CONGRESSRECONSIDERED

Edited by

LAWRENCE C. DODDUniversity of Florida

BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMERvanderbilt University

fIICQ!]ESS

A Division of Congressional Qyarterly Inc.Washington, D.C.

18. Re- Envisioning Congress: Theoretical Perspectives onCongressional Change -2004

The early twenty-first century has coincided with a time of remarkable changein the U.S. Congress. For much of the twentieth century, from the GreatDepression onward, the Democrats were the majority party in Congress, steeringthe country toward an activist social agenda and generating a remarkable amountof institutional and policy innovation. The party's core agenda issues such asSocial Security were so popular, and Democratic incumbents paid such closeattention to constituents' service needs and to interest groups' programmatic con-cerns, that the party appeared to have a permanent lock on Congress, particularlythe House of Representatives. Thus as Congress entered the 1990s mostobservers expected Democratic control to continue,! despite public opinion pollsdemonstrating widespread unhappiness with Congress as an institution.2 Instead,the decade witnessed a dramatic Republican assault on the Democrats and onCongress itself, which culminated in the "Republican revolution" in the 1994elections.

Once in control of Congress, the Republicans engaged in an aggressive pushtoward majority party dominance of national government. During the first fouryears in power they pursued a political and policy struggle of historic proportionswith the Democratic president and his congressional party. This struggle includedtwo government shutdowns, the enactment of welfare reform over the objectionsof most congressional Democrats, and the impeachment of President Clinton. Asthe struggle went forward, the Republicans maintained control of the House andSenate by slim margins in the 1996 and 1998 elections. The 2000 elections, againgenerating narrow Republican majorities, extended the Republicans' control intoa fourth Congress, delivered the presidency to their nominee, George W. Bush,and gave the party unified control of national government. The 2004 electionsthen solidified united party control, with expanded Republican majorities in theHouse and Senate and a popular vote majority for their president. This victorypositioned the party to consolidate its long- term dominance of Congress and thepresidency and possibly to reshape the Supreme Court for decades to come.

How could this have happened? What does it tell us about Congress as aninstitution? And what might it tell us about American politics in the first decadeof the new century?

In this chapter I address these questions by presenting three theoretical per-spectives that, taken together, help us to understand such periods of unexpectedchange and to clarifY the placement and meaning of such changes in contempo-rary politics. These theories argue that such upheavals, illustrated forcefully by theRepublican revolution, can best be understood not as aberrations in our politics

but as the natural, long- term outgrowth of three factors: the goals and strategiesthat politicians bring to congressional politics, the shifting societal Contexts thatthey confront, and the changing ideas about politics that they experiment with asthey pursue their goals and address societal problems. To better understand thesethree theories and their significance for Congress, we will start by consideringwhy the Republican revolution was so puzzling and how the three theories canhelp us address that puzzle. Then we will examine the three theories, the sensethey make out of contemporary politics, and what they together can tell us aboutthe current state of Congress and the nation.

The Puzzle and Explanatory StrategyWhat is so puzzling about the Republican revolution is that it occurred at

all, given the hold on Congress that the Democrats appeared to enjoy, and that itfollowed the path it did once the Republicans assumed control of Congress.Three aspects of this overall puzzle require particular attention.

First, the Republican victory came at a time when members of Congress pos-sessed more resources than at any other time in history for conducting constituentservice, contacting constituents personally, addressing specific programmaticneeds, and traveling home to meet with constituents. The incumbent advantage incongressional elections seemed assured, and there appeared little role for nationalpolicy agendas or national election forces in congressional elections. These factorsseemed to tilt Congress decisively toward Democratic control and to make a seri-ous Republican challenge almost inconceivable, short of conditions such as a majoreconomic crisis. Republican takeover of the House of Representatives seemed par-ticularly unlikely because localized constituent service and targeted federal pro-grams appeared to provide a very special incumbent advantage in the relativelysmall congressional districts that compose the House. Despite these expectations,in 1994 the Republican Party produced one of the most massive vote swingsagainst an incumbent congressional party in American history.3 The Republicanscaptured both the House and Senate and even defeated powerful House commit-tee chairs and the Democratic Speaker, Tom Foley. They accomplished all of this,moreover, in a time of good economic conditions. They did so by stressing a com-mon policy agenda and nationalizing the congressional elections.

Second, as they maneuvered for control of Congress in the decade prior tothe 1994 election, and during the 1994 campaign itself, the Republicans system-atically attacked the legitimacy of Congress as a governing institution. Mter gain-ing control of the Congress that they had worked so hard to capture, Republicansthen found themselves constrained by the public distrust of Congress they hadhelped inflame. Unable to put in place a strong leadership structure, they foundthemselves blamed for two government shutdowns, embroiled in factional fights,and subjected to three straight elections in which they lost seats in the House andstumbled precariously in the Senate, barely holding on to control of Congress.Their remarkable surge forward in 1994 thus was followed not by the rapid

. . ublican era that it seemed to portend but by stalem~te.consohdatlOn of a new Rep . h ty's hold on power was rem-This sense of stalemate and tenuousness m t e pard. George W. Bush's 2000

hI al 11ge controversy surroun mgforced by t e.e ector ~o e 1 d f 11egitimacy over the party's claim topresidential Vlctory, whlch cast a c ou O. 1 . d

1 f vernment once It arnve .unifi~J:l~~~;::Oth: Ji~ficulties the Republicans faced as thhey.sought tOt:~~~~

, .fi d ty government, t elr supporif)r control of Congress and asserbtullld

ed

fjpar the government shutdowns anddd 11 They re oun e rom .

polls 1 not co apse. . h 1996 1998 and 2000 elections, despltemaintained ~ontrol of both houses 1I~:e the ~r e~acted major new legislation,a DemocratlC resurgence. Along the y, al. P .ty .th China The Republicansfrom reform of welfare laws to trsade no~m lzatlOn w

20101when Sen. Jim Jeffords,

1 1 1 f the enate m summermomentarl yost contro 0 d the Democrats chamber control,V . h d t .ndependent status an gave . .R - t., SWltCe 0 1 h olls in 2002, while expanding its margm mbut the party re-won control at t e p . 1 f he House and Sen-the House. Then came the major mov~ forward m con:ro 0 .t

nthe defeat of the

ate in the 2004 elections, as discussed m the prologSue, mclM

ud.lg.ty Leader Tom' . bl . al spokesperson, enate mon

Democrats most VISl e natlOn br ' d cade long hold on power, com-Daschle of South Dakota. The Re~u allca~s .e f-2002 and 2004 made clear

. h h . . congresslOn vlctones 0 ,bined Wlt t e :mpresslVe fl k The Republican revolution had been real,that the 1994 vlctory was not a al

ue. .. . the party for sustained pursuit ofnot a momentary electoral anom y, posltlOnmg

1d d t 1 f the national government.unified and conso 1 ate con rlo 0 al sts have presented an interpretation

In response to these deve opments, an. y . .butes it almostof the Republican revolution that ~t~esses It

fsulllquenessRand ~~~t Gingrich of

h h d k d bnlhance 0 one man, ep.entirely to tear w~r an d b the coverage of events of 1994 andGeorgia.

4

The generallmage con~eye 1 y f Gin rich in orienting congressionalthereaf:er emphasized the over~rchm~ro ~ ~he D;mocrats in the 1980s and earlyRepubhcans toward a systematlc assa . t 0 Cess in order to discredit the gov-1990s, in creating a. strategy ~f ~ttacl~ingG~~~C to build a Republican base, inerning Democrats, m aggresslve y .usmg hall d in creating the thematic

. "J:" " f Repubhcan c engers, an .buildmg a larm team 0 . S. d on the Contract with Amenca.C . Opportulllty oClety anfocus on a onservatlVe . d f" reat man" theory of revolution that seems to

The result has been a kin 0 g d J:" d' 1990 when he faced an'f 1 G' . h had been eleate m ,imply that 1 on y mgnc ld have maintained control of Con-I 1 If the Democrats wouextreme y c ose e ec lOn, . h ld have gone unchallenged.N DIG t SOClety egemony wougress and e:v ea - r~a. t the Re ublicans faltered midway throughThis perspective further Imphes tha p h lmed wlth hubris. they

G' . h became overw e ,the 104th Congress because mgnc h ered' they struggled thereafterd . 1996 because e recov ,recovere m summer d 1 f rve. and they suffered grievouslyf h h' al t ggles an oss 0 ne ,becaus~ o. IS et 1~ s.ru. im eachment of Clinton to save the Repub-with hls mlscalculatlOn m re~ymghon106PhC ngress then could be attributed to. P Th bound m t e to.hcan arty. elr re . D . Hastert III into the speakershlp as., .. neuvenng enlllS ,.,Gingnch s sagaclty m ma .. 1 a soft _spoken Gingrich ally whohe resigned from the House, puttmg m pace

could continue the revolution without .with Gingrich himself Well served b ~~~e~atI~g th.e negative vibes associatedRepublicans were then positioned to ~akeI:d::nership transitio~,. congressionalanother great man George W B h ld' tage of the pOhtiCal skills thatticket in 2000 and 'thereafter. . us, wou bnng to the head of their national

Certainly there is some truth in the em has' G' . , "revolution, and on George W B h' I' Ph I ~son mgnch s cntIcal role in the. . us s ro e m e pm ali . ItI~. Individuals do matter in politics and histo X reo ze Its .o?f?er-term poten-toncal dynamics more clearly than others dry.. gIfted politIcIan may see his-Yet how can an individual overcome "scien~~fi :ctt m ways that accentuate them.congressional scholars that citizens' preoccup I/ ~t~s, such as the argument bylic lack of interest in sweepin li d a IOnWit casework politics and pub-contention in the House and IT~~e7thag~nfuas ha? frhozen the Republicans out of

