donellan - an investigation of two thought experiments.pdf

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Ridgeview Publishing Company

There Is a Word for that Kind of Thing: An Investigation of Two Thought ExperimentsAuthor(s): Keith S. DonnellanSource: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7, Language and Logic (1993), pp. 155-171Published by: Ridgeview Publishing CompanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214120 .

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Philosophicalerspectives,,Language ndLogic, 1993

THERE IS AWORD FOR THATKIND OFTHING: AN NVESTIGATIONOF TWOTHOUGHTEXPERIMENTS'Keith . DonnellanUniversityfCalifornia,osAngeles

Two kindsof thought xperimentshallengewhatmight e called theclassical view of thecontents nd capabilities f the mindor,to use HilaryPutnam'sneutral hrase, what's n the head."The classicalview-as repre-sented, for example, in Locke's An Essay ConcerningHuman Under-standing-holdsthat he meaning f an individual's words s a matter fnecessarynd sufficientonditionstched nthemind nd,derivatively,hat hecontent f ourthoughts,eliefs nd other ropositionalttitudes re as wellconstructedromhesementalmaterials. he twokinds fthoughtxperimentswhich eemtounderminehis iew re,first,he TwinEarth" fPutnam2nd,second, hose onstructedy Tyler urgen"IndividualismndtheMental"3 ndelaboratedn n ater apers.It has often een assumed, believe, hat urge'sthoughtxperimentsndthe Twin Earthexamplesdepend at bottomon something ike the samephenomenon. urge himself as argued, s I read him, nhis paper, OtherBodies"4, that he two sets of thoughtxperimentshouldbe thought f asessentiallyhe ame.And tseems ome that thers ave ssumed his s well.am inclined o think hat his s a mistake,hatnfact hetwo setsofthoughtexperiments est on entirely ifferent,houghperhapsequally important,principles.heymay, o be sure,have someofthe ame consequences or oththe lassicalviewsofthemind ndfor sychology,ut f o the outes akenrequite separate ndtheir oints fengagement ith heclassical view arealsodifferent.believe,nfact, hat he attermayhave someresources vailable nanswer o theBurge experimentshat tcannotutilizewhenconfrontedithTwinEarth xamples. n thispaper, mainlywishto arguefor he mportanceof treatinghesetwo setsofthoughtxperimentsndependentlynd, having


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156/Keith . Donnellangiven reasons for hinkinghat o, I briefly e-explore heir se as weaponsagainst he lassicalview.In regard o my reatmentf Putnam's iewson kind erms, shouldwarnthe eader hat am here ssuming, or hepresent urposes, hat t s generallycorrect nd that my treatment f it is therefore ympathetic. do havereservationssomeof which avebeenpublished5)bout hemechanics utnamproposes. That something ike Putnam's view represents possibility orlanguage, nd perhaps venfor he anguageswe speak, am convinced f.Forthat eason, t s not n idle exercise o distinguishisviews from urge's.6beginwith omeobservationsboutPutnam's iew.I. Twin Earth and Indexicality

In"The Meaning f Meaning"', utnam rgues hat he xtensionsf manytermsfor kinds, terms uch as 'water' and 'gold', are determined y theunderlyinghysical ature f whatwe might all "local paradigms". hustheextension f our term water' s all thestuff hathas themolecular tructurerepresenteds 'H20' because, oughlypeaking,he tuffnour akes ndoceanshas this underlying hysical tructure. n Putnam's Twin Earth,which sexactlyikeEarth, xcept hat he omparabletuffnthe akes ndoceanshasadifferentolecular tructure-let t be representeds hedoes by XYZ'-theextension f the term water'in the anguageofour counterpartss therebydifferent.he paradigms,henature f which eterminehe xtensionf a termsuch s 'water', re "local" not nly emporallynd spatially,fcourse, ut lsointerms f possibleworlds; t s thenature f the tuffnour akes and oceansin this, heactual world,whichdetermineshe extension f 'water'. But thismodal spect f theviewwillnot oncern s here.One of thewell-knownmportantonsequences utnam rawsfrom hisview of thenature f a largenumber f terms orkinds s that he xtension fsuchtermss notdeterminedy thepsychologicaltates f users f the erm.fwechoose time rior o thediscovery f themolecular tructuref the tuffnthe akesofoceansofEarthndTwinEarthnd/orick person rom arthndhis or her counterpartn Twin Earthwho are scientificallyaive, theword'water' as each uses it will have a differentxtension ven though heirpsychological tatesmay be identical. As we will see later,we needto besomewhat areful, owever, ow we construepsychologicaltate" ndwhat tis for uch state o "determine"he xtension.)In his papers n the opicPutnam as emphasizedwhathe takes obe thecentral ole of indexicalitynobtaining his esult.He very arlyon, perhapsincautiously,aid flatly hat 'Water' is indexical"7 nd in "TheMeaning f'Meaning"', less incautiously think, e tells us that Our theory an besummarizeds sayingthatwords ike 'water' have an unnoticedndexical


