Download - Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
1/17
The Transmission
of ffect
TERESA BRENNAN
CORNJJLL
UNIVERSITY
l llES
ITil C ND LONDON
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
2/17
Copyright©
2.004
by
Cornell lJniversity
All rights resel'ved. Except for brief quotalionu hl a 1·eview
1
this book, 01•
parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in ony forrn without per1nission in wdHng fro1n
\'he ptthlishet'. For h1forrnation
1
Rddt-ess Col'nell University Press, Sage I-louse,
512
Enat State Street, Ithaca, New
York 14850.
First published 2004by Cornell Unlvel'si.ty Press
First prhltlng
1
Cornall Papci:bucks, 2004
Printed
hi.
the United Sb1tes of America
Library of ongrerm Cataloglng-in-Ptlblicatlon Data
B1mutan, Thresa, 1952-2003
The trans1nisslon of i f f e c t
I
Tctesa. Brennan.
p.c1n.
Includes bibliographical
1-efeia1ceB
and index.
ISBN
0 .
8014-3998-1
cloth:
alk, paper)-lSBN 0-8014-8862-1
pbk.:
alk.
paper)
1
Affect (Puychology)-Social
aspects.
I.
Title,
BF5y(.B74
.?.003
152,4-dc2.2
2003019730
Cornell U11ivel'sity Press strives to use envh'onmentally i't: Bponsible .supplierR
nl\d
mateduls
to the fullest exteut possihleht
the
publiBh11lg of ita books. Such
n1alerials include vegetable-baaed,
o w ~ V O C
inks and c k l ~ f r e e papers that are
rocyded, tol-ally chlorinenfree, or pnrtly compo1:1ed of nonwood fibcl'a. For
further
ittfot'1 ation, vislt
our
website
at
www.cornellpl.'e:IB.corneII.edu.
Cloth printing
10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3
2 1
lJaperbackpdntiug 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 : ;
-1\li iW
' r-
Contents
Foreword
vii
1. Introduction
2
The Transmission
ofAffect
in the Clinic 24
3
Transmission in
Groups
51
4.. Tlie New
Paradigm 7
5 The Sealing
of
he
Heart
97
6.
The EducaHon
of
J e
Senses 6
7
Interpreting the Flesh 1. 39
Notes 165
Wark•
Cited
203
Index
217
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
3/17
C I I P T E R S I X
The Education of the Senses
Paradoxically, feelings are sellsory states produced by thought, while
interrnptive thoughts are produced
by
affects. Feelings are thought
ftll,
and
affects are thoughtless. Feelings are
mea11t
to be informatlon
about
whether
a state is pleasurable
1·
painfol,
whether
one is at
\Tacted to something or averse to it. This is the classic and only basis
for distin guishing feelings
and
affects. Feelings are meant to say, "I
like it, it feels
good
lo me," 01·
I
don't like it
and to
lead to action on
this basis. Jlut if feelings are trncing a logic in the flesh simultan eously
with
a logic in history, this means they feel good because the y are liv
ing. The
good
feeling
of
living and the personal liking
of
the sensa
tions ;hat come
with
it coincide in what is termed "pleasure.''
Jlu.t
only
up
to a point. At that point, the point al which the organism
would have to give up a distinct identity in order to go on feeling, it
w.ill generally choose the forme1· even if it
then
feels
bad.
Thus a man
gives into social pressure
and
chooses vanity (the
need
not to be
ridiculous
in
the eyc'S of others) over happiness. The organiHm makes
a simila1· choice, for in.stance, when it takes a new job
far
from those it
loves because tl1ere is a career advance.
niology,
like Freud, falters
wl1en it
co1nes
to inaldng sense of sometl1ing tl1at
n1akes
no sense for
the living organism, only for the ego.
L:ike
F1•eud,
It
assimilates the
ego drives to t he life drive even when they are opposites (as I have
shown). A real distinction
would
be drawn in terms
of
the difference
between what
is living and what is dead; the bounda1'ies that matter,
and
the only ones that work, are those that shield the organism from
u6
_
dead maller by stmounding it wil11 a field of living attention directed
outward
in a per petual act of love.
In positing that people in the
Weste1'1l
world were once aware of the
transxnission of affect, and that w have been sealed against th1B
l
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
4/17
form of it, as
we
have seen. But those in analysis, or engaging
in
the
meditation rites that also resurrect the specter of self-detachment, do
not call their opponents
by tl1e
name of
de1nons/'
let alone
p a s ~
sions, or even ''affects.
They
call it the ego/ if they are beit1g ana
Jyzed properly,
and
even
i
they are not.
In the last chapter, I suggested that the ego was nothing more than a
constellation of affects, grouped in clusters of associations (verbal and
visual) around certain S\Jbjective
fa11tasmatic
positions, in turn the re
suit of the subjective standpoint. l lmve also shown
how
the ego, as
the named enemy, appears in the seventeenth
centmy
for Pascal and
the authors of
the
Port-Royal Logic. The argument of this book goes
further, suggesting that
the
ego replaces the affects because
t s
lhe af
fects
in
a mor e solid constellation. These egolc affects have become so
predominant and organized (ht lhe spre ading of the foundational fan
tasy) that we
now
believe them when they tell us, This is me.
If
as
we
supposed
in
chapter
4,
there ls an alternative center for coherence
in
the mind,
fOI
bringing logic
and
reason lo bea r synthetically
on
di
verse information, there s little evidence of its presence. That olher I,
the one
who
once stmggled wit h demons, then fought the passions,
and
now
11egotiatcs with the ego, is less and less i evidence. This is
especially apparent
in
the decline ofreligious practices and civil codes
of courtesy. As
we
noted at the outset, civiland religious codes
may
be
remnants of a conscious knowledge of transmission. In cullmes
whete
knowledge of transmission is unconscious, these codes have
less 1neaning m1d are easily displaced
by
argun1ents tllat
one
sl1ould
be free to express one's feelings. As the stolcally
ii1cli11ed
realized
long since, if freedom means anything, it is freedom from possession
by
the
negative affects. Where such freedom holds sway, lhe otl1er I of
discernment
and
sensation gains a hearing. When possessed by
an
af
fect
with
which we are
unfan1iliar, t
can
seem
entirely reasonable tu
do things that the unposscssed self would reject oul of hand. Such
things are readily mtionalized at the time,
but
afterward the perpelra
tm
marvels
al
how far he forgot himself. This, I think, is what Aristotle
meant when he said t hat lhe doer of evil does not know at the time
that he is doing evil. From the perspective of the affect i11 commanq of
attention at the time, the action is entirely approptiale.
1'he point here,
h o w e v e ~
is that the significance of verbal, enlo-
tional restraint
demanded
by various declining codes is unclear when
the transmission of affect is miaclmowledgccl.
We
have established
HS
Tile
Transmission o Affect
that
when
I judge the othe.r, l simultaneously direct toward her lhat
stream of negative affect that cuts off my feeling of kinship from her
as a fellow living, suffel'ing, joyful creatme. I will expand
on
this no
tion briefly, before moving on. The act of directing negative affects
to
the other severs
my
kin tie
with
her by objectifyi11g
he1·.