. h eir ture m t e Senate;>And 'fG'gnc , and later Bush, were remarkabl ade . '. even I m-of history, what was it that they had :ense~~ ~~ensmg th~ un~erl~mg dynamicsthat had suggested opportunities to exploit a' d t at w~re t e histoncal dynamics

Ins rategies to pursue;>5n contrast to the great man or personalistic e . .'

that developments such as th RbI' P rspectIve, thIs chapter argues. . . e epu Ican revolutIOn reflect b d d '.mStItutIOns and societies, and that it is thro h . . .roa er ynamics mics that we make systematic sense out of cri~~al our Ide~tIficatIOn of such dynam-always advantages-city machines in th I .events. In the short run there arevice in the late twentieth century-th e

batefinmeteenth century, constituent ser-

at ene t one party or dcontemporary observers to make it im re nabl . . group an appear tolong run there are historI'cal p g e to pohtIcal challenge. But in the

. processes at work th t d h dsubject legislators, their parties, and Con ress a ero. e. suc . a vantages andwe understand these d' g. to new pOhtiCal CIrcumstances. As

ynamic processes thmkin b Con short-term and static partI'sa d ' b g a out ongress not by focusingn a vantages ut by . Iprocesses, we gain a general sense of how and assess~~g ong-term dynamicthe Republican revolution OCcur W; al I why surpnsmg upheavals such asmore on the underl in d .. e so earn to focus less on great men andship and in the pro~ssgch~namtichs that help gener~t~ and constrain great leader-

nge e structure of pOhtiCS.To understand the historical processes sh .

at Congress through three theo t' al apmg c~ntemporary politics, I look. re IC perspectIves' FIr t '11 I

chozee .or microeconomic perspective which . s , we.wI emp oy ~ socialstage m a natural and ongoi i f se~s t~e revolutIOn as a predIctableCongress, a cycle generated byngthceycteto ?rgalllz~tIOnal and partisan change in

s ra egic ways m h' h li"pursue governing power. Seco d'll w ~c po tlClans and partiessociological perspective who h

n, wehwi emI p~oy a socIal structure or historical-

. , IC sees t e revo utIOn as d f .SOCIetaltensions and publI'c fi t' h a pro uct 0 postmdustrial

. rus ratIOns t at overwh I d Cerlll~g. party still oriented toward industrial- era r t~ m~h ~d ongre.ss and gov-cogllltive or social learning perspective which po I ~cs. Ir,. we will employ amental phase in the effort of li'" .s:es t e revolutIOn as an experi-

po tIcians and CitIze t d' "strategies by which to resolve postindustrial oli ns 0 IScover ~r~nc!ples andgoverning regime. p cy problems and legItImIze a new

By looking at congressional politics through these distinct theoretical lenses,we can understand Congress in much the same way as we understand sportingevents such as basketball. To some degree we explain which team wins and whichloses by focusing on the nature or logic of basketball as a game and the skills,training, personal goals, and team commitment that players bring to it. Invariably,as we do so, we find that one team initially prepares well and works hard to win,but then with success and time it becomes lax and self-indulgent, while anothergrows strong, leading winners to lose and losers to win. A concentrated focus onthe preparation, strategies, and psychology of teams serves us well as we try toexplain a basketball game, but few of us rely solely on these "foreground" issuesto fully understand teams' successes and failures. We also look at the backgroundcontext within which games are played: who has the home-court advantage andhas best cultivated such advantage; who has the most at stake in a game and maybe most willing to take unusual risks or to break normal conventions, as in "talk-ing trash" to gain psychological advantage over another team. Finally, as greatteams meet on the court, we invariably consider the philosophies of the game heldby the different coaches, schools, and regions of the country: Which philosophyis better, a strong defense or an aggressive running offense? Which philosophy isoutmoded and no longer reflects the realities of a new basketball era? Which isinnovative and in touch with new strategies and understandings?

In explaining college basketball, or some other sport, we consider each ofthese factors-the foreground game, the background context, and the overarch-ing philosophies-and then we also look across these dimensions, thinking abouttheir interaction. To what extent, for example, can contextual factors like home-court advantage, or a new and innovative basketball philosophy, make a winnerout of a sure loser? As we talk about these issues, each of us has our favorite setof arguments or theories that we debate with others. We do so partly to explainwho has won or to predict who will win. But we do so also to understand theessence of the game, to gain perspective on how that essence is changing, and tosee how and why the game may change again in the future.

We are following a similar strategy in using a multi theoretical perspectiveto understand the congressional game and how it changes. Thus the social choicetheory is an argument about the foreground of politics - how partisan teamsplay the game of congressional politics and how maneuvering and jockeying forpower lead first one party to succeed and then another. The social structure the-ory is an argument about the background of contemporary politics, about howsocietal and institutional contexts influence the way citizens feel about congres-sional politics and thus shape the strategies and opportunities available to par-ties as they seek power. Finally, the social learning theory is an argument abouthow the ideas that politicians bring to the game shape their ability to play effec-tively, create enthusiasm in their fans, and not only generate victory but maketheir victory worthwhile.

The remainder of this chapter presents these three theories, one by one, andthen concludes with a short assessment of what the theories, taken together, tell

us a~out congressional politics early in the twenty-first century. In particular, WeconsIder several factors that could shape and constrain Republicans' long-t

lid f h ermcons~ atIOn 0 t eir hold on unified national government. In presenting thesetheones and arguments, I ask the reader not simply to respond to them in terof partisan or ideological preference but to step back, look beyond which te:you pre~e~,and consi~er t?e lessons to be learned about Congress and contempo-rary poli:Ics as we bnn? lllt~ clearer focu~ the dynamic processes that shape thecongreSSIOnalgame. WIth thIS understandlllg, let us turn first to our social choicetheory and see how far it goes in explaining the broad patterning of the events of:he past de.ca~e, and then turn to the social structure and social learning theories,III turn, bUlldlllg a more layered and intertwined perspective as we go.

The Social Choice TheoryThe social .choice theory is designed to clarifY how the political game nor-

mally proceeds III the foreground of congressional life, irrespective of historicalconte~t.7 Our concern is with identifYing the central goal that drives legislators'behaVIOr,much as the desire to win inspires a basketball team, and with examin-i~g how leg~slators' goal- oriented behavior shapes and alters congressional poli-tICSacross tn~e. A ra.nge. of m~tives exists among legislators, anyone of which,sepa~ately or III comblllatIOn With others, could form the basis of a theory of con-greSSIOnalchange. These include the reelection motive stressed by Morris Fiorinaand ?avid May~ew,8 the dual goals of reelection and policy stressed by JohnAldr~ch and DaVId .Rohde,9 a?d the multiple goals of reelection, policymaking,and lllfluence. examllled by Richard Fenno and Barbara Sinclair.Io Yet the goalthat most ulllversally runs through the discussion of politics, from Machiavellionw~d,. and that would seem to encompass the other goals, is personal power.~hus It ~sthe concern for governing power around which Anthony Downs buildshIS claSSICstudy of the ways that politicians' goals shape legislative elections andd 111' hemocratic govern~ent. t IS t e concern for personal power that Barry Wein-gast sees as the baSISfor reelection activities and norm behavior in Congress.I2The work of Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek; C. Lawrence Evans andOleszek; Glenn Parker; and Raymond Wolfinger and Joan Hollinger providesfurther evid.ence that members' concern for personal power or autonomy shapesand constrams party loyalty, resource distribution, and reform on Capitol Hill.I3Thus the central goal around which we will build our social choice theory of Con-gress is the quest for personal power.

Our strategy is to specifY the logical ways in which legislators' pursuit ofpower shapes the organizational politics of Congress. Microeconomic theoristsargue th.at the pursuit of profit by individuals and firms ultimately leads to nationaleCO?OmI~cy~les ~f boom and bust. Does the pursuit of power by legislators andthen partIes ~keWIse lea~ to predictable patterns of congressional change? Do suchpatte~ns p~oV1de.aplausIble explanation of the contemporary upheavals in Con-gress. SOCIalchOIce theory argues that the pursuit of power by members and their

parties generates recurring cycles of partisan alternation in Congress. We will lookat how well the theory explains contemporary developments.

Congress and the Qyest for Power

The foundation of our social choice theory is that the quest for personalpower by individual legislators leads them to seek power positions and resourceswithin Congress that provide influence over national policymaking.I4 In the pur-suit of personal power, members organize into partisan teams composed of like-minded members who would use power to serve similar policy objectives. Themajority party will control the major power positions within the legislature, suchas committee or subcommittee chairs and the speakership. It will also oversee theorganizational resources of the assembly, such as office assignments and staff, andit will largely determine congressional rules and procedures. For these reasons,and in ways discussed more fully by John Aldrich and David Rohde in Chapter11, the majority's dominance of institutional power and resources gives it theupper hand in policymaking and governance.

Being in the majority gives members the chance to exercise personal powerby becoming committee or party leaders, by skillfully using resources distrib-uted by the party, and by benefiting from rules and procedures that aid major-ity party policymaking. To attain personal power, members thus must worktogether to develop political strategies and legislative successes that enable theparty and its members to gain public support and consolidate control of theassembly.