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An Investigationf Two Thought xperiments157component:water' s stuff hat ears certain imilarityelation o thewateraround ere."8It is possible hat utnam houghtf the laimed ndexicalityf words ike'water'as explaining ow thepsychologicaltates f an Earthlingnd a TwinEarthling ould be the ame even though he xtension f the erm water'foreach is different. t least this s a reasonable mpression ne can get fromreading The Meaning f meaning"'. f only t were true, t would be a tidyexplanation.or ndexicalwords uch s the irstnd second erson ronounsinsome ofthe atter's se) and of words uch s 'here' and now' intheir pure"indexical ses seemto havethis eature.n an importantense wopeople ouldbe inidentical sychologicaltates nd yet heir se of "I", for xample,wouldobviously ave differenteferent,differentxtension.9A quick nd, believe, orrect esponse o this eading fPutnams that heword water' nd other xamples f the ame ort imply re not ndexical n therequired ense.This s Burge's nswer n "Other odies".To be an indexical,s,to quotePutnam, ...to have an extension hich ariesfrom ontext o contextor token otoken".0AndBurge ays, I thinkt s clear hatwater', nterpretedas it is in English, r as we English peakers tandardlynterprett,does notshiftfrom ontext o context"'IIAbout this thinkhe is absolutely ight.Nathan almonnReferencend Essence 2makes similar oint. almongoesonas well tosuggest, orrectly,believe, hat utnam ecognizedhat water'and other uch erms re not hemselvestraightforwardlyndexical. nd thinkSalmon salso correct henhe points ut that he mportancef ndexicalitynthePutnamhoughtxperimentseallyhowsupat a deeper evel, tthe evelof"explaininghemeaningf natural ind erms".13almonwas more oncernedwith he modal consequences o be drawn rom hem, ut thepoint s worthexploringgain nconnection ith ur oncerns ere.14Where, hen,mightndexicalityome nto ouruse of termuch s 'water'Let me try o reconstructn argument hich uts ff ndexicalityntil he astpossiblemoment,he rgument,hat thinks really nvolvednthederivationofthemoral.The first tep s perhaps hemostrevolutionaryf all inPutnam'suse ofTwinEarth xamples. t is a new way of thinkingbouthow a term or kindmight eterminets xtension.5Let us think f this s a new kind f semanticrule.The semantic uleforwater',for xample, s eitherusttheone Putnamgives n"The Meaning f Meaning"'or someclose relative.16nany vent heimportanteature f the ulewillbe that he xtension f the erms determinedbytheunderlyingature fsome etofparadigmsndthe aradigmsre fixed ytherule tself. ut what heparadigms nderlyingature onsists n,which ntheenddetermineshe xtension f the erm,s not.That s left or mpiricalresearch. his s, of course, uite pposed o the lassicalview, he newe findinLocke, that ll kind erms re determinedy rulesdirectlyccessibleto the


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158/Keith . Donnellanmind Locke's "nominal ssence") hat irectlypecify ecessarynd sufficientconditions or eing memberf the xtension f the erm.In speaking f a semantical ule, see no barto viewing t as "in us"Vtleast in the sense in which inguists hink f theoften omplex rules ofgrammars being n us (withouthefurtheriewofChomsky's hat heymightbe innatelynus). Mostof us feelthat hefact hat nly stroke f nspirationhas allowedus to formulatehe ulewouldnotbe anobjection. he nature f thesemantic ules or emonstrativesnd ndexicals nalogouslyavenotbeen asyto discover,but surely n some sense we followsuch rules. Thatin someimportantense the rules re followed y us in thecase of terms ornaturalkinds s perhaps ttestedo by theforce f the ntuitionsboutwhatwe wouldsay nthis r that magined ase, ntuitionsppealed o,for xample, yPutnamin defense f the onclusions e draws rom heTwinEarth xamples. ven f tis onlywith reat ifficultyhat he emantic ules or atural ind ermsuch s'water' nd gold' areuncovered,tmay e thatnprincipleheyre ccessible ousa priori,althoughertainlyot nthe ontinuallymmediate annernwhichLocke's nominal ssence, he ontentf abstractdeas",was supposed obe.If this s correct, heremaybe a sense nwhichwhat s "in ourheads"determineshe xtensionf a term uch s 'water'.We havea rulewhich,fweareabletocompletehe nquiriest ndicates, ay ead us to the iscoveryf thepropertiesomething usthave to fall within heextension. nd perhaps hisameliorateshediscomfortomemayfeelwith he ositionhatwhat urwordscofrectlypply o s a matterfthenature ftheworld utside s.But the atterposition s still implied; it is a matter f the fundamental atureof theparadigmsndthats notdeterminedywhat s inourheads.Returningo the uestion bout ndexicality,fwe reflecthat heparadigmsaretobe ones availableto theusersof the anguage,we maythen e able toderive omestartling odalresults, hat, or xample,four cience s true ndderived rom heunderlyingatureftheparadigms,hen hepropositionhatwater s H20 is necessarilyrue. 7We can also derive nother tartlingesult,that hevery sers fsuch term s 'water'maynothave vailable he esourcestodeterminehe extension f the term. his willbe true imply ecausetheusers anusethewordgoverned ythe emanticule ven nthe bsence fthewherewithal,he scientific esources, o uncover heunderlyingature ftheparadigms.18 he Twin Earth houghtxperimentsrerich nconsequences.Indexicality ay nter ere, speciallynthemodalresultswhichmaydependupon ntroducingn ndexical eferenceothe ctualworld.Butwheredoes indexicalitynter or heequallystartlingesultwe areinterestednhere, hepossibilityf twopeople nthe ame psychologicaltatewithwords ntheir ocabulary aving ifferentxtensions?f t comes natallit must e, of course,nthe pecificationnthe emanticuleof theparadigms.Perhaps roughly),water' s whatever as theunderlyingature fthe tuffnour akes nd oceans.Evenhere, owever,ndexicalitys not trictlyssential.


