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Walitz, Louise BermanAn Analysis of the Labor Market for Policemen.California Univ., Berkeley. Inst. of IndustrialRelations.Manpower Administration (DOL) , Washington, D.C.Office of Research and Development.DLMA-91-05-70-13-1Sep 74298p.; Ph.D. Dissertation, California Univ.,BerkeleyNational Technical Information Service, Springfield,Virginia 22151

EDPS PRICE ME-$0.75 HC-$13.80 PLUS POSTAGEDESCRIPTORS Academic Achievement; City Problems; Economic

Research; *Employment Practices; *EmploymentQualifications; Equal Opportunities (Jobs); LaborEconomics; *Labor Market; Law Enforcement; *ManpowerNeeds; Minority Groups; Personnel Needs; *Police;Racial Discrimination; Recruitment; SexDiscrimination; Wages; Work Experience

IDENTIFIERS California; Oakland

ABSTRACTThe project examines shortages of police manpower and

analyzes the economic content of police hiring standards. A monopsonyexplanation of shortages is rejected in favor of a dynamic shortagemodel and a more rigorous model stressing the interaction of wages,hiring standards, authorized employment levels, and vacancy rates.Through mulitple regression techniques, the characteristics sought bythe Oakland (California) Police Department testing process between1965 and 1971 are defined. The probability of success is greatlyincreased as years of education increase, and is also raised byprevious police experience and high previous wages. It is decreasedby minority group status and local residence. Recent changes arereviewed, such as aggressive minority recruiting and affirmativeaction programs, which have greatly increased minority representationon the force. A review of the literature and a bibliography areincluded. (Author)

U S DI o'ANIMI NI Of TIT Al THEOUCAtioN n WI l f ARENATIONAL INSItTutE Or

I CHIC A ION

An Analysis of the Labor Market for Policemen

By

Louise Berman Wolitz

B.S. (Cornell University) 1963

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Economics

in the

GRADUATE DIVISION

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Committee in Charge

-- _...... .

i'.111..!RAPHIC DATASl-iEET

1. 1(;'',:t N".DIP.A

-,..)5-70-.1. 3 .1.

2.

Ij

3. 1%. i ili,t's A,.1..1:,:. N.,.

4. 1 air and Subtitle

An Analysis of the Labor Market. for Policemen

--4

5. P.cport DateSeptember 1071i

6

7. Autlimis)ki. Pcriorming Organiz.4tion Rept.

No.

9. Performing Organization Name and AddressUniversity of Californiainstitute of industrial 'elationsi:,erkeiey, California 94720

k10. Project Tas Worl: 1;nit NO.

il. Contract ,tlrara No.

DL91-05-70-13

1 2. ".p..nsor lug ilrptanizat ion Name And Addre%s

U.S. Department of Labor

Manpower AdministrationOffice of Research and Development1111 20th St., N.W., Washington, D. . 20210

13. Type oi Report & PeriodCovered

Final

14.

15. Supplementary Notes

16. Abstracts This project e:.amines shortages of police manpower and analyzes the economic

content, o police hiring standards. A monopsony explanation of shortages is

rejected in favor of a dynamic shortage model and a more rigorous model stressing

the interaction of wages, hiring standards, authorized employment levels, and

vacancy rates. Through multiple regression techniques, we attempt to define the

characteristics sought by the Oakland (California) Police Department's testing

process between 1965 and 1971. We find that the probability of success is

greatly increased as years of education increase and is also raised by previous

police experience and high previous wages. It is decreased by minority group

status and local residence. We review recent changes, such as aggressive minorityrecruiting and affirmative action prorrams, which have greatly increased minorityrepresentation on the force. A review of the literature and a bibliography are

included.

17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17o. Descriptors

Aptitude tests Job description Professional personnel

Civil Servide Labor Quoiifications

Demand (economics) Local government Recruiting

Earnings Manpower Statistical analysis

Lc(,:.)mic analysis Manpower requirements Supply (economics)

Education (includes training) Negroes Tests

Ethnic groups Performance

Government employees. Performance evaluation

intelligence tests Personnel selection

17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms

PolicePolicemen

17c. ( (),,A TI Fild/(group 5C , 51.

18.A,..allalllovtmement Distribution is unlimited.

Available from National Technical Information

Service, Springfield, Va. 22151.

19. Net urdy tlass (ThisReprtiLLA:,'41.1ip

21. No. ol Pages

i i-..

20. se. limy ( las. (1 hisPage

UNCLASSIFII'D

22. hit e

. ..- ,,,,,, rl I" tthal OilI MIA,/ kd 1.5.15 114E V. 3.711 TIIIS FORM MAY RFP1lODUCED

J J

BEST COPY IIVAILABLE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MARKET FOR POLICEMEN

Louise Berman Wolitz

ABSTRACT

This project attempts to explain shortages of police man-

power and analyze the economic content of police hiring standards.

The shortages are of applicants considered qualified.

Chapter 2 outlines tho ambiguous and politically sensitive

nature of the polik_ job and the difficulties of defining succ:Jssful

performance.

Chapter 3 discusses three distinct theoretical models. The

simplest solution to shortages is to raise wages sufficiently to

eliminate them. Imperfect information and lags in institutional

decision-making are added to simple theory by the concept of

dynamic shortages, which allows wage adjustments to take con-

siderable, even infinite, time.

Secondly, shortages may arise from the exercise of monop-

sonistic market power, which implies an equilibrium position

with job vacancies at a monopsonistic wage.

Third is a rigorous model, stemming from a utility maxi-

mizing theory of public agency decision-making, which stresses

the complex interaction between wages, hiring standards,

11

authorized employment the value of the public service,

and expected vacancy rates. It is suggested that an agency may

wish to solve the problem of who shall be hired to fill vacant

positions, given authorized employment and wage levels, by

defining a minimum acceptable quality level chosen to maximize

the expected value of the net gain to society from the employees.

Chapter 4 analyzes the salaries, benefits, vacancies and

hiring standards of the Oakland, California, Police Department.

The evidence leads us to reject the monopsony explanation in

favor of a dynamic shortage model.

In Chapter 5, we attempt to define the characteristics

sought by Oakland's Mental Adaptability, Civil Service, and Oral

examinations, using data from 2,366 employment applications

submitted between 1965 and June, 1971, and multiple regression

techniques.

We find that while high school graduation is the only formal

educational requirement, the probability of success in the Mental

Adaptability is increased by large magnitudes as years of higher

education increase from some years of junior college through

three to four years of senior college or a college degree. Senior

college education still has a significant effect, moreover, on the

ability to pass the Civil Service test.

Local residence has a negative effect on the probability of

selection, perhaps because out-of-state candidates invest in more

search and self-selection.

Minority status, whether measured directly or indirectly

by the proxy of high school attendance in the South, has a large,

significant, negative effect on the probability of passing the

written tests, but a positive effect on passing the Oral.

Specific investment in police science courses is unimportant,

but previous police experience has a significant, positive effect

on the probability of success at all stages of the process.

The role of previous salary is clouded by the difficulties of

filtering out part-time from full-time work. The highest previous

salary category, $ 700 a month or more, has a significant positive

effect on the probability of success.

Age has a small, negative effect on passing the Mental

Adaptability, resulting from the well-known attrition of test-taking

ability with age, holding education constant, but a positive effect

on passing the Oral, reflecting concern with maturity.

Chapter 6 presents the dramatic changes in the legal en-

vironment, recruitment and selection between 1971 and 1974, re-

sulting, most importantly, in an increase in the minority per-

centage of the force from 3 percent in 1966, to 6. 5 percent in

iv

1970, to 16 percent in 1973, and 61 percent of the new hires in

1973. Affirmative Action and aggressive minority recruitment

have yielded significant results without sacrificing quality

standards. Moreover, patrolman and policewoman categories

have been merged, and height and weight standards abolished,

so more women should be hired. We also discuss Oakland's

turnover experience.

Chapter 7 concludes that wages, recruitment and selection

mus t be viewed together and hiring standards define not only the

potential police labor supply, but the nature of the job itself.

v

To my parents,

Abraham J. and Sylvia N. Berman

whose love and example provided the foundation

and to

my husband, Seth

and my daughter, Rebecca

who encouraged and supported the fulfillment

and to

the memory of my grandfather,

Israel Berman

vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study would have been impossible without the continu-

ous encouragement, interest, generosity and good humor of

James M. Newman, Personnel Director of the City of Oakland.

He provided not only information and data, but also invaluable

insights. Extended thanks are due here as well to Charles Gain,

former Chief of Police of the City of Oakland, and George T.

Hart, the present Chief of Police, for their support of the study;

to Edward M. Toothman, of the State of California Commission

on Peace Officer Standards and Training, and a former City of

Oakland Chief of Police, for his early encouragement; and to

Lamar M. Vaughn and the staff of the Oakland Civil Service

Office for their assistance and their patience.

