Chancellerie d'Etat
Michel ChevallierGeneva State Chancellery
Citizen engagementCitizen engagementand compliance with the and compliance with the
legal, technicallegal, technicaland operational measuresand operational measures
in iVotingin iVoting
Chancellerie d'Etat
Turnout is low in many modern democracies Does easy voting mean more voting? Postal vote (introduced 1995) increased
turnout by 20 percentage points After 5 years of postal voting,
95% of votes come in by post Yet, 40%-45% of citizens still do not vote Can we reach for them through a new delivery channel?
To see it for ourselves, we began iVoting in 2003 We run 3 channels: postal vote, iVote and polling station
Setting the Setting the stagestage
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As we are handling protected data – the voters' register, the votes – we must comply with strict rules
iVoting must be at least as secure as postal voting: this is the benchmark set by the federal authorities
It has legal translations in the federal constitution, in the federal law on political right and its ordinance and in the Geneva cantonal constitution and legislation
These texts define our perimeter of compliance
Our perimeter of Our perimeter of compliancecompliance
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The law states technically neutralyet very specific security rules to be implemented: One citizen, one vote Impossibility to capture or alter a substantial amount of votes All ballots must be counted for the final result No third party must see a vote (protection of the vote secrecy) Ballots must be encrypted in the voter's PC, for the transmission procedure
(anonymity of the votes) IT application linked to vote process must be split from all other IT apps. During ballot opening time, interventions on the IT system must be
performed jointly by at least two persons and recorded in a log book Before every ballot, authorities must check the hardware, software,
organisation and procedures according to the current best practices An independent 3rd party endorsed by the Confederation must confirm
that all safety measures are met and that the system works properly
What are the rules?What are the rules?
(protectionof the citizens' choice)
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Like notes on a score, laws must be interpreted In most people's view, the security of electronic voting is
associated with voter ID protection and vote secrecy It boils down to a user-centric approach: "I want
to be protected from my neighbour sniffing on me" The correct approach is a society-wide one The society requires trust and certainty, i.e. accurate
ballot results that reflect correctly the voters' intent Protecting the community against iVoting misuse
means therefore protecting the data integrity
Defining the right perspectiveDefining the right perspective
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Tales of two worldsTales of two worlds
Two worlds unite in iVoting, the real one and the virtual one We have to manage both harmoniously
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The real worldThe real world
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Physical identity It is tempting to use a token
based on the X509 normto identify the voter
This would raise more problemsthan it would bring solutions The identity control would be delegated to the browser We would not be able to know who is behind the keyboard
Therefore, we combine something that the voter owns(the Pin code reproduced on his voting card)with something he knows(his birth date and municipality of origin)
The voting card is a numerical ID with time-limited validity
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iVoting Paper-based ballot
The voting cardThe voting card
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The virtual worldThe virtual world
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Three contexts – three featuresThree contexts – three features There are three contexts or environments
that we must take into account in the virtual world The voter's PC The internet The State's IT system
(electoral register and vote processing application) We only control one of these: the State's IT system Our challenge is to ensure
data protection inuncontrolled environments
Chancellerie d'Etat
In our approach to security, we have changed paradigm In the past, we operationalized the legal rules one by one This imposed trade-offs between usability and security This illustrates our old approach We have now adopted
a systemic approach We view the system as a platform
to be secured – including the weband the voters' device
The voting application is "plugged" into this platform Security is our main business, voting is a side-offer
Change of paradigmChange of paradigm
Use
r fr
ien
dlin
ess
Security
A simple case:
the relationship
security/
user friendliness
The world as it is
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Auditing by the Confederation Systematic splitting of crucial data:
Anonymisation of the voters' register – you are but a number in our files Anonymisation of the vote by splitting the vote from the voter's authentication parameters
Permanent electoral commission, created when online voting was introduced in the law as additional watchdog
ISO 27001 certification process achieved – for budgetary reasons, we will not seek the actual certification
ISO 27001 means that all procedures are documented and their implementation can be checked by the electoral commission
A word about the A word about the proceduresprocedures
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The secure channelThe secure channel The SSL protocol is vulnerable on two accounts:
Because it is activated by the browser, it can be easily compromised
It can be broken by brute force attack The secure channel (a java applet) fulfils a triple function:
It provides an second encryption layer on top of the SSL, without having any link to the browser
It checks whether the messages we receive from the voters are coherent with a normal voting procedure
By doing this, it keeps the malware that might have infected your PC away from our IT system
The secure channel encryption key is made oftrue random numbers generated by a quantum generator
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Ja | Oui| Si | Gea| Yes
Nein | Non | No | Na| No
Wahlgang | Scrutin | Scrutinio | Scrutini | Poll
Hacker
Ja | Oui| Si | Gea| Yes
Nein | Non | No | Na| No
Wahlgang | Scrutin | Scrutinio | Scrutini | Poll
SSL without secure channelSSL without secure channel
SSL onlySSL only
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DEMK3A2#3KKJLJNJ{@3*BSÉ1=DEMK3A2#3KKJLJNJ{@3*BSÉ1=
Wahlgang | Scrutin | Scrutinio | Scrutini | Poll
Hacker
SSL with secure channelSSL with secure channel
What you see
What you see
is unreadable
is unreadableWhat you see
What you see
is unreadable
is unreadable
??????????