I make her
into an object by directing these affects toward her, because that ad
mad
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
5/17
out the intervention of anxiety ot
othe1·
fixed obstacles in the wny of
the
thinking process.
On
the face of it, any faculty of discemment
must
involve a process
whereby affects pass from the state of sensoty regislrotion to a state of
cognitive
or
intelligent reflection; this does not mean that the process
of ref eclion is
without
affect, just that the affect
is
other than the affect
that is being reflected upon. James shows that this was the case
fO '
Hobbes; nonetheless, reason and passion
or
affect and cognition keep
reappearh1g as bi11aries despite the argun1ents against their separalion
in
practice. Nevertheless, these binaries are attempts
at
approximating
a real
and
necessary distinction between the ego
and
the facully of
discetnmen.t, between the passions and the other I who reflects
11
them. The use of the binaries, in short, may be
an
approximation
o
the
palpable experience of being pulled
in
two directions. One of these di
rections feels more passionate (the desire to tick someone off);
U1e
othet (to listen, to discuss) more reasonable; but
U1e
licking off can
presen t itself as coldly rational, while the reasonable discussion ca11 be
warm. Reason and passion, as a distinction, captures some of the
ele-.
JI\tl'J.1ts
at work here but 111isses tl1e feeling or sensitive component
in
reaso11,
just as H
misses
t11e
calculath1g
component in
passion.it
However, the point is that
i s c c ~ m n e n t b y
this argtJment·--works
by
sensing (touching, hearing, smelling, listening, seeing)
and
the ex
pression o the senses, particularly in words.
t
works by feeling
(sometimes
in the
dark),
and it
Works deductively, often with insuffi
cient informatio11;
it
n1akes 1nistakes wl1en it is ru.'lhed to conclude be
fore ils time (it
s
rushed by the ego, which always needs a plan) or
when it
is delayed by the ego (which is always anxious about doing
the
wrong thing). Discemme11t, when it doubts the ego's judgment,
registers as a feeling.
Son1ethnes
s11ch feelings can be al ticulated with
rJaHve exactitucle; they
can
be
na111ed,
and reasons for their existence
can
be
adduced. But this, precisely, requires a vocabulary; that is
why
w defined
feelings as
sensations that have found a tr\atch in words.
The naming
of
the feeling is one thing,
but
the ability to investigate
its logic requires
1nore.
rrhat investigation requires a conceptual vo
cabulary
and
a means for circumventing the affects' combined
di.s-
tractlons. The notion that
we
arc susceptible to tr1msmitted affects
.rnakes n1ore sense of I·Iindu, ru1d related,
1•eco1n1nendations
for
achieving peace,5 just as
it
inakes n1ore sense of the 1neditative tradi
tion Descartes inherited. h1 the Jesuit tradition, spirits 1·
den1orts
120 The Transmission o ffect
were and are discer11ed, 1nttch as affects are now disce1·ned. There is a
"on
why Descartes s
editations are
called n1editations. The
p11r-
rea
,
suit of clear
and
distinct ideas
may 110
angel' mean .what 1t once
meant, but
h1
the meditutive
context
it ineans
reasoned
ideas
H1al can
be called upon when one is assailed by affects •md modes in which
one doubts one's faith.' These affects register as a
se.l ies
of apparently
unconnected thoughts,
in
which one thought inten11pls another
thought's pathway without warning.
By
this meallB one ls distracted
and le d to believe that one's feelings are other than they may be. Such
feelings are recoverable
in
some cases via
r e f l e c l i ~ n , in o t h ~ 1 · s r
analysis,
but
the procedure is essentially the same.
t
s that of luston
cal recollection, the comparison
of 1nentories.
When a man realizes that there is grief behind his anget, and that
what
he felt when he
heatd this or that
is
not the passionate affect that
possessed him
at
the time,
but
something finer, how does he do
so?
He
remembers. Then he onlwits the affects by comparmg the state in
whicl1 he was possessed by the othering affects with the stale in
which
he
discerned and felt. He
may
do so
with an
analyst or, occa
sionally,
with
the kind of friend who helps h im see
thmugh
the veil of
affects tatl1er than thickening the veil with misplaced sympathy-
sympathy for t11e affects (as in the sharing of indignation).rather than
love for the friend.
He
reviews the histo ry of his own feelings and af
fects in the matter.
He
follows an essentially histot•ical procedure in
order to
recover
a
truth, and lte
does so with loving intelligence 1•at11er
than by wallowing in. judgments of himself (guilt and shame) or oth
ers
(fe1.u and
paranoia).
111e
limits to this process are not only set
by
insight (the process whereby se11sation
and
feeling connect) but by
language
and
concept (the means whereby sensation and feeling m -
nect). The pl Ocess consists of the redh'ection of energy; the means he
in the comparative sensations of those redeployments, as well as the
words into which
we
are born.
Our man
has to have a language for
any 111atte1' involving histod.cal 1·eview, al\d lauguage is always cul
tural
and
traditional,' bu t that does not mean the development of an·
gnage is over.
In
naming a sensation of whiclt he may be aware (en
ergy depa1'1ing
and
returning) he
may
be limited by his
c1.m·ent
vocabulary, but
he
is pushed to expand it
in
accounting for sensations
in sequence: the knowledge gleaned by comparison.
~ 0 1 n p a r i s o . n based on 111en1ory is critical h1 all practices of discern-
1nent. B11t
unlike the instanta11eo11s con1parison of
positions
discussed
The Education o
ile
Senses 21
1•
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
6/17
in the last chapte1; compal'ison based
on memory
does not depend on,
but
ratl er
works against, the agitation
of
the affects.a ~ r h e instanta-
neous comparison of positions effected by the egoic affects demands
an immediate assessment and projection-or inb'ojection-of one's
position vis-a-vis the other. This unpleasant process of "placing" has
no
n1en101·y,
i10 sense of historical ·ind.ebtedness.9
I--Iistorical
compari-
son,
by
contrast, is fueled
by
living attention.
t
can only proceed by
concentration. Yet in the matemal cases discussed previously, we saw
H1at
concei1tration_
can
also be
impaired
when
a consta11t stream of
tention (the back
of
one's mind) is diverted toward an infont, leading
to the conclusion that the thing that is marshaled
in
concentration is
an attentive energy, withottt
which
concentration is powei•less to de-
feat ti1e affects and fantasies that int errupt it.rn As
we
have also see11,
the affects
and
concentration boti1
draw on
energy, but
the
affects
have a direct relation to visual and audito1·y fantasy, while m ncent ra
ti.on and feelings have a direct relation to words (and that open form
of
visio11
and the ot11er ear/' prevail when these hypot11etical forn1S
of vision
and
audition are
not
abducted
by
fantasy). As blocks in the
way
of feeling, vision and audition only serve the ego when one
is
wearh1g Freud's #ca1) of hearing on
one
side/ ~ 1 1 1 d
seeing with
an o f ~
fending eyeJI
The battle between feelings and affects that has characterized this
argument so far is plainly intensifying. So,
in t11is
chapte1; will a battle
between
~ h e
notion
of spontaneous einoHons a11d educated feel-
ings. The education, beghu1ing with t11e discemment , of the affects re
lies 01\ the feelings,
which
communicate
with
the sensations. But th e
sensations have a linlited range of self-expression when no language
for
01•
practice in
theil•
r ~ ~ c o g i i t i o n is available. 'fhis does not 1nean
that
the education of the senses has
been
altogether lacking.