Professor Lloyd Ulman, chairman of my committee,

deepened my understanding of labor and manpower economics

and economic policy research, and supplied meaningful intellec-

tual support. His graduate seminars were excellent testing

ground for provisional research, and his comments were particu-

larly helpful. Professor Robert Aaron Gordon read the draft

carefully, asked excellent questions, and offered invaluable

guidance in combining economic rigor and economic policy.

vii

Professor William K. Muir shared his own deep understanding

of the police function, the Oakland Police Department, and the

relationship of intellectual theories to public policies, his

enthusiasm for the importance of the subject, and his ability to

clarify ideas. The interest and comments of the members of my

committee added greatly to the study. All remaining errors are

my own.

Professor Robert J. Flanagan deserves special thanks for

reading each chapter as it was completed and offering some

excellent suggestions for additional analysis. Other professors

and friends who have generously provided assistance, tangible

07 intangible, at various stages of this project include: Aaron.

Wildaysky and members of the Oakland Project, particularly

Frank Thompson and David Wentworth, Frank Levy, Stephen

Engleman, Michael Wiseman, George Strauss, Joseph Garbarino,

Sara A. Behman, Robert E. Hall, Frances Van Loo Flanagan,

Betty Heian, Geoffrey Car liner, Alan Fisher, David Lewin,

Thomas Thurston, and David Radin. I am greatly indebted to

Thomas Moore for expert programming and to Barbara Dewald

for truly extraordinary research assistance, and herculean

efforts in doing an enormous coding job with remarkable skill

and efficiency, aided by Martha Chase. Jean Georgakopoulos

viii

has been an excellent and dedicated typist. The superior, loving

child care provided by Bonnie Sussman and Rebecca Green was

an essential part of an intense summer of writing.

Joan Lewis and the staff of the Institute of Industrial Rela-

tions at the University of California, Berkeley, have provided

an office which is more like a gracious home. Gwendolyn Lloyd,

Clara Stern and Opal Pannell have offered indispensable library

service.

I am deeply appreciative of the financial support provided

by the Manpower Administration of the U. S. Department of

Labor which made this project possible. I would like to thank

the Computer Center at the University of California, Berkeley,

for the facilities to do the empirical work in this dissertation.

Without the consistent love, support and encouragement of

my husband, Seth, this effort could not have been completed.

My parents and my grandmother, Sophie Nelson, deserve credit

for instilling the belief, very early, that a woman must make a

place for herself in the world beyond the family.

ix

This report was prepared for the Manpower Administration,

U. S. Department of Labor, under research and development

grant No. 91-05-70-13. Since grantees conducting z.esearch and

development projects under Government sponsorship are en-

couraged to express their own judgment freely, this report does

not necessarily represent the official opinion or policy of the

Department of Labor. The grantee is solely responsible for the

contents of this report.

Copyright © 1974

by

Louise Berman Wolitz

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter 2. THE JOB 15

DEFINITION OF THE JOB 15

POLICE PROFESSIONALISM 20

IDENTIFYING THE SUCCESSFUL POLICEMAN

EVIDENCE FOR OAKLAND 42

Chapter 3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 59

THE SUPPLY OF POTENTIAL POLICEMEN 59

Calculation of Present Value of ExpectedLifetime Earnings 59

Age-Earnings Profile 61

Shape of Supply Curve 63

Uncertainty 63

Tastes 64

Noncompeting Groups 66

THE SUPPLY TO THE POLICE EMPLOYER 67

THE DEVINE MODEL 71

THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC SECTOR DECISION-MAKING 77

THE EHRENBERG ANALYSIS 79

THEORY AND REALITY 90

xi

EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND ANSWERS 96

THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORY 101

Chapter 4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:SALARIES, VACANCIES, HIRING STANDARDS. . 109

THE COMPOSITION OF THE OAKLAND POLICEDEPARTMENT 109

SALARIES 111

BENEFITS 129

VACANCIES 132

FACT AND THEORY 134

HIRING STANDARDS 137

Age 139

141

142

143

145

148

150

151

152

153

154

155

155

Height and Weight

V is ion

Education

Filing the Employment Application

Mental Adaptability Test

Civil Service Test

Physical Agility Test

Oral Examination

Medical Test

Psychiatric Evaluation

Background Investigation

Barriers to Entry

xii

Chapter 5. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTIONTESTS 160

THE DATA 160

CENTRAL QUESTIONS 161

DEPENDENT VARIABLES 162

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 162

Years of Education 162

Residence 164

Minority Status 166

Specific Police Training or Experienc e 167

Previous Wage 169

Number of Jobs Enumerated 170

Age 170

Physical Qualities 170

METHODOLOGY 171

RESULTS 176

Mental Adaptability 176

Civil Service Test 184

Oral Exam 185

Physical Agility 188

1971 Equations, Including a Minority Status Variable. .189

Chapter 6. THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970s 196

MINORITY REPRESENTATION 196

The Legal Environment 196

Minority Composition of the Oakland PoliceDepartment 203

Administrative Attitudes 206

Research Efforts 208

A "Content Valid" Written Exam 211

Other Changes in the Selection Procedure 215

Active Recruitment of Minority Candidates 217

WOMEN 224

LESSONS FROM TURNOVER EXPERIENCE 229

Chapter 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 252

BIBLIOGRAPHY 264

xiv

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 2-1. Cohen and Chaiken Profiles 36

Table 2-2. Levy Profiles 43

Table 2-3. Levy Profiles 44

Table 2-4. Distribution of Oakland police officers byeducational level, August, 1962, toAugust, 1971 45

Table 2-5. Distribution of Oakland police officers byresidence, August, 1962, to August, 1971 46

Table 2-6. Turnover of Oakland police officers,August, 1962, to August, 1971 46

Table 2-7. Turnover of Oakland police officers byresidence, August, 1962, to August, 1971 46

Table 2-8. Turnover of Oakland police officers byeducational level, August, 1962, toAugust, 1971 47

Table 2-9. Positins taken by college graduates wholeft r)akland Police Department, 1956 to 1971 . . . 48

Table 3-1. Job applicants to Oakland Police Department,1965 to 1971, by occupational category 93

Table 3-a. Job applicants to Oakland Police Department,1965 to 1971, by occupational category,for Job 1, by years 94

Table 4-1. Oakland Police Department members, byrank, October 30, 1973 109

Table 4-2. Oakland Police Department members, bynumber of years of service, October 30, 1973 . . . 111

Table 4-3. Oakland Police Department members, bynumber of years of service and rank,October 30, 1973 112

XV

Table .4-4. Monthly salary of Oakland Police Departmentmembers, by rank, July, 1963, to July, 1974 . . .114

Table 4-5. Differences in salary of members of theOakland Police Department, by rank,July, 1963, to July, 1974 115

Table 4-6. Annual rate of increase Oakland PoliceDepartment patrolman and San Francisco-Oakland manufacturing production workers,July, 1963, to July, 1973 117

Table 4-7. Ratio of Oakland Police Department patrolmanand sergeant salaries to earnings of SanFranci sco-Oakland manufacturing productionworkers, July, 1963, to July, 1973 118

Table 4-8. Oakland Police Department salaries forpatrolman, step 1, patrolman, step 3, andsergeant, relative to median earnings in otheroccupational groups, 1969, for San Francisco-Oakland SMSA, total, Negro and Spanislsurname 121

Table 4-9. Oakland Police Department patrolman startingsalary relative to mean income of all SanFrancisco-Oakland males, 18 and older, andZvi to 34, in 1969, by years of school completedand race 127

Table 4-10. Oakland Police Department patrolman, step 3,and sergeant, salaries relative to mean incomeof all San Francisco-Oakland males, 18 andolder, in 1969, by years of school completedand race 128

Table 4-11. Total remuneration of Oakland patrolman,step 3, fiscal year July, 1970, to June, 1971. . . 130

Table 4-U. Oakland police officer vacancies, 1960 to 1973. . . 134

Table 4-13. Percent of all applicants appointed to theOakland Police Department, 1960 to 1970 137

xvi

Table 4-14. Common age requirements of California lawenforcement agencies in 1968 140

Table 4-15. Common height and weight requirements ofCalifornia law enforcement agencies in 1968. . . . 142

Table 4-16. Common visual acuity tandards of Californialaw enforcement agencies in 1968 143

Table 4-17. Number of employment applications for Oaklandpatrolmen filed and accepted, 1960 to 1970 147

Table 4-18. Number of Oakland patrolman applicants takingand passing the Mental Adaptability Test,1960 to 1970 150

Table 5-1. Percent of applicants in each non-referencecategory successful on the Mental Adaptability . . 177

Table 5-2. Regression coefficients, all applicants, 1965to June,1971 178

Table 5-3. Percent of applicants in each categorysuccessful on the oral exam 186

Table 5-4. Percent of 1971 applicants in each non-referencecategory successful on the Mental Adaptability . . 190

Table 5-5. Percent of white and minority members ineach non-reference category 191

Table 5-6. Regression coefficients: January to June,1971, applicants 193

Table 6 -1. Percent of new appointees from minority groups,Oakland Police Department, 1961 to 1973 204

Table 6-2. Total number and percent of Oakland PoliceDepartment positions filled by each minoritygroup, December, 1966, to December, 1973. . . 205

Table 6-3. Oakland Police Department members, by dateof appointment and ethnicity, October 30, 1973 . . 207

xvii

Table 6-4. Experience of ethnic groups on patrolmanexamination, Janu;,ry, 1972, to September,1973 214

Table 6-5. Educational levet of individuals who resignedfrom the Oakland Police Department, July,1966, to June, 1971 232

Table 6-6. Type of job taken by individuals who resignedfrom the Oakland Police Department, July,1966, to June, 1971, by educational level 233

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On July 23, 1965, "recognizing the urgency of the Nation's

crime problem and the depth of ignorance about it,"1 President

Lyndon. Johnson established the Commission on Law Enforcement

and Administration of Justice, through Executive Order 11236.

