas the OPP is applicable for both Advanced and Crisis
Response Planning, Advance Planning is usually conducted with
more time available to complete the process. Crisis Response
Planning, due to time constraints, normally demands an accelerated
use of the process.
0408. The OPP is used to produce plans to reach the desired end-
state and to achieve the mission that has been assigned to a
commander. The objectives of the OPP are to:
a. Standardise the planning process within the Alliance.
The emerging situation may demand an accelerated Crisis Response Plan.
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b. Ensure strategic/political control is effected during the
development of the plan.
c. Enable the staff to translate strategic political objectives,provided in an Initiating Directive, into appropriate
military objectives.
d. Enable commanders to guide the development of the
plan.
e. Maximise the staffs creative thinking and associated
thought processes.
f. Evaluate the products of the planning process.
STAGES OF THE OPP
0409. The OPP consists of five stages, leading from the initiation of
planning through to plan review. The process is essentially the
responsibility of the commander and his planning team and consists
of a deductive reasoning process, starting from the known facts and
moving to specific options.
STAGE I - OPP INITIATION
0410. Operational Planning may be initiated at varying levels in
response to either political or military events. In addition, commandersmay initiate the planning process in recognition of changing
circumstances. The initiation phase begins when the task is received
and, as the name implies, initiates the planning. Normally it starts
with the Initiating Directive. During this stage of the process, the
Initiating Directive is received, the Operations Planning Group (OPG)
is formed and the necessary information is gathered.
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STAGE II - OPP ORIENTATION
0411. On receipt of the Initiating Directive, the Commander will
determine exactly what has to be accomplished. Depending on thesituation, the initiation may result from a directive or a verbal briefing
from the command group anticipating a future requirement.
Regardless, the end-state(s) must be clearly expressed and the higher
commanders intent must be clearly understood for effective planning
to commence. The Orientation Stage is summarised in Figure 4-1.
0412. The product of the Orientation Stage is the Commanders
Planning Guidance, a formal document, which may serve as anInitiating Directive to start further planning by his staff and subordinate
HQ(s).
STAGE III - CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
0413. Concept Development begins with a review of the
Commanders Planning Guidance, produced in the previous stage.This provides the necessary direction and guidance to the planning
staff to conduct a staff analysis and subsequently shapes the
development of the Courses of Action (COAs).
A COA is a possible option open to the commander that would
accomplish the mission. It is initially stated in broad terms, with further
details determined during the actual COA analysis. Additionally, it
provides a framework for the necessary staff analysis that must
consider all factors and deductions to determine the viability of the
various options. The final product of this planning stage is a Concept
of Operations (CONOPS) based on a single COA chosen by the
Commander. The Concept Development Stage is summarised in
Figure 4-2.
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STAGE IV - PLAN DEVELOPMENT
0414. An approved plan will be the final product of the OPP. The
development of the plan is based on the approved CONOPS. Ifmajor changes to the CONOPS are introduced during Plan
Development, it may be necessary for planners to return to an earlier
stage of the OPP. There must be a continuous exchange of information
between the various staff branches subordinate commands. It is
important at the Plan Development Stage to ensure that potential
shortfalls are identified and that the plan addresses their resolution.
The Plan Development Stage is summarised in Figure 4-3.
Changes in the situation may result in the revision of the plans at all levels.
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STAGE V - PLAN REVIEW
0415. During an operation there will often be changes in the situation,
which may necessitate the review of a plan, or higher authority maydirect it. The review should focus on the new threat, availability/
flow of forces, suitability of contingency plans, requirement for
additional branch plans, etc. Once the review is complete, the
Commander should be briefed, along with any recommendations for
action, to deal with the changed situation. The Plan Review Stage is
summarised in Figure 4-4.
0416. Review of a COP or OPLAN must occur whenever a majorchange has occurred. It must be kept in mind that any major changes
or amendments to the plan will require renewed approval.
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Figur
e4-1
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Figure4-2
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2
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Figure4-4
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CHAPTER 5
DF(A) DEPLOYMENT PLANNING
0501. The Air Component Commanders (ACC) CONOPS is
paramount for DF(A) deployment planning. Thereafter, the Plan
Development stage of the Operational Planning Process takes
consideration of:
a. Base Availability. Host Nation (HN) or other nation basing,
Main Operating Bases (MOB), Deployment Operating Bases (DOB)or civil airfields, en-route bases, and Ports of Debarkation (POD).
b. Agreements. Bi-lateral basing and HN support agreements.
c. Contingency Operation Plan Basing. Other COP basing
or historical deployments.
Ports of debarkation options must be considered during the Operational Planning
Process.
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d. Restrictions. National constraints and national peacetime
restrictions.
e. Collocation. Collocation of national assets, if possible; ifnot, basing of similar assets together.
f. Air and Sea Ports of Debarkation (APODs/SPODs).
Minimising the number of Ports of Debarkation (PODs) a single
nation must use.
g. Infrastructure. Avoid a basing requirement that could cause
a heavy infrastructure build-up.
0502. DF(A) units will be planned for deployment to the most suitable
locations. For potential crises in NATOs area of interest, basing
options may be limited in choice and lacking in facilities.
