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The Matter of HabitAuthor(s): Charles CamicReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Mar., 1986), pp. 1039-1087Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780121 .
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The Matter of
Habit1
CharlesCamic
University f Wisconsin-Madison
This
article s a historical
nvestigation
f the
concept
of
habit
n
sociology.
Beginning
with the claim that historians f
sociology
need to
lookbeyond he now-famous
deas
that ppear
n
the fore-
ground fthe
works fthe
ociologicalmasters,he rticle
xamines
the
neglected dea
of
habit o document hat
his
oncept
was
long
stapletermntheconceptual ocabulary fWesternocialtheorists
and that t continued o function
s
a
major
background
actor n
the substantive
writings
of both
Emile Durkheim
and Max
Weber-a
factor
that
previous
scholarship
on Durkheim
and
Weber has almost
completely
verlooked. t
is
shown
that
Dur-
kheim
iewedhabit
notonly
s
a chief eterminant
f
human ction
in
a
greatvariety f areas but also as one of the
principal
upports
for
he moralfabric f modern
ocieties.
imilarly,
abit
s
found o
be
significant
n
Weber's
treatment
f
modern conomic nd
polit-
ical
life,Calvinism and the
spirit
f
capitalism,
nd
the
force f
traditionalism, hich s so central factor n his frameworkor
comparative-historicalnalysis.
Although
he
dea
of
habitwas also
used
extensively
n
American
ociology
own to around
1918,
n
the
course
of
the
two decades that followed
he
concept
was
purpose-
fully
xcised from he
conceptual
tructure f the
field.
This
dra-
matic
hange
s shown o be a result
f
the
nterdisciplinaryisputes
that
urrounded he
nstitutionalization
f
sociology
s an
academic
AUTHOR'S
NOTE. -To
make
it possible to provide the
relatively
arge amountof pri-
marysource documentationthat appears in this article, two space-savingmeasures
have
been employed. First,
in a number
of instances, quotations
are reported
with
words or
short
phrases
enclosedwithin
square brackets, the
enclosed material
repre-
senting
an
effort
n my part
to render concisely yet
faithfully
oints that are for-
mulated n
a less
abbreviatedway by the
original
uthors. Second, when
reporting he
dates of
the sources cited, the
text gives
only the year of original
publication
or the
original
date of
delivery
n
thecase of
ecturecourses). Information
bout the
particu-
lar
editions hat have used is
contained n
the ist ofreferences.
age citations
efer o
those
editions.
1
I
would iketo
thank
Warren
Hagstrom,
Maureen
Hallinan,Donald
Levine,Hal
Winsborough,
ndErik
Wrightor
heir
nstructive
dvice n
this rticle,
esearch or
whichwasfacilitatedygrants romheGraduate choolResearch ommitteefthe
Universityf
Wisconsin-Madison.
Requests or
reprintshouldbe
sent oCharles
Camic,
Department
f
Sociology,
University f
Wisconsin,
Madison,
Wisconsin
53706.
?
1986
by
The
University f
Chicago.
All
rights eserved.
0002-9602/86/9105-0001$0150
AJS
Volume
91
Number
5
(March
1986):
1039-87
1039
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Habit
currentlyuffusesociological argumentst every heoretical
evel
and
of every deological tripe, rom xchange heory o phenomenology
o
neo-Marxism1982a, pp. 67-80). Rangingover similarmaterials, awe
is likewisepleased to find
road agreement hat ction nvolvespurpose-
ful agents reflecting ver
alternative atterns,
lternative
equences,
alternative ossibilities 1978, pp. 379, 413).With esssatisfaction,try-
kerobserves n symbolic
nteractionisms well
an
emphasis
n reflexiv-
ity as the essence of thehuman condition, at
the
expenseof]
a
serious
consideration f habit
1980, p. 152).
A
kindred iew has been
adopted
even by theorists uch as Collins, who
combine the
insights
f eth-
nomethodologistsnd
sociologists f emotion o criticize ociology or ts
rationalistmodels of cognition nd decision-making ut then bring
back
a less wooden kindof reflectivection
by proposing
hat he struc-
tures of the social
world
rest
on
continuous
monitoring
nd self-
interestedmaneuver byacting ndividuals 1981, pp. 985, 996, 1012).
So
obviously ppropriate
as the reflective odel
come to
appear
that
those who employ t seldom concern
hemselveswith
providing
rea-
soned
defense, r
even an
explicit ustification,
or heir
ractice
f
uni-
formly astinghuman conduct nto this one mold.
That
theprocess
of
actionmight e modeleddifferently,nd was
in
factmodeleddifferently
by some of the so-called masters f sociological hought, as generally
passed altogether
nnoticed.And
for
the
persistence
f such
parochial
innocence, cholarswriting
n sociology's ast
bear considerable
espon-
sibility. lacing
an
overlynarrow
nterpretation
n the
demand
thathis-
torical
esearch e relevant o the
present,
hese cholarshave channeled
too much of
their ffort
owardextracting
rom he standard
lassics
of
sociology hose nsights hatare
seemingly
most
pertinent
o
questions
f
currentociological nterest. o do
this, however,
s
simply
o endorse
current
ways
of
approaching
he
social world: t
s
not
to
take ssue with
thosewaysand toquestion hepresentbout the imitationsf ts overall
approach.
If
research n the history f sociology s to contribute o the
present n this latter and
larger sense, it must, as much as possible,
bracket
he
mmediate oncerns f
contemporaryractitioners
f sociol-
ogy
and strive o
understand
he
ideas
of the
past
in
their wn
terms,
since
these
re
the
only erms
n
which
apsed
alternativeso
entrenched
present-day erspectives
ctuallydisclose themselves o us. The whole
matter
f
habit
s
one
such
lapsed alternative.
METHODOLOGICAL
INTRODUCTION
The
suggestion hat the
student
f
past ideas should seek to understand
those deas
in
their
wn terms s
not,
of
course,
n
original
ne. The
same
basic
argument as been
forcefullyut forth y scholars
n
other ields
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AmericanJournal
f
Sociology
(see Gunnell1978; Skinner 969; Stocking 968), nd historians f sociol-
ogyhave recentlyounded he ame note n growing umberssee Collini
1978;Jones1977; Simonds 1978),thus ssuing call for new history f
sociology
Jones
1983). To date, however, the preachments f
this
emerging ieldhave inevitably utrun ts accomplishments,s a result f
whichthe whole approach has come undermounting riticismsee Ger-
stein
1983; Seidman 1983; Turner 1983).
One
wonders, hough,
whether he new
historiography
ould not
be
more convincing f it worked to carry out its revolt against pres-
entism -the practice f reading he past through he filter f the pres-
ent-in a more thoroughgoing ay. Thus far, too manyof the new
historians' fforts ave been spent traversing he same territorieshat
theirmorepresentistdversarieshave charted.One consequence f this
has been theirreluctance o move much beyond the well-established,
classic sociological hinkersthe Marxes, the Durkheims, he Webers),
eventhough t s by highly resentisttandards hatthese hinkers ave
been
elevated ntothe classical pantheon see Camic 1979, 1981).
A fur-
ther,more subtle consequenceof the ingering resentism as
been the
tendencywhen dealing with classic figures o concentrate n the ssues
that are
in
theforeground f theirwritings-the very ssues that made
thesewritings, ot thoseofothers, tand out to thepresentn the first
place-rather than on the themes, concepts, and ideas that
remain
largely n the backgroundsee Polanyi'sdistinction etween focal and
subsidiary
wareness
1958, pp. 55-57]).
By narrowing he focus to classic
thinkers nd
then to
foreground
issues, even antipresentist istorians f sociology
have
provided
a se-
verely runcated icture
f
social theories ast.
In
these
ircumstances,
t
is not urprisinghatbasic changes
n
theconceptual
rameworkf ociol-
ogy
have
gone argely
nstudied r thathabit
n
particular
as received
little ttention n previousscholarship n sociology's ast.
In
fact,
not
only
has this
scholarship eglected
lmost
ntirely
hose
episodes
n
the
development
f habit that fall outside the
classics,
t has failed to
ap-
preciate he place of the idea even
in
the amply tudied
worksof
Dur-
kheim nd Weber. Hence, to take only hemostrecent xample,
Alexan-
der
declares hat
Durkheim
was done
with henotion
fhabit
prior
o his
first ook Alexander 982b,pp. 108-28) and thatforWeber heconcept
was
merely
a
residual
ategory,
educible
o
action
motivated
y
affects
and values (Alexander 1983, p. 152, n. 36). The evidence marshaled
below
makes suchpronouncementsxtremely oubtful;
nd
therehave
been
a
few
scholars
who
have come somewhat
nearer he
mark,notably
Roth
1968), Wallwork 1972), and Cohen, Hazelrigg,
nd
Pope (1975).
But the
fact
hat heroleof habit
n
the
thought
f
Durkheim
nd Weber
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Habit
has yet to be
sufficientlyrought ut
offers strikingndication f the
extent
fthepractice foverlooking
amifying
deas
n
the
background f
theirwritingsn the course of going over and over the standardfore-
ground opics.
What has been missed, s a
consequence,
s the
verykind
of
developmental rocess hat hehistorianf sociologyeeksto uncover:
the
change
in
underlying onceptual
structure
hat
separates
us
from
the age ofDurkheim
and Weber.
It is
with
the
aim of
demonstrating
that such
a
change occurred,
nd
not-I should
emphasize-in
the
n-
terest of
further verextending
reliance
on the
classics,
that
this
paper treatsDurkheim nd Weber
at some
ength,
n
addition
o
consid-
eringcertain
mportant nstallments
n
the earlier
and later
history
f
habit that are located outsidethecurrentlyecognized lassicsof sociol-
ogy.
It hardly
need be said, however, hatthestudent f sociology's ast s
concernednotonly with dentifyingow
the fieldhas changedbut also
with
xplaining
why t
has
done
so.
Accordingly,
will
attempt riefly
o
provide
sociological ccountfor heelimination
f
habit by American
sociologists f theearly20th century.n
doing so,
the
analysiswill
call
attention o the
ntellectual onsequences f
the widespread oncern
n
the
part
of those
sociologistswith securely stablishingheir ield s
an
autonomous
isciplinewithin heuniversitiesf
the
time.
n
stressing
he
significance
f
the factor finstitutionalization, y arguments simply
following he ead
of
research
n
the
sociology
f
science esp. Ben-David
1971),whichhas alreadybeen nstructively
ppliedto thedevelopment f
sociology
in
America and
elsewhere (Abrams 1968;
Clark
1973;
Oberschall
1972; Shils 1970). The twist s
that,
while
most
of this
work
focuses n
how
institutionalizationltered the social-structuralspects
of
culture
production, but] ignor[es] he content f culture Kuklick
1983, p. 300),
here the emphasiswill be on how the quest forgenuine
academic
autonomy ctually id affect he
conceptual abric f ociology.
In
this regard,
especiallywant to urge the mportance f studying ot
onlywhat was goingon in the sociological
iterature ut also what was
taking lace
in
the
iterature f thedisciplines romwhich ociologywas
seeking o secure ts autonomy.We have all
been taught hat sociology
took
hape
n
oppositionofields uch as
economics, istory,nd psychol-
ogy. But, to
date, the real significancefthispointhas been ost because
there
as
beenvirtually o efforto divest
urselves four currentmages
ofthesefields nd to investigate ow theywere pecificallyonstitutedt
the
time
hat
ociologywas first cquiringntellectual orm.By examin-
ing
someof
the ubstantive haracteristicsf
psychology uring hisdeci-
sive period,
hope to take a preliminary
tep toward correcting his
situation.
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AmericanJournal f Sociology
CONCEPTUAL
CONSIDERATIONS
At this uncture, omething hould be said about what theconceptof
habit refers o in this
study.At first lance, specifyinghis
may appear
problematic, iven hat
heword habit or ts French rGerman quiv-
alent)
has
been used
in
a variety fways by differentocial
thinkers rom
different
ges. Fortunately, owever,
he core
meanings
f
the term-as
the
OxfordEnglish
Dictionary shows-have been fairly onstantfor
many centuries; he variabilityhas exhibited tself hieflyn
different
loadingsonto the common
ore.
The core
meaning hat
s
pertinent ere
stands utmost harply
when heprevious efinitionf
reflectiveonduct
is recalled,for habit ordinarily esignates ctionsthat are relatively
unmotivated Giddens
1979, p. 218),
actions for
which
means-ends
relations . . are [from he
actor's tandpoint]not subject oargument'
(Hartmann, 939, p. 91).
Since
definitions
ith
uns and nots
may be
rather nsatisfying,t s
perhaps ppropriate o restate hesepointsposi-
tively:
the
term
habit generallydenominates
more or
less
self-
actuatingdisposition
r
tendency o engage
n
a
previouslydopted
or
acquired
form
f
action.2
Within his broad
definition,
ertain
distinctionsan be
made.