In its omnibus 1967. report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free

Society, the Commission emphasizes unequivocally the central

role of police manpower policies in the functioning of the Ameri-

can criminal justice system. "The police personnel need that

the Commission has found to be almost. universal is improved

quality ... The recommendations that have been made... about

community relations and policymaking, and the ones about...

organization and management, are predicated on the sharp

improvement of the quality of police personnel from top to

bottom." 2 In its much-quoted Table of Recommendations, the

Commission continues:

Widespread improvement in the strength and caliber

of police manpower, supported by a radical revision

of personnel practices, are the basic essentials for

achieving more effective and fairer law enforcement,

2

Educational requirements should be raised to college

levels and training programs improved. Recruitment

and promotion should be modernized to reflect educa-

tion, personality and assessment of performance. The

t raditional monolithic personnel structure must be

broken up into three entry levels of varying responsi-

bility and with different personnel requirements, and

lateral entry into advanced positions encouraged.3

Other discussions of police manpower abound with widespread

complaints of "shortages" of personnel to fill authorized positions 4

and difficulties in recruiting and selecting desirable candidates. 5

These problems are enhanced by serious controversies over

appropriate hiring standards and racial/ethnic composition and

their interrelationship.

While the intentions of the Commission are laudatory, the

clarity and sureness of its statement is deceptive. To speak of

"improvement" implies a perception of an existing state and of a

better one towards which one seeks to move. Yet, as recognized

by the Commission itself in its Foreward, discussions are being

held and policy recommendations are being made in an abysmal

analytic vacuum, not just about ideals but also about realities.

Are there, in fact, "shortages' ,6 of police personnel? If so,

3

why, and how an they be corrected? If not, why arc- they

widely perceived by police departments? A classic economic

discussion would infer that if there are shortages, perhaps

salaries are too low. Would raising police salaries be a good

policy approach? How can persistent complaints of "shortages"

be reconciled with the equally persistent debates about the

existence of arbitrary hiring standards, discrimination against

minorities, and demands to upgrade the "quality" of the men

hired, all phenomena more usually associated with freedom to

ration scarce jobs among many potential workers? Perhaps a

partial explanation lies in the very murky, institutional area of

labor market adjustment where hiring standards, recruitment

and selection procedures are worked out and administered.

Even more puzzling is the question of what is meant by

improving the "strength," "caliber," or "quality" of police man-

power. How do we know that raising educational requirements

to college levels will improve police quality? What personality

traits are we seeking in our policemen? How do we assess

police performance? How do we design recruitment, selection

and promotion processes to yield "quality" men?

It is the purpose of this study to shed some substantive

light on these questions. Immediately, it became apparent that

4

"shortages, if any, were caused not by too few applicants

offering their services, but rather by an insufficient number

deemed "qualified" by police departments.

Although police departments are encountering difficulty

in hiring new officers, this is not due to a dearth of

applicants, but to a lack of qualified applicants. In

1961, only 22.3 percent of the applicants for positions

in 3b8 police departments were accepted. The applicant

success rate in many departments is far lower. For

example, in 1965, only 2. 8 percent of the candidates

for the Los Angeles Police Department were eventually

accepted into the force. In 1966, only 29 of 1,033

applicants were hired by the Dallas Police Department.

A survey of police vacancies in California clearly "indicated

generally that most agencies had no difficulty in attracting men

in quantities, the problem was hiring and retaining men of

quality. "8

One is forced, therefore, to find out who it is that police

departments actually hire and why. What qualities do they seek

from their labor supply and why? In an environment in which st,

little is known, this question is complementary to the more

normative one of what qualities should they be seeking and why.

7

5

A meaningful analysis of the police labor market must focus on

a conception of the economic adjustment process which is particu-

larly sensitive to the role of such non-wage factors as recruit-

ment, selection and training.

To understand the role of non-wage economic factors, it is

necessary to study particular departments, their decisions,

decision rules and institutions. We were fortunate enough to

obtain the interest and cooperation of the Police Department and

Civil Service Commission of the City of Oakland, California.

The empirical focus of this study will be an attempt to assess the

role of the recruitment and selection process in yielding a labor

supply to the City of Oakland to fill its demand for patrolmen.

In particular, we will seek to discover the determinants

of success for Oakland Police Department applicants at three

critical stages of the process: the Mental Adaptability, Civil

Serice and Oral exams. We will concentrate on those variables

that labor market theories lead us to believe should be important,

leaving the more difficult, perhaps even more important, area

of personality assessment to the psychologists. A priori, we

expected that the critical variables would be: years of education,

residence, racial/ethnic status, specific police training or

experience, previous wages earned, employment history and age.

6

We test, through multiple regression techniques, the influence

of these variables on 1) the probability of success and 2) the

score on each of the exams. We will summarize our results

here, briefly and only suggestively.

We find that while high school graduation or its equivalent

is the only formal educational requirement for applicants to the

Oakland Police Department, the probability of success at the

first stage of the testing process, the Mental Adaptability, is

increased by large magnitudes as years of higher education

increase from some years of junior college through three to four

years of senior college or a college degree. Senior college ed-

ucation still has a significant effect, moreover, on the ability to

pass the Civil Service test. One might argue, therefore, that

the Oakland Police Department should assess carefully the

advantages and disadvantages of making explicit their implicit

educational standards by increasing the minimum educational

requirement. They would thus transmit more realistic signals

of their expectations to potential applicz:if'.,. They would

acknowledge more clearl y their competitors for labor. The

wage necessary to attract an adequate supply of college graduates,

for example, would differ considerably from that necessary to

attract the same number of high school graduates. Perhaps most

importantly, they would save the substantial cost of recruiting,

screening and testing applicants very likely to be rejected.

Alternatively, one can conclude that perhaps the emphasis

placed by tests upon years of education is screening out desirable

candidates who would make "successful" policemen, and it is the

tests, not the standards, which should be re-evaluated. These

and other issues will be discussed mo2,! fully later.

Local residence appears on balance to have a negative

effect on the probability of selection. This may be partly ex-

plained by the fact that it is considerably more costly for an out-

of-state resident to seek out the opportunity and to apply than it

is for a local fellow to walk into City Hall. off the streets. There-

fore, out-of-state people must have, on the average, more motiva-

tion or interest, and would do more self-selection than local

residents. This may argue either in favor of increased national

recruiting efforts to improve the average "quality" of applicants

as perceived by the department, or against the perception of

quality employed.

Minority group status, whether measured directly or

indirectly by the proxy of high school attendance in the South,

has a large and significant negative effect on the probability of

passing the standardized written test. It should be emphasized

8

here that multiple regression techniques allow us to estimate the

independent effect of minority status, holding everything else

(education, residence, etc.) constant. This points either to

intentional discrimination or to the validity of the complaints of

the minority community that such tests are culturally biased and

thus inherently discriminatory. In fact, recent court decisions,

including one by the Supreme Court of the United States, in

related cases, make it clear that if a selection test is inherently

discriminatory, the burden of proof is on the testing agency to

show that the test predicts performance. If predictive validity

cannot be demonstrated, the test must be abandoned and, some-

times, compensatory measures taken to correct its effects. 9

it should be added here that Oakland has recognized the

desirability and/or need to increase minority representation.

This is demonstrated by the fact that, at least in 1971, the last

year of our study, those minority members who make it through

the written tests have a higher probability of passing the oral

than non-minority candidates. More recently, Oakland has

switched from national recruiting to residence preference,

adopted an affirmative action program and embarked on aggressive

minority recruitment campaigns which have yielded significant

results.

9

Specific investment by applicants in college or non-college

police science courses is unimportant. Neither the Police

Department nor the Civil Service staff believe outside training to

be worth anything. They emphasize their own intensive 20 week

recruit school. Prior experience as a policeman, however, does

have a significant positive effect on the probability of success at

all stages of the process. Of course, such candidates have already

succeeded in a similar selection process elsewhere.

The role of previous salary as an indicator to the depart-

ment of an applicant's potential performance as a policeman is

clouded in our study by difficulties in filtering out part-time from

full-time work. The highest previous salary group, $700 per

month or more, does have a consistent significant positive effect

on the probability of a man being accepted. Other salary groups

were inconclusive. To minimize the distorting effects of part-

time work, we looked at the non-college group alone. For this

group, the previous wage variable behaved as economic theory

would predict, with higher salaries indicating progressively

greater probabilities of being selected. Previous salary does

indicate alternative worth and promise as a policeman. Number

of previous jobs enumerated on the application is unimportant.

Age has a small negative effect on the probability of passing

10 .

the Mental Ada Dta.bility, resulting from the well-known attrition

of test-taking ability with age, holding education constant. Age

has, however, a positive effect on success on the oral, reflecting

a concern with maturity.