We
shall
look at
how the educatl011 of
111
finer feelings was partially accom·
plished through religious codes and codes of courtesy. That is to say,
codes of courtesy
and
ethical or religious conduct operate on a level
similar to philosophical and psychological discermnent insofar as
they use the sa111e n1eans:
con1parison,
detach.n1ent, and living a t t c n ~
lion. Ilollowing some refiections on religious and cn\tural codes,and a
related discussion of the virtues embodied in those codes, I shall dis
cuss the level of discernment that is reached
by
the various philo
sophical
and
analytic practices. From "\his discussion there follows
more analysis of living attention and the life drive and of the role
u Tl e Transmission o Affect
played by the theological virtues
in
transforming as well as resisting
the affects. After tha t, we shall examine the mechanisms of dlscem·
ment in relation
to
sensation,
Cultural Discernment
Civil codes
are
not understood, of course, as means for
diAce1•ning
and
resisting the transmission of affect
and
responding to anothe r's affec
tive states
in
ways that
would
help dissipate 11egative and disabling
affects (putting a person at ease),12 But this is what they do. Codes of
courtesy and religious codes compare the passionate hnpulse to act or
cogitate
in
a certain way with a code of conduct and restraint. When
the code is strong eno ugh to override the in1pulse, whet her its origins
are internal or extemal 1· both, the impulse is refused. The ability to
do this as a
n1atter
of cot1rse, or on occasion,
was
captured in the old
expression, finer feeling, somethin g akin to flne sensor y distinc-
tions. The level of finer feeling is tli.e level referred to in the Spanish lo
siento: colloquially, I'm sorry," and literally, I feel it." On this level
discer1lment
and the
social cottrtesies de1·ived fron it
ai e
1nanifest, i n ~
solar as one is open
to
o t l ~ e r s in a way that wishes them well and
would dissipate their anxiety or
so1•1•ow
if one could.
t
is an opening
through which one feels the other's pain
r
joy as one's own. hl de
scribing friendship, Montaigne put it this way: 11·ue friends feel each
otl1er's feelings."13 They feel their joy or heir sonow. This taking on
of the other's feeling, as a consdo11s thing, presupposes a different
sense of self or boundary than the boundary the ego manufactures by
projecting
out-or
by being
swamped
by negative affects: One is not
open
to
ti1e other through the ego's routes but thmugh the deploy·
ment of sensation,
mmning
feeling. This is the equipment of the dis
c e r n e 1 ~ as distinct froni. the p1•ojecto1'. Civil and spiritual
codes
t11at
r e ~
strain affects that pass
around as
well as
within
cottld
lu1ve
been
wdtten wlth Hi.is
difference in mind. liar instance, a cod e of child
reai·-
ing based on restraining anger does not only repress.14 It also builds
resistance to expressing a wave of passing angry affect. A code based
on encouraging affective s e l f ~ e x p r e s s i o n on the othe1· hand.1
could
l e a v ~ a person
with
no defense ttgainsl invading affects
no
ineans
of
telling whether they expressed the self or something other than the
self. One stmpects that some understanding of the need for discern-
Tlie Educntion o 1e Senses 12:i
I
I
i
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
7/17
men of the affects
in
child readng i reflected
in language
suggestin
that the
affects and emotions are
not something that
originate
gen.eris. One is F'beside oneself or out of one's mind
or
giving in
to
feelings.''
Co11versely,
011e is
11
closed in at best detached.
There
are
implications
here
for ideas that have traditionally been dismissed as
conservative.
If
affechl wash throu.gh us, giving
in
to
then\ or
11
1
08
ing
it'
in
em.otional display means
that
notions
of
en1otional reserve
as
a good thing
take on new
1neaning.
In
t11is
respect,
as h1others,11
1
;
accou11t
is only a 111irror image of
H.oussea11
s notion of being forced
to
be free.
15
When one
d.oes not adhere to the dictates of the general will
'
one 1s, for l{ousseau, so1nel1ow estranged
fro1n
an essential part of
oneself, that part embodied
in
the collective. By this account, the abil
ity to discern. the transmis.
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
8/17
sive
accusations
of wrongdoing in
relationships o t •
others sphel e...q,1
6
But oue can also, as
we
have see11,be dumped upon simpliciter. This
is
·
the case
in
shock
and
trauma,
and
there is the constant
and
less tangi
ble buffeting by everyday life. Buffeting can be discerned, just
as
the
vaguely pleasurable process involved in masochistic complicity can
be
identified. Bui
it
takes
an
act of sustained consciousness, sustained
beca11se this resistance is precarious until o:t·
unless
it
becomes
a habit.
Perso11a1 Discer111nent
The production of habits appropdate to
dlscemmmt
is a matter of
personal practices in.volving comparison,
recollection
and 1netnory;.
and
detachment. These practices are held in common in the medita
tive tradition
in
philosophy,
in
psychoaMlysis,
and
in meditation it
self,
or
passive prayer, although the emphasis
on
one practice mther
than another varies. Comparison for the religious Wol'ks by compar
ing
one's actual conduct with a religious ideal. For the religious and
the eal'ly moderns alike, ii also works by comparing
and
contrasting·
inner states. But suc h comparL•on of itself does
110
really explain
the
decislon to embrace or reject a certain affect.
f we
conceive the mo
mc11t
of judgment as
the
moment
in
which
we
forcefully embrace or
project an affect, then
we
can accept that the judgment itself
is
a de
ployment of energy directed toward
an
object,
and
as such,
an
affec
tive
f.orce
h itself.
1
7 But because the streamof judgn1ents
one
Jnakes i11
daily life takes place
in
the context of affective transmission, the les
sons learned from the comparison of states of feeling are constantly
intermpted
by waves of affect.
t
is not only one's own inner states
that are the objects of a meditative investigation by reJfoclion
and
evaluation, as they were for Desca1'1es
and
Hobbes. t is also a qnes
tion
of
one-self and the
o t h l ~ t · .
But because
of
the other, we learn the
difference between living attention
and
draining affects. One can ex
perience directly the effects of receiving atte11tlon (once one
k11ows
to
look)
and
the remarkable experience of being bored or
dr11ined.
(Bore
dom, after all, is not explicable only on the basis of the bore's utter
ances. Another can say the san\c wo1 (ls and leave one vitalized and
fascinated.)
