documents by john ray trimmed author it an

8/2/2019 Documents by John Ray Trimmed Author It An

1/61

Documents by John Ray

Wednesday, March 08, 2006

For the general reader, a much shorter version of this article is available here

AUTHORITARIANISM IS LEFTIST, NOT RIGHTIST

By: John J. Ray (M.A.; Ph.D.)

The article below was originally written for publication in an academic journal calledPolitical Psychology. The journal was planning a special issue on the topic ofpsychological authoritarianism and, since I have had more academic articles on that topic(including previous papers in Political Psychology) published than anybody else, it seemedfitting that I contribute an overview of the field. Judged by normal academic criteria (no. ofarticles on the topic published in academic journals), I am the world's no. 1 expert on the

topic. Psychologists are overwhelmingly Leftist in their political leanings, however, so youmay see why the paper was NOT accepted for publication in the journal concerned. Nomatter how good you are, if you express views that are overtly unsympathetic to the Left,these so-called scholars and scientists do not want to hear anything you have to say.

A derivative of this article did however subsequently appear in a conservative intellectualjournal: Ray, J.J. (2004) "Explaining the Left/Right divide". "Society", vol. 41, no. 4, pp.70-78

Summary

It is now clear that the authoritarian personality theory of Adorno et al. (1950) has notwithstood empirical testing. It remains popular therefore only because of the agreeablenessof its conclusions. An alternative theory is presented that attempts to integrate psychologywith political history. Ideological Leftism is seen as a desire for constant change that ismotivated in most instances by strong ego needs -- principally needs for attention, power


2/61

and excitement. Leftists generally gain satisfaction of these needs by advocating equality ofvarious sorts and by proposing that an ever-increasing government role in society is neededto ensure equality. This enthusiasm for imposing an ever-widening nimbus of governmentregulation on all human activity is quintessentially authoritarian. Conservatives, bycontrast, are primarily motivated by a desire for individual liberty and a concomitant

dislike of government activism so are quintessentially anti-authoritarian."Revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one partof the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets andcannon" (Friedrich Engels -- from his controversy with the Anarchists).

History

The rather obvious insight from Karl Marx's collaborator quoted above -- which associatesauthoritarianism with Leftism -- seems to have been totally overlooked by psychologists.This is rather surprising when we realize that the tradition of research into psychologicalauthoritarianism traces back to The Authoritarian Personality by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950). And the leading author (Adorno) of the studyconcerned was a prominent Marxist theoretician! One might have thought that a Marxistwould have made the quotation mentioned central to his discussion of authoritarianism.

This overlooking of the obvious by the Adorno team was however symptomatic of theirwhole approach. Apparently, as committed Leftists, they wanted to explain Nazism andFascism in a way that discredited Rightists rather than Leftists. But the theoreticalconvolutions required for that were from the outset truly heroic -- considering that Hitlerwas a socialist rather than a conservative, considering that Mussolini was a prominentMarxist theoretician, considering that Stalin had been a willing ally of Hitler as long asHitler wanted him and considering that Hitler's most unrelenting enemy was no Leftist butthe arch-Conservative Winston Churchill.Or as Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1944: "The Nazis have not only imitated the Bolshevisttactics of seizing power. They have copied much more. They have imported from Russiathe one-party system and the privileged role of this party and its members in public life; theparamount position of the secret police; the organization of affiliated parties abroad whichare employed in fighting their domestic governments and in sabotage and espionage,assisted by public funds and the protection of the diplomatic and consular service; theadministrative execution and imprisonment of political adversaries; concentration camps;the punishment inflicted on the families of exiles; the methods of propaganda. They haveborrowed from the Marxians even such absurdities as the mode of address, party comrade


3/61

(Parteigenosse), derived from the Marxian comrade (Genosse), and the use of a militaryterminology for all items of civil and economic life. The question is not in which respectsboth systems are alike but in which they differ..."And Hayek had it right long ago too: "Hayek's challenge was to argue that German Nazism

was not an aberrant "right-wing" perversion growing out of the "contradictions" ofcapitalism. Instead, the Nazi movement had developed out of the "enlightened" and"progressive" socialist and collectivist ideas of the pre-World War I era, which manyintellectuals in England and the United States had praised and propagandized for in theirown countries."From history, then, the obvious conclusion is that Nazism was simply a racist form ofLeftism (Ray, 2002b). How can one make that harmful to conservatives?But the Adorno group managed their self-imposed and unlikely task after a fashion and thebasic conclusions that they produced (that "authoritarianism" underlay Nazism, that

authoritarianism also underlies conservatism and that authoritarianism is a "disease") weretherefore hardly surprising. Only the generally Left-leaning orientation of social scientists,however, can explain why such a historically and theoretically ridiculous work turned outto be enormously popular and influential among social scientists generally.Regrettably, however, we have known since Galileo that the popularity of a belief is no

guarantee of its truth. And The Authoritarian Personality must hold some sort of record forthe amount of criticism and disconfirmatory research that it has attracted. There are varioussummaries of this body of criticism but the first half of Altemeyer's (1981) book and Ray(1988) give a pretty good idea of it. And what the various criticisms have repeatedly shownis that only the most trivially true contentions of the Adorno theory survive the encounterwith empirical testing. The most basic postulates of the theory are just plain wrong.It must be noted, however, that I am speaking here only of research that sets out to testelements of the Adorno theory. Most research into the Adorno theory reported in thepsychological literature assumes the truth of the theory and so the authors concerned tendto fit whatever they find into the theory, by hook or by crook (Ray, 1989 & 1990). Andmost writers who cite the Adorno work show little or no awareness that there have everbeen any serious criticisms of it.So how do we explain that? How can an extensively disconfirmed theory still be widelyaccepted and referred to uncritically?The obvious answer is that psychologists are like people generally: They believe what theywant to believe and what it suits them to believe. And facts that run counter to that beliefare simply not seen.But there is more to it than that. It also seems to be true that bad theories are driven out notby disconfirmatory evidence but by better theories. And there has been a clear lack ofalternative theories to explain the origins of psychological authoritarianism. The present


4/61

paper aims therefore to present just such an alternative and hopefully better theory.Ironically, however, the conclusions of the alternative theory are just about the mirror-image of the original theory.Politics

As we have seen, ideas about authoritarianism have been intimately bound up with politics.So our understanding of what politics is all about is crucial to our understanding ofauthoritarianism. And it has long been my contention that the discussion ofauthoritarianism among psychologists has suffered from a lack of interdisciplinarysophistication. Psychologists generally give the impression of knowing little about thehistory of politics. So an essential first step in understanding what psychologicalauthoritarianism is and how it interacts with authoritarianism in politics is to get ourunderstanding of politics straight.

But that is not an easy task. Political studies are arguably as large a field as is psychologyand to blend the two is no easy task. And political studies are arguably also much morefractious than psychology. There is little by way of a convenient consensus that apsychologist can latch onto to use for his/her own purposes. So any well-informeddiscussion of psychological authoritarianism also has to be a discussion not only ofpolitical authoritarianism but also of politics and political history generally. And that largetask the present paper will attempt in at least an outline way.

And the first task is surely to make sure that we have got straight what is meant by termssuch as "Leftist", "conservative" etc.

WHAT ARE LEFTISTS?

A problem

The popular press refer to Communists in present day Russia as "conservatives". Yet"conservative" would once have been taken as the antithesis of "Communist". And anyoneinferring that conservatives in the USA must also therefore harbour a longing for Stalinismwould be rapidly disabused of the notion.Underlying this confusion is of course the old equation of conservatism with a love of thestatus quo and a dislike of change and new arrangements. Journalists still implicitly usethat hoary formula and, in consequence, quite reasonably refer to both Communists in


5/61


6/61

(1980 & 1982). Whether Leftist and Rightist objectives are opposite or just simplydifferent, how Leftists and Rightists go about achieving their different basic objectivescertainly generates plenty of conflict and opposition between the two sides.Whatever Rightists might want, however, wanting to change the existing system is the

umbrella under which all "Western" Leftists at all times meet. Even at the long-goneheights of British socialism in pre-Thatcher days, for instance, British Leftists still wantedMORE socialism. That permanent and corrosive dissatisfaction with the world they live inis the main thing that defines people as Leftists. That is the main thing that they have incommon. They are extremely fractious and even murderous towards one-another otherwise(e.g. Stalin versus Trotsky). It is in describing his fellow revolutionaries (Kautsky andothers) that Lenin himself spoke swingeingly of "the full depth of their stupidity, pedantry,baseness and betrayal of working-class interests" (Lenin, 1952). He could hardly havespoken more contemptuously of the Tsar.The Rightist, by contrast, generally has no need either for change or its converse. If

anything, Rightists favour progress -- both material and social. So when Rightists areconservative (cautious), it is not because of their attitude to change per se. On someoccasions they may even agree with the particular policy outcomes that the Leftist claimsto desire. When they resist change, then, it is mainly when it appears incautious -- and theyare cautious (skeptical of the net benefits of particular policies) generally because of theirrealism about the limitations (selfishness, folly, shortsightedness, aggressiveness etc.) ofmany of their fellow humans (Ray, 1972, 1974 & 1981). So it is only vis a vis Leftists thatthe Right can on some occasions and in some eras appear conservative (cautious aboutproposals for social change). But I will say more later about what really motivatesconservatives.