The efforts of legislators to gain personal power through service in themajority party involve a special paradox. Members' ability to work together inpursuit of majority party status requires a centralized party leadership that cancoordinate their activities. Such coordination helps the party to develop a coher-ent campaign strategy designed to win a legislative majority, address the cent~alpolicy problems preoccupying its members and supporters, and demon.strate ItSeffective governing capacities in order to retain power. To ensure effectIve coor-dination, a party may want to limit the number of "power positions" and power-fullegislators, so that undue resistance to party policy and electoral strategiesdoes not emerge among autonomous power-wielders within the party. Yet therank - and - file party members will push for the creation of numerous powerpositions, such as committee or subcommittee chairs, and for special resourcessuch as staff, so that they can have real influence on policy. Such influence ren-ders service in the majority a rewarding experience and also allows members tostress significant personal accomplishments in reelection campaigns. Moreover,the majority party itself will need to spread organizational positions andresources somewhat widely in order to draw on the expertise and energy ofmembers in crafting the details of its policy programs and communicating theprograms to constituents. The party also will have incentive to distribute posi-tions and resources widely, so that the resulting incumbent advantage helps the

party reelect its members and maintain its hold on power. Doing so ho. . k r , wevercarnes great ns s lOr the party. 'The success of individual members in gaining power positions and rb . 1 . eSOurces

nngs p~ lcymaking and electoral benefits to the party but also some consider-able detnments. For example, the Success of members in gaining extensive staffallotme~ts not o~ly helps them perform constituent service, potentially aidingboth theIr reelectIOn a~d the party's retention of power, but also can enable themto .p~epare and ~ush bills that p~rty lead~rs might find objectionable. Similarly,gammg a comm~ttee or subcommIttee chaIr may provide a member special advan-:age wh~n ru~nmg for reelection, aiding the party's hold on majority status, butIt also g:ves hIm or ~er an opportunity to push constituent interests that couldundermme the party s program. As members gain such power positions andresources, a~d. the. autonomy such success can bring, their personal policy prefer-ences, and ~lstmCtIVepressures of their constituents may push them away from thep~~ s polIcy stances, there~y undermining party coordination and limiting theability of the party to campaIgn or govern as an effective team.

The pronounced tension between centralized party power and autonomous?ersonal power generates long-term cycles of organizational and partisan change~n Congres.s. These cycles result from the contrasting personal calculus and polit-ICal strategIes of majority and minority party members. IS

The Cycles of Congressional Change

. Mter cooperating to win majority status and consolidate party control of thelegIslature, members of the majority party naturally push to divide up significantpower resources among themselves so that all can benefit from the fruits of vic-:ory. They will thus support the creation of increasing numbers of formal andmformal power positions within the legislature. They will lobby for greater per-sonal .resources s~c~ as office staff and travel allotments. And they will seek toestablish rules wI:hm the party caucus and legislative chamber that respect thepersonal prerogatIves of members. In pursuing these various efforts, they in turnfrag~ent the ~tructu~e of centralized party authority and undermine the majoritypart~ s ca.r.aclty for mternal coordination. These developments weaken theirparty s abIlity to respond to new policy problems or political circumstances andcan the~eby. undermi~e public satisfaction with the party's governing Success. Yet:he decll~e m enthu~lasm for the party itself will appear to be offset by the grow-mg S~CU~ltyof party mcumbents, who use their increased autonomy and resourcesto bUlld mcumbent advantage in home districts.16. . In contrast, members of the minority party have far fewer power resources to

d1V~de~mong themselves and significant incentive to Support centralized coordi-nat~on m order to battle with the m~ority over control of the assembly. Of course,the~r party may have suffered such a large reduction when it lost control that arapId return to m~ority status appears unrealistic. This can constrain minority

party members from an immediate focus on coopera.tion. and party loyalty. But astheir sojourn in the political wilderness lengthens, mmonty party members are farmore likely than members of the majority to constrain their desire for immediateautonomy and focus on how best to cooperate in gaining majority party status,since that is their only real avenue to meaningful personal power. They will thusincreasingly accept some degree of centralized party coordination.

As the minority party challenges the majority, the latter will appear invul-nerable owing to the success of its members in winning reelection, but appear-ances will be deceptive.17 The fragmented and uncoordinated nature of majorityparty governance, which helps generate incumbent advantage, also .gener~~es fes-tering policy problems in the nation and a growing sense of governmg cnSlS.Theelectorate, in response, increasingly focuses on assessing the governing capacity ofthe majority party rather than the personalized benefits received from its me~-bers. It is, after all, a party's ability to use institutional power to respond to polIcyproblems and govern effectively that justifies its hold on majority status. Citizensthus will not indefinitely support majority party legislators simply because theyensure the delivery of benefits from programs that address "old problems."Rather, they will consider punishing majority party legislators for current policyfailures.18 This reaction against the majority party will then be assisted by thestrategies and actions of the minority.

The out party, sensing the vulnerability of the majority, will use its central-ized capacities to coordinate a national election campaign and to focus its candi-dates on a clear, unified, and coherent party agenda designed to address govern-ing crises and emphasize its capacity to govern. It also.will seek to highlig~t andmagnify particular policy problems and perceived cnses, even to the p~mt ofensuring policy immobilism that helps to foster such problems. MeanwhIle, themajority party will look to the incumbent advantage enjoyed by its members inorder to assure itself that the minority party challenge will be fruitless. Its over-confidence will be reinforced by the vested interests that party members have inmaintaining the fragmented status quo within Congress, so that they ignoregrowing public hostility to their party. ..

Faced with these circumstances, frustrated voters Will revolt agamst themajority party and install the minority in power, doing so in a manner thatappears sudden and unexpected but that is in fact a natural conseq~ence of theways in which members and parties pursue legislative power across tIme. The oldminority party then will have its opportunity to address societal ~r~b.lems andconsolidate institutional control. Buoyed by its momentum and the mltIalloyaltyof members, it will almost certainly experience early policy successes. But theunderlying issue is whether the new majority party can refo.rrr~the legislature ~nways that reduce the internal fragmentation that the old n:aJ~nty party ha? bUiltinto organizational rules and arrangements. If the new maJonty party can imple-ment centralizing reforms appropriate to its governing tasks, it may be able to .sus-tain majority status and operate as a powerful congressional party for some time,

Lawrence C. Dodd

perhaps several decades, before the ower .centralized structure. If it fails .t P que~ts of Its members erode its

. , I may squander Its opportunity d allopposmg party to regain institutional control Sh uld h . .an ow theremain weak and unable to rally, a cross -party' ali. tff:e ~monty party itselfC Th ' co tlOn 0 actIOns m d .

ongress. . e resurgent party, or factional coalition th ay ~mmate

lchallengdem d~v~lo?ing a governing structure that c;uld e~;~~;d fa~eallts Ownems an sustam It m power. In time any ful . SOclet prob-

uld f: ' success governmg p ty al' .wo. a:e magnified tensions between its need fi . ar or co ItIondesire of ItS members for a . or centralized power and thementation, and confront anu~~:~;~t:~Pa~~ence d.e~ilitat~ng ~rganizational frag-

The success of ma'ori . ~urpnsmg mmonty party challenge.combined with the wi&n ~e~::~ le?lsla.tors m fragmenting congressional power,

Party guidance b 'ld I g mmonty party legislators to accept centralized, U1 s ong- term cycles of parti f:' al '.the organizational life of Con d' san or actIOn alternatIOn Intowell does this argument accou~~e;~~~~~or ~g to our social choice theory. Howcoming of the Republican revolut' ;; up eavals of the 1990s, particularly theIOn.

The Revolution as a Cyclical Stage

Seen through the lens of social choice theo hR' .be explained as a classic product of the recurrin ry, tIe epubhc~n r~volutlOn canThe current organizational cycle of C t cyc es .of orgalllzatlOnal change.the 1960s and centralizing reforms of t~:~;;~ egan w~t~ elec~oral upheavals ofcontrol. The 1980s and early 1990 ~ that sohdlfied liberal Democraticimmobilism, when the 0 ulari ~;ere a pen~d. of fragmentation and growingvants masked growing dPI'sePnchtyt De~hocrhatlc mcumbents as constituent ser-

an ment Wit t e party' . . .sudden and surprising defeat of th D . s governmg capacItIes. Ther ' I . e emocrats m 1994 was a result of the b-ICsong-term unhappmess with th Th' pu

fury and produced the defeat f th e par~ IS unhappiness came forth in fullbents, at a time when the Doe par

htyds most visible and vulnerable incum-

emocrats a proved un bl dd h ..governing items that they had . d h a e to a ress t e cntIcalchanging the welfare system a p~o.mls~ t e ~ation ~n the 1992 elections, such asjoined by a Democratic preside:t I;: e:~ntmg natIOnal health care, even whenand political analysts alike had fo~use~ e e~t ,:as unexpected because politicianscrats enjoyed and discounted . ?n t e ~ncumbent advantages the Demo-lock. The defeat was aided byththepUf]~hcs grfowhm

Rgfrustration with political grid-

e e lorts 0 t e ep bli .nated campaign strategy that d u cans to pursue a coordl-compelling image of a ar reuse party resources .effec~ively and presented awidely supported by it; ca~d~da~::~d to govern coheSively m pursuit of an agenda

From the perspective of social choic th h b' .of Republican leaders such a G' . h e eo~ t e rilIiant electoral strategies. s mgnc were a skillful hties afforded them b career a " '. response to t e opportuni-

immobilism within ~e majorimtyb~lOns,or~anp1ZatlOnalfragmentation, and policyemocratlc arty, rather than the machinations

of a rare political genius. The early organizational innovations and policy suc-cesses of the Republican Party were natural consequences of the internal cohesionit had developed in its pursuit of majority status and of members' concerns to acton its governing mandate. Subsequent factional conflict among Republicansresulted, in part, from the natural reemergence of personal ambitions and powerpursuits within a majority party and from frustrations with the realities of gov-erning in a complex policymaking environment.

But the factional conflict was also a consequence of the failure of the party,particularly in the House, to enact reforms that would institutionalize a central-ized authority structure. Leaders granted such centralized authority could man-age conflict and pursue strategies that would sustain and consolidate the revolu-tion. Rather than decisively strengthening the speakership, the Republicansenacted limits on service as Speaker that substantially weakened party leadershipduring the Gingrich era, retracting the term limit mandate only in December2002, long after Gingrich had left the scene. Instead, they relied on the personalpower of Gingrich, the good will of members, and debts owed him by membersand committee chairs during his speakership. In addition, rather than streamlin-ing the committee system in ways that might make it a more effective policy-making instrument and less a vehicle of member ambitions, for example bystrengthening the budget committees and expanding their capacity to constrainand prioritize spending across the federal budget, the Republicans largely keptthe old system in place, making changes that were mainly cosmetic and that didlittle to aid decisive action on their new agenda. The Republicans thus would facea difficult task in consolidating their control, particularly given the electorate'sclose division between Republicans and Democrats.

