Download - 2010 Demcracy Under Stress ISIS
Democracy under Stress:Civil-Military Relations in South
and Southeast Asia
Co-Edited byPaul Chambers and Aurel Croissant
Democracy under Stress: Civil- Military Relations in South and Southeast AsiaCo-Edited : Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant
First published by
Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS)
5th floor, Prajadhipok-Rambhaibarni Building,
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330.
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©ISIS Thailand 2010
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ISBN : 978-616-551-119-3
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Table of ContentsPreface
List of Contributors i
Reflections on Civil-Military Relations v
Acknowledgements ix
1. Introduction 1
Paul Chambers/Aurel Croissant/Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Section One: Understanding Civilian Control 20
2. Civilian Control of the Military and Democracy: Conceptual 21
and Theoretical Perspectives
Aurel Croissant & David Kuehn
Section Two: Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia 62
3. U-Turn to the Past? The Resurgence of the Military in 63
Comtemporary Thai Politics
Paul Chambers
4. Under an Iron Heel: Civil-Military Relations in Burma/Myanmar 102
Win Min
5. Armed Forces as Veto Power: Civil-Military Relations in 126
the Philippines
Katherine Marie G. Hernandez & Herman Joseph S. Kraft
6. Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia 149
Rizal Sukma
Section Three: Civil-Military Relations in South Asia 170
7. Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress – Civil-Military 171
Relations in Pakistan
Siegfried O.Wolf & Seth Kane
8. Factionalized by the Past: The Evolution of Civil-Military 201
Relations in Bangladesh
Siegfried O. Wolf
Preface
In his sweeping work on the state of democracies in the world, Larry
Diamond noted an incipient “democratic recession” that has resulted in losses
for the post-1974 “Third Wave” democratization1. With the Third Wave as the
base period, the corresponding gains have accrued to authoritarian regimes of
different stripes in the developing world. While not all authoritarian regimes
are militaristic in orientation, such as China’s or Vietnam, many are. Indeed,
authoritarianism and militarism are frequently entwined in their fundamental
manifestations.
Against this backdrop, Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of
Security and International Studies (ISIS) is pleased to bring out the present
volume. It investigates renewed and persistent cases of resurgent and latent
authoritarianism in the context of civil-military relations in South and Southeast
Asia, with reference to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and Thailand. As civil-military relations is a longstanding scholarly
genre, as pondered by Professor Suchit Bunbongkarn in the next section, this
collection of theoretical reassessment and empirical endeavor is not intended
to be profound. It merely adds new evidence to and updates relevant literature
on the role of the military in the domestic politics of six important countries.
In so doing, ISIS highlights one of its core areas of focus in addition to internal
conflict and regional security and economic cooperation.
1 Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout The World, New York: Henry Holt, 2008.
I wish to thank Aurel Croissant and Paul Chambers for approaching ISIS
to pursue this collaborative effort which began with an international academic
conference at Chulalongkorn University. While Professor Croissant was the
pillar on the theoretical approach and underpinnings, Paul Chambers spent
considerable post-conference time at ISIS to streamline the chapters and finalize
the book. Bob Fitts, Bill Klausner and Suchit Bunbongkarn of ISIS provided
valuable editorial advice. Seth Kane, an ISIS visiting scholar at the time, was
instrumental with logistical arrangements and substantive input on one of the
chapters. I am particularly appreciative of the effort and energy of the chapter
contributors and country experts. Finally, the conference presentations and
publication of this book were supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and its
then-director, Vesna Rodic, to whom I am most grateful.
Associate Prof. Dr.Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Director, ISIS Thailand
i
List of ContributorsDr. Suchit Bunbongkarn is Professor in Political Science and Chairperson
of the Executive Board and Director of Institute of Security and International
Studies (ISIS - Thailand) Chulalongkorn University. He has served as Chairperson
of the Counter-Corruption Committee, a Judge on the Constitutional Court,
member of the 1997 Constitutional Drafting Assembly, and Dean of the Faculty
of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University. He served once as adviser to
Former Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond. He obtained his Ph.D. from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and has written
numerous articles and books on Thai politics and regional security in English
and Thai.
Dr. Paul Chambers is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Political
Science, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg (Heidelberg University) and
Senior Researcher at the Thai and Southeast Asian Studies Program, Payap
University. His research interests focus on democratization and civil-military
relations in Southeast Asia (particularly Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines)
as well as the political economy of the Mekong basin. His articles have appeared
in Contemporary Southeast Asia, the Journal of East Asian Studies, the Asian
Journal of Political Science, and Party Politics, among others.
Dr. Aurel Croissant is Professor of Comparative Politics and Director of
the Institute of Political Science at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. His
main research focus is on democratization and civil-military relations in East
and Southeast Asia. He has published more than a dozen books in English,
German, and Indonesian and over 90 articles in edited volumes and journals
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including Democratization, German Political Quarterly, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Asian Perspective, Electoral Studies, and Journal of Comparative Politics.
Katherine Marie G. Hernandez is Assistant Professor of Political Science
at the University of the Philippines and Research Fellow at the Institute for
Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines). Her research interests include
Philippine democratization and security sector reform as well as Asian security
issues. She recently contributed to a draft report on Security Sector Reform (SSR)
in the Philippines for the United Nations Development Program.
Seth Kane is a Master of Arts candidate at the Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington DC and was recently a
Visiting Research Fellow at Chulalongkorn University’s Institute for Security and
International Studies (ISIS). With interests in Asian security and civil-military
relations, he has written articles for Asia Times, among others.
Herman Joseph S. Kraft is currently the Executive Director of the Institute
for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines) and Assistant Professor at
the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines where
he teaches courses in International Relations and Comparative Politics. His
research interests focus on Philippines security issues, security sector reform,
human rights, democratization, and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. He has
published articles, reports, and book chapters for the United Nations Development
Program, ASEAN, and Asian Security Studies (Routledge), among others.
David Kuehn is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science,
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. He received his Magister Artium (M.A.)
from Heidelberg University in 2006 and from October 2006 to March 2008 was
a lecturer in Comparative Politics there. David’s main research interests are
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iii
democratization studies, civil-military relations, social science methodology and
game theory. His regional focus is East Asia. In his PhD research, he analyzes the
institutionalization of civilian control of the military in the democratic transitions
in South Korea and Taiwan.
Win Min is lecturer in political science at both at the Thai and Southeast
Asian Studies Program of Payap University, Chiang Mai and at the All Ethnic
International Open University Program, Chiang Mai University. The focus of his
past and present research is comparative studies of civil-military relations for
a democratic transition in Burma. He is the co-author of Assessing Burma’s
Ceasefire Accords (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2007) and has most
recently published in Asian Survey. He was a member of the All Burma Students
Democratic Front from 1988 to 2000.
Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and
International Studies (ISIS) and Associate Professor of International Political
Economy at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. He has
co-edited and authored three books, including Thailand’s Trade Policy Strategy
and Capacity (with Razeen Sally), and a range of book chapters on Thai
politics, political economy and foreign policy as well as on ASEAN security and
economic cooperation. His articles have appeared in Journal of Democracy,
Journal of International Security Affairs, Global Asia, and East Asian Forum
Quarterly. He is also frequently quoted and his op-eds have regularly appeared
in international and local media. Dr Thitinan received his BA from the University
of California, MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, and PhD from the London School of Economics where he was awarded
the United Kingdom’s Best Dissertation Prize.
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Rizal Sukma is Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, (Indonesia); Chairman of International Relations Division,
Central Executive Board of the Muhammadiyah organization; member of the
board at Syafii Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity; a visiting lecturer
at the Department of International Relations at Muhammadiyah University in
Malang; and a member of the National Committee on Strategic Defense Review,
Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense. He focuses on Southeast Asian security issues,
ASEAN, Indonesian defense/foreign policy, and Indonesian political change and
is the author of numerous internationally-circulated books, journal articles, book
chapters, and reports.
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf is a lecturer in Political Science at the South Asia
Institute and a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, both at
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. He conducts research on democratization,
civil-military relations, identity, and social movements with a focus on South
Asia. He is co-author of A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia
(Routledge: London, 2006); is Deputy/Managing Editor of the Heidelberg Papers
in South Asian and Comparative Politics; and has worked as a consultant for
the German government.
v
Reflections on Civil-Military Relations
The issues involved in civil-military relations, both in Western democracies
and developing countries, have changed over time. In Western Europe and the
United States during the cold war period, the issues raised by a number of
scholars concerned the autonomy of the military and the nature of civilian con-
trol. Samuel Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State suggested that the
‘objective’ control, which allowed the military to be autonomous in maintaining
its professionalism and professional responsibility in the area of national de-
fense, would make the military stay out of politics. Morris Janowitz in his book,
The Professional Soldier, believed that the socialization of the military in the
United States which recognized the democratic value in society and instilled the
concept of ‘citizen soldier’ ensured the military’s acceptance of civilian control.
There have been many later works discussing the concepts and theories
of civil-military relations in democratic countries. But these could not explain
the military’s role in politics in many developing countries during the cold war
period. As a result, a number of research works were carried out to explain
the political role of the military in Asia, Africa and Latin America during this
period. These studies included the motives and the environments for political
interventions, the types of military regimes and the impacts of the interventions
on political development.
When the ‘third wave’ of democratization occurred in the late 1970s and
1980s, the pattern of civil-military relations in many developing countries began
to change. In Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, democratization gained mo-
mentum during the 1980s and forced the military to accept democratic regimes.
vi
In the case of Thailand, there is a concern whether the present state
of civil-military relations will be detrimental to democratic consolidation. This
concern is legitimate since the coup in September 2006 raised a question whether
the army is for or against democratic rule and civilian control. In my opinion,
the recent development of civil-military relations in Thailand has demonstrated
a number of points.
Firstly, a coup to overthrow a civilian regime is now highly unlikely for
a number of reasons. One of them is that the coup in 2006 demonstrated that
launching a coup is one thing, governing the country after the coup is very much
another. Thai military leaders have now realized that the problems facing the
country are too complicated to be solved through military rule. Moreover, there
would be strong resistance against a coup both within and outside the country.
In addition, I believe there has been a change in the military’s political attitude.
That is, there is no desire among military leaders to seek power by getting
involved in politics through launching a coup.
Secondly, if a coup is unlikely in the future, then how can we explain
the nature of civil-military relations at present? Some use the term “military
tutelage”. I am not sure this is an accurate explanation. I don’t think that the
military is strong enough to lead a civilian government in every issue so as to
ensure the government’s stability and survival.
Thirdly, some suggest that the military is a part of the political
establishment. They have argued that the conflict in Thailand at present is a
conflict between the elites and the rural masses. I do not want to argue this
thesis here although I believe that this interpretation or analysis to be rather
superficial. My point is that, when it comes to political issues, the military is
not monolithic. It is simplistic to assume that if they wear the same uniform,
they think alike. Thai military leaders are among the elites but as they do not
operate in a monolithic fashion, the establishment is not necessarily cohesive.
vii
Fourthly, given the problems mentioned above, we can say that civil-
military relations in Thailand at present are too complex to depict with a simple
explanation. Also, in analyzing civil-military relations in Thailand, we should look
beyond the issue of the military’s intervention in politics. There are a number
of issues involving democracy and civil-military relations in this country which
deserve attention. For example, to what extent does the military help develop
democracy; what type of democracy would the military prefer, etc.
Fifthly, what is more important is the role of the military in the areas of
national and regional security. The problems connected with security are now
complex and multifaceted. They include military security, non-traditional security
and human security. These are interrelated. It is worth studying how the military
perceive their role in this respect under the framework of civil-military relations
and of democracy. This is particularly true as civil society and non-government
organizations have now been accepted as playing a part in non-traditional and
human security.
Finally, we have to bear one thing in mind. Civil-military relation are
interactive. We should not focus only on the military side. The civilian side should
be equally considered. Civilian control over the military is unlikely if the civilian
government is weak, unstable, and unable to resolve political, economic or social
crises. Moreover, although the military are trained to fight to win and to manage
violence, this should not always lead to a conclusion that the military dislikes
peace and non-violent means. Sometime, we can see civilian leaders who are
more hawkish than the military. Therefore, to analyze civil-military relations,
we need to strike a balance and consider both the military and the civilian.
viii
Let me end my remarks by saying this. General MacArthur gave a well
remembered address to the U.S. Congress after he was ordered to return to the
U.S. He ended the address by citing a popular ballad among the soldiers of that
day, which has been cited again and again.
‘Old solders never die, they just fade away’
Thus for scholars, I would like to end my remarks by saying:
‘Old scholars always die, but their contributions never fade away’
This is why I mentioned the works of Sam Huntington and Morris
Janowitz in the beginning of my remarks, without which the study of civil-military
relations would not have been as lively as it has been.
Emeritus Prof. Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn
ix
Acknowledgements
The authors of this volume are most grateful for the assistance and advice
from the following individuals: Prof. Dr. Charas Suwanmala (Dean, Faculty of
Political Science, Chulalongkorn University); Prof. William Klausner (Distinguished
Author, ISIS Advisor, and Thai Analyst); Ambassador Roberts Fitts (Director,
American Studies Program – ISIS, Thailand and Former U.S. Ambassador to
Papua New Guinea); Dr. Chris Baker (Distinguished Author and Thai Analyst);
Ms. Pornpimon Trichot (Researcher, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn
University); and Dr. Naruemon Thabchompon (Lecturer, Department of Political
Science and Director, Master of Arts in International Studies (MAIDS) Program,
Chulalongkorn University.
The authors would also like to thank Arisa Ratanapinsiri of Heidelberg
University’s Institute of Political Science for her assistance in formatting as
well as the members of the ISIS Administration Staff—Wanwipha Khanngern,
Wuttinee Kamolpattrakul, Niruth Chuaihnu, and Suntree Jitmeumwai—for their
technical and logistical contributions.
x
1
ONEIntroduction
Paul Chambers/Aurel Croissant/Thitinan Pongsudhirak
This book focuses on civil-military relations in South and Southeast Asia.
In these sub-regions, the institutionalization of civilian control over the armed
forces has in many countries remained a crucial issue. This owes to the fact that
weak civilian control has generally coincided with democratic frailty. The result
has been a preponderance of power by the military over civilian governments,
a condition that has eroded political rights and civil liberties. While civilian
governments in some countries in South (i.e., India, Sri Lanka) and Southeast
Asia (for example Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei) have, in some respects, managed
to keep their militaries at bay, others appear to be falling prey to the armed
forces’ hegemony in the political realm.1
The past three decades have seen a global trend of democratic transition
going hand in hand with the decline of military regimes and open military
intervention. In 1979, fourteen military regimes held power in sub-Saharan
Africa, nine in Latin America, five in the Arab states and North Africa, three in
Southeast Asia, two in South Asia, and one in East Asia. Since then, democracy
replaced all of the military or “quasi-civilian” regimes2 in Latin America. In the
Middle and Near East, military rule has almost universally transformed into
1 See Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001.2 Quasi-civilian regimes are military regimes with a civilian window-dressing (civil president, constitution, semi-competitive elections) but which are military in substance in the sense that the military holds political hegemony. Typically, a former general serves as head of state and head of government, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Transaction Publication,, 1962.
2
1 : IntroductIon
civilian strongman rule. In Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand
and Pakistan have moved from military domination to democracy or mixed
patterns of civilian-military authority. At the moment of writing this chapter,
there is only one country in Asia in which the military openly rules by force,
Burma/Myanmar.
In spite of this development, asserting civilian control of the armed
forces remains high on the political agenda in many emerging democracies.
The nations of South and Southeast Asia have been no exception. In most of
these countries, the military used to be a key player, ruling through authoritarian
regimes. Even today in 2010, after two decades of democratic development in
East Asia, civilian control is still not an uncontested norm in the region. The
only exception is Myanmar, where soldiers have controlled politics since 1962,
though an opportunity for democratization did appear to open briefly in 1990.
These democratic changes have inspired an entirely new generation
of comparative analyses of democratic change in the region. In recent years,
various comparative studies have been published which deal with institutions
of democratic governance, their internal processes, and their impact on
the consolidation of new democracies in the region.3 Additionally, there are
3 See Jürgen Rüland, Clemens Jürgenmeyer, Michael H. Nelson, Patrick Ziegenhain, Parliaments and Political Change in Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005; Jean Blondel, “Parties and Party Systems in East and Southeast Asia,” in Ian Marsh (ed.), Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia, Routledge, 2006; Benjamin Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific, Oxford: University Press, 2006; Roland Rich, Pacific Asia in Quest of Democracy. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; Xiaoming Huang, Politics in Pacific Asia, New York, 2009; Aurel Croissant, Teresa Schächter, “Institutional Patterns in the New Democracies of Asia: Forms, Origins and Consequences”, Japanese Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2010. For Asia in particular, see for example Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; C. Kinnvall and K. Jonsson (eds.), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity, Routledge, 2002; William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less, Richmond: Curzon, 2001; M. Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan, Rienner, 2000.
3
democracy under StreSS
several works which analyze relevant political decision-making institutions and
organizations.4
However, the research on Asian politics in the age of democratic transition
still exhibits considerable shortcomings. This is especially the case when it comes
to the question of whether democratic change in the region is being accompanied
by a new political role for the military. While there have been some outstanding
works on the military in Asian politics,5 there has been very little research on
the subject in the past decade. Furthermore, most of this research is confined
to single country studies. There has only been very limited, systematic, in-depth
research on the relationships of politics and the military in multiple cases. For
many reasons, this is startling. First, there are strong theoretical and empirical
arguments in favor of the thesis that civilian control over the military is a sine
qua non for democracy and the consolidation of democracy. As argued in
one of the chapters of this book, without civilian control, liberal democracy
is impossible. Democratic constitutions tend to be worth little more than the
paper on which they are written if the political process is under military control.
Civilian authorities might be legitimized by popular elections to rule; however,
they lack the effective power to govern if soldiers do not follow their command.
4 Allen Hicken, Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Russell J. Dalton, Doh Chull Shin, and Yun-han Chu (eds.), Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development, Boulder ; London: Lynne Rienner, 2008; Andreas Ufen, “Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 3. (July 2008): 327-350; Aurel Croissant, “Die Parteiensysteme neuer Demokratien in Ostasien: Merkmale, Typen und Institutionalisierungsgrad” [Party Systems in East Asian Neo-Democracies: Elements, Patterns and Institutionalization], Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft) 1/2008: 98-125. 5 Recent examples of literature on civil-military relations in Asia include the following: Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance. The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001; Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001. Older works on civil-military relations in Asia are exemplified by the following: Edward A. Olsen and G. Stephen Jurika (eds.) The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies,. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986; Viberto Selochan, editor, The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
4
1 : IntroductIon
Second, the so-called “third wave” of democratization6 since 1974 has witnessed
the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratically elected governments
at an astounding rate, including in Asia. For example, in South Asia, military
rulers had to agree to share their power with democratically elected civilians
in Pakistan in 1987-88, and in Bangladesh in 1990/1. Southeast Asia’s recent
wave of democratization began with the demise of the personal dictatorship of
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Thailand (1988, 1992), Cambodia
(1993), Indonesia (1999) and East Timor (2002) followed in successive order.
Another transition to democracy even briefly seemed to be occurring in Myanmar
in 1990—though it failed.
Despite these regional democratic trends, Thailand, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh continue to be beset by unstable
parliamentary institutions, weak rule of law, inchoate systems of political
representation, chronic corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and a lack of
social justice. Meanwhile, the wave of democratization and people-power that
swept through Southeast and South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s has had
little effect on the military government of Myanmar. In addition, Cambodia’s
nascent democracy eroded into a new kind of electoral authoritarianism under
the leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen in the late 1990s.7 Furthermore,
East Timor, Asia’s youngest nation and one of the United Nations’ prestigious
showcases of post-conflict state building and democratization, continues to stand
in a condition of severe state fragility.8 Moreover, the 1999 military takeover in
6 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
7 See Duncan McCargo, “Cambodia: Getting away with authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 16 (2005), 98-112.8 See Aurel Croissant, “The Perils and Promises of Democratization through United Nations Transitional Authority – Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor”, Democratization, 15(3) (2008), 649-668.
5
democracy under StreSS
Pakistan, the 2006 coup in Thailand, the military interventions in Bangladesh in
2006-8, and multiple military mutinies in the Philippines indicate that democracy
in many Asian countries is under deep strain from military interventionism and
adventurism.
Even though a major part of democratization efforts has involved
removing militaries from the political arena and subordinating them under
civilian control, such efforts have encountered a multiplicity of obstacles in most
countries. Apart from Myanmar which today offers a case of failed transition
to democracy in the face of massive military control over political space, in
the emerging democracies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh,
and especially Pakistan, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in
guarding its prerogatives in the post-authoritarian era. This seriously impedes the
democratically elected authorities’ effective power to govern in these countries
and has facilitated democratic deterioration in virtually all of the countries
analyzed herein.
Such military resilience stems from the fact that its disengagement
from political and economic governance was only partial at best. Indeed,
ambiguous institutional development has accentuated the tentative nature of
civilian supremacy. As such, emerging democracies in South and Southeast Asia
have been plagued by continuing instances of military assertion and a lack of
civilian control, though Indonesia appears to be in better shape than the other
cases. Given the deep entrenchment of the militaries in the respective political
systems, the manifold problems of consolidation of democracy in general, and
the persistence of internal conflict, civilians lack sufficient tools for confronting
the military and can hardly be expected to diminish military decision-making
power in the political arena. The principal problem for emerging democracies in
6
1 : IntroductIon
South and Southeast Asia is how to challenge resilient militaries which threaten
to set their countries on a course for democratic demise.
Ultimately, this monograph represents the culmination of a workshop/
public forum sponsored by the Institute of Security and International Studies
(ISIS) under Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, held on September 1, 2009.
Each country-case chapter has, however, been updated to account for more
recent events. In addition, the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh have been
included to provide a larger picture of civil-military relations across two sub-
regions of Asia.
The contributions to this volume thus aim to situate civil-military relations
in six countries of South and Southeast Asia, within the context of continuing
democratic stress. Each case presents a different contemporary reality with
regard to the balance of power between civilian governments and the armed
forces. Thailand today is experiencing a military resurgence. On the other
hand, in Indonesia and Bangladesh, the military seems to be at bay. In the
Philippines and Pakistan, the military continues to challenge civilian control.
In Myanmar, the military monopolizes power. All six cases illustrate different
degrees of challenges to democratic control over the military. The authors in
this volume investigate what accounts for these situations, how they reflect the
state of democracy in different countries of South and Southeast Asia and the
implications for democracy of future military challenges to civilian control.
Two concepts are particularly crucial for this volume: democracy and civil-
military relations. The most influential definition of democracy in comparative
politics is provided by Robert Dahl. Dahl makes ‘open contestation’ and ‘public
competition’ the centre of his conception of Polyarchy,9 which includes eight 9 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971,
7
democracy under StreSS
procedural and institutional considerations: 1. Freedom of association, 2. Freedom
of opinion, 3. Right to vote, 4. Right to be appointed to public office, 5. Right
of political elites to compete for votes and support, 6. Existence of alternative,
pluralistic source of information, 7. free and fair elections, 8. institutions, whose
policy depends on elections and other expressions of the citizens’ preferences.10
More recently, a growing number of scholars have used an even broader and
expanded conception of democracy under the banner of liberal democracy.
These more substantial conceptions of democracy also require provisions for
horizontal accountability (checks and balances), the rule of law, and the absence
of reserved domains for the military.11 Meanwhile, civil-military relations are
defined herein as those interactions between the military and civilian actors that
in some way relate to the power to make political decisions. In other words,
civil-military relations are a continuum of distribution of decision making power
between the civilians and the military.12 Civilian control, then, marks one pole of
the continuum of decision making power, a situation in which “civilians make
all the rules and can change them at any time”; yet on the other pole of the
continuum is the military regime, in which military officers make all the rules
and can change them at any time.13
10 Ibid.11 Aurel Croissant, Wolfgang Merkel, “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in Defective Democracies,” Central European Political Science Review, 1.2 (December 2000): 31-48; Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” in Aurel Croissant/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): Special Issue of Democratization: “Consolidated or Defective Democracy? Problems of Regime Change,” 11, 5 (2004): 33-58; Wolfgang Merkel, “Democracy through War?,” in: Sonja Grimm/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): /Special Issue of Democratization: “War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness,” 15, 3 (2008): 487-508; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999; Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, New York: The Free Press, 2008.12 Cf. Claude E. Welch, “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality.” In Claude E. Welch (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, , Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976, 1-42. 13 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, Siegfried Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” in Democratization, forthcoming 2010.
8
1 : IntroductIon
This monograph is structured into conceptual and empirical sections.
In the first section, Chapter 2 proposes a new approach to the understanding
of civil-military relations in young democracies. Meanwhile, in the second
section, Chapters 3-8 present empirically-based examinations of the specific
interactions between soldiers and civilian governments in six countries of South
and Southeast Asia.
In Chapter 2, Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, highlighting the need
for a universally-accepted definition, conceptualize civilian control as “a set of
decision-making areas” and emphasize the need to view civil-military relations
as a scale of “political decision-making power” which offsets civilian governments
from the armed forces. The authors stress that civilian control is a sine qua
non requirement for the development and consolidation of liberal democracy.
They further contend that the extent of civilian control in emerging democracies
is dependent upon civilian elites’ skills and readiness in developing short or
medium-term tactics for devising institutions that restrict the armed forces’
political activities. The authors then delineate several strategies and contexts in
the institutionalization of civilian control over the military. They conclude that
an understanding of civilian control must transcend an over-concentration on
military coups, adding that though there is no single path to civilian control, the
consolidation of democracy necessitates the purging of armed forces’ prerogatives
from political decision-making.
In Chapter 3, Paul Chambers borrows from the approach introduced in
Chapter 2 to describe the current state of civil-military relations in Thailand.
As such, he disaggregates civil-military relations into the five decision-making
areas of Elite Recruitment, Public Policy, Internal Security, National Defense, and
Military Organization. In three of these areas, the decision-making authority of
9
democracy under StreSS
soldiers vis-à-vis civilians is seen to have risen since the 2006 coup. He states
that the period of 1979 to 2010 has witnessed the steady assertion of political
control by one particular military faction. He adds that even following the end
of direct military rule in late 2007, soldiers have continued to exercise great
power. Indeed, 2009 has seen the military exert autonomy from civilian control.
He concludes that the armed forces have located a politically-strategic “niche,”
becoming an essential actor on Thailand’s political stage. At the same time,
amidst growing military tutelage in politics, the country is increasingly veering
toward democratic erosion.
In Chapter 4, Win Min argues that, given the nature of civil-military
relations in Burma/Myanmar—where military control has long been entrenched—
one must talk about military-civil relations rather than civil-military relations.
He further contends that the up-coming 2010 general elections do not mean a
diminution in armed forces’ supremacy over the country given that the military
will remain largely independent from any elected government. Moreover, he
adds, to ensure their continued rule, Myanmar’s top brass intend to maintain
a preponderance of power by enfeebling civilian sources of power. He further
states that the military leadership will attempt to dominate the country as long
as possible, utilizing prerogatives granted in the 2008 constitution. He concludes
that any political opening and move toward national reconciliation can only occur
from within the armed forces if and only if a reformist senior officer ascends to
the top of the military establishment.
Chapter 5, by Katherine Marie G. Hernandez and Herman Joseph S. Kraft,
sheds light on the state of civil-military relations in the Philippines. They maintain
that, as in other Southeast Asian nations, soldiers have influenced politics and
society, but that multiple insurgencies have provided an excuse for a larger scope
10
1 : IntroductIon
of armed forces involvement in Philippine politics. They continue that, given the
general fragility of civilian governments, the military has exercised enormous
influence in the domestic political arena, allowing it to become a crucial “veto
actor” in competing with the country’s non-military elites. They add that the
nature of the Philippine military precludes it from attempting to take power
directly, instead opting for intervention in a more indirect and latent fashion.
The authors find it unlikely that a reform-minded President will ever successfully
consolidate civilian control. As such, they conclude, soldiers will maintain robust
influence in Philippine politics “for some time to come.”
In Chapter 6, Rizal Sukma affirms that in Indonesia reforms in civil-
military relations have been a top priority since the 1998 fall of General (ret.)
Suharto. At that time, he continues, many believed that military interventions in
politics were a thing of the past. He adds that even today, many insist that the
chance of the armed forces returning to play a political role is “slim.” Though
Sukma agrees that soldiers have mostly departed from the political arena, the
degree to which civilian control over the military has been established “remains
problematic.” Indeed, he adds, after ten years of military reforms, the armed
forces still possess “a degree of autonomy” in relation to the civilian government.
He concludes that, amidst resistance by the armed forces as well as incompetence
and inaptitude by civilian governments, there still remains much to be done to
bring the Indonesian military more fully under civilian control.
Chapters 7 and 8 shift attention to problems of civilian control in South
Asia. In Chapter 7, Siegfried O. Wolf and Seth Kane employ the approach
developed in Chapter 2 to analyze civil-military relations in Pakistan. They argue
that Pakistan has evolved into a classic “praetorian state” where the Army sees
itself as the only true guardian of national sovereignty, political integrity, the
11
democracy under StreSS
principal initiator of any national agenda, and the chief resolver of socio-political
conflicts. They further contend that soldiers hold enormous sway over civilian
governments in terms of political decision-making: elite recruitment, public
policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The authors
conclude that the military will certainly maintain itself as the chief stakeholder
in Pakistan’s political system. Furthermore, they stress that though currently the
Army has withdrawn from directly ruling the country, it will definitely resume
its interest in the political process whenever it feels that its professional or
corporate interests are becoming challenged.
Finally, in Chapter 8, Siegfried O. Wolf argues that in Bangladesh, the
armed forces have on occasion managed to play a significant role in politics since
independence in 1971, though their influence appears to be receding. He adds
that a variety of military endogenous and exogenous factors have shaped the
evolution of civil-military relations in Bangladesh. Yet he contends that though
internal and external security needs have contributed to unity among soldiers,
several factors have created a situation inhibiting the build-up of a substantial
regular armed force. These have included factionalism and politicization in
the military, an active civil society, and particularly-effective (though informal)
civilian government strategies, which have in general proven successful in
ensuring civilian control. Wolf concludes that, though the military will continue
playing a major political role in Bangladeshi politics, it will increasingly be
confronted by civilian governments that have successfully led Bangladesh for
close to twenty years.
Ultimately, when comparing the chapters in terms of the prognosis
for civilian control and democracy for each country case, two general trends
can be discerned: long-term, measured in terms of decades, and short-term,
12
1 : IntroductIon
meaning the exact current situation. Over the long-term, political space has
tended to grow (or at least the facade of space in the case Myanmar) in each
of the cases presented. Five countries can at least argue that they possess the
formal trappings of a democracy where voters can determine who governs them.
Of these five, Thailand has transformed itself from absolute monarchy while
Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia have progressed from being
colonial possessions of European powers. This is not to say that limited rights to
vote were not possible in each of these countries’ previous regimes for certain
citizens. Yet compared to today, such rights were negligible. Again, Myanmar
arises as the bogeyman exception to the trend. Though top generals drew up
a farcical (2008) constitution leading to general elections set for 2010, these
appear to be more or less a veneer behind which leading generals can retain
power. As such, an argument can be made that with regard to the long-term
trend in Myanmar, political space grew after independence but that any civilian
control which was achieved is today virtually sealed over.
Turning to civilian control over the military in the short term, the news
is not good. The fact of the matter is that authoritarianism is on the rise in
Southeast Asia and still undiminished in South Asia. Military actors are playing
an especially interventionist role in the politics of Myanmar—though the election
which has been promised for 2010 may bring forth at the least some sham form
of democracy. Yet soldiers are also politically active in Pakistan and, increasingly,
in Thailand. Meanwhile, the armed forces have successfully applied pressure to
civilian governments in Bangladesh and the Philippines. Finally, the apparent
beacon of civilian control—Indonesia—is also experiencing growing, though
more latent political influence by its military.
13
democracy under StreSS
Ultimately, the countries examined in this volume, offering variations in
degrees of civil-military relations, can be placed across a continuum (see figure
1 below). Indonesia offers a case where democracy has been shorter but more
successful. As for Bangladesh, civilians dominate politics, with soldiers possessing
a lesser albeit political role. Thailand exemplifies a country where the military is
clearly resurgent. The Philippines represents a mid-range case where the state
of civil-military relations remains tentative. In Pakistan, the armed forces exert
enormous power, though civilians at least possess formal power. Myanmar, at
the other end of the continuum from countries with robust civilian control such
as Japan, presents an example of failed democratization where the military has
succeeded in establishing thorough control over political space.
The placing of the six South and Southeast Asian countries along the
continuum in Figure 1 comes from information derived out of the chapters on
the countries in this volume. As for Japan, it is placed on the continuum as an
opposite example from the disproportionately high patterns of military control
existing in other countries of Asia (e.g. Myanmar). Indeed, the case of Japan
exemplifies well-established (since World War II) constraints on the role of the
armed forces in politics and society—a “restrictive approach to maintaining
[civilian] control over the military.”14 It must be emphasized, of course, that this
continuum represents only a very crude “measurement” which aims to illustrate
the approximate position of each of the six cases analyzed in this volume on the
continuum and the distance between the cases instead of clear-cut differentiations
and exact measurements.
14 The positioning of Japan in Figure 1 is based upon information gleaned from the following: P.D. Feaver, Shaun Narine, Takako Hikotani, “Civilian Control and Civil-Military Gaps in the United States, Japan, and China,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 1, (2005).
14
1 : IntroductIon
Figure 1: Continuum of Decision-making Control
Bangladesh Indonesia JapanMyanmar Pakistan Thailand
PhilippinesMilitary
Control
Civilian
Control
Table 1 below meanwhile offers an approximation of the position which
the countries examined in this volume might be placed in regard to levels of
civilian control, including the two dimensions of institutionalized and informal
decision-making power. The institutional dimension refers to the formal
powers or regulations which are supposed to guarantee civilian supremacy
over the military when there is civilian control. On the other hand, the informal
(contestational) dimension refers to the actual, de facto conduct of the military
vis-à-vis civilians with regard to political decision-making, despite the law. Again,
Japan has been included, as the ideal contrast—a country possessing both very
high levels of institutional and informal civilian control.
Table 1: Level of Civilian Control across South and Southeast Asia:
Institutionalized and Informal Dimensions
Balance of Decision-making Control in 2010
Institutionalized Dimension
Informal Dimension
Higher Military Control Myanmar MyanmarPakistan
Approximate Equilib-rium of Control between Military and Civilians
PakistanThailand
ThailandPhilippinesBangladeshIndonesia
Higher Civilian Control IndonesiaBangladesh PhilippinesJapan
Japan
15
democracy under StreSS
Table 1 renders a daunting depiction of civilian control’s tenuous standing
vis-à-vis the military in five young democracies of South and Southeast Asia
(with Myanmar democratization efforts stillborn). Though Myanmar’s position is
hardly surprising, the most disheartening situation is located in the right column.
There we find five democratizing states experiencing substantial informal military
control levels (including Indonesia). Of course, these countries’ ratings are not
static but instead fluid. But for Thailand the flow in the level of civilian control has
been on a negative trajectory since the September 19, 2006 military coup d’état.
Such tidings provide meager support for those who consider uniformed usurpers
a phenomenon of the past and any recent informal intervention a mere anomaly.
Skeptics need only look to the enshrinement of greater military prerogatives into
Thailand’s law despite the 2007 return to civilian rule. In this same box exists
Pakistan, a country which, caught in the throes of political pandemonium, has
yet to consolidate democratic processes.
Based upon the analyses of civilian control offered in this volume, any
short-term prospects for civilian control in the young democracies of South and
Southeast Asia are gloomy indeed. This is no time to pretend to view democratic
trends through rose-tinted glasses. The authors herein have sought to identify
a growing challenge to the development and consolidation of democracy in the
region. More than ever, civilian leaders and civil society need to understand
that excluding the military from the political realm is a current issue of critical
importance. Moreover, civilians need to start ensuring that in the dimension of
politics, they maintain institutional control over the military at all times. This
means altering any laws which bestow political authority upon military officials.
At the same time, civilian governments must educate and involve citizens to
increase vigilance in the face of any informal military political intrusions over
16
1 : IntroductIon
the institutionalized rights of civilians to exercise political power. Without such
efforts, civilian control can hardly expect to dislodge the growing influence
of the armed forces in politics and thus diminish current military threats to
democratization.
Works Cited
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Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Coercion and Governance. The Declining Political Role
of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001.
Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and
Empirical Perspectives, Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001.
Blondel, Jean. “Parties and Party Systems in East and Southeast Asia” in Ian
Marsh (ed), Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and
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Case, William. Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Richmond: Curzon,
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Chadda, M. Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan, Rienner,
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Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, Chambers, Paul, Wolf, Siegfried O. “Beyond the
Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in
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Croissant, Aurel. “Die Parteiensysteme neuer Demokratien in Ostasien: Merkmale,
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Democracies: Elements, Patterns and Institutionalization), Zeitschrift
für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft (German Journal for Comparative
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Croissant, Aurel, Merkel, Wolfgang. “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in
Defective Democracies.” Central European Political Science Review. 1.2
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Croissant, Aurel, Schächter, Teresa. “Institutional Patterns in the New
Democracies of Asia. Forms, Origins and Consequences.” Japanese
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Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale
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Dalton, Russell J., Doh Chull Shin, and Yun-han Chu, editors. Party Politics in
East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development. - Boulder ;
London : Lynne Rienner, 2008.
Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
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Feaver, P.D., Narine, Shaun, Hikotani, Takako. “Civilian Control and Civil-Military
Gaps in the United States, Japan, and China.” Asian Perspective, vol.
29 no. 1 (2005).
Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics,
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Hicken, Allen. Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies. Cambridge:
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Huang, Xiaoming. Politics in Pacific Asia, New York, 2009.
Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
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Kinnvall, C. and K. Jonsson, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia:
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McCargo, Duncan. “Cambodia: Getting Away with Authoritarianism”, Journal
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Merkel, Wolfgang. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” in: Aurel Croissant/
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and Effectiveness,” 15, 3 (2008): 487-508.
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Ufen, Andreas. “Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast
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20
1 : IntroductIon
Section One:Understanding Civilian Control
21
TWOCivilian Control of the Military and Democracy:
Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives1
Aurel Croissant & David Kuehn
Introduction
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the worldwide advance of
democracy. According to data from the Freedom House-Institute, in 2008 119
(61.6 %) of 193 countries in the world had introduced the procedural minimum
of democracy: free, secret and general elections.2 However, as the twenty-first
century begins, current analyses of democratization trends convey a pessimistic
message, noting the end of the third wave of democratization. As Thomas
Carothers stated in 2002, “by far the majority of countries considered as
‘transitioning’ to democracy in recent years have not achieved a relatively well-
functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever
democratic progress they have made.”3 The empirical evidence increasingly
suggests that many new democracies are in serious trouble. They have been
paralyzed by inconclusive and disputed electoral outcomes, incessant political
strife and partisan gridlock; rampant corruption, and recurring political scandals.
More specifically, in Asia, the 2006 coup d’état in Thailand, violent protests in 1 This paper is partly based upon Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (2009): 187-217 and collaborative work in the re-search project “Democratic Transformation and Civilian Control of the Military: Comparing New Democracies in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia” funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and headed by Subrata Mitra and Aurel Croissant. We thank Paul Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf for helpful comments and suggestions.2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Reports (Freedom House, 2009), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year=2009.3 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 9.
22
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Mongolia’s capital Ulan Bator after the parliamentary election of July 2008,
constitutional crisis and a decline of political freedom and civil liberties in the
Philippines, and a President who is under continuous attack for violating human
rights in South Korea seem to testify to a deepening crisis of democracy in the
region.4
Furthermore, for those who thought that with the global wave of
democratization the military would be permanently removed from political
participation in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa, the most recent coup
d’état in Thailand may have been unexpected. Although the frequency of military
coups has steadily decreased since the mid-1970s, there are ample signs to
suggest that the military is still a crucial actor in domestic politics in many
countries, often playing key roles in state and nation-building, political decision-
making, maintaining internal order, and in ensuring national security.5 While
military regimes today are less common compared to the 1960s and 1970s,
depoliticizing political armies, preventing soldiers from staging coup d’états and
institutionalizing civilian control over the military remain as central tasks for
democratic consolidation in many newly democratized nations.
4 See, for example, Doh Chull Shin and Rollin F. Tusalem, “Democratization in East Asia,” in Democratization, ed. Christian W. Haerpfer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 356-376; Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Min-hua Huang, “The Uneven Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18, no. 2 (2006): 246-255; Yun-han Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).5 See with regard to Asia, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series 6 (London: Routledge, 2008); Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies.”. For civil-military relations in Latin America see J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998); David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
23
democracy under StreSS
This is especially true for Thailand. In the seventy-six years since the
overthrow of the absolute monarchy, Thailand has seen somewhere between
seventeen and twenty-three coups and coup attempts, eighteen constitutions
and fifty-six governments.6 While the country has been undergoing a process
of political transition since 1988, deep-reaching political conflicts and fractions
reemerged in September 2006, when the Thai military staged a coup d’état
against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.7 The return to democracy in
December 2007 did little to heal existing divisions in Thai society. Rather,
the political schism between the pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin forces soared
precipitously into rival demonstration movements—the anti-Thaksin People’s
Alliance for Democracy or PAD and the pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship (UDD). In December 2008, the Democrat Party cobbled
together a coalition government and, with support from the armed forces,
has since managed to remain in power. Although formally an elected civilian
government, serious reservations exist in regard to the extent to which the
civilian administration is able to control the military or if it rather functions as
a mere civilian window-dressing for military tutelage (Chambers in this volume).
These events have brought back at least three questions onto the research
agenda of comparative Asian politics and the study of democracy in Asia:
What is civilian control (and what is it not)? What is the relationship between
civilian control and democracy? How can civilian authorities successfully at-
tempt to exercise civilian control over the military and what are the crucial
factors that impact the success or failure of democratic civilian control? As the
contributions to this volume demonstrate, those questions are not only of utmost 6 For the history of civil-military relations in Thailand see Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics: 1981 - 86, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Books and Monograph Series 81 (Singapore, 1989) and Samudavanija Chai-Anan, “Old Soldiers Never Die, They Are Just Bypassed: The Military, Bureaucracy and Globalisation,” in Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison (London: Routledge, 1997), 42-57. 7 For the 2006 coup, see, for example, the special issue 38(1) of the Journal of Contemporary Asia
24
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
importance for Thailand but for many, if not most, political regimes in South
and Southeast Asia, and in the wider Asia-Pacific region. While the case studies
presented here deal with the thorny issue of civil-military relations and civilian
control from an empirical perspective, the remainder of this chapter examines
the aforementioned questions from a conceptual and theoretical point of view.
Seeking to illuminate the challenges of civilian control in young democracies,
this study is structured into five parts. The first part discusses the central term
in the study of civil-military-relations (CMR): civilian control. The second section
presents a conceptualization of civilian control as a set of five decision-making
areas. Section three explores the often postulated but mostly under-theorized
relationship between civilian control and liberal democracy, whereas section
four elaborates on the relationship between agency and strategic behavior and
contextual factors in the process of institutionalizing civilian control in new
democracies. The final section briefly outlines the main implications of the
discussion in this paper for the course of civil-military relations in South and
Southeast Asian nations.
I. What is Civilian Control?
Civil-military relations are those interactions between the military and
civilian actors that in some way relate to the power to make political decisions.89 8 Claude E. Welch, “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality,” in Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Claude E. Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 2.9 The military or armed forces (the terms are used interchangeably) is defined as those permanent state orga-nizations authorized by law to apply coercive power in order to provide security for society and state primarily against external threats. This definition includes various military sub-organizations and specialized military units under formal command lines, such as military police and military intelligence services. Excluded, therefore, are non-state security forces (private security companies or party militias) and paramilitary units. The focus here is on the functional elites of the military organization, that is, the upper echelons of the officer corps. In contrast, the terms civilians or civilian authorities (used interchangeably henceforth) apply to those non-military segments of the state apparatus which have the authority to formulate, implement and oversee political decisions Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 3; Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 26; Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 22; Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in
25
democracy under StreSS
Traditionally, the study of civil-military relations levitated around questions of
who is master and who is servant in civil-military relations and who “guards
the guardians” of the nation. In other words: the question of civilian control is
at the heart of civil-military relations. Even though in recent years, especially
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, democratization processes in eastern Europe,
the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
proliferation of peace-building missions and programs in so-called post-
conflict societies, the concept of security sector governance or security sector
reform has gained prominence in the academic and policy-oriented literature,10
civilian control remains the central issue in civil-military relations in emerging
democracies.
Despite the long history of civil-military research,11 the field still lacks
a universally accepted definition of civilian control. The “old school of civil-
military relations”12 research has often been dominated by a lack of explicit
and theoretically grounded conceptualization of the boundaries and contents of
civilian control. Rather, most studies relied on meticulous empirical summaries
and historical descriptions of processes and events, refraining from making the
underlying assumptions explicit.13 In addition, the focus of civil-military research
in the 1960s and 1970s has mainly been on the causes, opportunities and
motives of military coups as well as on the forms and performances of military
Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 4. 10 For an overview, see Alexandre Lambert, Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era (Münster: LIT, 2009). With regard to the application of the concepts to the Southeast Asian region, see Beeson and Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia.11 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455-468; Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).12 Anthony Forster, “New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas,” Connections 1, no. 2 (2002): 71.13 Daniel N. Nelson, “Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy: A Civil-Military Critique,” Defense & Security Analysis 18, no. 2 (2002): 157-158.
26
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
rule. From this perspective, civilian control remained implicitly defined as the
absence of physical military intervention, and actual military rule.14
However, focusing on the coup/no-coup dichotomy runs the risk of
reducing the complexity of civil-military relations to only one extreme and partial
aspect.15 The fallacy, which necessarily follows from a negative definition of
civilian control as absence of coups, is that all other forms, states, and patterns
of civil-military relations necessarily need to be considered as civilian control.
This includes other forms of military misbehavior that are potentially not less
dangerous for the political elites or society at large than the military coup. One
case in point is the “parasitic military” which abuses its political power to draw
more resources from their parent society than needed to provide their core
functions.16 Another example is the carving-out of “reserved domains” for the
armed forces (see below). Furthermore, contrary to the equation of absence of
open intervention and civilian control, the contrary could, in fact, be true. As
Feaver has aptly pointed out, the absence of military coups could also be read
as an indicator for the high degree of the military’s political influence vis-à-vis
civilians. From this perspective, military interventions bear witness to the
political weakness of the officer corps, since the latter is not able to assert their
institutional, corporate or personal interests in any other way.17
In order to avoid the “fallacy of coup-ism.” a definition and conceptualization
of civilian control must go beyond the coup/no-coup dichotomy. It needs to depart 14 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 17, no. 3 (April 1965): 386-430; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); S. E Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall, 1962).15 A. R. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” Government and Opposition 6, no. 1 (1971): 5-35.16 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, 29-30.17 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 154-155.
27
democracy under StreSS
from the basic assumption that all militaries engage in some form and to certain
extents in political action.18 Furthermore, such a definition has to bear in mind
that political activity of the military can take various forms.19 The point of refer-
ence for a comprehensive understanding of civilian control must not be whether
the military yields political influence, but how and how much.20
Hence, it is necessary to think of civil-military relations as a continuum
of political decision-making power distributed between the civilian political
leadership and the military. In this sense, civilian control is a relative condition,
i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., strong
or weak, encompassing or limited). “Full-fledged” civilian control, on one pole of
the continuum, refers to the distribution of decision-making power under which
“civilians make all the rules and can change them at any time.”21 Under civilian
control, civilians alone have the power to decide on national policies. Civilians
can delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies
to the military. But, the military has no autonomous decision-making power
outside those areas that were specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is
civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or aspects of policies,
the military implements, and civilians alone define the boundaries between
policy-making and policy-implementation. In addition, civilian authorities are
entitled to, and have the capacity to, effectively control the implementation of
their decisions. They possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they
can—in principle—revise their delegation at any time.22 On the other pole of the 18 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, 95.19 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 (2002): 36-40.20 Welch, “Civilian control of the military,” 2; Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, 2. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 89-93.21 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 142.22 Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits,” Armed Forces & Society 19, no. 1 (1992): 7-26; David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” Comparative Politics 25, no. 1 (1992): 83-102; Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military”; Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 4 (2001): 525-540.
28
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
continuum is the military regime, that is, the distribution of power in which
the military controls all decisions concerning political structures, processes,
and policies while civilians do not possess any autonomous political decision-
making power.
II. Civilian Control Conceptualized as a Set of Decision-making
Areas
Following Timothy Colton’s seminal study on the changing range and
forms of political participation of the Soviet military,23 a range of different
approaches have been proposed to capture the different patterns of the
civil-military power relationship.24 Building on this body of work, we organize
the various components of civilian control into five decision-making areas of
civil-military relations: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national
defense, and military organization.
23 Timothy J Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Russian Research Center studies 79 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).24 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society; Alfred C Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988); Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democ-racies in South America”; Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Muthiah Alagappa, “Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 29-68; Harold A Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
29
democracy under StreSS
Figure 1: Five decision making areas of civil-military relations25
Internal Security
(C)
(D)
External Defense
Public Policy
(B)
(E)
Military Organization
Elite
Recruitment
(A)
A) Civilian control over elite recruitment is the sine qua non for
democratic rule. The principles of civilian control are violated under the following
conditions: if the military enjoys constitutionally reserved representation in
cabinet and parliament, or has informally recognized or institutionalized veto
powers regarding the appointment of members of the government or public
administration, if the armed forces control aspects of the electoral process, or
if active service personnel hold positions of political leadership.
B) The area of public policy encompasses decision-making and
implementation in all political affairs except security and defense policy, e.g.
fiscal and economic policy, foreign policy and public welfare. Examples of the
breaching of civilian control in this area are any occurrences of autonomous
military policy-making, or the formation of genuine military structures which
take over functions from civilian administrative organizations.
25 Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie,” Südostasien aktuell 26, no. 3 (2007): 5-54; Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies.”
30
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
C) Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations:
both new and established democracies deploy their armed forces for disaster
relief, to support the civilian police force and border control troops, or to fight
insurgencies and terrorism.26 However, these activities are compatible with
civilian control only if the decision-making power over the range, duration and
frequency of these missions rests with democratic authorities, and if civilian
institutions are able to monitor military activities.
D) National defense is the core function of any national military. Even in
established democracies, military officers are usually involved in the formulation
of defense policies and often provide expertise to civilian decision-makers. In
fact, effective defense policy-making requires civilians willing to make use of
the military’s professional expertise.27 However, civilian control in this area is
at stake if civilian authorities do not possess the final decision-making power,
cannot control the defense policy agenda, or if civilian institutions are not able
to monitor and sanction the military’s activities.
E) The area of military organization comprises decisions on the size
and organization of the armed forces, their doctrine and command structures,
as well as the general guidelines of recruitment, education, appointment and
equipment. While a certain degree of organizational autonomy is necessary for
the military to fulfill its functions, civilian control is dependent on the ability of
civilians to define the range and boundaries of this “institutional autonomy.”28
Full-fledged civilian control requires that civilian authorities enjoy
uncontested decision-making power in all five areas. Challenges to the civilians’
26 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2. ed. (London: Routledge, 2006).27 Thomas C Bruneau and Harold A Trinkunas, eds., Global Politics of Defense Reform (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).28 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America.”
31
democracy under StreSS
ability to make decisions in the five areas by the military can occur in two
distinct forms: institutionalized rules and contestation.29
Institutionalized rules refer to the existence of “military prerogatives.”
that is the military’s “acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise
effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military
areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between
the state and political or social society.”30 These rules perpetually confine the
elected civilians’ decision making power. Examples of military prerogatives can
be found in Ecuador and Turkey, where a role for the armed forces as “guardian
of the nation” is inscribed in each country’s constitution.31 To prevent a military
from acquiring political clout, one condition for civilian control in each of the
five dimensions is that the military must not possess any such institutionalized
prerogatives. At the same time, it must be assured that N develop institutions that
transfer the power to make decisions regarding all policy matters to civilians—
including defense and security policy.
Contestation encompasses all instances of the military challenging
civilian decision-making power by threatening to engage or actually engaging
in illegitimate conduct. While “contestation” is temporally limited, it N poses
a serious threat to civilian control. Hence, civilian control also depends on the
absence of any unlawful, or informal, political interference by the military aimed
at reducing the civilians’ ability to make or change political n, or to have them
implemented. Both conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient
29 Welch, “Civilian control of the military”; Kemp and Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military”; Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance”; Nelson, “Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy”; Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics.30 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93.31 Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 4-5.
32
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
for civilian control to be existent, i.e., if and only if both conditions are fulfilled,
civilians’ decision-making power is not circumscribed by military influence.
To differentiate between institutionalized and contestational forms of
military attacks on civilian control is an analytical distinction. In political reality,
more often than not both forms occur hand in hand. For example, while some
constitutions (i.e., Chile’s post-authoritarian constitution until the constitutional
reforms of the late 1990s) included some institutionalized military prerogatives,
the military also engaged in contestation, such as holding parades in the streets
of the capital of Santiago de Chile to demonstrate its power to the civilians and
to make sure that civilians did not follow a course in the reform of civil-military
relations that would have threatened the armed forces’ autonomy and corporate
interests.
III. Civilian Control as a Necessary Condition for Liberal Democracy
The literature on civil-military relations in democratic transitions
recognizes the importance of civilian control of the military as a conditio sine
qua non for the consolidation of new democracies.32 However, civilian control
is not equal to democratic control, as the experience of single-party regimes in
communist countries illustrated. The fact that civilians control the military says
little about the former’s political beliefs and practices. Alternatively, as Anthony
Forster aptly notes, “it is a fundamental premise of democratic civilian relations
that civilian control of the military is clearly possible without democracy, but
democracy isn’t possible without civilian control of the military.”33
32 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 250; Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, eds., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).33 Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 96.
33
democracy under StreSS
Regarding the specific relationship of civilian control and democracy, two
somewhat distinct contrasting perspectives can be discerned in the literature
on democracy and democratization. Some democracy theorists and students
of democratic transition define civilian control as a functional prerequisite of
democratic rule.34 On the other hand, scholars who subscribe to an “inherent”
conception of civilian control define military subordination under civilian
authority as a core aspect of democracy itself. In this perspective, civilian control
is one of the elements that define democracy.35 Regardless of the analytical status
of civilian control vis-à-vis democracy, both positions assume civilian control to
be of fundamental relevance for democratic governance: without civilian control,
there is no democracy.
Democracy can be understood as the realization of three “core values”:36
peoples’ sovereignty, political equality, and civil liberty.37 It remains then to be
asked how weak or absent civilian control influences the realization of these
three democratic principles.
The connection between civilian control of the military and sovereignty of
the people is straightforward. The degree of accountability and responsibility of
elected political representatives to the citizens declines with the degree of military
incursions into the elected civilians’ decision-making power. The larger the
military’s autonomous political decision-making power, the smaller the relevance
of democratic processes as instruments for making political decisions responsive
to the preferences of the people and holding decision makers accountable.
34 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 46.35 E.g., Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75-88.36 Corey Brettschneider, “The Value Theory of Democracy,” Politics Philosophy Economics 5, no. 3 (2006): 270-273.37 Larry J. Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds., Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 2005), 22.
34
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Weak or outright lack of civilian control also poses a serious obstacle to
the principle of political equality. As democracy is based upon the idea that all
citizens have the equal right of representation and access to the political system,
political privileges for certain political or social groups or individuals contradict
the idea of democratic citizenship.38 The emergence of the armed forces as a
“tutelary power” or military “reserved domains” places one social group (and its
individual members) into a politically privileged position which stands at odds
with the notion of political equality.
Weakly-institutionalized or outright lack of civilian control poses similar
problems for the democratic principle of liberty or individual freedom. This core
value refers to the limitation and mode of exercise of governmental power by
making it subject to legal boundaries and respect for the individual rights of the
citizens.39 In liberal democracies, a range of institutional arrangements safeguards
the citizens’ primary individual rights. Typically, this set of fundamental
rights refers to the life and security of the person, the liberty and freedom of
movement, the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of assembly and
association, freedom of information, protection against discrimination, special
rights of particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, and due process
rights.40 These rights are in jeopardy if the military is not subject to firm and
effective civilian control. This is so because the lack of civilian control necessarily
violates the institutions of constitutionalism and rule of law which are meant
to guarantee the protection of these rights. A tutelary military is by definition
beyond the checks and balances that are meant to “prevent, redress, or punish
38 Sidney Verba, “Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 04 (2003): 263.39 Marc F. Plattner, “Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One without the Other,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998): 171-180.40 David Beetham, “Freedom as the Foundation,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 66.
35
democracy under StreSS
the presumably illegal actions (or inactions) of public officials.”41 Similarly, if
the military enjoys autonomous decision-making power in certain policy areas
or if it can implement policies without being monitored by actors who can be
judicially or electorally held accountable, they remain unchecked by institutional
counterweights and are thus effectively lawless.
The question that follows from this is to what extent the lack of civilian
control can be arguably reconciled with calling a regime democratic, or to
phrase it differently: where is the threshold between a democracy under military
tutelage and a military regime? While this question is impossible to answer
with any degree of final authority without empirical evidence, two arguments
deserve closer scrutiny.
First, a political regime cannot be categorized as democratic if the military
has any degree of autonomous political influence in the areas of public policy
and elite recruitment because they touch upon the core elements of the electoral
regime per se. As the functionality of the electoral regime is the defining element
of democratic rule, any conferring of autonomous decision-making power over
these matters to the military violates the core democratic principles of people’s
sovereignty and political equality. If the military controls elite recruitment (area
A of civil-military relations) and the civilian government is subordinate to and
exists only at the disposition of the military, or if the armed forces direct most
other policy areas and oversee the workings of a civilian day-to-day cabinet, the
political regime must be judged as being under military control and can no longer
be considered “minimally” democratic. Political regimes with a literal military
government having full control over state policy and with cabinet members
drawn from the armed forces must be classified as authoritarian.42
41 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 37.42 Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 91.
36
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Second, concerning a possible military dominance over security and
defense-related areas, the argument is less theoretically clear-cut: if the military
exerts its influence over internal security-making, national defense, and military
organization without perpetrating gross human rights violations, withholding
civil or participatory rights for active service personnel, or utilizing institutional
autonomies to engage in large-scale graft, a point can be made that a defective
variant of democracy might still be viable.43 Hence, other forms of political
regimes, in which the military exercise a certain degree of oversight over
civilian politicians in these decision-making areas of civil-military relations must
be considered, “incomplete” or “defective” forms of democracy under military
tutelage.44
IV. Strategies and Contexts in the Process of Institutionalizing
Civilian Control
In democratizing regimes the process of (re-) creating civilian supremacy
over the military consists of two components. First, there is the retreat of the
military from direct government. This is by definition a necessary condition for
the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. But, as some cases in Latin
America, Asia and Southern Europe indicate, this retreat may be a matter of
degree and does not need to be complete, at least in the first years of democracy.45
Second, civilian control is institutionalized when civilians’ decision-making power
is not challenged by either institutionalized prerogatives or ad hoc contestation
by the military in any of the five areas. This requires the elimination of military
43 Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.44 Wolfgang Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie. Band 1: Theorie (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003); Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 90-92.45 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization After Twenty Years?,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144.
37
democracy under StreSS
discretionary power and reserved domains, and also the construction of a new
institutional structure of civilian-military interaction.
How can this shift be achieved and which factors determine the success
or failure of crafting civilian control? Thus far, civil-military relations theory
offers only partial and sometimes contradictory, answers to these questions.
While the theory-driven literature on civil-military relations is still dominated by
the professionalism school,46 in recent years the field has experienced attempts
to establish a new tradition of civil-military relations theory. Probably the most
innovative contribution is Peter Feaver’s agency theory of civilian control.47 By
developing a principal-agent model of civil-military relations, Feaver analyzes
dynamic interactions between civilians and the officer corps, arguing that the
subordination of the military agent can be measured by calculating whether
the civilian principal is able and willing to detect and punish military ‘shirking’.
Feaver’s model is a seminal contribution to the study of civil-military
relations in established democracies. It is less suited, however, for explaining
the institutionalization of civilian control in democratic transitions. His a priori
assumption, that civilians are the principals who employ the military agent as
an “armed servant.” is plausible in established democracies, whereas civilians
in newly democratized countries often have to first establish themselves as
principals.48To examine the complexities of civilian control in neo-democracies,
an alternative approach is needed. It incorporates some of Feaver’s arguments,
but is rooted in the neo-institutionalist tradition of an “actors-centered
46 Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait.47 Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique”; Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).48 Wendy Hunter, “Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1994): 634.
38
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
institutionalism.”49 This approach is based upon the theoretical premise that
the degree of civilian control in new democracies depends on the ability and
willingness of civilian elites to develop short- or medium-term strategies for
establishing institutions that restrict the political activities of the armed forces
and tie the actions of military officers to the basic norms and rules of the
democratic regime. While individual politicians and military officers maneuver
to maximize utilities, their options are inherently constrained because they are
operating within the rules of one or more institutions and specific structural
and situational contexts.
Based on the work of Feaver and Trinkunas,50 it is plausible to differentiate
six control strategies. Needless to say, these strategies are ideal-type conceptions;
in real political life, actors most certainly combine elements of more than one
strategy.
1) Appeasement. By granting the military material benefits and
institutional autonomy, civilians set incentives for the armed forces to refrain
from political intervention and to remain loyal to the political regime and
political authorities. The range of appeasement encompasses impunity for
human rights violations, sustaining or raising defense expenditures, providing
guarantees for organizational autonomy and self-governance of the armed
forces, and accepting military prerogatives in certain policy areas. However,
by stabilizing or widening existing military prerogatives and forgoing effective
control mechanisms, appeasement runs the risk of fostering the emergence
of some form of ‘guarded democracy’, in which the military sets the rules of
engagement in civil-military relations.49 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).50 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations; Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective.
39
democracy under StreSS
2) Monitoring. This strategy aims at creating oversight mechanisms, inside
or outside the armed forces, in order to reduce existing information asymmetries
between civilians and the military and, therefore, to minimize “moral hazard”.
Moral hazard refers to the incentives of the agent to utilize information
asymmetries for its own good, for instance by hiding its true intentions or by
taking hidden action against the will of political authorities. Key instruments
for monitoring the military are special bodies of investigation inside the armed
forces, parliamentary committees, and reporting systems. While monitoring alone
cannot enforce compliance, it is plausible to assume that the very possibility
of detecting misbehavior and the anticipated costs resulting thereof reduce the
probability of military insubordination.51
3) Ascriptive selection. Another fundamental problem in any principal-
agent relation is ‘adverse selection’. As with moral hazard, the threat of adverse
selection is rooted in existing information asymmetries between civilians and
the armed forces. It describes the problem that the civilian principal has in
not being able to know for sure the “type” of the military agent, that is, the
norms, values and interests of the military personnel and their inclination for
shirking. Ascriptive selection aims to reduce the military’s disposition to subvert
civilian control by nominating military personnel based on ascriptive criteria,
thereby hoping to minimize the chance of ‘adverse selection’. Military officers
are appointed according to their perceived loyalty towards the government and
political regime. This strategy is often employed in weakly institutionalized
political regimes where the transaction costs are low.52 However, it may foster
the problem of opportunistic behavior and the politicization of the officer corps,
51 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations, 68-75.52 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 214-226.
40
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
thus providing ‘solutions’ to the control problem in civil-military relations that
are ineffective or possibly harmful.53
4) Political socialization. This strategy is related to ascriptive selection
insofar as it aims to transform the professional norms and corporate self-image
of the officer corps. With this strategy, however, civilians actively mold the
military’s organizational culture and normative ideals through political education,
the reform of officer training programs, and the reorganization of leadership in
order to strengthen the acceptance of and loyalty to the democratic order and the
organizing principles of democratic civilian control. Obviously, this constitutes a
rather long-term approach and is thus less suited for the short-term enforcement
of civilian control.
5) Counterbalancing. By taking advantage of inter- and intra-agency
rivalries and cleavages among different segments of the security forces, civilians
try to balance military power and strengthen their own position. This strategy
includes alternately favoring different services, creating alternative military forces
outside of the armed forces’ chain of command (such as paramilitary police,
presidential guard, or special security forces under the command of the ministry
of the interior) and other balancing mechanisms. While this strategy allows
civilians to keep military power in check, it may undermine the armed forces’
ability to defend the country against external threats. Moreover, this strategy
may foster problems of opportunistic behavior and politicization among (para-)
military formations, thus increasing the control problem in civil-military relations.
6) Sanctioning. Sanctioning strengthens civilian supremacy by rewarding
compliance and punishing non-compliance. Negative sanctions include
discharges, early retirement or court-martialing of disloyal officers, investigations 53 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 227.
41
democracy under StreSS
by independent agencies and summary purges of the officer corps. By providing
concrete incentives, sanctioning is likely to produce subordination even if the
norms of civil supremacy and professionalism have not yet been internalized
by military officers.54
By analyzing the respective mix of strategies, the degree of civilian control
in any given country can be traced back to the specific decisions of civilian
actors. We assume that the extent and effectiveness of civilian control in new
democracies depends on the robustness of civilian control strategies: the more
robust or ‘intrusive’ the strategies, the more effectively the military’s prerogatives
can be permanently reduced and the armed forces kept under civilian control.
However, civil-military interaction does not take place in a historical or
social vacuum.55 Certain structural and situational factors provide resources,
opportunities and constraints for political elites which shape the civil-military
balance of power. Therefore, we assume that the strategic choices of civilians
and soldiers are also influenced by the specific context in which civil-military
interactions take place; civilians are more likely to choose robust strategies
if the historical, structural and situational contexts provide the opportunity.
Integrating deductive reasoning and empirical observations in civil-military
relations research,56 we distinguish three sets of structural and situational
factors: initial conditions, military-endogenous factors and military-exogenous
factors (see Figure 2).
54 Dale R Herspring, Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains: Civil-Military Relations Since Cromwell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 3.55 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 452.56 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance”; Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,” Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 3 (2004): 357-381.
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2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Figure 2: Factors and Strategies of Crafting Civilian Control57
Civil-Military Relations
Internal Security
(C)
(D)
External Defense
Public Policy
(B)
(E)
Military Organization
EliteRecruitment
(A)
Control Strategies
Initial Conditions
Mil.-endogenous factors
1.Organizational culture
2.Internal cohesion
3.Economic resources
Mil-exogenous factors
1.Public support of regime
2.Cinilian consensus
3.Active civil sicoiety
4.External threat perception
5.Internal threat perception
6.External actors
57 Croissant, “Riding the Tiger”; Croissant and Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie”; based on Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: A Threat to Democracy?,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 44, no. 3 (1998): 329-349; and Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy.
43
democracy under StreSS
Initial conditions
The characteristics of the non-democratic regime (e.g., single-party,
personalist, or military regime), the type of military rule (hierarchical or
non-hierarchical) and the scope of military prerogatives in the authoritarian
regime have profound implications for the challenges and opportunities for
crafting civilian control in new democracies. Particularly relevant is whether
the armed forces as a corporative agent or military faction were part of the
authoritarian regime coalition, whether the dictatorship was a military regime
or whether the military was subordinate to civilian elites. Where the military
played an important role in the old regime and in the transition to the new
regime, numerous obstacles must be overcome to achieve civilian supremacy.
A military in retreat from government positions usually wants to maintain
monitoring or tutelary capacities over new authorities, which would affirm
authoritarian enclaves within an otherwise democratic regime. More than any
of the other kinds of organizational bases found in non-democratic regimes, a
hierarchically-led and cohesive military possesses the greatest ability to impose
“reserve domains” on the newly-elected government, and this by definition
precludes democratic consolidation. In contrast, if the authoritarian regime is
led by a non-hierarchical military and this regime collapses or is overthrown, it
will be easier to impose civilian democratic control upon the military than if the
regime had been led by a hierarchical military.58 Non-hierarchical military-led
regimes, thus, have some characteristics that make them less of a potential
obstacle to democratic transition and especially to democratic consolidation.59
58 Regarding the distinction between non-hierarchical and hierarchically-led military regimes, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.59 Ibid.
44
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
The impact of the type of regime on the course of civil-military relations
after transition to democracy, however, is filtered by the mode of transition.60
There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that one of the most pressing
problems of civil-military relations in new democracies is that military officers
are able to secure a continuing role for officers in the policy process. This is
particularly the case if hierarchical military governments have ruled relatively
successfully. Democratic transitions in South America, South Europe and in
some countries in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa proceeded under heavy
military supervision. Transitions often took off under constitutional frameworks
planned by military-authoritarian rulers or under ad hoc rules prepared to
oversee change. The military thus significantly influenced the pace and agenda
of the transition, affecting the scope and pattern of competition, and occasionally
banned individuals from running for the highest offices. In addition, the military
leadership was able to remain mostly unchanged, at least in the early phases
of the new democratic regime (Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Portugal and Turkey, South Korea;.61 Hence, it is plausible to assume that civilians
will be more likely to employ robust strategies if the military has no control over
the course of the transition to democracy.
Endogenous factors
Endogenous factors are related to internal aspects of the military such
as its organizational cohesiveness, its doctrine and its economic posture. These
factors affect the ability and disposition of the officer corps to resist civilian 60 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, 29-45.61 Felipe Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-authoritarian Regimes,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 194-222; Alagappa, Coercion and governance; Smith, Democracy in Latin America.
45
democracy under StreSS
control strategies. Three different factors can be discerned. First, an ideologically
coherent military organization is favorable for the institutionalization of civilian
control over the military, if a “tutelary-guardianship”62 role is not part of the
military’s ideology.63 Conversely, an ideologically coherent military organization
which regards political interventions as an integral part of their historical mission
and roles as experts in the management of organized violence and political affairs
offers unfavorable conditions for the enforcement of civilian control.64
Second, the question of whether and to what extent military factionalism
is negative for the enforcement of civilian control depends on conflict intensity,
the degree of factionalism as well as on the dispersion of political power between
“loyal.” “semi-loyal“ and “illoyal“ factions65. Very problematic is the absence of
an overarching loyalty of military factions to the political community since this
increases the threat of an open outbreak of conflicts between segmented groups
within the military. Also problematic is a strong polarization between die-hard
followers of the authoritarian order and supporters of the new democratic
regime. In general, however, it can be assumed, that the more difficult it is to
institutionalize civilian control, the stronger the corporate unity of the armed
forces. A smaller degree of internal cohesion reduces the military’s abilities to
defend its political prerogatives, and thus is conducive to civilian control.66
Also significant is the degree to which democratization affects economic
interests of military groups. The question here is whether the military as
62 Brian Loveman, For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1999).63 Rosemary H. T. O’Kane, The Likelihood of Coups (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 97.64 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics; Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance .” 65 For the concept of democratic loyal and illoyal agents Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).66 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, 30-31.
46
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
an organization, single factions inside the military or influential individuals,
possesses autonomous economic resources that could render material sanctions
ineffective. These resources might provide military officers incentives to resist
the expansion of civilian control in order to defend their income and economic
interests. Under these conditions the civilians’ ability to cut back military
prerogatives is impeded.67 Therefore, the enforcement of civilian control is
hampered if the armed forces are engaging in entrepreneurial roles because it
makes a crucial difference for civilian governments whether they must implement
their economic policies against the opposition of civilian distributional coalitions,
or whether the military is part of this distributional coalition. In contrast to most
other political groupings, the military cannot only lobby a democratically elected
government, but it also can supplant it.
Exogenous factors
Exogenous factors shape the civil-military balance of power from outside
the military complex. Based on the rich research literature we identify six
different factors.
First, if the norms, rules and procedures of the democratic regime enjoy
sufficient public support because citizens perceive the democratic regime as
well-performing in economic and political terms, then civilians’ power vis-à-vis
the military will be strengthened and the use of robust strategies facilitated.68
A military will find it harder to resist pressure for change in civil-military
relations and push for its own prerogatives when political elites are visibly backed
by a wide array of electorally-strong social and political forces. Vice versa, the 67 Nordlinger, Soldiers in politics.68 Sundhaussen, “The Military.”
47
democracy under StreSS
options for civilians to choose more robust control strategies are less favorable
when the democratic system is widely believed to produce poor outcomes and the
public perceives politicians as being incompetent to deal with society’s problems.
Second, the same holds true when a consensus among civilians on not
involving the military in political controversies is lacking and, instead, political
groups are “knocking on the barracks’ door,”69 seeking support from members
of the armed forces. In fact, often it is the civilians who call on the military for
support either to overthrow or to defend constitutional government. In return, in
many societies, the civilian and “democratically” enacted constitutions attribute
to the military a “moderating” power that “legitimizes” their intervention. On the
other hand, the greater the cohesion of the political elite and consensus among
politicians not to engage the military in partisan politics, the more likely elected
representatives will be able to implement robust control strategies. Furthermore,
the weaker the coherence of the civilian coalition in charge of the democratic
transition, the easier it will be for the military to negotiate their withdrawal on
terms where they retain non-democratic prerogatives which hamper democratic
consolidation.
Third, civilians’ abilities to employ robust strategies will be further
enhanced if an active civil society can exert pressure on the military to accept
civilian supremacy and provides alternative sources of information on defense
issues, which serve as an additional oversight mechanism.70 In addition, civilian
control is easier to accomplish and solidify in case of the prior existence of well-
organized political parties which have stout support among voters and various
69 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Mlitary Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 47-65.70 Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe; Marina Caparini, Philipp H. Fluri, and Ferenc Molnar, eds., Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006).
48
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
social strata, thereby providing strong democratic regime leverage against the
military.
Fourth, by outwardly directing the military’s political energies and
providing electoral incentives for civilians to pay attention to civil-military
relations, an external threat to national security also tends to be conducive to
the institutionalization of civilian control.71
Fifth, the existence of internal security challenges, in contrast, potentially
weakens the legitimacy of the democratic order and civilian elites and strengthens
the military’s role as the ‘non-partisan’ guardian of national integrity, thereby
impeding the institutionalization of civilian control. Indeed, one of the most
often used arguments of generals and colonels to legitimize their interventions
is that the democratic government is unable or unwilling to solve internal crisis
and security threats.72 In fact, the sad story of coup politics in many parts of the
world tells us that the weakness of democratic institutions in settling political
crises within institutions and along the procedures of the democratic regime is
not only the most important trigger for military intervention, but furthermore it
also often generates broad public support for a military coup.73 Intense political
polarization or virulent conflicts form one of the most favorable opportunities
for military intervention. If state sovereignty is challenged by the government
of another country or by guerillas and secessionists, the military is pulled into
domestic political affairs.