Leftists do not of course want just any change. In particular, they want change that tends inthe direction of tearing down or drastically revising existing authorities, power structuresand social arrangements. And this generally takes the form of advocating greater equalitybetween people. What the Leftist ultimately wants in this direction however is fairly heroicin its dimensions and unlikely ever to be fully achieved in at least contemporary Westernsocieties so the Leftist always has a corrosive discontent with the world he lives in andtherefore is permanently in a position of wanting change from the way things are. Andsince any change that Rightists want is in an entirely different direction, the Rightist iscommonly cast into the position of the opponent of change. So it is only insofar as theLeftist is in sole charge of the agenda that the Rightist is truly a conservative (opponent ofchange).Needless to say, the now blatant failure of Communism and Socialism worldwide --failures both in humanity and economics -- has now removed the Leftist from thatprivileged position vis a vis the political agenda and the sort of change that is most to beseen on at least the economic agenda these days is change in a Rightist direction -- whichnow commonly casts the Leftist into the role of opponent of change.


7/61

But, despite that, in the end it was the Leftist's hunger for big changes in society, evenrevolutionary change, that, from the French revolution onwards, made attitude to change animportant differentiator of both people and political parties.

Leftists in Power

This paper started out with an endeavour fairly characteristic of modern Anglo-Americananalytical philosophy (Hospers, 1967): An endeavour to analyse and make coherent theway terms like "Leftist", "Liberal", "Socialist", "Communist" etc are commonly used. Oncean underlying focus for such terms had been "discovered", the psychology underlying thatfocus was considered. The analysis was however principally of what Leftism/liberalism isin the economically advanced countries of the contemporary "Western" world -- whereLeftists have only ever had partial success in implementing their programmes. So whathappens when Leftists get fully into power? Does the same analysis apply?

For a start, it should be obvious that the personality and goals of the Leftist do not changejust because he gets into power. He is still the same person. And that this is true is certainlyvery clear in the case of Lenin -- who is surely the example par excellence of a Leftist whovery clearly did get into power. In his post-revolutionary philippic against his moreidealistic revolutionary comrades, Lenin (1952) makes very clear that "absolutecentralization and the strictest discipline of the proletariat" are still in his view essentialfeatures of the new regime. He speaks very much like the authoritarian dictator that he wasbut is nonetheless being perfectly consistent with the universal Leftist wish for stronggovernment power and control over the population -- but only as long as Leftists are incharge. So Leftists in power certainly do NOT cause the State to "wither away" -- as Marxforesaw in "The Communist Manifesto".Obviously, Leftists in power also cease to want change. Aside from their focus onindustrialization, change in the Soviet Union was glacial and any institutional change orchange in the locus or nature of political power was ferociously resisted. So if a clamourfor change is characteristic of Leftists in the "West" but not characteristic when Leftistsattain full power, what are the real, underlying motives of Leftism?

WHY LEFTIST?

That question can be answered on a number of levels. The normal answer given by Leftiststhemselves, of course, is that existing societies are unjust -- where justice is defined aseverybody getting more or less equal economic rewards and access to power regardless ofanything that they might do or not do. This however just leads to the further questions ofwhy the Leftist is concerned about justice and why does he define justice in such asimplistic way?


8/61

Generally speaking, the answer to that is a simple and obvious one: The Leftist voter is in adisadvantaged position relative to the society in which he lives and so would benefit from amore equal distribution of society's resources.But not all Leftists are in that position. From Marx and Engels onwards, the more vocal and

prominent Leftists have tended in fact to be from relatively privileged backgrounds. Whatmotivates such "ideological" Leftists? Much of what follows will be taken up with somesuggestions about that. It would be foolish to propose that only one thing could lead to aLeftist orientation so several theories are put forward with the view that any one or perhapsmore than one could explain the orientation of any given individual.

Ego need

The theory that would seem to have the widest explanatory power is that Leftist advocacy

serves ego needs. It is submitted here that the major psychological reason why Leftists sozealously criticize the existing order and advocate change is in order to feed a pressingneed for self-inflation and ego-boosting -- and ultimately for power, the greatest ego boostof all. They need public attention; they need to demonstrate outrage; they need to feel wiserand kinder and more righteous than most of their fellow man. They fancy for themselvesthe heroic role of David versus Goliath. They need to show that they are in the small clubof the virtuous and the wise so that they can nobly instruct and order about their less wiseand less virtuous fellow-citizens. Their need is a pressing need for attention, for self-advertisement and self-promotion -- generally in the absence of any real claims in thatdirection. They are people who need to feel important and who are aggrieved at their lackof recognition and power. One is tempted to hypothesize that, when they were children,their mothers didn't look when they said, "Mummy, look at me".This means that the "warm inner glow" that they obtain from their advocacy and agitationis greatly prized. So it is no wonder that inconvenient facts -- such as scientific findingsabout the overwhelming influence of human heredity or historical truths about the brutalityof all of the many Communist regimes the world had in the 20th century -- aredeterminedly ignored. This view of Leftism as a club of the righteous that must never bedisturbed or threatened is explored in detail by Warby (2002).EnvyAnd, of course, people who themselves desperately want power, attention and praise envywith a passion those who already have that. Businessmen, "the establishment", rich people,upper class people, powerful politicians and anybody who helps perpetuate the existingorder in any way are seen by the Leftist as obstacles to him having what he wants. They areall seen as automatically "unworthy" compared to his own great virtues and claims on whatthey already have. "Why should they have ........ ?" is the Leftist's implicit cry -- and thosewho share that angry cry have an understanding of one-another that no rational argumentcould achieve and that no outsider can ever share.


9/61

The Leftist's passion for equality is really therefore only apparently a desire to lift thedisadvantaged up. In reality it is a hatred of all those in society who are already in asuperior or more powerful position to the Leftist and a desire to cut them down to size.

Envy is a very common thing and most of us have probably at some time envied someonebut, for someone with the Leftist's strong ego needs, envy becomes a hatred and aconsuming force that easily accounts for the ferocious brutality of Communist movementsand the economically destructive policies (such as punitively high taxation, price controlsand over-regulation generally) employed by Leftists in resolutely democratic societies.So the economic destruction and general impoverishment typically brought about by

Leftists is not as irrational as it at first seems. The Leftist actually wants that. Makingothers poorer is usually an infinitely higher priority for him than doing anybody any good.One suspects that most individual Leftists realize that no revolution or social

transformation is ever going to put them personally into a position of wealth or power sothe destruction of the wealth and power and satisfaction of those who already have it mustbe the main thing they hope to get out of supporting Leftist politics. For a fuller account ofthe enormously destructive nature of envy see Schoeck (1969).Whether or not someone is important, rich, successful, famous, poweful etc., is however ofcourse very much a matter of individual perception. This "relativity" of importance,prestige etc. would seem to explain why many active Leftists are in fact college oruniversity professors. College or university professor is a generally high status occupationthat provides an above-average income so might, on the face of it, be seen as alreadyproviding considerable recognition and praise. But if status is precisely why certain peoplehave gone to the considerable trouble generally required to enter that occupation, it couldwell be that the ego need of that person is so big that even more recognition is then craved.A college professorship may be prestigious but still be seen as providing far too littlepower, public exposure and opportunity for self-display. "Seeing I am so smart, I should berunning the whole show", is an obvious line of thought for such people. Just some powerand fame is still not enough power and fame for them.Such great egotism and hunger for power and attention does of course make a mockery ofthe Leftist's claim to be in favour of equality. Like the pigs in George Orwell's "Animalfarm", the Leftist wants to be "more equal than others". He wants to rule or at leastdominate. Beneath his deceptive rhetoric, he is the ultimate elitist. He actually despisesmost of his fellow men and thinks that only he and his clique are fit to run everything. Thelast thing he wants is to be lost in a sea of equal people.And nothing above, of course, is meant to suggest that pressing ego needs, self-

righteousness etc are confined to Leftists. It is merely meant to say that Leftism is theprincipal political expression of such needs. Such needs can also be met by religion etc.and it must be noted that Communism was often described as a religion by its critics. Whypeople choose politics rather than some other means of meeting their ego needs would have


10/61

to be the subject of a whole new enquiry but it seems possible that the potentially verybroad exposure that politics provides to an individual might attract the people with the veryhighest ego needs. This high level of ego need among Leftists would also explain thegenerally much greater political activism of the political Left compared to the generallyrather somnolent political Right.