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An nvestigationfTwo Thought xperiments159rule uch s we are contemplatingightnvolve o indexicals tthis oint, utonly purely escriptiveefiniteescriptionenotinghe aradigms.19I think hatregarding heparadigms s specified ndexically ecomesimportant,owever,whenwe want o generateheTwin Earth xamples.Togain the onclusions o be drawn rom hese xamples,we want he emanticalrulefor water'on TwinEarth o be indistinguishable,xcept or he ontextnwhich t is applied, rom he emanticaluleonEarth.We want his n part tleast norder o ensure hatn saying hat hepsychological tates f counter-parts n thetwo planets an be the same, we are not mmediatelyn troublebecausethesemantical ulesfor hetwo words re different.his is preciselybecausethe emanticalulesmayplausibly ethoughtobe"inthehead"of theusers ftheword, s I suggestedbove. f t s even n openpossibilityhat hesemantical ulefor water' s intheheadsof Earth nd TwinEarth sers f theword, hen herulehadbettere the ame fweare to keep their sychologicalstates he ame.Atthe ametimewe want he aradigmsssociatedwith heword water' nEarth obe differentrom he aradigmsssociatedwith heword n TwinEarth.But ftheparadigms ere pecifiedyeach of the ules npurely on-indexical,qualitative, ermst seemshighly nlikely hat he rules couldbe the same.Twin Earth ndEarth re, byhypothesis,dentical xceptfor he underlyingnature f the tuffalled water'.Withoutome ndexicalitynthedescriptionftheparadigms n therules showingup it is difficult o see how dfferentparadigmsregoing obe specified,fthe ules re tobe exactlyhe ame.But f the worules ontainndexicals n the pecificationftheparadigmsthen here s a well-knownense nwhich hey ould be identicalventhoughtheymakereference,s associatedwith hewordwater' nthevocabulariesfthe wogroups,odifferentaradigms.hesense s ustthe ense nwhich wousesofthe ame ndexicalndifferentontextsmayhave differenteferentsrextensions.t is thesense,once again, exemplifiedy Kaplan's notion f acharacter. hen woEnglish peaking eopleusethe ndexicalI', for xample,the haracter,he emantical ule, emains he ame neach nstance,houghhereferents obviously ifferent.20It s still ossible hat herehould e semanticalules elying n paradigmsspecifiednpurelyualitativendnon-indexicalays.There eemsno theoreticalreason for aying hat herulesfornatural indterms an onlyspecify heirparadigmsnonewayor theother. tis inthe ervice fTwinEarth xamplesthat ndexicalsmust ntern.So 'water' s not tself n indexical n either winEarth rEarth, ut tadeeper evel, t the evelof the pecificationftheparadigms hoseunderlyingnature etermineshe xtension,ndexicalityntersn order o make t possiblefor arthlingsndTwinEarthlingso beusing he ame emanticalules. wantnow to take look at thekinds f thoughtxperimentsivenby Burge.ForIthinkhey peratenquitedifferentrinciples.


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160/Keith . DonnellanII. Burge Examples

The caseBurge ives n "Individualismnd theMental" nd the ne that asstuck ndiscussions as to do with heword arthritis'.hat n English his sprobably term or natural ind houldnotmislead s, of course; n the amepaper to illustrateust this point,Burge gives other xamples, sofa' and'contract'which are not terms, ne would suppose,for naturalkinds.Histhoughtxperiments,hatever e may ay about heir elationshipoPutnam'sTwin Earthexamplesdo not and are not supposed to contribute o ourunderstandingf termsor aturalinds.Letme give a quick ummaryf the arthritis'houghtxperiment. e areto maginen ordinarynglish peaking ersonwho has somecommand f theEnglishword,arthritis',lthough ot completemastery.aving pain n histhigh, ebelieves, nd we are to ntuithatwewould gree hat eso believes,that e has arthritishere.We,ofcourse,nagreeinghat e hasthis elief,reinno waycommittedo the ruthf nor venthe oherencef thebelief.)Toldbya doctor hat ne canonlyhavearthritisna joint,he sees that ispreviousbeliefwas false;he defersn thisway toa somewhat pecialmember fhisspeech ommunity.ut, ounter-factually,e can imagine he ameperson orhis counterpart) aving the same history nd (in an important ense)psychologicaltates-up to thepoint ftalking othedoctorin a communitywhere hewordarthritis'sgiven wider se, usethat llows hat rthritisanoccur in soft tissue. In such circumstances,lthough he subjecthas notchanged, y hypothesis,e now maywell have,or so our ntuitionshould ellus, a truebelief. The beliefsof theactualpersonand his counter-factualcounterpart ustthenbe differenteliefs, lthough verythingxceptthesurroundingpeech ommunitys the ame.We should e sure, think,hatwe areclearwhat eeppoint urge stryingtomake. t s not, or xample, hat hemeaning fones words re necessarilydependent n the surroundingpeech community. he essential principleinvolvedn thethoughtxperiments,I believe, heone Burge mphasizesnhis paperwhenhe says, ...the houghtxperimentoesappear odepend ponthepossibilityf someonehaving propositionalttitudebelief, or xample]despite n incomplete asteryf some notionn tscontent."'21his, think,sa very mportantrinciplen itsown right nd Burge orrectlypends ime opoint utthat trepresentsnapparentlyervasive henomenon,ot estrictedoexampleswithnypeculiar roperties.In regard o its role in the Burgethought xperiments e can viewthisprinciples thefirst fthree remiseswhich ogether ieldtheresults ftheexperiments.he second premisewe needwill tell us somethingboutthestandardwhereby ompleteor at leastgreater)masteryf a notion s to bejudged. nthe ounterfactualituationfthe houghtxperimenthe ubject fthe xperiments ina communityhere hewordfor he oncept nvolved,s


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An nvestigationf Two Thought xperiments161used by thosewith complete r at leastgreatermastery,iffers rom heusemade by their ounterpartsn his actual community.n this ense the speechcommunityrovides he tandard hereby speaker an be said to have onlyincomplete asteryf a notion.A finalpremiseneeded asserts hatwhen a person an be said to haveincompletemastery f concept udged against ne standard ormastery,hatperson nchangednrespect oall relevantraitsfbehavior, istorytc.maybesaid to have an incomplete asteryf a differentonceptwhen udged gainstdifferenttandardfmastery.n the Burge xamples, he peechcommunitychanges nthe ounterfactualituationndthe ubject, nchanged,s creditedwithnincomplete asteryf the ifferentoncept esignated y the amewordinthenew speech ommunity.nce we have these remises he onclusionwearetodraw romheBurge houghtxperimentseems o drop ut mmediately.It s of some nteresto see that he econdpremise, he ne specifyinghestandard ormasterysat east heoreticallyndependentfthe therwo ndmaynot nvolve speech ommunityt all.A somewhat ancifulnalogue rgumentmayhelp to show this. lato, suppose, ould be thoughtf as holding o thefirst remise. nsofar s we can be said to have beliefs bout usticeorpiety,etc.,we are said to have thesebeliefs n spiteofthefact hat, nless we arecompletely nlightenedhilosophers, e haveonly partialmasteryftheseconcepts.Mostofus, perhaps ll ofus,haveonly ncomplete nowledgefthePlatonic orms. nd knowledge f therelevant orm rovides he tandard orcompletemasteryf a concept nd suchknowledge ouldbewhats mentionedina Platonicversion f the econdpremise. hus Plato wouldagree with hefirst remise, t seems, but provide differentersionof the second. Thehistorical lato would have trouble, think,withwhat count s the thirdpremise. here s just one form f Justice orhim, believe, nd all ordinarypeoplehaveonly partialmasteryfthe oncept f ustice.Becausethey avenot theknowledge f the form tself, t is hard o see how two peoplein thesame relevant tates ould have a partialmastery f differentoncepts.Butperhapswe could magine fancifulelativisedersion fPlatonismccordingowhich hegods haveprovided ifferentorms f usticefor ifferentations fpeople.Then twocounterpartsnthe wonationsmight avepartialmasteryfdifferentoncepts). am inclined o think hat his hows that t is the firstpremise, he principle hatwe attribute eliefsto personswhohave only apartialmasteryfa conceptsnvolvednthe eliefswhichiesat theheart ftheBurge thought xperiments. he communityse of a term s a standard orcompletemasterys a very lausible ndpossibly true ersion fthe econdpremise. ut one can imagine ther ot bsolutelymplausible ersions f thesecondpremisewhichwould,f rue, ield he ameresults.