The social choice theory of organizational cycles seems to go a long way inaccounting for the Republicans' sudden and surprising defeat of a long-termmajority party, yet it also has its limits. Why, at their moment of victory, did theRepublicans not follow through and implement real reform, choosing instead toundercut the very centralized leadership that had "brought them to the dance"?Why did they maneuver, moreover, for constitutional changes such as term lim-its and budget constraints that would seem to limit their own power as a major-ity party?19Why did the Republicans themselves so rapidly become the object ofpublic scorn? And why did factional problems emerge so rapidly at the highestlevels of leadership activity, so that the Republicans' governing capacities werethrown into serious question despite their great electoral victory?

The social choice theory, focused as it is on the general patterning of con-gressional change irrespective of historical context, cannot satisfactorily accountfor these distinctive characteristics and problems of the 1994 revolution. To do so,for reasons illustrated powerfully by Steven Smith and Gerald Gamm in Chap-ter 8 and Joseph Cooper in Chapter 16, we need to shift our conceptual focus tobackground factors and examine the social context and historical conditionswithin which it occurred.

The Social Structure Theory

As we shift from the foreground of congressional politics to the background,we will consider how Congress's power struggles and organizational cycles areshaped and altered by the societal conditions within which they occur. In doingso, we will be taking a sociological approach to Congress.

A strong sociological tradition exists in studies of the historical developmentof Congress. It is exemplified notably by Nelson Polsby's argument that societalmodernization generates growing demands on legislatures and induces organiza-tional specialization and institutionalization as they respond, a pattern he demon-strates for the U.S. House of Representatives.20 We also have insightful sociolog-ical analyses of congressional politics during specific eras.21Thus James SterlingYoung demonstrates how agrarianism, regionalism, and popular suspicion of gov-ernment generated a passive, factionalized, and constrained early Congress.Woodrow Wilson argues that social changes after the Civil War strengthened thegoverning role of a centralized, party- driven Congress and pushed the nationtoward congressional government. Joseph Cooper and David Brady highlight theways industrialization and growing careerist politics produced a crisis of adapta-tion in the early- twentieth - century Congress that undermined strong partiesand crippled congressional government. And Theodore Lowi charts the ways thatadvanced industrialization in midcentury helped create a bureaucratized andclientelist politics that he called "interest group liberalism," solidifYing commit-tee government and subsystem politics within a weakened Congress.

Our concern is to assess whether changes in social structure during the con-temporary period are having an equally profound impact on Congress and itsparty politics and whether this shift in context can thereby help us better under-stand the Republican revolution. This issue requires us first to identifY the funda-mental changes occurring in the contemporary era and then to consider theirpotential significance.

Historical sociologists have argued that the most critical change amongadvanced industrial democracies from the 1950s onward has been the move to apostindustrial society driven by a high - tech economy dependent on technologi-cal innovation and dominated by service - based employment.22 The issue facingsuch nations is whether the policy programs and governing arrangements createdto manage industrial- era problems can adapt to this new world.

During the advanced industrial era of the early twentieth century, as the work-force was employed in blue-collar, mass production industry and subject to periodsof severe economic dislocations, democracies such as the United States createdextensive social service programs. These programs were designed to supplement thehealth and retirement benefits that blue - collar workers received through unioncontracts with employers and to aid unemployed workers hurt by the ebbs and flows

Re - Envisioning Congress

. d with modern capitalism. Severe downturns suchof the economic cycles assoCIate d t harm to large groups of individuals

. t only cause grea . .as the Great DepreSSIOn no Am . employed at critical pomts durmgf dult encans un . .(with as many as a quarter 0 a f h . and the sustainability of capitalisth t b'lity 0 t e natIOnthe 1930s) but put t e s a I. . h d I:or social programs. Governments. k h b remforcmg t e nee 11 Gdemocracy at ns , t ere y h' upports for the industnes. ov-

"I: t" rograms suc as pnce s kalso created salety ne P 1 mbers of specialized wor ers,d h rograms because arge nu . hernments create t ese p . d . ltural sectors, were essential to t e

along with stable manufactunng adn agncu t' nal economies. Such nations alsod . h t enerate strong na 10 . alindustrial pro uctlon tag. h rams and generated pohtlC. t Implement t e prog . d

created large bureaucraCIes 0 lib al' d subsystem politics that sustameh t group er Ism an hprocesses suc as mteres 1 rd' fi d class - based party systems t at

ort for the programs. They a so so I I I~Sup? h ration of the service programs. .'deSigned and oversaw t e ope h th move to a postindustnal society

According to social structure tl. ~orlY' e res that the governing arrange-

. bl nd po mca pressuintroduces pohcy pro ems a'al t address 23 Although the post-

. . d f h' dustn era canno' dments mhente rom t em. h _ h' b that employ a highly educated anindustrialist economy creates hlg

dtehc JO s. ty of citizens as the new postindus-

. . LI:' t also ero es t e secun . kspeCIalized wonuorce, I ., h 'al benefits prOVided wor ersduce or ehmmate t e SOCItrial employment sectors re . d 'al These citizens turn to government,

. t of the m ustn era. dby the unIOn contrac s. .d' f, ty nets and expect it to replace anwhich is already committed to provi mg sa e ,

expand the lost benefits. . . f the postindustrial era expect theIn addition, the educated Cltlzedns.0 of quality- of-life issues over-

dd s a broa emng arraynational government to a res

f. 1 d gender equality, to consumer pro-

. h' d t' 1 era-rom raCla an .looked m t emus na . al' ducation and the hst goes on.. . al gulatlOn to qu Ity e ,tectlOn to environment re, fi al pressure on the govern-, . l' "d d 24put enormous scThese "postmatena 1st eman s. . oductivity. They also push

full ff t by growmg economIC prment, pressures not y 0 se . hales that an activist government. ul al ontroverSles over t e v u .

government mto c tur c ill t d by division within the natIOn overshould support. These pressures arle udstrae. the same kinds of government

. h ld b leg a an receive 1whether abortIOn s ou e d' 1 dures or whether gay coup esd f d' as other me Ica proce, .recognition an un mg d . the government prOVides to

should have access to benefits an protectIOnS

heterosexuals.25 . h . d f m the advanced industrial era exac-Two political arrangements mente ro

l n expensive and impersonal

bl F" t government re lance 0 .erbate these pro ems. Irs,. .al s further magnifies their cost,. 1 t postmdustn program u1 albureaucracies to Imp emen .' ccentuate perceptions of c tur

. . al tu e and mtruslveness a .while their Imperson na r 1 d' t t group politics entrench preexlst-

d 1 t 1ru es an meres .insensitivity. Secon , e ec ora d . h' preoccupation with programmatic. . .' wer esplte t elf . hing pohtlcal parties m po '. . h'b" the rise of new parties t at

. . dopted in the industnal era, m I mngposmons a . d cultural issues.might address the new economIC an h ., faced with such circumstances

h ests t at Citizens .Social structure t eory sugg . t In particular, they Will turnwill question the legitimacy of their governmen .

Lawrence C. Dodd

aga~nst the democratic institutions most re' ,a~amst the traditional parties, Althou h t~ponslb~e for maki?g public policy andwIth the boom and bust cycles of g, Ieseventy of public hostility will vary

d ' natIOna econo' dr'goo tImes, the public's growing disench t mI~s, ec mmg somewhat inall h an ment wIth g , . .eventu y s ould produce a breakdown i d ' overnmg mstItutions

This breakdown will occur not be n emo~rdatlcgovernment., b cause postm ust .al "

cratlc ut because the institutional a d 1" 1 n CItIzens are antidemo_'d 'al n po ItIca arrangem t ' h 'm ustn era do not provide th . h d en s m ented from theem WIt a equate mech' , herate and legitimate new policy d' t' d ' alllsms WIt which to gen-

Irec IOns an governm ' Thstructures and procedures of a' . g regImes, e antiquated, f" passmg era are mstead Iik 1 t ' 1Ity 0 CItIzens to convey their genuI'n li fi e y 0 cnpp e the capac-h' 1 e po cy pre erences a d 1" all 't elr e ected representatives lead' h ,n po ItIC oyaltIes to

d N ' mg t em to questIOn s h d 'ures, 0 more vivid illustration f th' ,uc emocratlc proce-h 1 ' 0 IS argument IS needed th h "t e se ectIOn of the new president in th k fi ll' an t e cnSIS over

cri~i~gave dramatic demonstration of j:~e~o~ ~e~~mg the 2000 elections, ThispolitIcs may be when regulated b ( d Itated twenty-first-centurycentury electoral college to ninete:n:: Iquate ~r~~e.dures, from an eighteenth-century punch cards with su h d-century JU ,ICIalprocedures to twentieth-

, c proce ures throw hI' ,president into doubt The el t' mg t e egltlmacy of the new

, ec IOn controversy creat d ' fI' ,the presidency of George W B h dR' e ISsues 0 egitImacy aroundment that shadowed the party' t:

sahn Bepub~Icancontrol of national govern-

roug out ush s first term.

