A STUDY INTO THE SIZE OF THE WORLD’S INTELLIGENCE
INDUSTRY
CHRISTIAN HIPPNER
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCEIN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIESMERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIAOCTOBER 2009
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIESMERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
A STUDY INTO THE SIZE OF THE WORLD’S INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY
A ThesisSubmitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst CollegeIn Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCEIN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
Submitted By
Christian Hippner
Certificate of Approval:
___________________________Kristan J. WheatonAssociate ProfessorDepartment of Intelligence Studies
___________________________James G. BreckenridgeChair/Assistant ProfessorDepartment of Intelligence Studies
___________________________Phillip J. BelfioreVice PresidentOffice of Academic Affairs
October 2009
iii
Copyright © 2009 by Christian HippnerAll rights reserved.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my primary reader, Kristan Wheaton, for his creativity, found
throughout this product. I would also like to thank Carl Hippner for his assistance in
interpretation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Cole Davis for his technical
assistance and motivation, despite having a two o’clock meeting.
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
A Study into the Size of the World’s Intelligence Industry
By
Christian Hippner
Master of Science in Applied Intelligence
Mercyhurst College, 2009
Professor Kristan J. Wheaton, Chair
[This thesis determines the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry in
quantitative terms. It reviews existing literature which describes, in qualitative terms,
various themes found about intelligence agencies around the world. The thesis provides a
quantitative method to estimate unknown intelligence spending and personnel. The study
concludes that the world’s intelligence industry spends approximately 106 billion United
States Dollars, and employs about one million people. Furthermore, the hypothesized
direct correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and intelligence spending may
exist, but the research does not strongly support the assertion. It is apparent that GDP is a
factor when it comes to intelligence spending, but it does not seem to be the primary
component.]
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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage
COPYRIGHT PAGE ........................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1
2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 4
Information Gap ........................................................................................ 4Comparative Studies in Intelligence ......................................................... 7Self-Reporting Countries ......................................................................... 14Systematic Studies of Intelligence .......................................................... 16
3 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 21
Data Collection ........................................................................................ 22Collection from Internet Sources ................................................. 23Collection from Other Sources ................................................... 27Other Relevant Information Collection ...................................... 28
Establishing Webpage Credibility .......................................................... 28Process for Estimating Unknown Spending ........................................... 29Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel ........................................... 30Standardizing Spending Units ................................................................. 31Standardizing Personnel Definitions ....................................................... 32
4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................ 33
The Totals: Spending ............................................................................... 33The Totals: Personnel ............................................................................. 40Other Extracted Results .......................................................................... 46Summary of Results ................................................................................ 50
5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 53
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 63
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 75
Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust ............................................................... 76Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest ........................... 77Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries......................................................... 80
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LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 4.1 Affect of US on Estimating 39
Table 5.1 List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other 56Relevant Database Productions
Table 5.2 Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending 59and GDP is Linear or Exponential
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LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 4.1 Total World Intelligence Spending 33
Figure 4.2 Top Ten Percent Intelligence Spending 34
Figure 4.3 Intelligence Spending Sorted Largest to Smallest 37
Figure 4.4 Total Intelligence Employment 40
Figure 4.5 Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers 42
Figure 4.6 Top 21 Intelligence Employers 42
Figure 4.7 Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person 43
Figure 4.8 Bottom 90 Percent Employment vs. 44Top Ten Percent Employment
Figure 4.9 Countries with Top Spending and Employment 45
Figure 4.10 Histogram of Intelligence Employment 45
Figure 4.11 Histogram of Source Credibility 50
Figure 5.1 Affect of a Linear Relationship Assumption on 61Intelligence Spending (US Not Included)
Figure 5.2 Countries with Known Intelligence Spending with 62Trend Lines (US Not Included)
1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about intelligence in national security. Since the Treaty of
Westphalia every nation-state has had concerns about its national security, however
defined. The role of intelligence is one that supports policymakers, military
commanders, and nation as a whole. Describing the actual process of intelligence is the
subject of many books, reports, and theoreticians. Although the traditional view of
intelligence encapsulates its activities as a cylindrical process, new conceptual models
tend to structure it around a collaborative targeted process. Regardless of how one wants
views what is intelligence, this thesis is about those engaged in it as a whole.
Intelligence as field of employment dates back to biblical days, when Moses sent
12 men to the land of Canaan in order to,
See what the land is like: whether the people who dell in it are strong orweak, few or many; whether the land they dwell in is good or bad;whether the cities they inhabit are like camps or strongholds; whether theland is rich or poor; and whether there are forests there or not.1
Moses is a decision maker who wants to know everything that may be relevant, as his
tasking implies. He asks for reports on the economic, military, and social situation of
Canaan. While this passage is infamous in some intelligence communities, Sun-Tzu’s
writings may resonate in others. With the relatively few exceptions, the subject of how to
finance the collection of intelligence is generally missing. Collection systems, or in
Moses’ case human operators, require adequate funding to be successful. It is
1 Numbers 13:18-20 (New King James Version).
2
unimaginable that Moses sent 12 men “who were heads of the children of Israel” without
food or other provisions.2 Yet discussion regarding this subject is absent.
If intelligence requires funding, like the rest of the national security
establishment, then every nation must allocate a budget. Various studies aiming to
estimate national defense spending already exist. Some countries issue so-called white
papers, while research institutions, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), have
elaborate methodologies to determine the spending of countries that do not self-report.
While each entity has a particular estimate regarding the world’s spending on defense,
none have ventured into a more nuanced subset of national security – intelligence.
This thesis is a study to determine the approximate size of the world’s national
intelligence industry. It uses two separate indicators to determine size. The first
indicator is intelligence spending by individual nations. The second indicator of size is
intelligence personnel under employment by individual nations. For the purposes of this
study, the components of the intelligence industry are, broadly speaking, services or
agencies that are direct divisions of a recognized government.
Understanding the size of the world's intelligence industry is significant for three
reasons. First, there is no existing study with the purpose of discovering the approximate
size of the global intelligence industry. Second, understanding its size can be useful for
allocating resources by US intelligence agencies. Third, knowing the size of the world's
intelligence industry would be helpful to educational institutions for their own planning.
As the intelligence studies field grows, knowing the relative level of demand for
professionals in this market will likely support these institutions in recruiting practices.
2 Numbers 13:3 (New King James Version).
3
To that end, a comprehensive and quantitative study is necessary. Although there are
numerous smaller studies that focus on certain regions or nations, they all fit into the
realm of qualitative discussions. While they add to the body of literature for this field,
they fall short of exploring the “human resources” aspect. The study could also assist in
training institutions’ recruitment by indicating the job market that exists for intelligence
professionals.
Determining the size of the world’s intelligence industry is also relevant for
practitioners. A study of this nature would give a national intelligence community
another method to benchmark their performance, as well as assist in future planning.
Knowing the relative size of other nations’ capabilities can result in more efficient
resource allocation or support new hiring practices.
There are certain limitations to this study. First, it does not intend to study the
organizational structure of an intelligence community of a given country. It simply wants
to determine an amount spent by that community. Second, governments are not always
willing to publish such data and if they do, it may be intentionally inaccurate. This study
can and will make the most accurate and conservative estimates as possible. A person
can delve deep into government publications and other primary data for years in an
attempt to determine a single precise answer. This is unnecessary due to the scale of the
study – the individual numbers are more likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
meaning that the impact of relatively few dollars is negligible. Third, for many countries
there is no existing information at all. This study estimates these figures using a process
described in Chapter 3, and then presents its findings in Chapter 4.
4
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a limited number of comprehensive studies into the world’s different
intelligence systems and agencies. Most studies on the topic of national intelligence
communities are qualitative in nature. They explore a variety of intelligence related
topics, such as structure and oversight, but few actually engage in describing their subject
in quantitative terms. The following literature review has four sections. The first section
briefly discusses why there are few systematic studies describing intelligence in
quantitative terms. The second section discusses the different comparative studies of
intelligence systems. The third section examines countries with self-reported data, their
relevance, and their drawbacks. The fourth and final section looks at the existing
attempts to systematically document different intelligence communities.
Information Gap
There are no comprehensive studies analyzing the total spending of the world’s
different intelligence organizations, or are there studies indicating their accumulated size.
One argument against the systematic study of intelligence is that the systems in different
countries are not comparable. In the words of author Michael Warner, “both inside and
outside scholars have sought to compare and contrast intelligence disciplines and
organizations across multiple national experiences and time periods. Unfortunately, this
is not yet possible to do in a systematic manner”.3 This mindset is perhaps the primary
reason for the lack of research into these matters. However, arguing that a transnational
quantitative comparison is not possible hinges on faulty assumptions.
3 Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of IntelligenceStudies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 25.
5
The argument assumes that the functions, roles, and missions of intelligence
organizations are inconsistent in international situations and cannot be categorized.
Notable intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson argues against this point, saying that there
are basic common features found in all national intelligence apparatuses. According to
Johnson, there are three basic activities of these governmental entities – collection and
analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.4 He argues that these three activities are
universally found in all national intelligence systems, regardless of the security
environment surrounding the country. This point seems to echo in the writings of Marina
Caprini, a theoretician on security-sector reform, who says that “within government,
intelligence has come to be thought of as comprising four main activities: collection,
analysis and estimates, counterintelligence and covert action”.5 At the heart of the three
activities, Johnson argues, is national wealth – Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6 Johnson
would likely argue that the security situation around a nation impacts intelligence
spending less than its national wealth. Of wealthy nations, he says,
Because of the breadth of their concerns, not even expenditures in therange of $35 billion a year (the widely reported figure for U.S. intelligencein 2002-2003) can offer transparency for the entire globe – especiallywhen adversaries choose to conceal their schemes and weapons systems indeep underground caverns, with camouflage, or by other methods ofstealth to avoid the prying lens of satellite cameras orbiting above them.In contrast, the intelligence objectives of smaller nations are much morelimited, say, to a single region or even a solitary enemy. Some may viewthis paradox as self-evident, but comparisons of the intelligence systemsof different countries are often made without taking into account thedifferences in their funding abilities and targeting needs.7
4 Loch Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy. 22, no. 1 (2003):1.5 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” in DemocraticControl of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephant, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini(England: Ashgate, 2007), 5.6 Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003):22-23.7 Ibid, 3.
6
Outside of national wealth, Johnson argues that other attributes are necessary for
successfully implementing these activities, such as focused targeting, all-source
synergism, and strong communication.8 These activities are important, but they are a
result of three basic features, collection and analysis, covert action, and
counterintelligence.
The ultimate goal of these activities is to reduce the level uncertainty for the
decision-maker. The end goal for national intelligence agencies is also inherently
different from other governmental entities with similar features. For instance, law
enforcement bodies often engage in Johnson’s three basic actives. They collect and
analyze crime statistics in order to identify problems and determine the best preventative
measures.9 They engage in undercover operations, as well as establish security measures
to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information. In short, many law enforcement
agencies engage in intelligence. However, the purpose of having a law enforcement
agency is to enforce laws, while its end goal is to facilitate crime and problem
reduction.10
Nevertheless, the primary attribute for the successful implementation of Johnson’s
activities is national wealth, suggesting that only wealthy nations have large, integrated,
intelligence systems. Yet Johnson is quick to admit that there are some exceptions to his
8 Ibid.9 Veronica Coleman and others, "Using Knowledge and Teamwork to Reduce Crime," National Institute ofJustice Journal 241, (1999): 18-20, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000241d.pdf.10 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, "Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action," in press 2009,3, http://jratcliffe.net/papers/Ratcliffe%20(draft)%20ILP-Anticipating%20risk%20and%20influencing%20action.pdf.
7
theory.11 He points to Russia as an example, saying while it may maintain a large
intelligence service, it is not an affluent nation.12
Johnson’s conceptual framework seems to suggest an observable correlation
exists between a nation’s wealth and the size of its intelligence community. If this is true,
further research is necessary to test Johnson’s assertion that national wealth, GDP,
determines the limits of intelligence activity. While most authors tend to focus
intelligence issues such as oversight, democratic control, and the significance of 9/11,
Johnson’s assertion is measurable in quantitative terms. His assertion is not only
quantitative but free from cultural biases. The next section reviews existing comparative
studies of intelligence, which are predominately qualitative in nature.
Comparative Studies in Intelligence
There are several ways existing comparative studies describe different
intelligence systems. The first section here describes intelligence in the context of the
Cold War, the second section describes intelligence through the lens of the Civil-Military
Relations (CMR) model, and the third section describes intelligence from the non-
western perspective. Common themes exist throughout all three sections, for instance, all
of the authors use a case-study format to compare intelligence systems. Each case-study
uses narratives and qualitative information to describe intelligence communities – another
theme in all three sections – and also tend to focus on research at the national level.
There are several reasons to conduct comparative studies of intelligence communities.
According to Peter Gill, conducting comparative studies allows one to “find out about
11 Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003):15.12 Ibid.
8
one’s own country through the study of others”.13 He adds that comparative studies also
allow for the generalized classification of data.14 Beginning to classify data is the
intuitive starting point towards quantification. While comparative studies of intelligence
are steadily increasing, they are not a new phenomenon.
One example, written 1985, is Walter Laqueur’s A World of Secrets: The Uses
and Limits of Intelligence. Laqueur compares the intelligence systems in “open
societies” and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.15 He compares these entities in
order to identify differences between the western world and Soviet bloc. Laqueur’s
writings on open societies tend focus on the relationship between intelligence producers
and consumers in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel.16 He
arranges each chapter consistently, initially providing a brief overview of the national
intelligence community, and then he gives examples of their interactions with civilian
authorities. He also compares the performance of the intelligence communities by
addressing issues such as the inefficient bureaucracies within some large agencies, and
analyzing the public’s perception of the intelligence community’s activities.17 Well-
written, well-thought out, Laqueur gives a critical analysis of intelligence in open
societies, but his method of comparative studies does not venture beyond qualitative
research.
Laqueur approaches Soviet intelligence from a slightly different angle. He looks
at Soviet intelligence from a historical perspective, first describing its revolutionary roots,
13 Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,”in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 83.14 Ibid.15 Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books,1985), 201-251.16 Ibid, 201.17 Ibid, 228, 231.
9
then moving to its most recent structure.18 He describes the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the other communist nations as unequal, where the smaller nations tend
to aid the Soviets.19 Laqueur’s historical approach is different than his methods used to
compare the various open societies. The dichotomy in approaches makes it difficult to
have a transnational comparison. One example is his description of the Soviet Union’s
intelligence structure – he focuses more on the weaknesses in their operations, rather than
comparing different agencies to one another.20 While he explains in some length about
the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers in open societies, he
glazes over the subject when writing about the Soviet system. Instead, his focus remains
more on its historical development and current defects.21
Other comparative studies use the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) model to
compare intelligence communities. Scholar Robert Jervis says the role of intelligence is
the “missing dimension” in international relations and advocates using the CMR model.22
There are some interesting parallels between CMR studies and other studies analyzing
relations between civilian authorities and intelligence services. According to Jervis, the
general view of intelligence services and militaries is that they “should be strong,
efficient, and professionalized, but on the other hand they should not set their own goals
and they must respond to civilian authority…We want the military and intelligence to be
18 Ibid, 233-248.19 Ibid, 249-250.20 Ibid, 248-252.21 There are a number of writings on the defects of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and Laqueur’sdiscussion is not entirely out of context. A more recent writing on this subject comes from MichaelHerman in Intelligence Services in the Information Age. Herman discusses the role of the intelligenceservices in under Stalin and how their assessments were intentionally subjective. This continued afterStalin and exemplifies one difference between western intelligence and non-western intelligence. SeeMichael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers,2001), 16-19.22 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming Intelligence:Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin, Texas:University of Texas Press, 2007), xix.
10
under civilian control but also to resist illegitimate orders”.23 Studies using the CMR
analogy generally fall into two broad categories, intelligence in modern democracies and
intelligence in emerging democracies. The overall focus in each category is how to
increase democratic civilian control over the intelligence organization of a given
country.24
Democratic civilian control is possible by giving legal oversight authority to the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. According to authors Steven
Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, a favorite oversight mechanisms used by governmental
bodies is budgetary review.25 They argue that in modern democracies, executive bodies
exercise budgetary control through advisory departments, such as the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).26 However, they are clear that budgetary review is not
the only oversight tool at the disposal of the executive bodies. Boraz and Bruneau both
agree that legislative bodies are able to control intelligence activities through budgetary
control and fund allocation.27 Legislative bodies accomplish budgetary oversight by
establishing oversight and appropriations committees.28 The CMR model analyzes
intelligence spending as a way to keep these organizations under the control of elected
officials, and ultimately to learn about the effective practices of well-performing nations.
