lloyd george, for and against

Lloyd George, for and againstLloyd George by Peter Rowland; Bounder from Wales: Lloyd George's Career before the FirstWorld War by Don M. Cregier; Lloyd George: The People's Champion, 1902-1911 by JohnGrigg; Lloyd George and Foreign Policy. Volume I: The Education of a Statesman, 1890-1916by Michael Fry; Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922by Kenneth O. MorganReview by: David BrooksThe Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 223-230Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638915 .

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The Historical Journal, 24, I (1 98 I), pp. 223- 230.

Printed in Great Britain

LLOYD GEORGE, FOR AND AGAINST

Lloyd George. By Peter Rowland. London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975. Pp. xix + 872. ?9-50-

Bounderfrom Wales: Lloyd George's career before the First World War. By Don M. Cregier. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, I976. Pp. vi+292. $I2.50.

Lloyd George: the People's Champion, i9o0-i9ii. By John Grigg. London: Eyre Methuen, 1978. Pp. 391. ?I0.50.

Lloyd George and Foreign Policy. Volume I: The Education of a Statesman, 189a-i9i6. By Michael Fry. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, I977. Pp. xv+3I4.

$i8.50.

Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition Government, i9i8-I922. By Kenneth 0. Morgan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Pp. xi+436. ?15.00.

Lloyd George's stock is riding high again these days. Until the late 1960S historians seemed to look much more favourably on his chief rival in the Liberal tradition, Asquith. Then a change began, influenced partly by the opening of the Lloyd George archives at the Beaverbrook Library and by the death of Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Asquith's daughter and the redoubtable defender of his reputation. In the 1970S there have appeared a plethora of books about Lloyd George, and in an atmosphere in which older loyalties and antagonisms have become much more subdued. As one contributor has observed, 'polemic has not disappeared, but praise is less lavish and more deserved, and criticism is detached and understanding'.'

The Lloyd George revival has coincided with a significant historiographical debate in recent years concerning the position and prospects of the Liberal party in the years leading up to 1914.2 Basically, two interpretations have been in conflict. One has seen Liberalism as, if anything, increasing in vitality before the Great War dealt it an unforeseen but mortal blow. The social reforms of the Liberal governments of 1905-I 4 are adduced to support the claim that the 'effect of the new Liberalism (actual or intended) was to change the class image of the Liberal party by giving it a clear identity as a poor man's party and crudely branding the Conservatives as a rich man's party '. By way of corollary Liberals and Labour are seen as competing for much the same 'progressive' vote. However, this is not the view taken by the rival school of interpretation, whose emphasis is more on the extent to which Labour could appeal to a quite different level of political commitment. Whereas Liberalism is cast as essentially a doctrine or creed, and a creed moreover whose ingredients of enlightened reformism possessed the fatal flaw of requiring 'in democracy just those qualities most conspicuously absent from it - knowledge and a well-developed political intelligence', Labour is presented as a movement, with not always very clear

I M. Fry, Lloyd George andforeign policy, i, pp. x-xi. 2 See especially: P. F. Clarke, Lancashire and the new Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971); idem,

'The electoral position of the Liberal and Labour parties, i9i0-I4', English Historical Review, CCCLVII (I 975); H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. McKibbin &J. A. Kay, 'The franchise factor in the rise of the Labour party', English Historical Review, CCCLXI (1976); P. F. Clarke, 'Liberals, Labour and the franchise', English Historical Review, CCCLXIV (I977).

3 Clarke, 'Liberals, Labour and the franchise', p. 583.

0018-246X/8I/2828-3880 $02.50 (? 198I Cambridge University Press

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224 HISTORICAL JOURNAL

ideas on 'policy', but capable of 'exploiting the diffuse, but intense, social consciousness of its adherents' and of formulating 'shrewdly contrived slogans attached to deeper and more subtle calls upon class loyalty'.4 By these lights Liberalism is seen to be doomed by the coming of virtually complete democracy in I9I8, and the party's period of comparative buoyancy before I 914 is passed off as an 'Indian summer' interlude only possible under the unreformed system of representation.