0503. As a quick reference for the screening of DF(A) basing during
operational planning, RFAS has developed special criteria to
standardize the assets basing requirements for Initial Operational
Capability. Because of the high readinessof NRF and HRF(A) units,
some requirements have to be met by facilities that are in place or
During Out-of-Area missions basing options may be limited in choice and less suitable.
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that are readily available from local sources, while others may be
met by assets that are deployed into theatre. These criteria, coupled
with the associated basing considerations, provide a 90% deployment
solution.
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CHAPTER 6
DF(A) COMMAND AND CONTROL
0601. Deployed air units will be integrated into either the
in-place NATO regional command and control structure at the
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) level or into the CJTF/
NRF structure at the Combined Joint Forces Air Component
Command (CJFACC) level, for non-Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations. Figure 6-1 compares the operational relationships
between the NATO Command structure and the CJTF/NRFstructure used for non-Article 5 operations.
0602. Upon arrival of air assets in-theatre and when operationally
ready, TOA will occur and Operational Command (OPCOM) and/
or Operational Control (OPCON) will be transferred to SACEUR
by the nations. SACEUR will then delegate OPCON of these assets
to the deployed Joint Force Commander (JFC), who in turn will decide
on further delegations of C2 to the appropriate CJFACC.
Deployed units will be integrated into the existing command and control structure.
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0603. The CJFACC will employ the deployed air assets, exercising
command and control over them via the C2 structure. If considered
necessary, liaison elements of nations providing air units can be
established at appropriate command levels. If the in-place C2 facilitiesare inadequate in the crisis area, enhancement using deployable
facilities may be appropriate. Following the introduction of the Air
Command and Control System (ACCS) (scheduled for 2007), a
Deployable ACCS Component (DAC) comprised of a Deployable
Combined Air Operations Centre (DCAOC) and supporting elements
will be made available. The CONOPS for the DCAOC is under
development.
0604. Deployable air C2 facilities are required to meet air asset C2
requirements prior to the implementation of ACCS. Therefore a DAC
Working Group was created with the support of nations and the
ACCs. It was tasked to identify available deployable elements and
to define the policy for their use. The resulting SHAPE Operational
Employment Sub-Concept for the SACEUR-Assigned Deployable
ACCS defines the need for the four building blocks equating to
elements of the ACCS structure. This policy identifies potential assetsavailable from NATO and national resources including, for example,
the HRF(A) Tactical Air Control Squadrons (TACSs).
Deployable air C2 facilities include assets from NATO and national resources.
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0605. Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of
reliable, secure Communications and Information Systems (CIS).
The next chapter deals with CIS for C2 and supporting functions.
Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of reliable and secure CIS.
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Figure6-1
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Fig
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CHAPTER 7
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATIONSYSTEMS
CIS FOR DF(A)
0701. Provision of appropriate CIS for deployed air units is a mission
critical area. The NATO Deployable CIS Concept (DCC) identifies
the NATO information transfer requirement for deployed air elements.This includes the need for access to the NATO Wide Area Network
core services, and air command and control and other functional
services. Deployed air elements may also require CIS access back
to their parent nations for the purposes of national command, logistics
or administration.
Provision of appropriate CIS is mission critical for deployed air units.
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0702. Responsibility for the provision of the CIS for deployed air
elements falls to the following three agencies:
a. NATO. NATO is responsible for the provision of the CIS requiredto support the NATO C2 of deployed air elements down to the highest
national or multinational HQ, which will normally be the Combined
Air Operations Centre. Wherever possible, existing NATO and
national CIS infrastructure will be used, but where this is inadequate,
system enhancement may be achieved using NATO or national
deployable assets. The provision of CIS services from the CAOC
to the Deployed Operating Base (DOB) will normally also be provided
by NATO.
b. Sending Nations. The SN are responsible for the provision of
internal CIS within the deployed element and for any required rear-
link communications to the parent nation. To eliminate overlap/
duplication, sharing of connectivity to meet NATO and national
requirements will be co-ordinated wherever possible.
c. Host Nation. The HN is responsible for providing access tolocal commercial tele-communications facilities and to their national
military systems in order to facilitate the provision of NATO CIS
services. The Host Nation may also provide CIS services for their
use or other Sending Nations use under a bilateral or multinational
Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU).
0703. As noted in Chapter 6, additional deployable air C2 elements
may be required to support deployed air units. NATO is responsiblefor providing CIS services to these deployed elements in accordance
with STANAG 5048 where higher formations provide connectivity
to the lower formation.
0704. Common NATO-wide distributed CIS are required by deployed
air elements to meet the needs of C2, battle management and
Intelligence, as well as for a number of support areas. Such elements
will, in due course, be provided under the ACCS and ACE AutomatedCommand, Control and Information System (ACCIS) programmes.
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In the interim, a variety of prototype systems will be used on an
ad hoc basis.