However, these comparative case studies tend to introduce a certain level of
Western-bias into their methods. This creates two problems. The first is whether or not a
nation is measurably democratic. For countries conceptualized as undemocratic, the
23 Ibid, xiii.24 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, “Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” inReforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau andSteven Boraz (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007), 331.25 Ibid, 14.26 Ibid, 3027 Ibid, 15.28 Ibid, 45.
11
national intelligence system is automatically exempt from study. If the goal is to observe
how various democratic nations maintain or create civilian control over their intelligence
services, countries such as China or Burma, which are generally seen as undemocratic,
cannot be studied for comparison. The likely underpinning argument for this point-of-
view is that civilian control is desirable.
The second problem addresses the subjectivity of what is desirable. Civilian
control is desirable for whom? Iran has a standardized election process, yet would the
West prefer to deal with the Supreme Council or the former Shah? If the ultimate
purpose of using the CMR model to study national intelligence systems is to learn how to
increase civilian control, then it is preferable to study Iran under the Supreme Council.
Using CMR as model creates the assumption that more civilian control is a good thing
(the researcher is inclined to agree). However, the Western bias that enters into these
studies results in inappropriate comparisons. These comparisons may include budgetary
reviews to satisfy the old adage “follow the money” but not to study transnational
spending patterns.
A third body of comparative literature might counter cultural bias, as it attempts
to gather knowledge about non-western intelligence systems. This literature comes from
native contributors and it provides descriptions of the strategic intelligence environment
of a non-Western country.29 According to one author, the primary purpose for this
accumulated research is to,
Provide some counterweight to the liberal democratic domination of theliterature, especially Anglo-American. Specifically…it is important todescribe and analyze a wider range and variety of national intelligencesystems in order to counter any simplistic assumptions that Anglo-
29 Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 1.
12
American models provide a reliable guide to present or, necessarily, futurearrangements elsewhere.30
As the quote suggests, studying other intelligence systems can allow for greater self-
inspection, may result in empirical material suitable for comparison, and can counter the
biases built into the CMR model.31 However, these studies are generally inconsistent in
the intelligence attributes they analyze. Some of these studies describe the internal
structure of an intelligence system, while others discuss issues relating to civilian
oversight. In short, Laqueur’s problems manifest themselves once again, only now it is
in a multi-polar world.
Some of these studies are subsections of defense sector reviews – likely a result of
their publishing venues. For instance, Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan write
about the military forces of nation-states in the Persian Gulf.32 Their study reviews nine
countries, each of which includes a section titled “Paramilitary, Security, Police, and
Intelligence Forces”.33 These sections include a brief biographical background along
with limited quantitative data. Yet, many of these defense sector reviews tend to
emphasize the military aspect over the intelligence component. An example of a robust
defense review is The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001, edited by Shai Feldman
and Yiftah Shapir. The review gives a weapons inventory for twenty-one Middle East
countries.34 The authors provide general information about individual economic and
30 Ibid.31 This point is articulated by Peter Gill, although he does indicate what “material” can produce empiricaldata. See Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of SecurityIntelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York:Routledge, 2007), 83.32 See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars(Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007).33 Ibid.34 Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001 (Massachusetts:MIT Press, 2001).
13
arms procurement programs for each country – only after which do they give an order-of-
battle for each military branch. Exploring countries in such a comprehensive manner
allows the authors to create international benchmarks and compare levels of military
prowess. Studies this detailed are not present in the current body of comparative studies
of intelligence.
Another example of a defense sector review with a subsection on intelligence is
Jane’s Information Group. Its Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library attempts to
provide a comprehensive list of entities related to every nation’s security apparatus. It is
a very valuable resource for those looking to obtain quick and general information about
the security situation in a country. For many nations, the library is also successful in
identifying their various intelligence agencies. While the information most pertinent to
this study comes from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, the majority of
the company’s intelligence related information is in Jane’s Intelligence Review and
Intelligence Weekly – albeit in qualitative form.
While some comparative studies discuss the interaction within the described
national intelligence system, others provide a detailed account of the weapon systems in
possession of each country. Each provides a response in a narrative format. As with all
comparative studies, there is a certain measure of variance between each observed
country. According to Peter Gill, the variance in national approaches reflects the
conditions of the individual nation itself.35 In western democracies, writers tend to
describe intelligence as something in need of reform, whereas in non-western nations,
35 Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al. (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 15.
14
they are entities to support the ruling party.36 Nevertheless, these contributors add to the
comparative body of intelligence studies, although, they are a reflection of the qualitative
approach.
Self-Reporting Countries
One body of literature relative to this thesis consists of countries opting to publish
information about their individual intelligence organizations and programs. Although
uncommon in most of the world, self-reporting can provide a wealth of information.
Self-reporting countries can provide unique views of those within the intelligence
establishment, as well as insight on the organization’s operations or how they interact
with top decision-makers. It gives other qualitative information about their internal
arrangements, decision-making process, and other data that is also useful for comparative
research.
Specifically, self-reporting countries are important to this thesis because they
contain budgetary and workforce data. Quantitative data is necessary to create a
benchmark and begin creating estimates in any study with unknowns. Thus, this
quantitative data allows the study to estimate unknown intelligence spending and
personnel – the explanation of this process is in Chapter 3.
There are various reasons why a country would publish its intelligence
community’s budgetary and personnel data. Some countries report their intelligence
budgets because of their own rules and regulations, generally in an attempt to provide
oversight. The US is an example of a country which requires its intelligence community
to regularly report its budget. Yet there are some drawbacks to how it reports. For
36 Ibid.
15
instance, reporting the intelligence budget does not occur on an annual or semi-annual
basis, only periodically with no set schedule. Infrequent and irregular reporting is a
problem for researchers attempting to create a trend analysis for a case study.
Fortunately, this study is not trying to analyze spending at the individual country level,
and therefore the most recent published data ought to suffice.
The US also demonstrates another problem with self-reported budgetary data. In
previous reported amounts, the US exempted the budget for the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP). Created in 2005, the MIP represents all intelligence spending under the
Department of Defense.37 Similar defense programs – such as the Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities (TIARA) – formerly encompassed the department’s spending, and
were not disclosed.38 Excluding part of the total intelligence budget is a common
problem. When nations do report their intelligence spending, it tends to only represent
certain programs or agencies. Nevertheless, the solution to this problem usually requires
more research.
The obvious problem with reporting individual programs – or agencies – is that it
becomes a bit more complex in counting, or more specifically, ensuring that none are
absent from the total. Canada is one example. Although it is not legally required, each
agency includes a budget within its own annual report. These reports usually discuss
operations, ability to meet customer demands, and budgetary data. While much of the
qualitative information here assists this thesis by ensuring the agency meets Johnson’s
conceptual framework, it does not identify other agencies or programs. To be sure that
37 Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Issues for Congress," US Library of Congress, OrderCode IB10012, May 9, 2006, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66506.pdf.38 Ibid.
16
one identified the correct number of intelligence entities, secondary sources must be
consulted.
These problems are not unique to financial matters. Indeed, similar problems
exist with sources that report on personnel. One example is Japan, which publishes a lot
of information on their intelligence establishment. However, the Land of the Rising Sun
has five distinct intelligence agencies – which apparently do not report to a single
oversight entity. The end result is that, while information exists about the employment
practices of the Japanese intelligence agencies, it becomes somewhat difficult to correctly
identify each one and find its total personnel.
Nevertheless, the nations that do self-report intelligence data are valuable to this
study. While the reports are sometimes dense and qualitative, the quantitative data –
budgets and personnel figure – are like golden nuggets of information. In many cases,
reporting these figures is a matter of legality, while others report simply due to agency
practice. This body of literature, nations which opt to publish quantitative data, is far
from being universal – most are generally considered part of Western society.
Regardless, the geographical spread of self-reporting nations is worldwide.
Systematic Studies of Intelligence
Despite the lack of comprehensive quantitative research, there are two prominent
studies attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies. Each study has
substantial benefits and provides a solid starting point for quantitative research.
However, each study approaches cataloging their information by using different methods.
Uniformity between these studies is certainly lacking. Before discussing them further, it
17
is important to briefly review the suitability of using a comparative case study design for
large-scale projects.
According to Michael Collier, Director of Research at Florida International
University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, the purpose for conducting
comparative studies is to identify variance among the measured attributes.39 Measuring
variance allows the observer to identify diversity and determine how different attributes
may result in the same outcome. He says,
Often qualitative and quantitative analysis tools are used incorrectly incomparative studies…the goal or strategy of comparative research is todiscover diversity among cases. Quantitative methods assume that allcausal factors (independent variables) work the same against the outcomefactor (dependent variable) being explained. In comparative analysis, it isassumed that there is more than one causal path to the same outcome.40
Collier points out that comparative research identifies diversity and only can apply to a
moderate number of case studies, say 50 or so.41 For studies with more than 50 cases, the
researcher must move away from the comparative case study format and use statistical
methods.42
One project that uses the comparative case study design to systematically catalog
national intelligence communities is Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook by
Robert Henderson. Henderson attempts to create a comprehensive list of intelligence
agencies in 50 countries.43 Brassey’s Yearbook “is intended to provide such a
background reference guide”.44 For the purposes of comparison, this “reference guide”
39 Michael Collier, “A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts,” Defense IntelligenceJournal, 14, no. 2 (2005), 22.40Ibid, 26.41 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey’s Inc, 2003).44 Ibid, x
18
structures its information into two broad categories, country briefings and countries
studies. For each country Henderson compares the following attributes:45
System of Government National Intelligence Community National Security Legislation Intelligence Oversight International Intelligence Relationships Recent activities
Both categories, country studies and country briefings, contain a section of each listed
attribute. However, each country lacks completeness and uniformity in its data. For
example, Henderson’s Costa Rican country study says of intelligence oversight,
“Reportedly, there is a Legislative Assembly Committee with responsibility for
legislative review of the security and police forces”.46 This brief description includes
only the name of the legislative body and their technical area of oversight. Henderson
does not explain the historical context of the country’s intelligence oversight, officials
charged with overseeing intelligence agencies, or the source for this information. This is
a marked difference from the next country study, Estonia. For intelligence oversight,
Henderson includes the name of the oversight authorities, the historical run-up to the
current system, notable oversight figures, and the source of the information.47
While Henderson lacks uniformity in completeness of each predetermined
attribute, he effectively creates a reference guide for future studies. His goal is not to
create a methodologically correct book of case studies. Henderson wants to provide
future researchers with a starting point. As a result, many of his country studies contain
relevant information pertinent to this thesis.
45 Ibid, xi46 Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey’s Inc, 2003), 248.47 Ibid, 258-259.
19
Another study attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies is a subset
of the Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), an ongoing project by the Federation of
American Scientists (FAS). This section of the IRP is dedicated toward finding and
classifying any available information on any intelligence agency.48 Each country has
information discussing their national intelligence agencies. The individual listings
generally have two sections. The first section contains documents specifically about the
intelligence agencies. For example, the IRP lists India’s three different ministries with
intelligence agencies.49 The second section contains information about sources and
background areas for future research. Looking again at the entry for India, the sourcing
section has two entries; the first is a study by Ronald Kostoff of the US Department of
the Navy, which reviews Indian defense research literature.50 The second source links to
Bharat-Rakshak, a news-like consortium with different Indian military websites
available.51 Each source provides a valuable starting place for future research.
The IRP’s website on the world’s different intelligence agencies is a repository of
information with limited analysis. It is best called a research library, not a study. Barring
countries with well-known intelligence agencies, each country entry links to either a
document on FAS’s website or to another external source. Like Henderson, the FAS’s
IRP provides resources, much like a specialized library or database.
These sources amount to correlated data and not congregate findings or
assessments. Previous qualitative methods used to describe the world’s intelligence
48 To see the IRP’s list of countries with complied information on their intelligence agencies, see John Pike,World Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/index.html.49 John Pike, India Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/index.html.50 Ibid. To read Kostoff’s study, see Ronald N. Kostoff, et al., Assessment of India's Research Literature,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/research.pdf.51 Ibid. To view Bharat-Rakshak, see Bharat-Rakshak, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/.
20
systems are relevant when looking at individual countries, and understanding other
methods to achieve civilian control over intelligence services is important. However, the
lack of quantitative studies describing intelligence communities provides an excellent
opportunity for advancement, particularly in testing Loch Johnson’s correlation between
intelligence activity and national wealth. This study’s specific goal is to quantitatively
determine the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry, although it expects to
identify Lock’s relationship. To that end, the researcher expects the aggregated amount
spent on intelligence to near 100 billion United States Dollars (USD), and the total
number of people working within the worldwide community to be about 500,000.
21
METHODOLOGY
This study uses a quantitative descriptive research design because it allows for the
classification of a sample population’s characteristics in a systematic way.52 For each
country, the study measures the following interval data – intelligence spending,
personnel, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This study uses the definition of GDP
given by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The researcher collected intelligence
spending and personnel information on individual countries using open sources, primarily
from the internet. The data also comes from traditional academic sources, such as books,
journals, and conference papers. However, not all budgetary and personnel information
is readily available for every country. The study does estimate some of the intelligence
spending and personnel data. The following chapter explains the process used to identify
and estimate the different spending and personnel numbers of the world’s intelligence
industry.
This chapter also explains how the researcher collated the intelligence spending of
individual nations into standardized units, such as dollars valued at a certain year.
Quantifying the set of data allowed for cross-country comparisons. However, problems
arose when unifying the datasets and this affected the standardizing process. The last
section describes the methods used to resolve these classification problems, specifically
52 This concept and other methodological approaches are discussed in Ronald Hunter and Mark Dantzker,Research Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice: A Primer, 2nd ed. (Boston: Jones & Bartlett,2005), 98-100,http://books.google.com/books?id=Z0sDhvGkomgC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=descriptive+historical+design&source=bl&ots=CSla94hG0K&sig=-8ayiRuBBsQ7dp0OICv7dMOGjD8&hl=en&ei=M0whSsrLG4aHtgeK_7jCBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#PPP1,M1.
22
how this study dealt with the definitional inconsistencies of different personnel types,
such as full-time, part-time, and contacted employees.
Data Collection
According to the Congressional Research Service, open source information comes
from newspapers, journals, radio, television, and the internet.53 Collecting information
on intelligence spending and employment came primarily from sources on the internet.
The data also came from other sources, such as scholarly journals, trade publications, and
congressional research documents.
This thesis limits the scope of collection to the 195 sovereign nation-states
recognized by the United States State Department – with the exception of the Holy See
(Vatican City). These states form the basis of the data. The Vatican is not included
because there are no GDP estimates to indicate its national wealth. Attempting to
measure this indicator would likely present a problem, as most of the Vatican’s income
comes from outside its territorial boundaries. The Vatican’s external assets and
economic activity cannot be included in a GDP estimate under the BEA’s definition of
GDP, which it says is “the value of final goods and services produced in [a country] in a
given period of time”.54 With the exception of minor goods, such as tourist mementos
and museum fees, the primary sources of income for Vatican City come from external
sources. Therefore, its GDP estimate is tricky at best to determine.
53 Congressional Research Service, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” US Libraryof Congress, Order Code RL34270, December 5, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf.54 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Measuring the Economy: A Primer on GDP and the National Incomeand Product Accounts,” US Department of Commerce, September 2007, 2,http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipa_primer.pdf.
23
The list of 195 countries does not include dependencies or other areas that are not
independent nations. Excluding these areas is consistent with the US State Department’s
definitions.55 The United Nations also does not consider these territories as independent
nations, and they are not recognized as Member States.56
The agencies listed within each country are intelligence agencies. To the best of
his ability, the researcher excluded government agencies with characteristics unique to
law enforcement. In some cases, the distinction between intelligence and law
enforcement is blurred. One example is the treatment of financial intelligence units (FIU)
as members of an intelligence community. While some FIUs act as members of a
nation’s intelligence community, others do not. The researcher addressed this issue by
generally excluding agencies with mandates requiring them to enforce financial
regulations, compliance matters, and tax evasion – when it relates to money laundering.
In other cases, there is no distinction between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. The researcher used the best available information to establish if such an
agency was consistent with the conceptual framework as explained in Chapter 2.
Collection from Internet Sources
The researcher used three different methods to collect relevant information from
the internet. The first method consisted of keyword and phrase searches using terms
most likely to generate results of an individual country’s intelligence spending and
personnel. Some keywords and phrases resulted in the desired information, but not all.
55 See United States State Department, Independent States in the World,http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm#note4.56 To see the list of Member-States of the United Nations, see United Nations, Member States of the UnitedNations, http://www.un.org/en/members/ [accessed June 1, 2009].
24
Most of the search results gave supplementary information, such as oversight committees
or annual reports about the intelligence community of a country. The most useful results
were noted for future use.
After using this initial search criterion, the researcher adjusted the terms to
specify the intelligence agencies. Adjusting the search criterion increased the precision
of the results. The process of searching initial keywords and phrases, then refining, is a
matter of trial and error. After finding the relevant information, the researcher recorded
the relevant data and year of publication. This method was applied to every country.