It would also explain why Leftists so often have a "spare me the details" or "Don't worryabout the facts" orientation. For most Leftists, it is the activism itself rather than what isadvocated that is the main point of the exercise. As long as the cause advocated is bothgenerally praiseworthy and disruptive to implement, that will suffice. If the Leftist cannothave power, praise and attention are the next best thing from a Leftist's point of view.The need for self-display does however in MOST people tend to decline as they mature --which is part of the reason why graduates tend to be less radical than students and whyolder people tend to be much more conservative than young people (Ray, 1985). Tomisquote Lenin (1952) only slightly, much of Leftism would appear to be "an infantile

disorder".

GuiltAnother psychological motivation for Leftism that is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Levite,1998) is one that seems on the face of it rather dubious: Guilt. The claim is that affluentpeople feel bad (guilty) when they see how poorly others are doing and want to rectify thatby getting handouts for the disadvantaged (but not from their own pockets of course). Thiscould be mere Leftist persiflage: Leftists may sometimes explain their motives in such ahigh-minded way but if they really felt guilty it would seem that there is plenty they coulddo to help others rather than agitating for higher taxes.The undoubted fact that Left activists (from the Bolsheviks on) tend to come from affluentfamilies does not necessarily point to guilt as their motive. It could show that those whohave all that they want materially then seek other luxuries: such as excitement, self-righteousness, praise and power -- particularly excitement in the case of "rich kid" Leftists.And if you can have praise and self-righteousness along with your excitement what a gooddeal it is! It is much the same motivation that causes self-made rich men (such asMicrosoft's Bill Gates) to become highly philanthropic. Bill Gates has power and wealth sohe now seeks praise and righteousness.

Other Causes of Leftism

There are, however, many other possible reasons for Leftism. Some that appear related tothe prime motivation (ego need) given initially above would appear to be:


11/61

Some Leftists just think themselves clever for being able to criticize.Some Leftists are simply cynical opportunists who see opportunity for themselves inchange.

Some Leftists are simply hiding their real hatred of their fellow man in a cloak of goodintentions. They want to hurt their fellow man but need to change the system (a"revolution") to get the opportunity of doing so.

The more "revolutionary" and Trotskyite Left often use the word "smash" in their slogans(e.g. smash racism, smash capitalism, smash various political leaders) so it seems probablethat some Leftists simply lust to smash things. They seek a socially acceptable excuse fortheir barely suppressed destructive urges. They presumably are the ones who areresponsible for the violence and destruction that often accompanies Leftist street and

campus demonstrations. Violent change is what they are interested in. Presumably, inanother time and place, many of them would have joined Hitler's Brownshirts.

***********

But not all motivations for Leftism are as discreditable as the ones given above. Among themore sincere motivations for Leftism would be:

Some are genuinely outraged by things that they do not understand and are unwise enoughto want to change those things willy nilly. In particular, they may be genuinely grieved bythe unhappy experiences of others and want to fix that ASAP without being wise enough toseek for means of fixing it that have some prospect of working or that are not self-defeating. They might, for instance, be disturbed by the impact of rising rents on the poorand propose rent-control as a quick-fix solution -- though a few minutes of thought or themost elementary inquiry should tell them that rent control will after a time also have theeffect of degrading and shrinking the existing stock of rental accomodation and drying upthe supply of new rental accomodation, both of which make the poor much worse off in thelong run.The Leftist may still be young and unaware of most of life's complexities so that thedrastically simple "solutions" and mantras proffered by the Left simply seem reasonable.Leftism has the appeal of simplicity.Some, again particularly the young, are idealists who find the imperfect state of the realworld unsatisfying. That there is some genuine idealism even among extreme Leftists isshown by the exoduses from Communist Parties in the economically successful "Western"democracies that followed the violent Soviet suppression of the East German, Hungarian


12/61

and Czechoslovak uprisings against Communist rule in 1953, 1956 and 1968. Once the realnature of Communist regimes became too clear to be denied, honest decent people whosewishful thinking had led them to believe Communist protestations of benevolence and goodintentions saw the light and abandoned Communism. In the USA (in New Yorkparticularly), some liberal intellectuals even saw enough in the Soviet actions of those

times to cause them to abandon "liberalism" and found neo-conservatism. Similarly inAustralia of the 1950s and '60s, the Andersonian libertarians of Sydney were alsointellectuals who might otherwise have been Leftists but who were united by realism aboutSoviet brutality.Some Leftists know that they themselves are weird by general social standards so preachchange towards greater tolerance for all weirdness out of sheer self-interest. As GeorgeOrwell apparently once said long ago: "There is the horrible -- the really disquieting --prevalence of cranks wherever Socialists are gathered together. One sometimes gets theimpression that the mere words 'socialism' and 'communism' draw towards them withmagnetic force every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-wearer, sex maniac, Quaker,

'nature-cure' quack, pacifist and feminist in England."Leftism works as a religion for atheists. There would appear to be a strong inborn need forreligion in human beings. Even in the present skeptical, scientific and materialistic ageabout half of all Americans are churchgoers and years of indoctrination into atheism by theCommunists seem to have left the Church stronger than ever in Russia and Poland. Andeven among those with no formal religious affiliations, very few are outright atheists. SoLeftism could be seen as a Godless religion -- something that meets the religious needs ofthose who for various reasons are dissatisfied either with other religions or withsupernatural ideas in general. Not all religions have a dominant God or father-figure attheir centre (e.g. Taoism, Confucianism, Shinto) and a religion that dispenses with thesupernatural altogether does not therefore seem impossibly paradoxical. The identificationof Leftism as a religion is very commonly made and the ability to believe in things thatsound good but have very little supportive evidence would certainly seem to constitute acommon core between Leftism and other religions. Both Leftists and the religious could, inother words, be seen as the wishful thinkers of the world: A very large throng. And, as areligion originally emanating from the economically successful "Western" democracies,Leftism is typical in being very proselytizing and intolerant of competing religions.Another reason for Leftism that seems worth considering comes from biological theory. Ifthere can be sociological and psychological explanations for Leftism, why not biologicalones too? Martin & Jardine (1986) and Eaves, Heath, Martin, Meyer & Corey (1999) havereported strong genetic heritability for political orientation so the possibility of a biologicalexplanation must be taken seriously. A possible biological or evolutionary explanationwould be that Leftism is a remnant of the primitive hunter-gatherer in us. A liking forchange might have been highly adaptive among hunter-gatherers because it caused them towander around the landscape more and thus exposed them to a greater diversity of food-sources. Some support for this is the strong tradition, still occasionally observable today,for Australian Aborigines to want to "go walkabout" (leave their current environment) from


13/61

time to time. Australian Aborigines were, of course, a purely hunter-gatherer people beforethe coming of the white man.Against this view, however, one must put the fact that hunter gatherer societies in generalseem to be characterized more by changelessness than anything else. In hunter-gatherer

tribes the same things are done in the same way for generation after generation. It could behowever that a changeless environment usually prevents significant change in practicesregardless of any desire for change. The corollary of this explanation, of course, is that aconservative orientation has been selected for by the requirements of civilization: Peoplewho are psychologically settled are needed to make civilization work.A final possibility among the more creditable motivations for Leftism locates the appeal ofLeftism solely in its usual stress on equality. The French Leftist Todd (1985) has putforward anthropological evidence to suggest that Leftism has strong appeal only incountries where child-rearing practices stress equality of treatment between siblings. ThusRussia showed easy acceptance of Communism because Russian parents normally go to

great length to treat all their children equally -- particularly by dividing up inheritances(property) equally. Whereas Britain has only ever had a tiny Communist party because ofthe traditional English practice of primogeniture -- where the eldest son gets almost all ofthe inherited property. English child-rearing practices have never had a devotion to treatingsiblings equally so the English do not usually expect or hope for equality of propertydistribution in later life. So your attraction to the dream of equality may reflect a childhoodwhere parents imposed a rule of equality. Because of your childhood experiences, equalityseems emotionally "right", regardless of its practicality.