The more one lives
in
the emotional world of judging
01·
being
judged the more the affects distupt concentration or the pl'Ocess of
J.26
Tlw Tl·ansmission o Aj} ect
sustaining attention, One can compare states of feeling as long as one
t e:rnembers
to note their passing, but one cannot attend to an
bu1cr
progression when one is possessedi one forgets, one loses t e thread.
So much
is
evident when we turn to the scraps of writing on discern
ment in the clinic. To quote Bion:
Now
the experience
of
o u n t e r ~ t r n s f e r e n c e
[meaning
the experience of
the
o t h t ~ 1 · s
affect
as
discussed
in
chapter 2]
appeal s to
me
to
have quite a
distinct quality that shot1ld
enable
tlte analyst to
dlffel entiate
the
o c c ~
sion when he
is the object of a
projective
identification
from the
occasion
when he is not. The analyst feels he is being nu1nipulated so as to be
playing a pnrt in
son1eone
else s
fontaay, ol
he ·would
do IJO if
itwere
not
for
what in recollection Ican only call a te1nporal y
loss of insight, aAenAe
of
experiench1g
strong feelings.
18
n
the clinic, the "temporary loss of insight" 1narks the interruption
of one s chain of associations. Inforn1ally
{as
the
qttestion
has not
as
yet been subject
to
a formal survey), cliniclans
who
experience the
transmission of affect say that they do so because the transmitted af
fect is
al odds
with
what
they ttlldel'Sla:nd of heh' owl\ feelings, and
the logic of those feelings, at the time
of
the transmi.sion. The affecL5
attached to
ideaB
should make sense in a sequence. When certain af
fects seen,_ disproport.io11ate in terms of their alleged
cat1BeB
one
should take note. Shnilarly, when_ a new atld stro Lg aff€:ct comes out
of the compamtive blue, it is suspect. For example, when a woman
was rackedby remorse one inorning, over tl1e n1isden1eanor
of
having
foiled
to
thank her research assistant fo • fetching some books, she was
aware that the extent of her self-repmach was too
g
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
9/17
.;.· --
. cussed earlie1; d l s ~ e t n i n g insight ls not achieved
in
a state of tempes
tuous defe1we.
t 1B
ach1
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
10/17
I
t bl.shed the subject-centered ego has lo project neg-
As
we
1ave es a 1 ' - . rd
er
to inaintain its identity.
Or
alive affects on or into
the
oU1er m o s
de
ressions. These can be felt
the ego a c c e p t ~ fatm1hlar e d p r o w i e ~ : l ~ o ~ ~ : : a n g ~ r that propelled them.
Or
·udginents
111 erna iz . . b
as J . .
d
igiditv in order to ma1nta1n
su
-
b gistered as 1nert1a an r .
they can
ere . .
0
both These affective proiec-
. d l ty b
femmme
means. r ·
ject1ve I en
1
Y . e saw at u
1
e
beginning, can
tions
and
introjections
or
1udg1nents, asd '. ' w'ds llt1t
it
is
obvious
1
·
d
withstoo 111
cro ·
be discerned in the c imc an · · · · sist
them It
that the fewer of these affects there are, the ea sier it IS _ t o r ~ s de
• c I
o
now plain
that
sucl1 resistance is
always
t h ~ snnu tadneou t
is a s . attention What re1na1ns to be rawn ou
ployment
of living, energetic' . f ed
in
the presence of
I
t' affects are trans
orm
is the
way
t 1e nega ive . · I · The next sec-
. t f l'ving attention: love,
opt11n1s111,
og1c.
other
var1an so
1
t . imniary involves evalua
tion tt1rns
to
this. Personal discern1nen_·, in stf 1
L {
in of the affects.
. f
ie,s inner
states
and evalt1at1ons o t le or g
hons
o o1 .
f
m one' s pa ssionate judg111ents and
These
are effected by e t ~ c ~ y n ; b : ~ r v i n g
their
sequence. One discerns
affective depress1011s,
an
these
things
with
attention.
The
Theological Virtues
. , . b
- n
as preservh1g a kind of stasis of
The
cardinal
v1.rtues I ~ I g ~ ~ s ~ h e y protect the one from the affects
the self in
: l a : : ~
: ~ e t
e d ~ : ~ t s . i n
themselves
change the
climate in
of the othe ' y fl h That transformation requHeS the
whicl1· tl1e i f 1 e l g a t i v ( e a 1 a 1 d f f : ~ t ~ ~ e r o p ~ : ~ s g e ~ 1 i t o ~ s of J ~ v i n g atte11tion,
such
as
presence o ove c b · b
ting
d f th) To
draw
this out, we can egm y no
hope,
reason,
an
ai . . . . different animal
that passion, i:1 its, c f t 1 r r e d n ~ y o ~ : : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ : : f v : ~ t l 1 y ~ r h e passio11
from the pass10n re use J( t' d
f
. . n1ent
b11t
more sinister.
an
s e 1-
they
ref11sed is
not
se11sual
en1oy
' . . . Joint
. . assio11
as
so111ething like
an
obsession IS a case in l . .
n1tI011
of
p . n of
tl1e
reasoning process, wh1cl1
. f . ] t was
the
pervers10 '
Pass1011 old aln 'ct. fixed
o11
a self-absorbed direction. Psychoana
is perverte ·w 1en
1
IS i· d · fro1n
lytically, the calculatio'.lS
c h a r a c t e r i s t i ~ of
o b s e : : : ~ ~ a a 1 ~ ~ a 1 ~ ; : ~ : ; only
the ego's
initial
forn1ahon
111
a ~ a n e ~ co1:npa b
the
affects they
tl
are tl1ese calcu]ations given
energy
y
~ , : ~ ~ e g ~ ~ e : ; . a i e . One can think oneself e t a c ~ 1 e ~ f ~ o m ~ ; : ; ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~
still
be
gripped
by
the1n, insofar as one ca cu a es co .
130
Tlie Transmission of ffect
.
c•··\ .'
\
1
1
j
i
j
of
whether this 1nistake was
ever made by
the ancients, i t is 1nade
by
those
who
think that coldness is equivalent
to
detach1nent, or worse,
clear thinking. Being coldly detached is
being much
too preoccupied
with one's own position, and it narrows one
1
s focus. It forecloses the
feeling intelligence at
work
in
11
evenly suspended attention in
which
one is
open
to new
ideas
about the other. And as tha t feeling
intelligence
works by
1naking connections
between
new
and
existing
ideas,
any constraint on
it
(such
as
a
preoccupation
with
prestige) is a
constraint on the soul's
growth
through knowledge. When
I
sug
gested above that there was so1nething ln attention that connected it
with
both
love and the life drive as well aB intelligence, I was think
ing
not only of the
their shared
processes
of
connection (documented
in
synaptic
growth). I also had in mind their close links
with
sexual
ity, as did Freud when
he
conceived of a life drive.
I
have indicated
why life drive is a needlessl y homogenizing ter1n, conjuring
up
a
romantic animism when it should be shedding it. But for now
I
shall
let
it stand, with
all its vitalist connotations, because it will remind
the
reader that
Freud's original
use of
it
connected
life
with
the ego
or self-preservative drives on the one hand (with thinking, action,
and attention) and the libido or love and sexual drives on the other.
