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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS:
GENUINEPROGRESS,DAUNTINGCHALLENGES
ByKathrynLedeburandColettaA.Youngers
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2 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
Introduction
Followingalandslidevictoryatthepolls,EvoMoralesbecamepresidentofBoliviainJanuary2006.1
Headofthecoca-growersfederation,Moraleswasalong-standingfoeofU.S.drugpolicy,andmany
observersanticipatedacompletebreakinU.S.-Bolivianrelationsandhenceanendtodrugpolicy
cooperation.Instead,bothMoralesandtheGeorgeW.Bushadministrationinitiallykepttherhetoricatbayanddevelopedanamicableenoughbilateralrelationshipthoughonethatattimeshasbeen
fraughtwithtension.FollowingBoliviasexpulsionin2008oftheU.S.Ambassador,PhilipGoldberg,for
allegedlymeddlinginthecountrysinternalaffairsandencouragingcivilunrest,andthesubsequent
expulsionoftheU.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA),theWhiteHouseuppeditscriticismofthe
BoliviangovernmentandforthepastfiveyearshasissuedadeterminationthatBoliviahasfailed
demonstrablyduringtheprevious12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcotics
agreements.2U.S.economicassistanceforBoliviandrugcontrolprogramshasslowedtoatrickle.
Nonetheless,in2011thetwocountriessignedanewframeworkagreementtoguidebilateralrelations
andarependinganexchangeofambassadors.Moreover,cooperationcontinuesbetweentheprimary
BoliviandrugcontrolagencytheMinistryofGovernmentsViceMinistryofSocialDefenseand
ControlledSubstancesandtheNarcoticsAffairsSection(NAS)oftheU.S.embassy.
Attheinternationallevel,Boliviaisseekingtoreconcileitsnewconstitution,whichrecognizestheright
tousethecocaleaffortraditionalandlegalpurposesandrecognizescocaaspartofthecountrys
nationalheritage,withitscommitmentstointernationalconventions.InJune2011,thecountry
denouncedthe1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugsasamendedbythe1972Protocoland
announceditsintentiontore-accedewithareservationallowingforthetraditionaluseofthecocaleaf.
(The1961Conventionmistakenlyclassifiescocaasadangerousnarcotic,alongwithcocaine.)Unless
morethanone-thirdofUNmemberstatesobjectbytheJanuary10,2013deadline,theBolivian
reservationwillbeacceptedandthecountrywillonceagainbeafullPartytotheSingleConvention.
TheapproachingdateforBoliviaspotentialreturntothe1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs
providesanopportunemomenttoevaluatetheBoliviangovernmentsprogressachievingitsdrugpolicy
objectives.Moreover,theMoralesadministrationhasbeeninofficefornearlysixyears,providinga
cleartrackrecordtoevaluate.Adoptingacocayes,cocainenoapproach,Boliviahassoughtto
decreasethecultivationofcocatherawmaterialusedinmanufacturingcocainewhileincreasing
actionsagainstcocaineproductionanddrugtraffickingorganizations.In2011,thelandareadevotedto
cocacultivationinBoliviadroppedby13percent,accordingtoU.S.governmentfigures,incontrastto
netincreasesinPeruandColombia.Seizuresofcocapasteandcocaineanddestructionofdrug
laboratorieshavesteadilyincreasedsincePresidentMoralestookoffice.Yetdespitethepositiveresults
achievedtodate,thegovernmentfacesincreasingchallengesastheamountofcocapasteandcocaine
flowingacrossitsbordersfromPeruhasincreased,theproductionofcocaineinBoliviaitselfhasrisen,
anddrugtraffickershavediversifiedandexpandedareasofproductionandtransportationwithinthe
country.
TheBoliviangovernmenthasmadesignificantprogressfacingtheongoingchallengesofdrugproduction
andtrafficking,inpartduetotheassistanceprovidedbytheEuropeanUnion(EU),theUnitedStates,
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 3
andothers.TheU.S.governmentshouldnowrecognizethisprogressinitsannualdeterminations.The
stringofnegativedeterminationsareincreasinglydisconnectedfromrealityinBoliviaandretainlittle
credibilitywiththeBoliviangovernmentorwithothergovernmentsintheregion,whichcontinuetosee
theannualU.S.ratingasoffensiveandpoliticallymotivated.Thesigningoftheframeworkagreement
markedsignificantprogressinU.S.-Bolivianbilateralrelations.Bothgovernmentsshouldbuildonthat
successbyusingtheaccordasavenuetodiscussareasofconcern,friction,andconsensus.While
differenceswillundoubtedlyarise,itisinthebestinterestsofbothcountriestomaintainanopen
dialogue.
CocaCultivation
InSeptember2012,boththeUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)andtheU.S.
governmentreleasedtheir2011statisticsoncocacultivationinBolivia.TheUNandU.S.
estimatesdifferedbyonlyonepercent(instarkcontrasttostatisticsproducedforother
countries).Theconvergenceofthecocacultivationestimatespointstotheeffectivenessofthe
governmentscocacropmonitoringstrategy,whichbenefitsfromcocagrowercooperation,amoreconcentratedcocacrop,andtechnologicaladvancesinmeasuringcultivation.Inshort,
themonitoringsysteminplaceallowsforafarmoreaccuratemeasurementthanisthecase
witheitherPeruorColombia,theprimaryproducersofcocafortheillicitmarket.(Accordingto
theUNODC,in2011Colombiacultivated64,000hectaresofcocaandPeru62,500hectares,
representingthreeandfivepercentincreases,respectively.)ItalsoprovidestheBolivian
governmentandtheinternationalcommunitywithanopportunitytodevelopcollaborative
policiesbasedonreliableinformationaboutcocatrends.
Source:UNCropMonitoringReports
27200
62500
64000
HectaresofCocaProducedin2011
UNFigures
Bolivia
Peru
Colombia
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4 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
Source:UNCropMonitoringReports
TheUNODCs2011CocaCultivationSurvey,3releasedonSeptember17,2012,indicatesthatcoca
cultivationinBoliviafellto27,200hectares4in2011from31,000hectaresin2010a12percent
decrease.Thereportnotesthatcocacultivationdeclinedineveryimportantcoca-growingregioninthe
country,bringingtheoverallareaundercultivationtonearthe2005level.TheUNattributesthis
significantdecreasetoeffectivecontrolthroughcooperativecocareductionanderadication.The
UNalsoreportsa13percentreductioninoverallcocaleafyields,downto48,100metrictonsin2011
from55,500metrictonsin2010.AccordingtotheheadoftheUNODCofficeinBolivia,CsarGuedes,
TheprogressinBoliviaisundeniable.Thisyear,Boliviaistheonlycountrywithadecreaseincoca
cultivationThefactsaresufficientlyclear,notonlywithregardstococacultivationbutalsowithalong
listofverifiablesuccesses.5
Similarly,theWhiteHousesSeptember14determinationreportsthatthe2011U.S.governmentcoca
cultivationestimateforBoliviawas30,000hectares,a13percentdecreaseinBoliviascocacrop.6Ina
July2012interview,theU.S.EmbassyinBoliviasChargdAffaires,JohnCreamer,statedthattherehad
beenanimpressivenetreductioninthenumberofhectaresofcocain2010and2011. 7Nonetheless,theSeptemberdeterminationwhichconcludesthatBoliviahasfaileddemonstrablyduringthe
previous12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcoticsagreements
downplaysthesignificanceofthecocareduction,referringtothe13percentdecreaseasonlyslightly
lowerthanthe2010estimateof34,500hectares.
12%
5%
3%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
Bolivia Peru Colombia
PercentageChangein
CocaCulvaonin2011
UNFigures
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 5
.