Though this debate has drawn heavily on psephological material, Lloyd George none the less remains highly relevant to it. On the one hand he appears to have been closely concerned with the social reforms which, according to the point of view, either confirmed the Liberals as the people's party or else betrayed the extent to which they were out of touch with popular prejudices and assumptions. On the other hand his career generally before 1914 is surely a vital yardstick of the degree to which Liberalism was still capable of mobilizing gut feeling and mass emotion. Lloyd George's appeal to the potent rallying cries of nonconformity in 1906, and of anti-privilege in I909-I0, hardly suggests that Liberalism was becoming too remote or intellectual; yet it is also the case that Lloyd George was increasingly reluctant to confine himself to traditional partisan topics. At all events, the recent books on Lloyd George must bejudged, in part, by what they tell us of the continuing vitality, or otherwise, of the Liberal party before 1914.

If size alone were the criterion, Peter Rowland's Lloyd George might rank as the authoritative account. The author is already known for his comprehensive, two- volume chronicle of the Liberal governments of 1905-14. Lloyd George is cast in very much the same mould. It is an ideal work of reference, a meticulous compilation of a mass of relevant information. It puts one on terms of ready familiarity with Lloyd George and his daily doings; and it reads therefore rather like an admiring account of a superior minister written by the civil servant immediately responsible to him. It lacks thus a critical and, in a sense, also an historical perspective. The reader is provided with plenty of matter, but he is largely left to fashion his own ideas. Perhaps there is merit in this, as there is in the older style of biography to which Lloyd George bears considerable resemblance. Rowland's book for example contains extensive quotations from Lloyd George's speeches and writings, exactly like an older biography, though he does not always seem to make the best possible use of them. Thus he quotes at length, but without further comment, from Lloyd George's notes of a discussion with some of his principal colleagues in late 1913, in which he admitted that 'education reform', just like 'Insurance', was 'very unpopular with working classes in many districts', and should therefore be postponed until after a general election.5 Maybe Lloyd George had a better sense than some historians have had since of the vote-winning potential of social reform.

In Bounder from Wales Don Cregier has produced a competent study of Lloyd George's career before I 914, based on an impressive amount of source material. The author's particularly good eye for the telling detail has enabled him to throw light on further corners of Lloyd George's life. We learn in detail about Lloyd George's methods of work (or lack of them), his tastes in reading, and his relations with his Caernarvon Boroughs constituency. We develop also a sense of the twilight area of his political activity, of his tally of confidants and informants, ranging from men

4 Matthew et al., 'The franchise factor', p. 747. 5 P. Rowland, Lloyd George, pp. 271--2.



REVIEW ARTICLES 225

with international business contacts like Trebitsch-Lincoln and Basil Zaharoff, to press lords like Northcliffe, whose presence, Lloyd George's son recalled, 'often seemed to brood in our home '.6 In terms of general interpretation, Cregier approaches Lloyd George's reputation as a reforming radical with a good deal of honest doubt. He does not see Lloyd George as particularly committed to social reform, or to the main tenets of the new Liberalism, much before i909. He argues that Lloyd George managed to derive more credit than he deserved from the introduction of old age pensions, whereas he was in fact much more involved than he afterwards cared to admit in the unsuccessful attempt in I906 to legislate on education, a subject traditionally dear to Liberal hearts. At the Board of Trade Lloyd George proved energetic but not necessarily progressive. His Merchant Shipping Act was not only protectionist in spirit, but even retrogressive, allowing alteration of the 'Plimsoll line' to permit the carrying of heavier cargoes; and H. M. Hyndman was moved to accuse the President of the Board of Trade of 'officially murdering the seamen of British vessels in the interests of the ship-owning class '.' It was at the Board of Trade moreover that Lloyd George developed his contacts with the business world that later became a somewhat notorious element of his political style.