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162/Keith . DonnellanIII. Comparison of Putnam and Burge Examples

AretheBurge nd Putnamhoughtxperiments erely ariantsf the amefundamentalhenomenon? think ot-not ifwe are thinking f Putnam'sTwinEarth xamples nd histreatmentfnatural ind erms.ButPutnamn"The Meaning f Meaning"' ntroducesprinciple, hathecalls "theprinciplefthedivision f inguisticabor",whichmaywell haveasimilarityo theuse of thesurroundingpeech communitys a standard orcompletemasteryfconceptsnBurge xamples.Theconfusing hing s thatPutnam ntroduces hisprinciple s if it were somethingike a generalizedversion f whatwe are to concludefrom heTwin Earth xamples.Yet, as Iview t, his s an entirelyifferentatter.The division f inguisticaborhas to do with hefact hat ormany temsina person'svocabulary, ot t allrestrictedo terms or ossiblenatural inds,he or she is prepared o defer o theuse of the word s representedy otherpeople in the speech community. nd there s, I think, hesuggestionnPutnam hat n such cases thepersonmay be said nevertheless,n a quiteordinary ense, to knowthemeaning f the word. Thus I have theword'carburetor'nmyvocabulary, ut fyouask me whetherhefairly ew "fuelinjection ystems" re carburetors,maybe uncertain. his might e because,for xample, am notsurewhetheromethings a carburetorust in case itdelivers mixturef gasoline nd airto the ylindersr whethert s one only fit does so ina certainway.A goodmechanic an probably nlighten e as tohowto use theword n this espect.The principle f the divisionof linguistic abor may conflictwith theclassical view of what word na person's ocabularymeans ndaccordingowhichwhat have inmy head at any moment etermines hat meanby'carburetor'ndinwhichno room s provided or hepossibilityhat tiemywords nthisway to theusageofothers. ndsince think hatmyuncertaintyabout certain pplications f theword carburetor' oes notpreventmefromhaving thoughts nd beliefs thatare correctly eported s, for example,"Donnellan elieves hat iscarburetoreeds djusting",heprincipleeems ogive us a start oward heconclusion urgereachesby supplying heperhapsmost lausible ersion fwhat havedistinguisheds the econd remise.In fact,however, he principles notone involved n theTwinEarthexamples ndtheirmploymentnconnection ithnatural indterms.22heessential ifference,believe, s thatwhat heTwinEarth xamples how s thepossibilityf a new kindof semantic ulefor term tterlyifferentrom heclassicalmodel, hemodel nwhich he xtensionf the ermsdeterminedyaset ofnecessaryndsufficientonditionsompletelyt the ommand f eithertheuser fthe erm ratanyrate fthe peech ommunitynwhich he ermsemployed.The revolutionarydea is that f a semantic ule which mploysparadigmsnd their nderlyingature,nature hichmaynot venbeknown o


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AnInvestigationf Two Thought xperiments163anyusers f the erm. othingn theprinciple f thedivision f inguisticaboryields such a result. Nor, it is important o add, do the Burge thoughtexperiments.One thing hat an obscure hisfundamentalifferenceetweenwhat sgoingon in theTwin Earth xamples nd what s involvedntheprinciple fthedivision f inguisticabor dea sthatboutboth here an be and has beenloose use of thenotion f "experts".My mechanics an expert bout heuse ofthewordcarburetor'nways nwhich am not nd amprepared o defer ohim.Scientists, f course,maywell be experts bouttheunderlyingature fwater and I may also defer to themwhen I agree that because of theirconclusions, othingan be water,whatever mayhave thoughtefore, nlessit is H20. But theuse of these experts" n determiningheextension f mytermss utterlyifferent.nthe ase of water', t s thenatureftheparadigmswhich determines he extension. here s nothingn the new notionof thesemantical ule ntroducedyPutnam's winEarth xamples hat astodo withexperts. cientistsome nonly nsofars they appen ohaveopinions boutorknowledgefthenaturefthe aradigms.Scientists re "experts", ot bouttheuse of a wordorexpression ut ssupposed onveyers f the truthboutthenature f theparadigmswhich hesemantic ule ssociatedwithmyuse of theword water' lludes to. t is theirexperiments,otthey, hat re crucial. Theyneednotbe infact part fmyspeechcommunityt all.) What defer o,one might ay, re the xperimentsandobservations.n thecase ofwaterwhat defer ohasnothingodo withmembers f my speech communitynd everythingo do with he results fputtinglectrodesnto epresentativeamples f waterndgettingwoparts yvolume f hydrogent the athode ndonepart xygen t the node.23Another ay of seeing he ndependencef these heses s to ook athowthey onfrontclassicaltheoryfsemanticsuch s that f Locke.Locke heldthat heextension,s we wouldsay,of a terms determinedythe nominalessence', setofnecessaryndsufficientonditionsor he orrectpplicationfthe termwhichhe also heldwere thepropertyf each useroftheterm,hatuser'sterm eing governed y thenominal ssencein his or hermind.Theprinciple f thedivision f inguisticabor onflicts ith ocke's view only nthislast point-the nominalessence maybe the propertyf the speechcommunitynd each ndividual's ermmayhave tsextensionoverned ythespeech ommunity.uttheTwinEarth xamples ebut ocke onthefirstoint;they ntroducehepossibility f a semantic ulecompletelyntitheticaloLocke's picture f a setof necessarynd sufficientonditions hich equire oinvestigationf thenature f the hingshemselves.24Insofar s we compare utnam nd Burge, t is then heprinciple fthedivision f inguisticabor nPutnamwhich orms possiblebond.TheTwinEarthexamples ead us to accept a new kind of semantical ule; the Burgeexamplesdo nothavethis utcome. his is not odenigratehe atter, nly o


