donau_ulm

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Participation and Civil Society in South-‐East of Europe

Jan W. van Deth

University of Mannheim

2nd Participation Day: Shared History – Common Future

28 October 2015, Ulm, Germany

Dear Mrs Erler – Dear Mr President Lütgenau – Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased and honoured to contribute to this “Participation Day” – and as

a social scientist mainly involved in academic discussions I am looking forward to

learn more about your experiences and expectations from quite different, but

certainly much more practical and pragmatic perspectives.

Today I would like to present you a brief overview of the results of empirical

research on participation and civil society in European countries, especially in

South-‐East Europe. After a very short summary of the arguments stressing the

importance of civil society for democracy I will review the main explanations for

the developments in South-‐East Europe. As we will see, the consequences of a

“shared history” and the contours of a “common future” are still very obvious

today. In the last part I will not follow the conventional practice of staring at the

obvious differences between Scandinavia and South-‐East Europe, but identify

three aspects of the relationships between state and civil society in South-‐East

Europe that deserve attention: uncivil society, government intervention and

regulation, and the impact of international contacts. These aspects can be

understood as challenges for civil society to improve its position in South-‐East

Europe.

The importance of voluntary engagement and civil society for democracy can

hardly be overestimated. Evidently, widely spread citizens’ protests and civil

Prof.&Dr.&&Jan&W.&van&Deth &Chair&of&Poli3cal&Science&and&Interna3onal&Compara3ve&Social&Research &October&2015&

1.&The&Spell&of&Civil&Society&

2.&Civil&Society&and&Engagement&in&Europe&

3.&Explaining&Civil&Society&in&SouthIEast&Europe&

4.&Specific&Aspects&of&Civil&Society&in&SouthIEast&Europe&&I&„uncivil&society“&&I&government&interven3on&and&regula3on&&I&Western&support&and&grassIroots&ac3vi3es&

5.&Conclusion&and&Discussion&

2

society activities played a crucial role in triggering the revolutions of 1989 and the

subsequent processes of democratisation. Civil society has been credited for its

positive impacts on democracy at least since Alexis de Tocqueville famously

depicted voluntary associations as “schools of democracy” already in the early

19th century. By now, social engagement and civil society are considered to be key

factors for any democratic society, providing citizens with indispensable skills,

resources, contacts, as well as pro-‐social and pro-‐democratic attitudes (especially

trust and confidence).

How do participation and civil society in Europe look like and how did they

develop in the last decades? Several findings provide a consistent picture.

Associational involvement in Europe is widely spread and, on average, one of

every two Europeans is socially active. These averages do not tell us much,

because the national differences are considerable with very high levels of

involvement in North-‐West Europe, much more modest levels in central European

countries – and low levels of involvement in the new democracies in South and in

South-‐East Europe.

If we focus on the EUSDR countries, than the relatively low levels of social

engagement in many parts of this area are clear: for the whole region the level is

already below the European average (48% vs. 53%) – a situation that looks more

alarming if we exclude Germany and Austria, or if we compare the most widely

spread civil society in Europe (Norway, 89%) with the last one (Romania, 24%).

These findings are well-‐known and it is a popular – and rather cheap – rhetorical

trick to use Scandinavia as a benchmark and denounce the rest of Europe as

civically backwards or underdeveloped.

Before we turn to the explanations and consequences of these large differences in

Europe some information on the developments in citizens’ engagement in the last

10-‐15 years might be helpful. Civil society in South-‐East Europe is probably

developing rapidly and the relatively low levels might already indicate clear

improvements if we think of the much more difficult situation in the past.