Note however, that the work by Martin & Jardine (1986) and Eaves, Heath, Martin, Meyer& Corey (1999) showing that Leftism is to a very considerable extent geneticallytransmitted rather than learnt militates against this as a general explanation for Leftism.Explanations of Leftism in terms of personality variables -- such as strong ego-need -- donot encounter this objection as the strong genetic transmission of personality characteristicshas often been demonstrated (e.g. Lake, Eaves, Maes, Heath & Martin, 2000).

SO WHAT ARE RIGHTISTS?

The initial focus in this paper has been on defining and explaining what Leftism is. But,large a project though it is, it is also of course necessary to give at least a skeletal outline ofwhat Rightism is. If Leftism and Rightism are NOT mirror-images, as this paper asserts,


14/61

some such account is necessary in order to complete the picture. I have, however, writtenone book and many previous papers for those who wish to study conservatism at greaterlength than is offered here (See Ray, 1972b, 1973, 1974, 1979 & 1981). Briefly, however,it will be proposed here that the main focus of conservatism has now for many centuriesbeen a stress on individual liberties and a concomitant dislike of big governmernt and of

centralized power generally.

Military Dictators?

In the late 20th century, it was a common rhetorical ploy of the more "revolutionary" Leftin the "Western" world simply to ignore democracy as an alternative to Communism.Instead they would excuse the brutalities of Communism by pointing to the brutalities ofthe then numerous military dictatorships of Southern Europe and Latin America andpretend that such regimes were the only alternative to Communism. These regimes were

led by generals who might in various ways be seen as conservative (though Argentina'sPeron was clearly Leftist) so do they tell us anything about conservatism generally?

Historically, most of the world has been ruled by military men and their successors (SargonII of Assyria, Alexander of Macedon, Caesar, Augustus, Constantine, Charlemagne,Frederick II of Prussia etc.) so it seems unlikely but perhaps the main point to note here isthat the Hispanic dictatorships of the 20th century were very often created as a response toa perceived threat of a Communist takeover. This is particularly clear in the case of Spain,Chile and Argentina. They were an attempt to fight fire with fire. In Argentina of the 60sand 70s, for instance, Leftist "urban guerillas" were very active -- blowing up anyone theydisapproved of. The nice, mild, moderate Anglo-Saxon response to such depredationswould have been to endure the deaths and disruptions concerned and use police methods totrace the perpetrators and bring them to trial.Much of the world is more fiery than that, however, and the Argentine generals certainlywere. They became impatient with the slow-grinding wheels of democracy and its apparentimpotence in the face of the Leftist revolutionaries. They therefore seized power andinstituted a reign of terror against the Leftist revolutionaries that was as bloody, arbitraryand indiscriminate as what the Leftists had inflicted. In a word, they used military methodsto deal with the Leftist attackers. So the nature of these regimes was only incidentallyconservative. What they were was essentially military. We have to range further than theHispanic generals, therefore, if we are to find out what is quintessentially conservative.It might be noted, however, that, centuries earlier, the parliamentary leaders of England --

led by Fairfax, Cromwell etc. -- did something similar to what the Hispanic generals of the20th century did. Faced by an attempt on the part of the Stuart tyrant to abrogate theirtraditional rights, powers and liberties, they resorted to military means to overthrow thethreat. There is no reason to argue that democracy cannot or must not use military means to


15/61

defend itself or that Leftists or anyone else must be granted exclusive rights to the use offorce and violence.

German Origins

I would like to submit, then, that what modern-day Rightists of the English-speaking worldare traces right back to the values of the German invaders (Angles and Saxons) whooverran Romano-Celtic Britannia around 1500 years ago and made it into England. Theybrought with them a very decentralized, largely tribal system of government that was verydifferent from the Oriental despotisms that had ruled the civilized world for most of humanhistory up to that time. And they liked their decentralized system very much. So much sothat the system just kept on keeping on in England, century after century, despite manyvicissitudes. Only the 20th century really shook it.

My thesis here is, of course, not exactly original. Montesquieu, De Tocqueville andJefferson all saw English exceptionalism and independence of spirit as tracing back toGerman roots and all relied particularly on Tacitus for their view of the early Germancharacter. The work of Macfarlane (1978 & 2000) is however probably the best modernreference on the topic.

But let us look at what Tacitus said in his "Germania". Excerpts:

They choose their kings by birth, their generals for merit. These kings have not unlimitedor arbitrary power, and the generals do more by example than by authority.About minor matters the chiefs deliberate, about the more important the whole tribe. Yeteven when the final decision rests with the people, the affair is always thoroughlydiscussed by the chiefs. They assemble, except in the case of a sudden emergency, oncertain fixed days, either at new or at full moon; for this they consider the most auspiciousseason for the transaction of business. Instead of reckoning by days as we do, they reckonby nights, and in this manner fix both their ordinary and their legal appointments. Nightthey regard as bringing on day. Their freedom has this disadvantage, that they do not meetsimultaneously or as they are bidden, but two or three days are wasted in the delays ofassembling. When the multitude think proper, they sit down armed. Silence is proclaimedby the priests, who have on these occasions the right of keeping order. Then the king or thechief, according to age, birth, distinction in war, or eloquence, is heard, more because hehas influence to persuade than because he has power to command. If his sentimentsdisplease them, they reject them with murmurs; if they are satisfied, they brandish theirspears.


16/61

In truth neither from the Samnites, nor from the Carthaginians, nor from both Spains, norfrom all the nations of Gaul, have we received more frequent checks and alarms; nor evenfrom the Parthians: for, more vigorous and invincible is the liberty of the Germans than themonarchy of the Arsacides.

Our modern-day parliamentary procedures are a little more sophisticated but the basicvalues and principles seem to me not to have changed at all.It could also be said that the decentralized nature of the early German communities was nodifferent from the decentralization in Greece before the Athenian Empire, thedecentralization in Italy before the ascendancy of the Roman Republic or indeed thedecentralization of the original Mesopotamian civilization. The important point, here,however is the much longer survival of that form of organization among Germans -- and itis certainly to Germans that the English must trace it.Where the English get their traditional dislike of unrestrained central power is not the main

point or even an essential point of the present account. Nonetheless, tracing that dislike tothe ultimately German descent of most of the English population might seem colossallyperverse in view of Germany's recent experience. Was not Hitler a German and was he notalmost the ultimate despot and centralizer of power in his own hands? One could quibblehere by saying that Hitler was NOT a German (he was an Austrian) and the Israeli historianUnger (1965) has pointed out that Hitler was much less of a despot than Stalin was butneither of those points is really saying much in the present context.The important thing here again is to see things with an historian's eye and realize that

recent times are atypical. Right up until Bismarck's ascendancy in the late 19th century,Germany was remarkable for its degree of decentralization. What we now know asGermany was once always comprised of hundreds of independent States (kingdoms,principalities, Hanseatic cities etc.) of all shapes and sizes: States that were in fact so muchin competition with one another in various ways that they were not infrequently at war withone-another. And even with the armed might of Prussia behind him even Bismarck had alot of trouble with the other German States. He could not even get his Prussian monarchdeclared as being "Emperor of Germany". He had to make do with "German Emperor" as atitle.And it was of course only the fractionated and competing centres of power existing inmediaeval Germany that enabled the successful emergence there of the most transformingand anti-authority event of the last 1000 years: The Protestant Reformation. Despite thealmost immediate and certainly widespread popularity of his new teachings amongGermans, Luther ran great risks and would almost certainly have been burnt at the stakelike Savonarola, Hus and his other predecessors in religious rebellion had it not been for his(and our) good fortune that he was a Saxon. His Prince, Frederick III ("The Wise") ofSaxony gave him constant protection. As one of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire,Frederick was strong enough and independent enough to protect Luther from Pope, fromEmperor and from other German potentates.


17/61

So only after Bismarck engineered the defeat of the French at Sedan in 1870 did most ofGermany become unified -- with the Germans of the Austrian lands remaining independenteven then. And to this day Germany has a Federal system very similar to that of theirlargely Germanic brethren in the United States, Canada and Australia -- a system of Stategovernments which markedly limits central (Federal) government power. So the German

origins of the English do make their historic dislike of concentrated power at the Centrejust one part of a larger picture.