Sixth, and lastly, civilians are more likely to adopt robust strategies if
external actors such as international donors, international organizations or 71 Michael C Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).72 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Rienner, 2000).73 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, 2. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
49
democracy under StreSS
national governments generate incentives for the military to internalize the
principle of civilian supremacy or to support civilian attempts to control the
military.74
V. Conclusions
Empirical evidence derived from quantitative analyses of civil-military
relations worldwide shows that military coups have become less frequent
in the past decades. While military interventions and military regimes
have not completely vanished from the face of the earth, their number has
dwindled significantly in the recent three decades, when the “third wave of
democratization”75 led to democratic transitions in former authoritarian regimes
around the globe. According to data presented by Thompson and Li, in the first
three decades after World War II, military officers in the Middle East had on
average staged coups once every eight months, in Africa once every three months
and in Latin America once every ten weeks.76 With the onset of the third wave
of democratization in 1974, the frequency of coup
74 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenonand its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 13, no. 5 (2006): 776-790.75 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).76 William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers, Sage professional papers in comparative politics; 4 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); Richard P.Y. Li and William R. Thompson, “The “Coup Contagion” Hypothesis,” Jour-nal of Conflict Resolution 19, no. 1 (1975): 63-84.
50
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Figure 3: Number of attempted and successful military coups 1960-2006 77
Note: This graph only shows successful and attempted, but failed coups. Not shown are plotted or allegedly
plotted coup attempts.
d’états declined significantly.
Apart from Turkey (1997), Europe saw its last coup attempt in 1981,
when segments of the Spanish Army (unsuccessfully) rebelled against the newly
institutionalized democracy. The latest coup attempt in the Middle East happened
in Egypt in 1981, the latest successful coup was staged in South Yemen, in 1978.
Meanwhile, in Latin America, military interventions have declined significantly.
At present, there are no open military regimes in Europe or Latin America. Only
in parts of Africa and Asia does military intervention remain a realistic threat for
civilian rule, as the recent coups in Pakistan (1999), Thailand (2006), Fiji (2006),
Mauritania (2005, 2008), Guinea (2008) and Honduras (2009) demonstrate.78
77 Croissant and Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie”; Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies”; based on data from the Polity IV project.78 However, on June 29, 2009, Honduras experienced the first military coup in Central America in a quarter of a century, in which the Honduran military ousted the democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya.
51
democracy under StreSS
Furthermore, the third wave did away with most military regimes in the world.
This is not only true for Latin America, where more than ten military regimes
transitioned to democracy between 1978 and 199079 but also for the Asia-Pacific.
As this chapter is being written, there is only one open military regime in the
region (Burma/Myanmar).
From a simplistic point of reference, this development seems to bode
unambiguously well for civilian control and democratic consolidation. However,
recent studies on democratic transitions draw an ambivalent picture of the state
of civil-military relations in most of the third wave democracies. On the one
hand, they acknowledge the declining relevance of open military interventions for
most of the countries under study. On the other hand, a large number of studies
suggest that the military has not given up its political roles and still intrudes
significantly into the realm of civilian politics in many countries. Particularly the
study of Latin American third wave democracies has provided ample evidence
that current militaries do not refrain from actively engaging in political activities,
but that they have merely changed the form and instruments of asserting their
will vis-à-vis civilian rulers. In this context, it has been argued that the typical
patterns of military political activity in the new Latin American democracies
are the “perverse institutionalization” of reserved domains and discretionary
power by the armed forces over their civilian superiors.80 The armed forces in
today’s Latin America are more interested in carving out respected political
niches within their democratic orders than overturning them.81 And even when
military revolts occurred, they often seemed designed mainly to defend military
79 Smith, Democracy in Latin America.80 Samuel J. Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings, Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Guillermo A. O’Donnell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 57-105.81 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 83.
52
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
prerogatives and professional integrity rather than to seek political domination.82
As with Latin America, in South and Southeast Asia, these forms of clandestine
military political power are widespread. There are at least four countries in
these regions in which the political system is under de facto military control
or the fragile and “incomplete” democratic order is subject to military tutelage
(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand).
In order to capture these instances of military political power, a definition
and conceptualization of civilian control must go beyond the coup/no-coup
dichotomy. We thus conceptualize civilian control as a certain distribution of
decision making power between civilians and the military. Civilian control is
that state in the civil-military power relationship in which civilians alone have
the power to decide on national politics. Under civilian control, civilians can
freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of
certain policies to the military and the military has no autonomous decision-
making power outside those areas that were specifically defined by civilians.
Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or
aspects of policies, the military implements, and the civilians alone define the
boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation.
In regard to the challenge of making democracy sustainable and self-
defendable, comparative studies on civil-military relations in newly democratized
nations demonstrate that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach or “golden
path” towards civilian control. However, there are a number of lessons to
be learned from past experiences of other societies. First, gradual timing is
crucial. Big bang strategies of reform, punishment or rectification of the past are
unlikely to succeed where the outgoing military regime is strong. Instead, the
82 Smith, Democracy in Latin America, 102-106.
53
democracy under StreSS
institutionalization of civilian control in young democracies is a gradual process,
consisting of two analytically distinct sequences, or “generations.”83 The first
generation challenge is the protection of the democratic civilian regime against
military intervention and the institutionalization of civilian decision-making
power over the political center. In our conceptualization of civilian control, this
means that first, the area of elite recruitment and policy-making needs to be put
under civilian control before civilians’ influence can be extended into spheres of
prior exclusive military domination. The “second generation problems” refer to
this next step of extending and institutionalizing civilian decision-making power
into former domains of the military, particularly internal security and external
defense policy-making. Following this argumentation, newly democratized
countries need to successfully solve “first generation problems” before they can
hope to tackle “second generation problems”. However, Cottey et al. also argue
that although the solution to “first generation problems” is necessary before
going on to the “second generation.” it does not mechanically lead to civilian
control of security policy. This is exemplified by empirical evidence of countries
in Latin America and elsewhere. Even where the military has lost prestige and
is weakened by policy failure, as for example in Argentina, big bang strategies
of wanting to cut back military power too much too quickly are risky. The most
dramatic political consequences are, of course, a breakdown of the transition
process or new military uprisings and attempted coups. In contrast, stability
and consolidation of democracy is greatly facilitated when military officers can
be convinced that their interests, both institutional and individual, will continue
to be represented and served under the new civilian and democratic rules of
the game.84
83 Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic.”84 Huntington, The Third Wave; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
54
2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Second, successful crafting of civilian rule depends on the ability of
civilian elites to maintain high levels of public support. A military finds it
harder to resist pressure for change in civil-military relations and to push for
non-democratic prerogatives when political elites are visibly backed by a wide
array of electorally-strong political forces.85
Third, and related to this, militaries find it easier to block transitions from
military autonomy to civilian supremacy if the democratic government fails to
produce effective government, or if important groups desert the pro-democracy
coalition.86 Thus, adherence to the democratic norms and processes, inclusionary
coalition politics by political party elites, and good democratic governance are
crucial parameters for the success of military reform in young democracies.
Fourth, successful transitions to civilian control are easier to accomplish
and to solidify if there exist well-organized political parties which are able to
make and keep commitments, whose membership encompasses most potential
political elites and who have the support among voters and various social strata.
Thus, the institutionalization of stable and full-fledged civilian control
requires more than the transition from open military rule to an elected
government. It demands the complete elimination of existing military prerogatives
and the neutralization of the military’s potential for contestation of civilian
authority and decisions. This, however, also requires a consensus among civilian
elites not to rely on the military to protect their interests against other political
and social groups or elites. Whether Thailand or other South and Southeast
Asian nations, which are currently under “transition to democracy,” fulfil this and
the other requirements of civilian control’s successful institutionalization will be
one of the research questions tackled in the empirical chapters of this volume.
85 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy.86 Smith, Democracy in Latin America; Siaroff, Comparing political regimes.
55
democracy under StreSS
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Thompson, William R. The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers. Sage professional
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2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy
Section Two:Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia—Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia
63
THREEU-Turn to the Past?
The Resurgence of the Military in Contemporary Thai Politics1
Paul Chambers
In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride horses. The jockeys do not own the
horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers but
the real owners are the country and the King. The government supervises and employs
us.... What I mean is that we are the country’s soldiers. Governments come and go.
--Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, July 14, 20062
Introduction
The above remark, from one of Thailand’s most powerful political figures,
locates King and country as the “owners” of military “horses” while a civilian
government is the “jockey” which merely “supervises” them. The comment,
symbolizing the fragile linkage between soldiers and civilians, offers testament
to the post-coup resurrection of military tutelage over elected governments as
well as the de-consolidation of democracy in Thailand.
1 The author would like to thank Dr. Chris Baker for his comments on an earlier draft of the chapter and for providing data used in Figure 5.2 Sutichai Yoon, “Thai Talk: Old Soldiers Never Die; They Raise ‘Career’ Thoroughbreds,” The Nation, 20 July 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
Indeed, the armed forces appear to have experienced a revival since Black
May, 1992. Following its massacre of civilians during that month, the military’s
clout appeared to have hit rock bottom in terms of support from the people and
the palace. It seemed reasonable to assume that soldiers might be returning to
the barracks indefinitely. If that were the case, Thailand might finally be joining
the ranks of “Third Wave” democracies in unlinear historical fashion toward
more expansive democratization (Huntington, 1991). During the 1990s, the Thai
armed forces appeared to be becoming indoctrinated under a professionalism
of compliance to elected civilians.
And yet in 2006, there occurred a sudden military coup. The takeover
immediately enhanced the role of soldiers in domestic politics. Even after the
return to civilian governance in 2008 Thailand’s armed forces find themselves
enjoying a privileged position of authority—though this is constrained by
apparent civilian control. Among the emerging democracies of Southeast Asia
today, there is no country other than Thailand which exhibits such explicit
military intrusions over civilian governance. The military occupies a major
position in what Thitinan Pongsudhirak refers to as the “nonelected ‘holy trinity’
of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy.”3 Increasingly, Thai military influence
today exhibits haunting echoes back to the era of pervasive military authority
during the civilian government of Gen. (ret.) Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91).
Clearly, the armed forces today deserve much greater scrutiny as an
actor on the Thai political landscape. Yet such an enhanced position in society
gives rise to four questions:
1. Exactly how has the balance of power shifted in civil-military relations
from 1992 to the present?
2. In what areas of civilian control do the armed forces today hold the
most sway?
3 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, 19, 4, (October 2008): 140.
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democracy under StreSS
3. What does continuing military involvement say about the
contemporary state of Thai politics?
4. What long-term and short-term patterns can we see in civil-military
relations?
In order to address these questions, the analysis at hand first provides
a brief, broad-spectrum overview about the grand developmental trends in Thai
civil-military relations since 1932. Second, the chapter applies the decision-
making framework introduced by Aurel Croissant and David Kühn (see chapter
2) to shed light on the relations between civilians and militaries in various
areas of decision-making. Based on the analysis of the patterns of distribution
of decision-making authority between civilians and militaries in the five decision-
making areas of civil-military relations, the final section of this chapter discusses
possible scenarios and future traits of the role of the military in Thai politics.
I. Thai Civil-Military Relations Over Time
Across the last eight decades, Thailand’s armed forces have undergone
a circuitous trajectory in terms of civil-military relations. The long-term pattern
(1932-2010) has been one of greater civilian control. Yet, over the short-term
(1988-2010), the armed forces have circled back to exhibit almost the same
amount of prowess they did thirty years ago. One can designate twelve core
phases illustrating alternative levels of military prowess since the overthrow of
the absolute monarchy in1932 (see below).
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
Table 1: Phases of Military Influence (1932-2010)
Period Level of Civilian Control
Method Initiated External Events
1932-44 Low Military Coup by anti-monarchist “Promoters”; Government later led by Pro-Axis Phibul Songkram
Global “Great Depression”; World War II
1944-47 High Forced Resignation of pro-Axis military Prime Minister
End of World War II
1947-73 Low Military Coup/anti-communist Phibul returns to power
Beginning of Cold War
1973-76 Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])
Military Coup byKrit Sivara faction/royal intervention
End of US military involvement in Southeast Asia
1976-79 Low Military Coup/Class Seven Communist revolutions in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia
1979-88 Medium(Power-sharing [military-led])
Unelected Military Prime Minister alongside elected Lower House and cabinet
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia
1988-91 Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])
Elected civilian government alongside autonomous military
Fall of “Iron Curtain” authoritarian regimes
1991-92 Low Military Coup/Class Five --
1992-2001 High Civilian caretaker/elections following massacre and royal intervention
Increasing number of “Third Wave” liberal democracies
2001-2006 High Election of civilian government Morepseudo-authoritarian populist democracies
2006-2008 Low Military Coup/Queen’s royal guard faction
--
2008-Present Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])
Coalition Shift with Military Support/Queen’s royal guard faction
--
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democracy under StreSS
After 1932 military influence over civilians grew precipitously but plunged
to its lowest levels in 1944. Yet a debilitated military was not to last. In 1947,
with support from royalists, the influence of the armed forces ascended once
again, and civilians were under the soldier’s boot until 1973. From 1973-6,
civilians possessed a medium level of influence over soldiers. This owed to
a post-1973 fractured military. Growing instability facilitated the 1976 military
coup and soldiers dominated the political scene for the next three years. In
1979, a power-sharing arrangement was set up whereby an unelected military
prime minister served alongside an elected lower house. Such a system offered
the bare trappings of democracy while guaranteeing military supremacy in non-
regal elite positions of power. This state of affairs continued under unelected
Prime Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda. In 1988, power-sharing was shifted
to allow for a civilian prime minister to be elected PM (Gen. [ret.] Chatchai
Chunhavan). Simultaneously, the military possessed enormous autonomy from
civilian control. The 1991 coup4 ushered in military governance once again. Yet
the fall of this regime after “Black May”1992 contributed to a further emergence
of Thai democracy. From 1992 until 2006, Thai armed forces’ societal influence
vis-à-vis civilians appeared to be at its nadir. But the 2006 coup crushed any
hope that the Thai military’s role in politics was at an end. Indeed, armed
forces clout was institutionally boosted thanks partly to the 2007 constitution
which weakened civilian governance vis-à-vis the armed forces. The return to
a nationally-elected government in 2008 forced soldiers back to their barracks
but at a cost to civilians of institutionally-enhanced prowess by the armed forces.
As such, civilian control diminished to a medium level given that the military
now exercised authority somewhat autonomously from Thailand’s elected Lower
House and partly-elected Senate. Indeed, some in the armed forces reportedly
4 The coup was led by Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, leader of Class 5 military faction.
68
3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
even helped to manipulate the accession to office of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa in
December 2008. Today the sway of the military is on the upswing.
These phases, revealing various alternating degrees of armed forces
authority, demonstrate that Thailand’s military has long played a vigorous role
in Thailand’s polity. Over the long-term, Thailand has experienced a dwindling
of military influence. But, since 2008, the role of soldiers in Thai politics (even
under an elected government) is proving to be nearly as extensive as during the
civilian-led power-sharing period of the late 1980s.
II. Thailand’s Tug-of-War of Civil-Military Decision-making across
Five Areas of Civilian Control
To determine the evolution of Thailand’s civil-military continuum in
decision-making power, one must analyze the five areas introduced in chapter
1: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and
military organization. Since 1988 alone, six periods in civil-military relations
can be observed: 1) the civilian-led power-sharing era of 1988-91; 2) the
military-installed authoritarian regime of 1991-92; 3) the 1992-2001 era
of democratization; 4) the Thaksin Shinawatra elected administrations of
2001-06; 5) the military-instated government of 2006-08; and 6) the period
since the return to civilian-led power-sharing in early 2008.
1. Elite Recruitment
Thailand’s armed forces have long influenced elite recruitment under
authoritarian rule as well as in periods of “civilian” regimes. However, the
balance of civil-military authority has experienced considerable changes over
time, especially since liberalization of the political order begun in the mid 1980s.
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democracy under StreSS
For example, civil-military relations during the administration of Chatchai
Chunhavan (1988-91) were characterized by civilian-led power sharing. The
armed forces possessed a reserved domain in the Senate and varying levels
of connections with different political parties in parliament (e.g. Chart Thai,
New Aspiration, Rassadorn, Democrat). Informally, soldiers could influence the
procedures of political competition as well as the formation or dissolution of a
government.5
The coup of February 1991 brought authoritarianism back to Thailand
and civilian control remained low through the March 1992 election until
the downfall of the military-dominated government in May. The all-military
National Peace-Keeping Commission coup group appointed civilian PM Anand
Panyarachun and his Council of Ministers to administer the country while an
appointed and unicameral National Legislative Assembly acted as parliament.
These bodies acted under the aegis of the March 1991 interim charter which, in
its ambiguity, facilitated the establishment of a domain of military appointments
within political posts.6 In December 1991, a new constitution came into force. It
allowed for a continuation of the military-dominated Senate, the possibility of a
non-elected PM, and it maintained the eligibility of active-duty military officers
for public office in the Senate. 7 The political prowess of the armed forces was
further accentuated by military Class 5’s establishment of the Samakhitham Party
to act as its surrogate in the Lower House. Samakhitham’s election landslide
propelled Suchinda to the post of PM.8 In May 1992, following the military’s 5 Under the 1978 constitution, from 1989 to 1991, 60.2% Senators were active duty military personnel. The Lower House and Office of Prime Minister, however, remained the domains of civilians. With regard to the Council of Ministers, 23.9% were retired military officials. Source: author’s calculations, based on the sources listed in footnotes 22 and 23. 6 For example, based on the author’s calculations, 52% lawmakers in the unicameral assembly were soldiers (active or retired). See sources in footnote 23. 7 David Murray, Angels and Demons (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996) 13; Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 357-8.8 Murray, 5.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
bloody crackdown on demonstrators, Suchinda was forced from office and
Anand returned to lead a brief caretaker government until elections could be
held. However, the military-dominated Senate remained in office though the
Constitution was amended to accommodate the demands of the May uprising, a
major one of which was that the PM must be an elected member of the Lower
House.
The mid-1990s witnessed the apparent flowering of civilian control over
Thailand’s military. Three factors helped to account for this state of affairs.
First, after Black May, the armed forces lost an enormous amount of respect and
political capital. Suchinda’s forced resignation and Anand’s dismissal of three
key generals weakened the military.9 Second, two pro-Prem Army commanders
during the 1990s (Generals Wimol Wongwanich and Surayudh Chulanond)
directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring.10 Third, the financial
crisis of 1997 brought down the government of PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,
a charismatic, potential competitor of Prem. This facilitated the return to office
of the Democrat party (closely allied with Prem) and its leader Chuan Leekpai.
Chuan in his second term (1997-2001) took the post of Defense Minister as well
as PM, pushing the military toward more reforms.
In terms of reserved representation for soldiers, 1992-2000 saw a growth
in political space for civilians.11 In the Senate, the informal military reserved
domain for military appointees diminished from 154 or 55.2% out of 270 senators
(1992-96) to 48 or 18.4% out of 260 (1996-2000).12 Still, in a continuing exam-
ple of manipulation, it was rumored that Privy Council Chair (ret.) Gen. Prem
9 Murray, 190-94.10 Duncan McCargo, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005) 133.11 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,” Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: The East-West Center, 2002) 77.12 Author’s calculations based on sources listed in footnote 23.
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democracy under StreSS
interfered in parliamentary politics on November 6, 1997 by influencing 12
members Prajakorn Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the
opposition, thus enabling the Democrat Party to form a coalition government.13
The 1997 constitution meanwhile established that senatorial candidates
could only become part of that body through election. And following that 2000
election, only two per cent of new Senators were ex-military officers.14 In 2001,
telecommunications tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together
with his political party Thai Rak Thai, won the general election by a landslide.
Other than Thaksin himself, only two retired security sector officials sat on
Thaksin’s first cabinet, including former PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchiayudh (Minister
of Defense).15 In his second term, Thaksin maintained the quota of two former
military personnel other than himself.
Under Thaksin, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political
competition it was Thaksin himself. Indeed, his clout in 2001 was such that he
was able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament, courts, and even
compete with Gen.Prem in terms of political influence. As for the military, Thaksin
offered posts to numerous soldiers while co-opting Chavalit and the latter’s close
supporters to establish a wedge against Prem until the PM could maneuver his
own cousin Chaisit Shinawatra in to the post of Army Chief.16
The 2006 military coup against Thaksin led to the appointment of non-
elected PM and Prem stalwart Gen.Surayudh Chulanond. Surayudh and his
cabinet of 26 administered the country, with two ministers coming from the
military (longtime Surayud confidant Gen. Boonrawd Somtas at Defense and
13 McCargo, Ukrist, 133.14 Author’s calculations based on sources listed in footnote 23. 15 McCargo, Ukrist, 134-5.16 McCargo, Ukrist, 137.
72
3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
Adm. Threera Haocharoen at Transportation). Meanwhile, a National Legislative
Assembly (NLA) was put together to draw up a new constitution. The NLA
was composed of 242 persons, including 76 or 31.4% active/retired military
or police17). While such military representation does not appear to approach
a majority, non-military NLA representatives allied with soldiers in the assembly
to ensure voting majorities.
Political parties, demonstrations, and related activities, were banned by
the junta until July 2007. The military-endorsed constitution of 2007 allowed for
a popular referendum on the charter. Yet soldiers were said to be attempting
to influence rural Thais to vote for it. Martial law was lifted only little-by-little
from provinces considered to be pro-Thaksin in time for the December 2007
pre-election campaign. There were furthermore allegations of covert military
involvement in seeking to influence the election’s outcome.18
Since the return to electoral democracy in December 2007, political
space has slightly widened, seeming to represent a fall-back to the era prior to
Thaksin. Lower House MPs are still elected. Yet the 2007 constitution also called
for a half-appointed (74 members), half-elected (76 members) Upper House.
Following senatorial elections in early 2008, 15.3% of the entire 76 directly
elected/74 appointed Senate is now composed of retired military officials to
make this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed Senators, 14
were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain.19 The 2008 cabinets of
civilian pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat
contained 2-3 ex-military men respectively. The government of civilian Democrat
17 Author’s calculations based on “NLA Doesn’t Represent All of the People,” The Nation 13 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.18 “Junta’s Media War a Big Mistake,” The Nation, 26 October 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 19 Author’s own calculations based on Thailand, Elected Senators (2008) http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/members_election.pdf; International Parliamentary Union,“Thailand: Senate Election (2008), http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2312.htm.
73
democracy under StreSS
Abhisit Vechachiwa (coming to office in late December 2008) contained two
retired military officials.20
With regard to military influence on the procedures of political competition,
this has occurred very recently. On December 2, 2008, the pro-Thaksin People’s
Power party was dissolved, forcing the resignation of Somchai. Thereupon,
throughout December, Anupong and other military elements worked to help
cobble together a coalition government under Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa
which would exclude Puea Thai.21
Figures 1 and 2 below show the evolution of military or retired military
elite recruitment in Thailand in the cabinet and legislature (1932-Present),
reflecting a general chronological trend: less military representation. Still, one
can see the reappearance of legislative military reserved domain since 2006.
Figure 1: Percentage of (ret.) Military Cabinet Ministers (1932-2010)22
Note: Includes active/retired personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police.
20 Thailand, The Secretariat of the Cabinet website, http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/. 21 Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, 11 December 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 22 Author’s calculations based on data from Thailand, Twenty-four Thai Prime Ministers: History and Name Index, Bangkok: Office of the Parliament, 2007, http://www.cabinet.thaigove.go.th/.
74
3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
Figure 2: Percentage of Military in the Legislature (Senate) (1932-2010)23
Note: Includes active/retired personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police.
Today, the level of civilian control when it comes to elite recruitment
stands at a medium level—neither monopolizing nor marginal. Though civilian
authority appears to have reemerged following the late 2007 elections, Thailand’s
military continues to wield considerable influence in terms of political influence
and participation.
2. Public Policy
Public policy has traditionally been a top-down affair in Thailand. From
1988 until 1991, the gradual drawback by the armed forces from dominating
most areas of public policy had led the military to diminish its hold over
influencing most aspects of public policy —except for those pertaining to national
security.24But following the 1991 coup, the military increased its hold over various
policies. Still, the armed forces’ appointment of a civilian (Anand Panyarachun) 23 Author’s calculations based on data from the following: Thailand. Senate in Thailand (Bangkok: Secretariat of the Senate, 2001) 1-3; Thailand, Members of Legislatures 1932-1991 (Bangkok: Parliament Library, 1991); Murray 6; Surachart 161; “NLA Doesn’t Represent All of the People,” The Nation 13 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; International Parliamentary Union , “Thailand: Senate Election 2008 (2008), http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2312.htm; Thailand, Elected Senators (2008) http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/members_election.pdf. 24 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” Coercion and Governance, the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 203; Pasuk and Baker, 350.
75
democracy under StreSS
as PM and Anand’s appointment of a mostly civilian cabinet showed that the
military was now ready to live with more civilian control over public policy.25
From 1992 until 2006, most public policy was in the hands of civilians
given the growing administrative and political decentralization. Various aspects
of the 1997 “people’s constitution” gave teeth to judicial bodies such as the
Administrative Court, Office of the Ombudsman, and National Counter Corruption
Commission. Chuan and Surayud added a new role for the military in Thai
foreign policy: participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. Still, the
armed forces continued to play an important though reduced role in relations
with Cambodia, Laos, and Burma because of ambiguous shared borders.26
The 2001 election of Thaksin Shinawatra increased civilian control over
public policy. Indeed, the popularity of the socioeconomic programs initiated by
the Thaksin government ensured people’s continuing support for civilian control
over politics and public policy. Indeed, the Thaksin government represented the
nadir of military influence over Thai public policy. Under Thaksin, elements of
the Thai military were sent in support of US forces in both Afghanistan and
Iraq.27 Though the Thai armed forces took a back seat to Thaksin during this
time, they generally supported the PM’s pro-US tilt.
The 2006 coup brought the military back to a dominant position in
policy formulation as well as implementation. The fact that a military man (Gen.
Surayud) was appointed as PM vouches for the argument that the armed forces
once again dominated public policy despite the fact that most of the cabinet was
composed of civilian appointees.
25 Murray, 194.26 Ockey, 2001, 203.27 See Paul Chambers, “US-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26, 3, 2004: 460-479.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
In terms of foreign policy, the Thai military has recently showed an ability
to act independent of civilian authorities. In August 2008, Thailand’s Supreme
Commander injected himself into foreign policy when he warned Cambodia to
“back off” from another border temple claimed by Thailand.28
In addition to national security-related public policy, the military
today has continued to exert control over public policy toward the media.
This owes partly to a tradition of armed forces control over the Ministry of
Communications. Currently the Army controls television channels 5 and 7.29 The
military also influences the media through the fact that some members of the
Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT) executive board have
been retired soldiers. MCOT owns channels 3 and 9. Regarding radio stations,
the military controlled 245 out of 524 stations in 2002. This amounted to 127
owned by the Army, 21 by the Navy, 36 by the Air Force, 44 by the Police, 3 by
the Ministry of Defense, and 14 by the Military High Command.30 This proportion
remained generally the same in 2008.31 The 2006 coup ushered in greaterstate
control of the media (at least for the period 2006-08). Under the 2006-08
Sonthi Boonyaratklin military government, a Broadcasting Act was implemented
which continued to grant broadcasting concessions to military vested interests.32
Ultimately the armed forces remain deeply involved in regulating, influencing,
and profiting from much of Thailand’s television and radio media.
In 2009, soldiers continued to exert much influence over policies mostly
related to security. Though Thailand’s military was once able to formally set 28 “Cambodia Warned to ‘Back Off,’”Bangkok Post, 5 August 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 29 Channel Five [Thailand], http://portal.tv5.co.th, http://www.ch7.com. 30 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Thailand Media Profile, 2002, http://www.freedom.commarts.chula.ac.th/articles/FXSU02-Thailand_media_profile_2002.pdf, 10.31 United States State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm. 32 Chang Noi, “Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,” The Nation, 2 February 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
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democracy under StreSS
public policy as it saw fit, this authority is today only informal. Today, amidst
this lingering military sway, civilian control over public policy stands at a
medium level.
3. Internal Security
In Thailand, soldiers have traditionally controlled internal security in the
shadow of the monarchy. Indeed, recent Thai constitutions grant the King and
military enormous power to declare martial law.33
Since promulgation of the 1960 Ministry of Defense Administration Act,
military prerogatives of internal security and rural development have been
enshrined into law. 1965 saw the establishment of the Communist Suppression
Operations Command (CSOC) to coordinate national anti-Communist operations.
In 1974, the name CSOC was changed to ISOC (Internal Security Operations
Command). ISOC helped to launch two ultra-right-wing paramilitary organizations
called Navaphon and Kating Daeng.34
By 1983, the structure of ISOC had been modified such that ISOC was
not officially part of the Army, but rather under the Prime Minister though
the Army Chief served as its director and remained in de facto control of it.
ISOC became the vehicle through which Thailand’s military, in the name of
maintaining internal security, was able to exert considerable authority over the
civilian bureaucracy.35
In 1987, ISOC was again restructured, with the Prime Minister (then
Gen.Prem Tinsulanond) becoming Director and the Army chief moving to be
ISOC deputy chief. But this was only a cosmetic alteration given that the Army 33 E.g. Section 159, 1978 constitution: Section 222, 1997 constitution; Section 188, 2007 constitution. 34 Pasuk and Baker, 307-8. 35 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics (Singapore: ISEAS, 1990) 51.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
Commander, in his new post as ISOC Deputy Director, “was empowered fully to
act on behalf of the Director-General.36 Some criticized this change as a strategy
by which the Army might be able to extend its powers over civilian agencies.37
ISOC further sought to informally co-opt politicians and political parties thought
to be amenable to ISOC objectives.38
Amidst the growth of ISOC, the military separately in 1976 established
the Capital Security Command (CSC) in Bangkok to preserve order, counter
terrorism, and eradicate the conditions which might help communists win their
struggle.39 But CSC was dissolved after Black May.40
The dwindling of the Thai communist insurgency in the 1980s, the 1991
end of the Cold War and the diminished credibility in the armed forces after
Black May placed ISOC in growing limbo as successive governments could
not agree on what to do with it. Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis increased
financial burdens for the agency as military budget cutbacks left ISOC leaner.
When PM Thaksin Shinawatra entered office in 2001, he delegated
military allies to oversee and influence ISOC. In 2005, the Thaksin administration
passed the Decree on Government Administration in a State of Emergency,
which allowed the Prime Minister to authorize a three-month state of emer-
gency in response to internal or external threats. The committee to administer
states of emergency and issue recommendations to the PM was composed of
19 persons, only four of whom were civilian non-bureaucrats, thus allowing for
36 Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive (Bangkok: ISIS, 1990) 112.37 Suchit, 1990, 52.38 Chai-anan et al., 112.39 Suchit, 1990, 58-59.40 Murray, 190-191.
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more representation by military personnel (See Section 6, Decree on Government
Administration in a State of Emergency, 2005).
In 2006, Thaksin had planned to restructure ISOC, centralizing control
over it in the Office of the Prime Minister. But the coup intervened and afterwards
Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratklin served as head of ISOC. Appointed
PM Surayud and the Council for National Security (CNS) coup leaders then
determined that ISOC must be rejuvenated to confront terrorism, to respond
to security challenges (e.g. cyber threats), to coordinate the counterinsurgency
campaign in Thailand’s far South, to unify much of the security bureaucracy,
“as well as taking the lead role for the bureaucracy to counter-balance the
runaway power of any rogue government.”41 The ISOC director was empowered
to simultaneously head up the National Counter Corruption Commission, the
Department of Special Investigation and the Anti Money Laundering Office.
Meanwhile, the coup-group was preparing a new Internal Security Act
(ISA) which would grant ISOC expanded powers over civilians. Indeed, the act
would allow the armed forces to curtail citizens’ civil liberties to promote national
security.42 Thus, the military could now more easily transgress upon the civilian
realm and commit human rights violations with impunity.
Despite opposition, the military-appointed National Legislative Assembly
passed the bill one month before the 2007 general election, and it took effect
February 27, 2008.43 In essence, the new ISA returns to the military many of
41 Avudh Panananda, “Thailand’s Dept. Of Homeland Security,” The Nation, 12 Decembe 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 42 Criticisms by Chulalongkorn professor Surachart Bamrungsuk and former dean of Thammasat University’s Law Faculty, Kamchai Chongchakphan. See “Law Would be a ‘Coup by Stealth,’”The Nation, 15 July 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 43 After the vote, one NLA appointee (Gen. Chockchai Hongthong), in response to criticism that the new act would erode Thai democracy, stated that “People must sacrifice their basic rights for the security of the country” “NLA passes controversial Internal Security Act,” The Nation, 8 November 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
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the powers taken from it in 1992, shifting the civil-military equilibrium back
towards the armed forces. The Act first establishes the army as the principal unit
safeguarding internal security.44 It establishes a structure of control whereby the
Prime Minister is ISOC director, the Army Commander is Deputy Director, and
the Army Chief of Staff is Secretary. This Secretary takes responsibility for the
direction and activity of ISOC. Since late 2007, Army Commander Gen.Anupong
Paochinda and his close associate Army Chief of Staff Gen.Prayuth Chanucha
(seen to be Anupong’s potential successor once the former retires as Army Chief
in 2010) have succeeded in dominating ISOC. Gen Anupong is ISOC deputy head
of ISOC while Gen Prayuth serves as ISOC secretary-general. In 2009, although
PM Abhisit Vechachiwa officially has direct command of ISOC, it is essentially
a military-controlled agency.45
The revised ISOC organizational structure is cosmetically geared to appear
under civilian control—given that the Prime Minister serves as Director while
four other civilian ministers can serve on the ISOC board. But the civilian board
members are outnumbered by bureaucrats (many allied with or belonging to
the military) 19-5. At the same time, the Deputy Director and Secretary (both
soldiers) possess an inordinate amount of autonomy in relation to the Director
(the elected Prime Minister). Finally, ISOC is decentralized toward higher military
control. That is, under the national ISOC board, there are regional and provincial
branches. Each regional branch parallels Thailand’s four military regions. ISA
provides that the Commander of each regional army shall be the director of
each regional ISOC subdivision.46 Thus, regional branches are under the total
control of the armed forces.
44 Thailand, The Defense of Thailand, (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 2008) 35.45 “Thai Insurgency” 11 June 2009, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1383420. 46 Chapter 1, Section 11, Thailand, Internal Security Act, (Bangkok: Government Gazette, February 19, 2008), http://www.thailawonline.com/en/thai-laws/laws-of-thailand/275-internal-security-act-be-2551-2008.
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Ultimately, the new ISOC provides Thailand’s armed forces a convenient
subterfuge from which they can enhance their power due to and despite the
authority of civilian governments. This is because civilian governments who wish
to govern effectively must cooperate with and lend legitimacy to ISOC, allowing
the armed forces greatly heightened authority. At the same time, soldiers cannot
be officially blamed for launching a violent crackdown since the PM acts as official
ISOC Director. However, the same civilian PM is responsible for negative fallout
related to such operations. As Wassana Nanuam emphasizes, the restructured
ISOC gives the army “a justification for stepping in to handle a political problem
without fear that it will be criticized for trying to intervene in politics.”47
An ISA amnesty clause could meanwhile allow soldiers to get away with
human rights violations as long as they are on duty. Also, the Act does not define
“security threat” and fails to make ISOC answerable to elected representatives in
Parliament.48Moreover, “no declaration of a state of emergency would be required
for the ISOC to exercise its powers. The parliament and courts are given no role
in debating, reviewing or approving the use of these emergency-style powers.”49
In sum, with its enhanced ISA powers and a whopping new Thai Baht 8.2 billion
budget, ISOC can increasingly stifle civil liberties and civilian control, all in the
name of maintaining internal security.
Since the NLA’s passage of the Internal Security Act in December 2007,
ISOC has been used to “promote democracy”. During the countdown to the
December 2007 election ISOC was accused of financially supporting parties
47 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, 13 November, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 48 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, 15 April 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 49 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, 4 November 2007,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracy-and-human-rights.
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opposed to the pro-Thaksin Palang Prachachon party.50 At the same time, ISOC
became more involved in coordinating the southern Thailand counter-insurgency.51
During 2008, the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat Palang
Prachachon party governments allowed ISOC power to be centralized in the
hands of Army Chief Anupong for fear of otherwise upsetting the anti-Thaksin
senior military leaders. Yet, the ability of Anupong to dominate ISOC allowed
him to deny assistance to the two pro-Thaksin civilian governments whenever
he saw fit.52 Such behavior demonstrated a military refusal to maintain internal
security for elected governments in Thailand. Yet, following the ascension to
power of an anti-Thaksin civilian government at the end of 2008, the armed
forces (as dominated by the anti-Thaksin Queen’s Guard military faction) now
found a need to ensure its protection and survival Thereupon, Anupong’s ISOC
moved from evading responsibility for internal security to guaranteeing it.53
In April, PM Abhisit declared a state of emergency in Bangkok
and surrounding areas, following a flurry of pro-Thaksin anti-government
demonstrations in Bangkok and Pattaya which led to the cancellation of an
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. The meeting was
re-scheduled to convene in Thailand two months later.54 The military ultimately
50 Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,” Bangkok Post, 19 June 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Wassana Nanuam, ISOC Ordered to Promoted Democracy,”Bangkok Post, 20 December 2007, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 51 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, 15 April 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.52 This is exemplified in Anupong’s refusal to order troops to end the PAD takeover of Government House, break up PAD rallies at Parliament, or stop the PAD seizures of Bangkok’s two international airports. 53 In March 2009 revelations surfaced that Baht1 billion had been apportioned to ISOC for rural projects aimed at weakening the pro-Thaksin red-shirt movement. “Baht1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas,” The Nation, 25 March 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.54 Use of the State of Emergency (rather than ISOC) placed greater power in the hands of Abhisit’s cabinet rather than if the Internal Security Act had been implemented (in which case Gen.Anupong would have had more influence). As such, Minister of Defense Prawit and Minister of the Interior Chaovarat Chanvirakul were able to see to it that the Red Shirts were dispersed. The former was able to exert influence on Anupong while the latter created a royalist state-sponsored militia called the Blue Shirts which was officially under the Ministry of Interior but actually under the control of Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party “Blue Shirts Return,” Siam Report, July 2009, http://www.siamreport.blogspot.com/2009/07/blue-shirts-return.html.
