Download - Ch12
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Chapter Twelve
Uncertainty
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Uncertainty is Pervasive
What is uncertain in economic systems?
– tomorrow’s prices
– future wealth
– future availability of commodities
– present and future actions of other people.
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Uncertainty is Pervasive
What are rational responses to uncertainty?
– buying insurance (health, life, auto)
– a portfolio of contingent consumption goods.
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States of Nature
Possible states of Nature:
– “car accident” (a)
– “no car accident” (na). Accident occurs with probability a,
does not with probability na ; a + na = 1.
Accident causes a loss of $L.
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Contingencies
A contract implemented only when a particular state of Nature occurs is state-contingent.
E.g. the insurer pays only if there is an accident.
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Contingencies
A state-contingent consumption plan is implemented only when a particular state of Nature occurs.
E.g. take a vacation only if there is no accident.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Each $1 of accident insurance costs .
Consumer has $m of wealth. Cna is consumption value in the no-
accident state. Ca is consumption value in the
accident state.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
20
17
A state-contingent consumptionwith $17 consumption value in the accident state and $20 consumption value in the no-accident state.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Without insurance, Ca = m - L
Cna = m.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Buy $K of accident insurance. Cna = m - K.
Ca = m - L - K + K = m - L + (1- )K.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Buy $K of accident insurance. Cna = m - K.
Ca = m - L - K + K = m - L + (1- )K.
So K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- )
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Buy $K of accident insurance. Cna = m - K.
Ca = m - L - K + K = m - L + (1- )K.
So K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- )
And Cna = m - (Ca - m + L)/(1- )
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Buy $K of accident insurance. Cna = m - K.
Ca = m - L - K + K = m - L + (1- )K.
So K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- )
And Cna = m - (Ca - m + L)/(1- ) I.e. C
m LCna a
1 1
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
m L
Cm L
Cna a
1 1
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
slope1
Cm L
Cna a
1 1
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
Where is themost preferredstate-contingentconsumption plan?
Cm L
Cna a
1 1
slope1
m L
m L
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $90 with probability 1/2 and win
$0 with probability 1/2. U($90) = 12, U($0) = 2. Expected utility is
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $90 with probability 1/2 and win
$0 with probability 1/2. U($90) = 12, U($0) = 2. Expected utility is
EU U($90) U($0)
12
12
1212
122 7.
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $90 with probability 1/2 and win
$0 with probability 1/2. Expected money value of the lottery
isEM $90 $0
12
12
45$ .
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
EU = 7 and EM = $45. U($45) > 7 $45 for sure is preferred
to the lottery risk-aversion. U($45) < 7 the lottery is preferred
to $45 for sure risk-loving. U($45) = 7 the lottery is preferred
equally to $45 for sure risk-neutrality.
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
2
12
$45
EU=7
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45)
U($45) > EU risk-aversion.
2
EU=7
$45
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45)
U($45) > EU risk-aversion.
2
EU=7
$45
MU declines as wealthrises.
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
2
EU=7
$45
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45) < EU risk-loving.
2
EU=7
$45
U($45)
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45) < EU risk-loving.
2
EU=7
$45
MU rises as wealthrises.
U($45)
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
2
EU=7
$45
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45) = EU risk-neutrality.
2
U($45)=EU=7
$45
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Wealth$0 $90
12
U($45) = EU risk-neutrality.
2
$45
MU constant as wealthrises.
U($45)=EU=7
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
State-contingent consumption plans that give equal expected utility are equally preferred.
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Cna
Ca
EU1
EU2
EU3
Indifference curvesEU1 < EU2 < EU3
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
What is the MRS of an indifference curve?
Get consumption c1 with prob. 1 andc2 with prob. 2 (1 + 2 = 1).
EU = 1U(c1) + 2U(c2). For constant EU, dEU = 0.
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Preferences Under UncertaintyEU U(c ) U(c )1 2 1 2
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Preferences Under UncertaintyEU U(c ) U(c )1 2 1 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 1 2
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Preferences Under UncertaintyEU U(c ) U(c )1 2 1 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 0 01 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 1 2
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Preferences Under UncertaintyEU U(c ) U(c )1 2 1 2
1 2MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 1 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 0 01 2
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Preferences Under UncertaintyEU U(c ) U(c )1 2 1 2
dcdc
MU(c )MU(c )
2
1
1
2
1
2.
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 1 2
dEU MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2 0 01 2
1 2MU(c )dc MU(c )dc1 1 2 2
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Preferences Under Uncertainty
Cna
Ca
EU1
EU2
EU3
Indifference curvesEU1 < EU2 < EU3
dcdc
MU(c )MU(c )
na
a
a
na
a
na
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Choice Under Uncertainty
Q: How is a rational choice made under uncertainty?