Cregier sees the essence of Lloyd George's radicalism in the People's Budget of I 909 and the Land Campaign of 1912-14. Both episodes mobilized the agrarian and anti-privilege themes of Lloyd George's political youth, but Cregier does not see them as evidence of a backward-looking attitude towards politics. Both the budget and the Land Campaign for instance favoured a view of the role of government and of public expenditure very different from that of nineteenth-century radicals. Rather Lloyd George was, in the author's opinion, trying to focus on issues where middle class and working class had interests in common. As Lloyd George himself hopefully remarked, 'every tradesman, every one who has had to build a house or enlarge his garden, has got a grievance against the town landlord '.8 Cregier stresses how Lloyd George was 'ingrained with bourgeois individualism' and 'repelled by the various socialist schemes for improving society'. Rather more sweepingly he goes on to assert that Lloyd George was 'a key figure in the development of twentieth- century social capitalism', and 'a generation ahead of his time in envisioning an affluent, classless society of fairly prosperous consumers in place of the economy of scarcity with its basic rich/poor division'.9 One gets the impression here that Lloyd George is being rather forcibly assimilated to the model of politicians of the progressive era in America.

Cregier is not afraid to call attention to the ways in which Lloyd George represented something of a political liability for the Liberal party. He considers Limehouse as partly to blame for the sweeping losses in southern England suffered by the Liberals in the January I9I0 general election. He points out how Lloyd George ' botched his first budget speech ',10 and he draws attention to the unedifying spectacle of Isaacs and Masterman using the time before Lloyd George was due to appear before the Marconi select committee ' to give the chancellor of the exchequer a cram course in the operation of the stock market - of which the highest financial officer in the British government showed a lamentable ignorance'."1 These candid observations are in line with other contributions from recent American scholarship. One such describes Lloyd George's performance in his 1914 budget speech as

6 D. M. Cregier, Bounderfrom Wales, pp. 137-8. 7 Ibid. p. 104. 8 Ibid. p. 127. 9 Ibid. p. 142. 10 Ibid. p. 125. 11 Ibid. P. 206.

8-2




reaching 'a new high level of ineptitude' which, but for the coming of the Great War, might well have halted his career.'2

John Grigg's emphasis, in Lloyd George: the people's champion, is somewhat different. He is in no doubt about the genuineness of Lloyd George's radical convictiois or of his commitment to reform. Nor does he see Lloyd George as really a political liability to Liberalism. 'For holding the electoral line against Labour', he asserts, 'much of the credit is surely due to Lloyd George - to his polemics no less than his policies."l3 Grigg devotes a good deal of attention to Lloyd George's polemics. And though he certainly does not neglect Lloyd George's constructive legislative achievements, providing for example an excellent summary of the problems of National Health Insurance legislation in i 91 I, one senses that his real interest is in Lloyd George as a man of ideas, vision and a talent for communication. (Probably Lloyd George himself might have accepted the bias of this interpretation.) Grigg is anxious to demonstrate how from an early stage Lloyd George's outstanding talents were put to the service of social progress and reform. Thus he points out how Lloyd George used an early debate on tariff reform in the House of Commons to direct attention to the issue of old age pensions, and he quotes to effect from speeches made by Lloyd George as President of the Board of Trade to show that even then Lloyd George 'repudiated the Victorian view of poverty and the Gladstonian concept of government'.'4 The Limehouse and Newcastle-upon-Tyne speeches are extensively considered, but the author stresses that it was the context as much as the actual language which made them notorious. The following year, at a time when talk of coalition was in the air, Lloyd George made a speech at the City Temple 'in some ways no less inflammatory', and containing 'some of his most telling invective against landlords and the idle rich'. Yet this speech, with its emphasis 'upon social reform as the only alternative to social revolution, and upon the necessity to mobilise the nation's strength' was 'admired and praised across party lines'.'5 In Grigg's view, Lloyd George was the people's champion but no doctrinaire partisan.