0705. Improvements to the static infrastructure to meet DF
requirements are being implemented by NATO. Prior to project
completion, increased reliance on the use of deployable CIS facilities
will be necessary for in-area as well as OOA applications. Some
deployable NATO CIS equipment is currently available, and further
packages are in the procurement process. Their usage will be in
accordance with the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). To
meet specific deployment needs, particularly during the build-up ofthe Force Goals, nations have been requested through the DPQ
process to assign deployable CIS facilities to deployable air units.
In addition, NATO is working with Partnership nations to enhance
their CIS interoperability with NATO for improving operations in a
wide spectrum of contingencies.
NATO is responsible for the provision of CIS required to support the C2 of
deployed forces.
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DF(A) RESOURCE PLANNING
0706. DF(A) CIS planning is co-ordinated at a variety of levels.
The design and provision of CIS facilities within NATO is a jointservice function, and hence the prime co-ordinating and controlling
staff for the development of an operational or exercise CIS plan is
that of the JFC or CJTF Commander. Air CIS requirements will be
identified by the staff of the Air Component Commander, in association
with RFAS and the deploying nations. Any CIS shortfalls will be
identified in the plan and passed through the chain of command to
SHAPE J6 and the NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency
(NACOSA). Provision of additional resources in support ofdeployed units will be co-ordinated with SHAPE
J5/Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) and, for deployable air
aspects with RFAS. CIS resources can be made available either by
re-allocation of existing assets, by allocation of deployable NATO
CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP), by the use of national
deployable assets (e.g. DF(A) assigned equipment), by renting
commercial facilities on an ad hoc basis, or by NATO emergency or
urgent procurement. Use of NCCAP facilities will be co-ordinated/de-conflicted by SHAPE J6/NACOSA in association with J5 / CJPS
and RFAS. NACOSA will co-ordinate the use of, and access to, the
NATO CIS infrastructure.
0707. The use of common CIS standards by NATO and the nations
is of paramount importance if the required flexible usage of DF(A)
elements is to be achieved. Nations should utilise NATO
recommended digital standards as laid down by the Consultative
Committee on International Telephone and Telegraphy (CCITT) and
in accordance with International Standards Organisation/Open
System Interconnection principles for their internal CIS. Where
this is not possible, SN and HN are responsible for providing
interfaces to NATO systems in accordance with NATO
Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs).
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CHAPTER 8
GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE
0801. To support a JFC or a CJTF Commander in the completion of
his mission, it may be necessary to reinforce a Region or Theatre
with Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). The spectrum of NATO
GBAD systems varies from basic Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)
and Manual Portable Air Defence (MANPAD) through modern
Radar Guided and Controlled Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD)
systems. In order to be able to defend DF and high value assets orpopulated areas against ballistic or aerodynamic missile threats,
sophisticated Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems capable of
Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) are in the inventory of some NATO
nations. When special system expertise is not available within the
region/theatre or when deploying OOA, the deployment of GBAD
units requires particularly careful planning and co-ordination.
The different roles of GBAD in the Integrated Extended Air Defence
Structure (IEADS) and the demanding requirements for automated
Some surface to air missile systems are capable of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).
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C2/EW for these systems must be taken into consideration.
0802. The receiving Air Component Commander is responsible to
integrate deployed GBAD reinforcements into an Integrated ExtendedAir Defence System. GBAD units can be deployed either to augment
and enhance the existing Regional Air Defence (AD) (Article 5) or
to build, together with other systems, a constructive Air Defence
Capability to fulfil the CJTF Commanders mission for OOA
operations. They will be employed to defend high-value military and
civil assets at specific geographic locations against air attacks, or
attacks with ballistic or aerodynamic missiles. The introduction of
modern GBAD units has reduced the clear distinction between thesystems with regard to range and altitude and their specific role.
In addition it provides a capability against specific ballistic/
aerodynamic missile threats.
SHORAD units will protect specific high value locations or assets.
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GBAD roles can be identified as follows:
a. SHORAD. Due to the nature of their task, these units will
normally be employed in a point defence role to protect specific highvalue locations or assets under local command and adhere to regional
standard airspace co-ordination rules. SHORAD units can also be
employed within a GBAD cluster and be used as gap fillers to
enhance the overall capability of the AD.
b. SAM. SAM units, being an integral part of the IEADS, are
primarily employed in an area defence role and are mostly structured
in clusters. They contribute to regional AD in order to provide generaltheatre low/medium to high altitude coverage, and protection to
designated high-risk areas. Under exceptional circumstances, SAM
units can be employed in a Point Defence Role.
SAM units can be included in the main body of DF(A). In those
circumstances where a ballistic missile threat exists, deployment of
TMD-capable GBAD units, as part of the deployed forces, will be
required.
SAM units are primarily employed in an area defence role.
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When possible, GBAD units in an Area Defence and/or TMD Role
are to be supplemented by ground-based, airborne and space-based
sensors and additional Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I) facilities. Developments in TMD and continuing
interconnectivity improvements will, however, allow for stand-alone
employments.
0803. GBAD units, especially SAM systems in an AD Role, must
also be able to operate in close co-ordination with ground /
sea-based forces when employed in a multi-service environment.
C2 arrangements are developed to maximise effectiveness of IEADS
and safety to allied forces.
GBAD units will be deployed to build, with other systems, a constructive Air Defence
Capability.