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164/Keith . Donnellansay that here s a verymportantifference.heBurge xamples, s we haveseenand as he emphasizes,epend pon he dea of partialmasteryf a notionorconcept.The Twin Earth esults f Putnam,t s importanto note, o not.We do not needat all to imaginepeoplewhohavea less perfect raspof anotionhan heir onfreres.nJohn ocke'sday,no one knew hatwater sH20or that old has atomicnumber9, butfor ll that hey ould all have hadthevery ame semantic ulegoverninghose ermsntheir ocabulary hatwe dotoday. he point s that t a similar tage n TwinEarthwith he amesemanticrule, he xtension f the erms ouldhave beendifferentecausethe ndexicalspecificationf theparadigms y therule would ead to differentnderlyingnatures.Burge n his attacks n theview he has called"individualism"asarguedthat othhis ownandTwinEarth houghtxperimentshowhowthe ontent fourpropositionalttitudess dependent pon theexternalworld, hatwhat swhollywithinurminds,s onemight ut t, snot ufficientodetermine,orexample?whatwe believe. want osuggest hat hedistinctionsrawnnthispaperbetween he wokinds fthoughtxperimentsuggesthat heTwinEarthexamples have more radicalconsequences n this regard hando Burge'sexamples.Because theunderlyingrinciple ehind utnam's iews nvolve semanticprinciplend Burge's nvolve ather rinciplesbout he ttributionf beliefs,tis easyto construct Putnamikeprinciple hichhas nothingo do with eliefattribution,ocialphenomenonnd,yes, ven natural inds.fthis s all that sneededto defeat individualism",henwe can do itwithout ny assumptionsabout ocialpractices r the ntuitive otion fnatural inds.Nothingo grandas thats involved t all. Burge xamples,n the ther and,nvolve s inmuchmore ifficult atters.Here s an example fthesemantic peration fPutnam's rinciple hichseems at once to have ittle odo with natural inds"but t the ame time odetermine kindbyhowthings re nthe external orld."25tseems oshowhoweasy it s to generate hePutnammechanismwhich s not to say that twaseasytopropose hemechanismithers Putnamr, na more enericway,Kripke oes).You and havebefore s a copyof the horter 4ord English ictionary.We agreetouse theword widget"n thefollowingway:You willopenthedictionaryt random hree imes. ach time,we will lookfor he firstntrydesignating propertyhysical bjects an have i.e,wewon't ount even" nthe enseof "divisible y two").A "widget"sanyphysical bjectwhich as allthreeproperties.t is obvious, think, hatwe could developa full-blownPutnam rinciple or widget",making t clear that heproperties hich reessential owidgetsre those iscovered romheOED weconsultnthe ctualworld, hatfourcopyoftheOED is strange nd has no suchentrieswhat hefallbackpositionwillbe inregardoouruse of widget",tc.


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An nvestigationf Two Thoughtxperiments165In thisvery simple way we can at once get the modal results that,

supposingthe three ntries re "round," red" and "cubical", a widget snecessarilyound, ed nd cubical.Andwecan get he pistemicesult hat hiscannot e known priori we have to lookat thedictionaryo ascertain heproperties.Depending ponwhatyour iewof Kripke's uggestedossibilityfthe contingent priori s, we could also possiblyderive heresult hat t iscontingently priori that widget s anythingwhichhas the propertiesuncovered ythemethod f ooking t theOED.)Ifthe emanticeaturesfPutnam's water" ase andothersre ufficient,fcorrect,o defeat nti-individualism,hen his imple xample oes t lso. nthesame ense nwhichyou nd willnotknow he pecific ssential ropertiesorwidgethoodntil ouhaveundertakenhe ictionaryearch,we do notknow, nPutnam's ccount, he ssential ropertiesf "water" ntilwe have undertakenthe nvestigationnto heunderlyingtructure,f ny, f water. ut doubt hat"widget",withts uite rtificialule,wouldbe thoughto havemuch o dowithany ntuitiveotion f a natural ind.I am inclined to concludefrom hefact thatthe semantic eaturesfPutnam's xamples an be reproducedn thisway is, first,hat he semanticfeatures renot ufficientthoughtillpossiblynecessary) or term o be aterm or natural ind.And, econdly,hat fone thinkshat utnam as shownthatthemeaning f a term annotbe both n the head and determineheextension f theterm,hen ne must lso think hatmyexampleshows thesamething.n some sense themeaning f "widget"s inthehead-we haverule,you nd , for etermininghe xtension.What s trues that hedirect,fmayput t thatway,properties hichmakesomething widget equire s tofollow ut therule-in this ase foryoutogo throughhedictionaryearch.Unlike theclassical,theLockean,viewtheessential ropertiesrenotat theoutsetnourheads.We could, fcourse, se "widget"na perfectlyespectableway even before ou have ookedat thedictionary. e couldspeculate boutwhetherhe up on the ablenext o thedictionarys or s not widget.Wereto have strong unchboutwhat agesofthedictionaryoumightrandomly"select, might venfeel ustifiednmyown conjecture. evertheless,nmyparallel ase, therule for heuse of"widget"s clear eventhoughtdoesnotdirectlyesignatessentialropertiesfthe rdinaryort.IV. Propositional Attitudes

Indiscussing hismatterwill not ssumemuch bout henaturef beliefand other ropositionalttitudesave thatwhateverhe orrectccounts itwillinvolve omerelationshipetween hebeliever nd thepropositionelieved.This relationship ay be a simpletwo place relationshipr itmaybe morecomplex, nvolving,ay, modeofpresentation.