Freud did not distinguish between the ego and the
other
I that thinks
by making connections, but he did note that when too much libido is
diverted
inward in narcissisin and fantasyf we fall ilI. M'oreover, such
narcissistic diversion by the
ego interrupts the
process
of
logical con
nection in
order
to inaintain its present
array
o judg1nental attitudes
(and hence its existing self-concept).
Whether
the libido is directed
toward tnaking connections in thought or inaking then1 erotically, it
_must 1nake the1n whenever it directs its
energy
away fron1 itself. That
is its
nature.
Apathy
in the sense of cold
detachment
does
not
fully
resist the affectsf
fol'
it has
not
co1npleted
turning
its attention
around, away
from itself and toward the other. It has paused at the
point where it notes what H receives fro1n the
other
but
nol·
what it
gives to the other.
It
detaches from the affect, but does not dissipate
it. Dissipation, as we have indicated, is effected by the theological
virtues: faith, hopef
and
love.
The relation of hope to con1bating the negative affects of trans1nis
sion is obvious enough. It is sin1ilar
to
the opti1nisn1 that the futur e
can be better that Freud listed together with
the
love of truth
(111eaning honesty) as positive factors in prognosis.2
2
Optin1isn1-or
The Ed cntion of
the Senses
i3
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
11/17
hope-repels rather than attracts anger and depression. Faith is a su
perb shield insofar as it presupposes that one is the focus of a divine
loving intelligence,
but
the trusting ability it also presupposes is at
odds with the n1odern existential te1npera1nent, which views faith as
symptomatic of a childlike dependence (which it is), an alternative to
the courage to look aloneness full in the face.23 On the other hand, if
the modern person truly wants
to
grow up, he or she will have the
courage
to
follow through
on
reaso11
when
its exercise leads to the
recognition of the existence of God, and not deny this conclusion be
cause of an e1notional dependence on the other s social approval. For
y own part, I think faith depends on reason, insofar as sustaining a
faith hangs on reason rather than the ego s credulousness.2
1
But rea
son is also tied to love.
J_Jove
as we have
arg11ed
throughout, cannot
really be divorced
fro1n
attention and, therefore,
fro1n
thinking. In
short, thinking and loving are closely related in themselves. They are
also-both of then1-forms of resistance in tl1c nonperpetuation of the
negative affects, as it see1ns is any process of 1naking or sustaining
connections consistent with the known facts or the needs of others
and
psychical
and
physical health. In short, the tendency to bind
and
bring together, to make things cohere, follows the logic of the life
drive. Without it, the psyche is in pieces. This erotic and cohering en
ergy is a bsent especially it1 psychosis, whose schizophrenic versions
are marked by the inability to make logical connections and by lack of
sexual affect and/or loving ties
to
others.25 (Milder forms of these in
abilities also characterize the hysterias, not
to
mention the disorders
of attention and hyperactivity (see chapter
1).
At the same time, while
one inay gauge a thinker a cold fish, tha t does not n1ean he
is
witho11t
love; t may be tha t he is merely channeling all of his ability
to
connect
with his thoughts rather than siphoning it offby interaction.
B11t t11e
1nain point is about the relation between the virtues
and
the
pracLice of discern1nent. It is perhaps plain now that the internaliza
tion of religio11s codes,
and
the religio11s observance of codes or cour
tesy, are also linked (potentially at least)
to
an inner process of dis
cern1nent, discern1nent at a n1ore private level.
~ h i s is
the case insofar
as these inter11alizations function as
an
ethical sense\ That deep ethical
sense is a 1neans for differentiating betwee11 one s position (oneself)
a11d the legitin1acy or conviction an invading affect lends to thoughts
that were hitherto kept in their place. Consider an example: I am toy
ing wit11 a fantasy of revenge that I have exan1ined ethically and
132
The Timw ission of ffect
spurned for what it is. Then I am possessed by a fury, a combination
of anger and the wish that the other should cease to
harm
me by dis
appearing, a kind of hate. The thought I had hitherto spurned now
takes over consciousness. Let us also say that this hostile thought
is
levered into place by a hostile act on the part of the part y 1 want
lo
be
gone and
to
feel in his going the affects he has made me feel Let us
say, too, that this hostile act causes
1ne
anxiety, perhaps based on
-
nancial insecurity if
n1y
enen1y is in the workplace.
As long as 1ny religious or secular ethics can counter this anxiety
and force back this invading affect, I am myself, and n1oreover, in a
position to discern the workings of the affect within me. But I cannot
discern
it
when I
a1n
driven by anger
to
act against
1ny
provocateur.
Instead, I experience this drive as an
inner
propulsion. My ego has
been engaged in a manner that permits the affect entry. This is the
place of n1y fear and anxiety, which arc the hooks for aggression, just
as depression is for anger. But the negative affects, as have often been
noted, have a function in self-preservation. As the (good) ego they lit
erally keep us alive, in tha t reality-based anxieties ren1ove us frorn sit
uations of peril, while aggression can save one s life when deployed in
defense. B11t the arousal of anxiety, as we have seen,
111ay
inake
n1e
party
to
an unjust idea, whose inju.stice is evident in the wave of ag
gression my ill wishes direct toward
n1y cnen1y.
T hese ill wishes, this
judging wave of affect, also reinforce the fear and anxiety in y foe
for he too feels the threat from my animus, just as his animosity pro
duced a correspondi ng fear in me.
Both of us have directed passionate judgments toward the other,
judgments that convey the revengeful constellation across space by
their energetic force. Whal I can 1nobilize against this force is the
strength of my
iclenlification with the principle ol forgiveness-and
the discernh1g other I who
may
emerge if I have a strong identifica
tion with that principle. When we love, the other feels it. When we
love those
\.Vho
are not like us, even though they don t think like us or
read the sa1ne books or read flt
nll
those others feel it. Son1eli111es lhe
other even listens, because the love alJows
the1n
to lower their
ovvn
shield (of projected affects or judgments)
and
permit entry to a new
idea.
26
To
love or forgive is to remove oneself fro1n the loop. This is
vvhy the act
o.f
real forgiveness can e entirely selfish. The forgiver is
the beneficiary, insofar as he or she
is
then free of trans111itting a nega
tive affect, and so free
fro1n
attracting inore of the
san1e.
Moreover, if
The Educntio oftlie Senses -c33
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
12/17
there is a negative affect directed towar d one in reality, refusing it
m y
irritate the projector un1nercifully, insofar as
he
or she counts
on
an
aggressive response. Really love those that hale you;
do
good to them
that pe rsecute you. There is
no
better escape, no clearer
p th to
free
dom. There is also
no
better revenge.
But if
11e
is to be free
of
the negative affects, one has
to
give over an
identity based on projected judgments.
n
the introduction, I pro
posed
t11at
an identity
based on
discern1nent
was
not the sa1ne as an
identity based on the ego s status-boun d boundaries. Enou gh has
been
said about the latter.