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CHAPTER 9
FORCE PROTECTION0901. Force Protection (FP) is defined as all measures taken and
means used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities,
equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, so as to
preserve the freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a
force. The generic title of FP covers the functions of Active Defence,
Passive Defence and Recuperation in both conventional and NBC
environments. For DF(A), the increased possibility of rapiddeployment to forward bases in much more volatile threat/risk areas
only serves to reinforce the continued importance of protecting air
forces on the ground.
0902. This chapter gives an outline of FP arrangements for DF units
to ensure that the FP dimension to deployed operations is properly
considered, prior to and in the planning phase, thus allowing FP
requirements and capabilities to be assessed and fully satisfied.
DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed operations.
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As FP facilities may be provided by IPF, by one or more of the
Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), or by a combination of both,
contributions must be carefully coordinated to ensure comprehensive
provision without duplication of effort.
ACTIVE DEFENCE
0903. Active Defence comprises the measures necessary to prevent
an enemy from successfully attacking a unit; it includes the physical
defence of a unit against ground and low-level air attack.
a. Active Ground Defence. The active ground defence
concept seeks to counter the threat of terrorist and conventional
(including Special Forces) attack by a layered defence which includes
control of entry measures, point defence of vital assets, on- and off-
base patrolling and the domination of vital ground thus denying a
potential enemy the freedom of movement required to operate
successfully. Active ground defence encompasses protection from
Active Defence forces protect deployed air forces against ground and low-level airattacks.
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close (i.e., direct attack by small arms, grenade or improvised
explosive device) and stand-off attack (i.e., mortar, sniper, heavy
machine gun or MANPAD) and thus needs to extend beyond the
perimeter of an airbase into the area from which attacks could bemounted. This area is deemed the Ground Defence Area. A high
degree of coordination and cooperation is required between the
airbase ground defence commander and the local military
commander, who will normally have primacy for defence
arrangements of the whole area in which the airbase is located.
b. Low Level Air Defence. Low level air defence will be
deployed to engage targets at distances beyond their effective rangeof weapon release; these targets may include manned aircraft,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and missiles.
Active Defence prevents an enemy from successfully attacking a unit.
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b. EOD encompasses the detection, identification, on-site
evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO).
c. ADR comprises the measures necessary to restore an airfield
operational flying support capability including the Repair of Aircraft
Operating Surfaces (RAOS) and the Restoration of Essential Services
and Facilities (RESF).
0906. DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed
operations to enable them to operate from their assigned functional
area on a deployment base with minimal support from IPF or otherTCN forces. They should be capable of carrying out the following
FP activities:
a. Warning, alerting and controlling all FP functions.
b. Providing point protection and control of entry to their
vital assets.
c. Concealment and dispersal of their equipment.
d. Providing immediate casualty care.
e. Fighting fires with local first aid fire fighting
extinguishers.
f. Carrying out PAR, EOR and NBCR in their designatedarea of operation.
g. Implementing individual NBC protective measures.
h. Decontaminating critical equipment unique to their unit.
Where possible, DF(A) units should deploy with infantry-trained
manpower that can be used to supplement HN defence forces.
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0907. Unity of FP planning and C2 arrangements on a multinational
deployment base will be an essential element of successful
employment of DF(A). Even well developed IPF facilities may be
overwhelmed by the demands of a DF(A) operation and thus a TCNmay be required to take the lead on FP, especially in providing
integrated FP C2. Moreover, there is a high probability that DF(A)
units may have to operate from bases where existing FP measures
are inadequate, especially when operating away from NATO
infrastructure. In such cases, TCNs will be required to provide the
full range of FP measures to ensure the survivability of their deployed
units. Accordingly, nations should retain sufficient deployable FP
capability, covering the full spectrum, at the same readiness as theirDF(A) units.
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MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC CONCEPTS
1004. Multinational logistics is a tool, which, depending on the
operational requirements, the level of interoperability of the systems,
and the specific situation in theatre, can enhance efficiency and
effectiveness of a multinational force. More specifically, the benefits
of multinational logistics can be the following:
a. Reduction of the overall costs.
b. Reduction of the logistic footprint in theatre.
c. Increased flexibility of the force.
d. Lesser use of scarce local resources.
e. Efficient use of national expertise.
Nations must ensure the provision of logistic resources for deployed forces.
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1005. Multinational logistics is not an aim in itself. During the early
stage of the Force Planning and Force Generation process, the
applicability, necessity and benefits of multinational logistics must be
considered. Unilateral national logistic decisions could adverselyimpact the effectiveness of the NATO Commanders mission.
1006. Besides national logistic arrangements to support own forces,
where ad-hoc support may be provided to other nations and /or
NATO Commanders (e.g., Logistic Time Sharing (LTIS) and Logistic
Sorties (LS)), there are three recognised levels of multinational
logistics:
a. Pre-planned mutual support, HNS and Third Party Logistic
Support Services (TPLSS) that are arranged nationally.
b. A nation formally undertakes to provide support or services
to all or part of the multinational force, but under national command
(Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistic Role Specialist Nation
(LRSN)).
c. One or more nations formally undertake to serve all or part of
the multinational force, under OPCON of the NATO Commander
(e.g. Theatre Support Unit (TSU), Multinational Integrated Logistic
Unit (MILU)).