In the
first ncyclopedia of theSocial Sciences, Murphyfound t convenient,
for
nstance, o differentiate
above the
evel of
motor
abits ) cognitive
habits, emotional
abits, nd moralhabits 1932, p. 238).
But
rather
2
Severalpoints
f clarification
re
perhaps
n
order
here. First,
he definitionust
offered
s designed o indicate
he
typical
way
in which he
majority
f thinkers
included
nthis tudy ave used
habit; t snot claim
bouthow
the erm hould e
used.Second, s the
definition
ndicates,hepresentnalysis
s concerned
otwith
he
vagariesf heword habit utwith hangingoints fview n thephenomenonhat
theworddesignates.
t happens, hough,
hat
n
the ountries
ndtheperiod
onsid-
ered
nthis
tudy, he
onventionas been
ctually
o referothephenomenon
fhabit
bythe erm
habit or tsFrench
r German
ounterpart)see Funke
1958)
o
that n
only few cases
will it
be
necessary
ereto
take account f
other erminological
pointers.
hird,while
he
definition
nd much
f he ollowingiscussion
recouched
in
terms
f thehabits
fthe ndividual,t
shouldbe
noted hatmostwriters
n the
subject
maintain hat
membersf ocialgroups
xhibit
many ommon abits.
Weber,
in
fact,
mployed
he separate erm custom
o denote
uch collective ay[s]
f
acting
hat
erive
rom abit ather
han romelf-interestr
hared orms
1922a,
.
319; 1922b,p. 187).
But this
particular sageremains
n idiosyncratic
ne,for, s
MacIver nceremarked,ustom enerallyefersocollectiveracticeshat rebacked
bya social anction,
a quality
which s inno
sensepartof the
meaning f . .
'the
habits f the group'
(1931,p.
294; see alsoT6nnies
1909,pp. 35-36). Fourth,
he
definitioneavesopen
thequestion fthe
origins
fhabit, ince pace
imits
reclude
taking p this ssue.
t
must uffice
o record
hat hemostwidespread
iewhas
been
thathabit
s
produced yrepetition:
hat
orms f ction hat
refrequentlyracticed
tend
ver
ime obecome
abitual. pinions
avedifferedreatly,owever,
s tohow
thisprocess
f
habit
formation
s actuallyet ntomotion.
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Habit
than place
primary mphasis
hereon
thisclassification
ccording
o
the
content
f different abits, t will be helpful or
historical urposes o
differentiatehe variousempiricalreferentsf the conceptof habit in
terms
of a dimensionthat crosscuts the
cognitive/emotional/moral
classification,amely,
whether he form faction hat s being
epeated
is
simple and
circumscribed r generalized nd complex. Since this
s
obviouslynot a
black-and-whitessue, it is probablybest to envision
long
continuum fpossibilities. he two end
points nd the midpoint f
thiscontinuum
merit eparatecomment.
To begin at the
beginning: abit sometimes
efers o the disposition o
perform
ertain relatively
lementary
nd
specific
ctivities
killfully.
Even in the heyday f theconcept f habit,activities f this yperarely
attracted he
sustained nterest
f
social theorists.
he
situation
as
long
been
otherwise
n
psychology, owever, nd
in
thevenerable radition
f
William
James 1890, p. 107)
the
modern
sychologistquates
habitwith
sequencesof behaviors,
usually imple,
. .
thathave become
virtually
automatic nd then llustrates henotionwith he
practice
f
putting
n
a
left ock before
right
ne
(Lefran?ois 983,
p. 393).
Still
within he
lower
portion f the habitcontinuum, ut
getting eyond
he
minutiae,
one
might
lso
locate habitsof
writing, peaking,
erceiving,valuating,
taskexecution, roblem olving, nd thelike,to whichsocial thinkers
have
devoted
more
attention, articularly
hen
discussing
he
require-
ments
oror
impedimentso reflectivection tself.
But
proceeding
o
what
may
be looked on as the vast middle
range
of
the
continuum,
heform f
ction
designated
s habitbroadens o various
more
extended ines or more nvolvedpatterns f conduct
n
the social
world.
Such
phenomena
were
frequently
n
evidence
n
thework
f ocial
thinkers rom he
mid-18th o theearly20th
century, nd
in
canvassing
this
work,we will encounter
abits
of
nterpersonalnteraction; abits f
economic, olitical,
eligious, nd domestic ehavior;habits
f
obedience
to rules
nd to
rulers;
habitsof
sacrifice,
isinterestedness,nd
restraint;
and so on.
This is not to
say that those who
speak
of these
kindsof
conduct
ropose hat hey re
uniformlyabitual.
When
he
habit abel
s
applied,
it
is
generally o
suggest hat
an
action, which may
in
some
situations
ome about
as
a
motivated ctor elects
ppropriate
means to
his
or her
ends, has-in the instance of the
actor beingdescribed-
emerged
apart
from
such
a
reflective
rocess.
That habitual
and
nonhabitual reflective r other)considerationsmay actuallybe mixed
together
imultaneouslys
something
o
commentatorknowofdenies.
Yet it
s
onlyWeberwho
explicitlyonceives
f
habitual ction s a pure
type,
which
concrete ases
approach
n
varying
egrees 1922a, pp.
25-
26)-and this s a
formulationhat ncourages s
to appreciate, nmany
of
the
allusions
by past thinkers o economic,
olitical, eligious, omes-
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AmericanJournal
f
Sociology
tic, and other habits,
an implicit
laim
for the
preponderance
f
the
habitualelement
n
a
givenpattern
f action.
In the upper reaches ofthe habit continuum, ne can situate still-
broaderusage of theterm.According o thisusage,
habit s the durable
and generalized isposition
hat uffuses
person's
ction hroughoutn
entire omainof
ife
r,
n theextreme
nstance, hroughout
ll of ife-in
which
ase
the erm
omes
o
mean
the
whole
manner,
urn, ast,
or
mold
of thepersonality. oday the word
character
robably
omesclosest o
evoking his nearlyforgotten
eaning
f
habit, although
ven charac-
ter ends o suggest systemmade up ofnumerous,
more
pecific erson-
ality ttributes, hereas
hepoint f usinghabit
n
ts
broadest
ense s
to
denotenota sum ofpartsbuta morenearly ll-encompassing odalityf
action hat
ifone mayborrow
ut ofcontext vivid
formulationromhe
Grundrisse)
hen
assigns
rank and influence o other
omponents
f
the
personality.3 mongEuropean
thinkers,hisdistinct onceptionf habit
has often een denotedbyleaving the word n its Latin
form, abitus.
This,
as
we shall see,
is a
practice
hat both
Durkheim
nd Weber fol-
lowed, and it s a practice hatBourdieuhas made
a
notablerecent ffort
at
long
ast
to revive
see,
e.g.,
Bourdieu and Passeron
1970).
These definitionalreliminarieserve
to
make one
waryof some com-
monstereotypes.o many, he notion f habit mmediatelyonjuresup
behavior
hat
onsists
n
a fixed,mechanical eaction
o
particular
timuli
and
is,
as
such,
devoid ofmeaning
from he actor's
point
of view.
In
sociology,
his
mage
s one
that
became
fairlywidespread
arly
n
this
century, hough
t was
already
current
n
the
1780s
see
Reid 1788, pp.
114-17) and alive during he
nterims well. The point o note, hough, s
that
the
mage
has also
met with substantial
pposition.
n
place
of
the
idea of a
fixed,
mechanical
eaction o
stimuli,
t has
been
held
that
habit
creates
stable
nner
orethat ffords
mmunity
rom xternal ensations
and
impetuous ppetites Ferguson1792, p. 225; Hegel
1821, p. 260;
1830, p. 144); that
t
s
not
by such stimuli
s
these,
butby theego itself,
that habit is called into
play
and allowed
to
proceed,
with
eeway
for
situational
daptation Hartmann1939, p. 88; James
1890, p. 116;
Ton-
3 It
may, in fact, be helpful
o regard
theconceptionof habit
under discussion here
as
the analogue in
the
personality o thedominant mode of
production
s seen byMarx:
It is a general
illumination which bathes all
the other colours and
modifiestheir
particularity. t is a particular ether which determines he specificgravityof every
being which has
materializedwithin
t
(1857, p. 107). The
only
American
writerwell
known among
sociologists
o make use of such an idea
was John
Dewey, who defined
habit as that orderingor
systematization f [themore]
minor elements of [human]
action, which is
projective,dynamic
in
quality,
ready
for overt
manifestation, nd
[operative] even
when
not
obviouslydominating
ctivity
1922, pp. 40-41;
see also
Kestenbaum 1977; Petras
1968).
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Habit
nies 1909, pp. 32-33); and that,however
much habitualaction
may
be
removedfrom hesitation nd
reflection,
uch action
s still
no
more
mechanical than actionof the same typethatemergesfromwholly
reflectiverocesses Stewart1792-1827, pp. 54, 55-57).
And
in
place
of
the claim thathabit s devoid of subjectivemeaning,
oth
phenomenolo-
gists nd psychoanalysts ave proposed hathabitual ctiondoes exhibit
a
meaningful
haracter -either
aken
for
ranted y
the ctor
r
odged
in
the unconscious Berger nd Luckmann 1966, p. 53;
Hartmann
1939,
p. 89;
Kestenbaum
1977, pp. 3-4;
Schutz
1932, p. 19).
I am not
suggest-
ing that heseviews be directly ubstituted or
he
stereotype;pokesper-
sons
on
all sides have been
sufficiently
eluctant o
specify
o
which
instances fhabit, nd to whatextent, heir tatementspply hat aution
is mandated all around if one is out for a description f some
of
the
auxiliary eatures
f habitualaction.
f
one is concernedwith he
history
of the
concept
f
habit, however,
t is best
simply
o set
stereotypes
nd
counterstereotypesside from he start nd
to eave them side until
hey
become
an essential
part
of the
story
tself.
HISTORICAL PROLOGUE
To understand he transformationhattheconceptofhabithas under-
gone
n
sociology,t is necessary o take notice
of
certain riordevelop-
ments
that occurred
chiefly
outside the classics
of
sociology.
The
provenance
f
habit
s
remote. he notionwas already
n established
ne
among ncientGreek hinkers,nd
it
thereafterrovedresilient, laying
a
consequential
role
in
the
writings
f medieval
scholastics,
eformed
theologians, nd numerous arly
modern
philosophers nd
litterateurs
(see
Burnham
1968a, pp. 8-9; Dubray 1905, pp. 17-23;
Fuchs
1952;
Funke 1958, pp. 32-344; Passmore 1970, pp. 161-62).
During the 18th century, he concept received till more systematic
attention
see Funke 1958, pp. 345-496), most conspicuously
rom
number f the major figures f the Enlightenment.peakingformany
thinkers f
the FrenchEnlightenment, elve'tius, or xample,proposed
that
habit
is a] principle y
which
humans verywhere]
re actuated
and that t s
also
the
greatwellspring
f
morality, othprivate nd public
(1758, pp. 57, 108, 180); as well, Rousseau proclaimedmany forms f
social
inequality uniquely he work ofhabit and held that aw should
rest n
theforce f habit, rather han on] the force f authority 1755,
p. 138; 1762, p. 81); and Condorcet orecast he progressive ransforma-
tionof
habits
.. adoptedthroughmiscalculation y freely ontracted
habits . . inspiredby nature nd acknowledged y reason 1793, pp.
192, 194). In Scotland, nlightenersuch as Hume (1739-40, pp. 104-5,
503-4) and Ferguson 1792, pp. 209-34) expressed imilar pinions; nd
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f
Sociology
even cerebralGermanAufkldrer
uch as Kant
nsisted
n
giving
habit
ts
due,
if
only better
o master
t. In
fact,
t was Kant's
opinion
hat all
acquiredhabits re objectionable, hat virtue s moral trengthnpur-
suit of one's duty, dutywhich
should never
be a matter
f
habit,
but
should always proceed,fresh nd original,
rom
ne's
mode of
thought
(1798, pp. 32, 34). The idea continued o
hold
itsown, moreover,
ven
when reaction o the
Enlightenment
et
n
during
he
early
19th
entury.
Indeed, theconcept
emained
n
active
duty
with hinkers
ootherwiset
odds as Englishutilitarians
n the mold of
James
Mill
(see
Woodcock
1980) nd German dealists, ncluding egel
himself,
ho
postulated
hat
habit s indispensable or he existence
f all intellectual
ife
1830, p.
143).