We
can now
dd
that proceeding
by
dis
cernment
nd
proceeding
by
judgmental projections are different,
but
we
can only see this because
we
have situated
both
processes in the
context
of
affective trans1nission.
If
one
n1ai11tains tl1e sense of
a
dis
tinct identity by discernment, one does so best
by
meditative practices
nd n
openness to the distinct being
who
is sheltering behind the
com1non ego, in 011eself and others alike. Only then can one attend to
one s own sensations
a11d
feeling for the other,
by
se11sing what is not
oneself,
a d
noting, as well as feeling,
when one
falls back
on
the neg
ative affects. But
we
have been stretching a point
by
contfauing to use
the language of
n
other
I, when
all
we
have really
shown
so far is that
the claims of the feelings
nd
senses can e
t w r with
those of the af
fects and ego. But we
have
also shown a little at least, that a
sense of
self anchored in discernmen t is possible nd desirable,
nd
that it is
more likely
to
take hold where the negative affects, as a social phe
non1enon, are dhninished.
If socia] context is one tl1at reinforces the ineans for struggling
against the negative affects thro11gh religiou s and c1tltural codes, then
tl1e practice
of
personal discern1nent beco1nes easier and the resis
tance to tl1e
ego-witl1
its
world of
appearances and
things-stronger.
In
t11is
late-modern context,
il1 which
affects thicken, discern1nent is
so weak that people no longer know that there
is
anything
to
be dis
cerned. In such a co11text, tl1e
sense of
self does depend on boundaries
formed
by
projecting
nd
introjecting affects, it
depends
on knowing
who one is
by
depositing alien affects in the other. The urge to do
tl1is -a11d inai11tain botu1daries
by
these aggressivz
means-intensi.fy
as
the
affects
11e
wants
to live without, anxiety especially, thicken so
cially. The affects are thickened, the hear t scaled better,
when
there are
real threats to living, such as ht1nger, 1101nelessness, and grief. These
tl1reats give rise to anxieties that under1ni11e any atten1pt at peace
of
134 The Transmission of
ffect
mind, as
do
related deman ds for unpurposeful work, which leave the
body unrested
nd
prey to passing affects. Attitudes of discernment
are 1nore easily adopted and reinforced
where
there is enjoy1nent and
where there is plenty; the bodily changes in rage
nd
pain are indis
solubly tied to those in hunger;27
nd
too
much
hunger for too long
can drive a people mad. Yet discern111ent can also be co1n1nunicated in
appalling physical circumstances, otherwise a form of resistance like
Gandhi s satyagraha
28
could never have taken hold.
The negative affects are brought to a stop
when
a dyadic
or
binary
loop is broken because the response to aggression is to resist it with
out violence. They are transfor1ned when love or its variants (wit, rea
son, affection) reorde r aggression. They can be deconstructed (the im
ages
nd
energies trapped in them taken apart) nd turned around.
For oneself, this can be done in solitude. But the transformation of the
affects at large requires being in the world, rather than living the life
of the mind.
t
requires subjecting oneself to eddies or even torrents of
affects, wl1ile so1nehow 1naintaining equilibritnn. Such is the practice
of
sot1ls who
when
assailed
by envy
or contempt or rage
do
not take
it
personally, for they kno w that these are forces that possess even the
finest souls,
whose
discerning agencies so1nethnes cower in the cor
ners
of
their possessed minds, waiting for jt to be over.
The other feels it when
we
love or give generous attention,
nd
benefits from it. The benefits
m y
not be conscious, but they are real
as long as love is really love, that is to say, the gift is one of attention
to
the other s needs rather tha n an obsession or a dem nd to be loved.
hypothesized earlier that light might be cast on some of the un
know ns in embryology if the living logic of the mothe r s flesh consti
tuted a shield against the negative affects, in the same
w y
that her
energetic attention constit11tes a shield after birth.
13ut
the nature
of
this postnatal shield is different. Loving attention does not provide
the absolute shield that partaking in the living logic does,
but
it is its
best approximation.
Feelings
Proceeding further
111eans
encountering the subjective standpoint that
stymies tts each tin1e we
tur11
to a given area for the state of its re
search. The active yet receptive capacities
of
discern1nent and atten-
The
Ed c tion
of
the enses
35
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
13/17
tion
cry
out to be named the soul." But these capacities, by the defi
nition
of
feelings employed here, are linked to the unimpeded
se11ses- tl1e se11sitive and vegetative capacities/ s11ch as
smell,
rather
than the higher ones,
such
as
thought, the
traditional
abode
of the
soul. Setting aside further discussion of the investigation of the other I
or soul for now,
we can
look at feelings as sucl1, which takes us back
to
t11e
idea
of
the
senses
as
11
the
seneschals of
attention.
The
difficulties in
understanding that
the senses
and
the flesh em
body
a logic
that
moves far faster
than thought
are tied to Western
schemas
that
degrade
the
body
and bodily
intelligence. This is be
cause t11e schemas
i11variably rank
the
so11l in ter1ns of intellect first,
followed by the capacity to sense, followed by the fleshly passions
and/or vegetative soul. The fleshly category is assumed to be the least
intelligent
and
to
11ave the maximum
disorder. It is prilne
n1atter
witl1out for1n, or the successor of for1n, thinking intelligence.
Yet
it is
thro11gh the blood that hormones dance
their
dance of co1n1nunica
tion,
while tl1e
senses lTy to inake sense of the1n in a vocabulary that
does 11ot provide the1n with an appropriate 11omenclature.29 More to
the
point, all
the se11ses
as vehicles of attention,
con11ect
the suppos
edly higher
cognitive faculty of linguistic
thought with
the fleshly
knowledge
or codes of
the
body.
By
the
logic of this argu1nent so far, it would be a grave n1istake to
perpetuate the association
between the
higl1er aims in 11tnnan en
cleavor and the 11igher brain functions. For ii1stance, s1nell 1nay ap
pear
1norc
prhnitivc than
the "l1igher" developn1ent of language,
but
it
is, nonetheless, incapable of lying.
t
can
be
deceived, just as hearing
and
vision ca11
be
deceived, bt1t
one cannot
consciot1sly decide to
e111it
a
smell
that
is
at odds with
one's affects. Above all, smell precisely dis
cerns.
t
does not
content
itself with
wallowing
in the primitive affec
tive responses
with which it
is so often associated. It also
works
with
great rapidity, processing
much in
a millisecond, whereas Janguage
takes its thne.
Yet the intelligence of
such
rapidly
moving
olfactory knowledge is
regarded as inferior, so1nething like a reflex, r a t h ~ r than a faster n o v ~
ing mind within. Why is this? I suggest that there is one reason and
one reason
only, ai1d
it
is na1ned the fotn1dational fantasy.
That
fan
tasy results
in tl1e
disposition to see activity as 1nindless
when
it is not
directed from
the
standpoint of self-interest. (In turn, this leads to the
136 The Transmission
of ffect
l
I
i
I
L
l
diff culties in conceiving of the activity of nature-or pregnancy, or
1natter-as
passive.) Even
when
the senses are actively palpating,
they are classified as subordinate to thinking
in words and
pictures
because they are
not
directed from the
standpoint
of self-interest.