We propose to proceed as follows. Chapter 2, "The Job,"

will describe the' unique nature of the job of policeman, the diffi-

culties in defining a "successful" policeman, the current contro-

versies, and the importance of the definition of the job to the

operation of the labor market.

Chapter 3, "The Theoretical Framework," will seek a

theoretical explanation of the alleged shortages of police man-

power in the 1960's. It will review the determinants of the supply

of labor to police departments. It will describe in detail three

distinct theoretical models which might be helpful in understand-

ing Oakland's experience.

First, the simplest economic reasoning argues that short-

ages should be eliminated by a sufficient rise in relative wages.

Informational imperfections and institutional decision-making

are added to the simple model by the conception of dynamic

shortages, which allows wage adjustments to take considerable,

even infinite, amounts of time.

11

Second is a model which relies on market power, specif-

ically monopsony, to explain shortages as consistent with a

monopsonistic equilibrium position and a monopsonistic wage.

Police departments experience job vacancies in equilibrium

because of their exercise of moncpsony power in the labor

market.

Third is a rigorous model, stemming from a utility max-

imizing theory of public agency decision-making, which stresses

the complex interaction between wages, hiring standards,

authorized employment levels, and vacancy rates. The problem

faced, in fact, by real world police agencies is defined: given

authorized employment and wage levels, who shall be hired to

fill vacant positions? It is suggested that the agency may wish

to approach this problem by defining a minimum acceptable

quality level, perhaps through a vector of hiring standards,

chosen to maximize the expected value of the net gain to society.

The formal implications of this model are discussed in detail.

Chapter 4, "The Institutional Framework: Salaries,

Vacancies, Hiring Standards, H analyzes the salaries, vacancies

and hiring standards of the Oakland Police Department. The

evidence leads us to reject the monopsony explanation in favor

of a dynamic shortage model.

12

Wv. also begin our effort to define and describe

the vector of hiring standards of the Oakland Police

Department.

Chapter 5, "The Empirical Analysis," which we have

already discussed, further specifies the vector of hiring stand-

ards by analyzing the characteristics for which the Oakland

Police Department's selection process between 1965 and 1971 is

testing.

Chapter 6, "The Challenges of the 1970's," presents the

dramatic changes in recruitment and selection which have

occurred between 1971 and August, 1974, and their effect on the

composition of the Oakland police force. Residence requirements,

Affirmative Action, and aggressive minority recruitment cam-

paigns have yielded significant results. The minority composi-

tion of the force has increased from 3 percent in 1966 and 6. 5

percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 1973 and 61.0 percent of new

hires in 1973. The sexual composition of the police force is

changing as well, as patrolman and policewoman categories are

merged, and height and weight standards which would exclude the

majority of women from the new police officer job are abolished.

In Chapter 6, as well, we also discuss the turnover experience

of the Oakland Police Department and analyze in depth why

13

officers resignk We discuss and reject the possibility of

increasing economic incentives to retain resignees.

Chapter 7, "Summary and Conclusions, " concludes that

our evidence is consistent with the model of dynamic shortages

and inconsistent with the monopsony power explanation of job

vacancies in equilibrium. We do not v.,sh to rest with only the

simple model, however, because the complex interactions

between wages, hiring standards, authorized employment levels

and vacancy rates must be explored further. We hope we have

made some contribution to observing, analyzing and under-

standing the central role of the choice of the vector of hiring

standards.

14

CITA PTER 1

FOOTNOTES

1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-tion of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967),Foreward.

2. Ibid. , p. 107.

3. Ibid. , pp. 29 4-295 .

4. See, for example, Raymond I . Bancroft, "Municipal LawEnforcement, 1966," Nation's Cities, February 1966, pp. 15-17; and President's Commission on Law Enforcement andAdministration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police,pp. 133-134.

5. See, for example, State of California, Commission on PeaceOfficer Standards and Training, California Law EnforcementRecruitment Program, p. 4.

6. The question of defining "shortage" precisely will be dealtwith at length in Chapter 3.

7. President's Commission on I aw Enforcement and Administra-tion of Pistice, Task Force Report: The Police, p. 134.

8. State of California, Commission on Peace Officer Standardsand Training, California Law Enforcement RecruitmentProgram, p. 4.

9. The Supreme Court decision is Griggs v. Duke Po,er Com-pany, March 8, 1971. See also Julius Arrington et al. v.Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Civ. A. No.69-681, United States District Court, Massachusetts, December22, 1969: Carter et al.. vs. Hugh Gallagher et al. , UnitedStates District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth DivisiOn,March 9, 1971: United States of America v. Virginia Electricand Po,.ver Company et al. , Civ. A No. 638-70-R, UnitedStates District Court for Eastern District of Virginia,Richmond Division, May 4, 1971.

15

CHAPTER 2

THE JOB

DEFINITION OF THE JOB

Unlike most jobs in our increasingly specialized economy,

the job of policeman remains inordinately difficult to define.

The policeman is simultaneously technician and generp.list. In

the routine performances of his daily tasks, he must adhet. to

finely drawn rules of dress, report writing, obedience to command,

weapons management, citizen contact procedure and law enforce-

ment procedure. He. must often endure long hours of boredom,

watching, waiting, appearing in court, filling out endless forms.

Yet, inherent ia the job is the knowledge that at any moment,

virtually ,Tkithout warning, he may be called upon to exercise

unlimited disc retio spontaneously and without guidance, in

matters of life and death for others and himself. He must be an

efficient cler,, without the security of constant routine, a skilled

craftsman without clear quality standards or freedom to improvise,

a professional without certification, systematic research or

collegial self-government.

The complexity of the police task was well captured in 1931

by the Wickersham Commission.1 We have defined it no better

16

today.

Reviewing the tasks we expect of our law enforcement

officers, it is my impression that their complexity is

perhaps greater than that of any other profession. On

the one hand we expect our law enforcement officer to

possess the nurturing, caretaking, sympathetic,

empathizing, gentle characteristics of physician, nurse,

teacher, and social worker as he deals with school

traffic, acute illness and injury, juvenile delinquency,

suicidal threats and gestures, and missing persons.

On the other hand we expect him to command respect,

demonstrate courage, control hostile impulses, and

meet great physical hazards. . . He is to control

crowds, prevent riots, apprehend criminals, and chase

after speeding vehicles. I can think of no other pro-

fession which constantly demands such seemingly

opposite characteristic s.

Research interest in the policeman's job was galvanized by

the explosive urban and campus tensions of middle-1960's America

and the questions raised by the very visible and public police

response. The urgency of remedying our abysmal ignorance of

policeman was apparent. The President's Commission on Law

17

Enforcement and Administration of Justice was therefore estab-

lished by President Johnson on July 23, 1965, to investigate

every facet of crime and law enforcement in America." 2 It

issued its omnibus report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free

Society, in February, 1967, followed by detailed Task Force

reports on each phase of the criminal justice system and also

staff research and consultants' studies. The literature, both

descriptive and analytic, has blosso:Tied since then, and if our

questions have not been answered, at least many have been

raised. The difficulty of merely defining and describing the

policeman's job is underscored by the appearance of so many

recent books by major publishers with this one aim in mind.

I am emphasizing this issue here because a labor market study

would logically begin with a clear and concise definition of the

job to be studied. The fact that the job defies simple definition

is the single most important characteristic of the labor market

and sets the stage for many of the controversies and problems

upon which this paper focuses. The reader interested in a fuller

discussion of the details, conflicts and problems inherent in the

policeman's job is directed to the following books, listed in

approximate order of appearance: David J. Bou-lua, The Police

(New York: Wiley, 1967); Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield

18

(Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Jerome Skolnick, Justice

Without Trial (New York: Wiley, 1967): James Q. Wilson,

Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1968); George E. Berkeley, The Democratic Policeman

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Paul Chevigny, Police Power

(New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Gene Radano, Walking the

Beat (Toronto: Collier Books, 1969); L. H. Whittemore, Cop.

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969): William A.

West ley, Violence and the Police (Cambridge: MIT Press,

1970); Albert J. Reiss, Jr. The Police acid the Public (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); and Jonathan Rubinstein,

City Police (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973).

The functions of the police are officially described as 1)

protection of life and property, 2) preservation of the peace,

3) prevention of crime, 4) detection and arrest of law violators,

5) enforcement of laws and ordinances , and 6) safeguarding the

rights of individuals. 3 Ambiguity and potential conflicts are

already obvious. Law enforcement functions may clash with

order maintenance ones. Prevention and detection of crime may

clash with individual rights. Whose conception of peace or order

or conformity is to be preserved? Should the law be bent to

preserve order, or order reign over law? Since each case a

19

r,:inciles is different, there can be no exhaustive

catalogue of how he should proceed to carry out his mandate.

At best, he is told what behavior to avoid. Substantial individual

discretion and selective enforcement of the law are inevitable.

And in his person coexist two potentially combustible elements,

danger and authority, exacerbated by a constant pressure to

appear efficient. In addition, the primary duties are sometimes

forgotten under the pressure of accomplishing various licensing,

inspecting and administrative tasks.