But far-reachinghangeswereabout to engulf he
concept fhabit.As
thepreceding uotationsmay suggest,when thinkers f the 18th and
early 19thcenturies poke of habit, they poke principally
t a level of
generalityhat corresponds o
the
middlerange of
the habit continuum
described bove. What ncreasingly
ame
to
the
fore
n
the course
of
the
19thcentury, owever,was the practice f equatinghabit moreexclu-
sively
with
activities
f a
relatively lementary
ypeand
then
treating
these
n
a manner
hat
ed
away
from he
analysis
f
action
n
the social
worldaltogether. his transformationas brought n by two develop-
ments hat
occurred
near the
center tage ofEuropean
ntellectual
ife.
The first fthesewas a rapidgrowth fthebiological
ciences-chiefly
through
he efflorescencef
evolutionary heory
nd of experimental
physiology. he well-known istory f evolutionary
heory eed not be
detailed here, save for
one basic item.
Habit,
it
emerges,
was a term
prominentlysed by evolutionists hen theydescribed
he elementary
behaviorsof lower
species.
It was
in
this sense that Lamarck talked of
giraffes brows[ing] n the leaves of trees and called this theirhabit,
talkedof snakes
.. crawling
n
the
ground
nd called
this habit
oo
(citedby Oldroyd1980, p. 31),
and
it
was
in this ense
also thatDarwin
spoke freely
n
On
the
Origin of Species
of
such
things
s the
feeding
habitsof British nsects, he climbing abitsof
the larger itmouse,
and the
flowering
abits
of
plants
when
transported
into]
nother li-
mate 1859, pp. 11, 183). This same usage oomed till argerwhen,
n
his
later writing, arwin hastenedfromhorses'pacing
habits,caterpillars'
eatinghabits,
and
pigeons'flying abitsdirectly
o the habitsof human
beings 1872, pp. 29-31).
Here Darwin's workhappenedto linkup with he
physiologicalitera-
ture of the
time: a noteworthy ody
of
research
hat had the effect f
confirming
he
equation
between habit
and elementary
ehavior and
driving he phenomenon ntirely ut of the social
world
and
into
the
recessesof the biophysical ciences on
this
research,
ee
Liddell
1960;
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Habit
Thomson1968,pp.
37-53;
Young 1970).This effect ame
about as
physi-
ologistswere
drawn, by their nterest
n
the movements
f
decapitated
chickens, eadlessfrogs, ndthe ike,to theexperimentaltudy f reflex
actions, which were conceived as motor
responses
ctivated
by
nerve
cells
excitedby stimuli
xternal
o a givenorganism see
Fearing1930).
This is significant,
or to view reflex
ctions
n
this
way was
also to
physiologize he
conceptof
habitthoroughlyecause the
physiological
literature ad
long since
adopted habit as the standard
synonym
or
acquired reflexesBurnham
1968a, p. 52; Fearing
1930).
More
signifi-
cantly
till,
physiologists
howed ittlehesitationn
extending
o
human
beingswhatwas said
about thechickens
nd
the
frogs.
Humans,
after
ll,
exhibitedcquiredmotor eflexes r habits oo,and much-if not ll-of
humanaction
might,by
extrapolation, e reducedto tendencies f the
nervous ystem to grow to
the modes
in
which t has been
habitually
exercised
as
the
English
physiologistarpenter ut
it in
the
1870s;
see
Danziger 1982, p.
130).
What made
this
eemingly
soteric
sage consequential
was its coinci-
dence
with a secondmajor
development: he
gradualemergence
f the
science
of
psychology, riorto the 19th
century,
sychological pecula-
tion
was
something enerally
arried out by
philosophers
ngaged
n
rather nspecialized nquiries.Thereafter,owever, s theera of ntellec-
tual
differentiationet
n,
students f the mind
ought
greaterutonomy
for
their
field, nd by thelast
quarterof the 19th
century
heir
fforts
beganto
pay off.Not
only
did
psychology
manage,
head
of
many
other
fledglingpecialities
f the
time,
o
establish tself s
a
recognized
ield
n
the
universities,
specially
n
Germany see
Ben-David and
Collins
1966;
Ross
1967;
Woodward 1982),but even
when theacademic
inkages till
left
much to be
desired, here
was an impressive
utpouring f
research
concerned
with
the
sensations, magesand
feelings
. .
out
of
which
complex tates
of
mind
were built
up (Thomson1968,
p. 89;
in
general,
see
Boring 1957;Hearnshaw
1964;
Thomson
1968; Watson1968).
This
newpsychology, s it
was often
alled, was onthewhole
lmost
militantlycientistic. erhaps
as a result
of a still low-status
ield['s]
attempt
o
upgrade
[itself] y borrowing
he
methods f a
high-status
field
Ben-David and
Collins
1966, p.
460), 19th-century
sychology
leaned
heavily n
the chievements fthe
biological
ciences, articularly
evolutionism
nd, above all,
physiological
xperimentalismsee
Murphy
and Kovach 1972,pp. 65-75, 126-47;Thomson 1968,pp. 92-124, 168-
73).Habit
was depicted
ccordingly.What
reliablyppeared n
recurring
psychological
iscussions f thesubject
was the dea of
habit as a phe-
nomenon
elonging mong the
primary
rocesses fthe human)
organ-
ism
(see Andrews1903, pp.
122-27;
Dubray 1905,pp. 64-73;
Fearing
1930,
p. 239;
James 1890, pp. 104-27). It
was thusthat Bain
equated
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f
Sociology
habit withreflex ction and a narrowing f the sphere f nfluence f a
sensational r active stimulus to] one solitary hannel in] the
cerebral
system 1859, pp. 11-12); and it was thus too that Dumontdiscussed
how the mpressions f outerobjects fashion or hemselvesn the ner-
vous systemmore and more appropriate aths and thenproposed hat
these
well-fashioned euralpathways re our habits 1876, p. 324; trans-
lationby James 1890, p. 106).
This distinctive onceptualization f habit was to
be
triumphant, ut
the triumph till ay abroad in America. n late 19th- nd early 20th-
century urope, the new psychologists' iews, widely ired though hey
were, never held the intellectual ieldunchallenged, or the fieldwas
already rich n more traditional tatementsbout habit. Hence, when
used in
social-scientificiscourse, he concept ended o retain he same
basic
character t had had prior o the changes ust enumerated. ne
can
see this
n
writings s diverse s thoseof Bagehot 1872, p. 9; 1879, pp.
141-64) and Bradley nd Bosanquet Collini 1978, pp. 12-14)
in
Britain
(cf. Spencer 1855, pp. 525-30); Comte 1830-54, pp. 235, 253, passim)
and
LePlay 1855-81, pp. 139, 143,passim)
n
France;
and
Jhering1883,
2:239-47), T6nnies 1887, pp. 33-170; 1909), Simmel 1900), Vierkandt
(1908, pp. 103-9), and Lederer 1918-19)
in
Germany.
t
is
true
hat
n
none ofthisworkdid habitexhaust hedomainofaction.Morereflective
types fconductwere consistentlyn the cene
as well. But these
did not
yetstandalone-and
this s
thepoint. Despite
the
effortsf
biologists,
physiologists,nd psychologistso carryhabit
off
n
other
directions,
t
remained standard erm y which ocialtheoristsaptured
hoseforms
of
action n the social worldthatwere
seen to
be less reflectivend
more
self-actuating.
t was
in this
context hat
Emile Durkheimand
Max
Weber
wrote.
HABIT
IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY
Durkheim
Habit
was well exercised y Durkheim, nd it was exercised hroughout
much of his career, even as he underwent, ccording o at least some
scholars, ertain ar-reachingheoretical hanges.
The
conceptwas, to be
sure, rarely t the forefrontf his attentions,nd all thosewho see only
theforefrontave accordingly lossedover it altogether. ut, however
little hetermmaymean to contemporaryommentators,t was nonethe-
less a tool n Durkheim's onceptual oolbox, ne thathe brought ut and
put
to
work on the mostvaried
occasions.
Some
scattered llustrations
may
introduce
he
point. Take,
for
n-
stance,Durkheim's bservations n the mpirical oleofhabit t different
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Habit
points
n
the evolutionary
rocess.
Primitive
eoples,
n
his
udgment,
live to a
largeextent y the
force fhabit nd under
he
yoke fhabit
(1893, p. 159; 1912, p. 103),for when thingsgo on happening n the
sameway, habit . .
suffice[s]
or onduct nd
moral
behavior tself s
easily
transformedinto habitmechanically arried
ut 1898-1900,
p.
90;
1902-3b, p. 52). Much the
same was true,he claimed,
n
advanced
cities f
theMiddle Ages,
where habithas ...
dominion
verpeopleand
over
things
without
ny
counter-balance 1898-1900,p. 38).
Neither o
modern ocieties ispensewith
t. A social order
based on the division f
labor, Durkheim maintained,
requires more and
more ntensive nd
assiduous
work,
and
[such
work
becomes]habitual -and
habitual
n
a
particularway, since civilization . . imposes upon manmonotonous
and
continuous
abor, [which]
mplies n absoluteregularity
n
habits
(1893, p.
242; 1902-3b, . 70,
m.t.; 1902-3a, p. 80).4Thus, for a worker
.
. . to
take his
place
in
society, he mustdevelop]
the habit of
exerting
himself
nd other habits ofwork that were
simply
nknown
mong
the torpidprimitives1902-3b,
pp. 173, 181;
the
general
rgument
ere
bears
comparison
withthatof E. P.
Thompson 1967]).
Habit
was a recurrentactor, oo,
in
Durkheim's
nalysis
of
suicide:
habitsof passive obedience,
of absolutesubmission, f mpersonalism
increase
the suicide rate
among military fficers, e asserted,whereas
the habit
of domestic
olidarity ecreases he ratewithin ariousother
populations 1897b, p. 238;
1888c, p. 234).
The
concept
was also
in
operation
n
certain iscussions fthedevelopmentfcollective
epresen-
tations.
n
his earliest
writings,
urkheim
proposedthat
religion
tself
first
merges s a theory oexplain nd make senseof
everyday] abits,
and
in
subsequentwork he held that the ideas and
reasons
which de-
velop
in
our consciousness arise, nter lia, from]
ngrainedhabits of
whichwe are unaware 1887a, p. 35; 1897a, p. 168). And his specula-
tions on
social and culturalchange repeatedly
harked back to habit,
which
he viewed
as one of thegreatest mpediments
o progress
f
any
sort. It
is always a laborious peration o pull up the
roots f habits hat
time
has fixed nd organized n
us (1893, p. 241);
operating utside he
sphere
f
the
clear
consciousness, .
.
habits
.
. resist
ny change since]
what cannot
be seen is not
easily modified 1898-1900, p. 84). Hence,
Durkheim
amented,manysocial facts continue . .
to exist merely
through
orce
f
habit, amongthem ntiquated
penal, educational, nd
4
M.t. within
citationndicates
hat have
lightly odifiedhe
English ranslation
of
the citedpassage to
preserve
omethingbout
habit that
has beenlost in the
translation-and his
ery ftensthe
oncept fhabit tself.nsuch
ases,
reference
to
thetranslation ill
appear
first, ollowed y a
cross-reference
o theforeignan-
guage ource.
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Habit
theDurkheimian cholarship as
sacrificed bove all else,
therefore,s a
more
adequate understanding f Durkheim'swhole approach
to the
alarmingpoverty f morality n his age (1897b, 387); for goodpart
(thoughnot
the whole) of the solution o this predicamentwas
seen by
himto lie in
the domain of habit.
This
becomesparticularlyvident t three unctures.The first f
these
is in
TheDivision ofLabor, where
Durkheimmaintained hatthe
moral
normsnecessary o end the crisis f
anomieactuallywould come
directly
intobeing with
the development fhabitsof nteractionmong
the spe-
cialized partsthat
constitute
he
world
of
divided
abor. There
are, he
stated, certain
ways
in
which [differentiatedunctions] eact
on one
another,which,beingmore n accordancewith henature fthings, re
repeatedmoreoften nd become habits;
hen he habits, s they
cquire
force, retransformedntorules f
conduct....
In
other
words,
certain
selection f
rightsnd duties s made by
habitualpractice
nd these
nd
up by
becoming bligatory 1893, p. 366; retranslationy
Lukes
[1973,
p. 164]; see
also Durkheim 1886, p. 213; 1887b, p. 275; 1888a,
p. 66;
1898-1900,
pp. 7-9; 1902, pp. 14-15;
Durkheim nd Buisson 1911, p.
153; cf. the
criticisms f Lukes [1973, p. 164]
and
Parsons 1937,
p. 321]
with
he rgumentf
Berger nd Luckmann
1966,pp. 53-67]).