Unfortunately, not much empirical evidence supports such interpretations. Firstly,


Civic%orienta,ons%B&Trust/Confidence&

B&Norms&

B&Tolerance&

Social%involvement,%

Civil%society%

B&Voluntary&associa3ons&

B&Networks&and&3es&

Social%democracy%B&Volunteering&B&Networking&B&Spending&B&Par3cipa3ng&

Poli,cal%democracy%B&Poli3cal&interest&and&

engagement&

B&Poli3cal&par3cipa3on:&

&&&&&Vo3ng,&Contac3ng,&Protest,&Poli3cal&consump3on&

Alexis&de&Tocqueville&(1840):&&„Schools&of&democracy“&


0&

10&

20&

30&

40&

50&

60&

70&

80&

90&

100&

Norway&

Sweden&

Denm

ark&

Nethe

rlands&

Finland&

Switze

rland&

Germany&W

est&

Austria&

Belgiu

m&

Ireland&

Sloven

ia&

Germany&East&

Great&Britain&

Slovak

ia&

France

&

Czech&Republic

&Latvia&

Estonia&Italy&

Croa3a&

Hungary&

Lithuania&Spa

in&

Poland&

Portugal&

Greece

&

Bulgaria&

Romania&

Associa'onal*Involvement*(199042010*average)*

European&average:&53%&


24&

42&

48&

54&

65&

89&

0& 10& 20& 30& 40& 50& 60& 70& 80& 90& 100&

Romania&

EUSDR&w/o&Austria/Germany&

EUSDR&countries&

All&nonPEUSDR&countries&

West&Germany&

Norway&

Associa'onal*Involvement*(199042010*average)*

3

membership in unions and similar interest groups is much lower in the Danube

region than in the rest of Europe – and the general downward trend of these

activities all over Europe does not change this situation. Secondly, the low

membership figures for the region excluding Germany and Austria is not

compensated by growing social involvement – on the contrary, the gap with the

rest of Europe even seems to increase somewhat recently. Very similar patterns

are found for political engagement in Europe. If we use voter turnout as a third

indicator, it is clear that the high levels of turnout declined all over Europe since

the early 1990s, but the decline is spectacular in the Danube region since the turn

of the century. Finally, studying the figures for a number of other forms of political

participation – demonstrating, petitioning, boycotting etcetera – it is clear that

the evident gap between the regions did not disappear for this type of

engagement in the last decades. In general, then, there is no trace of a declining

gap between civil societies in South-‐East Europe and the rest of the continent:

whereas in many countries at least half of the population is socially and politically

engaged, the Danube-‐countries remain characterized by constantly low levels of

involvement. Other research shows differences in line with these findings: the

small share of paid staff, the dependency on philanthropy, and the absence in

central welfare-‐state arrangements all characterize civil society in South-‐East

Europe. Apparently, the “Post-‐revolutionary hangover” has been replaced by a

“Post-‐honeymoon decline” increasing the gap between South-‐East and North-‐

West Europe.

In the last 25 years many explanations have been provided for the regional

differences in civil societies in Europe. Obviously, most of these explanations focus

on the authoritarian and communist legacies as decisive determinants. More

specifically, shared histories are still easily visible in the first two explanatory

factors. Under communism:

1. forced participation in state-‐directed organizations resulted in wide-‐spread

mistrust of formal organizations, and

2. people relied strongly on informal private networks (including family ties)

as substitutes or alternatives for formal organizations. Accordingly, values


0&

5&

10&

15&

20&

25&

30&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

Membership*of*Trade*Unions*or*Similar*Organisa6ons*(average*percentages)*

All&other&countries&covered&by&European&Social&Survey&

Members&of&the&Danube&Region&Strategy&(EUSDR)&

EUSDR&countries&without&Austria/Germany&


0&

2&

4&

6&

8&

10&

12&

14&

16&

18&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

Worked'in'Another'Organisa1on'(average'percentages)'





50&

55&

60&

65&

70&

75&

80&

85&

1991F1994&

1995F1998&

1999F2002&

2003F2006&

2007F2010&

2011F2014&

Voter&Turnout&Last&Na.onal&Elec.ons&&(average&percentages)&

All&other&countries&covered&by&Eurostat&




0&

10&

20&

30&

40&

50&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

*Vo3ng&and&trade&union&membership&excluded&

Poli%cal(Par%cipa%on((percentage(of(people(doing(at(least(one(form(of(par%cipa%on)*(





Main&results:&Shared'histories&clearly&visible:&&

1.  Large&regional&differences&in&associa3onal&involvement:&&&very&high&levels&in&NorthJWest&Europe;&&& & &very&low&levels&in&SouthJEast&Europe&

