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ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:rs20140114.2bvr272813

FEDERALCONSTITUTIONALCOURT

INTHENAMEOFTHEPEOPLE

Intheproceedings

I. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofDr.G,

authorisedrepresentatives:

RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.WolfRdigerBub,Promenadeplatz9,80333Munich,

Prof.Dr.DietrichMurswiek,

against1.

theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andthecontinuedpurchasesofgovernmentbondsonthebasisofthisDecisionandofthepredecessorprogrammeforSecuritiesMarkets(SMP),

2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringanactionagainsttheEuropeanCentralBankbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniononaccountoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andonaccountofthepurchasesofgovernmentbonds.

2BvR2728/13,

II. ontheconstitutionalcomplaint

1. ofDr.B,

2. ofProf.Dr.H,

3. ofProf.Dr.N,

4. ofProf.Dr.S,

5. ofProf.Dr.Dr.h.c.S,

authorisedrepresentativefor1.to3.and5.:

Prof.Dr.KarlAlbrechtSchachtschneider,Treiberpfad28,13469Berlin

against1.

theactsbytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankstosavetheeuro,inparticularthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsoftheMemberStatesoftheeuroareaforthepurposeofindirectfinancingofstatesonthesecondarymarket,

2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringproceedingsforannulmentpursuanttoArt.263sec.1andsec.2TFEUbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionagainstthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesoftheeuroareabytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandtheEuropeanCentralBank,andagainsttheacceptanceofgovernmentbondsascollateralforCentralBankloansifthoseactsservethefinancingofstates.

2BvR2729/13,

III. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofMrH,

andofanother11,692complainants,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristophDegenhart,Burgstrae27,04109Leipzig,

RechtsanwltinProf.Dr.HertaDublerGmelin,ofthelawfirmSchweglerRechtsanwlte,UnterdenLinden12,10117Berlin

Prof.Dr.BernhardKempenRheinblick1,53424Remagen/Oberwinter

against1.

theFederalGovernmentsomissiontoworktowardsarepealoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,

2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontotakeeffectiveprecautionstoensurethattheFederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthepurchaseofbondsasaconsequenceoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,anditsliabilityarisingfromtheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,willnotexceedthesumofitspaymentobligationsunderArticle8section5sentence1oftheTreatyasstipulatedinitsAnnexII,

3. theGermanBundestagsrefusaltoexerciseitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibilitybyonlyconsentingtothemacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammesestablishedwithintheframeworkoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismasarequirementforthepurchaseofbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankifithadpreviouslybeencomprehensivelyinformedaboutthenatureandscopeoftheEuropeanCentralBanksbondpurchases.

2BvR2730/13,

IV. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofProf.Dr.vonS,

andofanother17complainants,

authorisedrepresentativefor1.to6.and8.to18.:

RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.MarkusC.Kerber,HackescherMarkt4,10178Berlin

against theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012.

2BvR2731/13,

and

V.. ontheapplicationforarulinginOrganstreitproceedingsthattherespondent

1. isobliged,inordertoprotectitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,toworktowardsarepealoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheEurosystemonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,becauseitcircumventstheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingpursuanttoArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andthattherespondentmustrefrainfromallactsordecisionswhichservetoimplementthisDecision

2. maygrantitsapprovaltotheadjustmentprogrammeswhichwereestablishedasconditionsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankonthesecondarymarketwithintheframeworkoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,anapprovalintheformofaconstitutiveparliamentarydecision,whichisrequiredunderArticle38section1sentence2,Article20section1andsection2,andArticle79section3oftheBasicLawtoprotectitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,onlyifitreceivessufficientinformationaboutthenature,scopeanddurationoftheEuropeanCentralBanksbondpurchases,aswellasabouttheirassociatedliabilityrisks,andifitisguaranteedthrougheffectiveprecautionsthattheFederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthesebondpurchaseswillnotexceedtheamountofitspaymentobligationsunderArticle8section5sentence1oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(TESM)asstipulatedinitsAnnexII.