1007. Multinational logistics can be pre-planned or introduced during
an operation as the situation evolves. Based on the mentioned levels,
NATO and nations can decide to apply multinational logistics whereit replaces less effective or efficient national solutions. As a neutral
party RFAS is uniquely well suited to act as broker between nations
to facilitate multinational logistic arrangements. This is usually
accomplished through development of appropriate Technical
Agreements (TAs) and Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs)
detailing the functional, administrative and resource-related
implications of such relationships.
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1008. Multinational logistics may create opportunities for nations to
contribute their fair share to a mission especially for those nations
that cannot provide the full range of own logistic support or whose
contribution to the mission is of a size not justifying own logisticarrangements. RFAS is able to advise and assist NATO and nations
in the development of concepts and plans for multinational air logistics
for a mission.
LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES
1009. Current Air Forces Logistic Doctrine and Procedures provide
NATO and national authorities the doctrine for the logistic support
of air forces, including DF(A). RFAS is the custodian for this
document, and for the document that includes the format for the JIA
template for airfield beddown. This format can be used to detail
Sending Nations Statement of Requirements and HN capabilities
(based upon site surveys).
Multinational logistics can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of a multinational
force.
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LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL
1010. Logistic co-ordination and control arrangements are currently
being analysed and further developed within NATO, but basicconcepts will continue for DF(A), NRF, and GRF. Sending Nations,
through their unit-level logistic support elements and/or National
Support Elements (NSE), will control and co-ordinate their own
logistic activities. Where multinational air forces are collocated in
the same theatre, a Multinational Logistic Centre (Air) (MNLC(A))
may be established. Where a principle joint headquarters is
established, a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be
set up. A diagram summarising a potential Logistic Organisation isat Figure 10-1.
1011. National Support Elements (NSE). A deployed NSE in
close co-operation with the units will maintain the necessary stock
controls and consumption data to support national elements. The
NSE will provide the reports, required by national and higher
authorities, through the Air Component Commander and co-ordinate
activities with the appropriate MNLC(A)/MJLC, if established.
1012. Multinational Logistics Centre (Air). Multinational
operations may require the establishment of an MNLC(A). The
MNLC(A) will co-ordinate logistic, including movement and medical
requirements between the Sending Nations and the Host Nation.
The MNLC(A) main functions are to manage requirements for the
entire operation, to provide liaison with respect to temporary
shortages and to provide mutual assistance in resource allocation.The MNLC(A) will co-ordinate with and provide reports to the ACC,
MJLC (if established) and execute the NATO Commanders
authority to redistribute assets.
1013. Multinational Joint Logistics Centre. Where a principal
headquarters is established with representation from all Services, a
Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be set up as an
executive logistic element reporting to the Force Commanders CJ4
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LOGISTIC PHASES
1015. Logistics planning for DF(A) units during crisis will be
accomplished in phases. During all phases, RFAS is able to support
a standing multinational joint force headquarter by playing the role
of Broker Agent between SN, HN and force contingents. The
phases are:
a. Assessment and Preparation/Pre-deployment.
Co-ordination of multinational logistic requirements and capabilities
for multinational air forces is essential. To execute deployments of
these forces in a timely manner, to enable the best selection of forces
for a particular deployment base and to optimise the logistic support
package for that force, the logistic support will be planned on a
modular basis, with standardised pre-deployment procedures.
b. Deployment. In this phase, the initial deployment of national
air force contingents and the build-up of the initial operating stocks
take place.
c. Employment/Sustainment. During this period, the continued
deployment of additional required forces and employment of forces
in-place occur. Logistic activities like the establishment of resupply
routes and operations support services must concentrate on sustaining
on-going operations and should be adaptive to any increased level of
operations.
d. De-escalation. Throughout this phase, selected air
contingents will be re-deployed and supply pipelines will be reduced.
A re-organisation of the theatre logistics C2 structure may occur.
In some operations, the logistics architecture may transition to support
non-NATO follow-on operations.
e. Recovery/Re-deployment. In this stage, the withdrawal of
the deployed forces and operating stocks, as well as the termination
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of logistic and administrative support arrangements will take place.
Special attention will be given to the requirements necessary to avoid
restricting the effectiveness of forces for either re-deployment to
another area of the operation or future operations.
Note: The timing of these phases will be dependent on many factors, including
operational requirements, timings as laid down in relevant contingency plans and
the requirements for readiness, deployability and sustainability of the units.
LOGISTIC ASPECTS
1016. Survey Teams. Each SN should form a specialist teamcomposed of a cross-section of functional skills capable of evaluating
selected deployed operating locations and preparing the location
facilities in advance of the units deployment. In addition, SN teams
must ensure adequate equipped en-route bases are established, with
capability to support both DF(A) and associated airlift as necessary.
1017. Supply Requirements. The SN, in co-ordination with the
SC, is responsible for determining supply requirements for deployedunits and for identifying sources of supply or co-ordinating HNS.