There are several research studies in progress now to find

out exactly what it ,is that policemen do with their time. Prelim-

inary evidence from these studies seems to bear out that in spite

of the drama of the above description, policemen actually spend

only approximately ten percent of their time on law enforcement

related activities. The bulk of their time is spent on service

related activities, followed by order maintenance and information

gathering. 5

The most serious question which arises from ambiguity is

that of responsibility. To whom is a policeman, a police chief,

a police force ultimately responsible? The locality it serves

provides it with no exhaustive daily guidance. Local governing

boards, in fact, become involved only in clear cases of police

20

failure. Most localities today, particularly urban ones, are not

homogeneous entities, but represent diverse political and social

groups with widely disparate, often passionately held views as

to the appropriate role of the police. Whose views prevail') How

are they determined? Can a majority view be defined? Is it

middle class, Catholic, intellectual, young, middle-aged,

Democratic, Republican, white, black, etc.? Are all groups in

the community involved in the determination, or only some?

What about minority rights?

These are rhetorical questions, but critical ones. For

some cities there are answers, for others there are not. Many

cities simply attempt to avoid the questions. For our purposes,

it must be clear that the politics of the police, and its social

mandate, are heavily controversial, fundamentally explosive

subjects, totally unresolved in America today. Many of the

issues of police manpower we will be dealing with in economic

terms here are really reflections of or attempts to mask a

powerful political debate. So we must remain alert for implica-

tions broader tliar. our subject.

POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

One example, extremely critical to this study, is the issue

of professionalism or professionalization of police forces. Indeed,

L1

one way to divert the political questions is to make the police a

profession, like doctors, lawyers, teachers, responsible pri-

marily to themselves, their collegially determined goals and

standards of conduct. Professionalism itself is difficult to

characterize. 6 In Durkheim's view, what is distinctive about

professional groups is not merely their high status, high skill,

politically important monopoly over certain kinds of work, or

particular structure of control over work, but, most importantly,

the infusion of work and collective organization with moral values

and the use of sanctions to insure that these moral values are

upheld. An alternative concept of professionalism is associated

with a managerial view emphasizing rationality, efficiency and

universalism. This view envisages the professional as a bureau-

crat, almost as a machine calculating alternative courses of

action by a stated program of rules and possessing the technical

ability to carry out decisions irrespective of personal feelings.

This model has particular disadvantages when applied to the

police because it fails to bridge the gap between the maintenance

of order and the rule of law and because the policeman is an

especially nonmechanical official.7

The argument that policemen should become professionals

rests on inc reasing awareness of the complexity of the job, the

responsibility and judgment involved, the critical and isolated

nature of some of the decisions required. Education is proposed

as the vehicle through which men can be molded to handle dis-

cretion and make good decisions. The quality of policemen

should therefore be upgraded, two-year or four-year college

degrees required, departmental training programs deepened and

broadened, career hierarchies established, salaries raised,

pseudo-military conformity revised, physical prowess de-

emphasized, selection implements refined. All of this, more-

over, should improve the image, status and power of the police-

man within his community and secure public confidence and

support. Although the rhetoric encompasses both definitions of

professionalism, the reality tends towards the strictly adminis-

trative one.

In thoughtful, improvement-oriented police circles,

increasing professionalism is often proposed as a rational cure

for the problems of relations with minority communities, cor-

ruption, securing quality personnel and assuring public confidence,

particularly in the context of ever more sophisticated technolog-

ical advances and legal questions. The reports of the President's

Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice

unanimously and enthusiastically support and make extensive

23

policy recommendations in this direction, as quoted on the first

page of the Introduction to this study. The suggestions most

often offered can be summarized as follows:8

1) high standards of admission, through mandatory

minimum educational, mental, moral and physical

requirements;

2) extensive training program) for candidates, perhaps

with mandatory minimum standards, uniform curricula,

and specially trained teachers;

3) a career hierarchy, with progression determined by

education, training and experience levels;

4) licens;ng of members;

5) a code of ethics;

6) a special body of knowledge and theory, improved by

organized research efforts;

7) altruism and dedication to the service ideal;

8) autonomous control;

9) pride of the members in their profession;

10) publicly recognized status and prestige;

1) coordinated efforts of local jurisdictions to meet

common administrative, recruitment and selection

problems.

L4

California police departments, arid the Oakland Police Depart-

ment in particular, are proudly pointed out as having already made

substantial progress towards becoming professional departments.

Within police departments themselves, the issue of pro-

fessionalization is still controversial. The street-wise, old-time,

experienced beat patrolman who could not meet the suggested

educational standards generally scorns and resents both the

standards and their "cocky," inexperienced human embodiments.

Considerable hostility and social tension may be generated

between the young, college-educated, professional and the old-

timer.

The doctrine of the professional movement advocates

education, a non-punitive orientation, strict legality

in every phase of police work, and, most important

of all, good public relations. These principles create

an atmosphere in which only the professionally

directed police officer can operate successfully. On

a lower plane within the hierarchy exists the tough-

minded, authoritarian working class of the police

society. Conditions here foster exaltation of power

and force and contemptuousness of the unrealistic,9soft-minded, subversive ideas of professionals.

25

Outside scholars of the police such as James 0. Wilson,

Arthur Niederhoffer, and Jerome Skolnick are also not convinced

by the professionalization rhetoric, agreeing that although police

often have the responsibility, discretionary power, and aspira-

tions of professionals, they are not professionals yet.

Occupations whose members exercise, as do the

police, wide discretion alone and with respect to

matters of the greatest importance are typically

"professions"--the medical profession, for example.

The right to handle emergency situations, to be privy

to 'guilty information', and to make decisions involving

questions of life and death or honor and dishonor is

usually, as with a doctor or priest, conferred by an

organized profession. The profession certifies that

the member has acquired by education certain informa-

Con and by apprenticeship certain arts and skills that

render him competent to perform these functions and

that he is willing to subject himself to the code of

ethics and sense of duty of his colleagues (or, in the

case of the priest, to the laws and punishments of

God), Failure to perform his duties properly will,

if detected, be dealt with by professional sanctions--

26

primarily, loss of respect. Members of professions

tend to govern themselves through collegial bodies,

to restrict the authority of their nominal superiors,

to take seriously their reputation among fellow

professionals, and to encourage some of their kind to

devote themselves to adding systematically to the

knowledge of the profession through writing and

research. The police are not in any of these senses

professionals. They acquire most of their knowledge

and skill on the job, not in separate academies; they

are emphatically subject to the authority of their

superiors; they have no serious professional society,

only a union-like bargaining agent; and they do not

produce, in systematic written form, new knowledge

about their craft.

In sum, the order-maintenance function of the

patrolman defines his role and that role, which is

unlike that of any other occupation, can be described

as one in which SUB-PROFESSIONALS, WORKING

ALONE, EXERCISE WIDE DISCRETION IN MATTERS

OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE (LIFE AND DEATH, HONOR

AND DISHONOR) IN AN ENVIRONMENT THAT IS

27

A PPR EHENSIVE AND PEHI IA PS HOSTILE. The

agents of various other governmental organizations

may display one or two of these characteristics but

none or almost none display all in combination.

The doctor has wide discretion over matters of life

and death, but he is a professional working in a

supportive environment. The teacher works alone

and has considerable discretion, but he may be a

professional and in any case education, though

important, is not a matter of life or death. A welfare

worker, though working alone among apprehensive

clients, has relatively little discretion--the laws

define rather precisely what payments he can

authorize to a client and supervisors review his

written reports and proposed family budgets.10

The issue of the possibility and desirability of police

professionalization could be passed over as of purely theoretical

interest if attempting to apply the concept had few costs. How,

after all, could ungrading the quality of police forces be a bad

policy? Clearly, there is an economic cost. Briefly, higher

salaries must be paid in order to attract a more highly "qualified"

labor force. A college educated force must co ( more than a

28

high school educated one. If quality standards are artificially

high, so are salaries. If departments do not succeed in attracting

enough men of "professional quality," they will be operating

chronically below their authorized strength, a prevalent situation

in the 1960's.

Moreover, additional hiring standards increase barriers

to entry to the job, reducing the effective supply of labor. This

is critically important here because increasing educational stand-

ards is particularly likely to reduce the already grossly inadequate

pool of applicants from minority groups. Professionalization

directly clashes with, even makes a mockery out of, loudly

espoused efforts to increase the representation of minority groups;

yet minority status itself may determine professional efficiency

The serious under-representation of minority groups on

police forces is well documented in every city, county and state

where statistics are available. 11 For example, according to a

suit filed by the United States Justice Department on August 15,

1973, in U. S. District Court in Chicago, the Chicao Police

Department has about 13,500 police officers, of which 16 percent

are black and 1 percent are Spanish-surnamed. About 33 per-

cent of Chicago's population is black and 7 pc rcent Spanish

surnamed. Un the same day, the Justice Department filed a suit

1

29

in Federal court in Buffalo, which employs 1, 405 uniformed

police officers. Of the uniformed officers, 1. 8 percent are

black, none is Puerto Rican. Blacks make up more than 20 per-

cent of Buffalo's population and Puerto Ricans 0. 4 percent.12

In San Francisco, 9 percent of the city's police force is composed

of minority members. The 1970 Census listed minorities as 43

13percent of the population. Washington, D. C. has one of the

highest proportions of black officers in the country, 18. 5 percent,

with a population 54 percent black.14 In Oakland, which is almost

50 percent minority, 7. 3 percent of the uniformed police force was

minority as of June 1970. 15 Oakland's record is particularly bad

in a generally bad picture. to

Advocates of police professionalization, including the

President's Commission, have not dealt openly with the direct

conflict between raising educational standards and improving

minority representation. Some even advocate that if police

forces become professional, the problem of minority representa-

tion becomes unimportant because a professional force, by defini-

tion, would enforce all interests equally, making representation

of "special" interests unnecessary. The political naivety, at

best, of this view requires no elaboration.