In
his
ater
work on occupationalcorporations, urkheim oncluded hat thisfirst
formulation
as incomplete 1902, p. 4), but he mmediately ent
n to
incorporate abit nto his plans for
moral regeneration
n
a
second
way.
He urgedhis
celebrated roject o revitalize ccupational roups
n
part
because he
believed such institutionsble to createand implantmuch-
neededhabits fmoral onduct. o long s the
familyprovides
he
only]
collective ife
n
which
specialists]
articipate, heywill,
Durkheim ea-
soned, become nuredto the habit of
acting
ike lone wolves and ac-
quirean
inclination owarda fierce ndividualism
1902-3b, pp.
233-
34).
He then
posed
the
problem,
How
can we
learn
the
[opposite]
habit? -that of disinterestedness,
self-forgetfulness,nd
sacrifice ?
(1902, p. 4). His proposal for
occupational corporations
ollowed
m-
mediately
n
direct nswer
see 1902, pp.
4-31).
But
this
was
not theonly nswer,for thirdwayofpressing abit
nto
service
readily
suggested
tself-the
prospect
of
instilling ood
moral
habitsfrom arliest hildhood nward
nstead fwaiting or
ccupational
lifeto get
under way. Durkheim eized
upon this possibility ithgreat
enthusiasm, nd hiswritings n education ndeed constituteerhaps he
fullest
tatement
n
recordof the
habitual
basis
of
social morality.
t is
well
known
hat,
n
Durkheim's
iew,
modern ecular
ociety equires
moral code
emphasizing a) group
attachment,
r devotion o collective
ideals; b)
regularity,r behaving imilarly nder ike
circumstances ;c)
authority,
r
dutiful ubmission
nd
self-restraint
n
accord
with
obliga-
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tory ules; nd (d) autonomy, r reflectiveonsciousness oncerningth-
ical principles see esp. 1902-3b, pp. 17-126).
What has never
been
appreciated s the place of habit nthiswhole affair. ut,forDurkheim,
certain
omponents f
moralityre nherently atters
f
habit:
o
become
attached to collective
deals,
one must have
developed
the habits
of
acting nd thinkingn
common ;
to assure
regularity,
t s
onlynecessary
thathabitsbe strongly
ounded 1902-3b, p. 233, 28, m.t.; 1902-3a, p.
32). Furthermore, hile
somethingmore than habit s required,
n
his
view, to produce ubmission
o rules nd reflectiveonsciousnessas we
shall see), even this
somethingmore develops
from he base of
early
habits, articularlythe
habitof elf-controlnd restraint nd thehabit
of ucid thought 1902-3b,p. 149; 1904-5, p. 347).Thisfact, longwith
the
postulate hat children re creature[s] f habit, ed Durkheim o
arguethat ducational
nstitutionsould go far
n
laying
he
groundwork
for ll
elements f his
secularmorality: y offering
he
example
of
com-
mon
classroom ife,the school could
induc[e]
n
the
child
the
habits
of
group ife and attachment;
y enforcing regimen f rules and disci-
pline, t could accustom thechild] o regularity nd develop . . the
habitof self-control ;ndby teaching atural cience, t could encourage
the
child o acquire wholesome ntellectual abits,which
will
strengthen
his moralconduct 1902-3b, pp. 135, 143, 149, 249, 297; see also 1904-
5, pp. 275, 318, 331-48).
This argument s,
in
fact,
one of the chief
reasons hat chooling ameto playso indispensable role
n
Durkheim's
continual
ffortst moral reform.
It should be noted,though, hat when advancing
this
position,
Dur-
kheim's ocuswas
principally n primary ducation see 1902-3b, p. 17).
In
his
analysis f secondary ducation, very
different
pirit
eems o be
at work.
n
Durkheim's
udgment, econdary chooling
s
not,
nd
should
not
be, a process evolvingbout the cquisition
f certain
pecific
bili-
ties or habits 1904-5, p. 30). This contentions an outgrowthf two
aspects
of
his moraltheory
mentioned,
ut
not
elaborated,
bove:
first,
his nsistenceesp. in his aterwritings) hat nsofar s
it
nvolvesdutiful
conformityo rules,morality ecessarily
ranscends
abit,
since a rule
. .
. is
not only habitualmeans
of
acting,
t
s,
above
all,
an
obligatory
meansof
acting -a meansof
acting
hat
s
imperative1902, p. 4;
1902-
3b, p. 28;
see
also 1888b,pp. 214-15; 1903-12, p. 649; 1912, p. 482,
n.
10; 1920, p. 265, n. 1);
second,
his belief
hat,
under
he
dynamic
ondi-
tionsof the modern ge, any viable moralityntails as well continual
reflectiont the upperreachesof thesocial order1898-1900, pp. 88-94;
1911a, p. 84; 1904-5, pp.
315-16).5
It was
in
hopes
of
fostering
hese
5
Despite thisbelief, t
was
Durkheim's
udgmentthat
evenpersons
n
professional
nd
managerial
positions,which
demand
constantreflection
nstead of
fixedhabits, be-
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Habit
obligatory nd
reflective
eatures
f
moral ifethatDurkheim's
writings
on
secondary
ducation et aside
the ssue of
cultivating articular
abits
ofconduct.Moral education,nhisview,clearly equiredmore han his.
Yet what the requirement urnsout
to be
comes as
a
considerable
surprise-particularly
fwe
expect
Durkheim o
propose,
ike
sociologists
of
today, hatreflectiveonduct
n
accord
with
bligatory
ules
hinges
n
the
transmissionf
moralbeliefs, alues,
and norms.
For this s not
t
all
Durkheim's
wn position.Making
t
the task ofsecondary ducation o
impart a
certain
number f true beliefs
and] specific
rticles f faith
and
to
decorat[e he]
mind
withcertain deas
[and]
certain
ormulae s
nearly s
inappropriate, e argued,as
concentrating
t this evel on the
contract[ing f] certain specifichabits
(i904-5,
p. 29). Both pos-
sibilities,
n
his
opinion, mount
o
a
reversion o the
dubious ducational
objectives f
antiquity,
n
place
of
the
proper edagogical rogram
f
the
ChristianMiddle
Ages,
where
t
was
recognized
hat
if
we are
truly
o do
our
ob
as educators
nd have
an effect hichwill be
durable,
we
must
concern urselveswith
developing
n
the individual
a more
profound
conditionwhich
determinesheother
specific
spects
of
personality]
nd
gives hem heir
nity, namely,] general ispositionfthemind ndthe
will : a
habitus
f
moral
being 1904-5,
pp. 28-29;
see also
1902-3b,p.
21). Here, as habit nthemostgeneralized ense selevatedoverall more
specificusages,
Durkheim
vindicated
his
faith
n
the
transformative
moralpower
of
educational
nstitutions.
t was his
conviction hat the
Christian
onception
f the missionof
educationwas
theoretically
he
correct
ne;
were
modern
econdary
chools
only
to work to
create a
dutiful
nd
reflective
ecular
habitus
o
replace
he
religious
abitus
f
he
past,
the
exacting
moral
demands
of the
contemporaryge might et
be
well
satisfied
1904-5, pp. 30, 317).
If
this
sprawling ccount by Durkheim f the vital nterplay
etween
thehabitual and themoral attestsfurther o the fact that the ancient
concept
of
habit was
still alive and well in
his work, there
remains n
illuminatingxception o this conclusion.
The concept s all but
absent
from
urkheim's requent nd fervent rogrammatictatements n
the
field f
sociology
tself
see 1888a, 1890,
1892, 1895b,1898b,1899,1900a,
1900b, 1901,
1901-2, 1908a, 1908b, 1909, 1915). The omission
bears
witness, would
suggest, o the subtleways
in
which the
conceptual
have in
[nonwork]
ontexts s
simple
persons
acting by
routine,
who
neither hinknor
act
otherwise
than
the ignorant
populace
(1904-5, pp.
315-16;
1905-6, p.
138). It
should be
noted,
moreover, that the
objective of
the
type
of
reflection
urkheim
advocated is
not to
dislodge
habits but to
maintain them
in
the
state
of
necessary
adaptability
and flexibility
1905-6, p.
137).
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AmericanJournal fSociology
structuref sociological hought as been
shaped through
he
apparently
peripheralmovement
o institutionalizehe
discipline
f
sociology.
Durkheim's rogrammatictatements ere, after ll, integral o what
Lukes has described s a lifelong campaign
o win recognitionor ociol-
ogy's
scientific
tatus
n
an
ossified cademic environment
xtremely
reluctant o concede he cientificegitimacy
fthenew field Lukes 1973,
p. 36; see also Clark 1973; Shils 1970). It
was Durkheim's onviction,
furthermore,hatthe egitimacy f a would-be
ciencecould
be
securely
grounded nlywhen its subject matter s an
order f factswhichother
sciencesdo not study 1895b,p. 162).
Differentiatingociology rom he
moreestablished ield f individual
psychology hus became an issue of
cardinal concern o him.This, of course, s a pointthat previous om-
mentators ave oftenrecorded, lbeit in such general erms hat Dur-
kheim's ncounterwithpsychologymerges
s a struggle ith n almost
facelessopponent.
n
fact, however,
he
enemy
was
an
eminently
ull-
bodied one: chiefly,
t
was the aggressive
new
psychology f
the
time.
When Durkheim described
psychology,
e
spoke
of researchon
the
organic nd physical onstitutionf man
(1900a, p. 363);
when
he ad-
verted to specificpsychologicalwritings,
t
was the English, French,
German,
and
Americanrepresentatives
f
the
new
psychology
hat
he
repeatedly ited see 1898a; 1902-3b; 1913-14), even drawingon Du-
mont'spsychophysical iscussion f I'habitude, whichwas mentioned
above
(see 1898a, p. 5). Operating gainst
his
backdrop
nd determined
to
endow sociology
with a
subject
matter
eculiarly
ts own
1895b,p.
50),
Durkheim id
notwait ong
to
question
which
discipline
houldhave
custody f habit, and
it
did
not take
ong
for
him
to
answer
by explicitly
declaring
hat
the
phenomenon elonged
o
psychologysee, e.g., 1888a,
p. 51; 1901,p. 44; 1911b,p. 111).Never
mind
hat,byhis
own
testimony,
habitsmetthesame criteria s the socialfacts hatwereat thecore of
his sociology: hat theywereexternal o the ndividual
n
the sense that
theywereamongthe tendencies hat educationhas
impressed pon
us
(1912, p. 389; see also 1893, p. 320; 1895b,
pp. 50-54; 1902-3b, p. 244;
1904, p. 127) and thatthey
were also
constraining,dominat[ing]
s and
impos[ing] eliefs nd practices pon us
(1901, p. 44). For all this,
he
idea
of habit remained,
n
Durkheim's
mind,
oo
closely
ssociatedwith
psychologyo merit nclusion
n
his
sundry
ronouncements
bout what
the
discipline f sociology ught
o
study;
o
mnake
he
concept part
of
sociology ould onlyrisk hewhole causebysuggestinghat henew field
was not uch an
autonomous
ne after ll.
It is
true hat
Durkheim
might
have stressed he differenceetween he view
of
habitthat
ppears
else-
where
n
his
own writings nd
the
physiological
otioncurrent
n
the
psychological iterature,
ut it
was
safer to make a clean break
and
officially
oncede
his
pawn
to
the
psychologists,
or
ociology
ad
enough
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Habit
to do in
studyinghose phenomena hat
possessed
the
obligatory
moral
character
hathabitwas
now
said to ack.
And f
habitcould cometo
this
end withDurkheim-at the same time thathe employed he concept
throughout is substantive ork,held
that
t
describedmost
f
the ction
that
goes
onin
the ocialworld, nd made
t
central o
his
plans
for
moral
regeneration-itsfate could only be
worse at the hands
of sociologists
across
the ocean who fell hort n muchof this nd who were
embroiled
in
institutional
truggles hat appearedmore threateningnd more
ur-
gent.
Weber
BetweenDurkheim
nd Weberthere s
little ommon round;
n
terms f
assumptions,
roblems,
nd
methods,
he two were
greatly
t odds. Yet
Weber
was
easily
as
inclined
s Durkheim o make serioususe of
habit,
though
n
doingso he
ultimately
arried he
concept long paths
that
diverged rom he
moralizing ighroad
f his French
contemporary.6
It so happens,
however, hatto
understandWeber'sposition n habit
properly, ne must
ttendnot only ohis explicit
eferenceso habitand
its
cognates ut also
to his observationsn custom-in the
trictly ebe-
rian enseofcollective niformitiesf ctionrooted implyn habit 1913,
pp. 170-71; 1922a,
pp.