Grigg sees Lloyd George's commitment to national efficiency and social reform as at times in conflict with his radical background. This was notably the case regarding the I 902 Education Act, a measure which Lloyd George privately welcomed, even to the extent of regretting that it did not go further in the direction of compulsion. But he felt obliged to follow the bias of nonconformist and Liberal party feeling, and in so doing 'he accomplished the remarkable feat of persuading posterity, as well as his own contemporaries, that his fight against the Bill was utterly spontaneous - the gut reaction of a chapel-bred boy'.'6 There was however a price to pay. 'Between 1903 and the Liberals' return to power at the end of 1905 Lloyd George was lumbered with the Welsh revolt and on that account possibly denied his chance of becoming the Party's leading spokesman in a more momentous and truly national controversy."7 Instead it was Asquith who made the running against Joseph Chamberlain, and Grigg indeed acknowledges that it was ' proof of [Asquith's] political calibre that in spite of his ignorance of economic theory and his total lack of experience in business', he 'managed to hold his own against a self-made industrial magnate who was also a titan of debate, [and] even, many thought, to get the better of him '.18

12 B. B. Gilbert, 'David Lloyd George: the reform of British landholding and the budget of 1914', Ilistorical Journal, xxi, i (1 978), 133.

13 J. Grigg, Lloyd George, p. 294- 14 Ibid. p. i 6o. I5 Ibid. p. 268. 16 Ibid. pp. 28-9. 17 Ibid. p. 56. 18 Ibid. pp. 86-7.



REVIEW ARTICLES 227

Lloyd George's personal weaknesses have received plentiful attention in the past. Grigg does not excuse or play down the Welsh Goat's amorous entanglements, but he does make the point that he was 'free from the gravest defect that a glamorous man can have in his dealings with women, that of romanticizing his lust... He did not lead them astray by making them believe he would sacrifice everything for their sakes.'"9 Grigg also considers that Lloyd George has been rather unfairly singled out with regard to the newspaper leaks which gave prior indication of the composition of Asquith's cabinet in I908; and indeed he goes so far as to describe Lloyd George as 'nearer to being socially incorruptible than most politicians of his or any other time'.20 In all this one can see the author's determination to be fair to his subject, and this is true of his political record too. Though Grigg sees Lloyd George as a major asset for Liberalism, he does find aspects to criticize. Thus he considers that Lloyd George could have displayed more 'clarity of vision' and 'sense of urgency' as regards the issues both of women's suffrage and the House of Lords. Grigg's very pertinent comments on the Parliament Act of I9I I are an indication of his book's value as a work of political history. 'Apart from what it did to Balfour,' he points out, 'the Parliament Act was far less damaging to the Unionists than to the Liberals. From their point of view it was a singularly misconceived piece of legislation, and many of the troubles that beset them over the next three years were directly due to it. The basic error was to differentiate between money and non-money bills, and so to invite Lords' obstruction of measures falling into the second category.'2'

Foreign policy has usually received scant attention in studies of Lloyd George's career before 1914. This deficiency has now been more than remedied with the appearance of Michael Fry's Lloyd George andforeign policy, which, as its sub-title indicates, is very much about the 'education of a statesman'. Much-needed light is thrown on the old conundrum of the pro-Boer's transformation into the man of the hour in I9I6. But, as the author admits, the quest is by no means an easy one. Evidence on Lloyd George's developing attitude towards foreign policy is neither plentiful nor free from the kind of tendentiousness represented, not least, in Lloyd George's own War memoirs. However, Fry is a scholarly unraveller, who warns us against easy traditional interpretations and any tendency to see 'unyielding dichotomous relationships' in the 'well-worn labels of "Radical" and "Liberal imperialist "', labels ' perhaps more convenient for historians than valid, for far more complex relationships existed '.22

Lloyd George, it is made clear, was, even in the early days, no inge'nu as far as foreign affairs were concerned. Indeed, ' to prosper politically... [he] was forced to develop a familiarity with foreign and defence questions'.23 In the late 189os this took the form of baiting Salisbury's government for its failure to stand up adequately to France and the United States, support the Armenians, and locate a new naval base at Pembroke Dock. These were hardly the attitudes of an avowed Little Englander, and it is part of Fry's achievement to demonstrate how 'competitive, disparate and even alien' were the 'assumptions and ideas' that went to make up Lloyd George's conception of foreign affairs.24 Indeed at times their heterogeneity bordered on confusion and self-contradiction, as when Lloyd George contrived to attack the South African War as both unjust and incompetently conducted. 'None of us know what Lloyd George is up to', remarked one of his cabinet colleagues in

