1
ò What You Should Take Away from the Briefing
ò Transformation is a Process, not a Destination
ò Implications for the Army
ò The Path to Army Transformation
ò What the Blueprint for an Information Age Army MightLook Like:
Operational Level
Tactical Level
ò Summary + Back-Up Slides
Concepts for Army Transformation:A Briefing for the Transformation Task Force
What You Should Take Away from theBriefing
What You Should Take AwayFrom this Discussion
Reorganize the Army:
•to provide more ready, deployable combat powerthrough rotational readiness and unit cohesion.
•to continuously absorb new technologies and developnew capabilities.
•to integrate Army capabilities with the Navy, Marines,and Air Force.
•to mount combined operations and incorporateallies into US-led formations.
òInformation processes are sources of power andshould drive organization for combat.
òWarfighting systems should co-evolve with conceptsand organization.
òIntroduction/adaptation of new technology to theforce should be continuous.
òTransformation begins when the force exploits newtechnology and develops the concepts andorganizations that are indicated by the newcapabilities.
Transformation is a Process, not a Destination!
44
xxxx
xxx
xx
x
II
I
(Conduct Operational Maneuver)
(Conduct OffensiveOPNS in Joint
Operational Area)
(ConductTactical
Maneuver)
(FIGHT!)
CORPSHEADQUARTERS
(Joint Capable)DIVISION HQTRS
(Joint Plugs)
Brigade HQTRS
Battalion Task Force
Company-Team Platform
ARMY HQTRS
Army’s Single Service Structure:Designed to Deploy Mass, not Capabilities!
Six echelonsof C2 to
direct thesoldiers who
fight!
Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - TooExpensive to Modernize - Too Vulnerable to WMD!
•Army ground forces must integrate seamlessly into theemerging global strike complex.
•New technology compels and enables change in theway Army ground forces organize to fight.
•Army capabilities must be organized for integrationwith other services at increasingly lower levels.
•Integration of ground maneuver forces with powerfulstrike assets is the foundation for a true revolution inmilitary affairs!
Implications for the Army in the Age of Air, Spaceand Missile Power
•Historically, armies confuse transformation with re-capitalization.
•Armies transform when they successfully exploit newtechnology, new operational concepts, new organizations, aswell as new approaches to training and leadership to attainqualitatively superior fighting power.
•Army transformation should create powerful synergies withthe new technologies and concepts fielded by air and navalforces.
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The Key to Army Transformation:
Question: “What capabilities can the Army field thatthe Joint Commander is likely to need?”
7
The Path To Transformation
JStep 1. A New Joint Operational Concept
JStep 2. A New Organization for Combat thatCan Execute the Concept
JStep 3. A New Joint Operational Architecture
JStep 4. A New Approach to Modernization,Training, Readiness, Personnel Management,Recruiting, etc, … leveraging technology, aswell as concepts across service lines.
Redefining Warfare with a new OperationalConcept
•The objective of Dominating Maneuver (DM) is togain a positional advantage in time and space thatplaces the opposing force at such a disadvantagethat he is compelled to surrender or be destroyed.
•Dominating Maneuver is not single service.
•Its success depends on the ability to projectmilitary power rapidly using air, land and seapower from all points on the globe to convergenear simultaneously as joint forces that act inconcert to paralyze and defeat the enemy.
Operational Command and Controlfor the Combat Groups
• Position warfighting C2 in the unified commands.
• Reduce timelines for deployment and enhanceresponsiveness to crisis.
• Set the stage for an integrated standing JointTask Force.
• Flatten the Army’s hierarchical structure topermit rapid decision making and planning.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
Lieutenant GeneralJoint Force Land Component
Commander (JFLCC)(Army or Marine Based)
Major General(Deputy CDR for Close
Combat)
Major General(Deputy CDR for DeepCombat/Strike Opns )
Major General(Deputy CDR for RearCombat/ Sustainment
Opns )
•Army C2 exists within larger “plug and play” joint operationalarchitecture.
•The deep C2 structure plugs the Army into the JFACC.
•The close/deep/rear framework facilitates integration withemerging global strike complex.