In 1066, William of Normandy disrupted the traditional decentralized and competitivepower structure of England to some degree but by the time of King John and Magna Cartait was back with a vengeance. And the ascendancy of Simon de Montfort not long after thatalso displayed the traditional English belief in the limited nature of central governmentpower. Even in the reign of that great Tudor despot, Henry VIII, there were still in Englandgreat and powerful regional Lords and many less powerful but numerous local notablesrepresenting local interests that the King had to take great care with. Even Tudor central

government power was highly contingent, far from absolute and much dependant on thepopularity of the ruler among ordinary English people. And when the Stuarts, with theirdoctrine of "the divine right of Kings", ignored all that and tried to turn the Englishmonarchy into something more like a centralized Oriental despotism, off came the head ofthe Stuart King.

Protestantism versus Catholicism

Luther has been mentioned as a beneficiary of Germanic power decentralization butLuther's message received wide acclaim in Germany generally so it seems reasonable tosay that German distrust of centralized power not only protected Protestantism but was wasin fact a major cause of Protestantism. Because what is Protestantism after all if it is not arejection of centralized religious authority? So in that sense, conservatism andProtestantism are the twin children of Germanic suspicion of centralized power. Looking atit another way, we could say that Protestantism is a religious expression of politicalconservatismFurther, where the Roman Catholic believes that the sacraments administered by a religiousauthority (a priest) are essential for his ascent into heaven, the Protestant believes that hecan commune with the Almighty directly. Catholicism fosters habits of submission toauthority whereas Protestantism inculcates hardy independence. So acceptance ofgovernment authority over oneself should come as naturally to the Catholic as it is alien tothe Protestant.So German history could at a pinch be seen as a struggle between native decentralizingtendencies and Catholic centralizing tendencies --- with the German lands closest to Romeremaining Catholic and Imperial while the (Northern) German lands farthest from Rome


18/61

remained independent, Protestant and decentralized. And the struggle the North had toresist the Imperial South was indeed a titanic one --including the famous 30 years' warfrom 1618 to 1648.As some evidence that there is still something left of that difference, it might be noted that,

in interwar Germany of the early 20th century, the Protestant North was largely "Red"(revolutionary) whereas the Catholic South was largely Nazi -- i.e. more prepared tooperate within the existing power structures and more prepared to accept the Church. Hitlerdid after all have a Catholic education.So how do we account for the fact that "Christian Democratic" (i.e. Catholic) political

parties seem generally to be the major conservative forces within modern Europeanpolitics? And how indeed do we account for the fact that at least 50% of Germans are tothis day Catholic?A essential part of the answer is of course the counter-reformation -- a process that began

in response to Luther and which restored the acceptabity of Catholicism to many Germans.This reform process within the Catholic church may have begun in response to Luther buthas in fact been an ongoing process within the Catholic Church ever since --- with therelatively recent Vatican II ecumenical council being a particular highpoint of the process.So the Catholic church could only combat the power of Luther's message by partiallybending to it and thus becoming itself to a large degree Protestantized and weakened inauthority. And the way a huge proportion of otherwise convinced Catholics now disregardthe teachings of their church on such matters as contraception shows vividly that theauthority of the Church is now in fact mostly an empty shell.So in various guises Germanic Protestantism has won the day over Roman authority in thereligious sphere just as Germanic conservatism has won the day over socialism in thepolitical sphere. We now have Protestantized Catholics and "Thatcherized" socialists inmuch of the world.Nonetheless, even in a weakened form, the Catholic church offers a model of "top down"social organization that must make it easier for Catholics to accept political arrangementsof a "top down" sort. If you look up to the Pope as an essential part of your salvation in thespiritual sphere, to look up to the government as an essential agency in securing yourmaterial wellbeing is surely only a small step. So the fact that the vast majority ofEuropeans are still Catholic (even if the Catholicism is much watered down from what itwas) should make Europeans more accepting of all-pervasive government than Anglo-Saxons would ever be. And so, of course, it has come to pass. In Bismarck, Hitler,Mussolini, Franco, Salazar and Papadopoulos Europe has had authoritarianism ingovernment on a scale unknown in the English-speaking world.So how conservatism has evolved in the modern-day English-speaking world is ratherdifferent from how conservatism has evolved in Europe. Anglo-Saxon conservatismbenefited greatly from Henry VIII, who made England almost totally Protestant.Protestants in Germany failed to achieve this dominance and so England has been better


19/61

able to stay close to its Germanic and Protestant roots -- whereas European conservatismhas never totally escaped Catholicism. European conservatism has therefore mostly lost itsanti-centralization principles and conforms much more closely to the stereotyped image ofconservatism as being merely a defence of traditional arrangements generally. This ofcourse makes it a much weaker form of conservatism and the huge bureaucratization that

now characterizes the European Union is vivid evidence of that. European conservativeshave been much less effective as opponents of big government because opposition to biggovernment is much less of a central position for them.

A Conservative Revolution

The English parliamentarians who were responsible for beheading King Charles I in 1649were perfectly articulate about why. They felt that Charles had attempted to destroy the

ancient English governmental system or "constitution" and that he had tried to take awayimportant rights and individual liberties that the English had always enjoyed -- liberty fromthe arbitrary power of Kings, a right to representation in important decisions and a systemof counterbalanced and competing powers rather than an all-powerful central government.It is to them that we can look for the first systematic statements of conservative ideals --ideals that persevere to this day. And they were both conservatives (wishing to conservetraditional rights and arrangements) and revolutionaries!So right back in the 17th century we had the apparent paradox of "conservatives" (theparliamentary leaders -- later to be referred to as "Whigs") being prepared to undertakemost radical change (deposing monarchy) in order to restore treasured traditional rights andliberties and to rein in overweening governmental power. So Margaret Thatcher andRonald Reagan were not at all breakaways from the conservatism of the past. They hadvery early and even more determined predecessors. Nobody who knew history should havebeen surprised by the Reagan/Thatcher "revolution". And it was in deliberate tribute to theparliamentarians of Cromwell's day and their immediate successors that two of the mostinfluential conservative theorists prior to Reagan and Thatcher both described themselvesas "Old Whigs" -- Burke (1790) and Hayek (1944). Hayek described Whig ideals as "theonly set of ideals that has consistently opposed all arbitrary power" (Hayek, 1960).

And it is not only conservative theorists who still see overweening government power astheir bete noir. Even practical conservative politicians do. Note this very clear statement ofthe conservative mission from one of America's most notable conservative politicians in thesecond half of the 20th century:


20/61

"Those who seek absolute power, even though they seek it to do what they regard as good,are simply demanding the right to enforce their own version of heaven on earth. And let meremind you, they are the very ones who always create the most hellish tyrannies. Absolutepower does corrupt, and those who seek it must be suspect and must be opposed. Theirmistaken course stems from false notions of equality, ladies and gentlemen. Equality,

rightly understood, as our founding fathers understood it, leads to liberty and to theemancipation of creative differences. Wrongly understood, as it has been so tragically inour time, it leads first to conformity and then to despotism.Fellow Republicans, it is the cause of Republicanism to resist concentrations of power,private or public, which enforce such conformity and inflict such despotism. It is the causeof Republicanism to ensure that power remains in the hands of the people. And, so help usGod, that is exactly what a Republican president will do with the help of a RepublicanCongress.It is further the cause of Republicanism to restore a clear understanding of the tyranny of

man over man in the world at large. It is our cause to dispel the foggy thinking whichavoids hard decisions in the illusion that a world of conflict will somehow mysteriouslyresolve itself into a world of harmony, if we just don't rock the boat or irritate the forces ofaggression - and this is hogwash.And who said that? It is from the acceptance speech by Barry Goldwater at the 1964Republican convention which nominated him as its candidate for President.

So, for over three centuries, the central values of conservatism -- at least in the English-speaking world -- have remained the same

Other conservative voices in history

Showing a continuity that moves all the way from Cromwell to Goldwater is surelyimpressive but it does leave out a great deal of history in between. So let us also lookbriefly at some of the intervening history:To quote from one history (Roberts, 1958) of the earliest English Tories (ConservativeParty):

"The principles of Tory paternalism do not lend themselves to effective legislation orimproved administration. Coleridge, the most profound and influential of these theorists,looked to the moral regeneration of the individual, not to the reforming State, and heenvisaged the Church of England as the head of a paternalistic society. He despised what


21/61

he called "act of Parliament reforms", and he exalted the Church as much as he feared theState."Of a slightly later period we read:

"Only State aid to all voluntary schools could extend education, but the Tories would nottolerate State intervention in a sphere reserved for the Church. In a grandiloquent speech tothe Commons, Disraeli played deftly on this deep jealousy of the State. He raised thespectre of a centralized despotism comparable to those which oppressed China, Persia andAustria, and sombrely warned that the grant would force a return "to the system of abarbarous age, the system of a paternal government"."So dislike of State intervention has long been a prominent theme (though not of

course the only theme) among conservatives. Nor do we have to go so far back in history to

come up with instances of this sort. Two notable quotations that might be referred to forfurther reading are by the eminent British Conservative Prime Minister Sir WinstonChurchill and by the noted Conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott (See Buck, 1975p.139-141 and p. 154 as a convenient reference for the detailed texts of both statements).Although both statements were made long before the Reagan/Thatcher/Gorbachev era, bothstress how important to Conservatism is the limiting of State power and activity -- thoughneither of course limits the concerns of Conservatives to that one theme.