RFAS as a central air planning staff is able to assist in defining the
requirements and exploring support options.
1018. Service Support. Service Support will be a composite of
individual SN, mutual support and HN responsibilities.
RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of arrangements for Service
Support. An example of a table summarising service supportresponsibilities is at Figure 10-2.
1019. HNS. Responsive and flexible HNS is a vital supplement to
the organic support of a deployed unit. HNS will be provided to the
greatest extent possible, taking into account national legislation,
national priorities and the actual capabilities of the Host Nation.
HNS reduces the need for SN to deploy equipment or people,
although it is not a mechanism to offset deficiencies or shortfalls
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from each SN contribution. HN should provide the maximum possible
support for deployed forces, but not to the extent that it reduces a
HN operational capability. RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of
arrangements for HNS.
Note:RFAS is involved in the development of a concept that supports bare base
operations. Bare base modules are intended to provide the necessary non-organic
support to DF (A) units when they deploy to bases with no or limited Host Nation
Support. The aim of the process is to include the Deployable Operations Capabilities
for DF (A) units in the Force Proposal.
1020. Initial Operating Stocks. Logistic assets needed to provide
initial operating stocks, pending establishment of the resupply pipeline,will be to a large extent defined by the SN. Deployment stocks
need to be readily available and stored in air-transportable packs.
The required weapons and equipment, as well as the declared missile
loads and supplies, must be collocated with the deployed air
unit or suitably positioned.
Host Nation support reduces the need to deploy equipment or people.
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1021. Resupply. DF(A) units stocks are required initial
sustainment after deployment and a resupply logistics support system
for these forces is to be established within prescribed timelines.
Theatre stock levels will normally be crisis/Operation Plans
(OPLAN) specific.
1022. Unit logistics. DF(A) units should be equipped with a Mission
Support Kit in which vital mission operating assets are assembledand maintained at a high readiness level. Units should maximise the
use of containerisation for the aggregation of spares, material, and
weapons. Units should develop deployment listings that provide the
framework of their logistic requirements and availability of deployable
logistic assets.
1023. Maintenance. Deployable forces must be able to repair or
replace mission essential equipment and weapons under deployed
Sending nations are responsible for identifying logistic assets required to support a
deployed unit.
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conditions. Shared or co-use of support equipment resources must
be planned. First line preventive maintenance, battle damage repair,
and corrective maintenance should be organic to the DF(A) unit and
deployable. Second line preventive maintenance will normally be a
DF(A) unit main operating base responsibility, while national third
line organisations should be prepared to support national and deployed
units.
1024. Reporting. Logistic reporting will follow the requirements of
the Bi-SC Reporting Directive, as amended and amplified by specific
instructions issued by the directing NATO authority.
1025. Deployability. Deployable tactical/mobile combat logistics
systems have great benefits such as: flexibility for rapid deployment,
the ability to augment existing fixed systems or to compensate for
the lack of infrastructure provided by the HN. Although the
deployment of these systems will compete for scarce airlift assets,
non-Article 5 deployments to austere locations may require their
use to enhance the deployed unit support capability.
Deployable forces must be able
to repair mission essential
equipment under deployed
conditions.
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Examples of these assets are:
a. Operations Support Services. Where HN are unable to
provide all essential operational support services (such as arrestergear, runway or airfield lighting, sweepers, cranes, navigation aids
etc.), nations with spare capacity, or those not committed to deploy,
could offer available services to support deployed air operations.
b. Fuel Capacity Enhancement. SN should be prepared to
provide tactical fuel storage and handling facilities to meet any
shortfalls at deployment bases. This could include fabric bladder
tanks - and the necessary pumping equipment to enable emergencyinstallations - and the creation of additional pipelines.
c. Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid Nitrogen (LIN) Capacity
Enhancement. SN should be prepared to provide deployable LOX/
LIN tanks or a manufacturing plant to meet shortfalls.
d. Field Accommodation Modules. In the event that
accommodation at a deployment location is insufficient or unsuitableand the HN is unable to provide any alternative, the SN should be
prepared to deploy with a full range of field accommodation to support
its force.
e. Field Catering (Messing) Modules. SN should be prepared
to deploy catering support for its forces, where necessary.
f. Deployable Base Medical Facility. SN should be preparedto provide fully equipped medical facilities, with a limited hospital
capability, where necessary, to supplement HN base medical
capability at the Role 2 level. Additionally, a field hospital facility
may be required to supplement local hospitals at the Role 3 level.
g. Maintenance. Consists of deployable engineering and/or
avionics workshops and test facilities for repairs beyond First Line,
including Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR). This aspect alsoincludes hangarage, protection and handling facilities.
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Figure10-1
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14
Figure10-2
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CHAPTER 11
MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION
1101. The NATO principles and policies for movement and
transportation document reflects the need of the nations and the
Alliance to provide flexible support to NATO operations. Military
Movement and Transport resources will always be limited. National
M&T resources are likely to be tailored to meet the rapid strategic
deployment of key elements of the force and to provide operationaland tactical mobility. The greater the scope and the size of the
operation, the greater will be the reliance on civil M&T resources.