In
truth
or reality,
sensory
registration bypasses perceptions struc
tured
from the subject standpoint in a search for
language that
works
with the living logic and circumvents the ego. When the senses suc
ceed
in producing
conscio11s awareness of this
or
that, they produce
knowledge
that
can
be
con11nunicated eithe r to oneself or another
in
language
(when the
words
exist or can be learned),
but
the conscious
awareness it
produces
precedes
that
expression, and n1ay stun1ble for
words, although it will
run
after the words wl1en it sees or hears
them. h1formation is gleaned
by
the senses,
but
then it is interpreted
or transliterated
by something
split from the senses.
t may
be inter
preted
by something
aligned
with
the logic of the senses or
by
some
thing opposed to them, son1ethh1g interested
in
constructing a
world
view
based
011 its own whims. Sucl1 interpretations are 1nade by the
ego, and the ego's h1terpretations are tendentious, based 011 censor
ship.
In
the
interpretation
lies room for suggestibility, for paranoia, for
funda1nental inisr eading. For instance, if I smell of fear,
you may
dis
cern this
and
try to lJUt 1ne at n1y ease.
Or you
1nay iniscalibrate
1ny
nervo11sness. You smell
something
offensive, but you also n1isread my
apprehensive expression. In consequence, you interpret ine as aggres
sive
in
1ny intention s
toward
yotl.
In
the
exa1nple jt1st
give11 my
olfactory senses
would work
n1ore
subtly
than the visual perception
that
shapes my
response. Sensory
registration and perception would
not
be the
same
thing.'° The infor-
1nation fro1n
the senses
conflicts; one is accurate,
the
other sees
throt1gh a
darkened
eye, bt1t
when
they are interpreted
in
concert,
even
t11e
acct1rate inforn1ation
supports
a inisinterprctation. The
i11
forn1ation it atte1npts to con11nunicate is st1borned to t he service of tl1e
ego, whicl1
has censored
wl1at it sees and hears as it seeks reasons
to
agree with social opinio11.
The
senses, as I have stressed, are not the
e111otio11s;
they are tl1e vel1icles for lheir discernn1ent, just as they are
for alerting us to other aspects (the weathe1; the h'affic)
of
the envi
ronn1ent
a11d
circu111stances
in
which
we
exist. But they
work
by con
1
-
1nunicating
along
variot1s 11eural pathways. Before they co1ne or re
turn to the
brain,
they .have to negotiate
various
synaptic censors and
the translations
from
cl1en1ical
tc
electrical ilnpulses,
and
vice versa.
The ducation
of
the Senses 137
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
14/17
These chains of communication are inseparable from the impulse the y
communicate. Their matter is their form. Yet what they commtmlcate
also changes in
the
transliteration to language and concept
at
the
same time as the impulse
to
commtmicate persists.
t
persists
in
that it
seeks to circumvent the censornhip effected by the ego.
The conscious ego forecloses kitowledge and assumptions that chal
lenge its sense of intellecWal supel'lority in its body; the tmconscious
ego censors similar knowledge
by
repressing it
and
keeping it uncon
scious. By this censornhip and this foreclosure, the ego creates gaps ht
-conscious tu1derstanding. These gaps mea tl at ego-consciousness
knows less
than
the senses whose multiple communications battle
with
81e ego's censorship and denial.
t
means that t11e senses and the
informational channels of the flesh (whose matter is intrinsic
to
their
form) are intelligent, aware,
and
stl'llggllng either to overcome or get
tlu'Ongh to a s l o w e i ~ thicker person
who
calls itself 1 or worse, me. t
also means that the extent of one'• htlelligence depe nds olt a struggle
between different ideas, differen t chains of information, a s\n1ggle me
dialed by the available concepts as well as the ego's clinging to its own
standpoint.
Now whether the ego speaks
its
empty speech or the soft voice of
reason pr€vails, both speak. ne is speaking the pas1:1ionate1 henl'tless
language of the affects. The other ls relying
on
logic (in part) and its
sensing and feeling of the empirical state of things.
31
The outcome
of
this struggle depends on
how far
love or Jiving attention prevails over
the force of affects directed by the ego. To some degree, it also de
pends
on the
education of the senses, which improves tlteir cltances of
discerning
and
resisting those affects. The education of these sci1ses
gives us
joy. It is the arousal fto1n below that is so significant in rab
binical literature." Yet as the ego loses standing when the fleshly
senses
win
through
to consciousness
and
direct the body's govem-
1nent, we
also find the1n terrib.le as an
arn1y..
leavil1g noth:in.g of us h1
its wake.
138
The Tt·ansmission o Affect
C f l A PT ER SEVEN
Interpreting the Flesh
Freedom from the affects means freedom fo r the .feelings to be known
to conscioll8ness. Feelings ca11 be sifted from affects, and better
known
to consciousness, thtottgh the d eployment of living attention
or
love.
B t
stLch
attc11lion encou11ters
a fol n1idable opposing fotce.
Affects (via hormones and other means o.f projection and 1·eception)
arc carried in the blood,
and with
them is carried the presence of the
other
and
the social ln the system. (To find an utterly
pure
soul within,
something untouched by
human error, one woul d have to sustai n liv
Ing atteitlion through a process of complete exsnnguination.)
As
t
rule,
affects can be sifted from feelings in everyday life through dis
cemment, 01· through pradicing cultural codes tl1at suppress the af
fects, or through analysis, These
embody
llvlng attention dh'ected
toward the other within and withottt. But feelings are less likely
to
be
known
when
the
heart is sealed, for the reason lhat the 1nore the af
fects thicken
and harden
the more difficult discernment becomes. The
hardenlng of
t11e
affects is a social affair
so their
transfortnation re-
q t 1 h · ~ 8 political as well aa p(:1l sonal attention. In political as well as
person al cases, clmnging the disposition of the affects (from passivity
inducing and raging judgments
o
the other to love 01· affection) re-
quil es
practice
and
knowledge. The unclerstaitding
and
deployment
of feelings
s
critical in both endeavo rs as the means for discerning af·
fects
and
reconnecling
with
the original
knowledge
of
tl1e
senses.
u siento it was noted, means, literally,
" feel
it. The vei·b here, sen-
tir also
n1eans
to s1nell in
t·he
French languages, I 1nention this now
139
'
:
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
15/17
33. Rorty, "ExplainingEmotions/' 49.
34. Following Amelie Rorty from an anthropological perspective, R. C.
Soloxnon notes
that
"the p1•hnary entotions, those of the greatest concel'n,
va1'y
considen:i.bly
fro1n
c:ulture to culture. Indian clasaifications and dis
tinctions betW
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
16/17
:to, Thia is why psychoanalysis and shnilar intedocutions directed toward
this dis7.