In fact, the opposite case can be made persuasively. The

30

current demand for a more formally educated police force may

be in part a drive by the growing cl.:ss of professional and

educated Americans to gain influence over police actions, to

make "them" more like "us, " to insure responsiveness to the

perceived needs of this class. 17 The whole conflict over police

aims and standards can be looked at politically as a theater in

which different population groups compete for representation

and influence. The issues, perhaps, cannot be handled until

police departments and political leaders explicitly recognize and

deal with, rather than implicitly obscure, the political context

of police work.

These profound basic political controversies must be kept

in mind as one turns to the economic and empirical issues. The

controversies are all the more serious because the professional

standards proposed have no clear empirical validity in identify-

ing successful policemen.

IDENTIFYING THE SUCCESSFUL POLICEMAN

The empirical social scientist offers another means of

avoiding political controversy. The qualities needed to be a

successful policeman can be determined empirically with the

aid of modern statistical techniques, and selection procedures

can then be designed to choose those applicants most likely to .

31

succeed. A requirement that all police candidates have a college

degree, for example, can be recommended, validated and en-

forced if it can be demonstrated statistically that college grad-

uates perform better on the job. Indeed, advocates of police

professionalization often leave the impression that such valida-

tion has already taken place.

A burgeoning interdisciplinary literature has been emerg-

ing addressed to this effort. It varies in quality from the

bizarre to the careless to the sophisticated and careful. Bernard

Cohen's and Jan M. Chaiken's Fblice Background Characteristics

and Performance, published by the New York City Rand Institute

in August 1972, represents by far the best study. We will con-

sider it here in detail as illustrative of the potential role of

competent, thoughtful empirical analysis in identifying desirable

characteristics of policemen.

Cohen and Chaiken obtained and analyzed background and

performance data for 1, 915 officers appointed to the New York

City Police Department in 1957, 1,608 of whom were still

active members in 1968 when the information was collected.

From 18 possible performance measures they identified by

factor analysis five performance patterns:

1) termination, which describes the officer who left

32

the Department prior to 1968, either voluntarily

or involuntarily;

2) career advancement, which refers to the officer

who obtained special assignments or promotions,

frequently coupled with above-average numbers

of awards;

3) departmental discipline problem, which describes

the officer who had an above-average number of

departmental charges, and frequently also had

an above-average number of times sick:

4) above-average number of civilian complaints; and

5) above-average number of allegations of harassment.

The last four performance patterns were found to be inde.)endent

of each other.

They then explored the relationship between these per-

formance patterns and the following background characteristics

of the officers:

A) Early background characteristics

1) Race

2) Age

3) I. Q.

4) Civil Service Test Score

18

33

5) Region of birth

6) Siblings

7) Occupational history

8) Military history

9) Arrest history

10) Civil court appearances

11) Large number of debts

12) Prior history of psychological disorders

13) History of mental disorder in family

14) Father's occupation

15) Number of residences or place of residence

16) Marital status and number of children

17) NumbeA of summonses

18) Background investigator's rating

B) Later background characteristics

1) Recruit training score

2) Probationary evaluation

13) Education 9

Through multiple regression analysis, they estimated the

average performance levels for officers having specified combi-

nations of background characteristics and identified the charac-

teristics which made the greatest contribution to explaining

34

variations In performance among officers. For white officers,

the strongest explanatory variables, in order, were: average

grade in police academy training courses, probationary evalua-

tion, background investigator' s rating, military disciplinary

record, employment disciplinary record, level of education,

number of appearances in civil court, age at time of application,

civil service examination score, marksmanship, prior arrest

history, and 1. Q. For black officers, the strongest two pre-

.dictors were recruit training score and probationary evaluation. 20

Background characteristics 11 to 17, for example, were found to

be unrelated to later performance, in spite of an a priori

expectation that they would be negatively related. The policy

implication is, therefore, that these factors should not be con-

sidered in the selection process.

To determine the extent to which performance measures

would he expected to vary with background characteristics,

they calculated some typical values of performance measures

from regression equations. For example, they found that a

hypothetical candidate with three military or employment

disciplinary incidents, the lowest possible recruit score, and

two "unsatisfac,my" marks on his probation report would be

expected to have 8. 5 times as many substantiated complaints of

35

misconduct as a man with no military or employment discipline

record, a recruit score of 90, and no "unsatisfactory" marks on

probation. A similar disparity in civilian complaints was found

between older college graduates and younger high school grad-

uates. 21

Using the results from cross-tabulations and regression

analysis, they developed profiles of the candidates who are most

likely to embody the performance characteristics identified in

the factor analysis. The profiles differed for white and black

officers as shown in Table 2-1.

Three hundred and seventy-six out of 2, 002 men appointed

in 1957 (or 19 percent) had left the department by 1968. Voluntary

and involuntary terminations could not be distinguished from the

data. The peaks of the terminations tended to occur at two years

(18 percent) and five years (12 percent) after appointment. The

men who left the force were younger, if married had fewer

children and debts, and were considerably better educated than

those who remained.

It is particularly noteworthy that one-third of the

college-educated recruits in 1957 (8 out of 24) were

found to have left the force by 1968, compared to

19 percent of the men who had not graduated from

36

Table Cohs.n and Chaiken )files 22

1. The men most likely to be a discipline problem for thedepartment, with a large number of departmental chargesand times sick, had the following characteristics:

Whites BlacksYoung at appointment High I. Q.Non-college graduate Few siblingsExcessive summonses and Poor background rating

debts Low recruit scoreEmployment disciplinary Poor probationary evaluation

record Born in New York CityPoor background ratingLow recruit training scorePoor probationary evaluation

Z. Officers most likely to incur charges of harassment (falsearrest, protested summons, illegal search, illegal detention,etc.) had the following characteristics:

Whites BlacksNo history of prior arrest No history of prior arrestHistory of civil count Employment disciplinary

appearances recordMilitary disciplinary record

3. Officers most likely to incur civilian complaints had thefollowing characteristics:

Whites BlacksYoung at appointment Low I. 0,Non-college graduate Many appearances in civilMilitary disciplinary record court

Military disciplinary record

4. Offic..-rs most likely to advance through the civil servicepromotional system to the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, andcaptain had the following characteristics:

Younger at appointmentHigh I. Q.More likely to be singleCollege educatedHigher civil sorsi.-,e scoresHigher recruit training scoresMore likely to be an expert marksman

37

Table 2-1, continued

5. Officers most likely to advance to the rank of detective,which is not filled through civil service examinations,had the following characteristics:

Older at appointmentAverage I. 0.More likely to be marriedNot college educatedLower civil service scoreLower recruit training scoresLess likely to be an expert marksman

college. . . The data suggest that many men who

represent the Department's view of a desirable

candidate, especially college-educated men, will

have shorter tenure than the average officer unless

the Department consciously attempts to determine

the source of dissatisfaction among such officers

and modifies its personnel policies accordingly.23

So our debate on the value of college education is clarified

by empirical research, at least for this cohort of New York City

officers. College graduates are more likely to leave the depart-

ment, but those who remain are likely to perform better than

their colleagues. ''They advanced through preferential assign-

ments and civil service promotions, they had low i:icidence of

all types of misconduct except harassment, on which they were

average, they had low sick time, and none of them had their

38

firearms removed for cause. "24 Twenty-four percent of the

non-college graduates, but only 8 percent of the college graduates,

had received a civilian complaint. On the other hand, Cohen and

Chaiken also find that men of average intelligence and no college

education do very well in such assignments as traffic duty.25

Perhaps what police departments should be considering is

substantial restructuring of career patterns and duties and

salary structures. If college graduates, for example, were

assigned to more stimulati ng, more difficult and more highly

paid posts, their turnover might be lower and their contributions

would be used where needed most.

Well executed empirical efforts such as this have a great

deal to contribute, particularly to processing and evaluating the

facts relating to police departments' own experiences with

superior, average and inferior officers. The first problem

facing a researcher is finding meaningful performance measures,

even of the departments' own criteria. The New York City

department is large enough to make a cohort study possible.

Not many others across the country would be. Yet even Cohen

and Chaiken had to restrict themselves to measures reflecting

objective extremes of performance (termination, promotion,

discipline) because other types of evaluation (supervisor's

39

ratings, for example) tend to be extremely poor and exhibit

little real variance.