&

2. #„Post)honeymoon#decline“#con3nues:&gap&did&not&disappear&recently,&but&seems&to&widen&&

&

! What&to&explain?& &J&Posi3on&of&SouthJEast&Europe?&& & &J&Scandinavian&excep3onalism?&

&


Explana3ons&for&differences&in&levels:&Shared'history&

1.&Experiences&with&stateGdirected&organiza3ons&under&communism&

2.&Development&of&informal&subs3tute&networks&(families)&&

Explana3ons&for&differences&in&developments:&Shared'history&

3.&Frustra3on&of&high&expecta3ons&–>&“First/the/Transi3on,/then/the/Crash”/

4.&Interna3onal&basis&of&civil&society&organiza3ons&and&lack&of&grassGroot&connec3ons&–>&“Boomerang/Effect”/

&

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are “communitarian” instead of “pluralist” – stressing personal trust and

not general trust or confidence.

One would expect that these legacies slowly disappear with the gradual

replacement of older cohorts by younger ones lacking those experiences. Two

additional factors are offered to explain the continuous gap between European

civil societies in various regions:

3. The high expectations and idealizations of the early 1990s could not be

materialized and many people in South-‐East Europe are disappointment

and frustrated with the way democracy (and capitalism) functions („First

the Transition, then the Crash”). Beside, corruption remains a problem.

4. Many civil society organizations in East Europe are not naturally grown,

but have their basis in international networks and are weakly rooted in

local communities. Especially the EU pre-‐accession strategies primarily

strengthened associations whose activities are compatible with the

‘Brussels game’ instead of being rooted in local organizations (“Boomerang

effect”).

Whereas the first two factors explain the gap between civil societies in European

regions, the second two clarify why this gap did not disappear recently. Together

these four factors show that a shared history – covering both long-‐term and short-‐

term developments – counts for much of the differences and developments

found.

Stressing historical factors always results in a kind of defeatism. Does a shared

history imply anything for a common future? What can be done to improve

democracy and civil society in South-‐East Europe? First of all, it does not seem to

be very helpful to follow the conventional practice to gaze at the figures for

North-‐West Europe to conclude that civil society is rather weak in the rest of

Europe – it is Scandinavia that seems to be the exceptional case requiring

explanation, not the rest of the continent. Moreover, especially the Scandinavian

example shows that our presumptions about causality might be wrong: civil

society and democracy are indeed closely related, but that does not mean that


“Boomerang&Effect”&&


Common&understanding:&&&&&&&&&&

Recursive&rela3onships&&and&interdependencies:&&&&

Good$news$Bad$news:$vicious$circles,$downward$spiral$&&&&&&&

Civil%society%Democracy%

Civil%society% Democracy%

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Tocqueville was right. Much evidence suggests that a healthy civil society is not a

prerequisite for democracy, but a consequence of it. Therefore, strengthening civil

society should starts by improving the quality of governance – not the other way

around.

In practice, a general plea to improve transparency and accountability of

governments is just as little helpful as the general conclusions that the past is

important or that everything is better in Scandinavia. Instead, for a common more

democratic future in South-‐East Europe the recursive relationships and

interdependencies between state and civil society should be the main topic in our

discussions. However, these relationships and interdependencies usually imply

vicious circles: democracy is not functioning optimally because civil society is weak

and civil society is weak because democracy is not functioning optimally. How to

stop this downward spiral? Three concrete developments seem to be particularly

threatening:

1. A number of associations in South-‐East Europe belong to “uncivil society”

establishing a “dark side” of social participation (for instance: skinheads,

Serbian Resistance Movement (SPOT), Slovak National Movement, or

Hungarian Guard Movement). Especially because these organizations

present themselves as regular parts of civil society, their negative impact

on democracy is substantial. The existence of “uncivil society”-‐groups,

however, is no prerogative of the East, but they seem to be much more

prominent here than in the rest of the Europe. Besides, their emphasis of

nationalist and ethnic goals (“non-‐governmental nationalism”) does not

make it easier to accept these groups as positive determinants of

democracy.