Applicant: ParliamentarygroupDIELINKEintheGermanBundestag,representedbyitsChairmanDr.GregorGysi,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.Dr.h.c.HansPeterSchneider,Drosselweg4,30559Hanover,

Prof.Dr.AndreasFisahn,GrnerWeg83,32130Enger

Respondent: GermanBundestag,representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,

Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,

Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,Horemer13,72076Tbingen,

2BvE13/13

joinedtheproceedingsItoV:

GermanBundestag,representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,

Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,

Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,Horemer13,72076Tbingen,

joinedtheproceedingsItoIV,inproceedingsVonthesideoftheGermanBundestag:

FederalGovernment,representedbytheFederalChancellorDr.AngelaMerkel,Bundeskanzleramt,WillyBrandtStrae1,10557Berlin,

authorisedrepresentative:

Prof.Dr.UlrichHde,Lennstrae15,15234Frankfurt(Oder)

theFederalConstitutionalCourtSecondSenatewiththeparticipationofJustices

PresidentVokuhle,LbbeWolff,Gerhardt,Landau,Huber,Hermanns,Mller,KessalWulf

heldon14January2014asfollows:

I.Theproceedingsaresuspended.

II.PursuanttoArticle19section3letterboftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandArticle267section1lettersaandboftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,thefollowingquestionsarereferredtotheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionforapreliminaryruling:

a)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewithArticle119andArticle127sections1and2oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andwithArticles17to24oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank,becauseitexceedstheEuropeanCentralBanksmonetarypolicymandate,whichisregulatedintheabovementionedprovisions,andinfringesthepowersoftheMemberStates?

DoesatransgressionoftheEuropeanCentralBanksmandatefollowinparticularfromthefactthattheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012

aa)islinkedtoeconomicassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(conditionality)?

bb)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonlyofselectedMemberStates(selectivity)?

cc)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?dd)mightunderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?

b)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewiththeprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingenshrinedinArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion?

IsthecompatibilitywithArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionprecludedinparticularbythefactthattheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012

aa)doesnotenvisagequantitativelimitsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbonds(volume)?

bb)doesnotenvisageacertaintimelagbetweentheemissionofgovernmentbondsontheprimarymarketandtheirpurchasebytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksonthesecondarymarket(marketpricing)

cc)allowsthatallpurchasedgovernmentbondsmaybeheldtomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?

dd)containsnospecificrequirementsforthecreditratingofthegovernmentbondsthataretobepurchased(defaultrisk)?

ee)envisagesequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasothergovernmentbondholders(debtcut)?

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InthealternativethattheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniondoesnotconsidertheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionstobeanactofaninstitutionoftheEuropeanUnionandthusnotaqualifiedobjectforareferencepursuanttoArticle267section1letterboftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion:

a)AreArticle119andArticle127oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionandArticles17to24oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBanktobeinterpretedinsuchawaythattheyalternativelyorcumulativelyallowtheEurosystem

aa)tomakethepurchaseofgovernmentbondscontingentontheexistenceandadherencetoeconomicassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(conditionality)?

bb)topurchasegovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatesonly(selectivity)?

cc)topurchasegovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?dd)tounderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?b)Regardingtheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing:IsArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUniontobeinterpretedinsuchawaythattheEurosystemisallowedalternativelyorcumulativelyaa)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutquantitativelimits(volume)?

bb)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutaminimumtimelagaftertheiremissionontheprimarymarket(marketpricing)?

cc)toholdallpurchasedgovernmentbondstomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?

dd)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutminimumcreditratingrequirements(defaultrisk)?

ee)toacceptequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasothergovernmentbondholders(debtcut)?

ff)toinfluencepricingbycommunicatingtheintenttobuyorinotherways,coincidingwiththeemissionofgovernmentbondsbyMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyarea(encouragementtopurchasenewlyissuedsecurities)?

Reasons:

A.FactsoftheCase

Inareasonableassessmentoftheirapplications,thecomplainantsandtheapplicantchallenge,complainantsItoIVviaconstitutionalcomplaintspursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.4aoftheBasicLaw(GrundgesetzGG),13no.8a,90etseq.oftheFederalConstitutionalCourtAct(BundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetzBVerfGG),andapplicantVviaOrganstreitproceedings[proceedingsrelatingtodisputesbetweenconstitutionalorgans]pursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.1GG,13no.5,63etseq.BVerfGG,first,interalia,theparticipationoftheGermanBundesbankintheimplementationoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions,andsecondly,thattheGermanFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagfailedtoactregardingtheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions(hereinafter:OMTDecision).