In the second search method, the researcher utilized online journals and websites
with dedicated sections on intelligence. Journals like the International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Defense Intelligence Journal, and the
Intelligence and National Security Journal, provided some keywords and phrases for
future use. While some of the journals are available print, many more are available on
the internet. Additionally, their online versions tended to be more suitable, as they are
easier to conduct keyword searches.
The researcher searched these journals in a very systematic manner, where the
most recent editions’ articles were examined for relevant information. The only articles
searched had descriptions about intelligence agencies or communities – however, the
journal article titles provided most of the information necessary to determine if they
contained any relevant information. After recording the relevant data and citation from
the journal publication, the researcher continued on to the previous journal edition,
searching through it for relevant information. Each scholarly journal received this
process.
25
Other online publishers that consistently report, or have dedicated sections, on
intelligence agencies received the same systematic search approach. Some of these
organizations include the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Jane's Sentinel
Country Risk Assessments Library, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF), and GlobalSecurity.org. The researcher also applied the
systematic search approach to these sources, although the process slightly differed. From
a researcher’s standpoint, the primary difference between these sources and scholarly
journals is how they categorize their information. The scholarly journals generally
organize their content around date, whereas these online publishers organize their content
around national lines. This required a slight change in systematically searching for data.
Instead of searching these online sources based on publication date, the researcher
searched for data along national lines, systematically going through each publisher’s list
of countries, one at a time.
Government websites proved to be another useful source for information. As
previously discussed, some countries’ intelligence agencies publish a regular report of
spending, while in other countries the governments require the agencies to publish
general budgetary reports every so often. An example of a country that requires annual
reporting is New Zealand. Section 34 and 70I of the 1989 New Zealand Public Finance
Act requires the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service to undergo an annual audit by
the internal Auditor-General.57 Comparatively, the United States Constitution requires “a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditure of all public Money shall
57 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Financial Reporting,” House of Representatives, Home >Annual Reports > 2006 > Financial Reporting, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/financial.aspx.
26
be published from time to time”.58 In practice however, the publication of this
information does not occur on a set schedule, but rather infrequently.59 Nevertheless,
when self-reporting does exist it is generally attainable through government websites.
The researcher used a systematic search approach similar to the method used for online
publishers, in order to gather this information.
In the third method, the researcher used “Google Alerts,” a free “push” service
from Google.com. The researcher created a generic Boolean search criterion and set it at
the comprehensive collection level. This setting covers news, blogs, and videos.
However, using Google Alerts requires the user to first identify terms likely to produce
results. The researcher first identified the names of a particular country’s intelligence
agencies, generally both in English and the native language. After identifying these
agencies, the researcher entered their various names into the Google Alert search field
using Boolean format. The reporting of these results generally occurred on a daily basis.
In order to assist the translating of non-English results found by these three search
methods, the researcher used the website FreeTranslation.com. The owner of this
website is a service company that provides language translation software to global
corporations.60 FreeTranslation.com has two useful features: first, it has a single word
translator. The user inputs the text from the original language and selects the language of
the translation. Second, it has an entire webpage translator, where, the user inputs the
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and then FreeTranslation.com coverts it from the
originating language to the desired language.
58 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article I, Section 9, Clause 7.59 Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues,” US Library ofCongress, Order Code 94-261, Updated February 15, 2007, 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/94-261.pdf.60 SLD, Company Profile, http://www.sdl.com/en/company/company/.
27
Despite the benefits provided from using FreeTranslation.com, the website does
not have a comprehensive list of languages. The text translator can only translate into
English from the following languages: Spanish, French, German, Italian, Dutch,
Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese. A similar restriction applies to their webpage
translator. The webpage translator can only translate to English: Spanish, French,
German, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese. FreeTranslation.com also does not translate
Portable Document Format (PDFs) – a rather large drawback. Despite these limitations,
the service did assist in researching general information about foreign intelligence
agencies.
Collection from Other Sources
Data collected also came from other sources not previously mentioned. These
sources include journals not online, trade publications, and congressional documents.
The most common way in which the researcher identified these resources was cited
footnotes in other sources. Throughout the data collection process, the researcher
continually checked the sourcing of relevant data, which not only provided more
resources, but also allowed the researcher to better gauge the information’s reliability and
credibility. For example, one document from the Congressional Research Service
document gave Spain’s intelligence spending for 2006.61 The report’s authors cite
discussions with Spanish officials as the source of this information. Checking the
sourcing also led the researcher to further research that sometimes yielded more relevant
61 Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,"US Library of Congress, Order Code RL33573, July 24, 2006, 34,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.
28
data. A footnote may contain a book, report, or other primary source publications, which
can led to other relevant studies.
Other Relevant Information Collection
In addition to collecting information on intelligence spending and personnel, the
researcher also identified the corresponding year of the published data, and GDPs of the
individual countries. The purpose of citing the year of publication and the GDPs of
individual countries is to assist in comparing and estimating unknown datasets. The GDP
figures come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was chosen for its
consistent reporting periods. Also included are the names of the national intelligence
agencies, indicated intelligence community, or intelligence spending program. The
names of the intelligence agencies are not necessarily relevant to this study, but they are
available for reference purposes only. The researcher used Microsoft Excel to collate this
information in one single spreadsheet. Under each country listing is the name of an
intelligence agency and its corresponding budgetary and personnel data. However, if the
only information found represented the national intelligence community or spending
program, then it is indicated, and not necessarily each agency.
Establishing Webpage Credibility
This thesis uses Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet to estimate the
credibility of online sources. This Worksheet comes from Norman’s study, How to
Identify Credible Sources on the Web, in which he seeks to determine a “valid criteria for
29
evaluating the credibility of open source Web sites”.62 It is the first quantitative study
which aims to create a methodologically sound criterion for establishing a website’s
credibility, while targeting its use for open-source analysts. Previous studies either
addressed the issue as tangent to a larger study or were methodologically flawed.
According to Norman, there are several factors to consider when determining the
credibility of a website; corroboration is the most influential criterion.63 The worksheet
applies only to websites and not to online editions of journals or other primarily
hardcover sources. Each online source has a credibility rating recorded with its citation.
The purpose of tracking credibility is incidental to this study – it merely provides a
critique to non-peer reviewed sources.
Process for Estimating Unknown Spending
This thesis uses a three step process for estimating the unknown intelligence
spending of an individual country. In short, the researcher created a ratio using the
known intelligence spending and GDP from countries with the available information.
Once identifying each individual ratio for countries with known intelligence spending,
the researcher created an average of all the ratios. By using this averaged ratio, the study
identified the unknown intelligence spending for the remaining countries. GDP acts as
the independent variable, while intelligence spending represents the dependent variable.
GDP is independent because it represents national wealth – the variable that influences
the country’s intelligence spending. The following three steps explain how the study
62 Dax Norman, "How to Identify Credible Sources on The Web,," (Master's Thesis, Joint MilitaryIntelligence College, December 2001), viii, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/5-CompleteThesis-May08.pdf.63 Dax Norman, “Websites You Can Trust,” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006), 36,http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
30
created the averaged ratio and how it was used to identify the intelligence spending for
countries without this information. The steps are:
Step 1: Average the known intelligence spending of an individual country against its
GDP. Record this ratio of known intelligence spending and GDP for future use. Each
country with reported intelligence spending receives a ratio based on their reported
information. Each country’s ratio reflects its intelligence spending compared to its GDP.
Step 2: Create an average from all of the ratios in order determine a single general ratio
for intelligence spending. Although statistical outliers generally diminish the overall
accuracy of a distribution curve, they are included in this ratio. This is because it allows
the ratio more flexibility when estimating the spending.
Step 3: Apply this single averaged ratio to each country with unknown intelligence
spending. The estimation of a nation’s unknown intelligence spending was identified
through cross-multiplication, using the GDP of the country and the averaged ratio.
Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel
For countries with reported intelligence spending but not personnel, the researcher
used a four step process. This process treats intelligence spending as an independent
variable in order to estimate a country’s intelligence personnel. To estimate the number
of intelligence professionals in countries with unknown personnel, the researcher
identified two countries with similar levels of intelligence spending and with reported
employees. The researcher then took the average of these two countries’ employees and
applied it to the country with unknown personnel. The depended variable here is
31
unknown personnel, as the estimated figure relies on intelligence spending. The
individual steps in the process are:
Step 1: Identify the two most similar countries on the basis of reported intelligence
spending. These two countries must have both reported spending and personnel. One
country must have a lower level of reported intelligence spending than the country with
unknown personnel. The other country must have higher reported intelligence spending
than the country with unknown personnel.
Step 2: The country with the lower reported intelligence spending and personnel is set as
the low range, while the other country with reported intelligence spending and personnel
is set as the high range. The country with unreported personnel must fall somewhere in
between the high and low ranges.
Step 3: Average the personnel for both the high and low ranges. This results in a ratio of
the two ranges.
Step 4: Apply this ratio to the country with unknown personnel.
There are also countries with neither reported intelligence spending nor personnel.
For these countries, the researcher used the previously described process to estimate
intelligence spending. This included each of the three steps, where estimates use a
general ratio based on GDP. After estimating the country’s intelligence spending, finding
its personnel is a matter of following the pre-described four step process.
Standardizing Spending Units
The information for each country’s intelligence spending often came from
different periods in time and in different currencies. In order to standardize the monetary
32
units, the researcher converted the amounts from the originating currency to US Dollars
(USD). After converting the units, the amount still remained in the reported year. In
order to unify the estimated amounts into a single year, the study uses 2008 used as a
baseline year. To convert the original currency to USD, the researcher used the website
Oanda.com. This website provides free “Internet-based forex trading and currency
information services”.64 The advantage of using Oanda.com is that it allows the user to
convert currencies using previous rates. The user can determine the desired amount
currency to convert, set the rate used, and then pick the expressed currency.65
Standardizing Personnel Definitions
While the currency data may differ, personnel information suffers from
conflicting definitions. Some sources include only full-time employees, while others
include contract-based personnel. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service reports its total as the number of full-time equivalent employees.66 However, the
US includes approximately 56,000 contractors with its total intelligence personnel.67 In
order to come to terms with the differences in classification, the researcher only included
full-time equivalent employees directly employed by the government agency. In most
situations, the reported figure did not further divide personnel into separate categories.
The researcher accepted these figures as full-time equivalents.
64 OANDA, About OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/site/oanda/com_index.shtml.65 OANDA, “FXConverter - Currency Converter for 164 Currencies,”http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.66 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Public Report 2006-2007,” Canadian Security IntelligenceService (Gatineau: Public Works and Government Services, 2007), 15, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf.67Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009,http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf.
33
RESULTS
Research into the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry produced a
number of interesting results. This chapter will give the overall findings produced by the
methods described in Chapter 3. This chapter’s first section will discuss the patterns of
intelligence spending, while the second section will describe the workforce of the
intelligence industry. The third section will give a brief narrative description of the
identified intelligence agencies. The fourth and final section will provide a summary of
the results.
The Totals: Spending
Using the described methods, this study identifies that the world’s intelligence
industry spends an estimated
$106,961,604,308.01 United States
Dollars (USD) on an annual basis. The
relationship between intelligence
spending and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is positive, where for every 947
units of GDP there are two units of
intelligence spending. The United States
spends the most on intelligence. As shown in Figure 4.1, the US spends about $75 billion
dollars, approximately 65 percent of the total amount. According to statistics from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US’s GDP represents only 23.5 percent of the
USIntelligenceSpending:$75 Billion
65%
WorldIntelligenceSpending:
$31.96Billion35%
Figure 4.1: Total World IntelligenceSpending
Total Spending: $106,961,604,308.01
34
world’s entire GDP.68 When comparing the US’s portion of intelligence spending to its
proportion of the world’s GDP, is it clear that the US spends far more proportionally on
intelligence than the rest of the world. Its share of the intelligence pie is roughly double
that of its share of GDP.
Including the US, 20 nations represent the top ten percent of intelligence spenders
- those that spend $263,307,103.72
or more. Their accumulated
spending – indicated in Figure 4.2
– accounts for about 93 percent of
the total amount, or
$99,507,696,851.13. Compare this
to the same countries’ accumulated
GDP, about $42,127,856,999,999,
or 69.42 percent of the world’s total 2008 GDP.69 However, not all of these 20 countries
top the list of nations with the largest GDP.70 The average point-to-point variation in
intelligence spending among the top ten percent of spenders is $3,933,496,948.26.
68 This figure uses the International Monetary Fund’s world GDP estimate to derive the number 23.5percent. The amount is $60,689,812,000,000. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic OutlookDatabase, Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8.69 This figure uses the IMF’s GDP estimate for the years of the intelligence spending - the years which thestudy identified intelligence spending. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic OutlookDatabase, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.70 For the complete list of GDP estimate for 2008, see International Monetary Fund, World EconomicOutlook Database, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx. Or, to view a quick total, see “Listof countries by GDP (nominal),” Wikipedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)#cite_note-0 [accessed June 2, 2009].
Top TenPercent
Spending:$99.5Billion93%
RemainingWorld
Spending:$7.6
Billion7%
Figure 4.2: Top Ten PercentIntelligence Spending
35
However, excluding the US when measuring variation produces an average of
$248,494,801.33.
The other 175 nations, or the bottom 90 percent, spend the remaining seven
percent of the total intelligence figure, or $7,453,907,456.88. These countries have a
total GDP of $12,819,519,999,996, comprising about 31.12 percent of the world’s 2008
GDP.71 When comparing this population’s proportion of intelligence spending to its
proportion of GDP, it again demonstrates unevenness. The bottom 90 percent of
intelligence spenders is similar to the bottom 90 percent of countries with the lowest
GDP. The average intelligence spending for these countries is $42,593,756.90.
A bar graph is perhaps the best method for displaying the spread of intelligence
spending by each country. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows countries sorted by intelligence
spending. The countries most close to the y-axis have the highest intelligence spending,
while the countries farthest away, along the x-axis, have the lowest intelligence spending.
For the purpose of increasing clarity, numbers are in place of country names. Appendix
B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest has a list of each number’s
corresponding country, along with their individual intelligence spending. Additionally,
the y-axis in Figure 4.3 is set as logarithmic – its scale increasing by the power 10 – in
order to improve the visual display of the data.
There are two trend lines that seem to be the best fit for the data, power and
exponential. The first line is solid black and represents the exponential trend line. The
second line is a dotted black, representing the power trend line. The solid black trend line
71See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World Economic OutlookDatabase, April 2009,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8.
36
increases steadily upward from right to left. Given the logarithmic scaling, this
movement is consistent with what one expects from data which is exponential. The
dotted black trend line increases right to left in a similar way, however, there is a steady
curve that eventually hooks sharply upwards as it nears the y-axis. The researcher
computed the R-Squared (R2) values – which measures how well a trend line will match
with the data – in order to assist in analyzing the trend lines. The R2 value for the
exponential trend line is 0.940 and the R2 value for the power trend line is 0.835. It is
likely that the dataset, the individual intelligence spending, follows slightly more of an
exponential curve rather than a curve that obeys a power law. Nevertheless, the
proximity of the two R2 values to one another is notable, as it indicates that the dataset
may still follow a power law. Further research into identifying the minimum x (Xmin) and
the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is necessary. This step is necessary to
determine the approximated scaling exponent of the curve, if indeed it does follow a
power law curve. After finding the scaling exponent, it ought to be relatively simple to
accurately say this data does or does not follow a power law curve.
One interesting finding of this study is the difference the US has on deriving
statistical information from the data. For instance, including the US in estimating the
mean amount spent on intelligence results in an average of $548,521,047.73. However,
without the US the average drops dramatically, to $164,750,537.67. The standard
deviation with the US is $5,389,872,754.45, without the US it is $576,959,565.88. The
differences in the two means and standard deviations are noteworthy. On one hand, this
information suggests that the US is an outlier and it should not be included when
calculating this statistical information. On the other hand, the US appears to play a very
37
38
minor role in shaping the ratio used to estimate unknown intelligence spending. The
overall difference in the amount estimated – when using the measuring ratio that includes
the US, verses using the ratio that excludes the US – is about five percent.
When including the US, the average ratio of intelligence spending to GDP is
2/947, also expressed as 0.000961961. To determine this ratio, the researcher limited the
dataset to countries with known intelligence spending and GDP. The ratio here found a
total of $19,279,129,862.15 in estimated spending. The standard deviation of the ratio
group – the sample used to estimate – is 1/798, or 0.001368871. When excluding the US
from calculating the average of these ratios, the result is 1/442, or 0.0008665 – only
slightly different from the original 2/947. Using 1/442 to find unknown intelligence
spending results in a total of $17,365,946,777.38 in estimated spending. The difference
between using the ratio 2/947 and 1/442 is $1,378,694,524.39, an overall difference of
5.22 percent.