Congress and the Crisis of Legitimation

The social structure argument su h'imacy of governing institutions sh gIgdesbtst at,dlsenchantment with the Iegit-Am ' ou e an mtegral t fencan politics and that such d' h par 0 contemporaryC Isenc antment should fi ' ,ongress and its two parties 26 Th bI' ocus, m partIcular, onb, ,e pu IC would be co d' h Cecause of ItS powerful role I'n n t' al I' , ncerne WIt ongress, a IOn po Icymakin 1natIOnal legislatures elsewhere I dd" ?' a ro e greater than that of, . n a ItIOn as Mor F' .m Congress: Keystone 0+the WashinO"to E,'b" h ns IOfIna argued eloquentlyt al 1" ~ 0 n s.a as ment the ele t al d 'IOn po ItiCSof Congress _. 1 d' h' ' c or an orgalllza-mc u mg tense of . I' , ,Ience of constituent serVI'ce t'" ,careenst po ItIcians, the preva-ac IVItIes engramed f' .governing capacity of congressional ' ( d hnorms 0 selllonty, the limitedhave made it the institution m t par Ies: an t e veto power of committees-

os constramed by i d t'al 'casework politics and by safi 'b n us fI -era clIentelist ande mcum ents who b fit h' ,

developments make Congress the nat' al' ,en,e rom suc POlItICS.27These. d ' IOn mstitutIOn most d 'm ustnal- era policy strategies d 'fi '" pressure to contmuetheir fury against it. an rem orce the mclmatIOn of citizens to turn

M,os~ important, Congress suffers because it i .rooted m mdustrial- era politics B h D s c~ntrolled by partIes still, . ecause t e emocr t PVIce state, and thus is the party ,a IC arty created the ser-bI' h " most constramed by int 1"pu IC ostilIty focuses first and fi . T' erest group Iberalism

, , oremost on It hIS h (li' 'OpportullltIes for short- term Republi hall . os 1 ty proVIdes strategic

can c enges. But social structure theory

questions the long - term capacities of the Republican Party, or any industrial- eraparty, to solidify public support. Each party will be too beholden to its ownindustrial- era clientele groups, too blinded by industrial- era programmatic posi-tions, and too compromised by the behavior of its own incumbents to address theproblems of postindustrialism in innovative ways.

As we look at the contemporary Congress from a critical sociological per-spective, we see an institution out of sync with the emerging postindustrial societyand prone to a severe crisis of institutional legitimacy. Power struggles and parti-san shifts may be proceeding in the foreground according to normal cyclical pat-terns predicted by social choice theory. Looking at Congress solely through socialchoice lenses, we might conclude that nothing truly serious was occurring onCapitol Hill, other than the normal alternation of partisan elites that we occa-sionally expect. But historical sociologists, looking through the lens of social struc-ture theory, see the Republican revolution as a more momentous development.

The Revolution as a Product ofPostindustrial Tensions

The Republican revolution that engulfed Congress in the mid -1990s, asseen from a critical sociological perspective, was a consequence of the growingsocietal tensions associated with postindustrialism and the legitimation crisisthose tensions necessarily generate. In the preceding decades the DemocraticParty had held firmly to its orthodox programmatic orientation, the protectionand expansion of Social Security, while otherwise failing to provide innovativeleadership, when seen against proposals for massive, rapid, and fundamentalchange. This failure was demonstrated in soaring deficits and in the continuanceof festering problems with the environment, poverty, crime, and other quality- of-life concerns. With it came the public's growing disillusionment with Congressand its governing party and the attendant doubts about their governing legiti-macy. As a party pursuing power and seeking electoral support, the Republicansembraced the public frustration, gave it public voice, and rode it to power.

The Republican attack began in the 1970s, when President Richard Nixonchided the "credit card Congress" and wasteful Democrats and impounded fundsthat had been enacted by the Democrats in a constitutionally prescribed manner.Nixon's actions threatened to upend the balance of constitutional power betweenCongress and the president, before the courts forced him to retreat.28 The elec-tion of Ronald Reagan in 1980 then renewed the Republican assault, Reaganchallenged the Democrats' support for "big government" and pushed massive taxcuts, derided their "permissive" stance on cultural issues such as abortion, andscorned their support for "welfare dependency." Reagan also questioned theDemocratic commitment to forceful assertion of American interests and poweron the international stage and pushed an increase in military spending, His out-reach to "Reagan Democrats" in the South and Midwest seemed to portend animminent Republican takeover of Congress, but the 1982 recession ended such

Lawrence C. Dodd

momentum. The Iran - contra controversy in his second term then raised const"_tutional issues that weakened Reagan's governing authority. I

In the end, the concerted and sustained challenge to the Democrats came tothe fore in the 1980s within Congress itself, led by young Republicans such asNewt Gingrich and Trent Lott. Convinced that the constituent service activitiesof incumbent Democrats gave them an unfair advantage that could lock theirparty in power permanently unless dire measures were taken, Gingrich and hisallies engaged in a furious attack that violated the most fundamental norms ofcomity and decorum within the Congress.29 In doing so, they highlighted themisdeeds of the Democrats, from Speaker Jim Wright's questionable Use of bookroyalties to members' bounced checks in the House bank, as a way to underscorethe sense of a governing party and Congress that were corrupt and illegitimate atthe Core. To address the problems, they proposed term limits on members, con-stitutional constraints on Congress's budgetary power, and strengthening thepresidency (the institution Republicans had dominated for most of the previousforty years) by granting presidents the line-item veto. And they also questionedthe policy positions of the governing Democrats, along the lines of Nixon andReagan, and proposed the Democrats' removal from power.

These tactics and proposals, attacking not just the policy positions ofDemocrats but the constitutional authority and governing legitimacy of Congressitself, struck a chord with the public, to a large extent reflecting and magnifYingrather than creating public opinion. Coming at a time when the Democrats werevulnerable because of their internal fragmentation, the Republican attack sweptthe majority party from power in dramatic fashion, appearing to shake the foun-dations of congressional politics and to mandate dramatic change.

Ironically, and as social structure theory would suggest, once in power theRepublicans became victims of the legitimation crisis they had helped to fuel.Early on, as they sought to organize Congress, the party's call for term limits onmembers (which lost momentum once it became the majority party) becametransformed into pressure within the party for imposing term limits on theRepublican Speaker and committee chairs in the House, as a way of demonstrat-ing to the public the party's sincerity about reform. Thus did their attack on theinstitution boomerang, limiting their own capacity to put in place a governingstructure that would help them pursue broad - scale governmental change.3oMeanwhile, as discussed by John Hibbing and Christopher Larimer in Chapter3, the public continued to be suspicious of Congress and politicians in general fol-lowing the Republican takeover. In part this suspicion extended to the Republi-cans because their earlier investigation of the ethical problems of Democrats (asin the scandal over bounced checks) had also tarnished many of their Own col-leagues. But the public's wariness of the Republicans had been magnified by thedoubts the party had cast on Congress as a governing institution. If Congress wastruly as corrupt and outmoded as the Republicans had suggested, it was not clearthat they could really improve matters. Citizens thus granted little leeway to thenew congressional majority party.

. shut down the government in a budgetaryWhen the Repubhca~ Party1995 d then proved unable to negotiate with. h h .d nt m late , an . bl.

struggle WIt t e preSI e k th .ty granted to its leadershIp, the pu ICd b of the wea au on .the preSI ent ecause RbI.' own governing mcompetence,ill f of the epu Icans .saw the fiasco as an ustra lOn. all d Thereafter ethical problems aSSOCI-and the momentum ~f th~ revolut~~n ~ ~th the move ~f House Republicans toated with Sp~aker GI~gnch, co~ m~is w:blic support, deepened citizen disen-impeach PresIdent Clinton despIte PI nl the absence of a viable alter-

. h R br governance. twas 0 y .chantment WIt epu Ican . Cess beyond the DemocratIc erabl f f, fully movmg ongr . fnative party capa e 0 o:ce I d the 1990s The long-term secunty 0that kept the Republicans m contro u~mgft the 2000 crisis surrounding Bush's

. I h d even less certam a er .. f h.thIS contro t en seeme h h oned at the begmmng 0 IS. ul I h the tax cuts e campIelection, partic ar y w en . d. b rowth following a cyclical downturnpresidency failed to genera~e s.u:t~:~ tJ:to ~he wealthy, together with energy andin the economy. Rather, theIr SIZ . d ed to reinforce the sense thatal li f: orable to m ustry, seem .environment po Cles aVd . db. ts industrial- era clientele groups, Just asthe Republican Party was ommate y I .

D t when they were m power.was the case with the .emo~ra s . h the Republican revolution and. . al logIcal perspectIve ten, .

From a cntIc SOClO .' f th owerful tensions emergmgh b th a demonstratlOn 0 e p . .its aftermat serve 0 as f f h . bilty of Congress and the eXIstmg. 'ali d s proo 0 t e ma I . dwith postmdustn sm an a h . This perspective, artIculateI . t ddress t e tenslOns. dcongressiona partIes 0 a. h' 2000 .dential bid sees the parties anstrongly by Ralph Nader dunn? I~ t mPernet:

1destined t~ lead the nation fur-

ill t te govermng ms ru . ,Congress as egi Ima h dd th rediction that Republicans con-S .al h' theory t en a s e p . . alther astray. OCI c Olce . d pressures toward orgamzatlOn. h . "ty WIllgenerate renewe . alsolidatlOn of t eir maJon . bl The interaction of mternd . d overmng pro ems.fragmentation an mcrease gal. al t nsions seems likely to generate a. al d . and extern soclet econgresslOn .ynaI~l1Cs... . the threat to representative democracy.magnified legitimatlOn cnsls, !ncreasmg. I there any model for understand-

. nous questlOns. s ;>These concerns raIse se . t 01 d institutional collapse.r' h t ght suggest a way 0 av

ing contemporary ~o ItI.CSt a mi t work across the foreground and backgroundIs there some amelioratIve process a. I .. s we look through the lenses

al li th t we are SImp y mlssmg a .of congression po tICS a h' ;> Moreover might the Repubhcan. d .al t cture t eones. ,of social chOIce an SOCI s ru . I h I ng us to explain the party's con-

f h' cess ItS ro e e pI .r-. drevolution be a part 0 t ISpro , d' trol of Congress and umne. . g and expan mg continued success m re?ewm 1.;> These questions suggest that we stepnational government m the 20

h04e.ectlObnsaderintegrative pattern linking these

'd h ther t ere IS a ro hback and conSI er w e h'f' h' h might transform t e out-db kg d worlds a SIt m w IC .foreground an ac roun , h h the lens of sociallearmng theory.come. Let us now look at Congress t roug

The Social Learning Theory. .allearnin theory is to examine how the ideas of

Our goal in turnmg to SOCI g . al litics and to consider whethercitizens and politicians help shape congresslOn po

Lawrence C. Dodd

new ~deas can facilitate the adjustment to a new political era. A cognitive per-spectIve asks that we study Congress by becoming aware of the belief systems andlearning processes that characterize society across time and by seeing Congressand its parties as participants in societal learning.