29,
319-20, 652;
1922b,p. 187)-as wellas tohis
use
of the
special
term
Eingestelltheit. his
expression,
orrowedby
Weber
(less
its
psychophysical
rappings)
rom
psychologists
uch
as
Kraepelin nd Wundt,was employed
y him to designate
he phenome-
non
he had
in
viewwhen speaking f
habit,namely, n unreflective,et
disposition
o
engage
n
actions
thathave been long practiced
1908-9,
pp.
93-94; 1922b,pp. 192, 442). Here
the
word
disposition
ill be used
as
a
shorthand
or hiskind
of habitual
disposition nd thus s
thetrans-
lationfor
ingestelltheit.7
6
That
Weber
steered
clear of
the
moral-reformist
ath of
Durkheim
does
not mean
that
he
was
without
his own
moral
udgments on
the
value of
habitual
action. On
the
contrary, he
Weberian
ethic
of
responsibility,
s
Levine
has
observed,
extolled
the
freedom
f
actors
to make
their
own
decisions
and
enjoined
individuals
to be con-
stant n
employing
orrectives
gainst
unthinking abit
(1981, p.
20). The
difference
between
this
estimate
of habit
and
Durkheim's
assessment
of
the same
phenomenon
s
noteworthy,
hough
an
examination
of this
evaluative
discrepancy
falls
outside
the
bounds of thisarticle.
7
With one
evident
exception
(Roth's
translation
of
Weber
1922b, p.
570,
in
Weber
1922a,
p. 988),
Weber's
Eingestelltheithas
been
rendered
attitude,
attitude-set, r
the
like,
presumably
because
of its
root in
Einstellung,
which is
a
modern
German
equivalent for
attitude.
But
it
is
important o
recognize
that,
in
Weber's
day,
the
term
attitude
had yet
to
gain wide
intellectual
currency see
Fleming
1967;
cf.
Bendix
1960, p.
272, n.
24).
Indeed,
in
the
psychological
iterature
rom
which
he
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American
Journal f
Sociology
If
these semantic omplications re kept
n
mind, Weber's views on
habit emerge uite clearly.Consider, o startwith,his declaration f ts
far-reachingconomic ignificance. n Weber's estimate, the evel of
economicneed, which constituteshe basis of all 'economic ctivity,' s
comprehensivelyonditioned y mere ustom, whichplays ts part also
in determininghe means of exchange nd the utilization f such basic
economic dvantages as labor and the means of production; urther-
more, the patterns f use and of relationshipmong modern] conomic
units are determined y habit (1922a, pp. 67-68, 78, 89, 320, 335).
Work
tself,
s Weber aw
it,
rests
eavily
n
a habitual oundation.The
smallPolishpeasant succeeds n agriculture]n acountof he ow evel of
his physical nd intellectual abitsof ife 1895, p. 434); Germangirls
[work nefficiently
n
factories ecause of an inner] tonewall of habit
(1904-5a, p. 62); the freedmenof antiquity] rospered, ortheyhad
acquiredhabits of ndustry nd thrift hileslaves 1909, p. 59).
In
the
modernworld,a similar ituation btainswithin apitalist actories nd
bureaucratic ffices, hese nstitutionseing he offspring f discipline,
which
Weber
defined s the
probability
hat
by
virtue
of
habituation
a
command
will receive
prompt
nd automatic
bedience
n
stereotyped
forms
1922a, pp. 53, 1149, 1156 [emphasis dded]). Accordingly,
is
writingsnindustry iscussed tlengthhereplacementf the habits' f
the old
occupation[s] y
docile habits
in
line
withthe demandsof the
[factory]
ork
procedure 1908b,p. 130; 1922a, p. 1156;
see also
1908b;
1908-9; 1922a, pp. 731, 1155-56), while
his
analysis
of
bureaucracy
placed great weight on officialdom's disposition Eingestelltheit)
o
painstaking
bedience
and
to
the]
habitual and
virtuoso
mastery
f a
single
function
1922a, p. 988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).
By Weber's reckoning, abit
is also
plainly
n
operation
utside the
sphere
of work and economic
activity.
t is there
on the
battlefields,
where
uccesseshave been secured
s well
as
forfeited
y various
mar-
tial]
habits
(1922a, p. 1152);
there ikewise amid
processes
of
group
formation,
ith mere custom
.
.
facilitatingntermarriage,
the for-
mation f
feelings f
ethnic'
dentification,
nd
thecreation
f
commu-
nity 1922a, p. 320, m.t.;
1922b,
p. 187); and there, oo,
at the
base
of
modern olitical-legal rders,where the broad mass of the participants
act
in
a
way corresponding
o
egal norms,
ot out of
obedience
egarded
as a
legal obligation,
ut
[in
a
greatmany cases] merely
s
a
result
f
borrowed
he
word
ingestelltheit,
instellung
tself
as
generally
ithout
ts
modern
meaning of
attitude ;
e.g.,
Baldwin's
Dictionary
of
Philosophy
and
Psychology
(which
was
compiledn
collaboration
ith
wo
well-placed
erman
cholars,
Mun-
sterberg
nd
Groos)
officially
ranslates
instellung s
acquired
disposition
see
Baldwin
1901,
1:287,
2:679-80).
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Habit
unreflective
abit
1922a, pp. 31,
312, m.t.;
1922b,pp. 16, 182;
see
also
1913, p. 178).
But notonlydoes habitpromote onformityith egal as wellas other)
norms, t s also involved
n
the
genesis
f such norms.
n
a manner hat
recalls the early
Durkheim,Weber
held that customs re
frequently
transformed
nto
binding orms,since]
hemere act
f
he
regular
ecur-
rence of certain events somehow confers on
them the
dignity
of
oughtness.
n
other
words,
whatwere
originally lain
habits fconduct
owing o psychological isposition
Eingestelltheit),
ome ater o be
expe-
riencedas binding;then,with the awareness
of
the diffusion f such
conduct mong plurality
f
ndividuals,
t comes
to be
incorporatedin]
'expectations' s to the meaningfullyorrespondingonductof others;
[until inallyhese
xpectations]
cquire
the
guaranty
fcoercive
nforce-
ment
(1922a, pp.
326, 754, m.t.; 1922b, pp. 191,
442).
In
remarks uch
as these,one sees theplace of habit
n
Weber's
reat-
ment of
processes
of
change.
More
typically,
however,
what
Weber
stressedwas the nertia f the habitual
1922a, p.
321, m.t.; 1922b,p.
188).
n
his
udgment,
the nner
ispositionEingestelltheit)to
continue
alongas one has
regularly one]
contains
n
itself
such] angible
nhibi-
tions
gainst
innovations,'that
t
s
problematic]
ow
anything
ew can
ever arise n thisworld 1922a, p. 321, m.t.;
1922b,p. 188).Moreover,
he
continued, ven where
revolts, anics,
or
other
atastrophes
ave
forcibly
ntroduced
hanges,
he status
quo
ante has often
een restored
simply by an appeal to the conditioned
isposition
Eingestelltheit)
o
obedient ompliance n the
part
of
ubjects
nd officialslike
1922a, p.
988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).
That Weber
thus adverted to the significance
f habit in so
many
important ontexts
was nothappenstance.The
examples hat have
just
been
mentioned-the
majority
f
them, t anyrate-were not ncidental
comments
ut reasoned
formulationsully
n
accord withWeber's
direct
testimony. ot
onlydo we discover, e
wrote, thefurther e go
back in
history, . . that conduct, and
particularly ocial
action, is determined n
an
ever
more
comprehensivephere xclusively y
the disposition
Ein-
gestelltheit)
owardthe
purelyhabitual
1922a, p.
320, m.t.; 1922b,p.
188),
but
we find
hat individuals
re stillmarkedly nfluenced y . .
.
custom
even
today, so much so
that the great
bulk of all everyday
action
[approaches
an] almost automatic reaction
to habitual
stimuli
whichguidebehavior n a coursewhich has beenrepeatedly ollowed
(1922a, pp. 25,
337). Despite such testimony,
owever, the
habitual
undercurrentn
Weber'sworkhas
yet o be much
ppreciated. ixatedon
foreground,he
burgeoning
Weberian cholarship f hepast two
decades
has
gone
far
odissectWeber's
views on rationality,
ut-aside from he
perceptive eginnings
f
Roth
1968, pp. xxxv,xc,
lxix) nd Cohenet al.
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AmericanJournal
f
Sociology
(1975, pp. 231-33, 239)-habit has been eft ut of the accounting. his
omission s the morepeculiarfor, n the widely ead ntroductoryection
ofEconomy nd Society,Weber himself ointedly potlightedhe realm
of
the habitual when he placed traditional ction among his basic
types f social action, conceived f thisform f conduct s action de-
termined y ingrained abit, and then added to thistheabove-quoted
claim that thegreatbulk of all everyday ction pproximates his ype
(1922a, p. 25, m.t.; 1922b,p. 12). Students f Weber,nonetheless, ave
failed o take due heed ofthis; t best, heyhave made noteof heconcept
of
traditional ction, recorded
ts
definition,nd
then et the matter
o
(see, e.g., Alexander1983, p. 25; Aron 1967, p. 221; Giddens 1971, p.
153).
For Weber himself, owever,traditional ction was by no means a
residual ategory. he fact hatthistypeof action s defined s deriving
from ingrained abit serves o unite t directly ith he very spect of
Weber'sworkthat
has just
been
considered,
hat
s,
his
treatmentfthe
marked ffect f habit on economic nd
political ife,
ocial
stability
nd
change, and a good deal
else.
WithinEconomy
and
Society tself,
he
concept
f
traditional
ction
s a
link, oo,
to
the
detailed
nalysis,
which
immediatelyollows heconcept's ntroduction,fthenature f ocial
and
economic elations, or his analysisreverts epeatedly o the roleofthe
traditional-in structuringommunal elationships,stablishing
he
ex-
pectations hat underlie table organizations, anking lternative co-
nomic nds, canalizingworkeffort,nd so on (1922a, pp. 40-41, 49, 88,
129, passim). In fact, unless one is to believe that Weber, at
his ter-
minologically ostprecise,
ltered
withoutwarning
is definition
f tra-
ditional,
he
only
fair onclusion
s
that
n
all thishe was
again observing
what to him
werebasically he
ramificationsf habit.
But even more mportant,traditional ction provides bridge ut-
ward to
Weber's
vast
writings
n traditionalism.
his is a connection
that
Parsonswas
the
firstand
is still
mong
the
few)
to have
discerned,
thoughhe
then
beclouded
he ssue
by recastingWeber's
formulations
o
fit
his own emphasis on beliefs nd values at theexpenseof habit see
1937, pp. 646-47). But, as Webermade
clear when
defining
is
terms,
although
raditionalism
may
become a
pattern
f belief round which
reflectivection
s
structured1915e, p. 296; 1922a, p. 25),
in the first
instance t is
exactly
what habit
is: the
psychic disposition Einge-
stelltheit)owardhabituated outine s thebasis of ction 1915e,p. 296,
m.t.; 1915a, p. 269).
Insofar
s Weber
was serious bout this
quation
of
traditionalism ith
habit,
one
would
have to conclude hathabit
was
in
operation
well
beyond
hose
portions
f
his
workexamined
o
far;
hat
t
was
actually
ne of
the underlying
oundation
tones f the
comparative-
historical
tudies that constitute
he
core
of
Weberian
sociology,
ince
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Habit
traditionalisms amongthe central
oncepts
sed
n
these tudies.
To
see
justhow seriousWeberwas, it s not
necessary
o
ook far: orwhether
is
subject was the economic, religious,or political dimensionof tradi-
tionalism, e continuallytressed hefirm
inkagebetween raditionalism
and habit.
Economic raditionalism,ccording
o Weber, s the dherence o ong-
practiced conomic forms,particularly to productswhich are stereo-
typed n quantity nd qualityor to [an
accustomed] evel
of
earnings,
r
both
1922a, p. 151; 1923b,p. 16).
n
his
udgment,
conomic
ctivity
f
thiskind has been extremely
revalent, ccurring ot only mong peas-
ants the world over but also among medievalguildsmen, dventurer-
capitalists, ndian artisans,Chinese petitebourgeoisie,nd numbers f
modernwage-laborerssee, e.g., 1904a,
pp. 364-65; 1904-5a, pp. 59-76;
1906,pp. 321-22; 1915c,pp. 3-20; 1916-17, pp. 111-17).Whendiscuss-
ing such examples,Weber freely
cknowledged
hat certain ctors
may
proceed n traditionalistic ays
because doing so
is
in
their conomic
interest r is mandated by theirvalues and beliefs.Yet he explicitly
denied
thatthesereflectiveonsiderations
re the
principal
ases
of eco-
nomic raditionalism.ndeed, he was very areful o set
the
atter part
from atterns f economic ctivity ooted n self-interestr absolute
values and to
conjoin
t instead with
habit, ust
as he elsewhere
or-
trayed raditionalism
n
economic ffairs s
a force hat s
virtually
n-
stinctive,
ccurs
by nature,
and is
great
in
itself,
ven
without
utilitarian
nd
moral
supports
1904-5a, p. 60; 1915d,p. 356; 1916-17,
pp. 84, 112; 1922a, pp. 150-51;
1923b,p. 16). And,
in
his most
ystem-
atic
treatmentfthe
topic,
conomic raditionalism
as
depicted rimar-
ily as a manifestationf humankind'sgeneral ncapacity nd indisposi-
tion
to
depart fromhabituatedpaths
(1923a, p. 355, m.t.; 1923b, p.