Source:UNCropMonitoringReportsandU.S.InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReports
CooperativeCocaReductionandSocialControlBegintoShowResults
ThesuccessoftheMoralesadministrationscooperativecocareductionstrategyhingesonthevoluntaryparticipationoffarmersfromallcoca-growingregionsinthecountryandonbalancingpressuresfrom
theinternationalcommunitywiththedemandsofitscoca-growingconstituents.Successful
collaborationbetweenBolivianauthoritiesandthoseofneighboringcountries,notablyBrazil,andwith
internationalorganizationsandforeigndonorshasalsocontributedtoimprovingtheeffectivenessof
themonitoringeffort.
BoliviascooperativecocareductionstrategyallowseachChaparefarmertogrowonecatoofcoca,8
continuingapolicyadoptedbytheCarlosMesagovernmentin2004.Anycocagrownbeyondthatis
subjecttoelimination.TheBoliviangovernmenthasexpandedthisapproachintoareasofthecountry,
suchaspartsoftheLaPazYungas,wherenosignificantcocaeradicationhadpreviouslyoccurred.Asa
resultofthecatoagreement,theviolenceandconflictgeneratedbyforcederadicationintheChapare
has,withrareexceptions,ceased.Italsowasinitiallysuccessfulinstabilizingcocacultivationand2011
marksthebeginningofwhatFelipeCaceres,BoliviasViceMinisterofSocialDefenseandControlled
Substances,expectstobeasustaineddownwardtrendincocacultivation.9
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EsmatedHectaresofCocaCulvaon,
UNvs.U.S.Figures
UNFigures
USFigures
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6 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
Photo:SaraShahriari
Therelativesuccessofthepolicystems,inpart,fromthecocagrowersfederationsabilitytoenforce
theagreement.10
Inturn,limitedproductionmaintainsastableandrelativelyhighpriceforcoca,a
guaranteedsubsistencebase,andfreedomfromtherepressionthataccompaniedforcederadication.
AccordingtotheUNODC2011report,thepriceforcocainthelegalandillegalmarketsisthesame,
providinglittlecomparativeincentivetodeviatefromlegalsales.Thesecureincomegeneratedfromthe
catoofcocaalsoallowsforexperimentationwithotherincome-generatingactivitieswith
complementaryimplementationofeconomicdevelopmentprogramsthroughtheNationalAlternative
Developmentfund(FondoNacionaldeDesarrolloAlternativo,FONADAL)andotherprogramsthatoffer
additionalsourcesofincome,oftenreferredtoasintegrateddevelopmentwithcoca(seebelow).
Finally,thesanctionsimposedbythefederationsforfailuretocomplywiththeonecatolimitare
severe,includingthelossoftherighttogrowcocaand,ultimately,landexpropriationforrepeat
offenders.
AsexplainedbyfederationleaderRolandoVargas,thereisatwo-prongedstrategyforcocacontrol:the
internalcontroloftheunionandstatecontrol,whichincludesaerialsurveillanceandeliminationofcocathatisgrowninviolationofthecatoagreement.
11AccordingtoViceMinisterCaceres,duringthe
firstyearoftheMoralesgovernment,150cocafarmerslosttheirrighttogrowcocaforoneyear.From
JanuarytoSeptember2012,thenumberroseto600farmers.12
Asecondoffenseresultsinthe
permanentlossofcocagrowingprivileges.Toenforcethisorincaseswherecocaisgrowninareasnot
coveredbythecatoagreementtheBoliviangovernmenthasformedthe GrupoSurazo(namedaftera
bitingcoldfrontthatquicklydescendsintropicalregions),anelitemilitaryunitoftheJointTaskForce
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 7
thatenterscommunitieswithout
warningandforciblyeradicates
excessorunpermittedcoca.
However,thenewunits modus
operandiraisesconcernsaboutthe
potentialforabuses,particularly
mistreatmentofthecommunities
affected,ofthekindthat
characterizedthepastforced
eradicationcampaigns.
Finally,theMoralesgovernment
hasconsistentlymetitsannualcoca
reductiontargets.Accordingtothe
ViceMinistryofSocialDefenseand
ControlledSubstances,asofmid-November2012,10,201hectares
hadbeeneliminated.Thegoalfor
2012isareductionof11,000
hectares.
CocaMonitoringfromFieldstoMarkets
Theheartoftheseeffortsisthecocamonitoringstrategyitself,whichiscarriedoutcollaborativelyby
Bolivianstateinstitutions.Boliviancross-referencedcocamonitoringisauniquemodelincorporating
theactive,voluntaryparticipationandengagementofcocafarmerswithstateinstitutions,aswellas
informationsharingandengagementwithinternationalentitiesandagencies,includingtheUnited
Nations,theEuropeanUnion,theUnitedStates,andBrazil.TheGeneralCocaProductionDirectorate
(DireccinGeneralDeDesarrolloIntegralDeLasRegionesProductorasDeCoca,DIGPROCOCA)registers
thecatosandprovidesfarmerswithlandtitles.Thatregistryispartofasophisticateddatabase,
SYSCOCA,whichcross-referencestheinformationwithsatelliteimages,aerialphotography, ensitu
inspections,andmeasurementswithGPSandlaserdistancemetersandrecentlyupdatedlandtenure
information.Thisinformationisthenusedtoplancooperativecocareduction.SYSCOCAispartofthe
EU-fundedCocaSocialControlSupportProgram,andthedatabaseisalsosharedwiththeUNODCsCoca
MonitoringProject.Mostcocaplotsaremonitoredseveraltimesayearbysatellite,groundverificationbythreedifferentoffices,andwithaerialphotography.
UNODCsatelliteimageryclearlydelineates catosofcocain
theChapare.1
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8 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
Key
CGU Cocagrowers'unions
SixFederationsoftheCochabambaTropics,ADEPCOCA
inYungas,andothers.
DIGGeneralCocaProductionDirectorate(DIGPROCOCA)
EconomicandSocialDevelopmentUnits(Chapare,
UDESTRO,andYungas,UDESY)register,measureand
monitorcocaplotswithGPS,laserdistance-meters,etc.DatasharedwithUNODCandSCEU.
SCEU SocialControlSupportProgram
FundedbytheEU,theprojectincludestheCocaCrop
MonitoringSystem(SYSCOCA),asophisticateddatabase
thatcross-referencesmonitoringdata,landtitles,
satelliteimagery,andcocacroplocations.Thesystem
willincludecocamarketingandtransportinfutureyears.
OfficiallypartoftheViceMinistryofSocialDefense.
JTF BolivianJointTaskForce Bolivianmilitary/policecocareductionforce
NAS U.S.NarcoticsAffairsSection
Aerialmonitoring,purchaseofGPSandLaserDistance
MetersthroughTrilateralAgreement.
UN UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime
CropMonitoringProgramincludesanalysisofsatellite
imagery,aerialphotography,andgroundverification.
Publishesannualreport.SharesdatawiththeVice
MinistryofSocialDefense,DIGPROCOCA,andProgram
toSupportSocialControl.
BD BlackDevils BolivianMilitaryAirDrugControlUnit
BR Brazil
Real-timemonitoringwithdrones,softwareandtraining
forDIGPROCOCAtointerpretandanalyzeimagery.
ProvidedthroughTrilateralAgreement.Datasharedwith
ViceMinistryofSocialDefense,UNODC,DIGPROCOCA,
andtheU.S.NAS.
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 9
Asapartofthemonitoringeffort,theEUhasfundedabiometricregistryofcocaproducers,eachof
whomistoreceivehisorherownpersonalidentificationcard.Theregistryofover48,00013
producers
hasbeencompletedandtheIDcards,whichcontainanelectronicchiptofacilitategovernmentcontrol,
willbedistributedtoeachauthorizedfarmer.TheSYSCOCAdatabasedescribedaboveprovidesBolivian
governmentofficialswithup-to-dateinformationonthepreciseamountofcocaplanted,towhomit
belongs,andwhetheritcomplieswithnationallaw.ThroughtheelectronicIDandtheinformation
obtainedintheregistry,governmentofficialswillbeabletotracetheharvestofthecocaleafandits
saleinthelegallocalmarket.Theideaisthatgovernmentauthoritieswillthenbeabletotracecocathat
hadbeendivertedfromthelegalmarketwithgreaterefficiencyandwillbeabletodeterminewhoisnot
sellingtheircocatolegalmarkets.14
Ofparticularsignificance,theBoliviangovernmentplanstoextendthebiometricregistry,withEU
support,tocontrolthetransit,sale,andmarketingofthecocaleaf,fromthefieldtotheconsumer.