2. Several states attempt to regulate/criminalize democratic civil society

associations and to promote pro-‐government groups. The most infamous

example probably is the program for “civil society” established by the

Russian parliament and the creation of Nashi (Youth Democratic Anti-‐

Fascist Movement). Hungary’s new Civil Code implies far-‐reaching personal

liability of civil society representatives – to mention another example of


Civil%society%Democracy%

Uncivil&

society

&

(„nonF

govern

menta

l&

na3ona

lism“)&

Western&bias&(Boomerang&effect)&

State&interven3on&

State&regula3on&

lack&of&grassFroot&connec3ons&

6

the rapidly deteriorating legal environment in many countries in South-‐

East Europe. Here, too, the problems are not unique for the South-‐East

Europe, but seem to be much more widely spread. (For instance the recent

creation of the ‘Better Regulation Watchdog’ by more than 50 civil society

organizations in Brussels addresses similar but much less harmful activities

of the Commission).

3. A final point deals with the already mentioned fact that international

support for civil society frequently does not reach grass-‐root organizations

in South-‐East Europe. This started already with the EU pre-‐accession

negotiations in several countries and seems to be very difficult to change.

The ongoing professionalization of civil society organizations does not

make life easier. Besides, many governments in South-‐East Europe point to

“Western ties” in smear campaigns to criminalize civil society and to

damage their public image.

These problematic aspects of the position of civil society and social engagement

can be easily reversed into recommendations for improvements. Let me finish by

phrasing them clearly to stimulate discussions – and let me stress that these

recommendations are not only relevant for South-‐East Europe – they are,

however, clearly based on the experiences in this region:

1. “Scandinavia” is the exception, not the benchmark for civil society;

2. The border between civil and uncivil society should be guarded strictly;

3. Be sceptical about any government intervention in or regulation of civil

society;

4. Decrease political dependencies and strengthen own support

(crowdfunding, peer-‐to-‐peer funding, ‘Big Lunch’ etc.);

5. Focus on grass-‐roots organizations and challenge professionalization.

Thank you very much for your patience!


How&to&break&the&downward&spiral?&

1.  “Scandinavia”&is&the&excep3on,&not&the&benchmark&for&civil&society.&

2.  Guard&the&border&between&civil&and&uncivil&society.&

3.  Oppose&any&government&interven3on&in&or&regula3on&of&civil&society.&

4.  Decrease&poli3cal&dependencies&and&strengthen&own&support&(crowdfunding,&peerQtoQpeer&funding,&‘Big&Lunch’&etc.).&

5.  Avoid&the&“Boomerang”:&Focus&on&grassQroots&organiza3ons&and&challenge&professionaliza3on.&&

Thank&you&very&much&for&yo

ur&

pa3ence!&

VORLESUNG HS 2015 29.10.15

1


&&&&&

Par$cipa$on*and*Civil*Society*in*South5East*of*Europe****

Jan&W.&van&Deth&University&of&Mannheim&

**

2nd&Par3cipa3on&Day:&Shared&History&–&Common&Future&28&October&2015,&Ulm&(Germany)&*


1.&The&Spell&of&Civil&Society&

2.&Civil&Society&and&Engagement&in&Europe&

3.&Explaining&Civil&Society&in&SouthTEast&Europe&

4.&Specific&Aspects&of&Civil&Society&in&SouthTEast&Europe&&T&„uncivil&society“&&T&government&interven3on&and&regula3on&&T&Western&support&and&grassTroots&ac3vi3es&