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resorted to force to disperse the protestors.55 ISA has since been used on other
occasions to keep order, prevent any demonstrations, and prohibit the movement
of people applying it in the face of actual and potential pro-Thaksin rallies.56
Ultimately, what are the implications of this revised ISOC for civil-military
relations in Thailand? In terms of civil liberties, ISOC grants greater powers
to the military to decide for itself when internal security interests require it to
run roughshod over political rights, including the use of intelligence-gathering
against civilians. Meanwhile, where ISOC utilizes its new ISA powers, the military
can generally have jurisdiction over non-military personnel. As for separation
between civilian and military police, ISOC has facilitated a merging of functions
and duties for purposes of strengthening domestic protection. Regarding a
declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, the cabinet must initiate such
actions and can be held responsible for abuses of them. Yet ISA allows ISOC
to engage in blanket repression without a state of emergency being declared.
Indeed, given the overwhelming influence of the Army over the ISOC, soldiers
now have much more control over the issuing of such decrees. Finally, with
regard to civilian monitoring of military internal security operations, ISA allows
very little parliamentary or judicial oversight of ISOC programs. Ultimately then,
the emergence of a restructured and strengthened ISOC has paralleled the
erosion of civil liberties as well as civilian predominance over internal security
decisions. As such, civilian control over the military in the area of internal
security has moved from being robust under Thaksin Shinawatra to quite low
under AbhisitVechachiwa.
55 “Thai Army Begins Crackdown on Anti-government Demonstrators,” Thailand News.Net, 13April 2009, http//www.thailandnews.net/story/488936. 56 The military imposed the ISA to keep order during the ASEAN conference in Phuket during July 2009. ISA was also imposed against pro-Thaksin demonstrators in late-August and September, 2009.
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4. National Defense
In Thailand, authority over national or external defense was under
military purview until 1988. However, since the advent of civilian Prime Ministers
beginning with Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91), authority over national defense
issues has mostly resided in elected civilians (excluding the 1991-2, 2006-8 years
of military rule). Yet, informally, given the porous nature of the border which
Thailand shares with its neighbors and a lack of complete demarcation, Thai
soldiers sometimes involved themselves in hostilities, even initiating hostilities,
with the militaries of Burma, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, without the sanction of
the Thai Prime Minister.
With regard to national defense, civilian Prime Ministers formally possess
authority over policy-making and can monitor military national defense activities.
The PM’s point-man for national defense is the Defense Minister. Yet, where
this minister is is himself/herself a former soldier, the Ministry rarely monitors
military conduct in a thorough manner. This is because such a Defense Minister
often identifies more with the armed forces than the civilian government (which
generally only administers the country for a brief period anyway). The armed
forces have, however, often sought to remain isolated from civilian monitoring
with regard to national defense—a situation deriving from the military’s tradition
of autonomy from civilian intrusions. Still, the external nature of national defense
issues has boded well for civilian control since the military has oriented itself
towards internal order and development. Moreover, with the end of the Cold
War in 1991, the military lost its chief external enemy (communism) and found
itself seeking a new mission. As such, in terms of national defense issues, the
armed forces have receded behind the lead of civilian Prime Ministers. Soldiers
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thus readily cooperated with PM Chuan’s 1999 decision to send Thai troops
abroad as part of a peace-keeping force in East Timor.57
The selection of National Security-related advisors has been another area
where the Thai military has exercised its influence. Regarding the Minister of
Defense, 11 Thai constitutions have allowed active military personnel to occupy
this slot as opposed to 7 (including the most recent one).58 Six elected PMs have
acted as Defense Minister: MR Seni Pramoj (1976); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan
(1988-91); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001); Samak
Sundaravej (2008); and Somchai Wongsawat (2008). In such cases, there has
often been a decentralization of the Defense Ministry. That is, civilians, instead
of challenging the military, have more or less stood aside and allowed soldiers
to dominate the Defense Ministry.59Perhaps the only exceptions to this rule have
been the cases of Chavalit and, to a lesser extent, Chatchai.
Where the PM has not taken the Defense Minister’s slot, civilian
governments have always appointed retired military personnel. Examples include
generals Krit Sivara and Prawit Wongsawan. Placing retired army generals in
the position of Defense Minister is practical for civilian governments desirous
of close cooperation with and support from active senior military leaders. The
goal is to put someone in the Minister’s post who can guarantee military support
for the civilian government in power while influencing the armed forces on a
range of issues. Still, the danger is that this person may align with the active
military chiefs against the civilian government. Thus, the PM must take care to
ensure that the Defense Minister is effective but loyal.60
57 See Ockey, 2001, 187-200; anonymous very senior retired Army official. Personal Interview. 14 August 2009.58 This can be seen in the 1932a, 1932b, 1952 (1932b), 1947, 1959, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1991a, and 2006 charters. However, the 1946, 1949, 1974, 1978 (Section 148), 1991b, 1997 (Section 207), and 2007 (Section 194) constitutions represent the trend toward requiring the Defense Minister to be a civilian. 59 Mark Tamthai, Personal Interview, October 10, 2008. 60 Anonymous very senior retired Army official. Personal Interview. 14 August 2009.
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Besides the Minister, it is also necessary to maintain civilian control over
the staff personnel in Thailand’s Defense Ministry. These staff personnel are
the advisors to the Defense Minister. They make recommendations regarding
defense budget, troop mobilization, deployments, training, and are collectively
referred to as the Defense Council.
Though the Minister of Defense chairs this 18-person council, only two
other civilians are members. The MOD is also advised by a Permanent Secretary
(currently Gen.Apichart Penkitti) and four deputies. All of these officials are
active military personnel.61
Meanwhile, the Council of Armed Forces Commanders advises the
Minister of Defense and Defense Council on matters of force mobilization and
combat operations. It is an all-military body, chaired by the Supreme Commander
and is also composed of the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The
Council furthermore commands “joint task forces established in circumstances
affecting order and security in the country.”62 This vaguely defined objective has
the potential to offer the Council a wide array of power.
The National Security Council represents another arena where the military
has exerted great authority. The National Security Council advises the Prime
Minister when the country faces a national security challenge that necessitates
coordinated cabinet action or presents a serious threat to the country’s
sovereignty. The PM chairs this body with civilians outnumbering military officials
which comprise it. As such, the prime minister has been able to dominate “the
workings of the council“63 In July 2009, civilian power on the NSC increased even
more with PM Abhisit Vechachiwa’ appointment of anti-Thaksin civilian Thawil 61 Thailand, Ministry of Defense, Thailand, website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html. 62 Section 47, Ministry of Defense Administration Act (2008), cited in Thailand, Defense of Thailand, 2008, 32.63 Ministry of Defense website.
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Pliensri as NSC secretary-general despite intense military lobbying. “The NSC
has had 14 secretary-generals over the years, with only three of them civilians.64
Ultimately, in terms of national defense, civilians and soldiers continue to
struggle for control. Civilians have, since the early 1990s, succeeded in chipping
away at the prevailing armed forces influence. Only in informal situations, e.g.
border conflicts, do soldiers sometimes involve themselves in cross-border melees
without the PM’s permission. As for the selection of advisors, the military today
remains dominant at the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, despite the fact that
defense ministers must be civilians, many of these have been retired military
personnel still enjoying close ties with active duty soldiers. Thus, though civilian
influence may seem to have grown in the area of National Defense, it remains
at a medium level.
5. Military Organization
In Thailand, military organization has traditionally derived from
Thailand’s authoritarian era (1932-73; 1976-88). Institutional modifications in
terms of downsizing and increased transparency were implemented in the late
1990s but military organizational autonomy resurrected itself in 2007.
Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s armed forces were a large,
non-tranparent force which lacked proper training, equipment, and whose
decision-making structure often lacked unity and the ability to adequately
coordinate. As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, questions began to
arise as to the future force size and structure of the armed forces. Black May
1992 (which placed the military in disrepute) as well as the 1997 financial
crisis added impetus to the drive towards a reordered and restructured
64 Wassana Nanuam,“Thawil Firms as NSC Candidate,” Bangkok Post, 2 July 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
military. These events forced the military to reluctantly shift towards greater
emphasis on restructuring and professionalism.65 Under PM Chuan Leekpai and
Army Commander Surayud Chulanond, a plan emerged to reallocate military
spending, increase professionalism and transparency, and encourage the over-
supply of high-ranking officers to retire early.66 Yet, the plan was hindered
by bureaucratic resistence and administrative disagreements. The advent of
Thaksin’s government decelerated the restructuring. Since the 2006 coup, the
reforms appear to have been put on ice in all but name.
As for military resources, Thailand’s military budget and military-
controlled state enterprises have provided the lion’s share of appropriations.
Of these, defense appropriations derive mostly from the annual parliamentary
budget approval process, though there are also “blind” military appropriations.
Prior to 1992, the military possessed much greater autonomy over its budget.
The National Assembly rarely rejected a defense appropriation and few details
of the military budget were revealed.67 Only since the early 1990s has parliament
seriously scrutinized military appropriations.
In the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre, the military under
Army Commander Gen. Wimol Wongwanich, facing massive negative percep-
tions by the public, media, and parliament, reluctantly agreed to a defense
budget reduction for fiscal year 1993-94. The broad mid-1990s decline in
military appropriations continued, owing partly to the 1997 Asian financial
crisis as well as to the growing supremacy of “civilianization” in Thai politics:
65 Thailand, The Defense of Thailand, (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1994), Message from the Supreme Commander, 58.66 “Surayud Guns for Reforms,”Bangkok Post, 19 February 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Heiner Hänggi, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,” Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, 11.67 Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation (Singapore, ISEAS, 1996) 65.
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democracy under StreSS
the “people’s constitution” was adopted in 1997.1 Parliamentary scrutiny of
military budgets now grew even more intense, and the result was a decline in
armed forces funding.
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06) established a new method
for gaining control of military spending by ensuring that military allocation
requests would have to pass through him.2This he did by elevating retired
military cronies and relatives to high positions of power, e.g. Gen. Chaisit
Shinawatra became Army Commander in 2002. As such, Thaksin was able to
ensure a reduction of the military budget. From 2001 to 2006, it declined by
approximately 2% of the national budget (see figure 5). Under Thaksin, civilian
control stood at its greatest apex over military spending.
Yet, the 2006 coup’s voiding of the 1997 constitution and dissolution of
parliament (ending any scrutiny by elected representatives) enabled the armed
forces to run roughshod over civilian control of defense budgeting. One military
official, when asked about the ramifications of the coup, admitted that it helped
the military budget expand rapidly—though at the expense of democracy.3
Under the 2006-2008 military-imposed Surayud government, armed forces
spending spiraled higher and higher, with a 60% budget increase in 2007 and
18% increase in 2008.4 The 2007 constitution meanwhile freed up moneys for
potential military purposes (Section 169).
The return to elected governance in December 2007 paralleled the
continuing growth in military spending. To curry favor with the armed forces
and fearing a potential coup, pro-Thaksin prime ministers Samak Sundaravej 1 In 1997 the Thai defense budget was reduced by 25 percent, the highest decline in years. See Thailand Bureau of the Budget, http://www.bb.go.th/bbhomeeng/.2 McCargo, Ukrist 137.3 Anonymous very senior retired Army official,Personal Interview August 14, 2009.4 “Military Must be Accountable,” Bangkok Post, 2 July 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
and Somchai Wongsawat did little to restrain military requests for greater
appropriations. Surprisingly, the anti-Thaksin Democrat government of PM
Abhisit Vechachiwa (the rise to power of which was assisted through military
cooperation) insisted on cuts in the military budget request for fiscal year 2010.
Military expenditures had continued to rise from US$3,333 million in 2007
to US$4,190 million in 2008, to US$4,500 million in 2009. The armed forces
sought over US$5000 million for 2010. This was pared down to US$4,400 in the
2010 million budget given the continuing economic crisis [see figures below]).
Few know, of course, if the Abhisit government simultaneously promised any
secret funding. Despite the ability of the Democrat government to reject higher
armed forces appropriations requests, civilian governments in Thailand today
have experienced a loss in their authority vis-à-vis the military since the fall of
Thaksin and enactment of the 2007 constitution.
Figure 3: Thai Military Expenditures (in US$ millions, 1979-2010) 5
5 Source: 1978-1987, 2004-2007data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, various years. 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI), Stockholm, various years. 2008 data derived from “Military Spending to Soar A Further 24%,”The Nation, 28 June 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; 2009 and 2010 data derived from “Military Reduces Weapons Request [in Thai]” Thai Post. 21 May 2009. Http://www.thaipost.net/news/210509/5011.
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democracy under StreSS
Figure 4: Thai Military Expenditures (% of GDP 1979-2009) 6
Figure 5: Thai Defense Ministry Expenditures % of National Budget (1991-
2010)7
Another key area of military organization is the rotation of the senior
leadership because these people stand at the top of the military hierarchy and 6 Ibid; “Taxing its Way out of Trouble,” The Nation, 7 May 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 7 Acknowledgements to Chris Baker; Thailand, Bureau of the Budget, http://www.bb.go.th/bbhomeeng/; 2010 figure is based upon author’s calculation of a Bt151 billion defense budget plus a Bt 6.3 supplemental as a proportion of the total national budget. See “Taxing its Way out of Trouble,” The Nation, 7 May 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; “Defense Wants Funds for Helicoptors,” The Nation, 26 August 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. author’s calculations.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
make decisions in the name of the military pyramid. Appointments are always
political though matters of seniority, proven loyalty, ability, and sometimes
professionalism (in that order) are significant.
Traditionally, the complete list would be checked by the Supreme Com-
mander. It would proceed to the Defense Minister who was required to sign off
on it. After this, the Prime Minister approved it, and the palace would endorse
it on the advice of the Privy Council.8 The 2001 advent of Thaksin represented
a challenge to Prem in terms of armed forces promotions. During Thaksin’s
tenure, given his success in eventually dominating top armed forces positions,
senior reshuffles simply became a means for him to rotate and reward his own
expanding military base.
The 2006 coup led to a drastic change in the senior military appointments
system. On December 20, 2007, just prior to the general election, the junta-
created National Legislative Assembly passed a decree which vastly reduces the
power of elected civilians over the reshuffles process. The new law requires that
reshuffles of high-ranking officers be vetted by a committee, whose members
include the army commander, the navy commander, air force commander, the
supreme commander, and the permanent defense secretary as well as the civilian
defense minister and prime minister. In future, if any dispute occurs as to an
appointment, a simple committee vote will settle the dispute. Given that the
unelected military portion of the committee accounts for five votes as opposed
to two for civilians, the new arrangement should heighten military control at
the expense of the authority of civilians with regard to reshuffles.9
8 “It has not been uncommon for reshuffle lists to be upheld until Privy Council head Prem is satisified with them. See James Ockey, “Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule,” Asian Survey 47, 1 (January/February 2007) 137.9 “PM Loses Army Reshuffle Powers,” Bangkok Post, 2 February 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
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democracy under StreSS
Regarding military retirements, the Military Service Act of 1954 mandates
that all armed forces personnel must retire at age 60. Generally, senior military
promotions are timed such that the soldier promoted has only one or two years
left to serve in a top position, and thus has little time to centralize power. For
example, Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin, Army Commander and leader of the 2006
coup, was forced to retired at age 60 in 2007. Generally, civilian governments
have had little authority in dismissing soldiers. Transfers by civilians are also
rare.10 More common are instances where a recalcitrant Army Commander is
“retired” or “kicked upstairs” to become the armed forces’ Supreme Commander,
a generally ceremonial position (e.g. Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek, 1986; Gen.Surayud
Chulanond, 2002). Only when the military is perceived in a negative light by
the public at large, does the clout of civilian PMs enable the latter to dismiss
the former. For example, during the second Anand Panyarachun government,
the appointed civilian PM declared that any coup was “treason against the
country and the throne.”11He thereupon dismissed Army Commander-in-Chief
Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi, and two other senior generals from their posts.
But times have changed. Currently, given the heightened military influence in
the post-2006 coup climate, civilians must tread carefully in terms of offending
the armed forces. As such, civilian control of military organization today just
barely approaches a level of medium.
From the examination of the aforementioned five decision-making areas,
this study concludes that civilian control over Thailand’s military is on the wane,
relative to the 1992-2006 period. Civilian rule over internal security is especially
minimal, compared to other areas, while the area in which civilian rule is most
extensive is national defense. 10 In 2006, amidst the coup (popular with most Bangkokians), PM Thaksin sought to transfer coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratklin to an inactive posting, but the armed forces refused to follow Thaksin’s lead. 11 Murray 192.
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III. Conclusion: Thailand’s Military—Riding High
In 2010 Thailand is experiencing the growing erosion of civilian control
over its armed forces. Though “the Thai military sees itself as the self-entitled
defender and guardian of Thailand’s political future,”12it sees its role in terms of
preserving nation and monarchy rather than maintaining democracy and answer-
ing to elected officials. Thailand today is living under military tutelage. As such,
democracy is on the wane. One could even say that Thailand has sunk to the
status of faulty or defective democracy.13 Given that the military, in cooperation
with the Privy Council, is exerting growing, unhindered power over Thailand’s
weak civilian governments, one could specify that Thailand is a domain, or
tutelary, defective democracy.14
The introduction to this chapter raised four research questions. (1)
Exactly how has the balance of power shifted in civil-military relations from
1992 to the present? (2) In what areas of civilian control do the armed forces
today hold the most sway? (3) What does continuing military involvement say
about the contemporary state of Thai politics? (4) What long-term and short-
term patterns can we see in civil-military relations? In answer to (1), clearly the
civil-military equilibrium has shifted back in favour of Thailand’s military. As
for (2), the military today holds the most sway in the area of internal security
(e.g. an enhanced ISOC), followed by military organization (e.g. a larger budget), 12 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, 19, 4, (October 2008) 146.13 Croissant and Merkel (2000) state that “defective democracies are systems of political power that boast the existence of a meaningful and effective universal ‘system of elections.’regulating access to political power. At the same time, however, they significantly limit the functioning of institutions that secure basic political and civic participatory rights and freedoms, restrictions of the horizontal checks and limitations on power, and/or limitations on the effective political power of democratically legitimated authorities.” See Aurel Croissant, Aurel; Wolfgang Merkel, “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in Defective Democracies”, in Central European Political Science Review, 1, 2 (December 2000) 35.14 Merkel (2004) defines domain (tutelary) democracies as regimes where actors not legitimized by democratic vote (e.g. the military, entrepreneurs, multinational corporations) exert partial or total control over certain political spheres which should be under the control of democratically elected authorities. See Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies” Democratization, 11, 5, (December 2004) 49.
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and elite recruitment (e.g. greater influence in the Senate). Regarding (3),
continuing military involvement reflects an increasingly unstable phase in Thai
politics where weak civilian governments must either court the military or be
wary of a potential coup. In answer to (4), the long-term pattern since 1932
demonstrates enhanced civilian clout vis-a-vis the armed forces (most visibly seen
in the diminished number of soldiers in legislative/cabinet postings), while the
short-term pattern reveals that the military has more power today than at any
time since 1992 (evidenced by the 2006 coup from which the 2007 constitution
enshrined greater military powers).
The three-decade period of 1979 to 2010 has represented the gradual
assertion of political control by the military faction of Gen. (ret.) Prem
Tinsulanond over the armed forces. This era encompassed Prem’s own retirement
from the armed forces and ascension to President of the Privy Council. 2005
saw Prem ensure that Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin, who had previously served
under Prem-loyalist Gen. (ret.) Surayud Chulanond, was appointed to become
Army Commander, despite the wishes of Thaksin.15 In September 2006, Sonthi,
together with arch-royalist Prem supporters in the armed forces, led the coup
that ousted Thaksin, reportedly at the instigation of Prem.16Surayud was then
appointed as PM while the military ruled directly. Gen. Anupong Paochinda,
previously serving in the pro-Prem 21st battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s
Guard), succeeded Sonthi as Army Commander, and continues in that post today.
The posting of Anupong and his associates reflects the continuing dominance
of former Queen’s Guard officers and, implicitly, of Prem.
15 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where will Sonthi Lead Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1 (Feb-ruary 2008): 126.16 Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.129; Jakrapop Penkair, Personal Interview, 3 March 2009.
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3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce
The prospects for Thai civil-military relations are tilting toward intensified
armed forces’ influence. Though the elections of December 2007 appeared
to revitalize Thailand’s process of democratization and the military accepted
the election results, it was reluctant to safeguard the pro-Thaksin civilian
government elected. Indeed, the military stood idly by while unruly crowds
took over Government House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked
two international airports. Moreover, Anupong twice called on PM Somchai to
resign.17 Finally, in mid-December 2008, Thailand’s military became the indirect
arbiter in the formation of a new anti-Thaksin civilian government.18 These events
showed that the military was willing and able to involve itself in unconventional,
indirect political intrusions to the point of re-stacking the coalition.
2009 has been the year of military autonomy from civilian control.
The armed forces today have found their perfect niche. Counseled by Prem,
working behind the scenes with a generally compliant civilian government and
strengthened by the 2007 constitution, the military has made a U-Turn back to
1991 to become Thailand’s crucial clandestine political player. For the armed
forces, indirect domination of civilian governments allows them to augment their
autonomy vis-a-vis civilian authority. Weak civilian governments will come and
go while a strong military institution will endure. Amidst enhanced military
tutelage over politics and society, Thailand today has fallen off the trajectory
toward democratization. Rather, it is increasingly reverting to a domain defective
democracy.19 The military’s augmented budget, Internal Security Act powers,
the Defense Ministry Act, and the Broadcasting Act all attest to the renewed
political strength of soldiers.20 General Prem was right when he insinuated 17 Wassana Nanuam, “The Coup that Never Was” Bangkok Post, 31 October 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 18 Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, 11 December 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 19 See Croissant and Merkel (2003); Merkel, (2004).20 Chang Noi,“Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,” The Nation, 2 February 2009, http://www.
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democracy under StreSS
that the military was the horse ridden by civilian “jockey” governments. Given
intensified military prowess, the civilian government jockey can now at any time
be thrown from the saddle.
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102
FOURUnder an Iron Heel:
Civil-Military Relations in Burma/Myanmar
Win Min
Introduction
Unlike other Southeast Asian countries which have experienced rule
by the armed forces, Burma/Myanmar has experienced uninterrupted military
control for almost five decades and soldiers remain determined to take a
leading role in the country’s future politics. There is also no indication that the
armed forces are prepared to accept shared political leadership with civilian
counterparts.
This study looks at how and why the military in Burma/Myanmar
came into power, how it has sustained its power for so long, and the impact
of military rule on the country’s political, economic and social sectors. It will
analyze the role of the military and military practices by looking at military
relations with civilian branches of government (administrative, judicial and
legislative) and with broader society. It will also consider the significance of the
2010 elections and the implications of the 2008 constitution on post-election
civil-military relations. Finally, this study will explore possible future scenarios
regarding the top military leadership—scenarios which will shape continuity or
change and post-election civil-military relations.
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democracy under StreSS
The study argues that the nature of civil-military relations in Burma/
Myanmar has been considerably influenced by the country’s history—its
independence struggle, protracted civil war, 1950s parliamentary crisis and
1988 crackdown against pro-democracy demonstrators. It stresses that military
supremacy (i.e. control over civilian branches of government and society) has
been unprecedentedly entrenched over time. Thus in Burma/Myanmar, it makes
more sense to talk about military-civil relations than civil-military relations. The
study also argues that continued military dominance over politics after the 2010
elections is likely, at least in the short term.
Civil-military Relations under an Elected Government (1948-62)
Although the Burma/Myanmar Army was politicized as a liberating force
during the independence struggle, it accepted democratic civilian control after
independence. Indeed, the 1947 constitution enshrined civilian control over
military expenditures, security policy and senior promotions.1 However, the
outbreak of civil war significantly impacted the armed forces thinking about
its size and role. As Muthiah Alagappa has argued regarding Burma/Myanmar
and some other Asian countries, when political means were unsuccessful at
resolving ethnic claims against the state in the post-independence period, the use
of military means to prevent the country’s breakup and to unite the population
led to the rapid expansion in the troop strength of the armed forces of those
countries.2 In Burma/Myanmar, the military quickly sought to expand its size
1 Mary Callahan, “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 414-415.2 Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 4-5.
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4 : under an Iron heel : cIvIl-mIlItary relatIonS In burma/myanmar
and extend its reach to deal with the multiple anti-government forces operating
throughout the country. 3
The military also expanded its role into non-military areas (administration
and business) to deal with anti-government forces, gradually becoming the
country’s strongest institution, with the ability to seize state power in times of
political crisis.4 According to Alfred Stepan this phenomenon is not uncommon.
When a national army in a developing country is fighting a civil war, the military
is likely to gain interconnected political, social and economic skills that can lead
to the politicization of the military and the expansion of its role to areas such as
politics and economics.5 The Burma/Myanmar army adopted an ideology centered
on nationalism and socialism and began monitoring civilian activities.6 Military
officers saw the army as a unifying force and their successful battle experiences
reinforced their image of themselves as national guardians and saviors.
In 1958, the ruling Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) split
into two factions, leading to a parliamentary crisis that weakened the legiti-
macy of civilian governance in the eyes of the military. Certain military officers
were worried the split could hurt armed forces’ unity.7 In 1958, Prime Minister
U Nu privately conceded to military demands, allowing the armed forces to
temporarily take power. The military then publicized its ideology for the country:
the restoration of peace and the rule of law, the consolidation of democracy,
and the establishment of a socialist economy.8
3 Callahan, 421.4 Callahan, 419-421.5 Alfred Stepan, “The Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. by Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).6 Callahan, 420.7 Taylor, Robert, “Burma.” Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia, ed. By Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 34.8 Josef Silverstein, Military Rule and Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) 77-79.
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democracy under StreSS
After elections in 1960, it transferred power to the winning AFPFL faction.
Some military officers began to feel they were more competent than civilians
in maintaining political stability and that they should be ready to intervene in
politics whenever perceived political crises appeared. In the early 1960s, a new
split emerged in the ruling AFPFL faction. Then, in early 1962, U Nu engaged
in discussions with ethnic minority leaders regarding greater ethnic autonomy.
In March 1962, Army Chief Gen. Ne Win staged a coup, claiming the military
was saving the country from disintegration, and introducing the idea of the
military as a national unifier.
Military-civil Relations under the Revolutionary Council (1962-74)
The post-coup Revolutionary Council was determined to stay in power
and announced it would transform the country from a parliamentary democracy
into a socialist democracy.9 It abolished the constitution, parliament, political
parties and independent unions; granted executive, legislative and judicial power
to Ne Win; appointed a cabinet of mostly of active military officers and set up
Security and Administration Committees from the national level down to the
village and township ward levels. At the national, divisional and state levels,
military officers dominated the committees. Only at the local level was there
any civilian involvement.10
According to Callahan, the coup “brought army leaders to national political
power and eliminated their civilian competitors once and for all.”11 Government
propaganda portrayed parliamentary democracy and federalism as sources of
9 Silverstein, 81-85.10 Taylor, 38.11 Callahan, 422.
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instability and the military as the only force capable of ensuring national stability
and unity. Private businesses were nationalized and the economy put under
state control. Protests in 1962 and 1964 were quickly suppressed. The junta
announced its socialist ideology and set up the Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP), in which all Revolutionary Council members served as central executive
committee (CEC) members. In 1974, the Council pushed through a constitutional
referendum enshrining a military-backed one-party system.
Military-civil Relations during the Socialist Period (1974-88)
Retired and active military officers dominated BSPP leadership, although
the highest-level decision-making shifted from the military command to the
party’s CEC. Retired Gen. Ne Win became BSPP chairman and president of
the country while 75% of BSPP CEC members were active military officers.
Although participation by active military officers in the BSPP leadership
gradually decreased, retired officers remained dominant. In the early 1980s,
the 13-member BSPP central executive committee was comprised of three active
military officers, nine retired officers and one civilian.
The cabinet, likewise comprised mostly of active or retired military
officers, lacked policy-making authority and merely implemented policies adopted
by the BSPP’s CEC. The parliament merely rubber-stamped BSPP decrees and
until the late 1970s, almost 60% of members of parliament (MPs) were active
and retired military officers.12
The 1974 constitution banned all other political parties and independent
unions and restricted people’s rights to expression and assembly. The BSPP, 12 Taylor, 40.
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however, established its own mass civilian organizations, led by retired or active
military officers. Aside from brief demonstrations between 1974 and 1976, there
was no serious threat to indirect military rule until 1988.
The BSPP government was relatively cohesive in comparison with the
AFPFL, despite some purges of senior military leaders. It also differed from other
contemporary military regimes in Southeast Asia by being relatively stable13 and
maintaining extensive control over the nationalized economy, thus preventing
the emergence of an independent business community. This power imbalance
between the military and civil society is one of the main factors that enabled the
regime to survive so long. However, due to tight control over the economy, the
BSPP was unable to foster economic development, resulting in the UN’s 1987
declaration of Burma/Myanmar as a least developed country.
In late 1987, students initiated demonstrations after the government’s
abrupt demonetization of major bank notes. In August 1988, the general
public, who had suffered under chronic economic mismanagement, joined the
demonstrations, leading to a country-wide movement calling for multi-party
democracy. During a six-week period when the government lost control and
troops retreated to their barracks, independent unions spontaneously re-emerged
together with press freedom. Civil servants stopped working, joined the
demonstrations and the state bureaucracy ceased to function. In fact, during the
demonstrations the BSPP collapsed as low-level members quit in large numbers.
However, the military remained united, staging a coup in September 1988, while
forcefully ending the demonstrations and killing thousands of demonstrators.
Burma/Myanmar’s civil society had long been weakened under military rule and
13 Ibid., 42.
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the protestors found it impossible to sustain the demonstrations at the height
of the crackdown.
Military-civil Relations after 1988
The military regime that took power in 1988 called itself the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, renaming itself the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. Unlike in 1962, the regime’s leaders in
1988 quickly announced that its rule would be brief and transitional, paving the
way for multi-party democratic elections. The regime felt compelled to placate
demonstrators and reduce the possibility of further large-scale demonstrations.
The junta then announced that political parties could form and run in upcoming
elections.
Yet, like after the 1962 coup, the military sought to weaken alternative
sources of power which had re-emerged during the 1988 demonstrations.
Independent organizations, student unions and independent media were banned.
Gatherings of five or more people were declared illegal—restrictions which
have remained in place until today. Media censorship became more stringent
and the authorities closed many universities, tightened control on campuses
and arrested prominent civilian leaders. They also revoked the constitution
and dissolved parliament. Gen. Saw Maung, who headed the military in 1988,
became SLORC chairman. Both the SLORC and SPDC have only been comprised
of active military officers. As in 1962, the councils have granted all executive,
legislative and judicial powers to their chairmen. All cabinet ministers were
initially active military officers, although later some retired officers and a few
civilians were included. No parliament was created and the judiciary remains
109
democracy under StreSS
appointed and strongly controlled by the junta. To ensure centralized military
control, military councils have also been organized down to the village and
township ward levels where active and retired military personnel have taken
leading positions in local administration.
The military also established a pro-military National Unity Party (NUP),
comprised of former BSPP members, which nevertheless lost the 1990 elections
to Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). The junta refused
to transfer power and instead established a National Convention in 1993 to draft
a pro-military constitution. However, the NLD was allocated only 12% of the
representation in the convention, whereas most delegates were handpicked by
the military. Frustrated with the military’s unwillingness to compromise with
other participants, the NLD boycotted the convention in 1995. The military then
dismissed the NLD from the convention and halted the process in 1996.
Unwilling to yield power, the junta has continued to rule without
a constitution. Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for 14 of the
past 20 years. Although she was released for periods of time in 1995, 2000 and
2002, this did not lead to a substantial dialogue between the military and the
NLD for a negotiated transition to civilian rule. The armed forces appeared to
believe they had the right to rule, having been in power for so long and seeing
themselves as more competent than civilians to run the country. The junta
leaders were also worried they might be persecuted for past atrocities following
a democratic transition. Nevertheless, the regime recognized that it needed to
make some changes to maintain power.
After 1988, the junta realized an urgent need to weaken the pro-
democracy movement so as to prevent another uprising. The junta seemed
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worried that urban protesters and the armed opposition might coordinate and
jointly attempt to overthrow it.14 The military initiated ceasefire agreements with
many armed ethnic groups to prevent such coordination. This also served to
weaken the armed ethnic movement at a time when the military was intensifying
attacks against non-ceasefire groups. The junta has also increased the size of the
military to quickly crush any mass movements or armed ethnic resistance that
might emerge in the future and ensure tighter control over government. Troop
strength increased from 180,000 in the late 1980s to 300,000 by 1995, with
the official aim being to reach 500,000 troops.15 This led to an unprecedented
militarization of government bureaucracy. The military has retired many officers
and appointed them to senior positions in the civilian bureaucracy. The leading
generals appear to believe that having retired military officers leading these
departments will prevent civil servants from participating in future anti-regime
demonstrations.
Although the regime won some support by announcing that it would
reinstate a market-economy, the military nonetheless continues to monopolize
the economy under a system akin to crony capitalism, enabling it to control the
business community. For example, the military set up the Trade Council, led by
a top general, and has generally only provided import–export licenses to military
businesses, family members and friends. The military has also established two
conglomerates—the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH;
established in 1990) and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC; established
in 1997)—which are led by senior military officers and enjoy tax exemptions
and special permits. UMEH is the largest national firm and its shares are held
by the Directorate of Procurement at the War Office, regional commands and
14 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk (US): EastBridge, 2002) 34.15 Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw (Canberra: Australian National University, 1996) 19.
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active and retired military officers. Most major foreign investment has been
channeled through UMEH. Its commercial interests include gem and timber
processing, garment production, food and beverage production, transport, trade,
communications, construction, banking, hotels and tourism services. The MEC
is a similarly enormous enterprise with activities including oil and gas exports.16
After Gen. Saw Maung was forced to retire on grounds of mental illness
in 1992, he was replaced by Gen. Than Shwe, who remains SPDC chairman.
In 1993, Than Shwe set up a pro-military mass organization—the Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)—to help prevent or suppress
pro-democracy demonstrations, support pro-military political campaigns and
serve as a base for a new pro-military political party, similar to Gen. Suharto’s
Golkar Party in Indonesia. Civil servants and students were coaxed or forced
to become members of the USDA, which claims to have 24 million members.
The USDA also provides special privileges to its members, including exclusive
business opportunities, free educational courses and military training. The USDA
orchestrated an assault on Aung San Suu Kyi’s car in 1995 and her motorcade
at Depayin in 2003, where dozens of people were reportedly killed and she was
put back under house arrest. After the NLD boycotted the National Convention,
the USDA organized a series of mass rallies in support of the convention.
Selected members of the association have been given training on leadership,
management, politics, economics, social affairs, and computer technology to
prepare them to work for a pro-military party led by senior USDA leaders that
will run in future elections.
16 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed forces Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009) 182.
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However, there have been intra-military disagreements over how to deal
with Aung San Suu Kyi and the international community. The second and third
highest-ranking officers, Gen. Maung Aye and Gen. Khin Nyunt (former Military
Intelligence chief), did not even know about the planned 2003 attack on Aung
San Suu Kyi’s motorcade until moments before. The attack was carried out by
the USDA in line with a secret order issued by Than Shwe.17 By contrast, Gen.
Maung Aye and his close associates remain aloof from USDA activities. To counter
increasing international pressure after the 2003 attack, the junta appointed Khin
Nyunt as prime minister and announced a seven-point roadmap to “disciplined
democracy,” though without an implementation time frame. Indeed, Khin Nyunt
did respond to the international outcry by negotiating for the NLD’s return to the
National Convention, the completion of which was the first step of the roadmap.
He was also praised internationally as a pragmatist who might willingly work
with the opposition.18
However at the last minute, Than Shwe rejected Khin Nyunt’s agreement
with the NLD.19 This increased already-existing tensions between the combat and
intelligence factions within the military over the extent to which the intelligence
branch should have independent power—leading to the purge of Khin Nyunt
and his intelligence group in 2004. In 2005, Khin Nyunt was sentenced to 44
years imprisonment, but was put under house arrest instead. Many intelligence
officers were given prison sentences from 20 to almost 200 years.