I.SubjectMatteroftheProceedings

TheOMTDecisionenvisagesthatgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatescanbepurchaseduptoanunlimitedamountif,andaslongas,theseMemberStates,atthesametime,participateinareformprogrammeasagreeduponwiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.ThestatedaimoftheOutrightMonetaryTransactionsistosafeguardanappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandtheconsistencyorsinglenessofthemonetarypolicy.TheMinutesofthe340thmeetingoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankon5and6September2012inFrankfurt/Mainreadinthisrespectasfollows:

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WithregardtoOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),onaproposalfromthePresident,theGoverningCouncil:

(b)approvedthemainparametersoftheOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),whichwouldbesetoutinapressreleasetobepublishedafterthemeeting(Thursday,6September2012)

Thepressreleasewhichwaspublishedonthissubjecton6September2012hasthefollowingwording:

6September2012TechnicalfeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions

Asannouncedon2August2012,theGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)hastodaytakendecisionsonanumberoftechnicalfeaturesregardingtheEurosystemsoutrighttransactionsinsecondarysovereignbondmarketsthataimatsafeguardinganappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandthesinglenessofthemonetarypolicy.ThesewillbeknownasOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMTs)andwillbeconductedwithinthefollowingframework:

Conditionality

AnecessaryconditionforOutrightMonetaryTransactionsisstrictandeffectiveconditionalityattachedtoanappropriateEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility/EuropeanStabilityMechanism(EFSF/ESM)programme.SuchprogrammescantaketheformofafullEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammeoraprecautionaryprogramme(EnhancedConditionsCreditLine),providedthattheyincludethepossibilityofEFSF/ESMprimarymarketpurchases.TheinvolvementoftheIMFshallalsobesoughtforthedesignofthecountryspecificconditionalityandthemonitoringofsuchaprogramme.

TheGoverningCouncilwillconsiderOutrightMonetaryTransactionstotheextentthattheyarewarrantedfromamonetarypolicyperspectiveaslongasprogrammeconditionalityisfullyrespected,andterminatethemoncetheirobjectivesareachievedorwhenthereisnoncompliancewiththemacroeconomicadjustmentorprecautionaryprogramme.

Followingathoroughassessment,theGoverningCouncilwilldecideonthestart,continuationandsuspensionofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsinfulldiscretionandactinginaccordancewithitsmonetarypolicymandate.

Coverage

OutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbeconsideredforfuturecasesofEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammesorprecautionaryprogrammesasspecifiedabove.TheymayalsobeconsideredforMemberStatescurrentlyunderamacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammewhentheywillberegainingbondmarketaccess.

Transactionswillbefocusedontheshorterpartoftheyieldcurve,andinparticularonsovereignbondswithamaturityofbetweenoneandthreeyears.

NoexantequantitativelimitsaresetonthesizeofOutrightMonetaryTransactions.

Creditortreatment

TheEurosystemintendstoclarifyinthelegalactconcerningOutrightMonetaryTransactionsthatitacceptsthesame(paripassu)treatmentasprivateorothercreditorswithrespecttobondsissuedbyeuroareacountriesandpurchasedbytheEurosystemthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactions,inaccordancewiththetermsofsuchbonds.

Sterilisation

TheliquiditycreatedthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbefullysterilised.

Transparency

AggregateOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandtheirmarketvalueswillbepublishedonaweeklybasis.PublicationoftheaveragedurationofOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandthebreakdownbycountrywilltakeplaceonamonthlybasis.

SecuritiesMarketsProgramme

FollowingtodaysdecisiononOutrightMonetaryTransactions,theSecuritiesMarketsProgramme(SMP)isherewithterminated.TheliquidityinjectedthroughtheSMPwillcontinuetobeabsorbedasinthepast,andtheexistingsecuritiesintheSMPportfoliowillbeheldtomaturity.

TheOMTDecisionhasnotyetbeenputintoeffect.