A sophisticated attempt to develop a consistent performance

evaluation method utilizing paired-comparison tests of super-

visors was made by Melany E. Baehr, John E. Furcon and

Ernest C. Froernel of the Industrial Relations Center at the

University of Chicago. 26 As predictors they used 17 different

paper-and-pencil tests to form a psychological test battery as

well as background variables. "The predictors having the

strongest correlations, consistent among subjects, were

elements of background and experience derived from a Personal

History Index, a cooperativeness variable from a test of social

insight, and temperament traits of self confidence and self-

starting (positive) and demonstrativeness (negative). "27

The tests show that, apart from an average level of

intelligence, the most important personal attributes

of successful patrolmen are all related to stability- -

stability stemming from personal self-confidence and

the control of emotional impulses, stability in the

maintenance of cooperative rather than hostile or

competitive attitudes, and stability deriving from a

resistance to stress and a realistic rather than a

40

subjective and feeling-oriented approach to life.

Underlying this stability was the presence of early

assumption of family responsibilities and involvement

in family activities in the background of better patrol-

men. All of these attributes are measured by the

tests, and patrolmen who scored high on these

attributes were, in general, those who were

independently given high ratings for performance by

their supervisors. 28

Baehr, Furcon and Froemel demonstrated that there was

an "acceptably" high and statistically significant relationship

between the psychological test battery scores and independent

measures of performance. They also demonstrated that the

relationship improved substantially when white and black

patrolmen were studied separately. On the basis of these

results, separate validations for different racial groups are

recommended as a routine procedure in the selection of patrol-

1129men.

Further discussion of the general empirical literature

here would be needlessly laborious. The best attempts have

been telescoped and indicate the inherent pos.,ibilities of the

approach. 30 One must remember, in evaluating all empirical

41

attempts, however promising, that their substantive value is

critically dependent upon their chosen measure of performance.

Internal departmental measures such as those cited here are

extremely difficult to obtain and to work with. Even more

difficult, yet perhaps more significant, are external measures

of the community's evaluation of its policemen. Since community

standards are virtually impossible to articulate even qualitatively,

pessimism seems warranted about the possibility of developing

performance measures and empirical techniques which reflect

an external evaluation of the police by the community.

Secondly, these studies fail to deal with the argument that

it is the environment encountered by the recruit in the field,

his socialization by his peers, the implicit internal system of

rewards and punishments he learns, that determines his perfor-

mance, and not his personal characteristics. To study police

success, one must study the institution and not the individuals.

If this is true, then our observed relationships may be statistical

artifacts which sidestep the primary influences.

Thirdly, in a country as heterogeneous as ours, can

results from one jurisdiction be applied usefully in other

jurisdictions or does each geographical entity have to invest in

its own research`' In spite of considerable political and technical

42

difficulties, an ambitious, careful, uniform study involving a

sampling of cities should be launched. Preliminary indications

from the existing literature, however, are pessimistic on

transferability. Moreover, perhaps the job of policeman itself,

with all its inherent contradictory elements, should be broken

down functionally (i. e. , traffic, juvenile, detective, high crime

area, low crime area, etc.) to yield meaningful results.

EVIDENCE FOR OAKLAND

If transferring results from one jurisdiction to another is

hazardous, what do we know about identifying the successful

policeman in Oakland, California, the city of our primary

concern') In fact, Oakland is a well-studied city. Ruth Levy,

in early work in the field, studied 4,000 men from 1952 to 1962

from 14 California departments, including Oakland, to try to

determine empirically the difference between men who stayed

on their jobs, men who terminated as failures (fired, resignation

requested, or ineligible for re-hire), and non-failure termina-

tions.tions. She found that non-failure terminations were the best

educated, had lived in their city for the shortest length of time,

and had the highest total number of residences. The men still

in service had lived in their city the longest periods and had the

lowest number of total residences.

43

In a later study of the same 14 departments, she dealt

with 1, 765 officers hired from November 1, 1968, through

October 31, 1969, and had access to all pre-employment informa-

tion available to the departments about these men at the time they

were hired. 32 She formed discriminant equations using 6?.

variables and 1, 599 cases. The following table shows those pre-

employment factors which occurred most frequently in the dis-

criminant equations:33

Table 2-2. Levi Profiles

CurrentMany years in Calif.Less educationHas been in NavyNot a sworn police

officerNot divorced

FailureFew years in Calif.Many jobsTatooedSworn police officerDischarged from job

Non-failure

Few years in Calif.More educationNavyOlde r

She then added to the empirically derived variables a set of

"logically derived variables" stemming from her own inter-

pretation of psychological theory. 34 Combining the logically

derived variables and the empirically derived variables in a

second discriminant equation, she reached the following results

for the logically derived variables:35

44

Table 2-3. Levy Profiles

CurrentBorn in cityNo negative

recommendationsNo bad applicationNo broken homeNo low military rankNot 21 or 22No "Service to

Mankind"Not failed other p. d.

examsFew residences

Failure

Youngest siblingNegative recommend-

ationsBad applicationBroken homeLow military rank21 or 22 years oldHad GED"Service to Mankind"

Non-failure

Oldest siblingNo negative

recommendationsJuvenile penalsNo adult penalsJr. after nameMany residencesFather is sworn

peace officerFailed other p. d. examsParent deadDishonorsHas child at young age

Levy's work has been challenged by James M. Newman,

Oakland Personnel Director, and William E. Rogin, who argue

that the predictive ability of Levy's study has not been validated

and demonstrate that for Oakland alone the predictions are no

improvement over chance. 36 They also question her classifica-

tion procedures and her emphasis on avoiding failures without

considering the cost of turning away good candidates in the

attempt. I was more disturbed by Levy's failure to fully divulge

her models, analytical techniques, and the statistical significance

of her results. I also found her "logically derived variables"

intuitively unappealing and the suggestion that such factors as

sibling position or tatoos be used for selection as bizarre and

45

frightening. Nevertheless, the effort is indicative of research

possibilities and pitfalls, and relevant to Oakland.

More compelling, from our point of view, and of utmost

importance in interpreting our own work, is the information on

tenure processed by the Oakland Civil Service staff itself. The

facts in Oakland reaffirm the disturbing evidence that the most

highly sought individuals, college graduates, are also the most

likely to resign. The candidates attracted from out-of-state,

through national recruitment efforts on the assumptions of a

national professional labor market, are also most likely to

resign.

The distribution of the 588 police officers appointed to the

Oakland Police Department in the 9 years between August 1,

1962, and August 1, 1971, by educational level, follows:37

Table 2-4. Distribution of Oakland police officers byeducational level, August, 1962, to August, 1971

Number Percent

High school graduates 218 37, 07Less than 2 years college 176 2g. 932 or more years college 98 16.67College graduates 96 16. 33

588 100. 00

46

Their distribution by place of residence is:

Table 2-5. Distribution of Oakland police officers by residence,August, 1962, to August, 1971

Number Percent

Oakland area 421 71.60Other California 57 9.70Out-of-state 110 18.70

588 100. 00

The turnover data indicate that for all appointees:

Table 2-6. Turnover of Oakland police officers, August, 1962,to August, 1971

.a.v...,...=1111,Number Percent

Remain on force 419 71.25Resigned 144 24.48Fired 25 9.25

588 99.98

Breaking down the turnover data by place of residence reveals:

Table ;?,-7. Turnover of Oakland police officers by residence,August, 1962, to August, 1971

Oakland Other Calif. Out-of-stateNo. No . % No.

Remain 318 75.5 44 77. 2 57 51.8Resigned 85 20.2 11 19.3 48 43.6Fired 18 4.2 2 3.5 5 4.0

421 99.9 57 100.0 110 99.4

47

Breaking down the turnover data by educational level reveals:

Table 2-8. Turnover of Oakland police officers by educationallevel, August, 1962, to August, 1971

H. S. <2 Years +2 Years CollegeGrad College College Grad

No. % No. No. % No. %

Remain 169 77.52 121 68.75 78 79. 59 51 53. 12Resigned 36 16.51 45 25.56 19 19.38 44 45.83Fired _i3 5.96 10 5.68 1 1.02 1 1.04

218 99.99 176 99.99 98 99.99 96 99.99

Oakland actually traced the positions taken by the 50 college

graduates who left the department between 1956 and 1971. Sixty-

eight percent of them accepted their next employment within the

field of criminal justice. This finding tempers the serious impli-

cations of the high resignation rate and indicates that, in fact,

Oakland was providing specific training for higher law enforce-

ment agencies in many cases. Whether this is a rational policy

for Oakland to follow or not depends on the trade-off between the

deriv-ttive higher personnel costs and the benefits received from

high qui,lity service, even for a few years. There may also be

a public relations or prestige gain from providing men to other

agencies. 38

48

Table 2-9. Positions taken by college graduates who leftOakland police department, 1956 to 1971

CumulativeNext Position Taken Number Percent Percent

Federal law enforcementagencies 1 24 24

State law enforcementagencies 11 22 46

Other local law enforcementagencies 11 22 68

Indirectly related to lawenforcement (law or graduateschool, military officers) 8 16 84

Other occupations 7 14 98

Fired 1 2 10050

No independent attempt will be made in this study to formu-

late more sophisticated measures of successful performance.