The US clearly spends far more on intelligence than any other nation, from any
standpoint. However, when looking at its ratio of intelligence spending to GDP, the US
does not necessarily spend in disproportionate amount. Its affect on the total spending
figure is notable, but its affect on the estimating process is not. Table 4.1 reflects this
information by showing the US’s slight affect on the estimating ratio.
39
Table 4.1: Affect of US on Estimating
Population
(US Included)
Population
(US Excluded)
Average Spending $548,521,047.73 $164,750,537.67
Standard Deviation $5,389,872,754.45 $576,959,565.88
Ratios for Estimating 2/947 1/442
Percent Difference of Estimates 5.22%
As for the countries that comprise the top ten percent of intelligence spenders,
obvious nations – such as the US, UK, and Russia – are on the list. However, it is
surprising to see the nations not on the top ten percent list. If GDP is the primary
indicator of intelligence spending, then Spain would most certainly make the list with its
1.2 trillion dollar economy.72 Yet sources indicate that it spends about $200,000,000, an
amount far lower than Venezuela, which is part of the top ten percent. A direct
correlation between GDP and intelligence spending may exist, but it is not strongly
indicated here. It is apparent that GDP is a factor when it comes to intelligence spending
but it does not seem to be the primary factor. Further research is necessary to quantify
GDP’s affect on intelligence spending.
72 See Spain’s 2005 GDP at International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, WorldEconomic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.
40
US144,000
13%
Russia172,000
15%
World814,104
72%
The Totals: Personnel
This study identifies the total number of people working in the intelligence
industry as 1,130,104 persons. The two largest employers are the US and Russia who, as
shown in Figure 4.4, jointly employ approximately 28 percent of the total. All other
things being equal, it is logical to assume that because the US spends the most on
intelligence, that it should also employ the most people. However, it employs about
28,000 less than Russia. The US does
employ approximately 56,000
intelligence contractors, however.73
Including them into the calculations
would increase the US’s share, but the
definitions given previously in this
study prohibit non-government workers
from being counted. Regardless, the
US employs about 144,000 people,
resulting in roughly $520,833 in
intelligence spending per person. Its GDP per person is about $99,059,722.
For Russia, its total number of workers is about 172,000, making it the world’s
largest employer of intelligence professionals.74 Although Russia may employ the most
people, it does not come nearly as close as spending the most money. Russia has about
73 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009,http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by the ODNI is200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28 percent ofits workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number of employees isabout 144,000. See Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding True Employee Numbers Says SenatePanel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009, http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/.74 Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru,http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/.
Total Employment: 1,130,104
Figure 4.4: Total Intelligence Employment
41
$18,902.70 in intelligence spending per person – a figure substantially lower than its
American counterpart. This difference is also present when using GDP to calculate a per
person figure, which is $5,752,488. Obviously there are other factors working into the
equation. Given the small scope of this study, the finding here is that there are some
differences in employment practices.
Using the best information available, this thesis finds 21 countries that employ
10,000 or more people. They employ about 61 percent of the world’s total intelligence
workforce, or 689,428 people. As shown in Figure 4.5, the 21 countries come from
various regions around the world – however, some countries listed, such as Camroon and
Algeria, have estimated personnel. The researcher based these estimates on the best
available information and the methods outlined in Chapter 3. The total intelligence
employment of these countries varies, as seen in Figure 4.6. While the US has the
highest intelligence spending per person, $520,833.33, the United Kingdom has the
highest GDP per person, at $229,787,213.11. Panama has the lowest intelligence
spending per person, $1,465.79, and Syria has the lowest GDP per person, $1,567,200.
One interesting country on the list of top intelligence employers is China. China
is third largest intelligence employer in the world with an estimated workforce of 88,050
people, a figure representing about 7.79 percent of the world’s total intelligence industry.
Yet China’s intelligence spending per person is $46,755.19 – 40.42 percent higher than
Russia. Figure 4.7 compares the amounts spent per person by China, Russia, and the
world’s average. Taken at face value, China’s spending per employee is clearly more
consistent with the world average when compared with Russia. China employs less
people but spends more per person than its Russian counterpart.
42
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
Ban
glad
esh
Cam
ero
on
Iraq
Pak
ista
n
Pan
ama
Alg
eria
Egyp
t
Sin
gap
ore
Un
ited
Kin
gdo
m
Luxe
mb
ou
rg
Slo
ven
ia
Cu
ba
Iran
Ind
ia
Swit
zerl
and
Po
rtu
gal
Syri
a
Ro
man
ia
Ch
ina
Un
ited
Stat
es
Ru
ssia
Figure 4.6: Top 21 Intelligence Employers
Country
Pe
op
le
Figure 4.5: Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers
= Top Intelligence Employers
Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance,http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading andcolor alterations are the work of this researcher.
43
Figure 4.7 also says something about Russia. One of three scenarios is likely:
Russia’s identified intelligence spending is grossly inaccurate, the country values
intelligence less than the rest of the world, or the country has drastically different hiring
practices than its peers.
The remaining 90 percent of employers comprise 174 countries, representing 39
percent of the world’s total intelligence workforce, or 440,676 people – shown in Figure
4.8. The average number of persons employed by any given country is 2,533, with a
standard deviation of 2,709. Australia spends the most on its intelligence professionals,
about $1,273,174.83 per person. However, this figure may result from problems with
collection. The country with the second highest intelligence spending per person is
Japan, which spends approximately $1,123,208.36 per employee. Japan’s spending per
person estimate is likely more accurate due to the completeness in data collected on its
workforce. In arguing the correctness of its estimate, this thesis is also arguing that Japan
$0.00
$10,000.00
$20,000.00
$30,000.00
$40,000.00
$50,000.00
$60,000.00
Inte
llige
nce
Spe
nd
ing
Pe
rP
ers
on
Ch
ina
Ru
ssia
Wo
rld
Ave
rage
Figure 4.7: Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person
has the highest intelligence spending per
total comes from the Ministry of Defense’s
spending is an estimate.
One interesting finding
approximately 60 percent
employ 10,000 or more persons, these nations are not necessarily
intelligence spenders. Only six countri
on the list of top intelligence employers
the assumption that a relationship exists between intelligence spending and employment,
yet it does not. Most countries employ between 0 and 2,000 persons in their intelligence
system, as shown in Figure
countries that employ more than 6,000 persons and then again at 14,000. Countries seem
to cluster around employment le
Top Ten Percent
Bottom 90
Employment
the highest intelligence spending per person in the world. Information on Japan’s
Ministry of Defense’s National Institute for Defense Studies, but its
finding is the diversity in intelligence spending per
approximately 60 percent of the world’s intelligence workforce is in
employ 10,000 or more persons, these nations are not necessarily the same as the top
ers. Only six countries with the highest intelligence spending are
intelligence employers – as shown in Figure 4.9. The data should reflect
the assumption that a relationship exists between intelligence spending and employment,
ountries employ between 0 and 2,000 persons in their intelligence
system, as shown in Figure 4.10. There are also notable decreases in the number of
countries that employ more than 6,000 persons and then again at 14,000. Countries seem
employment levels between 0-6,000, and then 8,000-14,000.
Total Employment
Top Ten PercentEmployment
689,428
Bottom 90Percent
Employment440,676
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
Figure 4.8: Bottom 90 PercentEmployment vs. Top Ten Percent
Employment
44
Information on Japan’s
l Institute for Defense Studies, but its
ty in intelligence spending per person. While
in countries that
the same as the top
es with the highest intelligence spending are also
. The data should reflect
the assumption that a relationship exists between intelligence spending and employment,
ountries employ between 0 and 2,000 persons in their intelligence
. There are also notable decreases in the number of
countries that employ more than 6,000 persons and then again at 14,000. Countries seem
14,000.
45
96
36
24
5
13
5 61 2 1 1 1 1 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Nu
mb
er
of
Co
un
trie
s
Employs Between
Figure 4.10: Histogram of Intelligence Employment
# of Countries
Figure 4.9: Countries with Top Spending and Employment
= Top Intelligence Spender andEmployer
Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance,http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading andcolor alterations are the work of this researcher.
46
Other Extracted Results
Research of the 195 sovereign nations identified 246 different national
intelligence agencies.75 Based on the best available information, this list does not include
agencies involved in law enforcement. The average number of intelligence agencies per
country is 1.28. Most of these agencies seem to focus on military or political-strategic
target sets rather than operating and maintaining technological systems. The average
credibility rating for internet sources is 38.56, or somewhere between the medium and
high ranges of Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. Before elaborating further on
credibility, the following paragraphs will discuss the exclusion of certain financial
“intelligence agencies”.
The 246 different agencies identified by this study generally do not include ones
that specialize in, what they list as, “financial intelligence”. The by and large exclusion
of these agencies is due to inconsistent descriptions of their duties, as briefly discussed in
the methodology. For instance, the Canadian Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis
Centre (FINTRAC) says a primary function is to counter terrorist financing,76 while its
mandate requires the agency to “provide law enforcement financial intelligence that
would be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of money laundering offences and
terrorist activity financing offences as well as to provide CSIS [the Canadian Security
75 The figure does not include intelligence agencies of the United States. This is because the intelligencespending of the US is expressed in its budgetary account form, that is, the National Intelligence Program(NIP) or the Military Intelligence Program. The same is true for the United Kingdom which expresses itsintelligence spending via the Single Intelligence Account (SIA). There is some question as whether or notthe Defense Intelligence Staff includes its budget within the SIA – the figure within this study appears toinclude it. For referencing on the SIA, see Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 2007-2008," Parliament of the United Kingdom, ISC 2008/09/064, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc2007-08.pdf.76 To view a FINTRAC’s 2008 Annual Report on its duties, functions, and activities, see FinancialTransactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa: 2008), 22,http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf.
47
and Intelligence Service is the country’s foreign intelligence agency] with financial
intelligence that would be relevant threats to the security of Canada”.77 FINTRAC is an
intelligence agency that participates in collection and analysis, and interacts with the
Canadian intelligence system. Another example is the Saudi Arabian Financial
Investigation Unit, whose first priority is to “handle suspicious financial transactions,
analyze them and prepare reports thereon to submit them to the competent
authorities…and exchanges information with the relevant agencies in Saudi Arabia and
abroad”.78 Despite using the term “investigation” in its title, the entity is Saudi Arabia’s
official financial intelligence unit.79 These agencies differ from that of the Bahamas’
Financial Intelligence Unit, which says it is “The Bahamas’ regulator for anti-money
laundering and prevention of the financing of terrorism”.80 While the unit’s realm of
specialty includes preventing terrorism financing, the definition given here, along with
the Financial Intelligence Unit Act of 2000, clearly describes itself as a regulatory entity
and not an intelligence agency.81 The Bahamas’ description of its Financial Intelligence
77 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Who We Are, http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/fintrac-canafe/1-eng.asp [accessed May 30, 2009].78 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Financial Investigation Unit, Background,http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/safiu/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hT5wBnTwtfY0N3ZxNnA08TwzCDYGdTY6MAE6B8JJK8gamTs4FRmJ-zaVBIgIGboykB3cGpefrhIDtxq7I0RpPHYgdI3gAHcDTQ9_PIz03VL8iNqPDMMlEEACELTPE!/dl2/d1/L0lDU0lKSWdra0EhIS9JTlJBQUlpQ2dBek15cUEhL1lCSkoxTkExTkk1MC13ISEvN181Q1BDSThNMzE4NkU0MEk0NUpNNktFMkMyMQ!!/?WCM_PORTLET=PC_7_5CPCI8M3186E40I45JM6KE2C21_WCM&WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/main/Financial+Investigation/Main/Background/[accessed November 17, 2009]79 The Egmont Group, List of Members, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members/by-region/asia[accessed November 17, 2009].80 Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Welcome to FIU Bahamas,http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/A4AE9BF530DECF23852572C600580BD7.81 See An Act to Provide for the Establishment of a Body to be Known As the Financial Intelligence Unit,the Functions and Powers of That Body, and for Connected Purposes, No. 29 of 2000, Parliament of TheBahamas, December 29, 2000, http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/CC--Other--Compliance+Commission+PDFS/$file/FinIntellUnitAct2000(ConsolidatedVersion).pdf.
48
Unit is consistent with members of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF).
CFATF is,
An organisation of thirty states of the Caribbean Basin, which have agreed toimplement common countermeasures to address the problem of criminal moneylaundering...In Aruba representatives of Western Hemisphere countries, inparticular from the Caribbean and from Central America , convened to develop acommon approach to the phenomenon of the laundering of the proceeds ofcrime...The main objective of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force is toachieve effective implementation of and compliance with its recommendations toprevent and control money laundering and to combat the financing of terrorism.The Secretariat has been established as a mechanism to monitor and encourageprogress to ensure full implementation of the Kingston Ministerial Declaration.82
CFATF’s mandate does not extend to sharing such financial information with intelligence
agencies either within participating countries, or abroad. Simply put, these financial
intelligence units are generally not part of a national intelligence system.83
The 246 intelligence agencies do not generally include intelligence oversight
entities or coordinating agencies. The descriptions given by many these organizations are
not systematically consistent with the definitions of this study, indicating that a
correlation between them and what entities were counted is not possible. However, the
study uses the best possible information available to establish if these oversight entities
were comparable. Examples of these types of organizations are the Argentinean
Secretariat of National Intelligence and the Brazilian Consulting Council of the
Intelligence System. These two entities exemplify oversight and coordinating bodies and
are not comparable to agencies that participate in the coordination and analysis of
information, such as the US’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In
82 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force [CFATF], CFATF OVERVIEW, http://www.cfatf.org/.83 For more information regarding financial Units, The Egmont Group provides a comprehensive startingpoint. The Egmont Group states in its purpose statement that it is an organization created with the intent tocombat money laundering, regardless of the money’s end use. It is an organization that provides amechanism for sharing financial information related to money laundering. See Egmont Group, Statementof Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, June 23, 2004,http://www.egmontgroup.org/files/library_egmont_docs/statement_of_purpose.pdf.
49
short, the purposes and functions of the Secretariat of National Intelligence and the
Consulting Council are not comparable or similar to the ODNI.84 Including these types
of entities creates difficulties in maintaining a consistent conceptual model. Therefore,
the list of 246 different intelligence agencies does not include them.
The study finds its internet-based sources as having an averaged medium to high
rating of credibility. Based on Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet (shown in
Appendix A), the average of all internet sources used is 38.55, or medium to high
credibility. This rating is applicable for about 36 percent of the sources used. Norman’s
Trust Evaluation Worksheet does not apply to the remaining sources. Figure 4.11 is a
histogram displaying the different credibility ranges and the frequency of their
occurrences. The chart indicates that the sources follow a bimodal distribution, with
most falling into either the low or high ranges. The distribution of the data supports the
overall credibility of the internet sources, as, this study would not otherwise have a
quantitative tool to measure them. Furthermore, Norman’s study finds that intelligence
analysts generally require a source to be 75 percent credible to use in an intelligence
product.85 According to Norman’s findings, a 75 percent rating is 35.06 on his Trust
Evaluation Worksheet.86 Therefore, the researcher believes the credibility of this study’s
internet-based sources to be sufficient.
84 For a discussion into the particular differences between organizations which coordinate and overseeverses organizations which primarily coordinate information, see Lucia Dammert, ed., Report of theSecurity Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana deCiencias Sociales, 2007), 99-121; available at http://issuu.com/flacso.chile/docs/ssr_lac.85 Dax Norman, “How to Identify Credible Sources on the Web,” (Master’s Thesis, Joint Military College,December 2001), 63,http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=3&ved=0CBAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdaxrnorman.googlepages.com%2F5-CompleteThesis-May08.pdf&ei=_xwDS56YF9OUnQftxt14&usg=AFQjCNFNfRehUePDuWuIgUUiq0xvcqcDnA.86 Ibid.
50
Summary of Results
The data collected using the methods described in Chapter 3 indicates that the
world’s intelligence industry spends $106,961,604,308.01, employs 1,130,104 persons,
and has at least 246 agencies. Specific country information is in Appendix C: Data for
Individuals Countries. There appears to be an identifiable correlation between GDP and
intelligence spending, albeit not direct, while the personnel estimates seem to have some
interesting per person patterns.
One problem regarding the results is whether or not using GDP can create viable
estimates of intelligence spending. Author Loch Johnson argues that national wealth is
connected to intelligence spending. This study is indirectly exploring his assertion.
Although the correlation is not likely linear, the results presented here show that a
1
16
5
36
00
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40Fr
eq
ue
ncy
Figure: 4.11: Histogram of Source Credibility
51
connection does exist. However, the correlation predicates on the assumption that the
dataset with identified known spending is self-reported in an objective and accurate
manner. In short, the total spending assumes that deception does not play a role. This
may distort the identified correlation between GDP and intelligence spending. The
correlation also assumes that the set of individual country data is complete. There are
two problems with this assumption; first, the datasets are not complete, and second, ever
knowing if they are complete poses a difficult challenge – one will likely never know.