1.2,
Norbel't Elias, The Civilizing Proceos, t1·1 u1s Edmund Jephcott (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992).
i.3. Michel de Montaigne, "On Friendship,'' in
Essays,
tt·ans. J M. Cohen
(London: Penguin, 1958).
:t4. Posl._Winnicott chil d rearh1g is ruled by the idea that if a child feels ab
solutely loved, it will
be
capable of loving others. But love is
misunderstood
when it i n e u n ~ the free expression of all feelings. If a child is washed
by
a
torrent of
1·age
against
which
it
has no
defenses, it needa to
learn
to erect
those defenses by understanding that l'age is not ,'Jomcthing to give h1 to.
The more practice one has at this, the inore
one
fortifies one's defenses
against a
rage that
is
not
one's own.
It
is diffe1'ent
when
the rage s one's
own, however, just as
it
is different
when
one cat'l'ies the other's rage as
one's own depression.
i.5. For Roui:;senu also has Ernile s tu :or remark that
11
one is 1nore free
under
the social pact than
in
the stale of nature." Jean-facques Rousseutt
1
Emile, or
On
Education,
teans. Allan Bloon1 (New York: Dasie Books, 1979
1
book
5
1
part 4
1
84 .i.
But in Rousseau
1
s case, there is so1neth:ing missing that ls only
supplied by the general will: "Our trne
self
is
not
whole entirely inside of
us
11
CEm;lle
461). Dy contrast,
if
one is discerning affects, discerning
what
is
not
ours
but
inside of us is the aim of the exercise,
:t6.
For
Freud
this
c1·hne
was
the
itnaginary
murder
of
the
father, a
inurder
co1n1nitted
eve1·y
tinte the fnthcl' was surpassed by the son. See Freud,
"Those
Who A1:e
W1·ecked by Sui::ccss/' Standard
EdUion.
vol. 14. There ls al
ways an
interlock in
any
relationship between lwo
in
which
the
energy
and
capacities of
the
one are enhanced
at
the expense
0£
the other, unlesFJ it is u
case of rape, so-called Aeducllons of the young
and
physically vulnerable,
physical violence or intimidation,
and
abusive language or verbal violei1ce.
We know when another's anger shatterR us, altnost as though the sound bar
rier we
i11fe1·1·ed
earlier is a real thing, so'n1ething vulnerable to aggressive
tonalities, especially when they
m·e
repeated, as well us to physical trau1na.
These, st.t'lctly speaki ng, ar e
the
n1echanisms of dun1plng
pure and
shnple,
as·
distin ct fron1 the hook p1·ovided by projective identification, for good or ill.
J.7,
It is a force that can displace that other I who holds sway with 1nore dis
cern.ment. But the fact o f this movrr.blc force does not explnin Lhose 1no1nents
when
energy
and
insight are in lockstep. As we shall see, the
energy that
96 Notes to
Pages
:cl2-t26
bats al- Ottnd
freHully
ll1 bo1·edo1n 01•
follows in frustl'ution the opinionated
dh-eclions o f the judg1nents is energy that has lost son1e of its links with the
logos. Ilu't it can rmnake those links when it is once rnore aligned with
o n ~
sci.oi1s11ess. In such a case, Schopenl1auer
1
s will, at the hmnan level
1
is no
longer
blinded. wrhe soul has achieved its denrest ailn of ttnion
with
the
body,
11
as Angustine put it.
-16. Ilion, ExperienC es ht
Groups,
149.
19. Even passions in (ant's 1-esh·icled, obsessional sense-perversions of
the
reasoning
process-can
he
explained
by
the distortions effected
by
o s i ~
Honing. TheRe posilio ns a:i:e not the affects, but they p1·oduce the affects. The
idea
that they operate without the l'edceming fuel of hu1nan ernotions
(which at least leaveH us capable of co1npassion) feels evil because the con
nection with flesh
and blood
is so tenuous,
the body
a shnple tneans
to
an
end at odds with its purpose. The arnbiguity in l
-
8/18/2019 Brennan Transmission Affect Ch 6
17/17
23.
But this courage is only really courage if what
t
does i s socially difficult;
that is to
sa,y,
i f i t risks the loss of
the
love of friends
and fa1nily at
one ex
tren1e, or even ~ h e general good
approval
of others, intellectually or finan
cially. Atheis1n in
the
nineteenth century was socially difficult, but thal is no
longer the case,
24. See C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity.
2.r;. Freud nu1de the same polnt when he said that those who are well have
the
ability to love
and o r l ~
.
:z6.
Gillian Rose, Love's Worlc (London: ChaHo and Windusr 1995).
27. W. B. Connon, Bodily Changes in
Pain,
Hunger, Fear, and Rage (New York:
Evanst on, 1963).
28. The act of resistance is loving, intelligent, never neutral,
and
always
i s ~
torically based, whether
it
is exercised
in
an isolated or a socinl context.
29·
Forn1 was always intelligence
in h a t
it
organized
1natter into intentio1ml
patterns
thftt gave each
pattern
its distinct
being or
alln. That is
the point
of
the \ogos as proportionate i11atter, a point that is obscured the ntore the ego
gets things otlt of propo1tion, as is ita wont.
30.
See Freud s
account of the perceptual apparatus in chapter 7 of lw
n-
terpret-ation of
Dreams,
Standard EdiHon,
vol.
5.
31 The experience of rival interpreters in
one's head
is probably less con.1-
:inon t·han the experience of rival inte:tpretationa,
but
I would
hazard that
inne1
1
dialogues are as recognizable an experience as throwill.g one's reason
to the winds
when
gripped
by passh1g affects.
J2. See Abra1nson, Like Water/ ' 16. As Abra1nson notes, the arousal ftorn
belff'V has been connected y respected
Cabalists with
the ir:nmediate co1n-
111unication between hen1·ts, which is connected by Abratnson with the
sense of
s1nell.
7, Interpreting the Fleslt
1 The, ego is slowe1· in its calculntiona and its ability to reach a conclusion,
slower than what
is comn1011ly called inhlitio.t1. I hove
argued
that
it
ls
slower because it ulinost alwoyB re1noves itself, lo a greater or lesser extent,
frorn the present. (See
Exhausting Modernity,
chapter 3.)
The
ego-as
the I'.e
fleeting part of the
mind-exists
in
past and fulttre thne, either calcttlaHng·,
a1\ticipating, desiring, regretting, rctne1nbering, Ol' ill reverie. Oceasionally
1
the mind
is occupied
by
co11centratecl attention following a path ali.gned
with the
living logic
1
in which case 1·everie functions to l'edirect I am not
saying that
anticipation
nnd
l'Cflection
can
be avoided.
The idea-rather
is
U1at their exercise
has
a
living
cost. Really, all I tun
doing
here is making
1--Jegel's
old point that
refleclion
and
na1ning kill
the
vel-y
thing
they
na1n'e,
like capturing the fly in aspic/
1
as Lacan later
put the
sa1nc
point.
See Lucio
Colletti,
Marxisrn
and ffegel
1
Ltt111s Lawrence
Garner
(LondotL
New
Left
Books, 1973), 52-67, and jnc