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II.HistoryoftheProceedings

1.SubmissionsoftheComplainantsandtheApplicant

ThecomplainantsandtheapplicantarguethattheFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagareobligedtoworktowardsarepealoftheOMTDecision,oratleasttopreventitsimplementation,andthattheGermanBundesbankmaynottakepartiftheDecisionisputintoeffect.Theygivethefollowingreasonsforthisview:TheOMTDecisionisasocalledultraviresact.ItisnotcoveredbythemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBankpursuanttoArt.119,127etseq.oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)apartfromthis,itviolatestheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing(Art.123TFEU)andtheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thepurchaseofgovernmentbondsisonlypermittedwithintheframeworkofmonetarypolicy.Foranumberofreasons,however,theOMTDecisionisnotanactofmonetarypolicy.IttransgressestheboundariesofmonetarypolicyandviolatestheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetbytheEuropeanCentralBankbyenvisagingthatonlybondsofselectedstateswillbepurchased,thatgovernmentbondswillbepurchasedforwhichnobuyersexistonthemarket,andthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondswillbemadecontingentonpoliticalconditions,specificallyontheparticipationoftheMemberStatethatbenefitsinaprogrammeoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.MonetarypolicymustrelatetotheentireeurocurrencyareaandmustbefreefromdiscriminationwithregardtoindividualMemberStatesoftheEurosystem.Atthesametime,linkingOMTpurchasestodecisionsoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismandtotheconditionalitiesagreedtothereincollideswiththeindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thereareinfactnoupheavalsonthegovernmentbondmarkets,whicharerequiredforaninterventionoftheEuropeanCentralBank.TheOMTDecisionamountstoasuspensionofthemarketmechanismswhichviolatestheTreaties.TheEuropeanCentralBankdoesnothaveamandatetodefendtheeurobyanymeans,includingthosethatleadtolargescaleredistributionsbetweenbanksandtaxpayersandbetweentaxpayersofdifferentMemberStatesinthisrespect,itdoesnotenjoysufficientdemocraticlegitimation.ThetransferofsovereignpowerstotheindependentEuropeanCentralBankhasonlybeenpoliticallyauthorisedandconstitutionallyapprovedundertheconditionthatitwouldbelimitedtotheareaofmonetarypolicy.SincetheOMTDecisioncancreateliabilityandpaymentrisksaffectingthefederalbudgettosuchanextentthattheoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityoftheGermanBundestag,andthusalsoitsbudgetaryrights,canbeimpaired,thedecisionalsoviolatestheprincipleofdemocracyenshrinedinArt.20sec.1and2GG,andimpairstheconstitutionalidentityoftheBasicLaw,whichtheeternityclauseofArt.79sec.3GGprotectsnotonlyagainstamendmentsoftheConstitutionbutalsoagainstanerosionintheprocessofEuropeanintegration.

2.StatementsSubmittedbytheEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbank

IntheproceedingsbeforetheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbankhavesubmittedstatements.

a)AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,theOMTDecisioniscoveredbyitsmandateanddoesnotviolatetheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing.ItsmonetarypolicyisnolongerappropriatelyimplementedintheMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyareabecausethesocalledmonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisdisrupted.Inparticular,thelinkbetweenthekeyinterestrateandthebankinterestratesisimpaired.Unfoundedfearsofinvestorswithregardtothereversibilityoftheeurohaveresultedinunjustifiedinterestspreads.TheOutrightMonetaryTransactionswereintendedtoneutralisethesespreads.TherequirementforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionisthatthebenefittingMemberStatehasenteredintoagreementswiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityorwiththeEuropeanStabilityMechanismonmacroeconomic,structural,budgetaryandfinancialpolicyreforms,andcomplieswiththeagreements.TheOutrightMonetaryTransactionsareonlyintendedtocutoffunjustifiedinterestratehikes.IfaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligations,thepurchasesweretobestopped,evenifthiswillresultinmajoreconomicdifficultiesfortheMemberStateconcerned.AnotherconditionisthattheMemberStatehas,orregains,accesstothebondmarketsothatthefiscallydiscipliningeffectoftheinterestratemechanismisupheld.

TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthattheEurosystemwillnotclaimpreferredcreditorstatuswithregardtothegovernmentbondspurchasedonthebasisoftheOMTDecision.WhiletheEuropeanCentralBankobjectstoagreeingtoadebtcutandtocompletelyorpartiallywaivingclaimsagainsttheMemberStatesconcerned,itwouldacceptequaltreatmentwithotherownersif,inameetingofcreditors,amajorityvotedinfavourofadebtcut.