SocialControlSupportProgramofficialshavealreadyovercomewhatwaspotentiallythemost
significantimpedimenttothissystem:theconsentofcocafarmers.Thefarmershaveagreed,primarily
becausetheregistryvalidatestheirrighttothe cato.Eventually,anyoneinvolvedinthelegaltransportationorsaleofcocawillhaveanidentificationcardandwilltherebybeenteredintothe
system.Thenthegovernmentwillbeabletomonitorthetransportationofcocabyregistered
intermediariestothetwoauthorizedwholesalemarketsanditsdistributiontoindividualvendors,all
throughthescanningoftheirrespectivebiometricidentificationcards.Whenfullyimplemented,the
system,whichrequiresthetechnologicalequivalentofasmartphone,willrepresentadramatic
improvementoverthecurrentpaperrecords,whereregisteredmerchantshavestampedformsthat
allowthemtotransportcoca.Incontrast,thebiometricregistrywillallowformorecompleteandrapid
informationsharing.
Nosystemisfoolproofandmultipleobstaclesstillstandinthewayoftheeffectiveimplementationofthemonitoringprogram,asdrugtraffickersareadeptatadaptingtonewtechnologicalchallenges,and
corruptioncouldunderminetheeffort,withopportunitiesfordiversiontotheillicitmarketallalongthe
way.Nonetheless,itrepresentsapragmatic,ambitious,andpotentiallyviableefforttocontrolthe
diversionofcocatoillicitmarkets.Ifsuccessfullyimplemented,thiseffortwillarguablyprovidethemost
precisecocamonitoringsystemavailableintheregion.
EconomicDevelopmentintheChapare
Thesuccessofcocareductioneffortsdependsinlargepartontheabilityofcocafarmerstodiversify
theirsourcesofincome.InthecaseoftheChaparecoca-growingregion,effortsareunderwayto
improvetheoverallqualityoflifeofthelocalpopulation.Concretedataishardtocomeby,butthere
aresignsthatfarmersaretakingadvantageofarangeofincome-generatingopportunities.TheUNODC
pointstosignificantagriculturaldiversificationinthecoreareaoftheChapareregion(excludingnational
parks)wherecooperativereductionhasbeenimplementedsincelate2004.Accordingtoits2011coca
monitoringsurvey,bananascoveredthelargestareacultivatedintheChapare,followedbycitrusfruit
andpalmhearts,andthencoca.UNODCattributedthisphenomenontosustained,integrated
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10 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
developmentefforts.15
Butitisalsoimportanttonotethattheguaranteedsubsistenceincomeprovided
bythesmallparcelofpermittedcocaalsoallowsfarmerstotakeriskswithothercrops.16
AJune2012
reportbytheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)cametoasimilarconclusion,notingthat
USAIDsactivitiesinBoliviahavecontributedtoimprovedpovertyindicators,andhectaresofprincipal
alternativecropssuchasbananasandcitrushaveincreasedmorethancoca.17
IninterviewsconductedbyAINandWOLAinlateSeptember2012,Chaparemunicipalandnational
governmentofficials,cocagrowers,andrepresentativesofinternationalorganizationsallagreedthat
theoverallqualityoflifeintheChaparehasimprovedduetoincreasedgovernmentinvestmentin
educationandhealth,andimprovedtransportation.AgenerationofchildrenofChaparecocagrowers
hasnowgraduatedfromlocaluniversities,returningtotheareawitharangeoftechnicalskillstooffer.
BananaexportstoArgentinahavebecomeamainstayofthelocaleconomyand,inadditiontothecrops
listedabove,farmersareinvestingmoreinproductssuchashoney,coffee,andchocolate,andsomeare
investingincattle.Othersaregettinginvolvedinsmall-scalebusinesses,suchasmarketingor
transportationservices.AsonefemalecocagrowertoldAINandWOLA,Wedontwanttobe
dependentoncoca.Thatiswhyitismandatoryformembersofouruniontogrowotherthings.18
AccordingtothemayorofShinahota,RimerAgreda,oneofthemostimportantadvancesintheregionis
theimprovementinbasicservices,particularlytransportation.Wenowhaveroadsandbridgesto
about80percentofthezone,whichallowsforthetransportationofotheragriculturalproducts.Now
manypeoplehavetheircato,buttheyarealsoexportingbananasanddrivingatrucktoo.Such
economicdiversificationappearstobeslowlyincreasinglocalincomes,thoughdocumentationasto
howmuchisnotavailable.Agredaalsopointsout,however,thatitisalsothecasethatcocagrowers
arenowaccustomedtohavingtheir catoofcoca.19
TheMoralesadministrationhasalsopromotedthedevelopmentoflicitusesofthecocaleafasameans
ofgeneratingadditionalincome.Theindustrializationofthecocaleafisprobablytheweakestpillarin
theMoralesstrategy,yetsomeadvanceshavebeenmade.Severalyearsbehindschedule,acoca-
processingplantbeganoperationsintheChapareinlate2011.Thehighpriceofcoca,combinedwith
difficultiesinobtainingorganiccoca(whichisrequiredforeveryproduct),haveslowedproductivity.
Dealingwiththeveryhighhumidityinthezonealsopresentsachallenge,asfoodproductsquicklygo
stale.Nonetheless,thefactoryhasbeguntomanufactureavarietyofproducts,includingcocachips
forthesubsidizedpublicschoolbreakfastprogram,cocaliquor,energydrinks,flour,ointments,and
cocaholidaycakes.WhenWOLAandAINstaffvisitedtheplantinlateSeptember2012,productionhad
pausedforaweeksothemachinerycouldbecleaned,butwewereabletomeetwiththetwo
technicianswhoruntheplant.Theysaidthataboutthirtylocalpeopleareemployedattheplantand
thattheyarepresentlyfillingordersastheycomein,withthehopesofmovingtofull-scaleproduction
overtime.
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 11
BeyondtheChapare
Formanyyears,cocaproductionittheChapareregionfarexceededthatinLaPazYungas.Butthe
successofcooperativecocareductionintheChaparehasmeantthattheYungasisnowthecountrys
largestcocaproducingregion,with67percentofthenationalcrop.20
Prioradministrationswereunable
toreduceexcesscocaplantinginthisregion,buttheMoralesadministrationhasinitiatedreductionsthroughextensivenegotiationandintegrateddevelopmentefforts,whichseektocomplementincome
providedbycoca.Beginningin2006,FONADALwithfundingfromboththeBoliviannationaltreasury
andfromtheEUhasimplementedhundredsofinfrastructure,economicdevelopment,institutional
strengthening,andsocialdevelopmentprojects,primarilyincoca-producingzones,withanemphasison
consultationwiththeparticipatingfamiliesandfoodsecurity.21
Launchingtheseparticipatory
developmentinitiativesbeforenegotiatingcocareductionhashelpedtheMoralesadministrationreach
agreementsinspilloverzones,implementthe catosystemintheYungas,22
andestablishcoca
productionceilingsforYungassub-regions.Thesefactorslargelyexplainthe11percentreductionin
cocacultivationintheYungasin2011reportedbytheUNODC.Furthermore,forthefirsttime,farmers
withinthetraditionalcoca-growingzoneoftheYungashaveagreedtoworkwiththeBolivian
governmenttolimittheirproduction,althoughdifficultiesremain.23
AccordingtotheUNODC,in2011cocacultivationdeclinedinallcoca-growingregions,including
nationalparks(resultinginthenationwide12percentdecreasenotedearlier).IntheYungas,therewas
an11percentdecrease,Apolo-NortedeLaPaz,sevenpercent,andtheChapare,15percent.National
parksalsosawa15percentreduction,resultingfromforcederadication.Nonetheless,theUNODCdata
showthatcooperativecocareductionthroughsocialcontrolisthedrivingforcebehinddecliningcoca
cultivation.