Central to the dominant scholarly conceptions of social learning, particularlyas developed by Gregory Bateson and Geoffrey Vickers, is the perception thatindividuals and groups develop understandings of the world that they share withone another in order to operate effectively.31Each generation must develop a real-istic understanding of how best to balance personal and collective well- beingwithin its particular historical conditions. Insofar as it does so, its members cancompete effectively in pursuit of personal interests at the same time as theyaddress collective social problems and construct viable societies. As the worldchanges and ideas become outmoded, the ability to accomplish such personalgoals and public purposes declines. The solution, from a social learning perspec-tive, is for a new generation to engage in experimental learning of new ideasappropriate to new circumstances. As they discover such ideas and integrate themwith orthodox perspectives essential to societal continuity, a more viable socialparadigm emerges that can facilitate societal well- being and effective governance.

What might a learning perspective tell us about the capacity of Congress torespond to postindustrialism and the role of the Republican revolution in thatprocess? This requires us first to consider more closely the nature of social learning.

The Process of Social Learning: Crisis,Experimentation, and Paradigm Shift

All of us have experienced the process of social learning in our lives. As anexample, think back to sports as a metaphor for understanding politics. Occa-sionally we see teams that fail to adjust to new circumstances, such as the adop-tion of the three - point shot in college basketball, and thus lose regularly. Theteam's coaching staff understands the school's social culture and recruitingstrengths, but the coaches learned the game before the new rules were envisioned,so they are committed to an older, more conservative philosophy of basketball.Frustrated after several losing seasons, anxious fans demand change, and collegeadministrators search for a new coaching staff. The college may have to experi-ment with several coaching arrangements, introducing new members whoembrace a more aggressive basketball philosophy while keeping some existingcoaches, before it discovers a staff whose approach effectively balances a respectfor the program's historic strengths with new ideas about how best to play thegame. Once the school finds such a staff, the players learn new strategies of play,and excited fans learn to appreciate the three - point shot. Such a process of sociallearning, undertaken across several years by administrators, staff, players, andfans, can rejuvenate support for basketball on a campus.

Social learning theory argues that the significant role that ideas and learningplay in Our private lives, as illustrated here by basketball, also can be seen in pol-

a have governing problems, not justitics.32

An institution such as Congrelss m y t enched interests, but because ofli er strugg es or en r . albecause of debi tatIng pow .al d s that dominate congressIOn

outmoded thinking. The ideas brSO~I pahra IggemThosewho learned about pol-h k d ut times c an .Politics may once ave wor e , d to thinking within the old para-. y be so accustome or

itics in the prevIOUSera ma h . . changing and oppose eflOrts to1 hend t at sOCletylS ..digm that they fal to compre 'al. . ld then lead groups of cItizens to. . h .d A SOCl cnsls wou . . ._expenment Wit new leas. . . r .. s who are willing to expendemand action and to support ambitIOUS po Itlcian

ment and change. h. t ff. it may take time, a series ofAs with finding a successful coac Ing s dathe creative combination of new

hf . Ids and programs, anexperimental SItS In ea er d' bl dlgm It also may take a new. t fin a VIa e para .ideas and orthodox perspectIves. 0 .. d to service in Congress because

li . d SOClalactiVists, rawn d hgeneration of po .ticl.ans an ho challen e existing arrangements an p~sof its great constitutIOnal power, w g . experiments with innovatIve

. 33A the new generatIOn hnew policy perspectIves. s roach that appears to work, Cong~ess and t eideas and constructs a n~w aPh

P'f h t an reshape politics and society as pow-. aradlgm SIt t a cnation expenence ~ p sketball can reshape campus sports.erfully as a new phIlosophy of b~ d. .s necessarily slow, in part because. h . rnIng para 19ms 1

ExtenSIve c ange In gove 1'" th midst of complex structures,f t r' ng po ltiCS In e . . Ifof the difficulty 0 restruc u 1 d alli b t also because social learnIng itse. . rul d entrenche ances u bl b thanachromstic es, an f .. d recognition of pro ems, 0I . oments 0 cnsls an

is a slow process. t reqUIres m .. al' and also incremental processes. n the cntlc Issues, I

of which can fo~us attentIO? ~ . 34Th reliance of Congress on popular e ec-of experimentatIOn and aSSimilatIOn. k.e .t.ve to social problems and to the

. b h Ips to ma e It sensi 1 . altions to select ItS mem ers e ., . 1 alt' es that signal deep SOClet ten-1 . th ubhc s partIsan oy 1 . .occasional upheava SIne p . f h mittee system and the InStltu-

Th d rb t e nature 0 t e com d. alsions and crises. eel e~a IV f: lit tes the informed and metho ICd .. aking processes aCi ation's overall eClSIOn- m . d tandI'ng in response to crises.

. f digmatic un ers db.reconstructIOn 0 para . h of innovation followe y aSSlm-Actual paradigmatic shift comes In p ahses 'd .. and then are integrated

ideas break fort amI cnsls dilative retrenchment, as new. Th h bring with them segmented aninto preexisting understandIngs. desehp at~es experiment with some ideas cen-

. hf C gress an t e na IOn ..Partial paradIgm SItS. on d 1" hen institutionalized In governIngh alue an imlts w .tral to a new era, see t eir v bl d paradigmatic adjustment. This pat-

d t new pro ems an . hstrategies, an move on 0 f, f of paradigms can be seen In t etern of phased and segmented tra~s orma lOt?dustrialism with the Republican

C nd its partIes to pos In ,respon~e of . ongress a h hase of experimental learning.revolutIOn beIng one suc p

Congress and the Politics ~f ~enewal:Res onding to Postindustnallsm

p ostindustrial transition first began to eme~ge,Starting in the 1950s, when the p. shift across decades of experimentatIOnwe see incremental phases of a paradigm

and assimilation. During the 1950s Congress was still dominated by southernDemocrats elected in a segregated political world and was characterized, as it hadbeen since the late 1930s, by a deep resistance to social activism, with the exceptionof Social Security and occasional increases in the minimum wage. There were fewsigns of the strong partisan leadership necessary for broad - scale policy innovation.Congressional policymaking depended, instead, on a conservative coalition ofsouthern Democrats and northern Republicans committed to the status quo. Con-gress truly seemed immune to new ideas, social learning, or a transformativeresponse to postindustrialism.35 But in fact it did change and respond.

In the 1960s, activated by the influx of a new generation of northern Dem-ocratic liberals and presidential leadership from two former members, JohnKennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Congress broke its policy immobilism and imple-mented a broad range of programs designed to address postmaterialist policy con-cerns-including affirmative action for racial and ethnic minorities and women,health care for retired and displaced citizens, environmental and consumerreforms to protect our quality of life, and federal aid to education. This responsecame amid a growing sense of disorder and crisis over the nation's inability toaddress vital issues such as civil rights. It also came amid increased belief withinthe Democratic Party that its traditional commitment to social justice entailednot just the righting of economic wrongs and insecurities induce by modern cap-italism, which continued to concern it with respect to fate of the elderly. It alsoentailed response to such injustices as racial, ethnic, and gender inequality, theinequality in educational opportunities of the young, or the undue social costsaccompanying environmental degradation or consumer fraud. This period ofexpanded activism, highlighted in Sarah Binder's statistical analysis of postwargrowth in policy agendas in Chapter 13 of the 7th edition of Congress Reconsid-ered, 36laid the foundations for a postmaterialist paradigm that moved the nationbeyond issues of Social Security and responded broadly to social movements andcitizen protests of early postindustrialism. It also moved the Democratic Partybeyond attention to, and electoral reliance on, organized labor and connected itto new social movements transforming the face of the nation.

These developments broadened the base of the party and created substantialdemands that it fulfill its new postmaterialist agenda. At the same time, suchGreat Society activism enlarged government bureaucracy and expanded its fiscalcommitments in ways that fostered concern about the size, reach, and costs of thenational government. It also involved the national government-and thus thegoverning Democrats in Congress-ever more deeply in cultural and moralconundrums embedded in American society. Such conundrums revolved particu-larly around the tension between collective responsibility of the nation to ensuresocial justice and equal opportunity for its citizens, as espoused by the Democrats,and concern that individuals assume primary responsibility for personal well-being, long a foundation principle of the Republican Party.