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GuaranteedGuaranteed ballot box integrityallot box integrity The coherence control performed by the applet guarantees the integrity of the ballot box's content
We know for sure that it is possible to read the ballots We know for sure it does not contain any incoherent result
A second control is provided by the test ballot box The electoral commission owns the ballot box's encryption keys in application of the principle of segregation of duties Its members vote in a imaginary constituency and also record their votes on paper Comparing this constituency's electronic ballots with the paper notes provides a confirmation that the system does not introduce a bias
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A large controlled perimeterA large controlled perimeter The strength of the polling station resides in the control
by the State of the voting and ballot counting premises Postal voting weakens this control The secure channel contributes re-establishing
State control over the full voting perimeter The hardening of all IT levels (vote application, OS, hardware
and network) also contributes recreating conditions close to the polling station's
We are already past our government defined benchmark, postal voting
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firewall web server
voters' registerconsoles
browser internet
443 IDS/IPS IDS/IPS
application server
Cryptographic factory quantumgenerator
Controlled perimeterwithout secure channel
citizen
electronic ballot box
A large controlled perimeter: A large controlled perimeter: illustrationillustration
Controlled perimeter with secure channel(in this case, port 80 is being used instead of port 443)
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The control codeThe control code The control code fulfils two functions:
It confirms the voter that she is connected to the State of Geneva voting web site (as we know that hardly anybody ever checks the site's certificate)
It allows us to embed the voters' choices in an image, thus adding noise to the message
This code is differentfor each citizen
It changes for each ballot You find it on the voting card
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The control code (followed)The control code (followed)
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A few other measures No connection electronic ballot box/voters' register Voters' register only contains voting cards numbers eBallot box has a built-in encrypted device to record the
number of cast votes This device is off-limits for the database administrator;
no vote can be subtracted without us noticing Altering the votes is impossible: the ballot box's
encryption key is owned by the electoral commission The ballot box is shaken before being decrypted
in order to alter the ballots' reading order Helpdesk calls are screened for feedbacks
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The iVote usersThe iVote users
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Two publicsTwo publics There are two publics for iVoting:
The Swiss living abroad The Swiss residents
iVoting offers the expatriates an effective wayto exercise their political rights (at last)
For them, iVoting makes a qualitative difference Between 35% and 50% of all votes cast from abroad
are electronic votes Consider in valuating this figure that the border
is 5 km away and that "abroad" begins 5 km from here
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Residents: iVoting appeals to young Residents: iVoting appeals to young votersvoters
100%
Weight of thedifferent age groups among active voters
without eVote
Weight of the different age groups among active voters
with eVote
18-29 60-6950-59 70-7940-4930-39
With eVote, the younger voters cast their ballotaccording to their demographic weight
Demographical weight of age
groups
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No men/women digital divideNo men/women digital divide
100%
Demographical weight of age
groups
18-29 60-6950-59 70-7940-4930-39
Until 50, vote online according to their demographic weight
Their behavior through age is similar to the (parallel lines)
Online voting behavior byMen
Women
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Postal votePostal vote
eVoteeVote
44% 52%
3rd ballot week2nd ballot week1st ballot week
Two voting channels, two stylesTwo voting channels, two styles
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The search for a driverThe search for a driver Why do some voters use iVote?
Do the iVote users have anything in common?
Multifactor analysis shows that socio-demographic and political preference variables have no explanatory value
I can't anticipate your voting channel based on your age, gender, income or education
I can't anticipate your voting channel based on your political opinion
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What eVote users have in commonWhat eVote users have in common Subjectively
They assess positively their own IT skills
They trust online information, communication and transactions
Objectively
They use the web on a daily basis
They have a broadband access
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A broken barrierA broken barrier While 22%-25% of all voters use internet
55.5% of usual abstainers use it18.7% of regular voters use it
Online voting breaksan invisible barrier that keepsmany voters away from politics
Internet voting reaches further,it touches citizens more distant from politics
Internet voting makes a paradigmatic difference,it appeals to one's subjectivity or way of life
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The conception of our platform allowsa great deal of versatility
We took advantage of this to proposeother Swiss cantons to host their citizens on our system
We are currently working with three cantons, hosting their expatriates (some 25'000 citizens altogether)
To manage this project and keep these cantons in-line, we have set up a user group
The user group is an added security factor becauseit forces us to rethink and optimise our procedures
The hosting processThe hosting process
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Ballot type (date, topic, etc). 1
Voting cards
Voting material
Voters
Publication
Postal voting recording
Voters id / authentication
2
Print file3
4
5
electronic ballot box
Electoral register of the hosted
canton
Ballot description
Hosted canton Hosting canton
Results – Turnout
6
Electoral register
Hosting illustratedHosting illustrated
E-voting
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A last wordA last word
iVoting is totally different from any other "e" project
It cannot live on without trust
How did we achieve it? By a very careful project management approach
We went on slowly, never forcing the politicians
As we would like to capitalize on our achievements, we licensed two private companies to commercialize our system outside of Switzerland
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Thank you for your attention
www. ge. c h/ e votin g
m ic hel. c heva llier @ et at . ge. c h