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166/Keith . DonnellanBurge peaks f an"incomplete asteryfconcepts" nd up to this oint

have not challenged heaptness f this s a descriptionf thephenomenonbelievehe has inmind. now want o do so. All of us, probably, avemanywords ndexpressionsn ourvocabulary hichwe can use nassertions,equestsandeven, tseems, nexpressing urpropositionalttitudesnd yetforwhichwe lack mportantetails egardingheir roper se. The phenomenonanoccurwithwordswhich tand ornatural inds. ut, s I have tried o emphasize,hisis a matter ntirelyeparate rom henomenon ointed obyPutnam'sTwinEarth xamples. n order o keep things s straights possible, want ouseconcepts hat re, s far s we know,not oncepts f natural inds.And wantto consider t the beginninghe sortof case in which our partialgraspisextremelyimited.Imagine, hen, hefollowing ort f situation. ohnhas been eating naritzyAmerican continental"estaurant hoseconceit s to list ts dishes nFrench.While he canmake reasonable tabatpronouncinghem, ohn oesnotunderstand hat heFrenchwords n themenumean.Having njoyedhisfirstmeal t the estaurant,e decides o samplemore f themenu.He visits herestaurantsecond imewith etty. ot wantingo appear gnorant,e doesn'task thewaiter o explain hemenuforhim, ut imply rders ew tems romthemenu.At one pointhe says to BettyI believethe hampignonsaut6sa acreme houldbe good".We canimagine hat ohn s sincere: e believesfromexperiencehat nythingerved t this estaurantillbe good.The situationsnot utre ndJohn'smodeof expressing imselfs in tselfneither nusualnor, think,ncorrect. ohn, owever,s certainly eficientnsomerespect.t doesnot, owever,eem ppropriateo describe isdeficiencyshaving nly "partialmasteryf the oncepts" he renchwords xpress.Asfaras the oncepts o,hemay nfacthave as perfect masterys anyone f theconcepts xpressed ythe nglishwords mushroomsautedna cream auce".Whathedoes nothave,ofcourse, s a masteryf themeaning f theFrenchwords. He mayknow something bout theirmeaning, hat,forexample,'champignonsaut6sa a creme' escribesn edible ish).Does John implynd straightforwardlyelieve hat he hampignonsaut6s'a a cremewillbegood?Certainly,heway nwhich eexpresses isbelief ndtheway nwhichwe might rdinarilyescribe isbelief uggestshis.But naphilosophical ontext oth re misleading. peaking ntirelyn English,wemay sk whether e believethat hemushroomsncream aucewill be good?(For thats what hemenupromises o serve). t seemstome thathe doesnothave this belief. I am strongly nclined to say that in the imaginedcircumstances,hebeliefhe has s really omethingikethis, hat hedishcalled"champignonsautesala creme"willbegoodand that his s thebeliefhe canbe saidtosincerelyxpress venthoughe doesnot xpresst nthis ashion.I mightput my inclinationby saying that the proposition hatthemushroomsncream aucewill be good is not tself nypart f the ontentf


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AnInvestigationf Two Thoughtxperiments167John'sbelief.Russell once spokeofknowing proposition, otdirectly,utonly by description.26n a way that s what want to say about John.Hebelieves hat he ropositionxpressed ythewordshe used s true, uthedoesnothave a direct eliefn that ropositiontself.It might e askedhow t can be correct orJohn oexpresshis belief n aseeminglytraightforwarday f nfact he elief e has s strictlypeaking s Ihave claimed. thinkhe ituations notunlike neconcerningheuse ofpropernames thathas had some recentdiscussion.Someonecalls and leaves themessageon my nsweringmachine: This is Mary.Have Catherine all me".Hearing his, utnotknowingnanysense whocalled, tellCatherine,Marycalledand wantsyouto call herback".This s not, think,ncorrectnordinaryspeech nd nsome ense xpressesmy incere elief. utmany, think, ouldbe inclined osay thatwhat really elieve s thatomeonenamed Mary"alledetc.Even one such as myselfwhobelieves that roper amesoften ave noFregean ense ordescriptiveontent, utrefer ia historicalonnectionsr thelike,mayneverthelesshink hatnsuch situation ne is not na position oapprehend heproposition hichCatherinemay apprehend pon hearing hemessage relay.What said to Catherinenthe ircumstancesdescribed oesnotdirectly xpress belief f mine.There s a way nwhich pass alongtoCatherine proposition hich myself o not pprehend ysaying hewordswhich am confidentnfact xpress t. couldhavedirectlyassedon what doapprehendndbelieve y saying omethingike Someone amedMary" alled,etc."Ifwe can acceptmy nclinationsnthese ases for he ake ofargumenttleast, hen wonderwhetherimilar hings houldnotbe said abouttheBurgethought xperiments. hentheperson nBurge'smostwell-knownxamplesaysto thedoctor,I think have arthritisnmythigh,"hus isplaying lessthan erfect rasp fthe oncept xpressed ytheword arthritis",s itbeyonddoubt hat hebelief xpresseds the ame s that f one whohas a perfect raspofthe oncept? s itnot hatwhat s really elieved s only hat he peaker asinthe high he onditionalled "arthritis"r somethingikethat?Continuingo followmy nclinationere,werethis he orrectccount twouldno longerbe possible to argue from heBurgethought xperimentnwhich nexactcounterparts imaginedna societynwhich arthritis"s useddifferentlyhat ifferentelief ontentsre nvolved. r at eastthiswouldnotbeanimmediateonclusion ne coulddraw.nthe xample s detailed yBurge,both hepersonnthe ctualworld ndthe ounterpartouldbelieve hat heyhave nthe high condition roperlyalled arthritis".ndthisdenticaleliefwould be true n thefirst ituation nd false in the second.Their externalcircumstancesouldnotdeterminehe ontentftheir elief, ut nly he ruth-value.Noteveryonemay greewithmy nclinationsnthismatternd have notpresented, believe,more han plausible ossibility.etmethen raw nly