In addition, the total workforce findings hold similar problems. To estimate
personnel, this study uses intelligence spending as the sole metric to define similarity
among countries, thus creating the assumption that a linear correlation exists between the
two. Countries were rank-ordered on the basis of intelligence spending, whether
estimated or not. Yet some countries with similar levels of intelligence spending did not
have similar levels of employment. An example is Romania and South Africa. For both
countries, the researcher identified the total intelligence spending of the two countries –
the difference in spending is about $27,370,657.72, or 6.10 percent. Both Romania and
South Africa have known employment levels, Romania has about 41,800 workers and
South Africa has 3,500 – a difference of 38,300 persons or 84.54 percent! How can two
countries with similar levels of intelligence spending have such drastically different
levels of employment? Obviously other factors are at play. It may be a reflection of
cultural traditions, the use of expensive technology, or due to inaccurate reported data. It
may also indicate that the study’s assumption about the linear relationship between
intelligence spending and personnel is incorrect. The reasons for the discrepancies are
52
plentiful, however, it can be said that this estimating process is acceptable, as it follows a
structured methodology.
53
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the approximate size of the world’s
intelligence industry. The primary indicator to measure its size was intelligence
spending, while the second indicator was the number of people working in such
activities. Using the collection and estimation methods outlined in Chapter 3, this thesis
found a total of $106 billion United States Dollars (USD) in intelligence spending and
identified about one million people working in the field. In all likelihood, these numbers
are probably a low estimate due to two factors: first, the methodology assumed a linear
correlation between intelligence spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), not
exponential. Based on the identified information, the estimating process used the ratio
2/947 to find unknown intelligence spending. Second, the list with the total number of
intelligence agencies is probably not wholly comprehensive and complete. It is difficult
to say with virtual certitude that this thesis “got them all,” because of the nature of these
agencies and the conservative criteria used. Despite these two factors, this thesis makes
the best approximation possible with the given information. It used two methods to
identify the quantitative metrics and it is important to note what worked, and what did not
work.
The first method is direct observation of the national intelligence services, using
the three methods explained in Chapter 3. Regarding the methods, the automate push-
source search method provided little valuable information. Although Google-Alerts do
give a reasonable starting point for further research, creating them initially requires some
reasonable knowledge of the target country. Therefore, the results of each alert tended to
54
err on the unhelpful or useless side. They do provide an excellent way to collect
information on a specific topic over time, allowing one to study its trends. Unfortunately
this study did not have much use for one specific topic as it changes over time. It
required the answer to many similar questions and nothing much more.
Using keywords and phrase searches to identify the necessary information
provided helpful information. Much of the intelligence spending and personnel data
came from this method. One benefit of using this search method over automated push-
sources is its adaptability. A researcher has the ability to quickly alter the search terms in
order to increase the likelihood of identifying the necessary information. Having the
ability to search by keywords and phrases allowed the researcher to quickly cover various
online sources – books, scholarly works, and other forms of documents on the internet.
Unfortunately, the primary drawback is that the process consumes a lot of time. This
method requires a researcher to objectively understand that the amount of time spent
looking for one country’s metrics is increasingly outweighing the benefits provided by
the answers. The solution is to maintain objectivity and understand that time can
outweigh an answer.
Perhaps the most beneficial method employed came from systematic searching
journals and websites with dedicated sections on intelligence. This process is very
effective, although it is also very time consuming. The process is likely the most
effective for obvious reasons – they are the industry’s trade journals, associations, and
forums of discussion. Perhaps the most up-to-date and commonly used source is Jane’s
Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, although corroborating the information and
identifying primary sources tended to be difficult. Nevertheless Jane’s library of country
55
studies provides valuable information on the defense and intelligence field. Although
there are a few websites and online databases with sections dedicated to intelligence,
none came close to matching Jane’s level of organization and extensive collection. The
complete listing of journals and other scholarly sources searched for this thesis are on
Table 5.1. Table 5.1 has two columns; the first indicates sources completely searched.
The second column contains sources and publications not completely searched, due to
their lack of availability or other restrictions.
In addition to systematically searching through these various publications, the
search method extended to the websites of governmental intelligence oversight
committees and ministries. As many of these countries require their intelligence systems
to publish reports on an annual or frequent basis, these websites were helpful. Although
the practice of publishing annual reports is more common in Western nations, they are
increasingly becoming common in Eastern European countries – these reports are not
consistently published elsewhere, however.
The second method used to identify the quantitative metrics was estimating
unknown intelligence spending and employment. Determining the approximate total for
each category required the researcher to proceed according to the methods presented in
Chapter 3. It required using an averaged ratio, generated by countries with known
intelligence spending and GDP. As mentioned, this study assumes that intelligence
spending has a linear correlation with GDP. However, the results in Chapter 4 indicate
that the relationship is most likely exponential, or even power-law, in nature. The study
estimated unknown intelligence personnel using a slightly different approach. It
established the likeness of countries on the basis of intelligence spending. After which, it
56
estimated countries with unknown intelligence personnel by using known the workforces
of similar nations.
Table 5.1: List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other Relevant Database Productions
Completely Searched Partially Searched
African Security Review
American Intelligence
Comparative Strategy Journal
Cryptologia
Cryptome
Defense Intelligence Journal
Europe-Asia studies
Eye Spy Magazine
Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource
Program
Foreign Affairs
Intelligence Online
Intelligence and National Security
International Affairs
International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence
International Journal of Middle East Studies
International Security
International Studies Review
Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library
Jane’s Intelligence Review
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly
Journal of Democracy
Middle East
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Middle East journal
Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal
National Security Archive: George Washington University
Orbis (Philadelphia)
RUSI Journal
Strategic Analysis
Strategic Forecasting
Strategic Forum
Strategic Studies Quarterly
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
Studies in Intelligence
Arab-reform.net
Armed Forces Journal
International
Athena Intelligence Special
Report
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institutions and Organizations
Intelligence Heritage Centre
Journal
International Defense Review
Joint Forces Quarterly
Nativ – Israeli
RFE/RL Newsline
Terrorism Monitor
The Spooks Newsletter
World Intelligence Review
57
Another approach might use a ratio composed of known intelligence spending and
known personnel, to estimate unknown personnel. Using this average is slightly akin to
comparing countries on the basis of intelligence spending, as the underlying assumption
is that a relationship exists between spending and employment. In terms of being a more
accurate, further research is necessary to determine if this is a better approach. In terms
of increasing confidence, using an intelligence spending per person average to estimate
unknown employment would likely increase the overall confidence level. One can
statistically check the validity of a per person average, whereas the method used in this
study lacks that ability. The standard deviation and variance of the known spending per
person dataset is observable. The result, that is, the statistical information, would likely
more clearly explain the relationship between intelligence spending and personnel.
Both methods, the one used in this thesis and the hypothesized per person method,
contain the assumption that a linear correlation exists between spending and employment.
In retrospect, this assumption is built into the methodology, as explained in Chapter 3,
and is present when estimating intelligence spending. The method used to approximate
individual spending does not address this assumption. It was applied consistently when
estimating spending and its affect is seen in Figure 5.1. The figure is a scatter-plot chart
of the intelligence spending of individual countries. GDP is set as the X-axis and
intelligence spending is set as the Y-axis. The trending line, in black, follows neatly
along the line of data points, in blue. Although it is difficult to display, most countries lie
just above the trending line until they reach approximately $40 billion in GDP.
58
The linear trend line in Figure 5.1 appears rather strong and initially seems to fit
the data quite well. However the data points represent both known intelligence spending
and estimated spending. Therefore, the data points should be consistent with the trending
line, as some are estimated under the assumption that a linear relationship exists. The fit
of the trending line is not so clear when looking at the same scatter-plot chart without the
estimated data. In Figure 5.2, the blue data points represent the countries with identified
intelligence spending. As with Figure 5.1, the GDP is set as the X-axis and intelligence
spending is set as the Y-axis. There are two trend lines on Figure 5.2, the solid black line
is the linear trend line, and the black dotted line is the exponential trend line. They are
both included for purposes of comparison and to determine which has the best fit. It is
difficult to determine which trend line most accurately describes the data, and it is likely
that any future answer will be subjective. The R-Squared (R2) value of the linear trend
line is 0.349, while the exponential R2 value is 0.401. Both numbers are similar in how
they describe the fitness of the data. Therefore, using a methodology that assumes a
linear relationship exists may not be correct, but it would not be anymore incorrect than
using a methodology which assumes the relationship is exponential.
The researcher would say that if the relationship is assumed to be exponential,
then the intelligence spending total would likely be higher. However, this assumption
would likely have little effect on estimating personnel, as there are few countries that fall
beyond what appears to be key points – nations with GDPs over $1.8 trillion and $2.1
trillion. For a comparison of different outcomes, see Table 5.2.
Nevertheless this study meets its stated purpose, that is, to identify the
approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry. It identified both the primary and
59
secondary metrics – total intelligence spending and personnel. It also gave an
approximate number of externally-focused intelligence agencies and systems. In this
regard, the study appears to have met its stated purpose.
Table 5.2: Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending and GDP is Linear or Exponential
Assuming the Relationship is
Linear
Assuming the Relationship is
Exponential
Estimating Intelligence
Spending Outcome
Same results; this study
assumes that the relationship is
linear.
Total intelligence spending
estimate would likely be
higher. This would be
especially true for countries
with GDP’s over
approximately $1.8 trillion and
then again at $2.1 trillion.
Estimating Intelligence
Personnel Outcome
Same results; this study
assumes that the relationship is
linear.
Total intelligence personnel
estimate would likely be
slightly higher. There are
relatively few countries
beyond the two relative points
that would be affected.
However there are many more topics for further research. As discussed, the
methodology assumes a linear relationship exists between spending and employment.
More research is necessary to explore this topic. Understanding this relationship will
ultimately allow future studies to determine whether or not demand for intelligence
professionals is growing. As intelligence studies programs increase in number and
function, it is beneficial to correctly gauge the industry’s demand. Hopefully this study
plays a part in identifying that demand. In addition, now that a benchmark exists,
national intelligence communities are able to quantitatively compare their performance
against the industry average.
60
However, the breadth of this study is like an inverse function of its depth, that is,
it does not delve deeply into both spending and personnel. Future studies may look at
how these agencies spend their budgets, whether on personnel, technology, or on
bureaucratic redundancies. Another topic is how they utilize their workforces, for
instance, what percentage are analysts, linguists, or support staff? These questions seem
to be the next step in the field’s quantitative research.
61
62
63
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APPENDICES
76
Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust
46.75 = Very High Credibility, 40.00 = High Credibility, 35.06 = Medium Credibility, 21.00 =Low Credibility, 7.46 = Not CredibleCriteria Tips Value Y/N
1. Content can becorroborated?
Check some of site’s Facts. 5.17
2. Recommended by subjectmatter expert?
Doctor, Biologist 4.94
3. Author is reputable? Google for opinions, askothers.
4.64
4. You perceive site asaccurate?
Check with other sources. 4.56
5. Information was reviewedby an editor or peers
Science journals,newspapers.
4.52
6. Author is associated with areputable org?
Google for opinions, askothers.
4.02
7. Publisher is reputable? Google for opinions, askothers.
3.78
8. Authors and Trustworthysources wantto be known.
3.78
9. You perceive site ascurrent?
Last update? 3.78
10. Several other Web siteslink to this one?
Sites only link to other sitethey trust
3.68
11. Recommended by ageneralist?
Librarian, Researcher 3.65
12. Recommended by anindependent subject-guide?
A travel journal maysuggest sites
3.56
13. Domain includes atrademark name?
Trademark owners protecttheir marks.
3.45
14. Site’s bias in clear? Bias is ok if not hidden 3.06
15. Site has professional look? It should look like someonecares.
2.86
TOTAL
Source: Norman, Dax. “Websites You Can Trust.” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006),36, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
77
Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest
Number Countries Total Expenditures
1 United States $75,000,000,000
2 Japan $4,736,464,406.93
3 China $4,234,179,531.47
4 Russia $3,251,264,510.00
5UnitedKingdom
$2,854,668,400.00
6 Italy $2,225,874,049.52
7 Mexico $1,046,736,334.72
8 South Korea $1,000,000,000.00
9 France $636,492,097.00
10 Germany $515,661,895.00
11 Saudi Arabia $500,000,000.00
12 Indonesia $492,297,799.83
13 Switzerland $473,857,013.88
14 Canada $469,481,900.00
15 Iran $400,000,000.00
16 Turkey $378,301,672.00
17 Taiwan $377,619,583.05
18 Greece $343,948,073.89
19 Venezuela $307,291,600.78
20 Finland $263,557,983.06
21 Ireland $262,930,784.70
22 Thailand $262,853,827.85
23 Sweden $252,755,397.00
24United ArabEmirates
$250,245,409.41
25 Nigeria $249,191,821.00
26 South Africa $237,920,657.72
27 Portugal $235,191,686.96
28 Malaysia $213,765,937.06
29 Romania $210,550,000.00
30 Netherlands $200,271,805.00
31 Spain $200,000,000.00
32 Israel $194,086,145.77
33 Australia $184,610,349.79
34 India $178,120,639.00
35 Singapore $175,018,161.47
Number Countries Total Expenditures
36 Egypt $155,995,389.31
37 Algeria $153,595,297.45
38 Kuwait $152,075,399.60
39 Hungary $150,339,060.60
40 Kazakhstan $127,199,096.80
41 Peru $122,744,256.96
42 Argentina $114,126,558.00
43 Norway $108,957,708.00
44 Qatar $98,410,499.97
45 Denmark $98,022,410.00
46 Libya $96,264,365.73
47 Ukraine $90,380,219.00
48 Iraq $87,448,958.19
49 Vietnam $86,411,964.60
50 Morocco $83,107,629.71
51 Angola $80,212,128.11
52 Bangladesh $78,821,132.99
53 Croatia $66,694,656.84
54 Brazil $63,600,000.00
55 Belarus $57,994,684.58
56 Sudan $55,708,104.08
57 Luxembourg $52,881,863.65
58 Syria $52,718,330.34
59 Slovenia $52,560,568.79
60 Belgium $51,860,690.13
61 Oman $50,583,739.62
62 Ecuador $50,572,196.09
63 Cuba $50,308,618.87
64 Bulgaria $50,011,373.02
65CzechRepublic
$49,584,953.00
66 Serbia $48,156,712.86
67 Lithuania $45,504,587.31
68 Azerbaijan $44,613,811.73
69 Philippines $44,200,000.00
70DominicanRepublic
$43,862,520.45
78
Number Countries Total Expenditures
71 Austria $42,403,426.00
72 Pakistan $41,600,000.00
73 New Zealand $40,057,767.00
74 Slovakia $39,370,697.13
75 Tunisia $38,813,188.92
76 Zambia $38,508,618.00
77 Sri Lanka $38,097,490.19
78 Guatemala $37,474,139.67
79 Poland $36,900,000.00
80 Latvia $32,758,608.49
81 Uruguay $31,034,774.98
82 Lebanon $27,838,179.69
83 Uzbekistan $26,856,017.85
84 Burma $26,148,014.80
85 Yemen $26,118,194.02
86 Botswana $25,677,600.00
87 Ethiopia $24,681,986.75
88 Cyprus $23,994,184.87
89Trinidad andTobago
$23,862,396.26
90 Côte d'Ivoire $22,613,771.32
91 Cameroon $22,358,851.74
92 Panama $22,209,747.84
93 El Salvador $21,273,760.11
94 Kenya $21,229,784.00
95 Bahrain $20,428,196.69
96 Tanzania $19,932,786.94
97 Jordan $19,268,072.12
98EquatorialGuinea
$17,820,321.32
99Bosnia andHerzegovina
$17,766,451.53
100 Iceland $16,881,447.71
101 Bolivia $16,750,621.06
102 Ghana $15,510,653.77
103 Paraguay $15,397,142.41
104 North Korea $14,191,805.69
105 Brunei $13,999,413.56
106 Gabon $13,966,706.90
107 Jamaica $13,849,347.70
108 Honduras $13,588,656.36
109 Senegal $12,842,174.88
Number Countries Total Expenditures
110 Albania $12,470,858.06
111 Georgia $12,380,433.76
112 Nepal $12,214,976.53
113 Afghanistan $11,602,207.58
114 Armenia $11,474,266.81
115 Colombia $11,428,800.00
116D.R. Congo(Kinshasa)
$11,148,162.15
117 Estonia $10,867,484.00
118 Cambodia $10,756,644.16
119Republic ofCongo(Brazzaville)
$10,364,164.21
120 Mozambique $9,286,768.26
121 Macedonia $9,205,001.61
122 Madagascar $8,901,984.00
123 Mali $8,448,900.52
124 Mauritius $8,405,612.29
125 Chad $8,070,849.98
126 Malta $8,020,828.03
127 Burkina Faso $7,794,767.27
128Papua NewGuinea
$7,784,185.70
129 Bahamas $7,179,112.44
130 Turkmenistan $6,977,100.70
131 Namibia $6,906,166.00
132 Burundi $6,900,000.00
133 Haiti $6,687,550.54
134 Benin $6,676,007.02
135 Nicaragua $6,108,450.22
136 Moldova $5,891,047.11
137 Rwanda $5,758,689.00
138PalestinianAuthority
$5,250,381.31
139 Niger $5,174,386.42
140 Laos $5,059,913.10
141 Mongolia $5,057,989.18
142 Tajikistan $4,939,668.02
143 Montenegro $4,638,574.33
144 Guinea $4,369,225.34
145 Liechtenstein $4,001,756.37
146 Chile $4,000,000.00
79
Number Countries Total Expenditures
147 Kosovo $3,659,298.37
148 Barbados $3,541,939.17
149 Fiji $3,453,438.79
150 Kyrgyzstan $3,432,795.00
151 Andorra $3,121,562.36
152 Mauritania $3,040,757.66
153 Zimbabwe $2,996,216.00
154 Suriname $2,870,490.63
155 Togo $2,780,066.32
156 Swaziland $2,734,854.17
157 Somalia $2,436,646.36
158 Costa Rica $2,164,904.00
159CentralAfricanRepublic
$1,921,035.45
160 Cape Verde $1,657,458.23
161 San Marino $1,638,219.01
162 Lesotho $1,558,376.28
163 Eritrea $1,419,853.94
164 Belize $1,328,467.68
165 Malawi $1,323,120.00
166 Bhutan $1,315,962.19
167 Monaco $1,261,130.43
168 Maldives $1,211,108.48
169Antigua andBarbuda
$1,208,222.60
170 Guyana $1,087,015.55
171 Saint Lucia $986,009.68
172 Djibouti $944,645.37
173 Liberia $804,199.12
174 Seychelles $802,275.19
175 Gambia $777,264.22
176 Grenada $614,692.87
177 Uganda $606,953.15
178Saint Vincentand theGrenadines
$578,138.36
179 Vanuatu $551,203.46
180Saint Kittsand Nevis
$533,888.17
181 Samoa $516,572.88
182 Comoros $511,763.07
183 Timor-Leste $480,018.37
Number Countries Total Expenditures
184SolomonIslands
$455,007.39
185Guinea-Bissau
$443,463.87
186 Dominica $350,153.68
187 Sierra Leone $317,745.00
188 Tonga $248,185.85
189 Micronesia, $243,376.05
190Sao Tomeand Principe
$169,305.08
191 Palau $163,533.31
192MarshallIslands
$143,332.14
193 Kiribati $131,788.61
194 Tuvalu $28,858.82
195 Nauru $22,125.10
80
Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries
This appendix cites its information using the Chicago Style Manual, with one
minor exception. Indicated before each cited source are the credibility results from Dax
Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. The results include both a verbal assessment,
anywhere from “Not Credible” to “Very High Credibility,” and also the quantitative
finding. A record of the researcher’s scoring is available for each individual source but
will only be provided by request. The researcher used a general score for information
from Jane’s Information Group, which is “High Credibility, 44.3.” Government websites
and uploaded documents were not scored.