Despite disagreements over NLD participation, the military has continued
to use the seven-point roadmap to erode the relevance of the 1990 election results
and legitimize indirect military rule through a constitutional referendum and 17 “Depayin Tikekhitehmu Than Shwe kotaing Amaintpay, Myanmar Than Ayarshe Haung Pyaw” [Than Shwe himself orders Depayin attack, said a former Burmese/Myanmar diplomat,] VOA (Burmese), May 31, 2008.18 Interview with a senior western diplomat, April 2007.19 Interview with a senior diplomat, April 2005.
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subsequent elections. In 2004, the National Convention was restarted, without
NLD participation. Instead, the regime allowed ethnic ceasefire groups 10% of
the total seats at the convention, although all their proposals were rejected. The
draft constitution was finally completed in 2007. A week after a deadly cyclone
in May 2008, the junta went ahead with its planned constitutional referendum.
The regime assigned troops to secure referendum polling stations rather than
conduct disaster relief efforts. The junta also initially restricted international
humanitarian access to cyclone-affected areas. According to official statistics, the
constitution was approved by 92% of the voters. However, the NLD and others
claimed the referendum was not free and fair, with numerous allegations of
intimidation and pre-marked ballots.
Post-1988 Protests
Despite the junta’s attempt to prevent further demonstrations after 1988,
there were two major protests, in 1996 and 2007. In 1996, university students
staged a demonstration calling for improvements in the education system. The
regime responded with force, arresting over 100 students. Most universities
were closed for four years, and many universities relocated to suburban areas.
The government also encouraged students to take distance education courses,
so they would have few opportunities to gather or organize on campus.
In 2007, the second largest series of demonstrations after 1988 took place
when the government suddenly removed fuel subsidies leading to a steep increase
in gas prices. The ‘88 Generation Students’ group initiated the demonstrations
but the leaders were soon arrested. Buddhist monks then took up the cause.
The monks peacefully marched through the streets of Rangoon and other cities,
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chanting Buddhist verses calling for compassion, seeking to persuade the regime
to recognize the impact of its policies on the poor, release political prisoners and
hold a dialogue with the opposition. However, the junta succeeded in stopping
these marches by beating many monks and others, arresting thousands and
killing at least 31 civilians.20 It then organized USDA-led pro-military mass rallies
across the country. In order to manage growing international pressure following
the crackdown, the junta announced a timeframe for the constitutional referen-
dum and subsequent elections. It also appointed a liaison minister who met Aung
San Suu Kyi a few times, although these meetings stopped when international
pressure subsided. In order to silence dissent before the elections, the former
student leaders and monks who led the demonstrations were sentenced to
lengthy prison terms.
The Significance of the 2010 Elections
Approaching the 2010 elections, the junta has shown no willingness to
compromise with the political opposition, despite attempts to gain international
support for the elections. Although there were repeated international and
domestic calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, when her house arrest order
expired in May 2009, the junta took advantage of a tourist’s intrusion into her
compound as a pretext to extend her detention at least until the completion of
the 2010 elections. By sentencing her, the junta may want the NLD to decide
by itself not to run in the elections. This derives from the fact that the NLD has
set three pre-conditions for participation: the unconditional release of political
20 “Statement by Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” Resumed sixth session of the Human Rights Council, December 11, 2007, Geneva.
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prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, a review of the 2008 constitution and
the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections under international supervision.
In September 2009, the junta released over 100 political prisoners before
the UN General Assembly meeting to gain international support for the 2010
elections. However, political activists continue to be arrested and over 2,000
political prisoners remain imprisoned.21 In October 2009, the junta’s liaison min-
ister met Aung San Suu Kyi twice after she sent an open letter to Than Shwe
indicating her willingness to cooperate with the junta to lift sanctions. Moreover,
in November 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to meet foreign diplomats,
including senior US officials.
As for the status of the ethnic ceasefire groups, the junta has shown little
effort to compromise before the elections.
In August 2009, the regime attacked one of the smaller ceasefires groups,
the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), based in the Kokang
region. The apparent motivation for the attack was the MNDAA’s unwillingness
to concede to demands to transform itself into a border guard force under the
Burma/Myanmar Army’s command. Although other smaller ceasefire groups
have been compelled to become border guard forces, larger ceasefire groups
like the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Organization have
refused to do so.
Although the elections offer some hope for gradual positive change
in civil-military relations, any short-term changes that do occur are unlikely
to be substantial. The military is determined to take any measures it deems
necessary to avoid an outcome similar to 1990 when the pro-regime party lost
21 Human Rights Watch, “Burma’s Forgotten Prisoners,” September 2009.
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the election. Thus, despite the international community’s repeated calls for free,
fair and inclusive elections, the scheduled elections are likely to fall short of these
standards. There will be more restrictions than in 1990 for party registration and
campaigning. Moreover, authorities may use intimidation and ballot manipulation
as in the 2008 referendum to ensure that pro-military parties win.
Senior leaders of the USDA, who are likely to lead a pro-military party,
have launched unofficial election campaigns in various parts of the country by
initiating or promising development and social activities. Aside from senior
USDA leaders, some generals might retire from the military to serve in the CEC
of the new political party. Some cronies, former senior civil servants and local
influential people might also be included to broaden the party’s representation
and increase its chance of winning over 50% of parliamentary seats, and thus
the election. However, the USDA party may not have the full support of everyone
in the army. Many local army commanders have become upset over the USDA’s
increasingly influential role in development activities in their areas. The USDA
also has its own intelligence networks, which were established after the junta
dismantled Khin Nyunt’s military intelligence branch in 2004.
Smaller parties led by individuals handpicked by the SPDC (including
business cronies, local influential people and some retired ceasefire group
leaders—especially those whose groups have agreed to become border guard
forces) may also be set up, or they may be asked to run as individual candidates
to win another 20% of the seats and form part of a coalition government
controlled by the military. Given the military’s efforts to maintain power after
the 2010 elections, the likely representation for the political opposition will be
minimal.
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Implications of the 2008 Constitution
In the 2008 constitution, the military enshrined many of its prerogatives
in order to maintain military control over politics, rather than civilian control
over the military. The six basic principles of the constitution, which are also the
six “consistent objectives,” of the Union state that the military will be enabled “to
participate in the national political leadership role of the State.”22 This principle
of military participation differs from that of other democratic countries where
military influence over political decision-making is conducted indirectly via
lobbying or advice given to civilian leaders. The NLD, ethnic political parties
and to a lesser extent ceasefire groups previously demanded that the military
drop this basic principle, but to no avail.
Not only does the constitution restrict civilian control over the military
in principle, it also lacks any presidential mechanism that could ensure civilian
control over the military in practice. In democracies, the role of presidents or
prime ministers as commanders-in-chief of the armed forces serves as one of the
main mechanisms to ensure civilian control over the military. The head of the
Burma/Myanmar Army will be the commander-in-chief, thus wielding supreme
power over the armed forces without civilian oversight.
The 2008 constitution also grants the military primary responsibility
for internal and external security. Under Chapter 7 of the constitution (dealing
with Defense Services), Article 339 states the “Defense Services shall lead in
safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers.”23 In established
democracies, police forces, rather than the army, are mandated with primary
responsibility for managing internal security. This constitutionally-mandated 22 Ministry of Information, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) (Naypyitaw: Printing and Publishing Enterprise, September, 2008), 3.23 Ibid., 148.
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role of the military over internal security thus allows the armed forces to
independently respond to protests (which the military has repeatedly declared
to be internal security threats) and to manage law and order.
In addition, the constitution provides for the military to play a major role
in parliament following elections. In practice, however, the military will likely
have even more power in parliament than the constitution explicitly ensures.
The constitution includes a provision requiring 25% of MPs to be active-duty
military officers appointed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rather
than popularly elected representatives.24 There is moreover no transitional clause
to gradually phase-out this representation of military personnel in parliament
and it will be very difficult to reduce the number of military seats through
constitutional amendments. This 25% parliamentary block of military officers
provides the military with a veto over future attempts to pass constitutional
amendments, as any such amendments require approval by more than 75%
of MPs. Furthermore, as discussed above, a pro-military party established to
run in the elections is likely to win at least 50% of parliamentary seats due
to restrictions on opposition parties and electoral fraud. The military’s strong
representation in parliament (through the combined block of appointed military
officers and elected pro-military MPs) is likely to be used to ensure that the
parliament elects a president and vice presidents favored by the military rather
than the civilian population.
As another means of ensuring its leading role in national politics, the
military is likely to wield power over the executive branch after the 2010
elections. The constitution states that the president, as head of both state and
government, “shall be well acquainted” with military affairs.25 The implication is 24 Ibid., 39.25 Ibid., 19.
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that only a retired military officer can become president. A constitutional clause
in any case already bars the most famous civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi,
from becoming president or vice president due to her marriage to a foreigner.26
The constitution also enables the bloc of appointed military MPs to choose one
of the two vice presidents.27
The constitution furthermore stipulates that at least three active-duty
military officers will serve in the cabinet, though this is likely to be higher in
practice. According to the constitution, the president is to get nominees for three
security ministers (defense, home and border affairs) from the commander-
in-chief and submit these for parliamentary approval.28 The constitution in ad-
dition states that military officers appointed as ministers of defense, security
and border affairs would not need to retire or resign from the armed forces.29
Moreover, it seems that the military also wants to have as many other military
officers as possible serving in the cabinet. This is likely because the president,
as a person with military experience, is likely to choose other military men for
cabinet portfolios. According to the constitution, the president shall coordinate
with the military chief if he/she wants to appoint military officers as ministers
for ministries apart from the three security ministries.30
The charter furthermore explicitly allows the National Defense
and Security Council which comprises more military officers than civilians, to
declare a state of emergency. What constitutes a state of emergency, however,
is left ambiguous.31 This ambiguity gives wide latitude for the military leadership
to announce a state of emergency (in which executive, legislative, and judicial 26 Ibid., 19-20.27 Ibid., 20.28 Ibid., 86.29 Ibid., 87.30 Ibid., 86.31 Ibid., 75, 165.
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power are handed over to the commander-in-chief) or a coup, whenever they
see fit.32 The Council includes both the president and vice presidents together
with the armed forces chief and deputy chief, and the three security ministers.
This arrangement is meant to restrict independent presidential decision-making.
The council is set to become extremely powerful, in part because it can appoint
a new commander-in-chief.33
Not only is the military determined to dominate the executive and
parliamentary branches of government, but the constitution also guarantees
military autonomy (with regard to its management of military affairs) from the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Although the military
technically comes under the executive branch of government, it may use the
National Defense and Security Council to impose its decisions on the executive
branch. In the constitution, there is also no provision for legislative control
over military promotions, the military budget, arms purchases, recruitment
and military activities. Instead, the constitution stipulates that the armed forces
will have the right to “independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of
the armed forces.”34
The constitution furthermore allows the military to run its own court
system to try military personnel, and in matters of military justice, the deci-
sion of the military chief is “final and conclusive.”35 In this way the military can
protect its personnel from being sent to civilian courts for human rights abuses.
The junta has, in addition, enshrined a constitutional amnesty for itself to guard
32 Ibid., 167-8.33 Ibid., 148.34 Ibid., 6.35 Ibid., 148
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against military personnel ever being tried in court for past atrocities, should
parliamentary power ever shift in favor of civilians.36
The military will moreover be largely independent from the executive and
parliament in the management of its budget. Military businesses, like the Union
of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and Myanmar Economic Corporation
(MEC), are likely to expand to ensure that the military has independent sources
of revenue apart from the government’s budget. These outside revenues can
offset military budget reductions approved by an elected government. The military
also wants to maintain control over its budget in order to maintain or increase
its strength and support military families. This will make it difficult for any new
government to control the armed forces through budgetary power.
Future Military Leadership Scenarios
After the 2010 elections, a generational shift in the military is likely.
Although Than Shwe has himself managed to consolidate power, he is now in
his mid-‘70s and in declining health. His prowess will wane as his health wanes,
as happened to Ne Win in the late 1990s. Ne Win was put under house arrest
in 2002, while his grandsons and son-in-law, who allegedly plotted a coup, were
sentenced to life-imprisonment.
Nevertheless, Than Shwe has been implementing a strategy to guarantee
his influence over the military and the government until his death. Than Shwe
wants to ensure that he and his family do not end up under house arrest or in
prison as did Ne Win and his family. Than Shwe seems to believe that he can
manage the election process in a way that ensures him a continuing leadership 36 Ibid., 178.
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role in any future government. Given the conditions outlined above, there are
two likely post-election scenarios.
The first scenario is that Than Shwe will hold elections in 2010 as he
stated in October 2009.37 After the elections, he would retire from the military
together with Maung Aye as he told Ban Ki-moon in mid-2009.38 However, in
this scenario Than Shwe would create a patronage position or a body with
which he could continue to influence the government and the military. He might
serve as honorary commander-in-chief or set up a military council, comprised
of SPDC members, similar to that in China. He could lead this council since the
constitution allows the military to manage its affairs as it likes.39 He may then
continue to wield budgetary power over the military as honorary commander-
in-chief or through the council, as Ne Win did as BSPP chairman after retiring
from the position of president.
Than Shwe may also seek to place staunch loyalists in the two top-
most positions under the new constitution: president and commander-in-chief.
Specifically, Than Shwe may like to have his protégé, Gen. Shwe Mann, the third
highest-ranking officer, serve as president, engaging in travel as required, while
Than Shwe remains in Naypyidaw. Than Shwe may have a younger generation
officer, who can serve for two terms, become commander-in-chief. As long as
Than Shwe controls the military, which will continue to be the leading force
in politics, any political, economic or social changes are unlikely, let alone
a reduction in military prerogatives. Than Shwe has resisted domestic and
international advice and pressure and maintains a firm grip over the military.
37 New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe addresses second-day session of MWVO conference, October 10, 2009.38 Koyakutty, Haseenah, “UN gains leverage over Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, July 15, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KG15Ae01.html 39 Ministry of Information, 6.
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However, when Than Shwe’s influence wanes, Shwe Mann might have some
independent decision-making power and might be more open to the idea of
gradual change, starting with economic liberalization and, to a lesser degree,
political liberalization.
The second possible scenario is that Than Shwe would be unable to
implement the 2010 elections. He could die suddenly or be removed from power
because of declining health. In this scenario, Maung Aye would likely take Than
Shwe’s position and put his own protégés in key positions. In this scenario, with
Maung Aye taking over, there is a slight chance for dialogue between the military
and the opposition, if sufficient domestic and international pressure emerges.
This is because Maung Aye will not have as firm a grip over the military as
Than Shwe has had and will thus be more vulnerable to pressure. Also, he and
his close associates neither have faith in the USDA nor are much involved in
the group’s activities. In addition, Maung Aye previously engaged in a serious
conversation with Aung San Suu Kyi in one of their secret meetings, while Than
Shwe remained aloof.40
Conclusion
The role of the military, which has increased its size, expanded into non-
military sectors over time and, during the early years of civil war, intervened in
politics under weak and divided civilian rule, is deeply entrenched today, and
is determined to hold onto its prerogatives in the future. In order to maintain
military rule, the generals have ensured a power imbalance by weakening
alternative civilian sources of power. This power imbalance has led to the quick
40 Interview with a former close aide of Aung San Suu Kyi, April 2006, Bangkok.
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collapse of demonstrations which have been harshly dealt with whenever they
have broken out.
After ruling the country for almost half a century, Burma/Myanmar’s
military is deeply politicized, and the administration and civil services have
been militarized as a result. Consequently, there is also a political deadlock
while the country suffers from socio-economic mismanagement. Ideologically,
the military believes it has kept the union together, a critical task the generals
do not believe civilian politicians can handle. They also see themselves as the
saviors of the country and its citizens, protecting them from the threat of ethnic
nationalist armies and foreign influences.
The generals appear worried about losing political and economic
privileges and facing trials for past abuses. In order to avoid the mistakes of
the 1990 elections, the regime is likely to ensure success at any cost in the
up-coming 2010 elections.
It is clear the military leadership wants to maintain as much political
power as possible and will attempt to do so as long possible using and protecting
the powers it has given itself in the 2008 constitution. However, if a reform-
minded senior general were to assume leadership, there might be more space
to begin a process of national reconciliation and political reform. Ideally, this
could even include a diminishing of military prerogatives that would finally lead
to more balanced civil-military relations.
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Works Cited
Alagappa, Muthiah. “Introduction,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining
Political Role of the Military in Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001.
Callahan, Mary. “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders,” Coercion and Governance:
The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
Myoe, Maung Aung. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since
1948. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
Ministry of Information. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
(2008). Naypyitaw: Printing and Publishing Enterprise, September, 2008.
Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk (US):
EastBridge, 2002.
---. Transforming the Tatmadaw. Canberra: Australian National University, 1996.
Silverstein, Josef. Military Rule and Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977.
Stepan, Alfred, “The Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role
Expansion.” Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. Ed. Alfred
Stepan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
Taylor, Robert. “Burma.” Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia. Ed.
Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Human Rights Watch, “Burma’s Forgotten Prisoners,” September 2009.
126
FIVEArmed Forces as Veto Power:
Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines
Katherine Marie G. Hernandez & Herman Joseph S. Kraft1
Philippine society contains an important element that it shares with other
countries in Southeast Asia regardless of the political or economic context. It is
a society where political and to some degree economic conditions are very much
influenced by the interests of the institutionalized military. To a large extent,
there is nothing unusual about this as the literature on civil-military relations in
developing states tends to emphasize the highly influential position of “the man
on the horseback.”2 In the case of the Philippines, however, it is complicated
by a national situation that includes twin insurgencies, violent crime, military
rebellion, the presence of international terrorist networks, and a political culture
that emphasizes unfettered elite competition which gives scope for military
involvement (directly or indirectly) in Philippine politics.
The study and analysis of the Philippine military has received significant
attention from both academic and policymaking circles. However, a few
preliminary observations could be made regarding the state of its literature and
discourse. First, the bulk of the literature remains wedded to the traditional
(military) security paradigm. Second, the concept of civil-military relations largely 1 The authors are both Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of the Philippines and are research fellows with the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. The draft paper itself was largely taken from a 2009 report submitted by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies to the UN Development Program entitled “Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Philippines: A Preliminary Analysis” in which both authors were involved.2 Samuel Finer. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. London, Pall Mall, Press, 1962.
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focuses on a representation of the military as having been politicized mainly as
a result of the martial law regime under President Ferdinand Marcos. Lastly,
most studies on the Philippine military have not linked it institutionally to the
broader themes or perspectives of democratization and democratic consolidation,
the ongoing peace process in the country and conflict resolution, or to good
democratic governance.
The Development of the Philippine Military
National defense in the Philippines has historically been entrusted to
a fairly small regular military force whose constitutional duty is to defend
the country and the people from both internal and external threats. Known
as the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the AFP, it is divided into several
service branches — army, air force, navy, and up until 1990, constabulary. The
Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and Philippine Navy (PN) are
responsible for national land, air and sea defense, respectively. The Philippine
Constabulary (PC) was the service primarily responsible for the enforcement
of law and order and for rear-area defense during emergencies. The PC was
abolished and replaced by the Philippine National Police (PNP) in 1991. In
addition to the regular armed forces, auxiliary units, such as the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), are drawn from local communities for
purposes of area defense.3
The Philippine military can trace its origin to the pre-colonial period
although a semblance of a citizen’s armed force could be found during the
3 Rosalie B. Arcala, “Democratization and the Philippine Military: A Comparison of the Approaches Used by the Aquino and Ramos Administrations in Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Northeastern University, 2002a, 144-145 .
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country’s struggle for independence from Spain. Military historians particularly
note the active role of armed and organized Filipinos fighting against the
American and Japanese occupation forces.4 However, the modern-day AFP
was patterned after the United States military and began as such by virtue of
Commonwealth Act No.1. (1935). Also known as the National Defense Act, it
formally established the Philippine Army as the first component of the Armed
Forces. The PC already existed though it was primarily a police force under the
Department of the Interior and as such was not considered to be part of the
regular military. The 1935 Constitution established the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces while the military’s contact with the President passed
through a civilian defense secretary. The legislature exercised oversight functions
over the AFP through its powers of confirmation of military appointments and
promotions, over the defense budget, and investigation in aid of legislation in
cases of wrongdoing in the military.5
However, the US did not limit itself to shaping the structure of the
military. It also determined its roles and functions. Since the US assumed the
provision of external defense for the country, the AFP was left to “concentrate on
internal defense and peace and order”. This, to a large extent, shaped its size,
training, equipment, and supplies.6 Internal security became an umbrella term
encompassing all threats to the government, whether communist or separatist,
armed or unarmed.7 Coming from a postcolonial perspective, Hedman supported
this by concluding that in the end, “neither national interests of security nor the
4 Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000.5 Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (State University of New York at Buffalo, 1979); Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Role of the Military in Contemporary Philippine Society.” Diliman Review 32, (1984): 16-18.6 The Final Report. The Fact-Finding Commission (to Investigate the Failed Coup of December 1989) Makati: Bookmark Publishers, 1990: 29.7 Arcala 2002a.
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political dynamics of reconstruction” dictated the organization of the Philippine
armed forces.8
The internal orientation of the AFP was first demonstrated with the
emergence of the Hukbalahap9 insurgency. Under the direction of then Defense
Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, the AFP developed a two-pronged approach to the
Huk rebellion: to engage them militarily in a more organized and efficient way
and to show the disaffected populace that the government had their interests in
mind and that the military could be trusted to protect and take care of them.10
The latter came in the form of socioeconomic activities by the military. As
Danguilan stated:
Military troops went on medical missions and provided emergency
treatment and care and distributed relief goods to civilians caught in the crossfire
of combat. They built temporary bridges and roads linking civilians to military
camps which had become distributing (sic) points for medical and food supplies.
They also constructed makeshift [schoolhouses] and drilled water wells in villages
which the military declared free from the influence of the Huks.11
This incremental acquisition of developmental roles associated with
counter-insurgency since the 1950s was institutionalized during the Marcos
period. The relentless internal conflicts from two fronts--communist insurgency
and Moro secessionism—contributed to the civilian government becoming
heavily dependent on the military for national security. The AFP even became
8 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil.” In Muthiah Alagappa, Ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001: 170.9 Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon later renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or Army of National Liberation. Originally a peasant movement, it is a group of guerilla fighters that fought the Japanese invaders but rose in arms against the government because of their exclusion in the postwar political order. 10 Hernandez 1979.11 Marilen Danguilan, “Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement in the Philippines.” Research Paper No. 161. Harvard: Harvard School of Public Health (1999):13.
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the apparatus of Marcos to implement martial law as a ‘partner in national
development’. Martial law paved the way for the destruction of the civilian
political institutions of democratic governance, from the legislature to the political
parties and the judiciary. Other changes included the continuous expansion of
military functions to include non-traditional military roles, the institution of
structural changes that ‘merged’ the police with the military through the single
leadership of the PC and the Integrated National Police within the AFP, as well
as the suppression of civil liberties, including elections, freedom of expression
and association. Thus, expansion of the military role amid the destruction of
civilian political institutions of democratic governance resulted in a heightened
sense of political awareness in the AFP of being “the principal wielders of power
over a highly personalized authoritarian regime.”12 Given that the military was
the most important piece of state machinery in the country during martial law
under Marcos, he did not hesitate to increase its budget. Indeed, according
to reports, Marcos infused some 3.5 billion pesos into the AFP from 1973 to
1975.13 This was a 700 per cent increase in the AFP’s pre-martial law budget,
the highest for any state within the Southeast Asian region.14 The AFP also re-
cruited several thousands more into its ranks, swelling the number of regulars
from 70,000 to 275,000, representing an increase of more than 300 per cent.
Apart from this, Marcos appointed military officers to key civilian posts such as
some of the government-owned and controlled corporations.15
It is the crucial powers of appointment and promotion that enabled
Marcos to keep the armed forces under his control. His perfect employment of 12 Carolina Hernandez 1979; 1984; Carolina Hernandez “The Military and Constitutional Change: Problems and Prospects in a Redemocratized Philippines.” Public Policy 1, 1 (1997): 42-61; Felipe B. Miranda, The Politicization of the Military. Quezon City: University Center for Integrative and Development Studies (1992).13 Jose M. Crisol, The Armed Forces and Martial Law. Makati: Agro Publishing Inc (1980).14 Felipe B. Miranda, “The Military.” In R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo, Eds. The Philippines After Marcos. London: Croom Helm, (1985).15 Hernandez 1979.
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democracy under StreSS
what Huntington called ‘subjective civilian control’ of presidential prerogatives
frequently transgressed the formal chain of command by the retention of
generals loyal to him beyond the retirement age, and favoring his own choices
over the more qualified.16 This inevitably had increasing implications for the
professionalism of the military. Thus, it was no surprise that there would be
discontent among the junior officers. In time, they would hatch a plot to oust
Marcos using the context of mass protests against the alleged stealing of the
election results by the Marcos government following the snap presidential
elections of February 1986. Led by then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile
and inspired by the perceived professionalism of then Vice Chief of Staff General
Fidel V. Ramos, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM)17 broke away
from the AFP chain of command and joined the rest of the anti-Marcos groups
already protesting against the dictatorship, particularly since the assassination of
his principal political rival, Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. in August 1983.
The ‘restoration of democracy’ after the 1986 People Power Revolt had
tremendous implications for the country’s security forces. Given its critical role
in maintaining the dictatorship and in the transition, it was necessary that
democratic civilian control be instituted and the military’s role clarified.
The adoption of the 1987 Constitution reasserted and installed the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military and provided oversight
institutions over the AFP, such as legislative power over the budget and
confirmation of military appointments and promotions, as well as the participation
of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights in military appointments and
promotions. The institutional and functional separation of the national police
16 Ibid; see Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil Military Relations, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957. 17 Originally, this was known as the ‘We Belong’ movement.
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from the military was also effected.18 The Philippine National Police (PNP) - after a
period of transition - was to assume from the AFP the primary role of preserving
internal security including the suppression of insurgency, leaving to the AFP the
primary role of ensuring external security. However, due to the serious nature
of the communist insurgency and the Moro separatist movement, as well as
the PNP’s limited resources, the AFP remained in charge of fighting these two
armed groups19. This situation warranted the continuing frontline function of
the military in counterinsurgency operations.20
Democratic transitions, however, could be both volati le and
‘accommodationist’, especially when it involves a coalition of diverse political
forces. The varying interests of a very mixed group of actors had to be
accommodated by the state, even if such a policy was potentially untenable.
In this context, the military became an influential stakeholder in the Aquino
administration, particularly its key leaders. Hernandez, for example, noted
the accession of the government to demands for: (1) increases in pay; (2) the
removal of cabinet officials perceived as left-leaning or hostile to the military;(3)
holding back on the prosecution of military officers and personnel accused of
human rights violations; and (4) the suppression of internal conflicts through a
military-preferred approach.”21
However, as the experiences of democratic transformation facilitated
by a military coup showed, the Philippines also became vulnerable to military
adventurism. The Aquino administration was challenged by seven coup attempts 18 This separation required the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), which was formerly the AFP’s fourth major service. Only three have remained: the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force, and the Philippine Navy. 19 Republic Act 8551 or the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998” restored the AFP’s primary role in counterinsurgency.20 Arcala 2002a; Carolina G. Hernandez and Maria Cecilia T. Ubarra. “Restoring and Strengthening Civilian Control: Best Practices in Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines.” Quezon City: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc (1999).21 Hernandez 1997: 46-47.
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democracy under StreSS
from politicized and disgruntled junior officers. Some of these had been the
leaders of the coup plot that, coupled with the Marcos government’s attempt to
steal the results of the 1986 snap election, led to the first People Power Revolt.
Several factors contributed to the failure of these coup attempts to capture state
power. Among them was the lack of popular support, the senior command
remaining loyal to the civilian government, and the latent US support to the
regime.22 The last coup attempt of the 1980s which occurred in December 1989
was the most serious that pushed the government to form a fact-finding body to
inquire into its causes and make recommendations to prevent a reoccurrence.
The investigative body, popularly known as the Davide Commission after
the name of its chairman, conducted an intensive probe not only on the issues
that surrounded the December 1989 coup attempt, but also systematically studied
the military as a political institution in the Philippines. The final report of the
Commission contained findings and recommendations crucial to reforming the
military and institutionalizing democratic civilian control. It also revealed the
lingering problems internal to the armed forces including inadequate pay and
benefits, lack of logistical support and services to soldiers in the field, favoritism
in promotions, and prevalent corruption in the military and the government. In
the end, the probe not only emphasized the importance of military reform, but
also stressed the need for the civilian government to get its act together, fulfill
the promises of democratization and popular empowerment, and to work for
genuine national development.23
Several more reforms were instituted in light of the coup attempts against
the civilian government. Established in 1990, the Office of Ethical Standards
and Public Accountability (OESPA) was given exclusive jurisdiction over active 22 The Final Report 1990: 495.23 Ibid.
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AFP personnel involved in major graft and corruption cases. Moreover, a Code
of Ethics for the AFP was adopted and serves as the guideline of behavior for
all uniformed personnel.24 This provided clearer institutional guidelines on the
lines of accountability relating to civil-military relations. In the end, however,
the issues regarding the code’s effectiveness involved less the unwillingness of
the military to be subjected to civilian authority as it was the inability of civilian
authorities to credibly and effectively exercise that authority.
One consequence of perceptions of weakness in the civilian bureaucracy
and institutions is the prevalence of the appointment of retired military officers
to the country’s strategic executive offices and civilian bureaucracy, as well as
retired officer’s election to the legislature and to local government positions. An
investigative study by Glenda Gloria concluded that retired officer’s appointment
to strategic positions such as the country’s defense and foreign affairs
departments could be attributed to two factors: the soldier’s socialization and
the nature of the regime. Military role expansion into community development
and counterinsurgency enabled soldiers to assume civilian functions with duties
that trained them for eventual appointment to the bureaucracy, an indication
of the failure on the part of country’s civilian political institutions to discharge
their development tasks in conflict and post-conflict areas. Moreover, Gloria
also argued that the regimes which followed the 1986 People Power Revolt also
accepted, and/or possibly “encouraged, the influence and participation of the
military in running the country’s state affairs.”25
Reform Efforts and Initiatives
24 Hernandez and Ubarra 1999.25 Glenda Gloria, We Were Soldiers: Military Men in Politics and the Bureaucracy. Makati City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003: 33.
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The process of reforming the Philippine armed forces initiated by
President Corazon Aquino was continued by subsequent administrations. The
reforms undertaken by the Ramos administration, however, were situated within
a general government policy of supporting unification and reconciliation with all
adversarial groups – whether they be communist insurgents, Moro secessionists,
and even military rebels that staged the various coup attempts against the Aquino
government. Ramos succeeded in forging a peace agreement with the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 and in putting a temporary halt to
military adventurism by granting unconditional amnesty to the rebel military.
Ramos experience as a former military officer may have given him an advantage
in knowing how to deal with a restive military. However, it was less a factor
in addressing the problem of military adventurism than the amnesty program
his administration instituted and the general perception within the military that
(unlike Aquino) he would not be coddling left-wing politicians in the government.
Many of the soldiers who rebelled during the Aquino administration returned
to the AFP and redeemed themselves with loyal and distinguished service to
the state under Ramos. While this ended the coup attempts during his watch,
thereby creating an environment conducive to economic growth, there are those
that continue to express the belief that the extension of unconditional amnesty to
rebel soldiers could have undermined military discipline and stymied democratic
civil-military relations.26
This problem with the Ramos amnesty policy emerged when a group of
junior military officers27 conducted a mutiny in July 2003 against President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The failed coup was known as the Oakwood Mutiny, named
after the hotel which the Magdalo group used to stage its attempt. This seeming 26 Hernandez 1997.27 This group was called Magdalo from its adoption of rites of recruitment used by the Katipunan in the Philippine Revolution of 1896.
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re-emergence of restiveness within the military showed that elements within the
military continued to harbor dissatisfaction with civilian institutions and were
willing to use force to impose an alternative political rule. A more dangerous
development, however, is the emergence of a military which has become more
aware and confident about its ability to influence political affairs.
Arroyo was installed through a non-violent revolt after the aborted
impeachment proceedings against her predecessor, Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Arguably, the role played by the military in this event produced far-reaching
consequences for civil-military relations in the Philippines. Indeed, it could be
argued that the withdrawal of allegiance of the AFP and PNP was the crucial
factor in Estrada’s ouster. The subsequent success of the Arroyo Administration
in surviving a number of overthrow attempts by opposition political forces also
owed much to the continued loyalty of the upper levels of the military leadership
(and the fact that the rest of the military largely remained loyal the chain of
command). To a great extent, the AFP emerged as a consequential veto power
in the political landscape of the Philippines.
After a careful investigation into the root causes and the issues
surrounding the Oakwood mutiny, the Feliciano Commission was formed to
report on the reasons behind its occurrence. It concluded that the causes
behind military restiveness included widespread corruption in the military and
government, the poor plight of soldiers in combat, and rampant favoritism and
politicization of the military.28 However, the mutiny also highlighted the failure
of the previous administrations to institutionalize democratic civilian control
and implement the recommendations of the Davide Commission, particularly the
enforcement of the law against previous offenders. The Feliciano Commission 28 The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines dated July 30, 2003, 17 October 2003.
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democracy under StreSS
recommendations sought to address the legitimate grievances of the soldiers,
to improve their welfare, to professionalize the military, and to avert future
military adventurism. Unfortunately, the implementation and enforcement of
these recommendations remain uneven at best.
In a recent paper, Hernandez (2004a) argued that not only did the mutiny
set back the process of democratizing civil-military relations in the Philippines,
but it also showed that civil-military relations remained essentially the same
as that existing prior to 1986. This was characterized by an enlarged military
role - including responsibility against domestic armed threats to the government
and national development functions, questions of the incumbent’s political
legitimacy, weak civilian oversight institutions, poor socioeconomic conditions,
and the US factor.29
Among the steps that the Arroyo administration undertook soon after
the mutiny were the improvement of remuneration packages for officers and
enlisted personnel of the AFP, and the appointment of credible and reform-
oriented personnel to strategic positions within the country’s defense and
security establishments. Examples are the appointment of an undersecretary
for Internal Control at the Department of National Defense (DND) in order
to ensure transparency and good governance generally in the defense’s and
military’s financial and procurement systems, creation of a special adviser to
personally monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Feliciano
Commission, and addition of a civilian secretary of the DND.30
29 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: Civil-Military Relations in Philippine Democratic Governance.” Paper presented at the International Symposium on Asia’s New Democracies: Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea Compared co-organized by the Asian Foundation in Taiwan (AFIT) and Center for Asia Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) of Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 2004a.30 Since 1986, the country has had only three civilian (not retired AFP/PC/PNP officer) Secretaries of National Defense (or SND), namely Orlando Mercado, Avelino Cruz, Jr., and Gilbert Teodoro. See Carolina G. Hernandez Carolina G. Hernandez, “Security Sector Governance and Practices in Asia.” Journal of Security Sector Management 3,1 (2005): 3-4.
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In the coming years, the military reform agenda needs to encompass
more areas including the formulation of a more viable and efficient retirement
and separation benefits system for soldiers. Other issues require legislative
action, such as amending the country’s defunct National Defense Act, setting
the tenure for top military officers, and providing for a separate retirement
scheme for the AFP.
The Continuing Dominance of a Military Approach to Armed
Conflict
If democratizing civil-military relations is one crucial component of reform
of the armed forces, addressing the country’s peace problem is another significant
issue. The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) recognized the
impact of both the occurrence and persistence of armed conflict in countries that
registered low in human development. While poverty remains a major social
problem in the Philippines, the general feeling of deprivation breeds discontent
with the existing status quo. More often than not, groups excluded from the
benefits of development resort to violent means to dramatize their grievances
and/or achieve their goals. It is therefore not surprising that the PHDR reported
that the state of ‘unpeace’ is most evident in the poorest areas of the country.
Conflict has largely been shown to undermine human development. The PHDR
established that conflict is a costly state of affairs – affecting lives, property,
cultural identity, social cohesion, and human dignity. Its spillover effects, whether
economic (foregone investment and lost output), political (loss of political stability
and legitimacy) or social (prevalence of prejudice, socio-cultural tension, and
crime) are serious and pervasive.31
31 The 2005 PHDR has underscored SSR as one of the key reforms that should be undertaken in the current peace efforts in the country. This entails orienting the military and the police to recognize the peace policy of the government. SSR includes strengthening civilian control, professionalization, insulation from partisan politics, and curbing corruption. Also noteworthy is the Report’s stress that SSR contains measures that will improve
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To date, the AFP remains the primary institution safeguarding the
country against armed conflict. As the only country in Southeast Asia with
a resilient communist insurgency paired with a Muslim secessionist movement,
the government remains highly dependent on an overly military approach in
addressing each.32 A more holistic perspective in addressing domestic armed
conflict has yet to be fully developed and implemented by both the military and
civilian sectors of government. The balance between the right hand (primarily
the use of military force) and the left hand (socioeconomic/political measures
to address root causes and win the hearts and minds of the people) has tended
to tilt in favor of one side, depending on the overall political, economic, and
social environmental context, the strategic situation on the ground, and on the
personality and policy preferences of political leaders.33
In her assessment of the performance of the military approach to
achieving peace in the Philippines, Hernandez (2005) argued that not only did
the counterinsurgency or the military role in domestic conflict strengthen the
position of the military vis-à-vis the civilian government in handling the task of
conflict resolution, it also fanned the flames that ignited the twin insurgencies.