Still,thegovernmentfacesthechallengeofthecontinuingspreadofcocaintonewareas,including
nationalparks.AccordingtoUNODCestimates,between2010and2011,therewasa30%increaseinthe
priceofcocaleafinauthorizedmarketsanda16% increaseinunauthorizedmarkets.24
Thesignificant
priceincreaseshaveledtococaplantinginnewregions,aspeopleplantcocaormigratetonewareas
andplantasameansofgeneratingfamilyincome.Forexample,cocareductionoccurredforthefirst
timeinNovemberintheAyopayaProvinceofCochabamba,wherenococahadbeenpreviously
detected.25
TheMoralesadministrationimplementedforcederadicationintheIsiboroSecureNationalPark
Indigenousterritory(ElTerritorioIndgenayParqueNacionalIsiboro-Secure,TIPNIS)inanefforttoallay
fearsthatthehotlycontestedhighwayplannedthroughtheregioncouldprovokeanexplosionofcoca
andcocaineproductionthere.Thisscenarioisimprobable.SettlersintheTIPNISplantcocaasaresultof
poorroadinfrastructureandaccesstomarketsforothercrops,andtraffickersalreadythriveinareas
likeTIPNISwithmultiplewaterwaysflowingtowardBrazil.Theroadwouldclearlyprovidegreateraccess
fordrugcontrolefforts,butishighlycriticizedasitwillprovokesevereenvironmentaldamageandopen
theregiontocommercialagricultureandtrade.
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12 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
EffortstoDisruptDrugTrafficking
Eventhoughcocaproductiondeclinedsignificantlyin2011,theBoliviangovernmentconfrontsa
growingdrugtradeinthecountry.Thegovernmentsstatedpoliticalwillandincreasedenforcement
effortshaveledtoasteadyincreaseinseizuresofcocapastaandcocaine,aswellasdestructionof
laboratoriesmostlysmall-scaleproductionsitessincetheMoralesadministrationtookofficein2006.AccordingtotheEUsNicolausHansmann,goingafterthedrugtradeisoneofthetoppriorities
ofthegovernmentastheyknowthatbothinternallyandexternally,theworstdamagethattheycando
to[theMovementforSocialismparty,MAS]istoassociateitwithdrugtrafficking.26
BolivianForeign
MinisterDavidChoquehuancaemphaticallystatesthatwearefullycommittedtothefightagainstdrug
traffickingwhichthreatensourchildrenandgrandchildren.
Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandSpecialForceagainst
DrugTrafficking(FELCN)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
TonsSeized
CocaineSeizuresinBolivia2000-September
2012
CocainePaste
Cocaine
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 13
Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandFELCN
Bolivianauthoritieshaverepeatedlyexpressedconcernaboutthepresenceofrepresentativesof
internationaldrugtraffickingorganizationsinthecountry,somethingtheyattributetoBoliviascentral
locationinthecontinent,easyaccesstothecorridorthroughArgentinaandontoWestAfrica(nowa
majortransshipmentpointforillicitdrugsenroutetoEuropeandotherpartsoftheworld),and
proximitytothesecondlargestcocainemarketintheworld,Brazil.Inaddition,Boliviaoffers
comparativelylowoperatingcostsduetosignificantfuelsubsidiesandtheabsenceofsustained
violenceassociatedwithdrugtraffickinginMexicoandColombia.Letsfaceit,notespoliceColonel
GonzaloQuezada,werestrategicallylocatedfortraffickersandBoliviaisaniceplacetoworkwithout
gettingkilledforemissariesfromcartelswhowanttoexploretheiroptions;butthatdoesntmeanthat
wearentdoingeverythingwecantostopthem.27
HeclaimsthatfourColombiandrugtraffickinggroupshavesentpeopletoBolivia;however,othernationalitiesarerepresentedaswell.Drugtrafficking
detentionstatisticsconfirmthesedynamics.FromJanuarytoSeptember2012,Bolivianpolicearrested
peoplefrom30differentcountries.
Untilthelate1990s,elite,geographically-concentratedfamiliesdominateddrugtraffickinginBolivia.
However,inrecentyearstraffickingnetworkshavediversified,tendtoconcentrateononepartofthe
drugtraffickingchainandhavespreadthroughoutthecountry.Thegreatbulkofdrugproductionand
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Asof
Sep.
2012
NumberDestroyed
CocaineLaboratoryDestruconinBolivia2000-
September2012
Refinement
Laboratories
Recycling
Laboratories
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14 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
traffickinginBoliviaisnowcarriedoutbysmallfamilyclans,noneofwhichhasasignificantshareof
themarket.Theycanbebrokendownintofourdifferentgroups:thosewhobuycocaforillicitpurposes;
thosewhobuyprecursors;otherswhoprovidethelaborandtemporaryinfrastructureformakingcoca
paste(macerationpitsformakingcocapastehavebecomeathingofthepast,astraffickershave
adoptedtheeasierColombianmethodwherebythecocaisgroundupwithweedwhackers);and
thosewhotransportittococainelaboratoriesoracrosstheborderintoBrazilwhereitisusedfor
makingpaco,ahighly-addictivecocainederivative.28
Thearrestanddisbandingofonegroupmakesa
negligibledent,ifany,inthedrugtradeasitisquicklyandeasilyreplaced.
Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandFELCN
TheinfluxofcocapasteandcocainefromneighboringPeruposesanothermajorchallengefacedfor
Bolivianauthorities;accordingtoCol.Quezada,approximatelyhalfofthecocapasteandcocaineseized
inthecountryoriginatesinPeru.AsthepriceofakiloofcocapasteisUS$200higherinBoliviathan
Peru,moreandmorecocainepasteisbeingbroughtfromPeruintoBolivia.Bolivianpolice
investigationsshowthatmostoftheinfluxiscomingfromtheVRAEregionofPeru(nowreferredtoas
theVRAEMbythePeruviangovernment).Whilemostisbroughtintothecountryinsmallerquantitiesbymules,orsmall-scaletraffickers,itisalsobeingtransportedbysmallairplanesintoBolivian
territoryforprocessingandthensentontoBrazil.ThisisaparticularconcernoftheBolivianpolicegiven
thecountrysverylimitedcapacitytocontrolthecountrysairspace.
TheU.S.governmentclaimstheexpulsionoftheDEA,whichleftBoliviainJanuary2009,permanently
impededBoliviasabilitytodealwithdrugtrafficking,generatingdebateabouttheMorales
administrationspoliticalwilltoimplementeffectivedrugcontrolpolicies.Otherinternationalofficials
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011Asof
Sep.
2012
NumberDestroyed
CocaineFactoryandMaceraonPitDestrucon
inBolivia2000-September2012
Factories
MasceraonPits
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 15
aremoresupportiveofBoliviasdeterminationtoaddresstheproblem.AsnotedbytheEUsHansmann,
thereisagreatwill[byBolivianofficials]tomoveforwardondrugcontrolpolicybutthisdoesnt
necessarilyconformtowhattheUnitedStateswants.HealsopointsoutthattheU.S.focuson
eradicatingcocahasbeendetrimentaltobroaderdrugcontrolefforts:Therestwascrippled,thereis
noexperience,institutionalreformsdidnothappen,theyfailedtopassgoodlegislation.29
TheFELCNsCol.Quezadaagreesthatinstitutionalstrengtheningandarangeofnewlawsareneededto
strengthenthehandofenforcementindealingwiththedrugtrade.Healsopointsoutthathistop
priorityrightnowisnotattheinternationallevel,butthedomesticarena.Asthedrugtradehas
expandedinBolivia,sohasmicro-traffickingandothersmall-scaleoperationsnowfoundincommunities
aroundthecountry.Wearefocusedonoperationsthatprotectourcitizens.30
Theinstitutional
challenges,however,remainformidableasBoliviafacesseverebudgetlimitationsandlimitedtechnical
capacityindealingwithacomplexcriminalenterprisewithvirtuallyunlimitedfunds.