A: Choose the most preferred affordable state-contingent consumption plan.
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
Cm L
Cna a
1 1
Where is themost preferredstate-contingentconsumption plan?
slope1
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
mThe endowment bundle.
Where is themost preferredstate-contingentconsumption plan?
Affordableplans
Cm L
Cna a
1 1
slope1
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
m
Where is themost preferredstate-contingentconsumption plan?
More preferred
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
m
Most preferred affordable plan
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
m
Most preferred affordable plan
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
m
Most preferred affordable plan
MRS = slope of budget constraint
m L
m L
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints
Cna
Ca
m
Most preferred affordable plan
MRS = slope of budget constraint; i.e.
m L
m L
1
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
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Competitive Insurance
Suppose entry to the insurance industry is free.
Expected economic profit = 0. I.e. K - aK - (1 - a)0 = ( - a)K = 0.
I.e. free entry = a. If price of $1 insurance = accident
probability, then insurance is fair.
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Competitive Insurance
When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy
1 1
a
a
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
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Competitive Insurance
When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy
I.e. MU(c ) MU(c )a na
1 1
a
a
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
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Competitive Insurance
When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy
I.e. Marginal utility of income must be
the same in both states.
1 1
a
a
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
MU(c ) MU(c )a na
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Competitive Insurance
How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy?
MU(c ) MU(c )a na
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Competitive Insurance
How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy?
Risk-aversion MU(c) as c .MU(c ) MU(c )a na
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Competitive Insurance
How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy?
Risk-aversion MU(c) as c . Hence
MU(c ) MU(c )a na
c c .a na
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Competitive Insurance
How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy?
Risk-aversion MU(c) as c . Hence I.e. full-insurance.
MU(c ) MU(c )a na
c c .a na
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“Unfair” Insurance
Suppose insurers make positive expected economic profit.
I.e. K - aK - (1 - a)0 = ( - a)K > 0.
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“Unfair” Insurance
Suppose insurers make positive expected economic profit.
I.e. K - aK - (1 - a)0 = ( - a)K > 0.
Then > a
1 1
a
a.
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires
1
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires
Since
1
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
1 1
a
a, MU(c ) > MU(c )a na
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires
Since
Hence for a risk-averter.
1
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
1 1
a
a, MU(c ) > MU(c )a na
c < ca na
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires
Since
Hence for a risk-averter. I.e. a risk-averter buys less than full
“unfair” insurance.
1
a
na
MU(c )MU(c )
a
na
1 1
a
a, MU(c ) > MU(c )a na
c < ca na
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Uncertainty is Pervasive
What are rational responses to uncertainty?
– buying insurance (health, life, auto)
– a portfolio of contingent consumption goods.
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Uncertainty is Pervasive
What are rational responses to uncertainty?
– buying insurance (health, life, auto)
– a portfolio of contingent consumption goods.
![Page 65: Ch12](https://reader035.vdocuments.site/reader035/viewer/2022081603/5583aa60d8b42a03088b51dc/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Uncertainty is Pervasive
What are rational responses to uncertainty?
– buying insurance (health, life, auto)
– a portfolio of contingent consumption goods.
?
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Diversification
Two firms, A and B. Shares cost $10. With prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $100 and
B’s profit is $20. With prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $20 and
B’s profit is $100. You have $100 to invest. How?
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Diversification
Buy only firm A’s stock? $100/10 = 10 shares. You earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and
$200 with prob. 1/2. Expected earning: $500 + $100 = $600
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Diversification
Buy only firm B’s stock? $100/10 = 10 shares. You earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and
$200 with prob. 1/2. Expected earning: $500 + $100 = $600
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Diversification
Buy 5 shares in each firm? You earn $600 for sure. Diversification has maintained
expected earning and lowered risk.
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Diversification
Buy 5 shares in each firm? You earn $600 for sure. Diversification has maintained
expected earning and lowered risk. Typically, diversification lowers
expected earnings in exchange for lowered risk.
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Risk Spreading/Mutual Insurance
100 risk-neutral persons each independently risk a $10,000 loss.
Loss probability = 0.01. Initial wealth is $40,000. No insurance: expected wealth is
0 99 40 000 0 01 40 000 10 000
39 900
$ , ($ , $ , )
$ , .
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Risk Spreading/Mutual Insurance
Mutual insurance: Expected loss is
Each of the 100 persons pays $1 into a mutual insurance fund.
Mutual insurance: expected wealth is
Risk-spreading benefits everyone.
0 01 10 000 100 $ , $ .
$ , $ $ , $ , .40 000 1 39 999 39 900