The vulnerable position of civilian authority during the Aquino transition
regime also eroded as the military was given much leeway in counterinsurgency
operations.34 In comparison, the Ramos administration was more sensitive to
the issues of uneven development and economic discontent as root causes of
the rule of law, human rights, and cultural sensitivity among the core security actors See Human Development Network (HDN). Philippine Human Development Report: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines. Manila: HDN, 2005: 50).32 Francisco Nemenzo, “Comments on Government Responses to Armed Communism and Secessionist Rebellion in the Philippines.” In Steven R. Dorr and Deborah J. Mitchell, Eds. Governments and Rebellion in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.33 Hernandez (2005): 1-8.34 Rosalie B. Arcala, “Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy over the Military in the Face of Insurgent Threat: A Comparison of the Peruvian and Philippine Experiences During Democratic Consolidation.” Danyag 7(1): 3-28, 2002b.
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the resilience of the insurgent movements and sought to emphasize policies
that addressed these issues rather than to rely on a purely military approach
to the conflicts. It pursued a combination of military action and socioeconomic
programs. This policy was unfortunately discontinued under the short-lived
Estrada administration which saw the rise in the strength both of the communist
insurgency and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Failing to reach a
negotiated settlement, Estrada opted for an all-out war against the MILF, taking
its main stronghold, Camp Abubakar, in Mindanao in 2000.
The current Arroyo administration is pursuing combined right and left
hand approaches in dealing with armed conflict. Successful cases of peace at
the local level being established (the island of Bohol has been a case in point)
indicate that good governance has been more effective in reducing the likelihood
of the reoccurrence of conflict than continued use of a military approach. This
strategy, however, requires greater involvement of local government institutions
rather than the national government. In this context, the unevenness of capacity
in different local government units becomes a factor in the sustainability of peace
in any area. At the same time, peace talks involving the national government
have been selective in nature. The government was on the verge of a peace
agreement with the MILF while negotiations have been stalled with the National
Democratic Front (NDF) since the Estrada administration. The salience of global
terrorism and its suspected links with these non-state armed groups have also
complicated the peace processes.
The issue of human rights and extrajudicial killings
Human rights have been a central concern of civil-military relations in
the Philippines. The military’s demands for the removal of key cabinet officials
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democracy under StreSS
in the Aquino administration, those deemed to be “leftists”, had human rights as
one of the key related issues. These “leftists” were officials who from the Marcos
administration onwards had been critical of the human rights record of the AFP,
especially in the context of its counter-insurgency efforts against the CPP-NPA.
The issue continued to be a sticking point in relations between the military and
the civilian political leadership which had to answer to criticisms from civil
society. It remains a major point of concern under the Arroyo Administration.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo established an Independent
Commission to look into the increasingly embarrassing stories of unaddressed
killings of media personnel and anti-government activists. On 22 January, 2007,
that Commission’s report was finally made public.35 This Melo Report stated that
since 2001, there had been a noticeable increase in the number of activists who
had been killed, usually not in firefights. In the report, the Commission, led by
former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo, noted the disparity
in the numbers involved claimed by different groups. The human rights group
Karapatan claimed that at least 724 activists had been killed since President
Arroyo came to power. Amnesty International, meanwhile, officially listed 244
victims. Task Force Usig of the Philippine National Police, which was responsible
for the investigation of these killings, reported that there were 111 cases in
all. Whatever the number, the Commission’s report correctly stressed that the
number was worrisome. More importantly, this number had become a mortifying
issue for the Arroyo Administration within the international community. U.S.
Ambassador to the Philippines Kristine Kenney and representatives from the
European Union voiced the concerns of their governments and criticized the
Philippine government over the increasing number of extrajudicial killings of
35 Report of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings. (Created under Administrative Order No. 157), Melo Report. Jose A. R. Melo, Chair. (submitted January 22, 2007).
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purported leftist activists in the Philippines. The UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
Killings, Philip Alston, undertook a 10-day fact-finding mission at the end of
which he noted that he was convinced that a quite high number of killings
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and/or its agents even as
he absolved the Arroyo Administration of blame.36
The involvement of the military in these killings was generally indirect,
and the Melo Commission Report castigates it more for its lack of aggressiveness
in pursuing investigations of reports that pointed to the involvement of individuals
or groups that may be associated with the AFP. The Commission’s report did
not in the end identify those who were directly responsible for the killings.
Generally, however, the Commission reported that killings were done in broad
daylight against non-combatants (albeit known members of legal organizations
associated with the Left) assassinated usually by motorcycle-riding hooded
killers. What is perhaps telling are the statements emanating from senior mili-
tary officials which seem to accept, if not condone, vigilantism as a “necessary”
part of violent conflict.37 Despite the claim made by senior military officials
interviewed by Commission that the AFP does not consider assassinations to be
an acceptable part of warfare, the facts that these assassinations were likely to
have been committed by individuals or groups associated with AFP units and
that there had been little action taken against the individuals responsible, at
the very least pointed to these activities being accepted or even condoned by
military authorities. The Melo Commission, however, very clearly noted that
36 Philippine Inquirer, “Alston Report: AFP Behind Killings.” October 28, 2007, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquir-erheadlines/nation/view/20071128-103513/Alston_report%3A_AFP_behind_killings. 37 During the interviews conducted by the Melo Commission, Major General Jovito Palparan (now retired) confirmed a number of statements he had made about collateral damage, civilians killed or wounded in crossfires, and vigilante action against communists. While he repeatedly said he did not condone anyone in the military acting in this way, the report indicated that he had a cavalierly attitude towards the cases of political activists being killed by unknown gunmen in his area of jurisdiction and that he had offered “encouragement and ‘inspiration’ to those who may have been responsible for the killings.” See the Melo Commission Report 2007.
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democracy under StreSS
accusations made concerning killings involving political activists directly point
to the culpability of the military or at least forces under the command of the
military, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU).38 The Commission’s report also noted various cases of the deaths of
journalists and broadcasters in different parts of the country. According to the
PNP there have been 26 media persons killed since 2001. While the investigations
into the killings of political activists have thus far yielded very few results in
terms of arrests and cases filed (despite well-known public pronouncements by
Karapatan that the military is to be blamed), the cases involving the killings of
media personnel have in fact been for the most part resolved.39
While legal institutions have yet to establish the clear involvement of
military personnel in these acts, there have been reports of statements made
by military officers which are telling. There is a certain attitude within the
military officer corps (and undoubtedly within the rank and file as well) that
these kinds of operations are both militarily and politically necessary if the war
against the communist insurgency is to be won.40 Human rights abuses, particu-
larly the killing of persons from the opposition, have become a natural part of
the political environment because of the lack of action on the part of the state
to bring those responsible to justice. But, this is precisely the result of a situa-
tion wherein the state is unwilling to act against those that support it because
it needs that support to survive. The unwillingness or inability of the state to
act against those that support it but which at the same time commit human
rights abuses and violations makes it easy for those who have the resources
to create private armies. Indeed, there is an evident lack of incentive to follow 38 Ibid.39 Then PNP Deputy Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. reported that 21 cases have been filed of the 26 reported cases involving the killing of media personalities. The remaining five are undergoing investigation. (The Melo Commission Report 2007).40 Gloria 2003.
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the law. As an institution, the AFP is probably very frustrated over the political
conditions that make the war against the NPA and the Muslim secessionists
unwinnable militarily. These include the non-provision of needed resources to
conduct a successful counter-insurgency war.
Conclusion
As noted from the start, civil-military relations in the Philippines retains
elements shared with other states in the region. The major difference lies in
the fact that the Philippine government faces twin armed conflicts, the resilient
nationwide communist insurgency and the multiple secessionist movements
in Mindanao. These have provided the foundations for an increased military
involvement in government. Combined with what has traditionally been weak
civilian political institutions, it gives the military significant influence over
domestic political decisions.
In more recent contexts, this influence has increasingly taken the form
of the military being an important veto actor in the competition among the
country’s political elites. Yet, this veto actor role only makes sense in the context
of a political system where the military does not really seek to capture political
power for itself (despite all the instances of attempted coups), and instead
institutionally (through the upper ranks of the military leadership) aligns itself
with certain political factions. The question is whether a seriously reform minded
and popular President would be able to swing the balance clearly in favor of
civilian authority, thereby keeping the military’s political influence limited to the
role which the constitution mandates. The nature of Philippine politics, with its
weak institutions and extensive (sometimes violent) competition between the
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country’s political elites, makes this unlikely. In this context, it seems that the
military will continue to have a strong influence in Philippine politics for some
time to come.
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After Marcos. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
Nemenzo, Francisco. “Comments on Government Responses to Armed
Communism and Secessionist Rebellion in the Philippines.” In Steven
R. Dorr and Deborah J. Mitchell, Eds. Governments and Rebellion in
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.
Philippine Inquirer. “Alston Report: AFP Behind Killings.” October 28, 2007,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20071128-
103513/Alston_report%3A_AFP_behind_killings.
Pobre, Cesar P. History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People. Quezon City:
New Day Publishers, 2000.
Report of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings
(Created under Administrative Order No. 157), Melo Report. Jose A. R.
Melo, Chair, submitted January 22, 2007.
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The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines dated July 30,
2003, 17 October 2003.
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SIXCivi l-Mi l i tary Relat ions in Post-
Authoritarian IndonesiaRizal Sukma
Introduction
The restructuring of civil-military relations in Indonesia has been a major
agenda of political reform since the collapse of the military-backed New Order
regime led by General (ret.) Suharto in May 1998. After more than four decades
of authoritarian rule, Indonesia was once again presented with an opportunity to
return to democracy and reinstate democratic civilian rule.1 More importantly, the
collapse of authoritarian rule marked the beginning of an end to the military’s
dominant role in the country’s domestic politics. For the first time since 1957,
the primacy and legitimacy of Indonesia’s military (TNI)2 as both a political and
defensive force –justified and legalised by dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine--
was seriously contested and challenged. Indeed, with the downfall of President
Suharto, the TNI soon found itself under heavy criticism and pressure that it
should withdraw from politics sooner rather than later.
Responding to such pressures, the TNI had no choice but to declare its
intention to undertake a reformasi internal (internal reform) and adjust its role
1 Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy from 1950-1957. The first opportunity to reinstate democracy came in 1966 with the collapse of Sukarno’s regime. However, the military-backed New Order regime that replaced Sukarno quickly consolidated its power and, instead of restoring democratic rule, reinstated and indeed refined the authoritarian mode of governance.2 Indonesia’s military changed its name from Indonesia’s Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indone-sia, ABRI) to Indonesia’s Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in April 1999.
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in accordance with public demands. In October 1998, four months after the
collapse of the New Order regime, the military issued a reform plan called “new
paradigm” (Paradigma Baru) detailing how it might reform itself. It was declared
that the military would redefine (redefinisi), reposition (reposisi) and reactualise
(reaktualisasi) itself within a new democratic Indonesia. More importantly, the
military also accepted the decision by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)
to reduce, and later relinquish, seats reserved for the military in the House of
Representatives (DPR). It also declared that the military would no longer play a
political role and instead would concentrate only on its defense function. When
these measures were introduced and implemented, it became clear that the
military --once the most powerful supporter of authoritarianism under the New
Order regime-- finally had begun to succumb to pressures from democratic forces
to withdraw from the political arena. Consequently, the nature of civil-military
relations in Indonesia began to change in a significant way.
Indeed, after more than a decade of military reform, it is generally
believed that the chance and possibility for Indonesia’s military to once again
re-establish its political role has become increasingly slim. The reform process
has proceeded in such a way that it has become most unlikely for the military to
overturn the democratic civilian rule and re-establish its dominance in politics.
While the militaries in two other Southeast Asian democracies --the Philippines
and Thailand-- continue to exercise significant political role and influence, the
Indonesian military, despite its previous role as the most dominant force in the
country’s domestic politics since 1966, is no longer involved in politik praktis
(practical or day-to-day politics).
However, a closer look at Indonesia’s military reform over the last decade
would suggest that the process is far from complete. While the military has
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largely withdrawn from politics, the extent to which Indonesia has been able to
establish civilian control over the military remains problematic. Despite a decade
of military reform, the military continues to exercise a degree of autonomy vis-
à-vis the civilian government. Indeed, while the first stage of reforms (military
withdrawal from politics) has been fully or partially implemented, the progression
toward the second stage (establishing objective civilian control of the military
and defense reform proper) remains fraught with difficulties and challenges. This
study explains why the first stage of reform has been a success and examines
the problems and challenges in moving military reform to the second stage.
Military and Politics
Before Reformasi3
The military’s involvement in Indonesia’s domestic politics did not begin
with the inception of Suharto’s New Order in 1966. It had started during the
revolutionary war against the Dutch in 1945-1949, which led to the claim
that the military was not only identified with the birth of Indonesia, but it
also participated in creating the Republic. In that context, its central role in
defending the country and managing state affairs is seen not only as a sacred
duty but also as a manifestation of historical entitlement. In other words, the
Indonesian military has from the outset viewed its role in the new Republic as
“the shareholders” rather than “the executive agents.”4
3 The discussion in this section is primarily taken from Rizal Sukma, “Military and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Thang D. Nguyen and Frank-Jurgen Richter, eds., Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity and Stability in Fragile Times (Singapore: Times Media, 2003).4 Guy Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John Johnston, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 207.
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The military sense of political entitlement grew stronger when the
parliamentary democracy system, opted for by the founders of the Republic since
1950, failed to create stable civilian governments. The fluidity of the civilian
political structure, manifested in successive coalition governments, always led to
a constant struggle between government and opposition in parliament. As such,
the military, especially the army, soon found itself enmeshed within the political
struggle between government and opposition in parliament as each group
sought allies. Therefore, it is not surprising that many army leaders regarded
civilian attempts to politicize internal army divisions as an act of interference
in its internal affairs. As resentment against civilian governments intensified,
the army found it difficult to isolate itself from politics. The first major political
crisis took place on 17 October 1952 when a group of army officers organised
a large civilian demonstration in Jakarta and demanded that President Sukarno
dissolve the parliament.5 Military leaders contended that they did this due to the
incompetence of civilian governments in governing the country.
But instead, Sukarno dismissed the army chief of staff Colonel Abdul Haris
Nasution. The Army, however, managed to consolidate and settle its internal
differences leading to the reappointment of Nasution in October 1955 as army
chief of staff. Its role and position within the society, and especially vis-à-vis the
government, strengthened significantly when the army succeeded in crushing
a number of regional rebellions, especially in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Indeed, it
was after this success that the army began to expand its non-military role into
political, administrative, and economic functions.
The second opportunity for the military to assert its political significance
further came in the mid-1950s when President Sukarno himself began to cast 5 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 29-30.
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doubts over the parliamentary system and political parties. As his disenchantment
with multi-party system increased, Sukarno spoke of the need to “bury” political
parties—a viewpoint shared by the military leadership, especially General
Nasution. Following the collapse of the parliamentary system in 1957, Nasution
provided a legal basis for the army’s continued political role by formulating a
doctrine called jalan tengah (the middle way) which later became known as dwi
fungsi. According to Nasution, Indonesia’s military was neither a government tool
nor a force that monopolised state power. Rather, it was an unalienable part of
the people, equal to other social forces, obliged to give content to independence
and entitled to participate actively in the national development process.
Therefore, when President Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly
and reinstalled the presidential system in 1959, the move was enthusiastically
endorsed by the military, paving the way for the introduction of Guided
Democracy. The military leadership, especially General Nasution, clearly saw
in Guided Democracy an opportunity for the army to put his jalan tengah into
practice. Within this system, the army immediately served as one of the central
players together with President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). Indeed, it has been noted that “the implementation of Guided Democracy
represented a convergence of interests between President Sukarno and the
leadership of ABRI (Indonesia’s Armed Forces).”6
The army’s growing political role during the period of Guided Democracy,
however, was not without challenge. In a balance of power game played skilfully
by President Sukarno, ABRI found itself under heavy and constant pressure from
the PKI. Aware of ABRI’s political significance, President Sukarno often used the
6 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, “ Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Case of ABRI’s Dual Functions,” in David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe (Boulder, Col.,: Westview Press, 1998), p. 49.
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PKI to limit ABRI’s space for manoeuvring, a role embraced enthusiastically by
the PKI with the object of undermining ABRI’s chance to monopolise power after
Sukarno’s departure from power. The balance, however, tipped towards ABRI
following bizarre events on September-October 1965, providing an opportunity
for the military to crush the PKI. In a still-baffling series of events on the morning
of 1 October, the PKI soon found itself in a critical position when a group of
army dissidents, with participation of communist youth elements, attempted to
stage a coup and killed six top army leaders in the process.
The Army, under the leadership of Commander of Army Strategic Reserve
(KOSTRAD) Major-General Suharto, managed to put down the coup attempt
and quickly blamed it on the PKI leadership. An outburst of anti-communist
fury then erupted, resulting in unprecedented massacres against people even
suspected of membership in the PKI. With active involvement of significant seg-
ments of society in the pogrom, the PKI –once the third largest communist party
in the world-- was destroyed and annihilated in a few weeks. After eliminat-
ing the PKI, the military –in a coalition with civilian political forces— removed
President Sukarno from power in 1966. The road towards unchallenged political
ascendancy for the military soon opened wide with the initiation of General
Suharto’s New Order government.
Under the New Order, the military immediately moved to consolidate
its newly-acquired power by strengthening its legitimacy as a power-holder
through the reaffirmation of dwi fungsi doctrine, reducing the role and influence
of political parties, creating its own civilian political electoral vehicle through
which military aspirations could be legitimately channelled (Golkar), expanding
its presence in government and administration at national and regional levels,
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and de-politicising the society.1 What emerged as a result was a unique feature of
the New Order political system characterised by a blend of military and civilian
rule, in which the former had an overriding say in almost all state affairs.
Political participation from civilian politicians was permitted as long as they
were supportive of the regime’s position and policies. As one leading architect
of the New Order, General Maraden Pangabean, remarked: “as a political force,
at the present time ABRI is leading and commanding.”2
ABRI’s motivation in dominating state power was obviously not confined
to political interests only. As its control over state power was now virtually un-
challenged, ABRI soon expanded its corporate interests in business.3 Under the
New Order, ABRI’s involvement in business expanded rapidly through a vast
number of companies, many under the disguise of yayasan (foundations). Each
service has its own yayasan, such as Kartika Eka Paksi for the Army, Yayasan
Sosial Bhumyamca for the Navy, and Yayasan Angkatan Udara Adi Upaya for
the Air Force.4
ABRI’s primacy in politics and economic interests was sustained through
a combination of rational economic development on the one hand, and skilful
and ruthless way of exercising power to assure an ordered society on the
other. Within such a system, President Suharto and his military-backed New
1 For further discussion on the military’s strategy in dominating political power in Indonesia, see Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999), especially Chapter 4.2 Remark at the Second Army Seminar held in Bandung, 25-31 August 1966, quoted in Hidayat Mukmin, TNI Dalam Politik Luar Negeri: Studi Kasus Penyelesaian Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991), pp. 74-75.3 In the early 1950s, faced with a paltry defense budget, regional military commanders were forced to find non-budgetary sources to finance their troops and operational costs, often with the help of Indonesian businessmen of Chinese descent. Suharto himself was known to have been involved in such practices during his tenure as a regional military commander in Central Java back in 1950s. See Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” Indonesia, No. 11 (April 1971).4 For a brief but useful discussion on ABRI’s involvement in business, see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Chapter 5. For a more comprehensive discussion on this issue, see Indria Samego, et. al., Bila ABRI Berbisnis [When ABRI is Involved in Business] (Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).
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Order government employed a calculated display of rewards and punishments
as a way to ensure acquiescence and loyalty and deter defiance and challenge.
What emerged out of this combination was a strong authoritarian state with an
impressive record of economic growth that lasted for more than three decades
until the outbreak of the world economic crisis in mid-1997. Opposition was
regarded as unconstitutional, and any challenge to the New Order government
was dealt with harshly. In other words, the military ensured that the cost of
defiance would exceed the benefits of loyalty.
However, ABRI’s position as the most powerful institution changed as
the influence and personal power of President Suharto grew stronger and the
generational gap between him and successive military leaderships widened.
During the first two decades of the New Order, it was difficult to draw a clear
distinction between Suharto and ABRI. Suharto’s clout derived mainly from
ABRI’s support, and he was a primus inter pares within the core of ABRI
leadership. However, since the early 1980s, Suharto’s position had gradually
become more powerful and, by the mid-1980s, “President Suharto was then
very clearly the pre-eminent figure on the stage, having edged aside all possible
challengers to his authority, from within the Armed Forces or elsewhere.”5
At the same time, the decline of ABRI’s influence and power vis-à-
vis Suharto was becoming more evident. Suharto managed to ensure that
credit for successfully improving the national economy went largely to himself
instead of to ABRI as an institution. After being the backbone of the New Order
government for more than 20 years, ABRI was faced with the fact that Suharto
had himself become the supreme political force in Indonesia. Meanwhile other
forces, including ABRI, only constituted major players in a game where no 5 Jamie Mackie, “Indonesian Political Developments, 1987-1988,” in Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, eds., Indonesia Assessment 1988 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989), p. 18.
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one but Suharto exercised complete control over the rules. ABRI’s influence
in determining the shape of state policies was seriously constrained by that of
Suharto himself.6 In that context, ABRI leaders realised that its political role and
influence was extremely dependent upon Suharto. Therefore, since the end of
the 1980s ABRI was obliged to play a role as “the guardian of the palace” with
the object of ensuring the survival of New Order regime and keeping President
Suharto in power. Such a role brought ABRI into a direct collision course with
society when Suharto was finally forced to step down by student-led reform
movement (gerakan reformasi) in May 1998.7
The First Stage of Reform:
Successes amid Difficulties
It has been previously mentioned that the main demand by pro-democracy
forces in Indonesia was military withdrawal from politics. This ultimatum was
primarily manifested in the pressures on the military to relinquish its dual
function doctrine that justified the military’s role and dominance in politics.
Pressure against the military had been motivated primarily by the excesses of
military power over three decades of Suharto’s rule during which the military
had played a role as the strongest supporter of the New Order’s authoritarian
system. As cases of military abuse of power and violations of human rights
were publicly exposed, society came to the conclusion that the military should 6 For further discussion on the changing relations between ABRI and Suharto, see Sukma, Indonesia and China, pp. 169-177.7 For a comprehensive discussion on the role and position of ABRI during the political crisis on May 1998, see Marcus Mietzner, “From Suharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam During the Transition,” in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 65-102. See also Jun Honna, “The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Power Struggle,” in Yuri Sato, ed., Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, March 2000).
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be subject to civilian control. Consequently, the military’s role in politics was
seen as an obstruction to democracy in Indonesia, and therefore, such a role
should be relinquished. However, at the beginning of the reformasi era, no one
outside the military seemed to know how to bring that about.
Indeed, under Suharto’s immediate successor, President BJ. Habibie, the
reform of the military was very much left to the ABRI leadership itself. Under
General Wiranto (both as Minister of Defense and ABRI Commander-in-Chief),
ABRI soon embarked upon a series of initiatives aimed at restoring its image
by introducing a number of measures:
(1) the separation of the police and the military;
(2) the liquidation of social-political posts within the military at national
and regional levels;
(3) the replacement of the Office of Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol)
with the Office of Territorial Affairs (Kaster);
(4) the liquidation of posts responsible for assigning active members of
the military to undertake civilian positions,8
(5) the requirement for military officers to choose between military or
civilian careers, either through early retirement or tours of duty,
(6) a reduction in the reserved number of military representatives within
the national and local parliaments,
(7) the termination of ABRI’s involvement in day-to-day politics,
(8) the severance of ABRI’s organisational ties with Golkar and the taking
of an equidistance position with all political parties,
(9) the exercise of neutrality in elections,
8 For a discussion on this function of the military, see Ian MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1996), Chapter 7.
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(10) change in the relationship between TNI (Indonesian Defense Force)
and the associations affiliated with the TNI,
(11) revision of the TNI doctrines according to the spirit of reform and
the role of TNI in the 21st century, and
(12) changing the name of ABRI to TNI.
Through these measures, the military wanted to display its commitment
to adjust its role in the post-authoritarian era. The effects of these measures,
however, have not been insignificant. Some of the promises for change had
indeed been fulfilled within the first two years of democratic transition. The
military, for the first time since 1966, had also accepted the appointment of a
civilian as Defense Minister and a non-Army officer as the Commander of TNI.
The military also agreed to move the deadline for the abolition of its reserved
seats in Parliament to an earlier date, from 2009 to 2004. The internal security
function has now been transferred to the Police, and the role of the military is
now confined to that of defense only. The legal basis for this important change
is Decree No. VII/2000 of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), which
stipulates that the (internal) security function (keamanan) is now assigned to the
Police, while the military is only responsible for defense (pertahanan).
It is important to note that while concrete initiatives for reform have come
from the military itself, a more comprehensive reform began with the process
of legislation. By 1999, the Ministry of Defense started the process of revising
defense and military-related laws in the country. This process was made possible
by the presence and active involvement of civil society and reform-minded
generals within a civilian-led Ministry of Defense. It is important to note that
the approach that put emphasis on the importance of legislation in the early
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stage of reform later proved to be an important element of Indonesia’s military
reform when the process began to slow down by 2004. Indeed, even though the
process seems to have stalled today, there are several regulations that would
make it extremely difficult for the military to return to politics.
Two pieces of legislation, Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense and Law No.
34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces, constitute the most important laws
in that regard. The role and functions of the military and the police are then
defined further in these two new acts. According to State Defense Act No.2/2002,
the TNI is “a defense instrument of the unitary Republic of Indonesia” (Article
10). The Act also stipulates that the military has four main functions: (a) to
uphold national sovereignty and maintain a state’s territorial integrity; (b) to
safeguard the safety of the people and the nation, (c) to undertake military
operations other than war; and (d) to participate actively in international and
regional peace-keeping missions. Meanwhile, the National Police Act No. 2/2002
establishes the Police as an instrument of the state responsible for guarding
public security and order and tasked to protect, guide, and serve the public as
well as uphold the law. Law No. 2/2002 also clearly stipulates that the Police
are a civilian force responsible for internal security matters.
The process of reforming the military, however, was not without
difficulties. Indeed, as democratization started, there was a degree of resistance
from elements of the military opposed to moving the reform process beyond what
the TNI has envisaged earlier in its own-initiated reform. The TNI remained
politically influential, especially in policy formulation of national security related
issues. To a lesser degree, the TNI has also been able to exercise its independence
vis-à-vis the president on matters considered military internal affairs such as
promotion within its ranks and the trial of military personnel accused of human
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rights violations. For example, the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve
(KOSTRAD), Lieutenant-General Djadja Suparman publicly warned in December
1999 that “the investigation against some generals will make soldiers angry and
act wantonly.”9 Such a warning was then widely seen as a threat by the military
to the then civilian President Abdurrahman Wahid.
The military has also resisted any attempt to relinquish the territorial
command system (koter). Those who argued for the dismantling of koter believed
that this system –in which the military organisational structures are designed to
follow the civilian administration down to the village level—has in the past served
as an instrument for the military to maintain complete control over Indonesia’s
politics. In September 2001, for example, Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil
maintained that the Koter system was to be gradually abolished.10 However, when
in January 2002 the military indicated that it wanted an expansion of Koter,
by establishing a new Regional Military Command (Kodam) in Aceh, Minister
Djalil was unable to overrule the plan. The military continues to argue that the
koter system is needed to maintain Indonesia’s territorial integrity, to enable the
military to defend the country from armed secessionist threats, and to assure
internal stability in the face of communal and religious violence if the Police
cannot perform their role in this area. However, it is important to note that
while the koter system remains in place until today, it has ceased to function
as the political vehicle for the military.
Indonesia’s military has also continued to be involved in business. Despite
growing public criticism, the armed forces initially insisted that its involvement
in business was both justified and needed. It argued that the budget provided
by the government had never been able to match the military’s overall defense 9 Media Indonesia, 15 December 1999.10 Koran Tempo, 25 September 2001.
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requirements. Commander of TNI General Endriartono Sutarto argued that “the
military is forced to get involved in business because the welfare of the soldiers
has not been met yet [by the budget].”11 A similar argument was also given by
the civilian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono when he stated that the business
activities of the TNI were a way to help improve a soldier’s welfare.12 However,
the continuation of the military’s involvement in business is now close to an end.
The Law No. 24/2004 clearly stipulates that the government should take over
all military business by October 2009. The government and the military have
no other choice but to terminate its involvement in business. Indeed, despite
various technical difficulties, the process of taking over the military businesses
by the government is almost completed, with most of the business units being
either closed down or sold to civilian companies.13
The problem of military justice constitutes another area where the military
has been able to resist comprehensive reform. Despite the decision by the MPR
in 1999 stipulating that any military personnel that commit ordinary crimes
should also be subject to civilian courts, the process of passing the new bill on
military justice has dragged on for more than four years. The military continues
to raise its objections to the bill arguing that it is not yet the appropriate time
to try any military personnel in a civilian court. It has proposed a joint military-
civilian court to deal with such cases. The Parliament, for its part, continues to
insist that a full civilian court must be implemented. At the time of this writing,
it is not yet clear how these different positions would be reconciled. One possible
11 Tempo Interaktif, 30-31 August 2002, http://www.tempointeraktif.com.12 The Jakarta Post, 14 June 2000.13 For a comprehensive discussion on military’s involvement in business, see Rizal Sukma and Clara Joewono, “The Imperative of Good Governance: The Military and Business in Indonesia,” study report for the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s project on “Governance and Asia’s Corporation in the Aftermath of the Crisis,” January 2006. On the problem of taking over military business in Indonesia, see Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution, 2007).
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scenario is through the introduction of a period of transition during which a
joint civilian-military court would be utilized before a full civilian court could
finally begin to function.
The Next Stage of Reform:
The Problem of Civilian Control and Defense Reform
Despite the introduction of swift reform measures that forced the military
out of politics, the process of reforming civil-military relations in Indonesia is
still far from complete. Within the Indonesian context, two problems stand out.
The first is the problem of civilian control of the military characterised by the
dilemma of civilian incompetence. The second is the problem of defense reform
proper, especially with regard to reforming the system of defense planning,
programming and budgeting (PPB), re-formulating defense strategy and policies,
developing defense capability, and reforming the organisational structures of the
military. These two problems constitute two main agendas for the next stage of
military reform in the country.
With regard to the first problem, the process of democratic consolidation
also requires the presence of a democratic and effective civilian control over
the military. This should go beyond the requirement to push the military out of
politics. Yet the agenda for reforming civil-military relations cannot be confined
to the imperative of preventing military intervention in politics. It should also
address the problem of how civilian political institutions can exercise an effective
oversight role and the responsibility in formulating defense-related policies.
Within the Indonesian context, there has been significant improvement in the
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role of the Parliament. Indeed, the Parliament has begun to play an increasingly
important role in determining the defense budget and military procurements.
In general, however, civilian political forces, especially political parties,
are still facing a number of constraints and limitations in playing a strategic
role in creating democratic civil-military relations, especially with regard to
strengthening civilian control over the military. Even though civilian political
forces are now free from military intervention and influence, and indeed are in a
better political position, they have not been able to maximise that new position.
Both governmental institutions and civilian political forces are still constrained
by formidable problems in exercising their authority over the military.
The first problem is the half-hearted attitude of the successive civilian
governments in power. The civilian power elites are still worried about the
influential position of the military in politics, and still perceive the TNI as a
formidable political force. Moreover, Indonesia’s highly competitive political
system, characterized by intense political struggle among major political
groups, preserves the space for the military to retain political significance and
influence. For example, many political parties and civilian leaders still seek the
support from the military in the competition among themselves. Civilian political
forces have been reluctant to initiate policy measures that might harm military
interests. In other words, fractured civilian elites complicate the reform process.
The willingness to compromise is still too great so that some drastic measures
which are needed to promote further reform are often delayed. Within this
context, the military has managed to preserve a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis
the civilian government.
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The second problem concerns the lack of defense expertise among the
civilian leadership. As most Indonesian civilian elites are only familiar with the
political role of the military, the focus of attention has been mostly on the issue
of the military and politics. Meanwhile, effective control of the military also
requires concrete measures on defense reform. Eradicating the political role
of the military constitutes only half of the required military reform. Changing
defense policies --especially regarding strategy, defense posture, doctrines, and
education –should also be seen as an essential part of military reform. In this
context, it is not easy to convince the military to subscribe to the principle of
civilian supremacy if they perceive that the civilian authorities have no adequate
knowledge of defense issues. Most civilian expertise on defense issues has come
from sources outside the government and political parties, namely from the
limited number of civilian academics. The fact that the Ministry of Defense is
still dominated by military officers only reinforces this problem.
The third problem, related to the second one, has been the inability of ci-
vilian governments to provide a clear and comprehensive framework for defense
reform. For example, the government has not been able to change Indonesia’s
defense strategy and policy to suit new circumstances and challenges. The na-
tional defense strategy is still based on the Army’s experience during the 1945-
1948 revolutionary war against the Dutch. Similarly, despite demands by pro-
democracy forces on the need for changing the koter system, the government has
no plan to undertake a major overhaul of the system. The procurement system,
in which the military still decides to purchase the equipment it wants, remains
largely intact despite the attempt by the Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono
in 2005 to bring the authority on this issue under the control of the Ministry of
Defense.14 The major defense review undertaken in 2002-2003 has produced no 14 Marcus Mientzner, The Politics of Military reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies 23 (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2006), p. 53.
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immediate effect on how Indonesia’s defense policies and capability might be
restructured in the future. In short, the mindset thinking of the military, rather
than that of civilian politicians and government officials, continues to influence
Indonesia’s defense strategy and policies.
Conclusion
After more than a decade since democratization began in 1998, Indonesia
has achieved a degree of progress in restructuring its civil-military relations
through a number of reforms. The military’s role in politics has been curtailed,
and it has now been confined only to that of defense. Military officers, for
example, are now banned from running for public office and occupying civilian
positions within the ministry, except within few state institutions as regulated
by law. The internal security function, which had been the core function of the
military, has now been transferred to the Police, which was separated from
the military in April 2001. Other measures, such as the take-over of military
businesses, have also proceeded, even though the process is yet to be fully
complete. More importantly, the Parliament has also begun to exercise oversight
functions over the military. In other words, a decade of military refom in
Indonesia has led to a military withdrawal from politics.
However, the process of reforming civil-military relations in Indonesia is
still an ongoing process. The military continues to resist reform in the military
justice sector and the culture of impunity remains evident. The problem of
civilian control of the military is still marred by civilian incompetence and lack
of expertise. The problem of defense reform proper, especially with regard to
reforming the system of defense planning, programming and budgeting (PPB),
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re-formulating defense strategy and policies, developing defense capabilities, and
reforming the organisational structures of the military is still far from complete.
In other words, while the reform has brought about significant progress, much
still needs to be done to completely bring the Indonesian military under civilian
control.
Works Cited
Crouch, Harold. The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1988).
Honna, Jun. “The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Power Struggle.”
in Yuri Sato, ed., Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid
Government and Its Challenge (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies,
March 2000).
The Jakarta Post. 14 June 2000.
Koran Tempo. 25 September 2001.
MacFarling, Ian. The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military
Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1996).
Mackie, James. “Indonesian Political Developments, 1987-1988.” in Hal Hill and
Jamie Mackie, eds., Indonesia Assessment 1988 (Canberra: Australian
National University, 1989.
Media Indonesia. 15 December 1999.
Mietzner, Marcus. The Politics of Military reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia:
Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies
23 (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2006),
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---. “From Suharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam
During the Transition,” in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Suharto Indonesia:
Renewal or Chaos? (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
McVey, Ruth. “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army”,
Indonesia, No. 11 (April 1971).
Mukmin, Hidayat. TNI Dalam Politik Luar Negeri: Studi Kasus Penyelesaian
Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991).
Pauker, Guy. “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John Johnston, ed., The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962),
Rieffel, Lex and Pramodhawardani, Jaleswari. Out of Business and On Budget:
The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (Washington, DC: The
Brooking Institution, 2007).
Djiwandono, J. Soedjati. “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Case of ABRI’s
Dual Functions,” in David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building
Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and
Central Europe (Boulder, Col.,: Westview Press, 1998.
Lowry, Robert. The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin,
1996).
Samego, Indria, et. al. Bila ABRI Berbisnis [When ABRI is Involved in Business]
(Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).
Sukma, Rizal and Joewono, Clara. “The Imperative of Good Governance: The
Military and Business in Indonesia,” study report for the Sasakawa
Peace Foundation’s project on “Governance and Asia’s Corporation in
the Aftermath of the Crisis,” January 2006.
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---. “Military and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Thang D. Nguyen and
Frank-Jurgen Richter, eds., Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity and
Stability in Fragile Times (Singapore: Times Media, 2003).
---. Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London:
Routledge, 1999).
Tempo Interaktif. 30-31 August 2002. http://www.tempointeraktif.com.