Is individualism basic to conservatism?

It has then been shown that there is large historical precedent for the current conservativepreoccupation with individual liberty and it is argued here that a love of individual libertyis a basic value for conservatives. It is reasonable to ask, however, whether this is reallyFUNDAMENTAL to conservatism. Could there not be a deeper level of motivation thatunderlies a love of individual liberty?

We find one such proposal in the conclusions drawn by some historians of the BritishConservative party -- who find a certain realistic, practical and pragmatic outlook as themain enduring characteristics of Conservative thought (Feiling, 1953; Gilmour, 1978;Norton & Aughey, 1981; Standish, 1990) and this is clearly a theory about the wellspringsof conservatism rather than a description of what conservatives have tended to stand for.And it is not at all difficult to see why such skepticism has led to doubt about the benefitsof extending the inevitably ham-fisted activities of government ever further into the life ofthe community. So we might say that this proposal is that a certain STYLE of thinkingleads to a predictable CONTENT in thinking.


22/61

While this is a reasonable proposal, it does have a large philosophical problem: How do wedefine what is realistic, practical and pragmatic? So while I think that this proposal maywell be true, garnering evidence for its truth is too big a task at least for me.A more important alternative theory for the origins of conservatism is one that is very often

quoted and finds its principal exponents in Burke (1790), Hayek (1944) and Oakeshott(1975) -- though the two former thinkers in fact described themselves as "Whigs" ratherthan as conservatives. This theory also traces policy to a style of thought. The theorybasically is that there is an underlying wariness and skepticism in conservatives that makesthem question ANY political policies whatever -- including policies that call for change.Conservatives need good evidence that something will work well and have the intendedconsequences before they will support it. And for this reason conservatives prefer "thedevil they know" and want any change to be of a gradual and evolutionary kind --progressing by small steps that can easily be reversed if the intended outcomes are notrealized.

And it is this preference for "the devil they know" that has led to conservatives beingcaricaturized as wanting NO change when in fact all that they insist on is CAREFULchange. From Cromwell on, conservatives have never been characterized by a rejection ofchange for its own sake. When a regime is clearly oppressive or an experiment has clearlyfailed (such as State ownership of industry) conservatives find no difficulty in abandoningit and changing to something else.But this account of conservatism is insufficient by itself. It fails to ask what theCRITERION is in evaluating change. How do we evaluate whether a policy is beneficial ornot? How do we define "beneficial"? And it is in answering that question that we comeback to individual liberty as being a basic value. Conservatism is a broad church andconservatives will of course use many criteria in evaluating the desirability or efficacy ofparticular political policies but, in making such evaluations, it is the high value that onegives to leaving the individual free to make his/her own decisions and obtain his/her ownpreferences that makes one a conservative. Rejection of change may be an INSTRUMENTin protecting the individual but it is no more than that.

The "Germanic" USAMy thesis tracing both conservatism and Protestantism to an originally Germanic spirit ofindependence and dislike of centralized power or authority is of course well exemplified inthe early history of the USA. At the time of independence, the USA was not only"Germanic" (in the sense of having a large Anglo-Saxon population) but it was alsoliterally German in that German ancestry was nearly as common among Americans at thattime as was British ancestry. And what was the American revolution if not a rebellionagainst the centralized and remote authority of King George III? And what did thearchitects of the new American constitution set up if it was not a decentralized system --with the Federal government at that time being little more than an appendage to the various


23/61

State governments? And what was the American revolution fought in the name of if not inthe name of individual rights and liberties?

The role of Christianity generally

Many influential conservative writers of the past (e.g. Burke, 1790) have held thatChristianity is an essential foundation for conservatism -- though others (e.g. Hayek, 1944)disagree. A large part of the reason for that is the traditional role of the churches as arbitersand enforcers of morality in general and sexual morality in particular. Although suspiciousof authority generally, conservatives have never shrunk from the need for authority if theyconsider it essential to the functioning of a civil society. And morality has always to themseemed essential for any kind of civilization. And morality generally has to be taught andto some degree enforced. It does not always come naturally. And both the church and theState have generally seemed needed for setting and maintaining moral standards.

In the modern very secular world where religion has a strong influence only on a minorityof the population, however, it is clear that civil society and a modicum of morality (bothsexual and otherwise) can survive with or without the church. So the Burkean view thatreligion and its moral codes are essential to a good life and a reasonably well-orderedsociety has to be seen as disproved by history.Christian conservatives still claim with some justice, however, that traditional Christianmoral standards make for a better society than it otherwise would be and sometimes agitateenergetically for such standards to be widely applied. Their view of the benefits ofChristian standards may well be correct but any attempt to have such standards applied tonon-believers is both un-Christlike (tyrannical) and shows the Christians concerned asmired in an obsolete past. The best that one can say about such attempts is that those whomakes such attempts are mistaken about what is essential.Nonetheless, many American Christian conservatives are adamant that there would be nosurvival of morality or civility in the US without the widespread transforming power of theChristian faith. They see their faith as the historical and still real foundation of Americanvalues. They believe that, without anchors in Christ, Americans would all succumb to themindless "all is relative" doctrine of the Leftist and be unable to make any distinctionbetween right and wrong. The restraint of faith is seen as needed to prevent everyone frombehaving like mindless, selfish beasts. And certainly, even to a foreign visitor, there doesseem to be a marked contrast between the Piranha-like attitudes that are often to be foundin big cities such as New York or Los Angeles and the more generous and humane attitudesprevalent in smaller, more faith-based American communities.Although I was once myself a fervent Christian and still retain enormous respect andadmiration for the teachings of the carpenter of Nazareth, I see the view of Christianity asessential to civility and social cohesion as having only some truth, however. I agree


24/61

wholeheartedly that Christianity is an enormously beneficial influence on ethical behaviourbut cannot see that it is essential or unique.It seems to me that, in the US, the national traditions embodied in the Declaration ofIndependence, the Constitution, and the ideas of the American Revolution are still great

unifiers also, even among those with little or no religious faith. Americans on the wholestill do (with good reason) believe in the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness", and in democratic institutions, in protection of property rights, in the rule oflaw, and in the "American Dream." And the "American Dream" is about working hard andtaking risks to become well-off, not about winning the lottery or robbing the rich.

A second reason for my skepticism is the reality of another venerable democracy of theEnglish speaking world: Britain. England is one of the most Godless places on earth thesedays. A huge proportion of the population appear to have virtually no religious belief andonly about 2% go to church regularly. And when they do go to church what they now hearfrom their Church of England clergy is usually much more akin to Leftist politics than

traditional Christianity (Ray, 2002b).So has the United Kingdom collapsed into anarchy or Stalinism? Not at all. British PrimeMinister Margaret Thatcher was as energetic and as effective a conservative reformer asRonald Reagan and her influence has arguably been more long-lasting. A prominentmember (Peter Mandelson) of the nominally Leftist political party that presently governsBritain recently declared that "we are all Thatcherites now". And that is the LEFT ofBritish politics. Can we imagine Ted Kennedy saying that "We are all Reaganites now"?

Monarchy

So how does Britain do it? If Britain lacks the cohesive force of Christian faith, what keepsBritain as still one of the world's more civilized and prosperous places? One answer, Ibelieve, is the influence of the monarchy. I myself am in the happy position of being both akeen monarchist and a citizen of a monarchy (Australia) and I tend to assent to the usualmonarchist claim that the House of Windsor, for all its human weaknesses, is infinitelymore reliable as a model of worthiness than are certain American Presidents with (forinstance) strange uses for cigars. Be that as it may, however, I think the reality is that theclaims of monarchy are emotional. To be ruled by a distant, glamorous and prestigiousfigure with access to a lifestyle unimaginable to the ordinary person is the normal lot ofmankind. It is democracy that is the freak. The Roman republic succumbed to Caesar andAugustus and the ancient Greek democracies succumbed to the tyrants of first Sparta andthen Macedon. So people seem to have evolved to need a monarch. They need that gloriousand distant figure at the centre of power in their community.And the British genius has been to find a way of having their cake and eating it too. Theyhave a monarchy with all the trappings of greatness and real reserve powers yet arenonetheless governed by one of the world's oldest, most stable and effective democracies.