There are four columns of information in this appendix: first, the name of the
country, second, the name of the identified intelligence agencies, third, intelligence
spending, and fourth, intelligence personnel. There are essentially two rows of
information, the first row has a country’s name, total spending, and total personnel (this
row is in faded grey). A, Italicized number indicates that the total was estimated using
the methodology outlined in Chapter 3. Under each country, a second row contains an
individual intelligence agency, with its identified spending and personnel. The
information in this row has citations according to the location of the source. If the
information was not identified then the cell is left empty. If a country has more than one
intelligence agency, or program, it is likewise listed under the country’s name.
81
Country Agency Spending Personnel
1 Afghanistan $11,602,207.58 550
National Directorate ofSecurity (NDS)
2 Albania $12,470,858.06 5,000
State Intelligence Service(ShISh)
5,00087
Military IntelligenceAgency
3 Algeria $153,595,297.45 12,000
Department of Informationand Security (DRS)
4 Andorra $3,121,562.36 195
5 Angola $80,212,128.11 7,000
Directorate of Intelligenceand Security
6 Antigua and Barbuda $1,208,222.60 1,650
7 Argentina $114,126,558.00 5,500
87 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Albania > Securityand Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated)” [accessed September 21, 2008].
82
State Intelligence Office(SIDE)
$81,518,97088 2,50089
National Military StrategicIntelligence (DNIEM)
$32,607,58890 3,00091
8 Armenia $11,474,266.81 550
National Security Ministry(NSM)
Intelligence Department(MI)
9 Australia $184,610,349.79 145
Australian SecretIntelligence Service (ASIS)
$104,003,429.7992
Defence Signals Directorate(DSD)
Office of NationalAssessments (ONA)
$21,000,00093 14594
Defence IntelligenceOrganisation (DIO)
88 Low Credibility, 26.85, Natasha Niebieskikwiat, "El Gobierno pasa a controlar las tareas de inteligenciamilitar," Clarin, April 23, 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04/23/elpais/p-00315.htm [accessedApril 30, 2009].89Ibid.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.92 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Secret Intelligence: Portfolio BudgetStatements 2007-2008 (Canberra: Australian Government, 2008), 198,http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2007_2008_pbs/2007-2008_FA+T_PBS_06_ASIS.pdf.93 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia >Security and Foreign Forces, "The ONA budget for 2005-06 was USD21 million (AUD28 million),representing a 290 per cent increase over four years from the 2001-02 level."94 Office of National Assessments, About Us, http://www.ona.gov.au/aboutus.htm [accessed April 24,2009].
83
Defence Imagery &Geospatial Organisation
(DIGO)$59,606,92095
10 Austria $42,403,426.00 55096
Army Intelligence Service(HNA)
$42,403,42697
Abwehramt (AbwA)
11 Azerbaijan $44,613,811.73 5,000
Ministry for NationalSecurity (MNS)
5,00098
12 Bahamas $7,179,112.44 97
Drug Enforcement Unit(DEU)
9799
13 Bahrain $20,428,196.69 2,000
Bahrain National SecurityAgency (BNSA)
2,000100
95 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia >Security and Foreign Forces, "DIGO has grown rapidly over the last few years, witnessing an increase in itsstaff numbers by over one third and a near tripling of its budget since inception to AUD90.5 million”[accessed November 11, 2008].96 Siegfried Beer, "Bound" to Cooperate: Austria’s Little-known Intelligence Community Since 1945,"Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 1 (2003),http://www.acipss.org/intelligence/beitraege/bound_to_cooperate/current_organizations.htm.97 Ibid.98 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >Azerbaijan > Security and Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated).”99 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America & theCaribbean > Bahamas > Security and Foreign Forces , "There is a 97-strong Drug Enforcement Unit(DEU), with a 19-member strike force that participates in OPBAT missions; a 10-member marine unitwhich crews and services three fast interceptor boats; a 22-member general investigation unit; drug canineunits; and a 14-member technical and surveillance unit with a nine-member unit in Freeport and threecommanders” [November 12, 2008].
84
Anti-Money Launderingand Terrorist Financing
Unit (AMLTFU)
14 Bangladesh $78,821,132.99 10,000
Directorate-General ofNational SecurityIntelligence (NSI)
Directorate General ofForces Intelligence (DGFI)
10,000101
15 Barbados $3,541,939.17 90
Regional Security SystemLiaison Unit
90102
16 Belarus $57,994,684.58 1,600
State Security Committee(KGB)
Main IntelligenceDirectorate - MI (GRU)
17 Belgium $51,860,690.13 1,600103
100 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Bahrain> Security and Foreign Forces, "In 1998, Bahrain set up a new force, the National Guard (NG), to helpprotect the country from external military threats and also threats to internal security. It was proposed thatthe NG would be an elite, lightly armed force. It is organised on the basis of three battalions and has anestimated strength of about 2,000” [accessed November 13, 2008].101 Low Credibility, 24.52, Maloy Krishna Dhar, "The Fulcrum of Eastern Evil: DGFI Directs Terrorismand Jihad Against India," Frontier India Strategic and Defence, November 1, 2008,http://frontierindia.net/the-fulcrum-of-eastern-evil-dgfi-directs-terrorism-and-jihad-against-india.102 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America &the Caribbean > Barbados > Security and Foreign Forces, "There is also a special Financial InvestigationsUnit, which targets money laundering, financial fraud, and similar offences. There is a 90-strong task forcefor special operations, which is trained by and liaises directly with the Regional Security System” [accessedOctober 4, 2008].103 Herman Matthijs, "Intelligence Services in Belgium", Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 4(2008): 552-576.
85
Veiligheid Van de Staat(VS)
$51,860,690.13104
Algemene Inlichtingen- enVeiligheidsdienst (AIVD)
18 Belize $1,328,467.68 1,650
19 Benin $6,676,007.02 2,700
20 Bhutan $1,315,962.19 1,650
21 Bolivia $16,750,621.06 477
22Bosnia and
Herzegovina$17,766,451.53 703
Intelligence and SecurityAgency (OSA)
703105
23 Botswana $25,677,600.00 9,800
Directorate of Intelligenceand Security (DIS)
$25,677,600.00106
24 Brazil $63,600,000.00107 1,600108
104 Ibid.105 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans >Bosnia-Herzegovina > Security and Foreign Forces, "A total of 200 agents of the former Intelligence andSecurity Service of Republika Srpska, which employs some 400 people, and 307 members of the formerFederation Security and Intelligence Agency, were sacked on 31 December 2004. In line with the newsystematisation, the new OSA will employ 703 people” [accessed September 29, 2008].106 Low Credibility, 24.01, Isaiah Morewagae, “Botswana: Police Chief Unaware of DIS Torture Report,"AllAfrica Global Media, February 9, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902080020.html.107 Marco Cepik, "Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles toDemocratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University ofTexas Press, 2007), 165,http://books.google.com/books?id=zvGTOjWOID4C&pg=PA149&dq=%E2%80%98%E2%80%98Structu
86
Brazilian IntelligenceAgency (ABIN)
$36,000,000109
Ministry of Defense
25 Brunei $13,999,413.56 250
Department of Security andIntelligence
250110
Directorate of Intelligence(MI)
26 Bulgaria $50,011,373.02 2,050
National IntelligenceService (NIS)
Military InformationService (MIS)
27 Burkina Faso $7,794,767.27 469
28 Burma $26,148,014.80 9,800
Office of the Chief ofMilitary Affairs Security
(OCMAS)
29 Burundi $6,900,000.00 2,549
ral+Change+and+Democratic+Control+of+Intelligence+in+Brazil%22&ei=R6qySc_sEpGOMsennPkL&client=firefox-a#PPA169,M1.108 Ibid, 169.109Marco Cepik and Antunes, Priscila, "Brazil's New Intelligence System: An InstitutionalAssessment," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 370.110 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia >Brunei > Security and Foreign Forces. , “Department of Security and Intelligence – 250” [accessedDecember 12, 2008].
87
National IntelligenceService (SNR)
$6,900,000111
30 Cambodia $10,756,644.16 300
Cambodian Intelligence andResearch Department (MI)
31 Cameroon $22,358,851.74 10,000
National Security Service(Sureté Nationale)
32 Canada $469,481,900.00 4,128
Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS)
$303,081,900112 2449113
Communications SecurityEstablishment (CSE)
$127,000,000114 1350115
Transaction and ReportsAnalysis Centre of Canada
(FINTRAC)$39,400,000116 329117
33 Cape Verde $1,657,458.23 195
34Central African
Republic$1,921,035.45 195
111 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, La gouvernance,http://www.bi.undp.org/fr/service_renseigne.htm.112 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2006-2007 (Gatineau: Public Works andGovernment Services, 2007), 18, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf.113 Ibid, 15.114Roy Rempel, "Canada's Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence," International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 639.115 Communications Security Establishment Canada, CSEC: An Overview, http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/home-accueil/about-apropos/overview-survol-eng.html [accessed November 29, 2008].116 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa:2008), 22, http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf.117 Ibid, 21.
88
35 Chad $8,070,849.98 469
National Intelligence andSecurity Service (NISS)
36 Chile $4,000,000.00 2,000
National IntelligenceAgency (ANI)
$4,000,000118 2,000119
Directorate of NationalDefense Intelligence
(DIDN)
37 China $4,234,179,531.47 88,050
Ministry of State Security(MSS)
General Staff Department -Second Division (Second
Division)
General PoliticalDepartment - LiaisonDepartment (Liaison
Department)
United Front WorksDepartment
38 Colombia$11,428,800.00
800
Administrative Departmentof Security (DAS)
$11,428,800120 800121
118 High Credibility, 44.3, José Higuera, "Chile set to create a National Intelligence Agency," Jane'sDefense Weekly, March 19, 2003, www.janes.com [accessed March 15, 2009].119 Medium Credibility, 36.88, "Chile," Federation of American Scientists,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/dina.htm [accessed January 3, 2009].120 The original figure, $100 million, represents the total annual budget for DAS, which provides "strategicintelligence and counterintelligence; investigates crimes that threaten state security such as terrorism,kidnapping, and drug and human trafficking; and all issues concerning immigration." It has a total of 7,000employees, with 800 working specifically on intelligence. DAS spends approximately $14,286 peremployee (Using $100 million as the total budget and 7,000 as total employees). However, the source alsoindicates that only 800 work specifically on intelligence. If DAS spent the same per employee ($14,286),
89
Military Intelligence(DIPOL)
39 Comoros $511,763.07 250
40Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville)$10,364,164.21 300
41D.R. Congo(Kinshasa)
$11,148,162.15 300
National IntelligenceAgency (ANR)
Military Directorate onAnti-state Activities
(DMIAP)
42 Costa Rica $2,164,904.00 195
Security IntelligenceDirectorate (DIS)
$2,164,904122
43 Côte d'Ivoire $22,613,771.32 2,050
National Security Council
44 Croatia $66,694,656.84 2,500123
the total spent for intelligence would be $11428800. See Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook ofGlobal Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, MarkPhythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 137.121 Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: PraegerSecurity International, 2008), 137. Also see Steven Boraz, “Establishing Democratic Control ofIntelligence in Colombia," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 1 (2005):90.122 Paul Chaves, "Los Espías no Bastan: Definiendo las Politicas Públicas en Materia de Servicios deInteligenciaen Costa Rica," in Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (Washington DC:Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/costa_rica/chaves.html.123 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Croatia > Securityand Foreign Forces [accessed October 13, 2008].
90
Security and IntelligenceAgency (SOA)
Military Security andIntelligence Agency
(VSOA)
Croatian IntelligenceService (HIS)
45 Cuba $50,308,618.87 15,000
Directorate General ofIntelligence (DGI)
15,000124
America Department (DA)
46 Cyprus $23,994,184.87 9,800
47 Czech Republic $49,584,953.00 1,600125
Office for Foreign Relationsand Information (ÚZSI/BIS)
$49,584,953126 500127
Military Intelligence (VZ) 800128
124 Edward González and Kevin McCarthy, “Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments,”RAND (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 44,http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR131.pdf.125 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the BalticStates > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czechintelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008].126 Security Information Service [BIS], Annual Report of the Security Information Service (BIS) for 2005,http://www.bis.cz/_english/vz2005/vz2005-9.html [accessed May 5, 2009].127 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the BalticStates > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czechintelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008].128 Kieran Williams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the CzechRepublic, Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 94.
91
48 Denmark $98,022,410.00 700
Defence IntelligenceService (FE)
$98,022,410129
Danish Security IntelligenceService (PET)
700130
49 Djibouti $944,645.37 3,000
Service de laDocumentation et de la
Sécurité (SDS)3000131
50 Dominica $350,153.68 250
51 Dominican Republic $43,862,520.45 2,775
52 Ecuador $50,572,196.09 2,050
53 Egypt $155,995,389.31 12,000
Egyptian GeneralIntelligence Service (EGIS)
Military Intelligence (MI)
54 El Salvador $21,273,760.11 3,500
129 Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste [ Danish Defence Intelligence Service], FE's Budget, http://fe-ddis.dk/Om%20FE/Budget/Pages/default.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009].130 Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Organisation and Personnel,http://www.pet.dk/English/Organisation.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009].131 Autor Localizado, Africa South of the Sahara 2003, 32nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 348,http://books.google.com/books?id=1KBP7QbalX0C&pg=PP1&dq=Africa+South+of+the+Sahara+2003&client=firefox-a.