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Section Three:Civil-Military Relations in South Asia—
Pakistan and Bangladesh
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SEVENDemocratic Ambitions under
Praetorian Stress – Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
Siegfried O.Wolf & Seth Kane
The complexity of the challenges in the process of state-building in
a decolonized environment tends to reduce the distance between military and
civilian realms in numerous young Asian states, especially in Pakistan. Here,
the inherited “colonial notion of civilian supremacy over the military and the
military’s aloofness from politics”1 underwent a gradual but significant change,
after independence, leading to various regime-types oscillating between military
dictatorship and elected political authoritarianism.2
In this context, Pakistan became considered over time as a potentially
classic example of a praetorian state,3 in which the Army perceives itself as the
sole guardian of the country’s national sovereignty and physical, political and
moral integrity, the chief initiator of the national agenda and the major arbiter
of conflict between social and political forces.4 In order to maintain this role the 1 See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Democracy in Pakistan. Assessment Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia, 2007. 2 See Subrata K. Mitra/Siegfried O.Wolf and Jivanta Schöttli, A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia. London: Routledge, 2006; also table 1.3 See Amos Perlmutter, The Military in Politics in modern Times. on professionals, praetorians, and revolutionary soldiers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991; Aqil Shah, “Pakistan’s ‘Armoured’ Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 4, (October 2003): 26-40.4 See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; Brian Cloughley, War, Coups and Terror. Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2008b; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military: Change and Continuity under General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Singapore:
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military developed a critical outlook on its corporate interests prioritizing the
achievement of its goals independent from the ‘disappointing’ civilian (political)
sphere.5 Such autonomy was exemplified through modernization, including
procurement of arms and equipment, or sophisticated training. An essential
point of origin for the longevity and recurrent positions of the armed forces in
the business of the state was that it occurred in the form of direct and indirect
military intervention.6
Having this in mind, the following enquiry will explore the patterns of
civil-military relations in Pakistan, how these evolved and the short as well as
long-term perspectives for civilian control. The study will focus in particular on
the period preceding and including the rule of General Pervez Musharraf (who
led the country from 1999 to 2008) in which the fundamental cornerstones of
civil-military relations were put in place—a situation which has been essential
to judge the trajectory of democracy in Pakistan. In this context the work will
argue that Pakistan until now has never experienced a form of civil-military
relations which is generally described as “civilian supremacy”—a condition which
has been seen, for example, in India and Sri Lanka, or at least formally in the
Philippines. Even during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime, which is categorised
by various eminent scholars7 as the period with the highest degree of military
subordination under civilian rule, the term “civilian supremacy” appears as a
misnomer8 During this time, the Armed Forces were not only able to recover from ISAS, 2009; Mohammad Waseem, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Paper presented at ISAS Symposium, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, 24-25 May, 2007.5 See Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. A Political Autobiography. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 6 See Waseem 2007, 4.7 E.g. Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London: Pluto Press, 2007; Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99. In search of a Policy. Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publications, 2003; Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan. New Delhi: NO Publisher’s and Distributers, 1985; Waseem 2007; Rizvi 2000.8 Here one can state, this was primarily the military decision to move away from direct rule („planned disengagement“, which allowed a process called „controlled civilisation“ which started in 1962. See Rizvi 2000, 10.
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the “1971 military debacle” against India, but also strengthened their positions
and sharpened their ability to participate more directly in politics again. This
phenomenon was most obvious during the “bloodless” coup of General Zia-ul-
Haq against Z.A. Bhutto in 1977. Yet ultimately, Pakistan’s political history can
be divided into five different periods with reference to military influence over
the political decision-making process (see table 1).
Table 1: Patterns of Rule in Pakistan
Structure of Leadership* Duration Period
Direct Military Rule 17 years 1958-1962: Ayub Khan1962-1971: Yahya Khan1977-1985: Zia-ul-Haq1999-2002: Pervez Musharraf
Elected government under a military president**
15 Years 1962-1969: Ayub Khan1985-1988: Zia-ul-Haq2002-2007: Pervez Musharraf
Elected government under a civilian president ***
11 years1988-1999
(1) 1988 - 1990: Benazir Bhutto(2) 1990 - 1993: Nawaz Sharif(3) 1993 - 1996: Benazir Bhutto(4) 1997 - 1999: Nawaz Sharif
Semi-Civilian (non-elected) political government****
11 years1947-1958
(1) 1947-1951: Liaquat Ali Khan(2) 1951-1953: Muhammad Ali Bogra(3) 1953-1955: Chaudry Muhammad Ali(4) 1956-1957: Husey Shahhed Suhrawardy(5) 1957-1958: Sir Feroz Khan Noon
Civil-Military Equilibrium ***** 6 years 1971-1977: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Notes: * The formulated structures of leadership for the various periods represent models to express the dominant style of governance and political management; Interim-governments and Prime-Minister under Military President/rule are not taken into account; ** Also referred to as a post-military period, this specifies the military exercise of political influence via a retired or serving general as president; *** Also known as the ‘Rule of Troika’, the armed forces influences the political decision-making-process under civilian governments from the sidelines; **** supremacy of non-parliamentary forces (bureaucracy) under formal parliamentary rule; ***** The rule of Z.A. Bhutto is here called Equilibrium, not Civilian Supremacy despite the fact that civilians had gained extensive civilian control, but the limits were still set by the military.1
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To tackle the puzzle of comprehending civil-military relations in Pakistan,
this study applies the decision-making framework introduced in chapter 2 (which
chapter 3 on Thailand also utilized). The chapter analyzes the relations between
civilians and the armed forces in selected areas of political decision-making to
better understand past and current trends of democratization and civilian control.
Elite Recruitment
All four military rulers, due to various reasons, were not capable of
securing public support and searched for legitimacy via the introduction of a
‘controlled democracy’.1 Therefore, they launched processes of “civilianization
through elections”.2 In this context, their portfolio of institutional measures
consisted of abrogating or suspending the constitutions as well as carrying
out ‘constitutional engineering’. To gain legal and constitutional cover, they
focused primarily on two changes in the political-institutional framework. These
included first, the transfer of powers from the Prime Minister and Parliament
to the President; and second, the introduction of constitutional provisions and
institutions which relate to electoral democracy and its constituting elements
such as elections, political parties and elected assemblies.3 Analyzing each
military ruler’s influence on the electoral process, one can identify various kinds
of “electoral projects” during their periods of rule at the national as well as the
regional level. Motivated by the drive for legitimacy, in most of the cases (besides
Yahya Khan), they especially tried to use the “idea of local body elections at
1 See Pervaiz Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan. New York: New York University Press, 2002: 141.2 See Waseem 2007, 6.3 All National and Provincial Assemblies. See Harsh Sethi (ed.), State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report. New Delhi: Centre for Study of Developing Societies (2008): 40, 47.
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the ‘grassroots’ (district) level to become politically accepted and establish the
legitimization of military rule.4
This had a serious impact on the development of the party system,
in which the military authorities played a remarkably ambiguous part.5 The
military’s role in the parliamentary sphere gained particular momentum given
that political parties and their representatives, both inside as well as outside the
parliamentary sphere, lacked the ability to develop a constructive relationship
between government and opposition, given that parties and parliament were each
riven by personal rivalries and bitter conflicts among key civilian political players.
For example, General Ayub Khan (1958-1962) utilised this as an argument,
directly after staging a coup, to issue the Elective Bodies Disqualification
Order, aiming to ban all activities of politicians in the dimensions of political
participation and contestation.6 This was a significant step towards abandon the
1956 constitution, paving the way for the launch of his new ‘electoral vision,’
which became embedded in the 1962 constitution. This ‘Basic Democrat System’
thereupon re-established political parties.7 Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya
Khan (1962-1971) also immediately undertook institutional steps to gain political
control over civilians. He abrogated the 1962 Constitution, declared martial law
and banned all political activities including the dissolution of all assemblies and
cabinets.8 To get a ‘controlled’ electoral process started, he introduced the Legal
Framework Order (LFO), providing him with the right to call for the gathering
4 See Abdul S. Khakwani, “Civil-military relations in Pakistan: the case of the recent military intervention (October 12, 1999) and the its implications for Pakistan’s security milieu“, ACDIS Occasional Papers (May 2003): 15,16.5 See Kirk Cambell, Civil-Military Relations and Political Liberalization: A Comparative Study of the Military’s Corporateness and Political Values in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan. Dissertation, George Washington University (2009): 404.6 “A choice was given to the politicians, either withdraw from political activities for six years or be tried for their misdeeds”. See Cheema 2002, 136.7 See Cambel 2009, 405.8 See Cheema, 2002, 142; see also table 2.
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of the new National Assembly as well as the date for election. A remarkable
instrument, the LFO was also used to a wide extent by Generals Zia-ul-Haq
(1977-1985) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2002).
However, Yahya’s decision not to accept the results of the 1970 general
elections resulted not only in the secession of the Country’s Eastern Wing (today
Bangladesh) but opened a corridor for full-scale manipulation of electoral as well
as constitutional institutions and processes. Being influenced by this political
behaviour, Zia-ul-Haq was able to impose a “trojan horse” into the political
system of Pakistan for all future military interventions. Without abrogating the
1973 Constitution as a whole,9 he launched the Eighth Amendment in 1985,
giving him the legal right to dismiss all assemblies and strengthen the role
of the President.10 This was a tool which was used various times to dissolve
civilian governments. In his search for legitimacy Zia also opted for a kind of
‘rudimentary democracy’ on the basis of a party-less election on the local level
for the National Assembly. In 1988 he dismissed the civilian Prime Minister for
the second time (Mohammad Khan Junejo) as well as all assemblies, a trend
which was set by Ayub and continued by all his military successors (see table 2).
9 Only parts of it, see Cheema 2002, 146.10 The President was granted the power to dismiss and appoint the Prime Minister, the armed forces chiefs, supreme court and high court judges, governors and many other top officials.
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Table 2: Dissolutions of Governments/National Assemblies: 1947-2009Year Parliament
Dissolved byDismissal of Government
Type of Dismissed
Government
New Leadership Habitus
New Installed Regime-type
1953 Ghulam Muhammad (Appointed Civilian+)
Khawaja Nazimuddin(Appointed Civilian*)
Civilian(Bureaucratised)
Governor General** (civilian)
Civilian (Bureaucratised)
1954 Ghulam Muhammad(Appointed Civilian+)
M. Ali Bogra(Appointed Civilian***)
Civilian(Bureaucratised)
Governor General (Bureaucrat)
Civilian (Militarized-
Bureaucracy****)
1957 General Iskander Mirza (Elected Civilian+)
H. Shaheed Suhrawardy
(Appointed Civilian++)
Civilian Governor General (Militarized-
Bureaucrat+++)
Civilian (Militarized-Bureaucracy)
1958 General Iskander Mirza (Elected Civilian+ *****)
Malik Feroz Khan Noon (Appointed
Civilian++++)
Civilian (Militarized-Bureaucracy)
President (Bureaucrat)
Civilian (Militarized-Bureaucracy)
1958 General Ayub Khan(Military, by Coup)
Iskander Mirza(Elected Civilian)
Civilian (Militarized-Bureaucracy)
C-in-C (Chief Martial Law
Administrator), later President
Military
1969 P General Yahya Khan (Military,
appointed)
General Ayub Khan(Military, by Coup)
Military C-in-C (Chief Martial Law
Administrator)
Military
1977 P General Zia-ul-Haq (Military, by Coup)
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto(Elected Civilian)
Military C-in-C (Chief Martial Law
Administrator)
Military
1988 General Zia-ul-Haq (Military, by Coup)
M. Khan Junejo(Appointed Civilian)
Military President Military (civilianised)
1990 Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Civilian+)
Benazir Bhutto(Elected Civilian)
Civilian(Militarized-Bureaucracy)
President (Bureaucrat)
Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)
1993 Ghulam Ishaq Khan(Civilian+)
Mian Nawaz Sharif(Elected Civilian)
Civilian(Militarized-Bureaucracy)
President (Bureaucrat)
Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)
1996 Faroop Leghari (Civilian+)
Benazir Bhutto(Elected Civilian)
Civilian(Militarized-Bureaucracy)
President Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)
1999 Pervez Musharraf(Military)
Mian Nawaz Sharif(Elected Civilian)
Civilian(re-Civilianised- Bureaucracy)
COAS (Chief Executive); later
President
Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)
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Year Parliament Dissolved by
Dismissal of Government
Type of Dismissed
Government
New Leadership Habitus
New Installed Regime-type
2001 Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf
(Military)
PresidentMohammad Rafiq
Tarar
Military (civilianised)
President(Self-appointed)
Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)
2008 Yousaf Raza Gillani Pervez Musharraf (Military)
Civilian Prime Minister/President (civilian)
Civilian
Note: +All dismissals by Civilians are backed by the Military; *selected/appointed by the cabinet, dominated by bureaucrats; ** “In the newly independent dominion political authority was transferred to a Governor-General and a Constitutional Assembly the members of which were taken from those deputies of the Indian Central Assembly who had opted for Pakistan”2; *** Governor General of Pakistan Ghulam Muhammad dismissed civil-ian PM Khawaja Nazimuddin; **** The crucial features which turned the Bureaucratised-Civilian into a Civilian-Militarized-Bureaucracy type of regime were (1) the Amadiyya riots of 1953, which underlined the inability of civilian bureaucrats to control state affairs without military support (a process which had already started in 1948 with the police riots in Dhaka/East Pakistan and student protests during that year); (2) that Ghulam Muhammad ensured the support of the Army for the dismissal of the Nizamuddin government3; ***** Ghulam Muhammad (a former Army General) was, in 1956, officially elected President though all presidential elections are carried out indirectly by the assemblies; ++ Appointed by Governor General (GG) of Pakistan Iskander Mirza despite the fact that he was informally forced out of office by the bureaucratic-military establishment under GG Mirza; +++ In this sense, “Militarized” means – a civilian with a military mindset based on socialization (training, education and service) in the armed forces; ++++ Based on the 1956 constitution, Khan was appointed by the President (before Governor General).4
Ultimately, besides the myriad of institutional-constitutional interference,
military rulers nevertheless challenged the civilian decision-making in all facets
of this area. They exercised various forms of malfeasance and fraud during
the election campaign, manipulating election timing and rigging ballots. The
two mainstream national political parties, Pakistan People’s Party (led by the
Bhutto dynasty) and the Pakistan Muslim League (led by Nawaz Sharif), were
‘systematically constrained by the military’.11 Where the military did not ban
politicians and political party activity under martial law, the armed forces tried to
control these politicos basically in two ways: First, soldiers searched for a civilian
governing partner in periods of military rule. They co-opted and extensively
supported Islamist parties, tried to unite and/or organize multi-party coalitions
(especially under Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf), or enforced break-ups of 11 See Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: the Parallel State. London: Routledge, 2008, 24.
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existing parties to create a pro-military party (e.g. PML-Q under Ayub Khan)
as well as the reshaped of existing parties (e.g, the Muslim League)12. These
parties were used as the military’s political proxies during direct as well as
indirect rule. Second, in the cases of the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif, soldiers intervened actively in party politics13 to organize
parties in opposition, initiating (a) vote(s) of confidence and party defections
(“horse trading”) as well as harassing and monitoring politicians. In addition
to such methods, the military had a third ace up their sleeve. The military ruler
(e.g. Ayub Khan) placed “elected officials at various levels of governance under
the chairmanship of appointed officials”.14 Such tactics, useful in ensuring a
preponderance of military power over civilian control, were to some extent used
in Bangladesh (e.g the foundation of the Bangladesh National Party under Gen.
Ziaur Rahman in 1978) and Thailand (e.g. the military-created Samakkhitham
Party contested elections in 1992) as well.
In general one can state, that these methods for influencing the elite-
recruiting process have not been clearly delineated into separate models. Instead,
they have overlapped and have been applied by the top brass not only under
direct military control but also under civilian rule in 1971-1977 as well as in
1988-1999 and 1988-1999.15 Since the last general election in 2008, the civilians
appeared to be increasingly in charge in terms of elite recruitment, which can
be exemplified in the dissolution of the political wing of the military intelligence
service ISI.16 However, the military continues to wield enormous power behind
the scenes.12 Ayub Khan “re-animated” the Muslim League under the name “Convention Muslim League”. See Cheema 2002, 139-40.13 Especially the Mehran Bank Scandal.14 See Cheema 2002, 142.15 See Rizvi 2000, 192-3; Shah 2003, 28-31; Cambell 2009, 405f.16 See Frédéric Grare, Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2009): 44.
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Public Policy
It is crucial here to mention that key sections of Pakistan’s public policies,
especially foreign policy (e.g. India-Pakistan relations, Kashmir conflict) have
been perceived as both inseparable from and subordinate to national defense
policy by the top echelons of the armed forces. Indeed, there is a mutual chain of
logic within the military which links all policy fields: foreign and defense policies
are a matter of survival and as such it seriously affects domestic policy.17 This view
is also found in the civilian sphere; Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity
is more important than economic development. Although such development and
self-reliance contribute to the strengthening of the nation’s defense capability,
the defense requirements of her sovereignty have to be met first”.18 However, the
dominance of the military in this area is a product of external as well as internal
factors, but the internal are the most significant ones (which is actually true for
all areas). Indeed, civilians supported the gradually-emerging role of the armed
forces as an actor in decision-making in all public policy fields, especially foreign,
economic and financial (budgetary) policies. Here, the military was first a men-
tor as well as an arbitrator and then the monopolist. It was able to manipulate
and control not only the institutions of decision-making but also the political
behavior of civilian actors. In addition, the armed forces were able to extend
and consolidate their influence over the appointment of military officers (active
as well as retired) in managing and controlling positions of civilian authorities
and ministries.19
17 See Smruti Pattanaik, “Civil-Military coordination and defense decision-making in Pakistan,” Strategic Analysis, Volume 24, Issue 5 (2000): 939-968.18 See Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence. (Reproduced in PDF form by Sani H. Panhwar, www.bhutto.org), 2009, 117.19 See Rizvi 2000, 104; Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military relations in Pakistan. From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 35.
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With regard to foreign policy, the military had its own angle and exercised
“considerable influence over key areas” in this field.20 It has implemented the
two most and exclusive pillars of the country’s foreign policy, first, the issue of
Afghanistan, embedded in the concepts of Territorial Integrity and Strategic
Depth,21 and second, the issue of India, which it viewed as an arch enemy
especially with regard to the area of Kashmir. One has to point out that there
was not much space to manoeuvre for civilians in the field of foreign policy. Since
the first years after independence until today the various supreme commanders
fixed the determinants of Pakistan’s future foreign policy, e.g. the connection with
the West (especially the US) or Pakistan’s China-Policy. However, Z.A. Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif were able to extent civilian influence at least temporarily over
various crucial issues. This differed from Benazir Bhutto since her decision-
making power at least during her first term as prime minister can be described
in her own words: “I am in office not in power”.22 Due to the post-Musharraf-trend
whereby the army “officially” retreated23 from politics and administration, the
new civilian government is now at least able to establish a “civilian masquerade”
in decision-making affecting Indo-Pakistan relations as well as in matters of
regional integration and economic cooperation. However, stating that, due to
an extraordinary security situation, civilians and soldiers would share a very
similar notion regarding foreign policy affairs led to a misunderstanding of the
historical and contemporary dynamics in Pakistan’s civil-military relations. 20 See Ian Talbot, ”Does the Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.). Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar, 2002, 331.21 The concept of Strategic Depth by the Pakistani Military envisions a government in Afghanistan, controlled or at least influenced by Pakistan, to counterbalance India as well as to suppress the demands of Pashtun tribes over Pakistani areas, in other words to secure Territorial Integrity and avoid incisions in Pakistani sovereignty. See (Lt. Gen.) Asad Durrani, “Whither Strategic Depth?” Nation/Post (Pakistan), May 27, 2006; Frédéric Grare, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era, Carnergie Papers, Number 72, October (2006): 1-24.22 Benazir Bhutto quoted in Christian Lamb, Waiting for Allah. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991, 107.23 This „pull out“, enforced by the current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, found its further expression in the withdrawal of the Army’ support from the Musharraf presidency in favor of the reintroduction of fair and unchallenged electoral processes. Additionally the military removed a certain number of soldiers from civilian bureaucratic posts.
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The armed forces also removed the issue of nuclearization from the
sphere of civilian influence,24 an area of control which it has managed until
today. There is a particularly serious gap between civilians and soldiers in
the decision-making process in the nuclear weapon programme (Project 706
or Kajuta Project), which remains under military control,25 e.g. until today no
civilian prime minister received permission to visit a nuclear facility. While the
civilian government dissociates the state from the first use option of nuclear
weapons, the top brass of the military immediately confronts such statements
with the reference that civilians were not authorised to make such decisions.26
In this context, an extraordinarily delicate situation was created by the nuclear
proliferation activities of A. Q. Khan who is widely suspected of having close ties
with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and elites of the armed forces. Serving
largely the interest of the Army, these deals were made outside the civilian realm.
Another crucial issue which is part of Public Policy is the national budget.
Since most public affairs in Pakistan are linked with national security, the area
of public policy has often been under the control of top military echelons. In
addition, given that the state budget—which is controlled by the military—is the
central element for all political agenda setting and implementation, there is little
left over for civilians to control.27 Due to the ability of the Army to expand its role
as the “guarantor” of the physical and ideological survival of state and nation, it
has grown to become a major actor in decision-making in state budgeting and
consequently benefits the most from state allocations.
24 See Kotera Bhimaya, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Civil-Military Relations and Decision-Making,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994): 647-661. 25 See Talbot 2002, 323-4; Bhimaya 2004; Siddiqa 2003, 67.26 See James Traub, “Can Pakistan Be Governed?,” New York Times, April 5, 2009; James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan In Trade And Arms Offer To India,” Financial Times, November 23, 2008.27 See table 3.
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Table 3: Budgetary Allocations in Pakistan (in % of GDP): Defense versus
Development28
In addition, the military has carved out a role and position in the public
and private sectors, including industry, business, agriculture, education and
scientific development, health care, communications and transportation.29 This
phenomenon, described in terms of Siddiqa’s concept of MILBUS30, diminished
the relevance of the state budget as a means of controlling the military especially
since the army has its own independent sources of funding. The military’s self-
granted high degree of financial autonomy is enforced by military aid from
third actors from abroad, mainly the USA, which has contributed substantially
to the unofficial ‘defense-budget’ outside any civilian control. However, military
hegemony over decision-making in the field of Public Policy is best indicated
by the permanent high level of the military budget.31 The main reasons, and
28 Source: Siddiqa, 2007, 1997.29 See Rizvi 2000, 233; Khakwani 2003, 12.30 She coined this term to describe the military interests in the economic affairs of Pakistani society. An argument is made, that the military creates its own financial resources independent of the official defense budget, outside of civilian control. Subsequently, MILBUS is identified as a phenomenon which exemplifies the military aim to secure its material corporate interest and personal benefits of soldiers, demonstrating the armed forces’ intention to carry out necessary political influence. See Siddiqa, 2007.31 See table 3.
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subsequently the conditions which were used as arguments for shaping the
budgets such as striving for military parity with India,32 are outlined in the next
section (National Defense).
Table 4: Defense Expenditures in Pakistan in Billions (Pakistan Rupees)33
With regard to the political economy, one can state that the military, under
the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, started to build up a hegemonic position in the realm of
the civil-military bureaucracy complex. As such, the Army did not just act as
an agency-cluster which only implements decisions but also as an entity which
takes part in the decision-making process especially in terms of economic and
welfare policy. Under Musharraf the Army finally became the country’s most
important player in the “generation and distribution of economic resources and
wealth”.34 Ultimately, realising their own interests and substantially determining 32 See Veena Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts, and Crises. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 78.33 Source: 1947-1977 data derived from Economic Survey, Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, various years; Rizvi, 2000, 63; 1978-1987; 2004-2007 data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, various years; 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI). SIPRI military expenditure database, Stockholm [http://www.sipri.org], 1988-2008.34 See S. Akbar Zaidi, The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime. Singapore: ISAS Working Paper, No. 31, (9 January 2008): 1-24; Siddiqa 2007.
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all sectors of the economy, the army undermined the formal decision-making
process through their informal networks and enclaves (the aforementioned
MILBUS) and hampered the setup of control mechanisms in the discussed
area through a form of enforcement lacking transparency and accountability, a
situation which has continued until today.
National Defense
Since the country’s birth, the military has been deeply involved in defense
policy-making, beginning with the conflict with India over Kashmir in 1947-48
which provided a defining moment35. In addition, a political practice developed
in which matters of national security became the sole responsibility of the higher
defense administration and military echelons. However, one has to stress that
decisions about defense affairs were solely in the hands of the military’s top
soldier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army36 and there was little effort made to
institutionalize a coordinated and joint system of decision-making in this entire
area, neither from civilians nor from (Army) soldiers.37 As a result Pakistan’s
first official decision-making structure38 featured a two-fold lack of coordination
between the civilian and the military sphere as well as within the military domain
itself. The latter one was determined by a significant imbalance between the
three services Army, Navy and Air Force39. This inchoate structure of coordinating 35 E.g. the civilian government of M.A. Jinnah had to drop its plan to invade Kashmir with regular forces, still under the command of a British Commander-in-Chief, after the latter’s refusal. Even though this decision did not reflect the wishes of the Pakistani Officers Corps, it opened the pathway for the military’s role in the national defense policy of the country. See Shafqat 1997, 26; Talbot 2002, 315.36 See Siddiqa 2003, 37.37 See Cheema 2002, 37.38 A purely parliamentary Cabinet Committee for Defense (DCC) which should be responsible for determining the size, role, and shape of the armed forces, a subordinated Ministry of Defense (MoD), which has to carry out admin-istrative control over the Commander-in-Chiefs of three services (Army, Air Force, Navy), who were rudimentarily organized through the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee with the option to attend the DCC.39 Operation Grand Slam which led to the 1965 war with India was decided and carried out only by the Army
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civil-military and ‘intra-military’ relations missed the establishment of an external
and internal military checks-and-balances systems which opened up the window
of opportunity for the Army to intervene unhampered (either against civilians
or against the two other services) into politics. Therefore, since the creation of
the Pakistani military, the Army branch has tried to avoid the implementation
of a clear chain of command deriving from civilian authority to the military
and furthermore it has made several attempts to build up prerogatives in the
political arena.
For example, the first attempt to create such an institutional role was
carried out by Ayub Khan by forming the National Advisory Council (NAC), to
give his military regime a ‘civilian mask’.40 This idea found its new format within
the National Security Council (NSC), introduced by Ayub Khan and resumed by
Pervez Musharraf during his military reign. Zia-ul-Haq established the Eighth
Amendment to build up the president as an ‘institutional proxy’ of the military
in the political decision-making process. Another example of his strategy of using
existing institutions was the strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
(JCSC). In addition, one has to mention the 1996 creation of the Council of
Defense and National Security (CDNS), a remarkable measure designed to
formalize political influence of the military even under a civilian regime.
To sum up, defense decision-making was never a coordinated effort
between the civilian and military spheres in Pakistan, especially regarding issues
of entering a war or carrying out ‘armed encounters’ which were perceived
as purely a matter of the military establishment. Furthermore, all significant
decisions dealing with national security affairs, even those which do not directly
involve the use of force, were made autonomously by soldiers, not by the foreign without informing the Navy and Air Force. See Siddiqa 2003, 37, Pattanaik 2000.40 See Pattanaik 2000.
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ministry (e.g. to join the western defense alliance systems SEATO [Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization] and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization]).41 However,
the concept of joint planning for national defense in the policy-making process
gradually gained more momentum and had its pinnacle (up until today) under
Z.A. Bhutto, who offered a new system of civil-military relations (“command and
control concept”) through Article 243 (1) of the 1973 Constitution as well as his
“1976 White Paper on Higher Defense Organisation”42 which will be discussed
below under the section pertaining to Military Organization. The defense
decision-making-system, which was amended in 1988, placed civilians at the
top of the ladder.43 In a nutshell, to institutionalize control over national defense
decision-making, civilians and militaries each have utilized a two-fold scheme:
For civilians seeking to gain supremacy, a negative and a positive strategy of
institution building was applied whereby they set up a totally new system of
decision-making and tried to eliminate existing formal military prerogatives. To
avoid this challenge from civilians, soldiers resisted and created new institutions
as well as instrumentalizing existing (civilian) institutions.
Internal Security
Since independence, Pakistan has been in a state of political flux and
the military has been involved in various forms of state-building activities (e.g.
41 See Rizvi 2000, 77; Aziz 2008, 57.42 See Siddiqa 2003, 38-9.43 Siddiqa (2003, 38) summarizes this new (second) concept of decision-making in national defense as follows: “The responsibility for national defense with the head of the government and the chairperson of The Cabinet Committee for Defense, who, in both the cases, was the Prime Minister, The cabinet on the whole responsible to the parliament. The commander-in Chiefs of the three services re-designated as Chief-of-Staffs now came under the control of the Prime Minister. This system was further amended in 1988 placing the President as Supreme Commander.” In addition a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (headed by a General) was created. Significant here is that this committee is working on the basis of consensus decisions, which is significant for the aim of installing a balance between the three services.
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infrastructure development, water and energy supply schemes) as well as internal
security operations.44 According to the decision-making process one can state
that in general the armed forces tried not to be drawn into the “handling of law
and order situations”45. Meanwhile, all Pakistani governments have requested
the military to deliver such aid-to-civilians-power, a phenomenon which has
been permitted by Pakistan’s various constitutions. However, this aid-to-
civilians-power was one of the main sources for the military’s self-confidence
and legitimacy to intervene in Pakistani politics. To face the aforementioned
internal security threats, beginning under Ayub Khan, the military prescribed
a function for itself that includes both the management of traditional external
security challenges as well as internal security threats. With regard to the
latter, it promoted an image of itself as the “ultimate guarantor of the country’s
internal stability and territorial integrity.46 Indeed, the military was seen by its
top brass as the most sophisticated instrument to tackle the socio-economic and
political challenges of the country. Furthermore, the notion spread that not only
the task of implementation but also decision-making could not rest completely
in civilian hands.47
Table 5: Decisions for Internal Security Operations
IncidentStructure of Leadership
Carrying Out an Internal Operation
Civilian Choice Military Choice
East Pakistan - Dhaka-Police riots: 1948 Civilian Yes Yes
Punjab (Anti-Ahmadiyya) riots: 1953 Civilian Yes Yes
44 See table 5.45 This is understood as aid-to-civilian-power missions, the objective of which has been to restore civilian authority in law and order crises or to cope with natural calamities (e.g. in East Pakistan there occurred the Bengali-Urdu language crisis; various food crises; and the Dhaka police riots; while West Pakistan was confronted with the Karachi riots and the Ahmedia crisis, all of which transpired in the 1950s). See Cheema 2002, 122.46 See Talbot 2002, 322.47 See Pattanaik 2000.
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IncidentStructure of Leadership
Carrying Out an Internal Operation
Civilian Choice Military Choice
Karachi-riots: 1986 Military No Yes
Secession of East Pakistan: 1970/71 Military Yes Yes
Sindh crises: 1990 Civilian No Yes
Sindh, Operation Clean-Up: May 1992 Civilian Yes Yes
Kurram Agency - Shia-Sunni conflict: September 1996
Civilian Yes Yes
North Western Frontier Province (NWFP): 2004
Military Dominance
No Yes
Baluchistan: 2005 Military Dominance
No Yes
Baluchistan (Bajaur District): 2006 Military Dominance
No Yes
Swat-District: 2007 Military Dominance
No Yes
Lal Masjid (Red Mosque): July 2007 Military Dominance
No Yes
Swat-District, Malakand Division, Opera-tion Rah-e-Rast: 2009
Civilian Yes Yes
South-Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat: 2009
Civilian Yes Yes
Note: Requested by the local (civilian) Sindh government5.
Today, the military continues serving civilian demands to deal with
counterinsurgencies but finds itself in an ambiguous situation. It is still mentally
trapped in the ‘old’ threat scenario shaped and dominated by India, which is still
perceived in conservative circles as the arch enemy.48As such, the armed forces 48 The ongoing Composite Dialogue (started in 2004) and the India-Pakistan Joint Statement of Sharm-El-Sheikh in July 2009 can be interpreted as a change in the perceptions among the moderate elite of Pakistan and India to reshape their relationship, emphasizing the need for establishing a sustainable peace process amidst socio-political and economic cooperation.
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have generally over-concentrated their attention and resources on the external
dimension of security. Indeed, this focus on India is coupled with the fact that,
the top brass still decides autonomously the quality of internal threat perceptions.
In other words, it decides what and to which extent an internal phenomenon
is identified as a threat and who is a combatant, e.g. the militant extremists
(separatists and/or Islamic fundamentalists, Pakistan/and or Afghan Talibans).
Here, the Pakistani Army has tended to ignore civilian demands to be prepared
for the changing threat scenario characterized by internal security operations
and a rapprochement in the realm of India-Pakistan relations. The long-standing
unwillingness to shift major contingents of regular troops from the Eastern
(Indian) border towards the West in order to be engaged in the “Global War
against Terror,” the ongoing procurement of weapon systems, mainly aimed for
the use in a traditional territorial confrontation in a conventional war with India,
as well as the hesitation to withdraw support for militant groups in compromising
the decision of the civilian government to assist the international community
(especially the USA) in combating terrorism49, are examples of undermining the
civilian authority. The military’s ongoing refusal to dissolve its linkages with
cross-border-terrorism and its insistence on the nuclear first-use-option must be
interpreted. Indeed, the army still wants to formulate and implement its specific
policy agenda outside the civilian decision-making process. This includes also the
size, scope and duration of domestic missions like the Operations Rah-e-Rast50
49 However, COAS Lt. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani announced that the army will make future serious efforts to invest in training army units in counterinsurgency operations. See Brian Cloughley, “Pakistan’s Army and National Security,” Briefing Paper, University of Bradford: Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 47, (22nd April 2009): 10.50 Operation Rast-e-Rath (27 April-30 June 2009) refers to a full-fledged military action in the Swat district of the Malakand Division of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, aiming to crush the followers of the militant organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) as well as Taliban elements, operating in this area. Subsequently to counter similar extremist elements in the South Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat was carried out. See Noor Ul Haq. “The Operation Rah-e-Rast,” IPRI Factfile, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (2009): 1-165.
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or Rah-e-Nijat, which remains nontransparent for civilians even if the latter
have had the chance to decide on carrying out a specific internal security task.
Military Organization
On the whole, one can state that the developments in the area of Military
Organization before Pakistan joined the “War Against Global Terror” in 2001
can be divided roughly into two periods, with the year 1971 as the first critical
turning point in which the Armed Forces were defeated by India for a third time
with significant implications for the military’s soft- and hardware dimensions.
During the first period, which began after independence in 1947, there was little
military organization to speak of and soldiers had to face serious administrative
and management challenges. These were not only caused by the partition
process but also through the occurrence of unstable civilian governments
combined with the lack of capacity in managing state affairs. With regard to
the hardware-dimension, the armed forces had to build “from scratch” and
were additionally overloaded with permanent “aid-to-civilian-power” missions.51
Regarding the software dimension, the military had to undergo an extensive
process of “Nationalization and Re-organization”.52 However, in this period the
top brass gained influence in determining all matters of military organization
up to the point in which the officers’ corps rejected any civilian influence in
internal affairs. In the second period, beginning in 1971, these processes were
at least temporarily and seriously hampered owing to the national saga of losing
East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh in 1971) as well as the recognition of
growing Indian military and economic superiority. The newly-elected government
51 See Cohen 1984, 33.52 See Rizvi 1987, 30-34.
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of Z.A. Bhutto as well as his democratic successors tried to bring the unfortunate
autonomous self-management of the discredited military to an end.53 Therefore,
civilian governments identified four benchmarks towards achieving civilian
control: (1) creating a military balance within the three services and to ensure
co-operation between all relevant military services and agencies; (2) gaining
direct control over the command structure; and (3) reducing the dependency
of the government and administrative authorities in law-and order situations;
and (4) developing defense-related institutions.54 To implement this, the civilians
identified over time various measures to challenge the military’s post-colonial
swaraj55, corresponding to the four benchmarks above:
First, civilians (especially Z.A. Bhutto) eroded the hegemonic position of
the military in general and the army in particular by aiming for major structural
changes in the command structure among the three services.56 This can be
exemplified in the fact that the civilians try to balance the dominant position of
the army (especially to reduce the influence of the army chief) by modernising
the navy and the air force of Pakistan. The overall aim was to bring the three
services under the closer guidance of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).57
Second, to secure influence over military organization (especially the
hardware dimension), civilians reshuffled not only the command structure
of the armed forces, but also tried to interfere in the process of appointing
53 The concrete strategies of action are more thoroughly elaborated later in this chapter. See Cohen 1984, 123.54 See Shafqat 1997, 174; Siddiqa 2003, 37-42.55 The term swaraj is used widely across South Asia; literally it means self-rule or self-determination (see Mitra/Wolf/Schöttli 2006, 386). Here it refers to the notion that the military should secure its corporate interest autonomously.56 He re-designated the Cs-in-C as Chiefs of Staff. The three Chiefs were put under the command of a newly established Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee (JCSC, an institution for joint planning and control of the military), with the President as the Commander-in-Chief. The tenure of the Chiefs of Staff initially fixed at four years, was reduced to three years in 1975. See Siddiqa 2003, 37-8.57 See Siddiqa 2007, 62.
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and dismissing top military leaders58. In addition civilians began to monitor
the activities of the military and its associated security agencies, e.g. Benazir
Bhutto, who set up a commission to monitor and investigate the activities of
the intelligence services.59
Third, to reduce its dependency on the army in maintaining law and
order the civilians relied on the creation of countervailing forces. Here, the most
significant landmark was established by Z.A. Bhutto in creating the Federal Secu-
rity Force (FSF) as a paramilitary power purely under civilian command to reduce
the government’s dependency on the military in internal law issues and order
situations. However, the civilian governments of contemporary Pakistan, which
faces significant threats from terrorists and militant secessionist movements, have
in general depended heavily on military-supported internal security missions.