Theater Commander
Army Group
Army
Corps
Division
Regiment
Battalion
Company
Army
Corps
Division
Brigade
Battalion
Company
World War II C2 Gulf War C2
(Remagen, 1945) (Desert Storm, 1991)
CINC, USCENTCOM CINC,Unified Command
JFLCC or JTFCombatGroupBattalion
Company
21st CenturyC2
(Information Age)
Change in the Operational Architecture EnhancesJointness
1212
Adaptive organization leverages specializedmodules of Army combat power.
BGCommands
5,000 Troops
Within a training and readiness system thatensures the Army is strategically relevant to Joint
Operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Aviation in every Close Combat Group!
SUSTAINMENT
ARMEDRECON
STAND-0FFATTACK
CLOSECOMBAT
EMBEDDEDC4ISR
Fewer Echelons - Faster Decision Cycle -Cheaper to Modernize
13
JTF
II
I
(Conduct Operational Maneuver)
(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)
(Conduct TacticalManeuver)
(The Fighters!)
JTF CDR
Combat Group
MNVR TF
Co/Tm OA
Jointness Begins Here!
Platform
Tactical Reorganization for Joint Warfighting andRapid Response to Crisis and Conflict
How does the Army construct new specializedmodules of combat power from existing assets
and incorporate new technologies with newcapabilities in the process?
Employ the Close/Deep/Rear framework tosimplify Army organization for combat in a
network-centric “plug and play” jointoperational architecture.
NOTIONAL ARMY GROUND FORCES IN THE 21st CENTURY
Close BattleEchelon
8 Airborne-AirAssault Groups
3 Recon-StrikeGroups
15 CombatManeuver Groups
7 Aviation StrikeGroups
Deep BattleEchelon3 Rocket ArtilleryGroups
7 Air DefenseGroupsTBM/GLCM/ADA
7 C4I Groups
Rear BattleEchelon3 Early DeployingSupport Groups
3 Late DeployingSupport Groups
3+ SpecializedSupport Groups MP,MED ...
3 Engineer Groups
6 Aviation SupportGroups
Reorganization creates a larger combatbase of ready, rapidly deployable ground forcesthat can exploit paralyzing strikes.
US Air and Naval Forces can strike targets quickly andaccurately nearly anywhere on the earth’s surface.
This creates the conditions for an “Inchon-style” operation wherever the strikes areconcentrated.
Deployment Reconstitution8 Airborne-Air Assault
Groups
3 LightRecon Strike
Groups15 CombatManeuver
Groups8 Aviation
StrikeGroups
5 C4IGroups
5 TheaterAir-Missile
DefenseGroups3 EarlyDeployingSupportGroups
TrainingForwardPresence
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
4 4 4 3
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2*
1 1 1 2*
1 1 1
*PartiallyForwardDeployed
Notional Rotational Readiness Scheme
ARMEDRECON
CMD (C4I) &
CONTROLSPT
LRSG 5,000 Troops
COMBATMOBILITYSTRIKE
Brigadier GeneralCommands LRSG
1818• 3 Groups CONUS-based designed to move by USAF andcommercial aircraft!
Notional Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (LRSG)
Twice theManeuver
Strength of aConventional
Maneuverbrigade task
force!
Robustcommand
structure, IWSR,Cruise Missile &
NBC defensewithin a new
Joint Framework
StrikingPower of
an ArtilleryBrigade
Ability tobreech
obstacles,mines and
sustainmomentum in
the attack!
Power tosustain
independentoperations for
more than a fewdays!
LRSG
X
Phase I: MEU Seizes Airstrip 50 kilometers from the port city.
Phase II: LRSG Deploys to Secure Airstrip. (Assumes C17/C5Aavailability).
Phase III: LRSG and MEU secure Port for use by follow-onMarine/Army Forces (Maritime Prepositioning Force) [MarineExpeditionary Brigade (MEB)].
NCA Direct a CarrierBattlegroup (CVBG)and MarineExpeditionary Unit(MEU) to position offthe coast of the N.African State.
Setting: Crisis in the Mediterranean. Competingfactions position cruise missiles and air defensetechnology in a port on North African coast todeny access to US forces.
LRLRLRSGSGSG
X XARG MEU,,, (-)
TLAGX
ARGX
MEUX
,,,
ABCT
X
AEF
JMTFXXX
TLAGX
JFETFXX
JSTFXX
CVWCVBGX X
SLOCPG MPWX X
MPS-1
XXX
Pre-positioned MEB
CVWCVBGX X SLOCPG MPW
X X
MPS-1
XXX
Pre-positioned MEB
JSDTFXX
APS-1
XX
Pre-positioned HBDE
LRSG
X
,,,
LRSG
Joint Maritime Task Forcefor Forcible Entry on Day (N+10)
An LRSGIntegrated into a
Marine-Based JTF!