WiththeDEAsdeparture,Boliviahasbeguntoworkcloselywithitsneighborsonarangeofdrug
controlinitiativesandhassignedbilateralagreementswithBrazil,Peru,Argentina,Paraguay,Colombia,andothers.BrazilisprobablyBoliviasmostvisiblepartnerindrugcontrol;thetwocountrieshavehad
frequentbilateraltalks,havesignedmultipleagreementstostrengthenbordercontrol,andBrazilian
dronesareusedtoidentifycocainepasteproductionsites.31
Thejointmilitarizationofthesharedborder
could,however,providemorechallengesthansuccesses.LongerthantheU.S.-Mexicanborderand
muchlessmonitored,physicallyblockingtheflowofdrugsisimpossible.Atthesametime,theborderis
notwelldefinedandBraziliantroopshavecrossedoverintoBolivianterritory.Asaresult,theincreased
militarypresencealongtheborderhasattimesfueledbilateraltensions.32
Boliviaalsosignedtwoimportanttrilateralaccords:onewithBrazilandtheUnitedStatestosupport
cocacultivationmonitoring,andonewithBrazilandPeruonbordercontrolsandinterdiction.Most
recently,onNovember13,2012,theBolivian,Brazilian,andPeruviangovernmentsformedapermanent
workinggrouptosystematizedrugcontroleffortsandtodevelopprotocolstosecurethecountries
airspaceinanefforttoaddresstheproblemofover-flightsdescribedabove.Theplanincludesthe
placementofradaronthenationsbordersinordertobeabletoshootdownflightsidentifiedas
transportingillicitdrugs.33
Unfortunately,pastshoot-downpoliciesinothercountrieshavebeenfraught
withproblemsandhaveledtothedeathsofinnocentcivilians.34
Alsoofnote,onNovember25,2012,
theBrazilianmilitarysigneda$420millioncontractforthefirstphaseoftheIntegratedBorder
SurveillanceSystem,includingradar,drones,andsensorstobeinitiallyputintoplacealongtheborder
betweenBoliviaandParaguay.35
VaryingEstimatesofPotentialCocaineProduction
Estimatesofpotentialcocaineproductionarearguablyamoreimportantmeasureofthesizeofa
countrysillicitproductionandtraffickingthanareestimatesofthelandundercocacultivation.Wide
discrepanciesbetweentheUNandU.S.incocaineproductionestimatesinBoliviaandalackof
transparencyregardingU.S.estimationmethodshaveledtocontentionoverhowmuchcocaineis
likelybeingproducedinBolivia.Despitereportingthatthelanddevotedtococacultivationhas
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16 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
diminishedin2010andagainin2011,inSeptember2012theU.S.governmentannouncedastunning
increaseinBoliviaspotentialcocaineproduction:fromanestimated195metrictons,whichheldsteady
from2008to2010,toapotentialproductionof265metrictonsfor2011.Inotherwords,evenwiththe
U.S.-estimated13percentreductionincocahectaresandthe13percentdeclineincocaleafyield
reportedbytheUN,theU.S.governmentassertedthatBoliviaspotentialcocaineproductionincreased
by36percent.Foritspart,theBoliviangovernmentestimatesthatapproximately80metrictonscould
beproducedinthecountry.
WOLASeniorAssociateforRegionalSecurityPolicyAdamIsacsonhascalculatedthat265metrictonsof
cocainefrom30,000hectaresofcocaamountstoanastonishing8.83kilogramsofcocaineperhectare
ofcoca,instarkcontrasttoColombiawhereU.S.datashows2.70kilogramsperhectare.36
Inother
words,theU.S.figuresimplythatBoliviancocaleafisyieldingthreetimesmorecocainethanColombian
cocaleaf.(GiventhatasizableproportionofBoliviascocayieldisproducedfortraditional,legal
purposes12,000hectaresaccordingtopresentBolivianlawthecoca-to-cocaineconversionratio
impliedbytheU.S.figuresisevenhigher.)TheU.S.governmentestimatesthattheamountofpotential
cocaineproductioninColombiafellbetween2010and2011by25percent,from270to195metrictons.
Bycontrast,theUNcalculatedColombiaspotentialcocaineproductionat345metrictonsfor2011,
usingU.S.governmentdatafortheconversionfrompastetococaine.
Source:U.S.InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReports
U.S.officialsmaintainthattheincreaseinpotentialcocaineproductioninBoliviaisduetomoreefficient
processingmethods(ironically,thesamemethodsusedinColombia)and to thematurityof existing
fields,whichcontributetohigheryields.Allagreethatmorecocainecanbeproducedwithlesscocain
Boliviatoday.Yetthatwouldbeunlikelytoaccountforsuchadramaticincreaseinpotentialproduction.
Furthermore,theU.S.governmentannounceda50percentincreaseinitsestimatesofBolivias
potentialcocaineproductionin2008,usingthesameargumentmoreefficientcocaineprocessing
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
EsRmatedTonsofCocaine
U.S.FiguresforPotenalCocaineProducon
(MetricTons)
USOfficialFigure-Colombia
USOfficialFigure-Bolivia
USFigureforBolivia
Subtracng12,000Hectare
AllowanceforTradionalUse
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 17
methods.37
Inshort,U.S.officialsclaimthatpotentialcocaineproductionmorethandoubledinthree
years,despitereductionsincocacultivation,eachtimepointingtotheadoptionofColombian
processingmethods.Mostdisturbingly,theU.S.governmentprovidesnoinformationwhatsoeverabout
howtheyderivethesestatistics,givingcredencetoallegationsthatthenumbersareconstructedfor
politicalpurposes.
U.S.officialsdosaythatOperationBreakthrough,initiatedinBoliviain1993,providesthebaseline
methodologytocalculatepotentialcocaineproductionintheAndes.(AINwasabletoobtainthe
OperationBreakthroughmethodologyviaadeclassifiedDEAdocument.)38
Yetcurrentestimates,which
reportedlycontinuetoemploythesemethods,demonstratesomedramaticcontradictions.First,
OperationBreakthroughestimatedin2000thattheColombiancocaineprocessingmethodis
approximately25percentmoreeffectivethanthemacerationpitsystemsinitiallyusedinPeruand
Bolivia.39
Inaddition,OperationBreakthroughidentifiedcriticalelementstoestimatecocaine
production:
1) numberofhectaresundercultivation;2) thecocaleafyieldperhectare;3) thecocaleafalkaloidcontentwithintheleaf;4) theefficiencywithwhichthecocainealkaloidintheleafisconvertedintococainebase;and5) theefficiencywithwhichcocainebaseisconvertedintococainehydrochloride(HCL) 40
Thestudyprovidedthefollowingformula:
YetU.Sofficialsacknowledgethattheyarepresentlyunabletodeterminecocaleafyieldsandhaveno
datatocalculatetheefficiencyofthealkaloidextraction,bothindispensabletocalculatepotentialcocaineproduction.TheU.S.governmentcomplainedinMarch2012thattheyhavebeenunableto
carryoutyieldstudiesinBoliviasincetheexpulsionoftheDEAinJanuary2009.42
Inotherwords,U.S.