Fourth, as an extraordinary step towards the building of institutions for
civilian control Z.A. Bhutto introduced in 1976 the White Paper on Defense
Organization to outline the civilian Government’s defense and strategic policy
and institutional arrangements for a Higher Defense Organisation (HDO), to
reorganize the hierarchy and mechanisms of Pakistan’s defenses.60 Another
important measure in building up institutions was linked with the reform of
the defense industry sector including the procurement of arms and weapons
technology. This has been a section of Military Organization particularly difficult
to control in Pakistan for two reasons: (a) it is influenced to a great extent by the
58 Here, Z.A. Bhutto dismissed Air Marshal Rahim Khan as well as Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan. Benazir Bhutto took advantage of a failed ISI mission (‘Jalalabad assault’) and replaced the ISI head General Humdid Gul with General Shamsur Rahman Kallue (1989). Nawaz Sharif forced to dismiss COAS Jehangir Karamat and tried to dismiss Musharraf. However, Gul Hassan’s compulsory retirement through Sharif represents the high point of civilian supremacy (Pattanaik 2000) followed finally by the combined efforts of civilian pressure groups to force President General Musharraf to “take off his uniform”. 59 See Talbot 2002, 325.60 See J. Hittle, “Civilian Participation in the Formulation of Defense Policy,” Defense Journal, (April 1999).
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up and downs in the US-Pakistan relationship, as well as relations with China61
and France; and (b) the military echelons “are highly motivated to play their
part” with military equipment not only seen in the context of fulfilling ‘military
functions` but also as vital for maintaining political power.62 However, the various
arrangements with external actors about arms supply and technology transfer
(especially in nuclear technology) are exclusively handled by the military brass
without consulting any civilian governments. There is also a preponderance
of the armed forces in the sector of defense production. Civilians were neither
able to develop and formulate their own agenda63 in building up a Pakistani
defense production industry nor could they implement it in the form of a physical
infrastructure (Defense Production Division). Here one has to state that those
facilities like the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Complex (POF), Heavy Industries
Taxila (HIT) or the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)64 are outside of any
kind of effective civilian control. The fact that they are state-owned and that
the defense bureaucracy operates [still] under the tremendous influence of the
armed forces has contributed immensely to the consolidation of the military’s
omnipotent position in decision-making in this field.
Civilian decision-making in the field of military organisation is today
perceived by the officers’ corps as an outside influence and resisted as such. It
is something which “is against the institutional norms of the armed forces and
will translate into risks and threats for organisational coherency” leading not 61 “The Chinese contribution to the building up of Pakistan’s defense industries, which surpasses contributions of other countries by an impressive margin, gained momentum during the regimes of Z.A. Bhutto and Zia (i.e. the period 1971 to 1988).” See Cheema 2002, 159.62 See Siddiqa 2003, 57.63 Which includes the following goals: (1) To achieve maximum self-reliance in the production of defense materiel; (2) To accelerate the pace of technological development, (3) To maximise industrial potential in the production and procurement of defense stores; (4) To attain economies of scale through optimum production and procurement. See Cheema 2002, 160.64 Other establishments are Defense Science and Technology Organisation, the Military Vehicle Research and Development Establishment, the Armament Research and Development Establishment, the Margalla Electronic Establishment or the Institute of Optronics e.g. See Cheema 2002, 160-163.
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only to a disturbance of the inherent lines of authority but also to politicising
and destabilising effects.65 To sum up, civilian decision-making regarding the
soft- as well as hardware of military organisation is perceived by most soldiers
as efforts trying to create dissension within the ranks, especially among the corps
commander and recognized as a measure to disintegrate the unity of command.66
Such civilian supremacy is as such vehemently avoided by the military.
Conclusion – ‘Enlightened Exit’ or ‘Strategic Fallback’
In the final analysis, the Pakistani military retains enormous clout in
political decision-making. Indeed, it has informally “assumed control as well
as oversight of Public Policy, merged issues of security with politics, played the
role as an agency for defining security and has constrained civilian authority”.67
In addition, generals maintain a veto in vital foreign policy, Internal Security as
well as National Defense matters. Finally, with regard to Military Organization,
the defense budget remains insulated from civilians.
There are, however, indications of some increases in civilian control.
First, the armed forces have begun to confine themselves largely to planning
the hardware of military organization such as force structure, equipment, and
supplies, as well as the software of shifting its approach to former doctrines
including the process of identifying new combatants. Second, there are also
growing indications that the traditional alliance between the armed forces
and civilian bureaucracy (especially regarding the ministries of Defense (Mod),
Finance (MoF) and Foreign Affairs) is gradually dissolving because of competing 65 See Khakwani 2003, 11.66 Tarique Niazi, “Ouster of the Prime Monster,” Aftab Alam (ed.). Pakistan’s Fourth Military Coup. Delhi: Raj Publications, 2001; Khakwani 2003.67 See Wassem 2007:3.
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corporate interests as well as mutual perceptions of disappointing performances.
Third, in the area of Elite Recruitment, the military’s acceptance of the results
of the 2008 general elections as well as the dissolution of the political wing of
the ISI can be interpreted as a boon for civilian decision making in this area.
Today it seems that Pakistan has moved towards a higher degree of
civilian control after alternating periods of direct and indirect military rule. It
appears that the military, at least formally, is becoming increasingly separated
from civilian affairs, and the Army may transform itself in the near future into
a “politically sterile and neutral”68 agent of its principal, the state. But to what
extent can one talk about a sustainable process of democratization or instead
a democratic interlude remains unclear.
To sum up, it seems a significant feature of the armed forces in Pakistan
that they will not accept any civil-military scenario in which they have no for-
mal or informal role. Indeed, the informal military influence in decision-making
will very likely remain in the future as a norm rather than an exception. The
army will undoubtedly continue as the major stakeholder in the political power
structure of Pakistan. Ultimately, though the armed forces may withdraw from
formal politics, this does not mean that they will abandon their interest in the
political process if their professional and corporate interests are challenged.
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68 See Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, 84.
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Aziz, Mazhar. Military Control in Pakistan: the Parallel State. London: Routledge,
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EIGHTFactionalized by the Past:
The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh
Siegfried O. Wolf
Civil-military relations in a post-colonial state are largely determined
by the way it comes into existence. Bangladesh was born as a result of two
traumatic events1, of which the latter led the country finally to its independence.
The victorious liberated political elites started with a multi-party democracy
but were soon forced to undergo a variety of regime changes, from an original
parliamentary system to a presidential one. Subsequently, Bangladesh turned
from an electoral democracy to growing authoritarianism which evolved into a
praetorian polity and then reverted to a democratic form of government.2
It is interesting to note that in all of this political turmoil, unlike in
other post-colonial countries, the military was not able to gain from its crucial
contribution to the liberation of the country any political capital3 in the
transformative phase. Due to its small size, various internal schisms within the
military rank-and-file, and the fact that the regular military was neither well-
1 The first one was the so-called Partition of British India as a consequence of the transfer of power from the colonial ruler to the two newly independent states of Pakistan, divided into West- and East Pakistan, by India. The second one was the War of Liberation, in which East Pakistan successfully fought against the Western wing for succession.2 See Emajuddin Amaded, “The Military and Democracy in Bangladesh,” R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds.), The Military and Democracy in Asia and Pacific, 2004, 104.3 Here understood as institutional integration into the political system, socio-political prestige, recognition by the civilians within the decision-making process.
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established within the political power structure of Bangladesh, nor did it possess
the basis for becoming well-established.4 Herein, the chapter argues that societal
cleavages in Bangladesh have been mainly responsible for the factionalism and
the intensive politicization in the country. However, the military has played a
major role in politics, which it has dominated for more than 13 years, an era
which has included two direct periods of military rule5.
To analyse this phenomenon, this chapter draws upon notions that
a certain set of factors, exogenous and endogenous, are framing civil-military
relations in the country, which traces the origins, social background and rea-
sons for intervention by the Bangladesh armed forces in politics (as outlined
in chapter 2).
Conditional Factors
The roots of the cleavages and politicization responsible for military
factionalism can be identified in the British colonial period. They were extended
and confirmed by the basically military-bureaucratic elites of West Pakistan
who sought to impose and maintain a repressive pattern of rule over what was
then called East Pakistan. This gulf resulted in a violently repressed secessionist
movement and consequently in the war of liberation of 1971. This was an event
the consequences of which created an incisive polarisation within society, which
found its expression in rapidly increasing politicization between two diametrically
opposed poles dominating not only the political but also the societal spheres of
contemporary Bangladesh. This split is marked today by the arch-rivalry of two 4 Ibid., 106; Golam Hossain, “Overthrow of the Mujib Rule,” Narindra Kr. Singh, Volume 14: Post Independence Political Reconstruction in Bangladesh, New Delhi: Anmol Publications (2003): 83-96.5 Ziaur Rahman’s regime lasted from August 1975 to May 1981 and Ershad’s rule from March 1982 until December 1990.
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leading political parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National
Party (BNP), leading to various essential political and constitutional crises.
Here one has to emphasize that this confrontation had extraordinary effects
on civil-military relations, creating cross-cutting cleavages through civilian and
military spheres.
However, the relationship between soldiers and civilians, first of all,
has been determined by the history of the regular Bangladesh Armed Forces
(BAF), a unit which has been “the lineal descendant of the British Indian and
Pakistan Army”.6 The military inherited not only the institutional framework of
its predecessors but also awareness of political power7 and the mindset of the
colonial army which contributed to a suspicion of politicians as well as anti-
democratic attitudes.8 But this heritage did not lead apriori to an orientation
against civilian rule and to the high degree of politicization among the soldiers.
Generally, the War of Independence removed the colonial feature of the
physical and social distance9 between civilians and soldiers. The former regular
units of the freedom fighters were soon aware that the country possessed
incoherent political leadership as well as weak and fragile political institutions.
Here, they experienced the fact that the civilians who led and carried out the
armed confrontation against West Pakistan were divided into various parallel
and rival governments.10 From the soldier’s point of view, the struggle suffered
from fratricidal conflicts and the lack of a strict chain of unified command. Even 6 See Ahamed 2004, 114.7 This is due to the specific role of the British Indian Army to maintain the ‘Law and Order’ as well as to promote the British economic and political interest. Here one can state, that it was expected that the colonial troops are political neutral, “but the politics of colonialism itself was against such bureaucratic neutrality”. See Khan 1981, 551; Ahamed 2004, 112. 8 See L. Rudolph and S.H. Rudolph, “Generals and politicians in India,” Pacific Affairs, 37:1 (1964): 5-19; Ahamed 2004, 113.9 See H. Alavi, “The army and bureaucracy in Pakistan,” International Socialist Journal, 3:14 (1966): 140-181; Ahamed 2004, 113.10 See Hossain 2003, 87; Ahmed 1983, 10.
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after independence the political and administrative spheres were divided into a
Mujibunagar and non-Mujibunagar camp. The first camp perceived themselves as
the real heroes who went into exile and looked upon and denounced the second
group as collaborators. This second group remained in Bangladesh during the
1971 struggle.11 However, despite the fact that the fully-fledged struggle of 1971
was waged mainly by East Pakistan’s ‘Liberation Army’, Bangladesh gained its
independence finally through the military intervention of neighbouring India12.
Despite initial democratic tendencies, the newly independent government
soon displayed the characteristics of an autocratic regime. The Bangladesh
Armed Forces had to observe how the newly independent democratic regime
turned gradually into a family- centered political dynasty revolving around its
kingpin Mujibur Rahman. In other words, from the regular soldier’s point of
view, the war of liberation simply led to the establishment of an increasingly
undemocratic civilian master, hostile to the military establishment and perceived
as a “serious threat to the existence of the armed forces” in Bangladesh.13 Indeed,
civilians and soldiers developed a relationship which was “marked by reciprocal
mistrust and suspicion”.14
11 See Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics,” Asian Survey, 14:2 (February 1974): 129f; Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State,” Asian Survey, 12:2 (February 1973): 200, 205.12 Which gave already diplomatic and material support, hosted the exile Mujibnagar government People’s Republic of Bangladesh under Tajuddin Ahmed. 13 See Hossein 2003, 93.14 See Syed Imtiaz Ahmed, “Civilian supremacy in democracies with ‘fault lines’: The role of the parliamentary standing committee on defense in Bangladesh,” Democratization, Volume 13, Issue 2 (April 2006): 286.
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Military Endogenous Factors
Military factionalism15
Within the societal and political-administrative sphere, the military was
also hit by widespread factional tension.16 Despite religious, linguistic and ethnic
homogeneity the military organisation could not emerge as a cohesive actor. The
1971 War of Independence and its consequences led to serious internal rivalries
within all ranks. In the context of various schisms, different military groups
“tried continuously to promote their factions within the military organisation”.17
(1) Here, most significantly there was an existential confrontation between
those who (could) participate in the War of Liberation and those which did
not. This schism was enforced by the way in which the struggle was organised.
The major force during the Bangladesh Liberation War was the Mukti Bahini18
(Liberation Army). This force was composed of two major components, Bengali
personnel serving in the regular units of the Pakistan armed forces and civilians.
Together with the Mujib Bahini19 and numerous independent armed gangs, it
was the major entity waging the armed independence struggle. However, the
incorporation of these fighting elements from the independence struggle created
the most significant schism between the ‘freedom fighters’ who took an active
part in the armed struggle and the so-called ‘repatriates’ from West Pakistan20.
Deep conflict between these two groups derived from the fact that the first
group received more favourable socio-political treatment, benefits and privileges 15 See Table 1.16 See Jahan 1974, 130; Lawrence Lifschulz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution. London: Zed Books, 1979, 85-88; Ahamed 2004, 107-8.17 See Hossain 2003, 85.18 It succeeded the Mukti Fauj, an earlier secessionist armed force. Most of the soldiers therein were trained and equipped by India which fought for the country’s liberation from West Pakistani forces.19 A paramilitary force loyal to the leading East Pakistan politician Mujibur Rahman.20 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (1992): 204.
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from the government. Conversely, the freedom fighters “felt insecure given
the numerical superiority of the repatriates” who were in the regular forces.21
Another significant factor which led to various conflicts among the “regulars”
was that the repatriates, despite the fact that they provided the bulk of the
personnel, were underrepresented within the officers’ corps. This confrontation
peaked with the state’s portrayal of the freedom fighters as war heroes and the
repatriates as collaborators22.
(2) A second schism can be identified between the traditional army
establishment (repatriates as well as freedom fighters) and post-independence
formations such as the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB, National Security Force).
The newly-established civilian government under Mujibur Rahman (1971-75)
became suspicious of the regular armed forces and in 1972 built up the JRB as
a counterforce to assist the regime as a law enforcing agency to meet internal
security challenges23. Here one has to mention that most of the freedom fighters
joined the JRB, and not the regular defense services in which the repatriates
were dominating. This paramilitary force was organised under Mujibur’s office
and was primarily composed of his loyalists. However, the establishment of a
second parallel armed force with its own separated command structure in the
country did not find much support among traditional military organizations,
especially the repatriates. However, this conflict transformed itself subsequently
into a permanent confrontation between the regular and paramilitary forces.
Despite the fact that the JRB is integrated within the Bangladesh Armed Forces24,
21 See Ahmed 2006, 286.22 An equation which is also used in the conflict among the civil servants and technocrats (see also Conditional Factors). 23 See S.S. Islam, “Polity and Politics During Mujib Era,” Singh, Nagendra Kr. Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh, Volume 14: Post Independence Political Reconstruction in Bangladesh, New Delhi: Anmol Publications (2003): 11.24 See Zillur R. Khan, “Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived Shortcomings of Civilian Government,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 5 (May 1981): 554.
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armed clashes between paramilitaries and regulars have continued until today
(e.g. the 2009 Pilkhana revolt25).
(3) It is generally understood that the guerrilla character of the War of
Separation crafted an environment in which radical politicization could thrive
among the East Pakistani combatants, which created another schism. In other
words, on one side there were those people which retained or adopted the
outlook of a conservative (professional) soldier (especially repatriates) and on
the other side there were those who were in different ways associated/attached
with political groups during the liberation war and/or inspired by their political
agendas and ideologies, especially the leftist groups which will be elaborated
in more detail below.
(4) In addition, there has been a generation-conflict, not only within the
‘camp’ of the freedom fighters but also among the repatriates. The creation
of the Mujib Bahini under the leadership of some Young Turks of the Awami
League was not only deepening frictions within the porous central command
but was also deeply resented by the senior leaders of the party including the
Government-in-Exile. However, following independence in Bangladesh, it gained
momentum within the regular forces through frequent upheavals of young of-
ficers against their senior colleagues and the civilian regime which they were
supporting, leading to numerous coups attempts.
25 During a parade of the Bangladesh Rifles (a paramilitary border force) on the 25/26 February 2009, a substantial part of the commanding officers was exterminated.
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An ideologically coherent military organization
Since independence, Bangladeshi society in general and the military
in particular have been plagued by ideological conflicts.26 Thus, societal
fragmentation has found its expression reflected in various military factions.
The most crucial points of dissension have oscillated around attitudes towards
(1) India, (2) Secularism; and (3) Socialism. All three of these cleavages can
be condensed into a pro- or anti-Mujibism27 stand and have also been deeply
influenced by the overall schism between freedom fighters versus repatriates.
In other words, the disputes over Mujibism produced an ideological diffusivity
which factionalised the armed forces of Bangladesh already at the initial stage.28
(1) With regard to the India cleavage one can state that most of the groups
in the defense services in Bangladesh shared a common anti-Indian orientation.29
A pre-Independence feature of what became the Bangladeshi Armed Forces
regulars--trained by West Pakistanis in West Pakistan--was the identification of
India as the arch-enemy. This, however, soon turned into a broader phenomenon
because many of the Bangladesh “freedom fighters” faction were increasingly
convinced that the Indians “were robbing the Bangladesh military of the glory
of liberating their motherland”.30 The anti-Indian feeling was also enhanced by
the fact that they [the Indians] captured all the sophisticated weapon systems
left behind by the defeated armed forces of West Pakistan. In addition, the
coincidence that the Mujiburnagar Government stayed in India during the War of
Liberation bolstered rumors that India had always tried to influence the political
26 See Khan 1981, 552.27 This term refers to Mujibur Rahman, also called the Father of the Nation, who tried to impinge his ideological commitments upon the new Bangladesh state and his people.28 See Ahamed 2004, 107.29 See Jahan 1974, 134-5; Ahamed 2004, 108.30 See Ahamed 2004, 108; Jérémie Codron, “Putting Factions ‘Back in’ the Civil-Military Relations Equation Genesis, Maturation and Distortion of the Bangladeshi Army“, South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal (2007).
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development of the newly independent country. In this context, the set-up of the
Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini as a paramilitary force under Mujib’s control was seen
as a bridgehead of India into Bangladeshi politics,31 to protect and control an
Indian-friendly government as well as India’s interest. Here, the signing of the
“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace” between India and Mujib was
seen as “surrendering national interest to India”.32 This proved to be a dangerous
move since Bangladesh’s regular forces perceived that the civilian government
had betrayed the country for its own sake to maintain power. Indeed, “this anti-
Indian feeling gradually developed not only into an anti-Mujib feeling because
of Mujib’s pro-Indian foreign policy”33 but also united elements of “repatriates”
and “freedom fighters” into a new faction. Moreover, this was a phenomenon
enforced by the fact that post-independence military recruits had started to
challenge the monopolistic position of the “freedom fighters” and joined the
“repatriates” (Maniruzzaman 1992, 204) in challenging the pro-Indian civilians.
(2) The Secularism-cleavage gained political significance after the fall
of the civilian government of Mujibur Rahman. Secularism comprised two
intermingling dimensions, the role of Islam as well as the notion of nationalism.
As in Pakistan, the military rulers in Bangladesh (especially Ziaur Rahman)
“managed to develop a successful populist and religiously coloured nationalist
discourse”.34 Subsequently, to challenge the secular civilians promoting Bengali
language-inspired nationalism they developed the notion of an Islamic-inspired
Bangladeshi nationalism. Islam was identified as an essential religious element
of national (Bangladeshi) identity35, to diminish the significance of the pre-1975
31 See Ahamed 2004, 108.32 See Hossain 2003, 90-1.33 See Ahamed 2004, 109.34 See Codron 2007.35 Therefore Bangladesh has to be an Islamic state.
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former ideological main building blocks of national identity – secularism and
language (Bengali nationalism) favoured by the civilians.
(3) The Socialism-cleavage includes the confrontation between a pro-
China camp and a pro-Soviet Union camp, as two politicising pivots. After the
formation of Pakistan, major cultural, political, economic and administrative
grievances existed between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. In this context,
various socialist and communist elements during the War of Liberation were
coming into existence, which identified the war against West Pakistan not only
as a struggle for independence but also as a “class struggle”. As such, the
Bangladesh armed forces inherited a remarkable ‘leftist cleavage’ which finds
its expression in the confrontation between a pro-Maoist (Peking) and pro-
Marxist-Leninist (Moscow) stand. The first tendency was in favour of a kind of
productive army on the pattern of the Chinese People’s Army as a model for the
Bangladesh defense forces. In other words, the army had to be an “inseparable
part of the country’s production system”36 and be seen as an opposite version
of the anti-production-oriented standing (conventional) army.37 The argument
made was that the country could not afford to maintain a sufficient standing
army to deal with any external threat.38
To sum up, despite this common bond of “anti-Mujibism” the ideological
cleavages led to such a high degree of politicization that the regular armed
forces were not able to transform into an unifying force or develop a ‘corps
d’ esprit’. In contrast, all the aforementioned schisms and cleavages led finally
to two stereotypical categories of soldiers: 1) the secular, pro-Indian and pro-
Moscow freedom fighters; and 2) the anti-secular, anti-Indian and pro-Peking
36 See Hossain 2003, 87.37 See Lifschultz 1979, 85ff, Ahamed 2004, 108.38 See Khan 1981, 552.
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repatriates.39 These two categories must be seen as ideal-types since they are
composed of numerous, partly overlapping factions.
Table1: Periods of Factionalism (based on selected cleavages/schisms) and
state of politicization of the armed forces
Period*Regime Type
Cleavage/Schism:
Participation in the War of
Liberation
Cleavage/Schism:India
Cleavage/Schism:
“Socialism”
Cleavage/Schism:
“Regular/Paramilitary”
Cleavages/ Schism:
“Secularism”
State of politicization of the Armed Forces: High, intense factionalism
Mujibur Rahman1971-75
Civilian High High High High High
Ziaur Rahman1975-81
Military Low High High Medium High
State of politicization of the Armed Forces: Process of de-politicization, enhancement of internal cohesion
Hussain M. Ershad1982-90
Military Low Medium/low Low Low High
Khaleda Zia(BNP):1991-1996
Civilian High Medium Low High Medium
State of politicization of the Armed Forces: Process of re-politicization (civil-military crisis of 1996); renewed factionalism through political parties (AL & BNP)
Sheikh Hasina (AL)1996-2001
Civilian High Medium Low High Medium
Khaleda Zia2001-06
Civilian Medium Medium Low Medium High
Sheikh Hasina (AL) 2009-
Civilian Medium Medium Low High Medium/Low
Note * Interim (Caretaker) Governments are not taken into account.
Source: Author’s own compilation based upon a review of the literature. 39 See Ahamed 2004, 107.
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Internal Cohesion
Despite schisms and cleavages, various successful internal security
operations from the early years have existed until today in the form of com-
bined measures of the regular defense forces, paramilitary Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini
and the police to assist the civilian government in law and order situations.
This has improved, at least temporally, internal cohesion among the regulars.40
But instead of establishing effective cooperation between civilians as well as
their paramilitary forces and the regular forces, this relationship between both
turned into an even more hostile one. The perception of the army that Bangla-
desh’s corrupt, clientelistic, senior political leaders have been unable to handle
state affairs has enhanced the belief among the military top brass that there
is an immediate need for the establishment of homogeneous and integrated
armed forces as well as a political role for them. This has marked a significant
development in their mindset, which indicates the growth of something which
can be seen as a form of internal cohesion. Yet without the support of both
senior officers and the military rank and file, a political move by a single faction
of the armed forces would be impossible. Nevertheless, despite various moves
toward greater integration and unification among soldiers, the military rulers
Ziaur Rahman (1975-81) and Hussain Mohammed Ershad (1982-90) still had
to ensure the loyalty of the mass of soldiery. Therefore measures of military
re-organization were undertaken (especially by Rahman after the unsuccessful
1977 coup against him), mainly through the incorporation of the bulk of the
paramilitary force within the regular command structure, which helped to reduce
the impact of ideological confusion, at least temporarily.
40 E.g. the combined operations of the police, Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini and the armed forces in July 1973, December 1973 as well as April and May 1974 (see Hossain 2003, 88) or in 2002 Operation Clean Heart/Joint Drive Operation in 2002.
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Degree to which democratization affects economic interests of Bangladeshi
military groups
Here it has to be first noted that the political environment was confronted
with socio-economic developments which gave very few opportunities for the
building up of a large regular armed force. The lesson from West Pakistan
not to create a military-bureaucratic leviathan convinced the ruling civilians
not to mobilise the limited resources to invest in the hardware as well as
software dimension of the military organization (see Chapter 2 for definitions
of “hardware” and “software”). The regular armed forces had to experience not
only the curtailment of most of the pre-independence privileges and available
resources offered by the military ruler of West Pakistan, but also had to
observe the fast-deteriorating socio-economic situation of its soldiers. This was
particularly frustrating, because most of the military infrastructure was destroyed
during the war. In this context, the civilian government was perceived as a
serious threat to the most basic corporate interests of the military.41 Additionally,
it was “faulted for its lack of basic understanding of the politics of budgeting,
especially in respect to the military”.42 To sum up, this deterioration of economic
conditions under democratic rule has increased the politicization of the regulars43
and tensions between civilians and soldiers as well as between regulars and
paramilitary forces over resources.44
41 See Ahamed 2004, 108; Ahmed 2006, 286.42 See Kahn 1981, 552.43 See Khan 1981, 552.44 See Codron 2007.
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Military Exogenous Factors
Public support and Consensus among civilians
In general, though the armed forces have been highly politicized, the
people of Bangladesh have been deeply committed to democratic order.45 Despite
growing political turmoil today one can state that a democratic (civilian) regime
is the most preferable form of government in Bangladesh (see table 2).46 This
root of democracy can be traced not only to colonial history but also to the
peculiar form of a two-fold process towards the country’s independence: from
Britain first, and then West Pakistan later. According to Ahamed47 during British
rule in India, Bengalis were in the forefront of freedom movements there. Their
anti-colonialism can be described as agitations “for a democratic polity and was
deeply rooted in the democratic ethos“.48 In this sense, beside the resistance
against economic exploitation, one of the main motivations to take up arms
against West Pakistan in 1971 was to restore the democratic system and enforce
the political implementation of electoral results of the 1970 national elections.
But while the Bangladeshi seems to be traditionally committed to democratic
ideals, governing elites until today were not able to establish and consolidate
an effective and functioning democratic order. Additionally, the high degree of
factionalism and corruption combined with a weak performance in governance
and administration led among other things to the decline of the socio-economic
situation of most Bangladeshi people. Facing an economic squeeze and an
unequal sharing of austerity, coupled with the allegation of widespread disastrous
patron-client relationships),49 the masses turned against the ruling civilians
45 See Ahamed 2004, 115.46 See Harsh Sethi (ed.), State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report. New Delhi: Centre for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), 2008. 48ff.47 See Ahamed 2004, 115.48 See Ahamed 2004, 115.49 See Jahan 1974, 125.
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as well as military elites. This created a civilian consensus working in two
directions: on one side, against the civilian rule of Mujibur Rahman including
the acceptance of the first direct intervention of armed forces into politics and
subsequently military rule in 1975 by Major General Ziaur Rahman. On the
other side, it created various pro-democracy movements against the military
rulers, who “were forced to relent and restore democratic institutions”.50 The
most sustained was in 1990 as General Ershad was compelled to leave office, at
present the last man-in-uniform in government. To sum up, civilian consensus
is one of the most crucial factors in the civilian-military equation, producing an
active civil society in Bangladesh.
Table 2: Preferable form of government in Bangladesh (in %)
Democracy is preferableSometimes dictatorship is
betterDoesn’t’ matter to me
69 6 25
Source: Sethi 2008.
Active Civil Society
Bangladesh is thus characterised by a very active civil society. Social
movements in particular have played a significant role (starting with the
language (bangla) movement in the 1950s), peaking in the war of independence
and subsequently in the formation of Bangladesh. Since then social movements
have been prominent in organizing broad sections of society in an effort to
overthrow undemocratic regimes, both civilian and military. The student wings
of the political parties have especially played a vital role, acting independently,
and organizing platforms on which other sections of the society could join.
Besides students, today civil society is composed of the intelligentsia, lawyers 50 See Sethi 2008, 48.
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of the Supreme Court, labor unions, non-governmental organizations, and the
media, appearing thus as a well- organized force which is one of the country’s
most significant political actors.51
Internal Security Challenges
Directly after coming to existence, Bangladesh was forced to face its most
serious internal security threat. Due to their notion of an unfinished revolution
(independence of 1971 did not led to an end of the class struggle) the extremist
pro-Chinese communist groups attempted to instigate a second revolution
through armed struggle. They gathered together in armed underground gangs
(together with other former freedom fighters52) to overthrow the Indian-supported
government which “represent[s] the exploiting classes”.53 Another vestige from
the War of Liberation was the existence of the so-called Razakkars54, which
were challenging the state-building process. It is significant to mention that the
subsequent security operations helped to consolidate the military organization
of the regulars as well as enhance the politicization among their ranks.
Nevertheless, they proved their loyalty towards the civil-political authority in
carrying out what the civilian government had demanded: the suppression of
the militant pro-Chinese, anti-Indian communist threat.
However, due to Bangladesh’s comparatively homogenous society, sub-
nationalist movements based on ethnic and religious lines (generally recognized
as one of the most serious challenges in South Asia) have not emerged. The
most significant separatist movement of ethnic groups has been that of the 51 See Ahmed 2006, 267-8, 289.52 These militants destabilised in particular the countryside where many of them became marauders. See Khan 1981, 553. 53 See Ahamed 2004, 104; Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Bangladesh in 1975: the fall of the Mujib regime and its aftermath,” Asian Survey, 16:2 (1976): 119-29.54 The Razakkars were East Pakistani paramilitary troops supported by West Pakistan helping to crackdown the secessionist movement.
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Chittagong Hill Tracts. This conflict created a corps d` esprit among the military
regulars because virtually all of soldiers have shared the experience of having
to undergo service in this area.
Finally, there is the increasing challenge of terrorism. Until recently
Bangladeshi officials denied the existence of terrorist structures. Nevertheless,
in the last few years the government banned various Islamic organizations, a
move interpreted by observers as a sign of increasing concern that Bangladesh
might become a base from which both South- and Southeast Asian terrorists
could operate. This threat is gaining momentum because it might renew certain
cleavages like secularism and the conflict between regulars and paramilitary
groups.
External Factors, actors and threats
With regard to the external dimension, two major pivots can be identified:
concern about India’s intentions as the regional hegemon and the country’s
strong dependence on foreign development assistance. According to the latter
factor, the need to secure economic aid from all possible sources has been one
of the main concerns of the civilian leadership as well as the military top brass.
Here especially, two external actors taking increasing influence in Bangladeshi
domestic politics have to be mentioned: the UN and foreign donors. Today,
the Bangladeshi armed forces is one of the largest contributing forces to the
United Nations for peace-maintaining operations across the globe, e.g. UNIIMOG
(Iraq), UNIKOM (Kuwait), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) and UNMEE
(Ethiopia/Eritrea). Here, the UN has not hesitated to warn Bangladesh that if it is
not democratic, the UN will cut it off from these lucrative peacekeeping duties (as
in January 2007). The threat of losing these financial benefits can be identified
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as a crucial factor for the soldiers as individuals and the army as an institution
in giving up political ambitions.55 In addition, the changing international
environment after the end of the cold war had a significant impact on necessary
development aid. As with the UN, foreign donors56 modified the patterns of their
support, making aid to Bangladesh dependent on the enhancement of democracy
as well as non-interference of the armed forces into politics. In this context, one
can state that the internal actors substantially “boosted the confidence of the
civil society”57 and the pro-democratic forces.
Besides this dependency, there is no serious external threat perception
towards the integrity and sovereignty of Bangladesh among the country’s ruling
elite. However, India and the US are seen as the most significant external actors
in Bangladesh. Whereas India’s involvement in domestic politics is undoubtedly
proven due to many factors including geo-strategic proximity,58 United States
involvement has been more opaque. However, since the regime and policy
changes (towards a more hostile stand against the Delhi-Moscow axis), US
support and influence regarding Bangladesh’s ruling elite has been increasing.59
Beside the civil society and media, the external dimension can be identified as a
major determinant in civil-military relations in Bangladesh and a crucial factor
for the withdrawal of the military from politics.
Civilian Strategies vis-à-vis the Military
In Bangladesh, civilian governments have developed a myriad of strategies
which they use to deal with the military. These strategies refer back to the
tactics elaborated upon in Chapter 2. Indeed, the strategies of the Bangladeshi 55 See Codron 2007.56 Like the Consortium for providing foreign aid to Bangladesh.57 See Ahmed 2006, 288.58 Bangladesh is totally surrounded by India. See Khan 1981, 553.59 See Ahamed 1973, 209.
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democracy under StreSS
civilian administrations (Mujibur Rahman [1971-75], Khaleda Zia [1991-96],
Sheik Hasina [1996-2001; 2009-]) were based on a mixture of sanctioning the
majority of the regular forces consisting mainly of the “repatriates” faction,
ascriptive selection by supporting “freedom fighters” among the officers corps,
and counterbalancing the regular defense services with the political paramilitary
force Rakkhi Bahini. In addition, negative discrimination was used, by not
recognizing the contribution of the regular forces in the process of state-building
as well as disassociating them from all security and defense affairs60. Here one
has to state that sanctioning, negative discrimination, and ascriptive selection61
were a combined measure to create disunity among the regular forces and
enforce the effect of the strategy of counterbalancing. According to Hossain62, the
civilian governments thus aimed “to reduce the influence of the Pakistani-trained
Bengalee military and to counterbalance other freedom fighters belonging to
different ideological groups”.
However, the most significant feature in the context of the application
of this portfolio of strategies is that it was carried out not by formal political
institutions but by informal channels, though it was initiated by the leading
Awami League and the charismatic leadership of its linchpin Mujibur Rahman.
This led finally to a civil-military situation which is roughly characterised by
two rival camps comprising elements of both the civilian and military spheres.
60 See complaints of the Commander-in-Chief General (ret.) M.A.G. Osmani quoted in Hossain 2003, 89. 61 According to Hossain 2003, 85 this included the following measures: The Awami League government gave two years of seniority to the “freedom fighters” and “the repatriates” resulting in these junior officers taking positions away from other officers. These latter, repatriated to West Pakistan, were either retired unceremoniously or transferred to civilian posts, which was disliked by many in the cantonments of the army and had to suffer under deteriorating economic conditions. 62 See Hossain 2003, 89.
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Conclusion
In the final analysis, civil-military relations in Bangladesh have tended
to be typified by a myriad of cleavages as well as factions, all of which have
been responsible for rudimentary institutionalization and a predominance of
informality. Indeed it is significant to mention, that the institutionalization of
civilian control has not necessarily derived from the use of civilian strategies.
In contrast, since independence civil-military relations have been characterized
by non-institutionalization and informal rules. This is a major reason why
the intense societal cleavages have been able to find unhampered access to
the politically and socio-culturally isolated armed forces (in the British and
Pakistani tradition), a phenomenon which has helped to create and maintain
military factionalism. Subsequently, the high degree of politicization among the
soldiers through the entire rank and file made non-institutionalized civilian
control vulnerable to party politics and personal rivalries until today. To tackle
this challenge, military efforts (especially those by Ershad) to enhance internal
cohesion through military organization reforms were undertaken. But these
processes of professionalism and institutionalization led to a situation in which
specific cleavages were only temporarily frozen. The post-1991 civilian era of
oscillating democratic governments have witnessed various examples of the
thawing of these historical conflicts which civilian leaders have used to gain,
maintain and ensure political legitimacy as well as power, bringing factions
back into the informal intermingling of civilian and military spheres. Therefore,
civilians in particular were not in favour of institutionalizing their relations with
the armed forces.
However, today it seems that the lack of institutionalized civilian control
is increasingly filled by some civil society actors (especially NGOs) and media
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as well as external actors (especially donors and the UN). This is a situation
which the military is well aware of, trying to keep an accepted balance between
ensuring its own corporate interests, avoiding political influence, fulfilling its aid-
to-civilian-power duties and maintaining its external and internal reputation as
a trust-worthy agent, attempting to locate its position within the contemporary
and future political-institutional framework of Bangladesh. Ultimately, while the
armed forces of Bangladesh will continue to be a major player in Bangladeshi
politics, they will increasingly be compelled to contend with civilian governments
which have succeeded in leading the country for almost two decades.
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