92
National Directorate ofIntelligence (DNI)
Ministry of Defense andPublic Security (MI)
55 Equatorial Guinea $17,820,321.32 1,352
56 Eritrea $1,419,853.94 1,650
National Security Office(NSO)
57 Estonia $10,867,484.00 300
Estonian IntelligenceBureau (EIB)
$10,867,484132 300133
58 Ethiopia $24,681,986.75 9,800
National Intelligence andSecurity Service (NISS)
59 Fiji $3,453,438.79 195
Fiji Intelligence Service(FIS)
60 Finland $263,557,983.06 2,415
General Staff IntelligenceDivision
132 This comes from the Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget for 2007 where it is listed under "InformationBoard". See: Estonian Ministry of Defence, "Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget 2007," Ministry ofDefence, http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=439 [accessed March 2, 2009].133 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey's Inc, 2007), 257.
93
61 France $636,492,097.00 9,166
General Division ofExternal Security (DGSE)
$538,915,500134 4,406135
Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence (DRM)
$12,192,036136 1,700137
Directorate of TerritorialSurveillance (DST)
$73,000,000138 1,500139
Direction de la Protection etde la Securite de la Defense
(DPSD)$12,384,561140 1,560141
62 Gabon $13,966,706.90 2,625
63 Gambia $777,264.22 250
134 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Western Europe > France >Security and Foreign Forces, "As of 2007, the DGSE employed 4,406 personnel, of which two-thirds werecivilian and a third military. Military personnel are predominantly attached to the 44th Infantry Regiment.The DGSE has a budget of EUR445 million (excluding the wages of military personnel), translating to 0.9per cent of the Ministry of Defence's budget. The DGSE operates out of two primary stations, Mortier andTourelles, located in Paris. Although attached to the Ministry of Defence, the DGSE is highly dependent onthe prime minister's office at Matignon” [accessed December 19, 2008].135 Ibid.136 European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private andCommercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009].137 Ibid.138 Hans Born and Marina Caparini, ed., Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing RogueElephants (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 131,http://books.google.com/books?id=FUtNtTJVe6EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Democratic+Control+of+Intelligence+Services:+Containing+Rogue&ei=NmgJSszUHaG2zQTqzeiQDw&client=firefox-a#PPA131,M1[accessed May 5, 2009].139 European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private andCommercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009].140 Low Credibility, 32.25, "Exclusive: How DPSD Operates," Intelligence Newsletter, July 12, 2000,www.nexis.com.141 Ibid.
94
National IntelligenceAgency (NIA)
64 Georgia $12,380,433.76 200
Foreign Intelligence andSecurity Service (FISS)
200142
65 Germany $515,661,895.00 7,250
Federal Intelligence Service(BND)
$515,661,895143 6,000144
Military Security Service(MAD)
1,250145
Intelligence Service (G-2)
66 Ghana $15,510,653.77 477
Defence IntelligenceAgency
67 Greece $343,948,073.89 2,929
National IntelligenceService (EYP)
2,929146
142 "Gela Bezuashvili; Tblissi," Intelligence Online, February 14, 2008, www.nexis.com.143 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, The 2006 Budget: Chancellor and FederalChancellery, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6562/Content/EN/Artikel/2006/03/2006-03-29-the-2006-budget-chancellor-and-federal-chancellery.html.144 Bundesnachrichtendienst, Herzlich Willkommen beim Arbeitgeber,http://www.bnd.de/cln_090/nn_1365968/DE/JobsUndKarriere/JobsUndKarriere__node.html?__nnn=true[accessed May 2,2009].145 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 71.146 John M. Nomikos, "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): Past, Present and Future," National Securityand the Future 9, no. 1-2 (2008): 84, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/greece/nomikos2.pdf.
95
Independent IntelligenceBranch (MI)
68 Grenada $614,692.87 250
Grenada Drug InformationNetwork
69 Guatemala $37,474,139.67 5,500
Military IntelligenceDirectorate (MI)
Secretariat of StrategicAnalysis (SAE)
70 Guinea $4,369,225.34 5,500
71 Guinea-Bissau $443,463.87 250
72 Guyana $1,087,015.55 1,650
73 Haiti $6,687,550.54 2,700
74 Honduras $13,588,656.36 2,625
75 Hungary $150,339,060.60 5,750
Military IntelligenceService (KFH)
Military Counter-Intelligence Service (KBH)
96
Foreign Intelligence Service(IH)
76 Iceland $16,881,447.71 477
77 India $178,120,639.00 18,000
Research and AnalysisWing (RAW)
$31,000,000147 8,000148
Intelligence Bureau (IB) 10,000149
National TechnicalFacilities Organisation
(NTFO)$147,120,639150
Defence IntelligenceAgency (DIA)
78 Indonesia $492,297,799.83 5,689
National IntelligenceAgency (BIN)
Strategic IntelligenceAgency (BAIS)
79 Iran $400,000,000 17,000
Ministry of Intelligence andSecurity (MOIS)
$400,000,000151 15,000152
147 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey's Inc., 2003), 78.148 Ibid.149 Low Credibility, 30.9, Maloy Krishna Dhar, interview by Susheela Menon, "Keep Up the Pressure, SaysFormer IB operator," India Together, January 12, 2009, http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/jan/ivw-dhar.htm [accessed March 25, 2009].150 Low Credibility, 33.37, Sanjay Singh, "New Intelligence Agency Set Up," The Pioneer (New Delhi),April 7, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/ntfo.html.
97
Intelligence Directorate(MI)
2,000153
80 Iraq $87,448,958.19 10,000
General SecurityDirectorate
4,000154
Military IntelligenceService
6,000155
81 Ireland$262,930,784.70
2,415
Military Intelligence (G-2)
82 Israel $194,086,145.77 8,200
Institute for Espionage andSpecial Tasks (Mossad)
1,200156
151 Estate of Yael Botvin et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the Districtof Columbia, Civil Action No.: 05-220 (RMU), January 28, 2005, 8,http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Botvin_v_Iran_Complaint.pdf.152 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 404,http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+Presidency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcs-ArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7Itge-uojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. Also seeHigh Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran >Security and Foreign Forces, “The agency is believed to have approximately 15,000 officers and supportstaff. MOIS differs from SAVAK in that its personnel are all civilians” [accessed April 20, 2009].153 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran >Security and Foreign Forces, The Intelligence Directorate of the IRGC is relatively small, boasting no morethan 2,000 officers. Its officers are heavily vetted for ideological conformity, and unlike the VEVAK, theirloyalty to the Islamic regime is beyond doubt." [accessed November 15, 1008]. See also Mahan Abedin,"The Iranian Intelligence Services and the War On Terror," Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 10 (2005),http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=393&tx_ttnews[backPid]=179&no_cache=1 [accessed on April 10, 2009].154 Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," Middle EastReview of International Affairs 6, no. 3 (2002), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html.155 Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Intelligence and Security Forces and Capabilitiesfor Popular Warfare," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 16, 2003, 7,http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraqi_popwarfare%5B1%5D.pdf.
98
Military Intelligence Branch(Aman)
7,000157
Research and PoliticalPlanning Center
83 Italy $2,225,874,049.52 3,500
Intelligence and DemocraticSecurity Service (SISDE)
1,500158
Service for Information andMilitary Security (SISDE)
Security and IntelligenceDivision (RIS)
2,000159
84 Jamaica $13,849,347.70 2,625
Defence Force IntelligenceUnit (HQ JDF Int Unit)
85 Japan $4,736,464,406.93 4,100160
Cabinet Intelligence andResearch Office (CIRO)
170161
Cabinet SatelliteIntelligence Center (CSICE)
300162
156 Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: ZedBooks, 2003), 152-153.157 Ibid.158 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 103.159 Ibid, 103-104.160 Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute forDefense Studies News 100 (2006): 2,http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf.161 Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: PraegerSecurity International, 2008), 266.
99
Ministry of Foreign AffairsIntelligence and Analysis
Service (IAS)80163
Defense IntelligenceHeadquarters
2,300164
Public Security IntelligenceAgency (PSIA)
1,500165
86 Jordan $19,268,072.12 1,352
General IntelligenceDepartment (GID)
87 Kazakhstan $127,199,096.80 5,750
National SecurityCommittee - Syrbar (KNB)
Defence Intelligence of theMinistry of Defence (GRU)
88 Kenya $21,229,784.00 5,000
National SecurityIntelligence Service (NSIS)
$21,229,784166 5,000167
Military Intelligence (MI)
162 Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute forDefense Studies News, no. 100 (2006), 2,http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf.163 Ibid, 271.164 Ibid, 268.165 Ibid, 270.166 Low Credibility, 24.11, Fred Mukinda, "Battle Lines Drawn Over Election Violence Report," DailyNation, October 22, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/483076/-/view/printVersion/-/thp3kkz/-/index.html.167 Ibid.
100
89 Kiribati $131,788.61 250
90 North Korea $14,191,805.69477
State Security Department,Communications
Interception Bureau
Reconnaissance Bureau(MPAF)
91 South Korea $1,000,000,000.00 9,000
National IntelligenceService (NIS)
$1,000,000,000168 9,000169
Defense IntelligenceCommand (DIC)
92 Kosovo $3,659,298.37 1,045
93 Kuwait $152,075,399.60 6,000
Kuwait State Security(KSS)
6,000170
94 Kyrgyzstan $3,432,795.00 195
168 Jon Moran, "South Korea," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approachesvol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: PraegerSecurity International, 2008), 287.169 Ibid.170 The Kuwait State Security is also referenced by other sources as the National Guard. The source heredescribes the duties of the guard as, “providing assistance to the military and security forces, in addition tothe execution of any assignment entrusted to it by the Higher Defense Council, such as safeguardingestablishments and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.” This description indicates, at thequalitative level, to the researcher that it is an intelligence agency. See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, vol. 1 (Washington DC: Center for Strategicand International Studies, 2007), 103.
101
Kyrgyz National SecurityService (SNB)
$3,432,795171
95 Laos $5,059,913.10 5,500
Ministry of NationalDefence
96 Latvia $32,758,608.49 1,750
Military Intelligence'sSecurity Service (J-2)
97 Lebanon $27,838,179.69 9,800
State Security Organisation(SSO)
General SecurityDirectorate (MI)
98 Lesotho $1,558,376.28 300
National Security Service(NSS)
300172
99 Liberia $804,199.12 1,750
171 Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,"International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 272.172 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >Lesotho > Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH 300...It is responsible directly to the primeminister, in his capacity as minister of defence. Its role is set out in the National Security Service Act of1998, and includes to: protect the state against threats of espionage, terrorism or sabotage which mayinfringe on national security; protect the state from activities of agents of foreign powers and from actionsof persons intended to overthrow or undermine democracy by political, industrial or violent means; protectthe economic well-being of the state against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons inside oroutside Lesotho; and protect the state against any activity that may tend to operate to undermine nationalsecurity” [accessed December 27, 2008].
102
National Security Agency(NSA)
Minister of NationalSecurity (MNS)
National Security Council(NSC)
100 Libya $96,264,365.73 200
Jamahiriya SecurityOrganisation
200173
101 Liechtenstein $4,001,756.37 1,045
102 Lithuania $45,504,587.31 3,750
State Security Department(VSD)
103 Luxembourg $52,881,863.65 13,300
Second Bureau of the Army- Deuxième Bureau de
l'Armée (MI)
104 Macedonia $9,205,001.61 300
Intelligence Agency (AR
173 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa > Libya> Security and Foreign Forces, "Hayat Ann al Jamahiriya is Libya's intelligence/security service. It isdivided into two main wings, one dealing with domestic security (al-Amn al-Dakhili) and the other withforeign intelligence gathering and operations (al-Amn al-Khariji). The latter is run by Musa Kusa and issometimes known as the Secretariat of External Security (SES) and has been involved in operations outsidethe country aimed at liquidating opponents of the regime. Approximately 200 agents are thought to beactive” [accessed November 20, 2008].
103
Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate
(UBK)
105 Madagascar $8,901,984.00 300
General Directorate ofInformation and
Documentation (DGID)300174
106 Malawi $1,323,120.00 1,650
National IntelligenceBureau
1,323,120175
107 Malaysia $213,765,937.06 2,000
Military Intelligence 2000176
108 Maldives $1,211,108.48 1,650
109 Mali $8,448,900.52 840
Unités Méharistes 840177
174 High Credibility, 44.3 Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >Madagascar > Security and Foreign Forces, "300 - DGID…The General Directorate of Information andDocumentation (Direction Générale de l'Information et de la Documentation: DGID)...was tasked as themain Madagascan internal and external intelligence agency with a heavy political bias towards the thenruling party” [accessed December 27, 2008].175 Malawi Economic Justice Network, "Comments on the proposed Malawi Budget 2001-2002: Report forMembers of Parliament," Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 10,http://www.sarpn.org.za/CountryPovertyPapers/Malawi/ProposedBudget/MalawiBudget2001.pdf.176 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia >Malaysia > Security and Foreign Forces, "Other intelligence units are Malaysia's external intelligenceorganisation, controlled by the Department of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Defence's joint-service 2,000-strong Military Intelligence” [accessed January 3, 2009].177 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > West Africa > Mali >Security and Foreign Forces, "Since 1996, specialist camel patrol units have been used within the NationalGuard to re-extend state control into the desert regions. Functions include border patrol, rural policing anddispute resolution, as well as countertrafficking and the gathering of intelligence on Saharan insurgentorganisations...Known as Unités Méharistes, they have been funded and equipped by France on the model
104
110 Malta $8,020,828.03 469
111 Marshall Islands $143,332.14250
112 Mauritania $3,040,757.66 195
Direction Générale de laSecurité Extérieure et de laDocumentation (DGSED)
113 Mauritius $8,405,612.29 469
114 Mexico $1,046,736,334.72 6,250
Center for Intelligence andNational Security (CISEN)
115 Micronesia $243,376.05 250
116 Moldova $5,891,047.11 400
Information and SecurityService (SIS)
400178
117 Monaco $1,261,130.43 1,650
118 Mongolia $5,057,989.18 5,500
of colonial forces...Each 'brigade' is composed of 100 to 140 armed men...They are based in the followinglocations: Abeibara (Adrar des Iforhas mountains; Algerian border), Gossi (Burkina Faso border), Inabog(near Tessalit; Algerian border), Inakounder (near Araouane; northern desert), Léré (Mauritanian border),Ménaka (Niger border)” [accessed December 27, 2008].178 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >Moldova > Security and Foreign Forces, "Estimated Strength: 400+ The SIS was created in 2000 on thebasis of the National Security Ministry. The agency's operations are governed by the Law on the SIS. TheSIS director is appointed by the parliament and has a ministerial status, reporting to the prime minister. Thecurrent SIS director is Artur Resetnicov, a former legal advisor to President Vladimir Voronin” November13, 2008].
105
General IntelligenceAgency (GIA)
Information ResearchAgency (IRA)
119 Montenegro $4,638,574.33 5,500
120 Morocco $83,107,629.71 4,000
General Directorate ofStudies and Documentation
(DGED)4,000179
121 Mozambique $9,286,768.26 300
State Security andIntelligence Service (SISE)
122 Namibia $6,906,166.00 2,549
Namibia CentralIntelligence Service (NCIS)
$6,906,166180
123 Nauru $22,125.10250
124 Nepal $12,214,976.53 500
National InvestigationDepartment (Guptachar
Bibhag/NID)
179 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa >Morocco > Security and Foreign Forces, "The DGED is a counter-intelligence service, set up after anattempted coup against King Hassan II in 1972...It has been reported that the DGED has a strength of about4,000” [accessed November 20, 2008].180 Institute for Public Policy Research, "National Budget 2008/09: Great Dollops of Jam," IPPR BriefingPaper No. 42, March 2008, 5,http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan031201.pdf [accessed January 4, 2009].
106
Military IntelligenceDirectorate (RNA)
125 Netherlands $200,271,805.00 1,764
Defence Intelligence andSecurity Service (MIVD)
$50,928,905181 764182
General Intelligence andSecurity Service (AIVD)
$149,342,900183 1000184
126 New Zealand $40,057,767.00 570
New Zealand SecurityIntelligence Service
(NZSIS)$15,881,767185 200186
GovernmentCommunications Security
Bureau (GCSB)$23,176,000187 340188
External AssessmentBureau (EAB)
$1,000,000189 30190
181 Defence Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report of the Defence Intelligence and SecurityService of the Netherlands (The Hague: 2002), 29, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/mivd2002.doc.182 Ibid, 28.183 Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: NationalApproaches vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London andConnecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 352.184 According to Janes, the AIVD had 750 personnel in 2002. However, according to annual report, theservice added 250 employees in 2004 and 2005. See High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel CountryRisk Library > Western Europe > Netherlands > Security and Foreign Forces > "In 2001 the NetherlandsNational Communications Security Agency (NBV) was also incorporated into the service to increase itsrange and quality of information sources. The AIVD is undergoing an expansion in personnel. In 2002, ithad 750 operatives with a target of recruiting an additional 150 each year until the AIVD reaches its desiredstrength in 2008. " and Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, mark Phythian,and Shlomo Shpiro, PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches Volume 2(London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 352.185 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2006,” House of Representatives,http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/review.aspx.186 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Overview, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about/ [accessed March20, 2009].187 Government Communications Security Bureau, Organisation, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/organisation.html [accessed March 20, 2009].188 Ibid.189 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 138.190 Ibid.