19 Ibid. p. i89. 20 Ibid. p. 1 28. 21 Ibid. p. 289. 22 Fry, Lloyd George, p. 63. 23 Ibid. p. 17* 24 Ibid.




I907.25 There were times when he seemed hardly to know himself. But, as the author reminds us, the essence of Lloyd George's career was 'evolvement largely through a process of response and reaction to political realities, issues and crises', it being 'as absurd to see Lloyd George simply discarding radical assumptions for, say, the realism of the Foreign Office, as it is to detect a fully developed set of ideas in the man of twenty-five'.26

Fry performs a valuable task in relating Lloyd George's evolving view of foreign affairs to his immediate domestic preoccupations. The fact, for example, of his being Chancellor of the Exchequer was probably more important than residual radical loyalties in explaining his attitude towards naval expenditure. Contrary to traditional interpretations, Lloyd George on the whole favoured a strong navy as, among other considerations, essential for the protection of Britain's free-trading interests. On the other hand he wanted the Liberals to keep faith with their I906 pledges to reduce public expenditure and, in true Gladstonian fashion, he feared the effect on parliament's fiscal authority of an unconstrained armaments programme. This desire to keep naval building under some kind of control, however, conflicted with a tendency, in cabinet, to find himself aligned with Grey in a growing suspicion of German intentions. Domestic factors could operate in other ways on Lloyd George's response to foreign affairs. When Lloyd George was in deep water politically, as over the Marconi scandal and the 1914 budget, he was less able to strike out on a line of his own over foreign policy. Considerations of this kind may explain the sense of constraint he seemed to be under in the crucial days ofJuly and August 1914.

Fry's book is laced with many stimulating and provocative reflexions of the kind which can illuminate the man as a whole. Thus Lloyd George is described as one who 'understood that the prolonged absence from power corrupts', and who possessed ' a high propensity for violence... he fought old campaigns over again when current struggles were lost '.27 He was also 'a brilliant political schizophrenic who evidently expected to carry the license of opposition into Downing Street'.28 Yet, in the end, one wonders how much wiser we are as to what was going on in Lloyd George's mind at the critical moments of decision in foreign policy. Thus little is added to our understanding of his role in the Agadir crisis, beyond the observation that 'with temperatures close to go9, it seems reasonable to suppose that in such an emotional atmosphere Lloyd George's patriotism was aroused '.29 Nor are we all that more informed as to the background to the ' knock-out blow' statement of September I9I6. Perhaps this is really all Lloyd George's fault. Fry admits to his 'elusiveness in the archives',30 due in large measure to his erratic methods of recording information.

Where Lloyd George has most stood in need of historical rehabilitation is surely for the period of his post-war coalition government, I9I8-22. Now, in Kenneth Morgan's Consensus and disunity, we are provided with a comprehensive reassessment of these years which have, as the author observes, been for so long 'credibly represented as debasing the tone and the currency of British public life'.3' Thus, in 1929, Viscount Grey, formerly Lloyd George's Liberal colleague, could accuse the coalition of having 'let down and corrupted public life at home and destroyed our credit abroad '.32 Morgan sees little substance in any of these allegations. Indeed he

25 Ibid. p. i6. 26 Ibid. p. 17. 27 Ibid. p. 14. 28 Ibid. p. I5. 29 Ibid. p. 132. 30 Ibid. p. 9. 31 K. Morgan, Consensus and disunity, p. 2. 32 J. Campbell, Lloyd George: the goat in the wilderness, 1922-1931 (London, 1977), p. 243.