5.&Conclusion&and&Discussion&


2


Civic*orienta$ons*T&Trust/Confidence&

T&Norms&

T&Tolerance&

Social*involvement,*

Civil*society*

T&Voluntary&associa3ons&

T&Networks&and&3es&

Social*democracy*T&Volunteering&T&Networking&T&Spending&T&Par3cipa3ng&

Poli$cal*democracy*T&Poli3cal&interest&and&

engagement&

T&Poli3cal&par3cipa3on:&

&&&&&Vo3ng,&Contac3ng,&Protest,&Poli3cal&consump3on&

Alexis&de&Tocqueville&(1840):&&„Schools&of&democracy“&


0&

10&

20&

30&

40&

50&

60&

70&

80&

90&

100&

Norway&

Sweden&

Denm

ark&

Nethe

rlands&

Finland&

Switze

rland&

Germany&W

est&

Austria&

Belgiu

m&

Ireland&

Sloven

ia&

Germany&East&

Great&Britain&

Slovak

ia&

France

&

Czech&Republic

&Latvia&

Estonia&Italy&

Croa3a&

Hungary&

Lithuania&Spa

in&

Poland&

Portugal&

Greece

&

Bulgaria&

Romania&

Associa$onal*Involvement*(199052010*average)*

European&average:&53%&


3


24&

42&

48&

54&

65&

89&

0& 10& 20& 30& 40& 50& 60& 70& 80& 90& 100&

Romania&

EUSDR&w/o&Austria/Germany&

EUSDR&countries&

All&nonTEUSDR&countries&

West&Germany&

Norway&

Associa$onal*Involvement*(199052010*average)*


0&

5&

10&

15&

20&

25&

30&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

Membership*of*Trade*Unions*or*Similar*Organisa$ons*(average*percentages)*





4


0&

2&

4&

6&

8&

10&

12&

14&

16&

18&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

Worked*in*Another*Organisa$on*(average*percentages)*





50&

55&

60&

65&

70&

75&

80&

85&

Voter*Turnout*Last*Na$onal*Elec$ons**(average*percentages)*

All&other&countries&covered&by&Eurostat&




5


0&

10&

20&

30&

40&

50&

2002& 2004& 2006& 2008& 2010& 2012&

*Vo3ng&and&trade&union&membership&excluded&

Poli$cal*Par$cipa$on*(percentage*of*people*doing*at*least*one*form*of*par$cipa$on)**





Main&results:&Shared*histories&clearly&visible:&&1.  Large&regional&differences&in&associa3onal&involvement:&&

&very&high&levels&in&NorthTWest&Europe;&&& & &very&low&levels&in&SouthTEast&Europe&

&2. #„Post)honeymoon#decline“#con3nues:&gap&did&not&

disappear&recently,&but&seems&to&widen&&

&! What&to&explain?& &T&Posi3on&of&SouthTEast&Europe?&

& & &T&Scandinavian&excep3onalism?&

&


6


Explana3ons&for&differences&in&levels:&Shared*history&

1.&Experiences&with&stateTdirected&organiza3ons&under&communism&

2.&Development&of&informal&subs3tute&networks&(families)&&

Explana3ons&for&differences&in&developments:&Shared*history&

3.&Frustra3on&of&high&expecta3ons&–>&“First#the#Transi:on,#then#the#Crash”#

4.&Interna3onal&basis&of&civil&society&organiza3ons&and&lack&of&grassTroot&connec3ons&–>&“Boomerang#Effect”#

&


“Boomerang&Effect”&&


7


Common&understanding:&&&&&&&&&&

Recursive&rela3onships&&and&interdependencies:&&&&

Good#news#Bad#news:#vicious#circles,#downward#spiral#&&&&&&&

Civil*society*Democracy*

Civil*society* Democracy*


Civil*society*Democracy*

Uncivil&s

ociety&

(„nonTgo

vernmen

tal&

na3ona

lism“)&

Western&bias&(Boomerang&effect)&

State&interven3on&

State&regula3on&

lack&of&grassTroot&connec3ons&


8


How&to&break&the&downward&spiral?&

1.  “Scandinavia”&is&the&excep3on,&not&the&benchmark&for&civil&society.&

2.  Guard&the&border&between&civil&and&uncivil&society.&

3.  Oppose&any&government&interven3on&in&or&regula3on&of&civil&society.&

4.  Decrease&poli3cal&dependencies&and&strengthen&own&support&(crowdfunding,&peerTtoTpeer&funding,&‘Big&Lunch’&etc.).&

5.  Avoid&the&“Boomerang”:&Focus&on&grassTroots&organiza3ons&and&challenge&professionaliza3on.&&

Thank&you&very&much&for&you

r&

pa3ence!&

donau_ulm

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