303)-or, inotherwords, s a matter fhabit seealsoMarshall 1980,p.
115;
Cohen et
al. 1975, p. 232).
A
similaremphasis appears in
Weber's writings n religion nd on
domination. hroughout he former, here s muchconcernwithwhat s
variously called the traditionalism f the laity, magical tradi-
tionalism,
r
magical stereotyping,
xpressions
hat
generally esig-
nate
theformerlylmostuniversal endency or magically roved orms
of
actionto be
repeated
n
the form nceestablished, sometimes ith-
out]
he
lightest eviation 1915d,p. 341; 1922a, pp. 405, 456; 1923a,p.
161; 1923b,p. 303). Like other ctiontendencies, hisone, Weber held,
has often een sustainedby religious
onvictions nd by practical nter-
ests
1915d, p. 331).
But
having aid this,he hastened irectly o connect
magicaltraditionalismlso with he
habitual:
with
the persisting abits
of
the
masses
1922a, p. 467, m.t.;
1922b,p. 285; see also Warner1970,
p. 86).
In
his
telling,
he
magical habits
of the
laity antedatedthe
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development f systematic eligious ctivity nd retained lifeof their
own even afterward,s manyworldreligionseft hevast majoritymired
in its originaltraditionalism1915c, pp. 229-30; 1915e, pp. 275-88;
1916-17, p. 342; 1922a, pp. 466, 470, 629, m.t.; 1922b,p. 284; 1923a, p.
363). Traditionalism's abitualunderpinningsre clearly rought ut as
well
in
Weber's treatment f politicaldomination, articularly hen he
examined he natureof traditional uthoritynd sought he foundation
for
his oldest nd mostuniversal ype f egitimacy 1922a, p. 37). His
statements ere peak for hemselves: traditional structuref domina-
tion is based] on the belief nthe nviolabilityfwhat has always been;
[thisbelief]derives . . effectivenessrom he nnerdispositionEinge-
stelltheit)o theconditioned owerofthepurely abitual -that is,from
actors' habitual rientationo conform nd general sychologicalnhi-
bitions
gainst ny
sortof
change
n
ingrained
abits f
action 1918, p.
79; 1922a, pp. 37, 1008,
m.t.;
1922b,pp. 19, 582).
At
thispoint,
t
s perhapsworth bserving hat,
n
addition o ndicat-
ingthatWeberretained he ncient oncept fhabit nd put t to work o
understand
what
he saw as the
great,protean
forceof
traditionalism,
Weber'swritings n traditionalism ay
be
seen as developing in a way
that,
o
my knowledge,
as
nowhere een
matched) macrosociological
perspective n habit. f Durkheim's eformisteal propelled im oexam-
ine the micro-level evelopment
f
specific
moral
habits,
Weber's com-
parative-historical
rientationed
him
away
from his ssue
and into a
more
horoughgoingnvestigation
f the
arger
ocial and cultural
ondi-
tions under
which general
ocietal
patterns
f habitual action wax
and
wane.
It
was Weber's
belief hat habitual
action does
not occur
at random.
While
ndividuals
verywheremay
act out of habiton
occasion, hey
re
not ll equally nclinedn thisdirectionn alldomains ftheir ctivity,or
there s a
strong ffinity
etween
he
way
of ife
within
differentocial
groups and
the
propensity
f
group
members
oward various sorts of
habitual
or reflectiveonduct.
Peasants,
for
xample,
ive a
simple
nd
organic
xistence
evolving
round
recurringcycle
f
natural
vents,
with the result hat traditionalism
ypically goes
without
aying ;
he
situationwith rtisans
s sometimesmuch
he ame
1915d,pp. 344, 346;
1916-17, pp. 104, 112, 313; 1922a, pp. 468, 1197).
n
contrast,
members
of
civic
strata
exhibit ] tendency
owards
practical ationalism,for]
theirwhole existenceis]basedupon technologicalnd economic alcula-
tions
and]
the
mastery
f natureand man
(1915e, p. 284).
Reflective
tendencies,
f this nd other
ypes,
an be
detected, oo, among ay
and
religious ntellectuals nd among
incumbents
f
rulershippositions
(1915c, pp. 41-44, 142-43; 1922a, pp. 467-518). Yet,
as Weber con-
tinued,groups
hat
have been imbuedwith
hesenontraditionalenden-
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inthe modernworlddepends ess on simply rading ne set of beliefs or
another hanon theformationf n entirelyew moralhabitus, o Weber
maintained hatCalvinism spurred ational conomic ction because it
wentbeyondthe articulation f ideas that favoredsuch activity nd
produced, nstead, fundamentallyifferent 'habitus' mong ndivid-
uals
which prepared them
n
specificways to
live
up to the specific
demands
of
early
modern
apitalism 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 242-
43).
Weber's
thesishere s of a
piece
withhis other
writings
n
religion.
n
his view, t has been one ofthehighest ims ofmany alvation eligions o
impart o religious virtuosi totalcharacter : specificallyeligious
habitus or charismatichabitus, or permanenthabitus -which
transcends he ordinaryhabitus of everyday ife, that is, the often
unshakablenaturalhabitusofthe majority hat takes ifeas a miscel-
laneous
successionof discrete ctions and thus
makes
do
with
tradi-
tionalistways and an adherence o thehabitual 1915c, pp. 231-32,
m.t.; 1915b,pp. 517-18; 1922a, pp. 534-40, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 325-28).
The
exclusively irtuoso ects
of
Calvinism
went the furthestn
this
regard;
from heir
eligious ife,
ut of their
eligiouslyonditioned
am-
ily traditions nd from he religiouslynfluencedife-styleftheir nvi-
ronment merged central nnerhabitus - a methodically nified
dispositionEingestelltheit) -which,
henchanneled
nto
nner-worldly
activities,
esulted
n a
historically
omentous
fflorescencef
sustained
rational onduct 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 240, 244, m.t.; 1915b,pp.
527, 531).
In
this
ense,
modern ational ction tself
ests,
or
Weber,
on
a
foundation f habit:
on a
dynamic
habitus
that
supplants
he
static
habitus
hatunderlies
imple
habitual ction.
t
is
true hat hese re not
the
terms
n
which
he
Weberian
position
s
ordinarily
ummarized.
hey
are, however,
he terms
n
whichWeber
himself
ought
o
represent
is
argument. ndeed, Weber notonlydeclaredexplicitly hat,when The
Protestant thic speaks of
the
development
f the
capitalist pirit,
t
means the
development
f
[a] particular abitus,
he
stated
unequivo-
cally
thathis controversial
tudy intentionallyconcentratedn]
the as-
pect
mostdifficult
o
grasp
and
'prove,' the spect]relating
o
the
nner
habitus 19lOb, pp. 157, 186,
n.
39;
latter ranslation
y
Tribe
n
Hennis
1983, p. 146; see also Weber 1904-5b, p. 182).
For
all this
emphasis
on the
habitual,
here s nonetheless
ne
way
in
which heconcept f habitoccupies n uneasyplace inWeber's hought.
To
understand his,
t
s
important
o
recognize hat,during
he ate
19th
and
early
20th
century,
he
German
academic
world
was,
like its
counterpartslsewhere, competitive
rena
in
which
the
advocates
of
many hen-emergingisciplines, ociology ncluded, truggled iercely
or
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Habit
a securepositionwithin he universities
longside he older branches f
thenatural nd
sociocultural ciences nd such
upstart
ields s
psychol-
ogy see Ben-David and Collins 1966, pp. 461-63; Eisenstadt nd Cure-
laru 1976, pp.
30-34; Oberschall 1965, p. 13). Writing rom distin-
guished nd
easily won chair of economics,Weber actually xhibited
good deal
more openness regarding hese
interdisciplinaryorderdis-
putes than
many of his contemporariesHennis 1983, p. 161). He, too,
however,was
an activeparticipantn the
Methodenstreit,hecelebrated
controversyver
thenature f
cience hat
provided
he
ntellectual ack-
ground o the
disciplinaryquabbles see
Burger1976,pp. 140-53; Cahn-
man
1964;Oakes 1975, pp. 16-39).
In positioning imself mid thiscontroversy,Weberset the natural
sciences part
from he
sociocultural
ciences,holding
hat t s
only
he
latter isciplines-those withwhichhewas
allied-that
treathumans s
cultural
eings whose action embodies
subjectivemeaning, which]
maybe moreor
ess clear to the actor,
whether onsciously oted
or
not
(1904b, p. 81;
1913, p. 152).
The
objectiveof such sciences, herefore,
s
to
understand uman action
by identify[ing]
concretemotive' . . to
which
we can
attribute he conduct
n
question
1903-6, p. 125).
The
naturalsciences, n contrast, schew this
subjectiveunderstanding
f
action and
favor]
he
explanation
f
ndividual
acts
y applying general
causal
laws] (1922a, p. 15). Accordingly,t
was
among
the natural ci-
ences
that
Weber classifiedmost
contemporary sychology,
with its
search
for
he
laws of psychophysics nd itsfragmentation
f
experi-
ence into such 'elements'
as] 'stimuli,' sensations,' reactions,' and]
'automatisms'
(1903-6, pp. 136, 140;
1908a, p. 31).
In
his
opinion,
he
sociocultural
ciences-economics, history,
nd
also
sociology-could
do
without ll
this,
for
ction does not
.
. become
more
understandable'
than t wouldotherwise y the introductionf]psychophysical oncepts
(1908a, p. 29).
Yet, as Weber'swide reading fthe
European and
Ameri-
can
psychological
iterature isclosed, hese wereprecisely he concepts
under
whichthe
business
of
habit was
commonly
ubsumed
see 1908b,
pp. 112-34; 1908-9, pp. 64-65, n. 1,
72-106).
For a
more sectarianacademic, this
circumstancemightwell have
sufficedo
place habit
altogether eyond
he
purview
f the
sociocultural
sciences.
Weber
did
not succumb
o
this
knee-jerk eaction, owever.
f
the
workof
psychologistsrained he ubjectivemeaning ut ofhabit,
his
ownresearchesended ntheopposite irection, otonlywhen xamining
such
greatvessels of
meaning
s the
habitusof Calvinism nd of other
salvation
eligions ut also when
considering oremundaneworkhabits,
military abits,
politicalhabits,magical
habits,and the ike. For at no
point
did
Weber treat such
phenomena,
n
the mannerof
the natural
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scientist studying human
activity, as incomprehensive tatistical
probabilit[ies] 1922a, p. 12);
that s, as nonunderstandableehaviors or
which tis impossible o identifyny conscious r nonconsciousmotive.
Nevertheless, ven Webercame within he spell of psychological o-
tionsof habit. He thus couched
his definitionf traditional ction n the
psychophysical rgot of stimuli and automatic reactions, nd he
tended ikewise o portray hisform f
action s existing by nature nd
antecedent o culture see above,
and 1922a, pp. 17, 320-21, 333, 1134).
Given the
nterdisciplinaryontroversiesf
his
age and his commitment
to
study culturalbeings while
setting side
the natural
cientificp-
proach of the psychologists,
hese views on habit could but raise grave
doubts bout the concept's elevancewithin heWeberian onception f
the
sociocultural ciences. Such
doubts were codified
n
Economy and
Society, where Weber urged the
sociologist
o
investigatemeaningful
social
action and
then
nnounced hattraditionalr habitualconduct-
describedhere
n
psychophysical
erms,
ather han
n
the
interpretive
languageused in his empirical
tudies- lies very lose to the borderline
ofwhat
can ustifiably e called
meaningfully
riented
ction,
nd indeed
often
n
the
otherside (1922a, p. 25).
This
formulation
as
a
risky
compromise.t left hedoor tothe
domainof
habit
ufficientlypen
that
Weber's sociologycould still incorporatehis own ample analyses of
habitualaction,but it set that
door precariously nough jar
that
those
withother nclinationsmight
uickly
lose
t, and close
t for
good.