Growing cultural divisions were augmented by the intrusion of cold war pol-itics into American society, as the Vietnam War led many citizens, particularly

1 .thO the Democratic Party, to question the extent ofliberals and young peop e WI m b' 1 ed with an unJ'ust and costly war.. al bI" . to support or e mvo vtheIr pers~n 0 IgatIOn bined with the growing concern about the powerTh; con~c; ~~:~e~:r~;~~~r~ment in civil rights and social policy, increased thean rea~ 0 rvative Democrats in Congress, who were ain~ran.sIge~c~ ofa;~u~:~~el~o;::y positions of committee leadership vi~al to themmonty 0 t e P, . d With the loss of the White House m 1968,pasdsageh?f:hebPahrtylfsosl~~~ap~:nty':'agenda depended on effective action by itslea ers Ip mea

majorities in the House and Senate. . f f, desi ned toI the 1970s the Democrats enacted a Wide range 0 re orms h dg h-n . limit the power of entrenc e soutreconstruct their congreSSIOnalparty S? as to. d mitment to and effective

ern Democrat~ and ensure. t~e pare~~a s~~:I~e re:a~:s created a ~ew "incentiveenactment of, ItS postma~enalIs~g '. 1 . 1 tors in which movement tostructure" ~or career ~:~~::itt;:oa~~t~~e e;::~ res~ed less on seniority and

~;:'o~n~::;'~';;:";o~mitment to fo""ing theP'rty'~bww Pl~li'Ygetnd~.~~extension, these reforms created disi~centi:es for a~~~tl~:: ~~u~~I~~e: c~n-careers as congression~ Democrats I~ r~~~O~Se!eU~entsof the par~s new pro-stituents were substantlally at odds WIth g.. d wI'th reformist Republicans

.. S' lt ously, Democrats Jomegrammatlc Imag~. Imu ane . ' al rules and structures that would protect theto experiment WIth n~w cfoncgressIOn. the new era In doing so they created an

li ki thonty 0 ongress m . .. alpo cyn:

ang au . d et rocess to help Congress mamtam fisc

innovatlve new congre~sIOnal bu gd PTh' ess introduced annual votes onintegrity as it pursued ItS newagen. a. IS proc. r ets for the government,budget resolutions that specified taxmg ~nd spebndm

lgta gthan in the past about

. b d the partIes to e c earerthereby ~u~~mg ~em. er~ ~n 0 erall the reforms of the 1970s encouraged thebroad pnontles an pnnCIp es. v , 'bl'n theI'r articulation of and pur-. al . b me more responsi e 1congressIOn partIes to eco 1 sed by such congressionalsuit of clearly etched policy agendas, a move. ong ~S?alu . . 37

. d B lli and b academIC polmc SCIentIsts.reformers as Richar o. ng d . Yth 1980s pushed Congress to reassess andTh Ragan revolutIOn unng e . h

e e . materialist commitments, to experiment WIt newreaffirm the extent of ItS post h . stagnatI'on that had arisen in a. . d t ding t e economICrevenue strategIes aime a end 'd re muscular approach to foreignd d d' n to conSI er a motime of expan e spen mg, a . f thern Republicans into Congress. I al b ht new generatIOn 0 soupohcy. t so roug a . . h' h ar toward a more socially conser-and reinforced ideological shIfts WItbli~nt .e p . tythe South had begun in response

. 38Th' wth of Repu camsm mvatlve stance. ,ISgro. . h'f awa from tolerance of southern segrega-to the D~mocrats paradIgmatIc s 1 trowi~ states' rights rhetoric among south-tion, a shIft counterbalanced. by the gh Jgh 'T' er of Texas Barry Goldwater

d R ublicans suc as 0 n .low , ..western an western ep f Cal' J: The Democrats' embrace of CIvil. d R ald Reagan 0 !.lorma. fof Anzona, an on ... h .d -1960s against the opposition 0rights and voting rights le~IslatIOn m t e m~ d man/white southerners to beginpowerful southern congres.sIOnal Dem~cratsR e blicans and thus slowly shiftingabandoning the party, votmg for sout ern epu

Lawrence C. Dodd

southern House and Senate seats t R bI"time ~y the switch of southern D~m~~~atsI~::~o:str~;. This shift was aided OverCarolIna to the Republican Party and th d " rofm Thurmond of South

li . . e eCISIOns0 young s thpo tlClans such as Newt Gingrich to b 'ld h . . ou ern whiteW UI t elr careers In the R bliIth growing Republicanism in the South . epu can Party.

became more attuned to cultural concerns d . ' ~onhgreSssIOnalRepublicans. omInant In t e outh Th' .

not Just concerns about the role of the fi d al .' IS Involvedbeer government In affi . .ut also concerns about traditional moral issues and f:'l rmat~ve actIOn,

fundamentalist Protestant churches of the S th S. a:I y values assOCIatedwithchised southern blacks moved to th D OU.' plm ta~eously, newly enfran-

e emocratiC arty re fi . . fisocial justice and ensuring that Democrats w uld .' In orcIng ItS ocus on

. 0 contInue to hold t Hseats In areas of the South dominated b Afi' Am' on 0 Ousey ncan encans These all 1dopments created the sort of deep red Ald" d' par e evel-

. '. ng 0 Istncts an deep blu Afi' AmIcan dlstncts in the South that Bruc 0 h . d' ~ ncan er-

. e ppen elmer ISCusses In Cha t 6process somewhat mlffored outside the S th d'ffi . P er , aland the Midwest d h ou as 1 erent groups In New Eng-of the parties' poli~;:ge~~a~est responded in distinct ways to the repositioning

. As Congress entered the 1990s it had in man . .tIOn, which had responded to postindustrialism in : ways become a new InstItu-inconceivable in the mid-1950s AIth h' h days that would have seemedparadigm that addressed the full'range oufpr~~le~s ~~t e~braced a postindustrial?-ress had moved the nation in incremental and se ~:~t:d new era posed, Con-Ideas about what government could do. It had also ~oved phases .t~ward newCongress might organize itself and ursue '. to a ~ew VlSlonof howon ?a~ty discipline and strong party~eaders1~~c:n~~~leme~tatltn, relying moreselllo~ty'hspecialized policy expertise, and committee g:;;:;:n;.ss on norms of

s t ese processes went forward the . dnot as entrenched in industrial- era al; partIes em~nstrated that they were

Ignments and polIcy . .structure theorists had surm' d Th D perspectives as SOCIalbase of the Rooseveltian era ~~~ beyo:d r:~~~~:t:nh: m~ve: beyond their laborto ensure their national dominance Th h d e sa e ut segregated Southsive stance that h d . . .. e party a moved toward a more inclu-

reac e out to mInOnties and w d d' .as environmental rotection omen an pursue polICIes, suchlabor base. Republkans had ::v~~~ume~ s~f~tybth~t alienated parts of its oldsocial activism beyond the' eyon t felr elllgn acceptance of New Deal

, Ir acceptance 0 per '.seemed to come with inabil'ty t . manent mInonty status that

1 0 compete In the So th d d h .version of ex and d' 1 . '. u, an towar t elr ownto southern s~cialean~n~~tuSIvealness.RepublIcdan Inclusiv~ness entailed an openness. r concerns an to the real f 1"Inside the party as well as betw h . Ignment 0 po ItIcal forces

A . . een t e two partIes.s addItIOnal proof of th d' ..the early 1990s . e

laDaptIVecapaCItIes of the parties and Congress in

congressIOna emocrats b d d 1 'with deficit spending and emb d a .an one a ong- term fascination

. race a commItment to bal db d W'thIS move had been facilitated b th . . ance u gets. hilecame with the new budget y e gr?W1n

lgat:entIVeness to fiscal policy that

process put In p ace In the 1970s and the struggles

with deficits in the 1980s, it was given momentum by the new Democratic pres-ident, Bill Clinton. He sought to combine the pursuit of postmaterialist programswith fiscal policies that could sustain economic growth and the available revenuefor such programs. This move, together with Clinton's repositioning of the partyin support of stronger law enforcement, went some distance in addressing fiscaland cultural problems associated with the postmaterialist Democratic agenda thatalienated key voters. Yet left unaddressed by congressional Democrats was theirundue reliance on the federal bureaucracy to implement activist programs.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, many state and local governments-Democrat and Republican alike - had experimented with new ideas about howto "reinvent government" and avoid excessive bureaucracy. Bill Clinton and VicePresident AI Gore brought this new perspective to the national government in1993, with the new Democratic administration focused particularly on new"entrepreneurial strategies" for recrafting government programs.39 These entre-preneurial strategies involved continued government commitment to activist pro-grams such as welfare and public health, but they utilized the private sector to runsome aspects of such programs and implemented incentive systems taken fromprivate industry to redesign the government bureaucracies that would overseethem. They also included devolving to states and localities responsibility for theimplementation of key social programs and requiring that citizens take significantresponsibility for their own personal well- being. The movement to such entre-preneurial strategies thus would reduce the cost of specific social programs to thefederal government and had the added benefit of providing ways to limit federalgovernment intrusion into private lives, thereby addressing the cultural issues thatconcerned voters.

Congressional Democrats, who had done much to address key postindustrialissues, approached these new ideas cautiously and stymied efforts by the Clintonadministration to experiment with them in areas such as health care and welfare.These "old" Democratic reformers, elected in the 1960s and 1970s and now head-ing key committees and subcommittees, continued to support more traditional,bureaucratized approaches to social policy. They were often locked into suchcommitments by the need to maintain support from groups benefiting from thetraditional design of programs and by the need to sustain the personal influenceand expertise they had developed within the existing bureaucratic structure andthe congressional committee system that regulated it. Yet most also believed thatexisting arrangements provided a more reliable and equitable way to address pol-icy concerns than a rushed transformation of government, as seen in the Clintonhealth reforms, with a more gradualist and expertise-informed experimentationbeing called for. Their strong support for traditional programmatic strategies andgradualism came, however, at a time when citizens were increasingly frustrated bythe inability of the government to rein in its bureaucracy. It also occurred at thepoint where Republicans were mounting their strong assault on the legitimacy ofCongress, questioning whether it and the governing Democrats were trulyresponsive to the interests and values of citizens. At this critical moment, the

Democrats' failure to support Clinton's experiments with entrepreneurial reformsprovided the congressional Republican Party a historic opportunity to push newentrepreneurial strategies of its own and become a major player in this next phaseof postindustrial experimentation and paradigm shift.40

. . t wlth the Republicans' new direction.d will to nsk expenmen mg .an ltS mgness . . rmal c clical alternation m par-

The election thus was not Just ~ sdtage:alnthe ~o s tho:gh both helped make it. d t of postm ustn tenslOn,

ties, .~~r ~ust a ~;o ~cphase in the process of experimental learning whereby t~e

~~:~~n%~::a:rementally recrafting its governi~g regime: It was. :~en~;;po~~::~. .th new ideas and programmatlc strategles Wl .