25/61

And, as it is so often re-iterated, the monarch is the symbol of the nation and of thecontinuity of national traditions. The popularity and prestige of the Queen is enormous andher powers are no less real for not being exercised. The reality of the reserve powers of themonarchy was vividly seen in Australia in 1974 when the Queen's representative dismissed

a Leftist Federal government that tried to continue governing against constitutionalprecedent (failure to get its budget through both houses). In short, the monarchy gives theBritish people a strong sense of security against arbitrary power, a strong sense of theiridentity, history and nationhood and serves as a model for what is decent and allowable. Itis a unifying and cohesive force that transcends differences of class, accent, education,occupation, region etc.So it may be that in the US, Christianity plays an important part in preserving civility and ahealthy common culture but I submit that the monarchy does a similar job for Britain andthe other countries where the Queen reigns.

And is it coincidence that the other enduring European monarchies (Norway, Sweden,Denmark, The Netherlands and Belgium) are also highly civilized and stable democraciesthat have never turned to dictatorship and remain among the more peaceful and prosperousplaces to live?More potted history of the European monarchies: The Fascist dictator Mussolini came to

power only because the Italian King allowed it. Monarchy is weak in Greece and Spain(though the Spanish have recently restored theirs) and both suffered years of militarydictatorship. Germany abandoned their monarchy (with good reason) after World War Iand got Hitler in exchange. France decapitated Louis 16th only to get the military dictatorNapoleon and the incredible loss of life of his wars in exchange. And look what happenedto Russia when they deposed the Tsar! I think it is not unreasonable to conclude from allthis that, incredible though it might sound to American ears, monarchy has a powerful roleto play in maintaining a civil society and is not easily replaced, once lost.

American isolationism

US conservatives do of course differ from British conservatives in various ways that reflecttheir different history and different national situations. And attitude to monarchy is not theonly difference. Another major difference is isolationism. American conservatives wouldlike to tell the rest of the world to go hang if they could. And this attitude is not dead yet.Religious US conservative, Patrick Buchanan (2002) still expresses it. And he knows hishistory. He uses a knowledge of history to support his isolationist views. He points out (asis also done in Ray, 2002c) that Mussolini was initially anti-Nazi and with some justiceblames the Western Allies for Mussolini's going over to Hitler's side eventually. He omitsto mention that Hitler would probably have been a lot better off if Mussolini had stayedneutral. Mussolini's alliance with Germany gave Germany so many additional problemsthat it is probably the best thing that Mussolini could have done for the Allied cause!


26/61

But Buchanan's conclusion -- that Britain and the USA should have stayed out of the warwith Hitler -- is one only for the ostrich brigade. England could not have afforded to letHitler grab the whole of Europe unopposed. Once Hitler had wrapped up Europe, the worldwould have been his oyster.

But it is a tribute to what a hardly plant American isolationism is that it survives even todaywhen the world is a global village and the US has been savagely attacked by Islamicterrorists from half a world away.

ONE DIMENSION OR TWO?

As is evident from the above, describing the entire domain of political attitudes in terms of

a single Right/Left dimension does have its problems. For this reason various authors (e.g.Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Kerlinger, 1967) have proposed that an adequatedescription of world politics really needs two dimensions. They propose, for example, thatthe Left-Right dimension be supplemented by an Authoritarian/Permissive dimension. Sothat democratic Leftists and Rightists are Permissive Leftists and Rightists whereasCommunists and Fascists are Authoritarian Leftists and Rightists.Although such proposals have considerable intuitive appeal, they do not, unfortunately,seem to coincide with how people's attitudes are in fact organized when we do surveys ofpublic opinion. It is very easy to find people's attitudes polarizing on a Left/Rightdimension but nobody has yet managed to show in a satisfactory way any polarization ofattitudes on the postulated second dimension (Ray, 1980 & 1982).The account of Left/Right attitudes given in this paper suggests why this is so. For a start,the assumption that Fascists or Nazis are Right-wing is false. Hitler himself energeticallyclaimed to be a socialist and Mussolini (the founder of Fascism) was a prominent Marxisttheoretician. The evidence for the view that Fascism is simply another Leftist sect has beensummarized at great length in Ray (2002 b & c) so will not be further elaborated here.Historically, the core of conservatism has always been a suspicion of government powerand intervention -- and conservatives therefore accept only the minimum amount ofgovernment that seems needed for a civil society to function. So it is no wonder that thereis no authoritarian version of conservative ideology. If it were authoritarian it could not beconservative.Leftism, on the other hand, IS intrinsically authoritarian and power-loving and will alwaystherefore tend in the direction of government domination. It is only non-authoritarian to theextent that is thwarted by external influences (such as democracy) from achieving its aims.Leftists in democratic societies do of course commonly deny authoritarian motivations butthat is just part of their "cover". Deeds speak louder than words.


27/61

ATTITUDE TO AUTHORITY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Defining what was meant by "Leftist" and "Rightist" did prove to be a very large detourthrough history so how does it help with our understanding of authoritarian attitudes asstudied by psychologists?What it does is suggest that denial of motives may be an important part of Leftism. Thebare fact that Leftists normally deny authoritarian motives while still being quite prone tosetting up and supporting regimes where the State monopolizes or substantiallymonopolizes power is suggestive enough. When, however, we see that the whole point ofLeftism is the setting up of such regimes, we clearly have a phenomenon of considerableinterest before us. Logically, Leftists should be strong supporters of authoritarianism withRightists being only weak supporters. The reverse, of course, would appear to be the truth

-- at least as far as expressed attitudes are concerned (Adorno et al, 1950).There may be many ways of explaining this particular puzzle but the kindest one thatsuggests itself to the present writer is that Leftists who support democracy are in a situationof fundamental conflict. On the one hand they see the value of democracy, civility, humanrights, liberty etc while on the other they see that such systems do not by themselves lead tothe sort of outcomes that Leftists desire -- i.e. the poor and disadvantaged in such systemstend to stay poor and disadvantaged. People just do not behave in a sufficiently "brotherly"way towards one-another. "So if people will not be brotherly towards one another bythemselves we will have to make them more brotherly" seems to be the next step in aLeftist's thought. Such a thought is, however, very authoritarian and completely at oddswith all the civilities and respect for human rights of a modern-day democracy and to admitto it would entail an admission of complete incoherence of thought. As a result allexpressions of attraction to anything authoritarian are, consciously or unconsciously, quitethoroughly inhibited and denied. This is so much so that even reasonable admissions of thedesirability of authority in certain circumstances get suppressed.We are thus left with the rather odd situation where the Rightist who is generally averse toauthority in government but who can see that there are some things to be said for it in somecircumstances is prepared to admit the ways in which it can be desirable while the Leftistwho very much wants to expand the authority of government is forced to ridicule authoritygenerally to compensate for his real attraction to it. Were he/she to admit his/her realthoughts, he/she would be exposed as opposing other values that both he/she and othersgenerally respect. In other words, the Leftist's humanitarianism carries with it the seeds ofits own destruction. The Leftist wants to make the whole world more humanitarian but tomake it do anything is, of itself, inhumane. Pol Pot was merely the most extreme exampleof that.

Students versus the public


28/61

The phenomenon just described is very much an intellectual one, if not in fact intellectualgymnastics, and it should be noted that most of the research on attitude to authority andpsychological authoritarianism generally seems to have been done using well-educatedsamples -- young American college students in particular (Sears, 1986). It is possible,

therefore, that the phenomenon just described is confined to well-educated people. Lesseducated people might have less need for and ability at such intellectual repressions. Itwould therefore be something of a confirmation for the theory if Leftists in the generalpopulation were less troubled about authority. As we shall see, this appears to be to at leastsome extent the case.

Acquiescent biasThere have been a considerable number of studies of attitude to authority in the generalpopulation, mostly using some form of the California F scale of Adorno et al (1950).