The American cene
To
American ontemporariesf Durkheim nd Weber,
the
concept
of
habitwas
also
a
familiar
tem.
n
the ast
decades
ofthe
19th
entury
nd
the
earlydecadesof the20th-to goback
no
further-onefinds
he
dea
all over
he ntellectual
andscape, nvoked
like
bypopularreformers,y
solemn
Harvard philosophers, y
social evolutionists ith Lamarckian
leanings, nd by evolutionaryhinkers f
a
moreDarwinian
bent,
uch
as
Sumner n the
right nd Veblen
on
the
eft
see
Curti
1980, pp. 233-34;
Kuklick
1977, pp. 74-75, passim; Stocking1968, pp. 238-69; Sumner
1906; Veblen 1899, pp. 107-8,
passim). Mentionof
these
evolutionary
currentstself uggests omething
f
the
biologisticight
n
which
habit
was seen at
this time. But the
best ndication
f
this,
as well as of the
concept's ontinuing tilization,ppears n theworkof the earlyAmeri-
can
psychologists.
his work is
particularly
nstructiveince not
only
does it
contain
he
age's
most
ystematictatementsbout
habit,
t also
reveals
the
point
of
departure or he sociological reatmentsf the sub-
ject
thatwere
producedduring he same period.
To
appreciate
he
psychologists'
iews
properly, owever,
few
words
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habits re nothing ut concatenated ischargesn thenerve-centers,ue
to the presence here f systems f reflex aths 1890, pp. 107-8, 112).
Congruent iews werewidely xpressed: y theveteran cholarBaldwin,
to whom habitswere lowermotor yntheses 1897, p. 55, n. 2); by the
risingyoung experimentalist
erkes,
who regardedhabit, whether n
turtles,frogs,
or
humans, as
a
tendency oward
a certain
action
[resulting rom hedevelopmentn theorganism] f a track alongwhich]
nervous
mpulse[s]
ass (1901, p. 545); by the eclectic heoretician n-
drews,who concluded
n
an important
ffortt
synthesis
hat
habit
..
is at bottom physiological henomenoninvolving] euralmodifications
[caused] by the
neural
excitations 1903, pp. 139, 149). Similar
tate-
mentswere nscribed ntothetextbooks f the periodby authoritiesuch
as
Angell,Judd, Pillsbury, nd Swift see Fearing 1930, pp. 242, 247;
Watson
1914, pp. 252-56).
The complete riumph f this pointofview came whenJohnWatson
launched, early n the second decade of this century, he behavioral
movement
n
Americanpsychology. etermined o make psychology
even moremanifestlycientifichan
t
had alreadybecome,
o
purge
he
field f all
introspectively
solable
elements such as] sensation, ercep-
tion, imagery, tc., and to write psychology instead]
n
terms
of
stimulus nd response 1913, pp. 199, 201), Watson adopted a thor-
oughly hysiologized onception
f
habit nd thenplaced
this
oncept
t
the
very center
of
his program
or
the analysis
of human
conduct.
n
Watson's
view,
habit is
simply system
f
[acquired]
reflexes r re-
sponses, or,
in
other
words, part
of the total
striped
nd
unstriped
muscular and glandular changes which follow upon
a
given
[environmental]timulus 1914, pp. 184-85; 1919, p. 14;
see also
1914,
pp. 184-276; 1919,pp. 169-347).
He
contended, urthermore,
hat man
is the sum of his instincts nd habits, meaninghereby hat all nonin-
stinctive
ctivity
s to be
seen as
habit
n
his
particular
ense of the term
(1917, p. 55; 1919, p. 270). So insistent as Watsonon this ount hat
he
actually onceivedof thinking
tself-which
had long
been
regarded
s
the
ultimate asis of
reflective
uman
action-merely
as
an
operation
f
the
tongue, hroat, nd laryngeal
muscles
.. moving
n
habitual
rains
(1919, p. 11).
Had Watson's pronouncements
een
idiosyncratic utpourings,
ne
might,
f
course, asily
write hem
ff.
n
fact,however,
is behaviorism
notonly representedn integrationf a good deal ofpreviouswork n
American sychology,
t
also became, by
the
mid-1920s,
ne of the
great
intellectual rthodoxiesmongprofessional sychologists, any f
whom
were
utterly
electrified
y
.
. Watson's
deas,
whichworked o well to
consolidate
he
cientific
tatus
f
their
ising
ield
Cravens
nd Burnham
1971,p. 645; see
also
Baken 1966;
Burnham
1968b;Curti1980,pp.
373-
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Sociology
these thinkerswidely
and
frequently redicated
heir
nalyses
ofsocial
lifeon the findings f the more stablished
cience
of
psychology,ust
as
psychology ad in its turn ppealed tothedistinguishediological ields
(Cravens 1978, p. 141).
Accordingly,mong sociologists f the time,
he concept f habitcon-
tinued o
function-alongside
erms ncompassing he reflectiveide of
human conduct-as an active partner
n the enterprise f social theory.
Examples are plentiful:Giddings ccepting he notion hat habit s an
affair f the nervous pparatus and then making
t
the verytask of
sociology o study the nature of the soci[al
man], his habits and his
activities
1900, pp.
1
1,72); Cooley
nodding ikewise oward hephysio-
logical usage of habit and concerning imselfwithhow habit exerts ]
fixing nd consolidating ction n the growth f the self, with hedevel-
opment f the habit of conscience, withthe way the modern conomy
generates a whole system
f
restless]
abits, nd
so on
(1902, pp. 187,
368, 370, 379; 1909, pp. 328-29);
Ross
attending
n
detail to habitsof
consumption nd
habitsof
production
1908, pp. 262-66); theyoung
W. I. Thomas
asserting
hat all
sociological
manifestations
roceed
rom
physiological onditions nd placing the
habitsof the group nd their
vagaries mong heprimarynterestsfthe ocial theorist1905, pp. 446-
47, 449-51; Stocking1968, p. 260); Hayes (a decade later till)defining
habits s established erebroneuralendencies
nd describing hem s
decisivemolders f the human personality
1915, pp. 297-98, 394); and
Ellwood adopting neurophysiologicaliewof habitand thendeclaring
that
for
he ndividual nd
for
ociety
habit s of
supreme mportance,
[since
t
s]
themain
carrier fall thoseforms f
ssociation . . which ise
above the
merely
nstinctive
evel, and
is
thus]
hechief aw material
n
which
cultural volution
must act. The higher tages
of human culture
[have actually] een builtup by thegradualdevelopmentof]higher ypes
of
habit, [and]
the social
order
of even
the
very highest
ivilization s
almost
ntirely
made
up
of habitual
ypes
f
individual]
eaction
1912,
p. 107; 1917, pp. 62-63). Even Robert
Park, ust embarking pon his
academic
career, umped
on the
bandwagon,
xuberantlyauding
work
on the
physiology
f
the
nervous
ystem,
efining
character
as]
noth-
ing
more
han he um ..
of
thosemechanisms
hichwe call
habit,
nd
announcing
that ducation
nd
social control
re
argely ependent pon
our
ability o establish
abits
n
ourselves nd
in
others
1915, pp. 82, 84;
see also 1904, p. 39).
Despite all this,
the
concept'sdays
were
numbered.
As behaviorism
grew
n
strengthmongpsychologists
n
thedecade or soafterWorldWar
I
and made its advances into sociological
erritories,ociologists efen-
sively
recoiledfrom he
conceptual
ramework
f
physiological sychol-
ogy. That they eacted
n this
way,
moreover,
s more
commentary
n
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Habit
the
tate f ociology
tself hanonbehaviorism,
or he
better-established
social sciences
of
the
time
were
generally
nruffled
y
the behaviorist
challenge see Curti1980, pp. 395-98). Sociology, owever, emained n
a vulnerable
osition, aggingbehind
n
terms f academic nstitutional-
ization s late as the
arly1920s,when
hediscipline till onsistedmainly
of
a scatteringf
undergraduateourses aught romwithin ther
epart-
ments see Cravens 1978, pp.
129-30; Ross 1979, pp.
124-25).
Com-
mitted
pokesmen or
he
field
hus
became
ever more
passionatelyon-
cerned
with the vigorous assertion f
[the]
disciplinary utonomy
f
sociology Matthews1977, p. 149; Cravens
1978, pp. 121-22, 147-53)
and
respondedwith
alarm
at the
behaviorists' ncroachments.
ndeed,
formanypractitionersf ociology,hewholepostwar eriod tood ut as
an
age when extreme
ehaviorism
hreatened o dominate
hesociolog-
ical
scene Odum 1951, p. 450).
Fearfulof
ust
such
an
outcome, ociologistsmoved with
dispatch
o
stem
the
apparent
ide of
behaviorism,
nd it was
in
so
doing
that
they
purposefully
bandoned the venerable
concept
of
habit.
There
are,
of
course, exceptions
o the rule-Bernard
(1926),
who
sought compro-
mise
withthe behaviorists hat
preserved abit
n
its
physiological rap-
pings;Maclver
(1931), who was
steeped
n
a traditionf Europeansocial
theory ntedatingbehaviorism nd continued o speak ofmoral,reli-
gious,political, nd economichabits
cf. Sorokin1947,pp. 43-51). But,
increasingly,hesewereminorityoices.
n
theview of
many ociologists,
habitwas the
behavioristdea of habit:
o countenancehiswas to accept
behaviorism's
hysiologicallyeductionistccount
fhuman
ction
n
the
social world
nd
to
ruleout
all
those
nstances freflective
ction
hat
had
long held
an
important lace
in
American
ociology longwithhabitual
action. That
broader
conceptualizations
f habit
might
have been sub-
stituted or he
behaviorist ormulationnd
were
actually
vailable
in
so
ready sourceas Dewey (1922; see n. 3 above) matteredittle.Dewey's
statements
n
habit wereread but
not seized as an alternative
Allport
1954, p. 59), for n
an intellectual ettingwhere
habit was so closely
associated
with
psychology,ny use
of
the
concept
eemed o exhibit
ust
the
kindof
rel[iance]
n
concepts orrowed rom nother
iscipline hat
jeopardized
the
autonomy f
sociology Matthews
1977, p. 149)
8
It
is
true,
as
sociologists
rankly dmitted, hat breakingwith
psychology
meant
hat
ociology
ould no
longer nhance ts scientificredentials
y
leaning on the reputation f thephysical ciences Ellwood 1930, p.
8
Mead's
social
behaviorism,
owever,was
palatablebecause
t
concentrated
n
the
ctivity f
ndividuals
nsofars
they re
acting s
self-conscious
embers f
a
social
group, ven
though
Mead
himself
saw
most acts
as
habituated
esponses
proceeding
ithout
elf-conscious
eflection
Lewisand
Smith
980,pp.
144,
160).
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Habit
below
him
1918, p. 789). Increasingly
ritical
f
thewhole dea
of
habit
and of the
Behaviorist whoneglects
verything]xcept
he
modification
ofhabitsor reflexes, llwood devotedmuch of his later workto the
reflective
intellectual lements ywhichhumans ranscend hehabitual
(1927, p. 65, 75; 1930, p. 204). In due
course,Park, too, came
to
argue
that
whatwe do whenwe behave
most
ike
human
beings is]pretty
ure
to escape the
behavioristswho focus n]
habits ;
hathuman haracter
s
neither
instinctive or
.
. habitudinal, ut
an outgrowth f present
attitudes, hich
he
ociologist
an
study
without
ecourse
o
the
physi-
ological
term . .
habit 1930, p. 98;
1931, pp. 17-32;
cf. Park
and
Burgess 1921,
pp. 438-39; Park and
Miller
1921, pp. 82-83).
Faris
sounded imilar hemes, ashing utagainst he physiological sychology
and
neurological
sychology
f
the
behaviorists, isdaining
heir defec-
tive
theory
f
habit and concluding
the
word habit'
s
quite
unsatisfac-
tory o capture all the
thinking
nd
striving
hat constitute uman
social
conduct;
orhim
lso,
attitude
was the
preferableoncept 1921, p.
194; 1924, p.
41; ca. 1930a, p. 236; ca.
1930b,pp. 244-46).9
In
fact, o
readilydid thisgeneralpoint
of
view make
its mark
that,by
the
early
1930s,Queen
could approvingly eport hat
in
recent ears .. students
of
human relationshave talked less about habits and more about at-
titudes 1931, p. 209), while histories fAmerican ociology rom he
same
periodcould
identify
o
contemporaryociological
reatmentsf
habitsave for
hose of Bernard nd Dewey and
digressed nstead
o the
topicofattitude
Bogardus 1929, pp.
518-19; Karpf 1932, pp. 334-42,
408-9).
And
a few
years ater,whenZnaniecki ssuedhismassive reatise
Social
Actions,he could confidentlyeiterate
he
point,made years
be-
forewith
Thomas,
that 'habit'
is an expression hat
ociologists] refer
notto use, since
t denominates biological
behavioral' atternthat] s
of no
importance
or
he
study
f
social] ctions 1936, pp. 40-42) and,
with
that,
et the matter
rop altogether.