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168/Keith . Donnellanmodest onclusion. o pursue hecoursemy nclinationsake me along s atleast a possibility or one who holds a view such as Locke's. No suchpossibility resentstselfwhenwe confronthePutnam winEarth xamples.For expressions hat peratenaccordancewith he ort f semantic ulethoseexamples mply,t s built nto hevery emantics hat he dentityonditionsfor hekindwe have beliefs bout s to be determinedy nvestigationf theexternal orld. t snot matterfhaving n incompleterasp f the emantics;themost omplete rasp till eavesthe ob of nvestigatinghenature f ourparadigms obe done.Andwhetherwopeoplehavebeliefs bout he amekindornot-whether nthefleshed utexamples, hey ave the ameordifferentbeliefs-will be depend not uponwhat s in theirmindsalone, but uponwhetherheir aradigms avethe ameor differentundamentalature.foneadmits hat ome ourkindwords unctionntheway theTwinEarth xamplesseem to mply hey o,the lassicalviewrepresentedythat fLockemust eabandoned.With heBurge houghtxperimentshere eems, t anyrate, waytomake t east temporarytand.Notes1. Versions f thefirst arts f this aperwereread at theUniversityf NotreDameand in a symposiumwith Professor ierreJacob at the Pacific Division 1989meetings f theAmerican hilosophical ssociation.A laterversionwas readatthe CentralDivision 1990 meetingwithProfessors enoveva Marti and JohnPerry as commentators nd subsequently t the University f California,Riverside. have greatly enefittedy thecomments f theparticipantsnd theaudiences in these meetings. am also very grateful o ProfessorCharlesCrittendennd Catherine onnellan forhelpful omments n an earlierdraft.Extensive hanges from he earlierversionshave resulted, utobviously amresponsible or he remaining efects.2. Putnam, Hilary, "The Meaning of 'Meaning"' in Language, Mind andKnowledge:Minnesota tudies n the Philosophy f Science, VII, ed. byKeithGunderson. Minneapolis,University f MinnesotaPress, 1975). Reprinted nHilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers Vol II: Mind, Language and Reality

(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress, 1975). Page references re to thelatter. utnam cknowledges,orrectly, debt o Saul Kripke'sviews as given nNamingand Necessity Cambridge,HarvardUniversity ress 1980; originallypublished n 1972). I believe, however,that Putnam's views add importantdetails and thathe is incorrect n supposing hatKripke'snotionof a "rigiddesignator"s the ocus of his debt.3. TylerBurge, Individualismnd theMental" n MidWest tudies n PhilosophyIV. (Minneapolis,University f Minnesota ress, 1979).4. TylerBurge, OtherBodies", in Thoughtnd Object,ed. byAndrewWoodfield(New York,OxfordUniversity ress,1982).5. "Putnam nd Kripke on Natural Kind Terms", n Genet & Shoemaker, ds.,Knowledge ndMind, OxfordUniv. Press,1983).I would like to take this opportunityo attempto rectifyn omissionofsome importancen the paper mentioned ere. After omposing he paper,butbefore ublishingt discovered hatmyprimaryxampleused in arguing orcentral oint, n example whichdependedupon the factthatH20 can containthree ifferentsotopes f hydrogen, ad been previously sed by Professor ayAtlas in a review Philosophical Books, July1980) of the volumein which


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An nvestigationf Two Thought xperiments169Putnam's Meaning, eferencend Stereotypes"irstppeared. should aveincludedn acknowledgmentf Professortlas'prior se of the xamplen anassessmentfPutnamn naturalind erms.believe hat he se we eachmadeofthe xample as omewhatifferent:used tto llustratehat take obe anindefinitenessbout henotionf importantnderlyinghysical roperties,notion sed n thepresentaper; rofessor tlas, believe, sed t in part omount moreradicalattack n Putnam'swhole project. n any case hisdiscussion,n pp. 134-136of his piece cited above, s importantnd I,belatedlyndwithpologiesoProfessortlas, ecommendtnow o the eader.6. I shouldayhere hathe iew ascribe oTyler urge n this apers a viewhavedistilledrom ispapers,mainlyhe arly nes, nd hat he eaderhouldnot ake t as in anyway uthoritativen what urge's ositionn detail s. Iwant o ook at a particularnd mportant,think,hilosophicalosition,newhich haveonly ome o see the mportancef from urge'swritings.o, Iattributet to him and thinkthersmay lso). t is, n the nd,however,heview tselfboutwhich wanto say omething.7. Hilary utnam,Commentn Wilfridellars", ynthese7 (1974)p.451.8. Op. Cit.p. 234.9. Thepoints elegantly ade yDavidKaplann hisexamplef theCastorndPollux twins n "Demonstratives"n Themes romKaplan, Oxford, xfordUniversityress, 989,p. 534.)10. "TheMeaning f Meaning"'. p.Cit.p. 234.11. "Other odies".Op. Cit.p. 103.12. Salmon,Nathan.1981. Referencend Essence. Princeton:he PrincetonUniversityress). eeI, Part our.13. Referencend Essence,Op. Cit.,p. 106. n what ollows believe hat amprobably ot adding o nordisagreeing ith ny deep points f Salmon'sextensivenalysisf the ole f ndexicalityn the win-earthxamples.14. Weshould dmit, owever,hatt s not heoreticallyutof the uestionhatword or kind fthinghould e indexicalnot in any eepmanner,ut ighton the urface. havenotfoundny uch n our anguages it s. But t seemspossible o constructnimaginaryxample.Suppose hat nceupon time hereweremany ingdomsut commonlanguage poken ythe ubjectsf all the ealms. helanguageontains hewordkingsgold'.ere s how hat ord unctioned.n each ealm here ere neormoreroyal" bjects. o speak fkingsgold as to speak fthe ind f stuffwhich as theunderlyingature f theroyal bjects n therealmwhere hespeaker appenedobe. A travelermong he ealmsmightpeak f, efero, fyouprefer,ifferentinds f tufftdifferentimes hen eor heused heword,for henaturef the oyal bjects n one realmmightavebeendifferentromthatnanother.till he ravelersed he amewordwith he amemeaning,rtoemploy avidKaplan's erm"Demonstratives",p. cit.pt. VI), with hesame haractero matternwhat ealm eor hehappenedobe.Eventhoughachtime t was usedthewordkingsgold'eferredo a kind,even natural indif he articularoyal bjects ad single nderlyingature)it seems orrectosaythatthasan ndexical atureightn the urface.tnotonlychangedtsextension ith ontext,thad anothereature ommonoordinaryndexicals.usts a personost nspace anrefero the lacehe or sheis by using here' nd ost ntime othe resentimewithnow', o a travelerlostamong herealms anrefero a kind f stuffy using kingsgold'.hedifferenceetweenwater' s we actually se it and kingsgold's in certainrespectsnalogouso the ifferenceetweenproperame or personnd heindexical se ofthe ronounyou'. nparticularsesbothmay efero the ameperson,ut hey o sobydifferenteans. fcourse properame or persondoesnothave he aradigmaticspect f a natural ind ermuch s 'water': hesemantics f namesforpersons o not direct s to an explorationf theiressential roperties.