TheEuropeanCentralBankarguesthatconsideringtheSpanish,Italian,IrishandPortuguesebondsonthemarket,thepotentialvolumeofpurchasesonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionwouldcurrentlyamounttoapproximatelyEUR524000000000(statusof7December2012).TheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksdoesnot,however,intendtopurchasethemaximumpossibleamountofthesebonds,butcannotpublishtheenvisagedamountfortacticalreasons.

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TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthatimmediatelybeforeandaftertheemissionofgovernmentbonds,thereshallbenopurchasesonthesecondarymarketsothatamarketpricecanbeformedanappropriatetimelagofsomedayswillbeobservedforthis.Theexactlockingperiodwillbedeterminedinaguideline,butnotbepublished.

TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherarguesthattheOMTDecisioncanbebasedonArt.18.1.oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank(hereinafter:ESCBStatute).ThepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketdoesnotservetofinancethebudgetsoftherespectiveMemberStatesindependentfromthefinancialmarkets,anditisnotaimedatrenderingmarketincentivesineffectiveitisaimedatadaptinginterestratelevelstonormalmarketactivities.Moreover,theEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksiscalledupontosupportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheEuropeanUniontotheextentthatthisdoesnotconflictwithmaintainingpricestability.However,theEuropeanCentralBankisindependentinthisrespect(Art.130TFEU,Art.7ESCBStatute)andwillalwaysundertakeanautonomousanalysisoftheoverallsituation.

AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,thereisnoliabilityriskforthenationalbudgetsbecausetheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankshasensuredsufficientriskprevention,mostlythroughprovisionsandreserves.Iflossesoccurnevertheless,theycanbecarriedforwardandbalancedwithrevenuesinthefollowingyears.

b)IntheviewoftheGermanBundesbank,theassumptionofadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisquestionableanddoesnotjustifytheOMTDecision.AccordingtotheGermanBundesbank,interestspreadsongovernmentbondscannotbesplitintoeitherjustifiedorirrationalcomponents.ApoorereconomicdevelopmentinaMemberStatejustifiesahigherinterestspread.ThefactthatadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismshallbetoleratedifaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligationsunderagreementswiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanismshowsthattheOMTDecisionisinfactnotabouttheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.

TheGermanBundesbankarguesthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketcanalsodisconnectthebenefittingstatesfinancingtermsfromthefinancialmarketifthemarketparticipantscanrelyonbeingabletoselltheirgovernmentbondstotheEurosystematanytime.Thesoonersuchpurchasesaremadeafterissuing,andthehigherthepurchasevolume,thelowertherisk.Moreover,alargescalepurchaseofgovernmentbondscarriesconsiderableriskandcanleadtoaneverincreasingamountofaMemberStatesdebtsbeingassumedbytheEurosystem.

TheGermanBundesbankfurtheraddsthateverylossitincursburdenstheGermanfederalbudget,sothattherisksensuingfrompurchasesofgovernmentbondsbytheEurosystemarenodifferent,ineconomicterms,fromthoseoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.UnliketheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,theEurosystem,however,lacksparliamentarymonitoring.

III.RelevantLegalProvisionsandJurisprudence

1.LegalProvisions

TherelevantArticlesoftheBasicLawfortheFederalRepublicofGermanyof23May1949,mostrecentlyamendedbythe59thActAmendingtheBasicLaw(59.GesetzzurnderungdesGrundgesetzes)of11July2012(FederalLawGazette,BundesgesetzblattBGBlIp.1478)readasfollows:(AtranslationoftheBasicLawprovidedbytheFederalMinistryofJusticeandConsumerProtectioncanbefoundonline:

http://www.gesetzeiminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html[http://www.gesetzeiminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html]

.)

Art.20

(1)TheFederalRepublicofGermanyisademocraticandsocialfederalstate.

(2)Allstateauthorityisderivedfromthepeople.Itshallbeexercisedbythepeoplethroughelectionsandothervotesandthroughspecificlegislative,executiveandjudicialbodies.

(3)Thelegislatureshallbeboundbytheconstitutionalorder,theexecutiveandthejudiciarybylawandjustice.

(4)