REVIEW ARTICLES 229

regards the immediate post-war years as ones of continuing Liberal influence and achievement, thanks, in no small part, to the dynamic and progressive role of the prime minister. Abroad, Lloyd George's government took the lead in promoting disarmament and international reconciliation. At home important social reforms were implemented during the, albeit brief, period of post-war economic boom. Also, despite severe difficulties on the labour front, Lloyd George still retained his capacity as an industrial arbitrator, able to bridge apparently divergent points of view. In effect Morgan gives Lloyd George's government the credit for weathering the difficult years after i9I8. As he sums it up, 'no blood was shed anywhere, violence was minimal, social cohesion and a sense of national identity remained firm'. Much was due here to the government's essential moderation - in short, to its Liberalism. 'There was no concerted attack on trade unionism as in 1927; private members' bills for amending the 1913 Trade Union Act on "contracting-out" got nowhere. Conversely there was no general strike; "direct action" slowly receded from memory. Class passions never ran to extremes.' Ironically it was only under MacDonald's first Labour government in 1923 that the trade unions lost 'that easy access to government, that constant open-ended dialogue which had so freely characterized the bad old days of the Lloyd George Coalition .

Consensus and disunity therefore fills an important gap in the political history of the twentieth century. Having said this, it is unfortunate that the author allows himself the luxury of one or two sociological generalizations which detract from the book's otherwise high quality as a work of history. He speaks for instance of the 'transformation in the capitalist structure, well under way since the I89os, completed by the war, which...divided people in communities in terms of class rather than of traditionalist sectionalists '.34 As an assertion this can only be regarded as 'not proven'; neither the book's own terms of reference, nor the material cited by way of support in the bibliography, offers much substantiation. Likewise Morgan insists on the fundamental significance of the First World War in terms of social history. Thus he speaks of the war as occasioning 'a profound social dissolution, bringing into prominence new groups such as organized labour, dissolving old loyalties to church, region or community' ;35 and he goes beyond this to infer that the phenomenon of what we today think of as public opinion in effect came of age at this time. 'The Cabinet itself,' he declares, 'far more than Cabinets in pre-war days, constantly appealed to public opinion as the final arbiter of policy.'36 Here again the evidence is hardly conclusive; and in any case it is not quite clear what the author means. Is he saying that public opinion necessarily grew in line with the extension of the franchise? But this is surely to equate two rather different things. Or is he suggesting that public opinion emerged as a counterpart to the decline of older value systems such as those associated with religion? One is tempted to ask whether opinion influenced by the pulpit is less public than that influenced by the press.

Surely the point about the years after I9I8 is that older attitudes and prejudices proved too strong for the political arrangements made in the emergency of the war and its immediate aftermath. And, reading occasionally between the lines, this is what Morgan's on the whole excellent account reveals to us. In October 1922 the majority of Conservative backbenchers chose to destroy the coalition rather than risk destroying their own party. As Morgan relates, they were influenced less by the

33 Morgan, Consensus and disunity, pp. 78-9. 34 Ibid. p. I65. 35 Ibid. p. 367. 36 Ibid. p. 149.




'abnormal economic and external conditions in a Britain suffering from industrial decline and imperial disintegration on a scale unknown in its recent history' than by a desire to restore the 'decencies of normal party politics, in place of the presidential manoeuvres of Lloyd George, the corruption of his fund, the intrigues of his Garden Suburb, his clandestine links with the press, and his contempt for the constitution'.37 1922 marked the reassertion, on the right, of a sense of party identity which had been rather in abeyance since I 9I6. It was much the same on the left, where Labour entered into the inheritance of the Liberals. A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out how ' the rise of the Labour party, which seemed to disrupt the pattern of politics, paradoxically restored the two-party system in a new form '38 Likewise Morgan sees the 'politicizing of Labour' as the coalition's most ambiguous achievement, and indeed as a crucial factor in its final collapse.39

Much has been added, over the past decade, to our knowledge and understanding of Lloyd George. But it seems unlikely that the man once described by Keynes as 'this siren, this goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity',40 will cease to beguile the writers of history.

QUEEN MARY COLLEGE, DAVID BROOKS

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

37 Ibid. pp. 252-3. 38 A.J. P. Taylor, Politics in wartime and other essays (London, I964), pp. 147--8. 39 Morgan, Consensus and disunity, P. 78. 40 Rowland, Lloyd George, p. 499.



lloyd george, for and against

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