officialsdonothavethebasicinformationneededtocalculatepotentialcocaineproductioninBolivia
viatheOperationBreakthroughmethodology.TheUNODCs2011cocacultivationreportonBoliviadidnotprovideanydataonpotentialcocaine
production,althoughtheyreporteda13percentdecreaseincocayields,whichwouldsuggesta
reduction,ratherthananincrease,inpotentialcocaineproduction.Concernsthattheprevious
methodologyisoutofdateandmaynotproduceaccuratestatisticsledtheUNODCtorevampitsdata
collectionandanalysis.Theorganizationdevelopedanewmethodology,whichincludesgathering
informationfromincarcerateddrugtraffickerstodeterminecocaine-manufacturingmethodsinorderto
replicatethemindifferentareastoestimatecocayieldsandpotentialcocaineproduction.Thiswillbothimprovestatisticsatthenationallevelandfacilitatecomparisonsbetweencountries.Thenew
methodologyisalreadybeingimplementedinPeruandColombia,andinSeptember2012theUNODC
andBoliviasignedanagreementtoallowitsimplementationinBolivia.TheUNODChopestoreleasethe
newdatainmid-2013.43
Calculatingpotentialcocaineproductionisalwaysachallengingtask.InBolivia
alone,thereareatleasteightecosystemsthatwillleadtodifferentcocayields.However,thenew
methodologydevelopedbyUNODC,ifimplementedaccuratelyandcompletely,offersthepossibilityfor
morereliable,transparent,andcrediblestatisticsonpotentialcocaineproduction.
maturecocaleafcultivationXcocaleafyieldXcocainealkaloid
contentXlaboratoryefficiency=cocainebase(MT)41
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18 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
U.S.PolicytowardBolivia
ThedebatesparkedbytheWhiteHousesSeptember2012determination,andinparticularitsclaims
regardingpotentialcocaineproductioninBolivia,hasstrainedwhathasbeenfairlysteadybilateral
collaborationondrugcontrolprograms.DespitetheexpulsionoftheDEA,theBolivianMinistryofGovernmentsViceMinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesandtheU.S.embassys
NarcoticsAffairsSection(NAS)maintaindailycooperationontheground.InOctober2011,Assistant
SecretaryofStateforInternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairsWilliamBrownfieldtolda
congressionalcommittee:
InBolivia, eradicationefforts area highlightofa sometimes-difficultbilateral relationship
and actually exceeded the 2010 target of 8,000 hectares. These efforts appear to have
stoppedtheexpansionofcocacultivationFurthermoretheU.S.estimateactuallyshowed
a500-hectaredecreaseinlandundercocacultivation.InBolivia,U.S.assistance,including
supportfortrainingandcanineprograms,hasresultedinBolivianseizuresofcocaleafthat
are19timeshigherthantheywereadecadeago.44
TheNAScontinuestofunddrugandcocacontroleffortsalbeitwithareducedbudgetand
coordinateswiththeBoliviangovernmentonadailybasis.U.S.ChargdeAffairesJohn
Creamer45
confirmedonJuly15,2012thatdespiterumorstothecontrary,NASisstaying[Its]
missionischangingasaresultoftheBoliviansgovernmentsnationalizationofthedrugwar,an
initiativewewelcomesoweareapprovinglessoperatingcostsandemphasizingtrainingmore.
AframeworkagreementthatformallyrenewedbilateralrelationswassignedinNovember2011andthe
governmentsannouncedtheirintentiontoreinstateambassadors.Althoughsincethattimeboth
countrieshavereiteratedthispoint,itisunclearhowlongthisprocesswilltake(andevenaftertheU.S.
governmentannouncesacandidateforthepost,significantdelaysintheU.S.Senatesconfirmation
processcouldoccur).Theframeworkagreementincludesrecurringdialogueondrugpolicy.InJanuary2012,Bolivia,Brazil,andtheUnitedStatessignedatrilateralcocacultivationmonitoringagreement.At
the2012SummitoftheAmericas,PresidentObamaobserved,TherecentagreementbetweentheU.S.,
Brazil,andBoliviatogoafter(excess)cocacultivationinBoliviaisthekindofcollaborationweneed.46
U.S.economicassistancetoBoliviahasdeclinedsteadilysincePresidentMoralescameintooffice.Thisis
largelyduetooverallbudgetcuts,vocaloppositiononthepartofkeyRepublicanmembersofCongress
toMoralesrelationshipwithVenezuelanPresidentHugoChvezandCubasRaulCastro,andinprotest
oftheexpulsionoftheDEA.However,fromtheBoliviangovernmentspointofview,lessaidisbetter
thanmoreaidwithstringsattached.AsnotedbyForeignMinisterChoquehuanca,Wewanttohave
goodrelationswithallcountries.Butrelationsbasedonrespect.Ihavefoundunderstandinginthe
UnitedStates.WearenotafraidoftheUnitedStatesaspreviousgovernmentswere.Weareasmallcountry,butonewithdignity.HeconcludedthatcomprehensionofthesituationinBoliviaonthepart
ofsomeU.S.officialsiswhatallowedforthesigningofaframeworkagreementbasedonmutual
respect,adding,Wewouldratherhavegoodrelationswithouteconomicassistancethaneconomic
assistancewhoseuseisdictatedbytheUnitedStates.47
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 19
Source:U.S.InternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairs(INL)reportsviaJusttheFacts.
However,twoissuesinparticularhaveputsignificantstrainonthebilateralrelationship.The
continuationoftheunilateralU.S.drugcontroldetermination(previouslycalledcertification)in
whichtheUnitedStatesjudgeswhichcountriesareeffectivelymeetinginternationaldrugcontrol
obligationsiswidelycriticizedacrossLatinAmerica,furthererodingU.S.credibilityinaregionnow
openlyquestioningtheprevailingdrugpolicyparadigm.TheObamaadministrationhascontinuedthe
practiceofitspredecessorofgivingBoliviaafailinggrade(alongwithVenezuelaandMyanmar)each
September.However,inthecaseofBolivia,thenumerouserrorsandinaccuraciesparticularlyevident
inthe2012determinationgivetheimpressionthatthedecisionisbasedonpoliticalmotivations
ratherthananaccurateassessmentofdrugcontroleffortsontheground.Forexample,the2012determinationstatedthattheUNODChadreportedaslightincreaseincocacultivationin2011,whenin
factthreedayslatertheUNODCannounceda12percentdecrease.ItalsoassertedthatBoliviaremains
oneoftheworldslargestproducersofcocaleafforcocaineandotherillegalproducts.Asnoted
previously,BoliviascocacropissignificantlysmallerthaneitherColombiaorPeru(together,theseare
theonlythreecountriesthatproduceandexportsignificantquantitiesofcoca),particularlywhencoca
usedforlegalpurposesistakenintoaccount.
TheWhiteHousesSeptember14determinationconcludesthatBoliviahasfaileddemonstrablyduring
theprevious12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcoticsagreements,basing
thisassertiononadismissalofthegainsmadeviadecliningcocacultivationandwhatappeartobe
exaggeratedestimatesofpotentialcocaineproduction.
48
ThelackoftransparencyabouthowU.S.officialscalculatecocaineproductionestimates,asdescribedabove,combinedwiththecontentionthat
BoliviaisproducingmorecocainethanColombiadespitehavingfarlesslandundercocacultivation
thanColombiaorPerufurthererodesU.S.credibilityinBolivia.Moreover,itisnotlostontheBolivian
governmentthateveryyearPeruislavishedwithpraisefromWashington,despitesignificantandsteady
increasesinbothcocacultivationandestimatedpotentialcocaineproductioninthatcountry.