107
Directorate of DefenceIntelligence and Security
(DDIS)
127 Nicaragua $6,108,450.22 2,700
Directorate of IntelligenceAffairs (DAI)
128 Niger $5,174,386.42 5,500
129 Nigeria $249,191,821.00191 1,700
Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence (DMI)
National IntelligenceAgency (NIA)
130 Norway $108,957,708.00 3,100
Norwegian IntelligenceService (NIS)
$108,957,708192
131 Oman $50,583,739.62 2,050
Internal Security Service(ISS)
132 Pakistan $41,600,000.00193 10,000
Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI)
10,000194
191 Budget Office, "2009 Budget: Intelligence Community," Ministry of Finance,http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/2009_budget/2009BudgetICom.pdf [accessed April 1, 2009].192 Not Credible, 7.46, Norwegian Intelligence Service, http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/4133162[accessed March 1, 2009].193 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 143-144.
108
133 Palau $163,533.31 250
134 Palestinian Authority $5,250,381.319,000
General Intelligence Service 8,400195
Military Intelligence 600196
135 Panama $22,209,747.84 10,000
National Service ofIntelligence and Security
136 Papua New Guinea $7,784,185.70 469
137 Paraguay $15,397,142.41 477
138 Peru $122,744,256.96 5,750
National Intelligence Centre(CNI)
Army Intelligence Service(SIE)
139 Philippines $44,200,000.00197 3,750
194 Sean Winchell, "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government," International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 384.195 Roland Friedrich and Mohammed Najib, "Palestine," in PSI Handbook of Global Security andIntelligence: National Approaches, vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro(London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 604.196 Ibid, 606.197 High Credibility, 44.3, "Philippines Intelligence Budget," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999,www.janes.com.
109
National Security Council(NSC)
$946,636198
National IntelligenceCoordinating Agency
(NICA)$4,528,445
140 Poland $36,900,000.00199 4,600
The Intelligence Agency(AW)
2,000200
Military IntelligenceService (SWW)
1,300201
Military CounterintelligenceService (SKW)
1,300202
141 Portugal $235,191,686.96 22,650
Department of DefenseStrategic Information
Service (SIED)
142 Qatar $98,410,499.97 800
Qatari State Security (QSS)
198 House of Representatives, "Intel Agencies Invoke Broader National Security Concerns to JustifyBudget," Congress of the Philippines 13, no. 81 (2005),http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/commnews/commnews_det.php?newsid=478 [accessed April 29,2009].199 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 151-155.200 Ibid.201 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central Europe andthe Baltic States > Poland > Security and Foreign Forces, “The WSI was disbanded on 30 September 2006.Minister of Defence, Radek Sikorski, has been engaged with releasing WSI personnel trained under theformer Soviet regime from duty. He has also discussed the resignation of WSI leadership. The WSI will bereplaced by a new military intelligence (SWW) and counter-intelligence (SKW) service…According toWassermann both the SWW and SKW would require between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel to be effectiveincluding civilian personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008]202 Ibid.
110
National Security Shield(NSS)
800203
Intelligence Centre AgainstDrug Trafficking
143 Romania $210,550,000.00204 41,800205
Foreign Intelligence Service(SIE)
Defense General Directoratefor Intelligence (DGIA)
Special TelecommunicationService (STS)
144 Russia $3,251,264,510206 172,000207
Federal Security Service(FSB)
Foreign Intelligence Service(SVR)
6,000208
203 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Qatar >Security and Foreign Forces > "Qatar launched a major security project, National Security Shield (NSS), inJuly 2007. The NSS, which is expected to deploy more than 800 personnel when fully operational, has thetask of operating a network of electronic surveillance stations on Qatar's land and sea borders, and also ofcovering the emirate's airspace. The mission of the NSS is to supply security information to all officialagencies in Qatar, including the armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior” [accessed November 13,2008].204 Valentin Filip, "The Intelligence Phenomenon in a New Democratic Milieu: Romania - A Case Study"(Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006), 44,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/filip.pdf.205 The source used here indicates a total of 46,800 individuals work in the "Security and IntelligenceService," however, this figure also includes the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). The SRI is theinternal intelligence agency and the same source indicates that it has approximately 5,000 employees. Thisnumber was subtracted from the total to reach 41,800. This number includes the DGIA, SIE, and STS.High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans > Romania> Security and Foreign Forces [accessed October 14, 2008].206 Low Credibility, 23.27, Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru,http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/.207 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >Russia Federation > Security and Foreign Forces > Security and Foreign Forces [accessed November 13,2008].
111
Federal Agency ofGovernment Information
and Communication(FAPSI)
120,000209
Main IntelligenceDirectorate (GRU)
145 Rwanda $5,758,689.00 2,700
Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence (DMI)
National Security Service(NSS)
$5,758,689210
146 Saint Kitts and Nevis $533,888.17 250
147 Saint Lucia $986,009.68 1,650
148Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines$578,138.36 250
149 Samoa $516,572.88 250
Transnational Crime Unit(TCU)
150 San Marino $1,638,219.01 195
208 Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: ZedBooks, 2003), 143.209 Ibid, 146.210 Ministry of Finance and Planning, "Annex II-3: State expenditure by Budget Agency – 2008-2010,"Government of Rwanda, 1, http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/en/inno-download_file.php?fileId=100.
112
151Sao Tome and
Principe$169,305.08
250
152 Saudi Arabia $500,000,000.00 5,689
General IntelligencePresidency (GIP)
$500,000,000211
Military Intelligence (MI)
Financial Investigation Unit(SA-FIU)
153 Senegal $12,842,174.88 2,625
Senegalese IntelligenceAgency
154 Serbia $48,156,712.86 2,500
Security-IntelligenceAgency (BIA)
2,500212
Military-Security Agency(VBA)
155 Seychelles $802,275.19 500
211 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 233-234,http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+Presidency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcs-ArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7Itge-uojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. ;Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, "The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and Security Services -Challenges and Developments," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 42,http://www.dcaf.ch/news/past_2004/ev_geneva_04071113_Cordesman.pdf.212 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Serbia > Securityand Foreign Forces [October 25, 2008].
113
Special Branch 500213
156 Sierra Leone $317,745214 250
Central Intelligence andSecurity Unit (CISU)
JIC Joint Assessment Team(JAT)
Office of National Security(ONS)
157 Singapore $175,018,161.47 12,000
Security and IntelligenceDivision (SID)
158 Slovakia $39,370,697.13 2,585
Slovenska informacnisluzba (SIS)
$39,370,697.13215
213 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Africa > Seychelles >Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH = 500 (estimated)...The National Guard is the maininternal security force, but there is also the small Police Special Support Unit, which is armed for riotcontrol and response. Police Special Branch is the main organ for non-criminal intelligence gathering andanalysis” [accessed October 19, 2008].214 It should be noted that this figure does not include two important spending figures. First, it does notinclude funds from international aid programs, which are generally one time allotments for specificprojects. For instance, the ONS received grant money from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. TheONS received USD $1.5 million to start construction on a new facility. This money is not included in thetotal number given in the Ministry of Finance's budgetary statement. For more information on this specificproject, see United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Project Summary,http://www.unpbf.org/sierraleone/sierraleone-projects.shtml [accessed April 16, 2009]. The secondspending figure excluded from the total figure given is salaried employees. See Ministry of Finance,Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the Financial Year 2007(Freetown: Bank of Sierra Leone, 2006), 6, http://bankofsierraleone-centralbank.net/pdf/Gov_Budget.pdf[accessed April 16, 2009].215 The amount cited was for 1998 and was 944,912,000 SKK, however, no rates were available forconversion to 1998 USD. The researcher used the 2008 exchange rate, 48.22 SKK per 1 USD) KieranWilliams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the Czech Republic,Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 141.
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Military IntelligenceService (VSS)
159 Slovenia $52,560,568.79 13,300
Intelligence and SecurityAgency (SOVA)
Intelligence and SecurityService (OVS)
160 Solomon Islands $455,007.39 250
161 Somalia $2,436,646.36 195
Somali National SecurityAgency
162 South Africa $237,920,657.72 3,500
South African SecretService (SASS)
$220,502,680.70216 1,500217
Intelligence Division(SANDF-ID)
$17,417,977.02218 2,000219
163 Spain $200,000,000 4,982
216 High Credibility, 35.31, Steve Swart, MP, "Intelligence Budget Vote," African Christian DemocraticParty, http://acdp.intoweb.co.za/index.php?page=speeches167.217 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >South Africa > Security and Foreign Forces, “At provincial level, Provincial Intelligence Co-coordinatingCommittees (PICOC) were subsequently created. Information on personnel strengths is confidential, but areport published at the end of 1999 indicated that NIA employed some 2,500 agents and the Secret Service1,500 agents. Control mechanisms such as a mechanism for parliamentary oversight; an independentinspector-general; and an absence of law enforcement powers are also provided for."218 Source cites The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Fact book,http://www.photius.com/countries/south_africa/national_security/south_africa_national_security_defense_budget.html.219 Kevin A. O'Brien, "South Africa's Evolving Intelligence and Security Structures," International Journalof Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 9, no. 2 (1996): 197.
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National Intelligence Center(CNI)
$200,000,000220
Armed Forces IntelligenceCenter (CIFAS)
164 Sri Lanka $38,097,490.19 2,585
National IntelligenceBureau (SIS)
Military Intelligence Corps(MIC)
165 Sudan $55,708,104.08 1,600
al-Amn al-Khariji
Military Intelligence Branch(MI)
166 Suriname $2,870,490.63 195
167 Swaziland $2,734,854.17 195
168 Sweden $252,755,397.00 1,900
Security Service (SS) $115,000,000221 900222
220 Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,"Federation of American Scientists, 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.221 Dennis Töllborg, "Sweden," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approachesvol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: PraegerSecurity International, 2008), 379.222 Ibid. See also, Swedish Security Service, Swedish Security Service 2006: Annual Report (Växjö:Davidsons Tryckeri AB, 2007), 10,http://www.securityservice.se/download/18.79f4d0a71125247256d800035/swedishsecurityservice2006.pdf.
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Military Intelligence andSecurity Directorate
(MUST)
Independent Special Unit(FRA)
Swedish Defence ResearchAgency (FOI)
$137,755,397223 1,000224
169 Switzerland $473,857,013.88 21,128
170 Syria $52,718,330.34 25,000
General IntelligenceDirectorate (GID)
25,000225
Political SecurityDirectorate (PSD)
Syrian Military Intelligence(SMI)
Air Force Intelligence (AFI)
171 Taiwan $377,619,583.05 1,500
National Security Bureau(NSB)
1,500226
Military Intelligence Bureau(MIB)
223 Swedish Defence Research Agency, What is FOI?,http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page____6630.aspx [accessed March 25, 2009].224 Ibid.225 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:Brassey's Inc, 2003), 317.226 Steven Phillips, "Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization," in ReformingIntelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 177.
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172 Tajikistan $4,939,668.02 5,500
Ministry of Security (MoS)
173 Tanzania $19,932,786.94 1,352
Tanzania Intelligence andSecurity Service (TISS)
174 Thailand $262,853,827.85 2,415
National IntelligenceAgency (NIA)
175 Timor-Leste $480,018.37 250
176 Togo $2,780,066.32195
National IntelligenceAgency
177 Tonga $248,185.85 250
178 Trinidad and Tobago $23,862,396.26 9,800
Special Intelligence Agency(SIA)
179 Tunisia $38,813,188.92 2,585
Tunisian IntelligenceAgency
118
180 Turkey $378,301,672.00 5,000
National IntelligenceOrganisation (MIT)
$378,301,672227 5,000228
Special Warfare Unit(SWU)
181 Turkmenistan $6,977,100.70 5,000
National SecurityCommittee (KNB)
4,000229
Aliens' Registration Service(GSRIG)
1,000230
182 Tuvalu $28,858.82 250
183 Uganda $606,953.15 250
External SecurityOrganisation (ESO)
$4,229.15231
227 The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 28.47,"MİT'İN 2009 BÜTÇESİ NE?" Cafe Siyaset, November 4, 2008,http://www.cafesiyaset.com/haber/20081104/MITin-2009-butcesi-ne.php [accessed April 28, 2009]. Thefigure indicated here represents the allocated amount in the 2009 budget in 2008 USD. However, using the2009 USD conversion rate, the amount would be USD $273,475,903, quite a difference!228 The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 32.25,Hazırlayan Ferhat Ünlü, "MİT'te iç çekişme entrikaya yol açtı," Sabah, July 19, 2007,http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/19/haber,4D36E8C34C434B5880E8E8BE1D3FF328.html [accessedApril 27, 2009].229 Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,"International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 280.230 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >Turkmenistan > Security and Foreign Forces, "The GSRIG, a spin-off from the NKB...Its de-facto coreresponsibility is counter-espionage and total control over the expatriate community. The agency employsover 1,000 intelligence officers..."231 Joseph Enyimu, A Review of the Uganda Police Force Budget and its Effect on Crime Management, ed.G.P. Joshi, Michelle Kagari & Sophy Thomas, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (London:Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006), 24,http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/uganda_report.pdf.
119
Chieftaincy of MilitaryIntelligence (CMI)
Joint Anti-Terrorism TaskForce (JATT)
$602,724232
184 Ukraine $90,380,219.00 4,350
Foreign Intelligence Serviceof Ukraine (FISU)
$49,153,882233 4,350234
Main Directorate forIntelligence (MDI)
$41,226,337235
185 United Arab Emirates $250,245,409.41 1,700
UAE Intelligence
186 United Kingdom $2,854,668,400.00236 12,200
Single Intelligence Account(SIA)
Defence Intelligence Staff(DIS)
4,500237
Security Service 3,200238
232 Low Credibility, 30.75, Human Rights Watch, "Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the JointAnti-terrorism Task Force in Uganda," Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2009,http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82072/section/8.233 Oleksii Petrov, "Political and Budgetary Oversight of the Ukraine Intelligence Community: Processes,Problems, and Prospects for Reform," (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate College, September 2007), 71,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/ukraine/petrov.pdf.234 Ibid.235 Ibid, 74.236 Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 2007-2008," Federation of American Scientists, 8,http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc2007-08.pdf.237 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe >United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces, "Defence Intelligence Staff Total Strength 4,500 (est)."
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Secret Intelligence Services
GovernmentCommunications
Headquarters$1,212,878,238239 4,500240
187 United States $75,000,000,000.00241 144,000242
National IntelligenceProgram (NIP)
Military IntelligenceProgram (MIP)
188 Uruguay $31,034,774.98 9,800
189 Uzbekistan $26,856,017.85 9,800
National Security Service(SNB)
Defence IntelligenceService (GRU)
190 Vanuatu $551,203.46 250
238 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe >United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces > "The number of staff is around 2,200 in total after arecruitment drive during 2004, and there are plans to increase staff numbers to around 3,200 by 2008…”[accessed December 12, 2008].239 Medium Credibility, 36.03, “GCHQ Moves Into Limelight," Intelligence Newsletter, December 7, 2000,www.nexis.com.240 Ibid.241 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15,2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf.242 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15,2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by theODNI is 200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28percent of its workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number ofemployees is about 144,000. See High Credibility 43.28, Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding TrueEmployee Numbers Says Senate Panel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009,http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/.
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191 Venezuela $307,291,600.78 2,415
Directorate of Security andPolice Intelligence (DISIP)
192 Vietnam $86,411,964.60 7,000
General Department II (GDII, Tong Cuc 2)
193 Yemen $26,118,194.02 9,800
194 Zambia $38,508,618.00
Zambia SecurityIntelligence Service
$38,508,618243 2,585
195 Zimbabwe $2,996,216.00195
Central IntelligenceOrganisation (CIO)
$2,996,216244
243 Low Credibility, 31.39, Charles Musonda, "State, Mines Act to Save Jobs," Zambia Daily Mail, March26, 2009, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=9&id=1238053304.244 Medium Credibility, 36.03, Tendai Biti, "Zimbabwe's 2008 Budget: Economic Fiction," Association ofZimbabwe Journalists in the UK, November 30, 2007,http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=3245&cat=4.