Military planners must appreciate that civil M&T resources are
also limited, are not specifically designed for military use, and
might therefore be neither available, nor capable of meeting the
military requirements.
NATO and nations have collective responsibility for M&T support to NATO operations.
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(2) The HN has the ultimate authority to approve, coordinate and
control all movements, including RSOM related activity, on its
sovereign territory in accordance with the NATO commanders
priorities.
NATO STRUCTURE FOR M&T
1103. The M&T Architecture in the integrated NATO Command
Structure and during a CJTF is shown at Figures 11-1 and 11-2.
a. NATO HQ. NATO HQ provides the political and military
guidance through consultation with Nations for overall M&T
aspects and by obtaining timely agreements for the transit of
deploying forces through national territory when necessary.
b. The Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC).
The AMCC is the SHAPE agency for the overall management of
strategic movements. In this respect, the AMCC in cooperation with
Nations constructs the Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan
(MNDDP) and addresses strategic lift shortfalls.
The Nations are responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain
and redeploy their forces.
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c. The Joint Force Command CJ4 M&T Staff. The Staff
is to develop and to implement movement and transportation plans
and directives and to prioritise movement requirements as they
apply to the JFC tasks. The M&T Staff is the focus for all aspectsof operational movements within the region in co-ordination with
the HN.
d. National Movements Control Centre (NMCC). The
NMCC is the agency provided by the HN to approve, control and
co-ordinate air, sea and inland surface movements on its own territory,
in support of NATO operations.
e. Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS). The JTMS is the
Commander Combined Joint Task Forces (COMCJTFs) primary
focus for Deployment and Movement matters. Its role is to monitor,
evaluate and provide continuous assessment of strategic and
operational deployments. It is part of the CJTF HQ and is the focus
for co-ordination and consultation between the SN, HN and the
Component Commanders.
f. Joint Transportation Co-ordination Centre (JTCC). The
JTCC is a cell established on an as-required basis to co-ordinate the
employment of any transportation assets, which may be assigned to
COMCJTF for an operation at the theatre level.
g. National Support Element (NSE). The NSE is a national
organisation positioned in theatre when required by a nation. The
NSE supports reception, onward movement, re-supply andredeployment of national forces. The NSE will interface with the
NMCC or Theatre Movements Control Centre (TMCC) as
applicable.
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h. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Centre (AECC). The
AECC element is established by the designated NATO Commander
to co-ordinate aeromedical evacuation. The AECC monitors patient
movements and coordinates strategic aeromedical evacuation withthe AMCC.
i. Regional Air Lift Control Centre (RALCC). The RALCC
is an agency within the CJTF structure (Air Component Command)
and will plan, co-ordinate, execute and control the air transport
operations within the Area of Responsibility (AOR).
SEQUENCE OF M&T PLANNING
1104. The development of M&T plans in support of NATO
operations requires close coordination between NATO Commands,
SN and HN. This process is supported by the Allied Deployment
and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is used for planning,
evaluating and monitoring (tracking and tracing) M&T operations in
support of NATO missions.
1105. Movement planning is part of the Operational Planning Process
(see Chapter 4). The development of deployment/movement plans
in support of NATO operations will be an iterative process and may
begin with limited military guidance or political clearance. Force
planning should identify all forces needed to fulfil operational
requirements that have been established in the concept of operations
in order to arrange the arrival of these forces into the area of
operations in accordance with the NATO Commanders priorities
and timelines.
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The end product of deployment planning will be a Multi-National
Detailed Deployment Plan, coordinated and de-conflicted at the SC
level, to meet the NATO Commanders operational requirements.
Figure 11-3 shows the deployment planning process. Sequentially,the main deployment planning documents are:
a. Statement of Requirements (SOR). SACEUR will, with
the designated NATO Commander, provide the SOR to the nations.
The SOR lists the forces required by the NATO Commander for the
mission.
b. National Force Contribution (NFC). Based on the SOR,the Nations identify and offer forces they can provide in support of
the mission.
c. Allied Forces List (AFL). When combined at SC level, the
NFCs become the AFL. The AFL provides the information contained
in the NFCs and also includes the movement characteristics for each
unit (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units).
The development of deployment/movement plans in support of NATO operations is
part of the Operational Planning Process.
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d. Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is an expression
of the time-phased requirements for deploying the units listed in the
AFL. The ADL specifies the NATO commanders operational
requirements by listing the Commanders Required Date (CRD),Desired Order of Arrival, Ports of Debarkation (PODs), and Final
Destination (FD) for each unit.
e. Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP). Based on the ADL and
identified constraints, nations develop their national DDP considering:
(1) Force Packages;
(2) Time Phasing;
(3) Lines of Communication (LOCs);
(4) Modes of Transportation (MOTs);
(5) Assignment of Transportation Assets;
(6) Reception, Staging and Onward Movement.
National DDPs are then combined by the AMCC into a Multi-National
DDP and de-conflicted as required by the AMCC, in conjunction
with the designated NATO Commander(s), the Troop Contributing
Nation(s) (TCN(s)) and HN(s) as appropriate. Reception and onward
movement planning is an integral part of the deployment planning
process. The HN(s), in conjunction with the TCN(s) and NATOCommander, will conduct reception and onward movement planning
to maximise the throughput capacity of: PODs; reception, marshalling,
staging, and assembly areas; and routes to final destinations to meet
the CRD. In this respect, the early identification of HNs and
infrastructure capabilities is essential.