$-
$20,000,000.00
$40,000,000.00
$60,000,000.00
$80,000,000.00
$100,000,000.00
$120,000,000.00
$140,000,000.00
$160,000,000.00
$180,000,000.00
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
U.S.DrugControlFundingtoBolivia
Aid
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20 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
Boliviaand1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs
AnotherpointofcontentioninbilateralrelationsisU.S.oppositiontoBoliviasre-admissiontothe1961
SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugsasamendedbythe1972Protocol.Boliviaisseekingtoreconcileits
newconstitutionwithitsinternationalcommitments.Article384ofthe2009Constitutionstates:TheStateshallprotectnativeandancestralcocaasculturalpatrimony,arenewablenaturalresourceof
Boliviasbiodiversity,andasafactorofsocialcohesion;initsnaturalstateitisnotanarcotic.Its
revaluing,production,commercialization,andindustrializationshallberegulatedbylaw.The
Constitutionallowsforaperiodoffouryearsforthegovernmenttodenounceand,inthatcase,
renegotiatetheinternationaltreatiesthatmaybecontrarytotheconstitution.
Hence,inJune2011,thecountrydenouncedthe1961SingleConventionandannounceditsintentionto
re-accedewithareservationallowingforthetraditionaluseofthecocaleaf.Unlessmorethanone-third
ofUNmemberstatesobjectbytheJanuary10,2013deadline,theBolivianreservationwillbeaccepted
anditwillonceagainbeafullPartytotheSingleConvention.
TheU.S.governmentsJuly2012formalletterofobjectionstates:
The United States considers the Convention tobeone of the cornerstones of
internationaleffortstopreventtheillicitproduction,manufacture,trafficinand
abuse of drugs, while ensuringthat illicit drugs areavailable formedical and
scientificpurposes. TheUnitedStatesis concernedthatBolivia's reservation is
likelytoleadtoagreatersupplyofavailablecoca,andasaresult,morecocaine
will be available for the global cocaine market, further fueling narcotics
traffickingand relatedcriminalactivitiesinBoliviaandthecountriesalong the
cocainetraffickingroute.49
Butinseekingthereservation,BoliviahasbeenfollowingestablishedConventionguidelines.ItalsotookthisactionafteritsefforttoamendtheSingleConventionbydeletingitsprovisionobligatingthatcoca
leafchewingmustbeabolishedwithin25years(Article49).TheU.S.governmentledoppositiontothis
amendment,eventhoughitisquiteclearthattheeliminationofcocachewingisnotfeasibleandthat
thatthepracticeiswidelyacceptedinmanysectors,inBoliviaandinternationally.Incontrast,with
regardtoBoliviasintenttore-accedetotheSingleConventionwithareservation,U.S.officialsclaim
thattheyarenotorganizingoppositiontoBoliviasactionsandthattheydonotexpectmorethanone-
thirdofUNmemberstatestoobject.Atthetimeofthiswriting,onlytheU.S.governmenthad
presentedaformalobjection,althoughothershaveindicatedthattheywouldalsodoso.
TheBoliviangovernmentisoptimisticthattheywillbereturningtotheConventioninJanuary2013.
ForeignMinisterChoquehuancadidatourofEuropeancountriesinOctober2012topressthegovernmentscase.AccordingtoViceMinisterofCocaDionicioNuez,Theinternationalcampaignhas
gonewell.Weareoptimisticthatwewillbeabletoreturntotheconvention.50
Onestickingpointwith
EuropeangovernmentsisthereleaseofanEU-fundedstudyonthetraditionalusesofcoca,whichis
intendedtoprovidethebaselineforhowmuchcocashouldbeproducedinBoliviaforlegalpurposes.It
isnowyearsbehindschedule,butBolivianauthoritieshavestatedthattheyarefinishingsome
complementarycomponentsofthestudyandthatitwillbereleasedinthefirsthalfof2013.51
TheBoliviangovernmentregisteredadiplomaticadvanceattheNovember2012Ibero-American
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 21
SummitheldinCdiz,Spain.Atthatsummit,aspecialcommuniquwasadoptedonthetraditionaluse
ofcocachewinginwhichthepresidentsunanimouslystated:
Conscious of the importance of conserving the ancestral and cultural practices of
indigenouspeoples,intheframeworkofrespectforhumanrightsandthefundamental
rights of indigenous peoples, in accordance with international instrument We
recognizethatthetraditionaluseofcocachewing(akulliku)ofthecocaleafisacultural
andancestralmanifestationofthepeopleofBoliviaandPeruandshouldberespected
bytheinternationalcommunity.52
Inotherwords,BolivianowhasatleasttacitsupportfromallLatinAmericancountries,aswellasSpain
andPortugal,foreliminatingtheinternationalstigmapresentlyanderroneouslyassociatedwiththe
cocaleaf.
Conclusions
CriticsofBoliviasUNcocainitiativeareforcedtobalanceconcernsoftheprecedentsetbyallowinga
countrytore-accedetothe1961SingleConventionwithareservationagainsttheimplicationsof
Boliviaspermanentwithdrawalfromtheinternationaldrugcontrolsystem.Staunchdefendersofthe
conventionsfearthatpermittingBoliviatore-entertheSingleConventionwithareservationupholding
traditionalusesofthecocaleafcouldpotentiallyopenupaPandorasbox,withothercountries
proposingchangesthatcallintoquestionthefundamentalsofthecurrenttreaties.However,the51-
yearoldinternationaldrugcontrolregimemustprovethatitcanadaptandadjusttothechanging
dynamicsofthedrugtrade.Theinclusionofthecocaleafinthe1961Conventionwasahistoricerror
whosecorrectionislongoverdue.Moreover,regardlessofwhetherornotBoliviareturnstotheSingle
Convention,cocacultivationwillcontinueinBolivia,andtheUNconventionsshouldbeadaptedtoalign
withthatreality.
TheBoliviangovernmenthasmadeclearitsintentiontocontinuetoengagewiththeU.S.government,
theEuropeanUnion,andneighboringcountriesondrugcontrolandhassignificantlyreducedoverall
levelsofcocacultivationandhasincreaseddrugseizures,amongotherdrugcontrolactions.Inother
words,Boliviaclearlywishestocontinueplayingbytheestablishedrulesofthegametoaddressillicit
drugtrafficking.
TheBoliviangovernmenthasinfactmadesignificantprogressfacingtheongoingchallengesofdrug
productionandtrafficking,inpartduetotheassistanceprovidedbytheEU,theUnitedStates,and
others.TheU.S.governmentshouldnowrecognizethisprogressinitsannualdeterminations.Thestring
ofnegativedeterminationsisincreasinglydisconnectedfromrealityinBoliviaandretainslittle
credibilitywiththeBoliviangovernmentorwithothergovernmentsintheregion,whichcontinuetosee
theannualU.S.ratingasoffensiveandpoliticallymotivated.Alongthesamelines,thepotentialcocaine
statisticspresentedbytheU.S.governmentinlastyearsdeterminationweremetwithdisbeliefin
Bolivia.Giventheongoingdoubtsaboutthereliabilityofsuchestimates,theU.S.governmentshouldbe
transparentaboutexactlyhowitperformsthesecalculations.
ThesigningoftheframeworkagreementmarkedsignificantprogressinU.S.-Bolivianbilateralrelations.
Bothgovernmentsshouldbuildonthatsuccessbyusingtheaccordasavenuetodiscussareasof
concern,friction,andconsensus.Whiledifferenceswillundoubtedlyarise,itisinthebestinterestsof
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22 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
bothcountriestomaintainanopendialogue.
Boliviafacesdauntingchallengesfromdrugproductionandtrafficking.Whilethegovernmenthasan
innovativenationalstrategyforaddressingthesechallenges,theincreasingmilitarizationofitsborders
andproposedairinterdictionraiseavarietyofconcerns.Moreover,thecontinuedgrowthinregional
andglobalcocaineconsumptionmeansthatBoliviacannotandshouldnotbeexpectedtosolvethe
problemsassociatedwithcocaineproductionandtrafficking,evenwithinitsownborders.Bolivias
effortsmustbecarriedoutintandemwitheffectivedemandreductionstrategiestocontainand
eventuallyshrinktheglobalcocainemarket.