to ~xperflmhentWl -that galvanized the Republican activists, partlcularly Newtphles 0 t e game . al

.. d stituted their contribution to natlOn governance.Gmgnch, a~ con h R blcans faced the difficulty of learning to governo ce m power t e epu 1 . h ..n '.. while simultaneously pursumg t elr VlSlOnafter forty yearalsaShthe m:~~~~:r:~ed by a weak leadership structure, by in.e~-of government c ange. . . d b internal dlVl-perience with the responsibilitie~ ~f m

laJ~nty party lst:~s~:~t sq~andered their

. h R ublicans made cntlca mlssteps ear yslOns, t e. ~~ institute fundamental alterations in national government. Yetopportumty h d with the president and some Democrats,when the party soug t common groun . in of

lfare reform telecommunications restructunng, and the revamp gdas on we . ' . al Re ublicans achieved victories that serve toagricu~tural ~ohcy, congres~~n d; Such accomplishments helped the party toactualize thelr entrepre.neur~. age;adigmatic shift and to provide citizens with. ademonstrate the ?r~~lSe 0 ltS Pd. certed Democratic counterattack mreason to maintam It m power, esplte a con

the 1~:::1:a:~~:~~,2t~~~;Le~~~~::ident to much of the public at ~he time, con-1 . h d more forceful assertion of Amencan power on

gressional Repub~cans p.u~ e .0\998 they passed the Iraqi Liberation Act at a

:~;;~~~ns~::~de:;~l:~to:~:ld not afford p~li~C~y to :eto}:~s:;;:~:~t::~"it should be the policy of the U.S. to ~emov~,t e raql r:IT~m~nd thereby estab-tionalized the idea of regime change l~ Ira~ as ~ll\~fore ~he 2000 elections.43lished a justification for ithssURbseqbul~ntmvbasoltohn: pursuing their more assertiveTh d ffi ulty for t e epu lcans, 1e great ;, ~ r d in expanding on their domestic policy successes, ayideas about orelgn p~ 1C~.~~ al skill of the Democratic president and the obstruc-in the veto power an po ~lC . . al To trul ursue their para-tionist successes of his mm~ntyd congre~sl~ :;~~ govern:~nt and expandeddigm shift, they needed umte contro 0 na 1

marg~~ in2~~ ~:~s~;;: ;l::~~~s gave the Republicans their .gre~t chafnc~ t.oe. 1 f overnment and seek consohdatlOn 0 t elr

push towar~ ~mfied contr~ 0 g W B h they had a gifted politician at thenational maJonty sta~s. In. eorge .. uSers ectives that had emerged withinhead of the ticket artlculatmg the p~hcy Ptw Pdecades and representing its con-

. 1 ty er the prevlOuS 0the congresslOna par ov 1. 1 rovided Democrats their opportu-servative southern base. Yet the e eC;lOn.ahso p rty was foreordained in 2000, asnity for a comeback. The victory 0 nelt e.r pa dldate Al Gore demonstrated.

.. f the Democratlc can , ,the popular vote maJonty 0 fficlently close to the Republicans in

. al Democrats were su . 1Moreover, congresslOn 11 d the House and Senate, partlcular ythe number of seats they contro e m

The Revolution as a Phase inExperimental Learning

Characterized by greater generational turnover than the governing Demo-crats, and thus more distant from New Deal and Great Society ideas about gov-ernment, the congressional Republican Party had by the early to mid -1990scome to contain a growing number of new members willing to challenge existingassumptions about government.4l With backgrounds in private industry and statelegislatures, these young Republicans had their own ideas about reinventing gov-ernment, accepting the need for social programs but often supporting more rad-ical entrepreneurial strategies than had Clinton and Gore and showing moreattentiveness to the ways such strategies helped address cultural and family-valueissues salient to regional constituencies. They also tended to be a "post- Vietnam"generation of politicians, often too young to have served in the war or cushionedfrom it by draft deferments or National Guard service, and thus generallyuntouched by the personal conflicts and suspicion of militarism associated withit. Rather, as the political heirs of Ronald Reagan, their attention was on limitingnational government involvement in domestic life through the reinvention of itssocial programs, with foreign policy seen more nearly as the area of the nationalgovernment's legitimate power.

Although the Republican Party continued to be attached to traditional poli-cies, including support for business and low taxes, these new perspectives on rein-venting and limiting government in the domestic sphere came to the fore of theparty's policy agenda. They provided ways to reframe such traditional party com-mitments, so that low taxes and the restructuring of the tax system became notjust a business - related policy but a by- product of government restructuring tomake it more responsive to cultural concerns about government intrusiveness andindividual responsibility. Most critically, the party balanced its attack on Congressand the congressional Democrats with innovative proposals for policy reform, sothat its candidates did not simply oppose existing programs but had constructivestrategies to propose for improving them. As congressional Republicans mountedtheir 1994 campaign, issues such as welfare reform became core elements of theContract with America and constituted much of what made it innovative, defin-ing the differences between the congressional parties in some distinctly new ways.

Seen through the lens of social learning theory, what is important about the1994 election is that it presented a choice between the Democrats' bureaucratizedapproach to social programs and the new, entrepreneurial approach of congres-sional Republicans. The Republican victory can be seen as signaling the elec-torate's frustration with the congressional Democrats' traditionalist perspectives

through t~e .2002 elections, that their reassertion of congressional control wnot unreahstlc. as

W~at was historically determinative with respect to the elections, rathertha~ theIr prestructured o~tco~es, was that they pitted two closely competitivepartIes .that had adapted m dIfferent ways to postindustrialism. Much of thadaptatlOn had come from within the Congress itself over the previous sev ~decades, rather than being driven by the presidency. Thus much of the co t' er. . . ,n lnu-mg competItIveneSs of th~ Democrats resulted from their adjustment in theirsupport base and congresslOnal rules in the 1960s and 1970s, which created amore modern, postsegregationist and postindustrial party in touch wl'thf, f . . .. ' neworms 0 progresslv~sm. SImIlarly, the foundation for the victories of George W.

Bush. and the gro,:"mg consolidatio.n .of Republican power had been laid by con-gresslOnal Repubhca~s, as they sohdlfied their competitive stance in the South,challenged !?emocratIc hegemony through aggressive campaigns nationwide, andpushed theIr entrepre.neurial and ~~ltural agendas. Members of Congress~esponded to and exploIted opportumtles created by the historical forces at workm the contempo~ary era, crafting a substantially new party system and new pat-terns of congresslOnal government as they went.

T?e elections then provided citizens with critical moments of choice andpot.entIal self- correction, as they considered which party could best move the~atlOn forward. Their choice in 2000 was complicated by the cross - pressure cit-Izens felt ?etwe~n the strong economy they attributed to the leadership of theDemocra:lc preSIdent and :heir. qualms about the cultural and moral values pur-sued by hIS party, qualms hIs pnvate behavior reinforced. The choice in 2004 wasmad~ difficult by the tensi.on between the strong performance of the RepublicanpreSIdent and Congress m response to the 9/11 terrorist strikes as DonaldWolfens.berger disc~sses in C?apter 15, and questions about the co~petence of:he p.resldent and hIs party wIth respect to stewardship of the economy and themvaSlOn of Iraq ..And across the elections the hold of Republicans on Congresswas made questlOnable by their seeming inability to make the appropriationsproce~s work, as Joshua Gordon discusses in Chapter 12, and by verbal and ethi-cal mls~teps, by leaders such as Trent Lott and Tom DeLay. Yet, impressed byRepubhcans resolute response to the terrorist strikes and by their stance on cul-~ral values, th~ citizens increasingly tilted across the four years toward solidifica-tlOn of Repu?hcan control of national government, reinforced in the trend bysavvy ~epubhc.an moves such as the redistricting of House seats by the Republi-can ~e?lslature m Texas. Most fundamentally, the tilt appeared to owe to the desireof ~ltlzens for clarity of direction and accountability in performance of thenat~onal government, with a majority finally willing in 2004 to give Republicansthelf clear shot at governing.

~his mo~ent of clear choice came slowly and erratically, from the perspectiveof SOCl~lear~l1ng th~ory, b.ecaus.ereassessment of existing paradigms and experi-ment~tlOn wIth new l~eas ISan mherendy difficult, lengthy, conflictual, and prob-lematIc process. Yet Wlth the 2004 elections, the Republican revolution seems fully

realized, and concern turns to how effectively the party can govern, so as to consol-idate long-term national majority status. As this transition occurs, and however itmay turn out, the essential contributions of the revolution, particularly from thestandpoint of the Congress and its institutional legitimacy, need to be recognized.

With the defeat of a long-term governing party in 1994 and the decade-long move to new governing strategies, the Republicans helped to break the senseof paralysis that existed in American politics in the early 1990s and focus thenation on vital issues of deep concern to the citizenry. In doing so, they greadyspurred the process of paradigm reassessment and reconstruction, to such anextent that in the 2000 elections congressional Democrats touted welfare reform,and in 2004 serious proposals for reform of Social Security, long unmentionablein American politics, were commonplace in national debates.

Most critically, as the congressional Republicans faced the opportunity andresponsibilities of governing on a sustained basis, which they had not held, intruth, since the 1920s, they came to see more clearly the strengths and contribu-tions of Congress to national governance and even came to defend its preroga-tives. They asserted the constitutional role of Congress in annual negotiationswith the president, and they asserted their right to impeach a president, drawingon powers that a generation earlier they had denounced when they were usedagainst a Republican president, Richard Nixon. Calls for congressional term lim-its vanished from party platforms, and the push for constraints on congressionalauthority decreased. Although Republicans were still struggling to find a vision ofCongress that could mesh with their entrepreneurial policy agenda, they werenow less prone to emphasize its flaws as justification for reducing its institutionalpower and constitutional prerogatives.

The Republican revolution thus demonstrates just how critical it is to repre-sentative democrac