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f. Sequencing. A series of Movement Planning Conferences
chaired at SHAPE by the AMCC would be held to support the
iterative process to develop a Multi-National Deconflicted
Deployment Plan. Sequential simulations and evaluations of plannednational movements using ADAMS will determine initial gross
feasibility, provide data for analysis and refinement of the movement
flow, and identify any shortfalls for resolution in subsequent planning
cycles. During execution planning and deployment, nations will
continue to provide National DDP updates to the AMCC.
AIR TRANSPORT
1106. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil lift
necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO
military operations. The procedures for requesting and providing airlift
resources for co-operative and/or shared use are found in Allied
Joint Movement and Transportation doctrine.
1107. Air Transport (AT) is relatively expensive and, in most cases,
the fastest mode of transport. However, contrary to broad thinking,
it is not in all cases the most efficient means to deploy or re-deploy
large units. AT is greatly affected by factors that can hamper the
airflow significantly (e.g. weather, throughput capacity of airports,
saturation of Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities, dependence on
onward movement, etc.).
1108. Nations retain full Command and Control of their military airlift
assets. Nations are encouraged to consider bilateral arrangements
with other nations for the use of military and civilian airlift assets,
prior to requesting NATO co-ordinated, co-operative airlift support.
In addition, nations are requested to make available their surplus
airlift assets under military control for NATO Military Command
co-ordinated, co-operative and/or shared use. Nations can also elect
to place airlift assets under operational control of a NATO
Commander in specific instances or for a particular period or task.
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1109. Airlift assets placed under operational control of NATO for
co-operative and/or shared use will be managed by AMCC or, if
required, by Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre (JMCC). The
day-to-day management of these assets may be delegated tosubordinated organisations for an operation or exercise, for example,
the NMCC/JTCC or the Regional Airlift Co-ordination Centre
(RALCC). An Intra-Theatre Airlift System (ITAS) may be
established to support in-theatre airlift requirements.
1110. Military movements will rely heavily on airlift resources
chartered directly from the commercial aviation market or upon
utilisation of normal commercial services. Nations plan for use of
commercial aviation resources during operations and retain control
over their chartered airlift assets. However, they may encounter
difficulty in chartering sufficient airlift resources to meet military
requirements.
M&T resources must enable rapid strategic deployment and provide operational and
tactical mobility.
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Nations may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close
co-operation with military planners of other countries within the
AMCC. Co-ordination will not increase the number of aircraft
available, but it could result in more efficient use of them and couldrestrain escalating charter hire rates.
SEA TRANSPORT
1111. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil sealift
necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO
military operations. All military shipping assets remain under national
control. However, it is envisaged that under certain circumstances,nations may be prepared to offer shipping assets, which are under
military control for use by other nations. The AMCC may request
nations to place available surplus shipping capacity under military
control for use by other nations.
1112. Sea Transport (ST) is a very economic mode of transport.
Although relatively slow on short distances because of the loading
and discharging time, on long distances this mode of transport canbe the only suitable way to move as quickly as possible a whole
force package. Examples of efficient usage of ST are for units with
outsized and/or heavy cargo and hazardous cargo such as fuel or
ammo. A further advantage is that there are almost no problems
with border crossings.
1113. Military movements rely heavily upon vessels chartered directly
from the commercial shipping market or upon utilisation of normal
commercial services. Nations plan for use of merchant shipping during
operations and retain control over their chartered sealift assets.
However, they may encounter difficulty in chartering sufficient
tonnage of preferred types to meet military requirements. Nations
may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close co-operation
with military planners from other countries within the AMCC. Again,
co-ordination will not increase the number of ships available, but it
could result in more efficient use of ships and could restrain escalatingcharter hire rates.
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INLAND SURFACE TRANSPORT
1114. Inland Surface Transport (IST) encompasses the use of ports
and beaches, road, railroad, inland waterway transport, and pipeline
modes, as well as the interrelationship between them. One or more
of these modes will be required to accomplish operational
deployments and redeployments of forces and their follow-on support.
IST resources, and planning for their use, remain fully under national
control during operations. However, planning requires co-ordination
between nations and relevant headquarters.
1115. Civil resources will be necessary to meet operational movement
requirements due to the limited availability of military IST resources.
Consequently, ready access to civil transport resources will be
beneficial. Harmonised military and civil procedures for regular use
are prerequisite for easy acquisition of HN transport support, as
well as for border crossing movements.
Sea transport is one of the most efficient means to deploy or redeploy large units.
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1116. Characteristics. Selection of IST modes will take accountof the specific lift requirements. Characteristics, capabilities,
availability and cost effectiveness are factors in deciding upon which
transport mode, or combination thereof, is to be used.
a. Road Transport (RT). RT is, in general, suitable for intra-
regional deployment of forces and accompanying stocks, normally
using military organic vehicles. RT is particularly suitable as a feede