KathrynLedeburistheDirectoroftheAndeanInformationNetwork(AIN)basedinCochabamba,
Bolivia.ColettaA.YoungersisaSeniorFellowattheWashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica
(WOLA).WOLASeniorAssociateJohnM.Walsh,WOLAProgramAssistantAdamSchaffer,and
AINProgramAssistantJessicaRobinsonalsocontributedtothisreport.
ThisreportwasmadepossiblewiththegeneroussupportoftheOpenSocietyFoundations.
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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 23
1MoraleswontheDecember2005electionswith53.7percentofthepopularvote.HewasreelectedinDecember
2009.2TheWhiteHouse.WhiteHousePresidentialDetermination:MemorandumofJustificationforMajorIllicitDrug
TransitorIllicitDrugProducingCountriesforFiscalYear2013.Washington,D.C.:September14,2012.
3UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivodeCoca,September19,2012.https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/September/coca-crop-cultivation-
falls-significantly-in-bolivia-according-to-2011-coca-monitoring-survey.html 4Onehectareisroughly2.5acres.
5Authorsinterview.September28,2012.
6ColettaA.YoungersandKathrynLedebur.WOLAandAIN.WashingtoninWonderland.
http://www.wola.org/commentary/washington_in_wonderland7Laparadojaesquehaymenoscocalesperohaymscocana,PginaSiete,July14,2012.
8Acatois1,600squaremeters,oraboutathirdofanacre,intheChapare,and2,500squaremetersintheYungas
(wherefarmersarguethecocaplantyieldislessthanintheChapare).9Authorsinterview,September26,2012.
10IntheChapareregion,therearesixcocagrowerunionsthattogetherformtheSixFederationsofthe
CochabambaTropics(SeisFederacionesdelTrpicodeCochabamba).11Authorsinterview,September24,2012.12
Authorsinterview,September26,2012.13
Seehttp://www.mingobierno.gob.bo/pdf/vicemindefsocial.pdfformoreinformation.14
AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,AttachtotheCooperationSectionoftheEuropeanUnionin
Bolivia,September28,2012.15
UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivode
Coca,September19,2011,47.16
Formanysmallfarmers,cocaisthefamilysonlysourceofcashincome.17
USAIDreportedsupportingthecultivationof39,834hectaresofalternativecropsandthecreationof22,386
jobsinBoliviainfiscalyears2006through2010.Atthetimeofthiswriting,USAIDsresultsforfiscalyear2011
havenotyetbeenfinalized.SeeU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO).CounterdrugAssistance:U.S.
AgenciesHaveAllottedBillionsinAndeanCountries,butDODShouldImproveitsReportingofResults,GAO-12-824,
June2012.17.18
Authorsinterview,September24,2012.19
Authorsinterview,September24,2012.20
UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivode
Coca.September19,2012,5.21
InformacinInstitucional.FONADAL.
http://www.fonadal.gob.bo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=9222
Asnotedearlier,intheYungasthecatoismeasuredat2,500squaremeters,orone-quarterofahectare,rather
than1,600squaremetersintheChapare,whereyieldsarehigher.23
Authorsinterview,DionicioNuez,September27,2012.24
UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivode
Coca,September19,2012.5.25
FELCNyFTCinicianoperativosenCocapataLosTiempos,November14,2012.
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20121115/felcn-y-ftc-inician-operativos-en-
cocapata_192426_409446.html 26
Authorsinterview,September27,2012.27
Authorsinterview,September27,2012withCol.Quezada,DirectoroftheSpecialForcetoFightDrugTrafficking,
FELCN,Boliviasdrugcontrolpolice.28
AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,September27,2012.29
AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,September28,2012.
-
7/29/2019 Bolivian Drug Control Efforts: Genuine Advances, Daunting Challenges
24/24
24 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS
30
Authorsinterview,September27,2012.31
CarlosValdez.BolivianofficialsaysBraziliandronesaidinlocatingillegalcocainelabs, AssociatedPress,June
21,2012.32
Brasilesperaunarespuestabolivianasobreaccinmilitar,LaRazn,April30,2012;Boliviarefuerzacontrolmilitarenla
fronteradondelincharonabrasileo,EFE,August18,2012;andBrasilcierrasufronteraconBoliviapor
supuestosexcesos,ElDiario,November26,2012.33
Bolivia,BrasilyPerproyectancrearunfondoparalaluchaantidrogacondinerosdelaextincindebienes,LaRazn,November14,
2012.http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/Bolivia-Brasil-Peru-extincion-
antidroga_0_1724827563.html34
TheTransnationalInstitute.TheDrugWarintheSkies.November17,2005.http://www.tni.org/article/drug-
war-skies35
EmpresaaeronuticadiseavigilanciaparafronterabrasileaconParaguayyBolivia,LaRazn,November26,2012.http://www.la-
razon.com/mundo/Empresa-aeronautica-vigilancia-Paraguay-Bolivia_0_1731426897.html36
UNandU.S.EstimatesforCocaineProductionContradictEachOther.JusttheFacts.July31,2012.
http://justf.org/blog/1?page=137
Excesscocaleafisbeingdivertedtotheproductionofcocainehydrochloride.Compoundedbyimproved
processingmethods,theUnitedStatesGovernmentestimatespotentialcocainehydrochlorideproduction
increasedinBoliviaduring2008by50percentto195metrictons.U.S.DepartmentofState.Bureauof
InternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairs.2010InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReport,March
1,2010.http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137190.htm.38
SpecialthankstoJeremyBigwoodforprovidingdocumentationonOperationBreakthrough.39
Usingawater-pit,leaf-stompingtechnique,boththePeruvianandBolivianchemistswerecapableof
extractingsome45percentofthecocainealkaloidfromtheleafColombiancocainebaseprocessorsuseand
entirelydifferentproductionmethoditisreasonablethatColombianchemistsmaybecapableofextractingas
muchas70percentofthecocainealkaloidfromtheleaf.DCICrimeandNarcoticsCenterandtheDrug
EnforcementAdministration.Colombia:CocaCultivationandPreliminaryResultsfromOperationBreakthrough,
May2000,8.http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/bigwood_coca_op_breakthrough.pdf.40
U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministrationIntelligenceReport.OperationBreakthrough:CocaCultivation&Cocaine
BaseProductioninBolivia,July1994,DEA-94032,1. 41
Ibid.16.42
InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReport:Bolivia,March7,2012.43
AuthorsinterviewwithCsarGuedes.September28,2012.44
TestimonyofAmbassadorWilliamR.Brownfield,AssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofInternationalNarcotics
andLawEnforcementAffairsbeforetheSenateCommitteeonForeignRelationsSubcommitteeontheWestern
Hemisphere,PeaceCorps,andGlobalNarcoticsAffairsHearingonASharedResponsibility:Counternarcoticsand
CitizenSecurityintheAmericas,March31,2011.45
Laparadojaesquehaymenoscocalesperohaymscocana,PginaSiete,July14,2012.46
WilliamsFarfn.ObamadestacaelpactoantidrogasconBoliviayBrasil, LaRazn,April14,2012.
http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/Obama-destaca-antidrogas-Bolivia-
Brasil_0_1595840433.html 47
Authorsinterview,September28,2012.48
http://cts.vresp.com/c/?AndeanInformationNet/c7a7203e06/4b02934804/d7ae0745eb49
TheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations.UnitedStatesOfAmerica:ObjectionToTheReservationContained
InTheCommunicationByThePlurinationalStateOfBolivia,July3,2012.Reference:C.N.361.2012.TREATIES-VI.18.50
Authorsinterview,September27,2012.51
Difundirnenmayoestudiodelacoca,basedefuturaleyantidrogas,LosTiempos,November26,2012.
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20121126/difundiran-en-mayo-estudio-de-la-coca-base-
de-futura-ley_193581_412158.html52
AuthorstranslationfromoriginalSpanish.