denis beninger european conference on long-term care zew mannheim, october 21-22 2005
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Comments on Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making by David Byrne, Michelle S. Goeree, Bridget Hiedemann and Steven Stern. Denis Beninger European Conference on Long-Term Care ZEW Mannheim, October 21-22 2005. What’s the paper about?. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Comments on Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision Making
by David Byrne, Michelle S. Goeree,
Bridget Hiedemann and Steven Stern
Denis Beninger
European Conference on Long-Term Care
ZEW Mannheim, October 21-22 2005
What’s the paper about?
• Consumption + formal care• Time: informal care, leisure, work (c)
Parent 1 Parent 2
Child 2Child 1 Sp 1 Child 3Sp 2 Sp 3
“takes care of”
• Nash game (parents <-> children)
• Elderly care (informal care, formal care)
• Behavioral parameters?
Positive aspects
• Well written • Ambitious• Innovative theoretical model• Estimations are properly done (very
complex…)• Simulation of effects due to policy
change• Appropriate data
General comment: Identification of the household behavior
• Information only on aggregate consumption at household level
Players are the couples and not the individuals
• Time use is not very detailed• No information on household production
(cleaning, cooking,…) An essential aspect is missing to understand
relations within and between the couples
Remarks (1)
• Nash Game (NG):– NG may lead to non-unique solutions
The solution is unique in the paper.Have you set restrictions to guarantee uniqueness?
– Solution of NG may be a conflictual situation– NG is non cooperative suboptimal outcomes
but: caregiving ~ repeated game parents and children know each other
well– Testable restrictions for NG– Have you estimated alternative models?
Remarks (2)
• Specification of the utility function– Log-linear (matters of simplicity?)– No cross terms
Remarks (3)
• Definition of the relations within the couples– Couples ‘Children + Sp’ are “unitary”– When separate preferences for parents,
the allocation rule of the resources between the parents is very simple (each one receives the half)
– Father and mother are both Nash-playersmore structure on the intra-household
decision process in the parental couple would be useful
Other points
• ‘Subjective’ variables (happiness, satisfaction): – Relation between parents and children
“How close are you to your children / parents?”– Opinion on caregiving
“Do you find normal to take care for your parents?”
• Linearization of the budget constraint at optimum
• Definition of the budget constraint
• Work in progress