Overwhelmingly, however, such studies have ignored or overlooked the important problemof acquiescent bias -- the tendency for at least some people to say "Yes" to questions in afairly thoughtless way. There have been optimists (e.g. Rorer, 1965) who have explicitlyconsidered this problem and rated it as an unimportant one but the responses to suchoptimism have been fairly crushing (Campbell, Siegman & Rees, 1967; Peabody, 1966;Jackson, 1967; Ray, 1983a & 1985c) and it seems clear that tendency to acquiesce canhave effects on racism and politics all by itself (Heaven, 1983; Milbrath, 1962). Thesituation appears to be that acquiescence effects on attitude scales do sometimes generalizefrom scale to scale (and hence cause spurious correlation) but when they will do so isessentially unpredictable. In the circumstances, one can never rule out an explanation ofone's findings in terms of acquiescent bias unless one uses scales that are proof against itsinfluence (i.e. "balanced" scales where there are equal numbers of "For" and "Against"items). The original F scale of Adorno et al was, however, devised before acquiescenceeffects were well-known so is not balanced. Most research using it, therefore, must be ofuncertain implication. To make a proper examination of authoritarianism in the generalpopulation, therefore, one must turn to research using balanced scales.

General population authoritarianismThere appear to be only two studies carried out among general population samples whichused balanced versions of the California F scale. Both are by the present author (Ray,1973b & 1984) and both show no relationship between authoritarianism and vote. Amongthe general public both Rightists and Leftists seem equally likely to concede that authoritycan have both good and bad points.A great problem with using the California F scale, however, is its dubious validity. Onlyabout a third of its items refer to authority or its exercise and it would appear to measuremany other things than attitude to authority. The implications of this have already been


29/61

explored at great length elsewhere (Ray, 1988) so it should suffice here simply to note that,more than anything else, the F scale would appear to measure an old-fashioned orientation(Ray, 1988). Such an orientation could be seen as conservative in various senses but it isnot an orientation that predicts authoritarian behaviour (Titus, 1968; Ray & Lovejoy,1983). More satisfactory evidence on the incidence of psychological authoritarianism than

that so far considered does therefore seem needed.There have been two alternative scales designed, as was the F scale, to measure Right-wingauthoritarianism. Of these, the Ray (1972a & 1984) "A" scale focuses quite strongly onauthority-related issues while the Altemeyer (1981 & 1988) RWA scale contains manyitems that would not be out of place in an ordinary scale of political Rightism (or"Conservatism", as some still call it). Both scales are fully balanced against acquiescence,have good reliability and a variety of validity demonstrations behind them. Many of thevalidity demonstrations provided by Altemeyer (1981 & 1988), however, appear to havebeen done with insufficient thought for the possibility that the scale might measureRightism only rather than a particularly authoritarian form of it. Both scales, however, are

clearly an improvement over the F scale.There is also a well-constructed scale by Rigby & Rump (1979) that measures attitudestowards four different institutional authorities (the Army, the law, the Police and teachers)but this scale has no obvious political polarity. The most overtly political is the Altemeyerscale.

Altemeyer's workAltemeyer's work was limited from the outset by his naive definition of conservatism asopposition to change. As mentioned already, this ignores the fact that that the mostferocious enemies of change were not to be found anywhere in the West in the second halfof the 20th century but rather in the Communist countries (Brahm, 1982). Stalin, Brezhnevand Li Peng were the great enemies of change and defenders of their status quo for theirpeoples in the 20th century. So Communists are Rightists and Margaret Thatcher is aLeftist according to Altemeyer's naive definitions.And, strangely, his ideas were even less sophisticated than the ideas he claims to supersede:the ideas of Adorno et al. (1950). The Adorno work did at least attempt to measureconservatism and authoritarianism separately so that any association between them couldbe examined empirically. They did it very badly but they did at least make an attempt at it.Altemeyer made no such attempt. He just assumed what he had to prove: that conservatismand authoritarianism were intimately associated.And the empirical work reported by Altemeyer is also naive. The nearest approachAltemeyer seems to have made to general population sampling is to survey the parents ofhis students. This would hardly be an educationally unbiased sample. Altemeyer's findingsare, nonetheless, of considerable interest. What he finds is that, even among students, hisRWA scale gives virtually no prediction of vote. Studies of well-educated samples show


30/61

Rightists as strongly authoritarian if you use the F scale to measure authoritarianism andanother scale to measure Rightism (Adorno et al, 1950) but if you use Altemeyer's RWAscale and vote as the respective criteria, there is essentially no connection betweenauthoritarianism and Rightism.

Does this mean that the RWA scale is more valid and that results from it are the ones thatwe should accept? Unfortunately, no. The real situation would appear to be that both scalesare of deficient validity. If the RWA scale was designed to measure Right-wingauthoritarianism but does not provide any substantial prediction of anything Right-wing isnot that a fundamental flaw? Is it not ridiculous and self-contradictory to say (as Altemeyerimplicitly says) that many Right-wing authoritarians are Leftists? Black might as well bewhite. The RWA scale surely lacks even the minimum condition for validity.In response to Altemeyer's first book (Altemeyer, 1981) I was able to devise research tocheck on the validity of the RWA scale. I found (Ray, 1985b & 1987) that it was not validas a measure of authoritarianism. In response to Altemeyer's (1988) second book however,

I was able to design no new research that would test his claims as it seemed to me thatAltemeyer's own research clearly showed his scale to be invalid! Thus, althoughAltemeyer's claims are large and must, as such, be considered, it seems that to considerthem with any care is to dismiss them. That would seem to leave us with only the "A" scaleto consider.

The "A" scale and attitude to authorityThe "A" scale does show a modest (r = .29, p


31/61

became evident in the construction of the "AA" scale (Ray, 1971) and can also be seen inthe work of Rigby and his associates.Rigby & Rump (1981) found that respect for one's parents generalized to respect for otherauthorities only in early adolescence. By late adolescence, the relationship had vanished

entirely. Since it was a central claim of the Adorno et al work that attitude to authority wasformed by experiences with parents, this seems an important disconfirmatory finding.Such disconfirmations are far from unprecedented. For instance:1). Arap-Maritim (1984) found parental strictness to producecompetitiveness in children rather than submissiveness;2). Elms & Milgram (1966) found that it was rebellious rather than submissive childrenwho came from strict parenting;3). Baumrind (1983) found that children who had experienced firm parental controldeveloped with better competencies than did children who had experienced less parentalcontrol; and

4). Di Maria & Di Nuovo (1986) found that authoritative training and parental behaviourhad very little influence in determining the dogmatic attitudes of children.Rigby, Schofield & Slee (1987) extended the work further. They noted that Johnson,Hogan, Londerman, Callens and Rogolsky (1981), in a study of college students, found thatratings of "father" and "mother" loaded on a factor different from that loading "police" and"government". They also noted that, using a younger sample, Lapsley, Harwell, Olson,Flannery and Quintana (1984) reported some correlation between ratings of "father" andratings of "police" and "government" but no prediction at all from ratings of "mother".Rigby et al (1987) then went on to report more data of their own which they viewed asgenerally supporting the view that attitudes to authority do generalize. In arriving at thisconclusion, however, Rigby et al (1987) relied fairly heavily on factor analysis andreported very few of their zero-order correlations. Those they do report, however, areinstructive. From their table 5 we can calculate that the average correlation betweenrebellion/submission to parents and attitudes to the Police and the law was less than .20.This is very close to orthogonality indeed. Rebellion/submission to teachers, however, wasa more substantial predictor of attitude to the Police and the law -- with a mean correlationof over .40. If, then, parents are an example of authority (as Adorno et al contended), theyseem to be a very special case of it.Perhaps more decisive in evaluating the generalizability of attitudes to authority, however,was the finding that, among High-School students, one of the three proposed componentsof the "AA" scale did not correlate with the other two (Ray, 1971). The body of itemsdevised to measure "View of the leader as an executive versus a decision-maker" did notcorrelate with the bodies of items concerned with "Freedom versus regulation" or"Evaluation of authoritarian institutions". The latter two clusters did, however, correlate.The first cluster, therefore has to be discarded, leaving an "AA" scale that is thematicallyrather limited. Perhaps more disturbing, however, was the finding that none of this appliedwhen the items were administered to an Army conscript sample. There all three elements


32/61

intercorrelated highly. The degree of generalizability of attitude to authority is, therefore,not only limited but also variable.A more recent replication among adults of the relationships (between components of theAA scale) found among the High School students can be found in Byrne, Reinhart &

Heaven (1989, Table 2) so it cannot be maintained that the High School students were a"special case"A final finding of failure to generalize in this area also comes from Ray (1971). It wasfound that the "AA" scale showed a correlation (.19) of only borderline significance with ascale of Social Deference. The study reported in Ray (1971) was carried out in Australiaand Social Deference is an explanation that is sometimes used in Britain and Australia (SeeRay, 1972b) for the fact that around a quarter of the working class vote Tory (i.e. forRightists). British and Australian politics tend to be class-polarized with the Left beingrepresented by a "Labor" party. It is therefore seen as requiring explanation that somewor