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170/Keith . Donnellan15. The way f thinkingbout ow he xtensionf a terms determineds new ndrevolutionaryn its use of empirical aradigmsnd the resulting eedforempiricalesearch. s Charles rittendenincorrespondence)ointedut ome,that he aturef omethingxternalo themindmay eterminextension ouldseem, or xample,obe a featurefthe latonicheoryfforms.I am nclinedtothink,fcourse,hat he win arth xamples ointo a viableway n whichreferences fixed xternallynd hePlatonismoesnot.) t needs o be pointedout s well hat utnam'sules anbe viewed s a special ormf Saul Kripke'sdevice fusing referenceixing"efiniteescriptions.16. I am nclinedosuggest,or he ermwater",or xample,somewhat odifiedversion f Putnam'sarious ormulations:omethingike, Water s the tuffwhich as the mportantnderlyinghysicalharacteristicsf the tuff e or )havebeenused o callingwater"'. I leaveouthere xplicit se of modalities,which anbe added sPutnamoes.)This s close o theway put t n"Kripke

andPutnamnNatural inds"Op. Cit.). The dea s thatwhat we" havebeencalling water"oosely ivesus the aradigmsf waterndthatwe havebeencalling its fstuffwater"nthe asis f certainurfaceroperties,.g., olor,liquidityt ordinaryemperatures,otability,tc. t is the atter actwhichmakes he ulenon-circular.17. Tomake he emanticule orhe seof water' eflecthe acthat he aradigmsareavailable ndto derive his esultromhe ule tself, eprobablyave obuild n somethingikea referenceo actuality,o the ctualworldand thismaynvolvendexicality.utthats not he tartlingesult e are nterestednhere.18. Thisresult e can get ven fthe aradigmsrespecifiednthe ulebypurelyqualitative escriptions.t is importantere that his result s perfectlyconsistentith heusers fthe anguage eing ompletelyrivy o therulewhich overnsheuseof their ord. he ruledetermineshe xtension,ut tdoes so by referringo empirical acts bout henature f someparadigmswithoutaving o specify hat hose mpiricalacts eallyre. o onecan knowthe ule, uthaveno means fknowinghe mpiricalacts,t east syet, boutthe aturefthe aradigms.19. The full ule, owever, ay nvolvendexicalityf trequires,ay, referenceothe ctualworldnd f he attersessentiallyndexicalnnature.20. This,by the way, hows hat ndexicalityn the Putnamules s not to bethoughtf as possibly estrictedo somevariant n the ndexical otion factuality.his s all thatmay e necessaryor he tartlingodal esults,utnot or he esult e are nterestedn.ForPutnam'sarthnd win arthccupythe amepossibleworld nd the ndexicalityf theactualityperators notgoing o do anywork npicking utdifferentaradigmsobe associated iththewordwater'. he ndexicals ill, fterll,need obe somethingikeour'asin our akes nd ceans' sPutnam aintained.21. "Individualismnd heMental". p. Cit., . 8322. This is not to say thatthe division f linguisticabor cannothave anapplicationo a naturalind erm. heword elm"may e a term or naturalkind. ampreparedodeferoa knowledgeableardenerboutwhetherhe reenmyyards anelmornot, lthoughhe ardener ay othingbout he tructureofthe NA, f hats whathe nderlyingaturef rees astodo with.23. Theprinciplefthedivision f inguisticabor astodo with eferringo theuseof a term yothermembersfmy peechommunity.may hus eferorvarietyfreasons,obeable o usethe erms a certainavoredroup ses t, ouse t n a waywhich or racticalurposes illmaketmore seful.tmay ethatcarburetor"ould e much essuseful ermfanartificialistinctioneremadebetween hat s to be calleda "carburetor"nd what s calleda "fuelinjectionystem".nd heremay egoodreasonswhichmymechanicas forusing he erm o cover he ld fashionedind f device s wellas thenewer.Thesereasonsmaynvolve ome xpert nowledgef how hese eviseswork.


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An nvestigationfTwo Thought xperiments171But t snot hatherereparadigmarburetorsndwhat need n the nd s thetruthboutheir nderlyingature.24. Oneis remindedere f the ituation ith egard o the lassical escriptionstheory fproper ames,which ften ookthe form f putting escriptionsidentifyinghe eferentfa namenthehead f eachuser.A move wayfromthiswas to suggest hat hedescriptionse obtained romheusers,n theplural, f thename, rom hecommunityf users.This is analogous o theprinciplefthe ivisionf inguisticabor.t was a quite ifferentttack n theclassical heoryfnameswhen twasarguedyKripke, yselfnd thers,hatthe referentf a namemight otbe determinedy a set of identifyingdescriptionst all.25. The dea and he xample remine, ut he dea arises romhe roblemsboutnatural inds ndnaturalind ermsaised yDominicklenarn discussion.26. See, for xample, he Problems fPhilosophyOxford, xford niversityPress, 959),p. 57.

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