In
the
following ear, a youngTalcott
Parsons added to the chorus.
One
often-overlookedeitmotif f The
Structure f Social Action s, in
fact, what Parsons
later described s its vigorous . . polemicizing
against behaviorism 1978a, p. 1353).
Attacking the behavioristic
scheme for
reducing the individual to
a biophysical unit and
9
Like
many
natural
cientist
hohas
practiced
nder
ne
paradigm
ndcan
never
entirelyhiftoanothernthewake of scientificevolutionseeKuhn1962, p. 144-
59),
Thomas,
Ellwood,
Park,
nd
Faris
all had
moments
hen
hey
apsed
back
nto
talk
about
habit,
ven
after
hey
had
formally
enied
he
sociological alue of
the
concept see,
e.g.,
Thomas
1927,
pp.
143-47;
Ellwood
1925, pp.
88-93;
Park
1930, p.
96;
Faris
1937,
p.
182).
Only
n
the
generation
hat
ucceededhese
ioneers
as their
conceptual
reak
with he
pastfully
arried
hrough-again,much
s
in
the
case of
scientific
evolutions.
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American
Journal f
Sociology
exclud[ing
he] subjective spect of human conduct,
Parsonswas led,
like his early ontemporaries,o equate habit directly ith
the psycho-
logical oncept fhabit or, n otherwords,with hebehaviorists'ndless
talk
about organically conditioned eflexes r habits 1937,pp. 76-78,
116, 380, n. 3, 647; see also 1934, pp. 437-40)-an
equation he was to
retain ormuch of his career 1959, p. 687; 1975, pp. 667-68; 1978b,p.
389; cf. Parsons and Shils 1951, pp. 78, 89, 125). But such
an equation
could onlyprove nimical o habit since, when writing he Structure f
Social Action,Parsonswas as eager as others
n
the
sociological
ommu-
nity o differentiatehe sociologist's pproach from he
behaviorist p-
proach,for he atter eemedto imply hattherewas no place for he
young ield f sociology 1937, pp. 115-17, 773-74). He accordingly ro-
posed to establish ociology s one of a handful f
independent ciences
of
action, ach of whichwould have as its domainone ofthefour emer-
gentproperties f action ystems-with thehereditaryasisof
person-
ality falling
o
psychology, economic ationality
o
economics,
coer-
cive
rationality opolitical cience, nd common-value
ntegration
o
sociology1937, pp. 760-73).
For
present urposes,
what s most
triking
aboutthis eeminglyncompassingcheme sthat,beyond he
residuum
...
referable o heredity 1937, p. 769),
t
s
a
mappingwholly
imited o
the provinces f reflective ction, a limitation hat accordswell with
Parsons's premise hat action consists f a reasonedselection
f means
and
ends
by
the
application
f
guiding
orms
1937, pp. 26,44-45, 48).
Twist and turnhis groundplan for he sciences f action s
much s
we
like, t yieldsno nichewithin ociology, r even within llieddisciplines,
for
he tudy fhabitualforms fhuman ocial action.
For
Parsons,
s
for
other
ociological pponents
f behaviorism
uring
he
1920s
and
1930s,
habithad abruptly eased to be an acceptable,going oncern f
the
ocial
theorist.
There are, however, factors hat make Parsons's
own treatment f
habit in
The Structure f Social Action especially ignificant. or
one
thing,
histreatment as
presented
n
conjunction
with
lengthy-and
ultimately ery
nfluential-accountof the
development
f
European
social
thought,which,
aside from
few
dismissive
emarks
1937, pp.
321, 646), wrotehabit
out
of the whole history
f modern ocial
theory,
even when
considering
urkheim nd
Weber.
This was
so
despite
the
fact
that, throughout
he actual course
of this
history,
abit had often
referredo innerdispositions nd tendencies hatwereverymuchpartof
the
subjective ide
of
humanconduct hatParsons
now
counterposed
o
habit.Parsons's analysis tands out,
in
addition,because it
articulated,
far
more explicitly han the work of Thomas, Ellwood, Park,
and
the
others ad
done,
the
underlyingonception
faction t which
ne arrives
once the
dea
of
habit
s
set
aside.
This
conception,
s
clearly
tated
by
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Habit
Parsons,postulates hat all action exhibits common
tructure :
hat
actionprocesses o not vary
n
their orms, nly
n
their ubstance-that
is, only n terms fthe particularmeans, ends, and normswithwhich
given ctors re
concerned 1937, pp. 733-34; see
also Warner1978,pp.
1321-22; Zaret 1980, p. 1194). And here ies the
problem.
* * *
If we take a
largerhistorical erspective n the
matter
f habit than
that adopted by
those who dispensed with the
concept,
then to
homogenize ction
processes n the way thatParsons'swork llustrateso
well s, I submit, nsatisfactoryor hree easons.First, hehomogenized
view
of
action
ffectivelylocks
out
consideration
fthe
empirical
ole
of
habit
n
the social
world. For thinkersike Durkheim
nd Weber,habit
was
of
significant
onsequence
in
economic,
political, religious,
nd
moral ife, nd elsewhere s well; but ts consequences re not
something
one s at all
prompted o nvestigate,
r
even to
notice,whenone
assumes
that action always
takes
the form f a reflective
eighing, y
various
normative
tandards, f means to ends. Parsonshas, it s true, cknowl-
edged
that the
adequate understanding
f
many
concrete
henomena
mayrequire heemploymentf nalytical ategories rawnfrom utside
the
ciences
f
action 1937, p. 757). But
this
declaration
as
proved
o
be
a
dead letter oth
n
his
own later work and
in
most
contemporaneous
linesof sociological
esearch, orhabitual
phenomena imply o not con-
geal as salient mpirical ealities or hosewho operate
with
model
of
action
that allots
no place to habit.
A
second
problemwith hismodel s itsneglect f
the
heoretical
mpli-
cationsof
habitual ction, ncluding hose hatrelate
directly o the cen-
tral
askthat
Parsons etsfor theory f ction-the taskof
account[ing]
for he element forder n social relationships 1937, p. 102). In accord
withhis
reflectiveonceptualizationf action,Parsonsholds
in
Munch's
[1982, p. 776]useful ummary) hat ocial order
derives rom the recip-
rocal penetration
f nstrumental. . andnormativelybligated ction.
Neither
he nor
critics
f
his
position
on
this
point
raise
any question
whatever bout
the extent
o
which social
regularities
btain because
humans also act in more nonreflective,abitual
ways. Nowhere does
Parsons confront
he Durkheimian hesis about the place of habit
in
moral educationand consider he degreeto whichthe reflectivemoral
action
that he finds o necessary o sustain social
ordermay reston
a
foundation f
habits mplanted arly on and maythereafterrystallize
only insofar as there are numbers of activities
that remain largely
habitual. Even less does the Parsonsianmodel of
action ccommodate
more
Weberianmacrosociological erspective n the
ssue: thepossibility
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American
Journal f
Sociology
that ome actorsmayderivereal or deal advantagesbecause other ctors
proceed in some areas) in habitualways, with he result hat he advan-
taged ctorsmaypursue ourses fconduct hat erve o perpetuate, r to
refashion,hesehabitualways and theorder hey mply cf.Bourdieu nd
Passeron 1970).
The third
difficulty ith homogenizingction as Parsons does lies
in
the
resulting onception
f
the relationship etween hehumanpersonal-
ity nd the social world. n his famous ttack n theutilitarianradition,
Parsonsdeclares hat themostfundamental riticism f utilitarianisms
that t has had a wrongconception fthe concrete umanpersonality
(1937, p. 387). What he does not perceive,however, s the marked imi-
larity between the alternativehe develops and the formulation e
criticizes. or
whether
ction s
depicted s
the
pursuit
f
economic
nds
via
normsof efficiency,r whethermore sublimeends and obligatory
moralnorms re also taken nto onsideration,heunderlyingssumption
is thatthe human personalitys essentially he aggregate f variousend
preferencesnd normative rientations-attributes hose content ar-
sons sees as varying
n
differentocial groups
nd
constituting
he
basic
substance f the
socialization
process.Missingaltogether
ere
s an
ap-
preciation or he point hatDurkheim nd Weberurged
when
adopting
the
concept
f
habitus,namely, hatpersonalitys
a
good
deal more han
the
tidy sum of attributes ike these; that the implications or actual
conduct
f
any particular orms, eliefs, nd ideas
are
highly ontingent
on
the basic cast or form
f
the whole
personality
f
which
hese
ompo-
nents are parts-on a generalizeddispositionwhose very shape may
differ
ithvariations
n the
ocialization
ractices
f
different
roups
nd
may undergomajor reorganization
s social formations
hange
histori-
cally.
This
way
of
eeingpersonality
as lost
ight f, oo,
as the
homoge-
nized view of action proposed by Parsonscodified he outcomeof the
campaign gainsthabit hat
he
and
his
older ontemporaries
ere
waging
on behalf f
the cause
of
sociology.
CONCLUSION
For
the present, here s no need to carry his historical nvestigation
forward
n
time.
t is
enough
to record
hat,
s habit was
progressively
discarded
rom
he
anguage
of
ociology,
ew cohorts
f
ociologists
ho
learned his anguage fresh nevitably ameto couchtheir wnthoughts
and theoriesn terms ther hanhabit,whether rnottheywereat all
cognizant
f the
rejection
f the
conceptby
the ikes
of
Thomas, Park,
Faris, Znaniecki, r the ncreasingly rominent arsons.
Since the terms
that were
current mbraced
action
only
to the extent hat
t was of a
reflective ariety, he work of these cohorts ended neluctablythough
often
unwittingly)
o
recapitulate
arsons's course
n
The
Structure
f
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Habit
Social
Action:
to
portray
ll
social
actionas
possessing
common
truc-
ture
nd
then
o
overlook
boththe
empirical
nd
theoretical
ignificance
of habitual conductand the role of habitus n theorganization f the
human personality.
One
might rgue,
to
be sure,
that
ociology
s a whole
benefited,
n
a
very angibleway,
from
eaving
thesematters side and
getting
n
with
other
usiness: hatthe excision f habiteffectivelybetted nstitutional-
izationof the discipline s well as the various
substantive chievements
that nstitutionalizationade possible.But thesebenefits ave ong ince
been
secured;theyhave ceased to
afford
rounds
or
rampling
n
con-
ceptualresources
hat
wereblighted
n
the
heat
of
ong-forgotten
ircum-
stances.By uncovering hese ircumstancesnd thusbringingo ight he
historical rocess hroughwhich heconceptual
tructure
f
ociology
as
cometo have
itsdelimited ocus,
esearch n
sociology's ast
constitutes
clear
invitation o those who currently ork
within hat
structure
nd
take
tsfocus orgranted t last to ook without nd consider
eriously
he
broader
lternatives
hat are
in
fact vailable
to
them.
In
undertaking o examine the history f the alternative hat s
the
concept fhabit,this rticle
has
proposed
hatrecent ffortso overcome
presentistpproaches o the study f sociology's ast be
expanded
o that
works ther hanacknowledged ociological lassics nd ideasother han
those
occupying heforegroundftheclassicscome to
be
recognized
s
integral o understandinghehistory f sociological hought.t
has
main-
tained, furthermore,hat to appreciate how the
conceptual
fabric of
sociology nitially cquired certain f ts basic
properties,t s instructive
to
investigate he
intellectual
onsequences
f
the
interdisciplinaryis-
putes
hat
ccompanied
he
establishmentfsociology
s an
independent
academic discipline and,
in
so doing, to examine the conceptual
framework f thosefields romwhich sociologists
f earliergenerations
were
seeking
o
differentiate
heir
wn discipline.Applyinghese ugges-
tions, his tudy asfound hat heconcept fhabit
was long staple tem
in
the
idiom of Western ocial thinkers; hat t
served as a ramifying
background orce
n
the work of both Durkheim
nd Weber,exerting
decisive effect
ven
as
theycame to termswith the central
ociological
issues
posed
in
theirwritings; ut that,during he
earlydecades of the
20th
entury,he ermwas intentionallyxpunged rom hevocabulary f
sociology
s
American ociologists ttempted o
establish
he
utonomy
f
theirdisciplineby severing ts ties with the fieldofpsychology, here
(esp.
in
connectionwith he
growth f
behavioralism) restricted otion
of
habit had
come into
very widespread usage. As struggles o, this
particular
onfrontation
ithpsychology as
one
that ndedquickly nd
was soon
forgotten-though orgotten
t
the ame time hat t eft
erma-
nent
effects n the nner onceptual tructure fsociological hought.
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