MEU
NDay
42 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
CVBG + MEUDeploy
MEUSecuresAirport
LRSGDeploys
LRSG + MEUSecure Port
MEBLands
Linking the LRSG to the AEF integrates maneuver andstrike assets across service lines!
AEFs are cross sections ofcapabilities made availablefor deployment duringspecified periods and sized bycurrent force.
òUnder JFACC command,the LRSG can contribute toAEF success in the halt phaseof future crises and conflicts!
òLRSG can conductoperational maneuver to keyobjectives, compelling enemyto concentrate.
òLRSG Strike assetscomplement, not duplicateAEF/Naval strike efforts.
Kosovo: The arrival of an LRSG inJanuary 1999 might have made adifference to Belgrade’s calculus.
BOSNIA -
HERZEGOVINASARAJEVO
SKOPJE
TIRANA
THESSALONIKI
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
VJ Corps
XXX49,000 troops355 Tanks500 BMPs/BTRs900 ArtillerySystems
In a coercive campaignLRSG:
òProvides lighter, butcredible landcomponent.
òMakes air and navalcomponents moreeffective.
òSignals escalationdominance.
òCan shift rapidlybetween combat andpeace enforcement.
KOSOVO
JFLCC (integrated into unified C2 Structure)
1 COMBAT MANEUVER GROUP (CMG)
1 CMG Army Prepositioned Equipment
2 CMG Army Prepositioning Afloat Set
1 JTF SPT GP Army Prepositioning Afloat Set
1 AIR DEFENSE GROUP (strategic air/sea lift)
1 AVIATION STRIKE GROUP (in theater)
1 ROCKET ARTILLERY GROUP (strategic lift)
1 LIGHT RECON-STRIKE GROUP (strategic air lift)
1 C4I GROUP in theater
Bottom line: This Group-based Force could be ready to attackin two weeks and close in less than 30 days. Anotherequivalent force is immediately behind the deployedforce in the training phase. Mix could include more!
TROOPS NO. SOURCE
600 In Theater
5,000 In Theater
5,000 CONUS
10,000 CONUS
7,000 CONUS
2,500 CONUS
3,000 CONUS
3,000 CONUS
5,000 CONUS
2,500 CONUS
43,600 Total Strength
Example: Group-based Response Force to aMajor Theater War (ROK/SWA)
1
JTF
II
I
(Conduct Operational Maneuver)
(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)
(Conduct TacticalManeuver)
(The Fighters!)
JTF CDR
Combat Group
MNVR TF
Co/Tm OA
Jointness Begins Here!
100,000Troops in120+ days.
VII corpsmoved to
Desert Stormfrom
Germany/US:
xxxx
xxx
xx
x
II
I
(Conduct Operational Maneuver)
(Conduct OffensiveOPNS in Joint
Operational Area)
(ConductTactical
Maneuver)
(FIGHT!)
CORPSHEADQUARTERS
(Joint Capable)DIVISION HQTRS
(Joint Plugs)
Brigade HQTRS
Battalion Task Force
Platform (tank)
ARMY HQTRS
43,600 Troopsin 30 days.
Combatcapabilityequal to or
greater thanVII corps in
Desert Storm.
•America’s NATO allies are moving to force designsthat are consistent with the Group approach.
•The British and French armies orient contingencyplanning along the lines of large brigadebattlegroups (5,000 troops).
•Contemporary German army doctrine organizeswarfighting around large mobile brigadebattlegroups (5,000 troops).
•The Group-based structure can become a model fora commonality of doctrine, organization, andcommunications in US-led alliance structures.
Group-Based Structure Supports Combined Operationsin the NATO Alliance
JTransformation should result in significantchange to enhance joint warfighting capabilities.It should not “tinker on the margins!”
JThe uncertain promise of future technologymust not thwart change now through thecontinuous interaction of technology and neworganizations for combat.
JThe combat group concept is a critical bridge tothe future. It facilitates continuous adaptationthrough the incorporation of new technology.
Summary of Key Points