Such an effort would involve the analytical skills of political

science and psychology and would take us well beyond the

economic focus of this study. Moreover, we have benefited

extensively from the considerable interdisciplinary research

activity now taking place in Oakland and have been able to absorb

and include its results where relevant. 39

Among the most into

the most impressionistic,

resting and original efforts, although

is the sensitive anri provocative work

of political scientist William K. Muir. 40 He views policemen

49

as political beings, designs a system of behavioral classification,

ranks a small sample of men through in-depth interviews, and

analyzes the results. The policeman is a political being because,

in the critical part of his job, he must influence people to do what

they do not want to do, and his influence is through his a t:hority,

his threat to harm. A good policeman "must have the moral

skills to reconcile these sometimes necessary political practices

with his previously felt moral obligations to be reasonable, kind,

empathetic, and creative;" .he "has to have the moral skills to

be mean opportunistically without becoming mean compulsively. "41

"At the same time he must have the philosopher's itch--a correct2..4sense of place, time and purpose."

A "professional" policeman in Muir's scheme would have

both moral skills and a philosophical itch. This is the ideal

policeman. The "mellow" would fall short because he is a

philosopher but not a moralist, not dominant enough; the "legal-

ist" would fall short because he is a moralist but not a philoso-

pher; the ''reluctant" is neither; and the "impressionable" has

the potential to be a "professional" but is still to young and in-

experienced. Muir then uses his rankings of policemen in his

theoretical schema to assess the validity of the department's

existing selection tests and possible alternative selection de-

50

vices and to inquire into the effect of police work on personal

characteristics. Of particular interest to us, he finds that 100

percent of the "professionals" and 100 percent of the "impress-

ionables" have completed at least one year of college, as opposed

to 25 percent of the "mellows," 43 percent of the "legalists," and

0 percent of the "reluctants. "43 Again an indication that some

college may make a difference in performance while a man re-

mains on a force.

We have finished, for our purposes, our brief survey of

the policeman's job, the controversies surrounding it, and the

efforts to determine the distinguishing characteristics of

successes and failures Hopefully. one has emerged

with some understanding of the critical importance of

selection criteria, the ambiguity surrounding them, and the

difficulty of empirically validating and interpreting them. We

will turn now to the economic analysis of police selection, first

to theoretical models, then to empirical results.

51

CHAPTER 2

FOOTNOTES

1. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,"Report on the Police," (Washington, D, C. : U. S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1931), p. 19.

2. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-tration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,February, 1967).

3. See J. Edgar Hoover, "Should You Go Into Law Enforcement? "(New York: New York Life Insurance, 1961), p. 7. An ident-ical description is given in the Encyclopedia of Careers andVocational Guidance, Revised Edition, Volume II, (Chicago:J. G. Ferguson).

4. Jerome Skolnick argues convincingly in Justice WithoutTrial (New York: Wiley, 1967) that the coupling of dangerand authority must combine to frustrate the rule of law,that they should never be permitted to coexist. Dangertypically yields self-defensive conduct, conduct that muststrain to be impulsive because danger arouses fear andanxiety so easily. Authority then becomes a resource toreduce perceived threats rather than a series of reflectivejudgments arrived at calmly. As a result, proceduralrequirements become secondary in the face of circumstancesseen as threatening.

5. For example, a 1966 study of the Syracuse, New York,Police Department found the following distribution ofactivities, as cited in James 0. Wilson, Varieties of PoliceBehavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.

18:

Citizen Complaints: Syracuse Police Department

Ty 2e of Complaint Percent of Calls

Information gathering (book and check, geta report, inspect, question) 22.1

Service (accidents, illnesses, ambulance,animals, assist person, drunk person,escort vehicle, fire, power line, treedown, lost or found person or property,property damage)

Ofder maintenance (gang disturbance,family trouble, assault, fight,investigation, neighbor trouble)

Law enforcement (burglary in process,check a car, open door or window,prowler, make an arrest)

37. 5

30. 1

10. 3

52

See also Melaney E. Baehr, et al. , Psychological Assess-ment of Patrolman Qualifications in Relation to Field Per-formance (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government PrintingOffice, November, 1968), pp. 9-11.

6. See Howard Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, Professionaliza-tion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 'Hall, 1966); Ernest Green-wood, "Attributes of a Profession," in Sigmund Nosow andWilliam H. Form, Man, Work and Society (New York: BasicBooks, 1962); Harold L. Wilensky, "Varieties of WorkExperience, " in Henry Borow, Man in a World at Work(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 125-154: and JosephW. Garbarino, "Professional Negotiations in Education, "Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, February, 1968, pp.93-101.

7. See Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, pp. 235-239;Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 29; Max Rheinstein,Max Weber on Law in Economy and Societt(Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 350.

8. This list draws heavily on Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind theShield (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 18-20; Presi-dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administrationof Justice, Task Force Report: The Police, and Challengeof Crime in a Free Societe, passim; and State of California,Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training,California Law Enforcement Recruitment Program, pp. 1-9.California police departments, particularly the OaklandPolice Department, are often proudly cited as in the fore-front of professionalization.

53

9. Arthur Niederhoffer, op.. cit., p. 131.

10. James O. Wilson, 22. cit., pp. 29-30. See also HerveyA. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism (Lexington,Mass. : D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 103-119 for sensitivetreatment of this issue.

11. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-istration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police,pp. 167-175.

12. New York Times, Wednesday, August 15, 1973.

13. New York Times, Sunday, December 3, 1973.

14.. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-istration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police,p. 168.

15. Oakland Civil Service Office.

16. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement andAdministration of Justice, Task Force Report: T_ he Police,pp. 167-175 for statistics confirming the general accuracyof the examples cited here.

17. See, for example, Gene E. Carte, "Police Representationand the Dilemma of Recruitment," Issues in Criminology,Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 1971, pp. 85-95.

18. Bernard Cohen and Jan M. Chaiken, Police BackgroundCharacteristics and Performance (New York: New YorkCity Rand Institute, August, 1972, p. ix.

19. Ibid. , pp. xi-xviii.

20. Ibid. , p. xviii. The statistical technique used here wasstepwise multiple linear regression, in which the mostpowerful background factor enters the regression equationfirst and explains as much of the variance of the performancemeasure as it can. This is followed by the second strongestindependent factor, and so forth. Whenever a new factor isintroduced, each of the preceding factors is held constant

54

to avoid duplication. The computer program utilized forthis analysis (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences)permits identification, by F test, of the statisticalsignificance of the reduction in variance produced by eachindependent variable. Only those predictor variables whosecontribution weresignificantly different from zero at the. 05level were retained. Thus, the regression equation for theperformance variable Y takes the form:

Y = a + b1X1 + b

2X

2+ ....... bkXk

where k is the number of predictor variables included, andthe particular variables included varies with the performancemeasure. See ibid. , p. 121.

21. Ibid. , pp. xviii-xix.

. 22. Ibid. , pp. xix-xxi.

a3. Ibid. , p. x.

24. Ibid. , p.

25. Ibid. , p. 157.

26. Melaney E. Baehr, Johv E. Furcon, Ernest C. Froemel,Psychological Assessment of Patrolman Qualifications inRelation to Field Performance (Washington, D. C. : U. S.Government Printing Office, November 5, 1968).

27. Bernard Cohen and Jan M. Chaiken, a. cit., p. 10.

28. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Depart-ment of Justice, "Predicting Patrolman Performance,"(a summary blurb of the Baehr et al. study).

29. Baehr et al. , off. cit., p. 183..

30. The reader interested in pursuing the literature further isreferred to the following additional studies: Nick J.Colarelli and Saul M. Siegel, "A Method of Police PersonnelSelection, " The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, andPolice Science, Vol. 55, 1964, pp. 287-289; Robert J.

55

McDevit, "Situational Tests in Metropolitan PoliceSelection," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminolou,and Police Science, Vol. 57, 1966, pp. 99-106: GilmoreSpencer and Robert Nichols, "A Study of Chicago PoliceRecruits: Validation of Selection Procedures, 'I The PoliceChief, Vol. 38, No. 6, June, 1971, pp. 50-55: Jewel E.Mullineaux, "An Evaluation of Predictors Used to SelectPatrolmen," Public Personnel Review, Vol. 16, pp. 84-86;Robert B. Mills, Robert J. McDevitt, and Sandra Tonkin,"Situational Tests in Metropolitan Police Recruit Selection, "The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and PoliceScience, Vol. 57, 1966, pp. 99-104; Deborah Ann Tent andTerry Eisenberg, "The Selection and Promotion of PoliceOfficers: A Selected Review of Recent Literature," PoliceChief, Vol. 39, No. 2, February.1972, pp. 20-29: J. D.Matarazzo, "Characteristics of successful Policeman andFireman Applicants," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol.48, 1964, pp. 123-133; J. T. Flynn and M. Peterson, "TheUse of Regression Analysis in Police Patrolman Selection, "Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science,Vol. 63, No. 4, 1972, pp. 564-569; John A. McAllister,"A Study of Prediction of Measurement of Police Perfor-mance," Police, Vol. 14, 1970, pp. 58-64; Robert W. Balch,"The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction," Journal ofCriminal Law, Criminolo , and Police Science, 1972, p.

106; Irving B. Geller, "Higher Education and Policemen,"Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology) and Police Science,1972, pp. 396-401; and Robert Hogan, "A Study of PoliceEffectiveness," Experimental Publication System, AmericanPsychological Association, Washington, D.. C., June 1970.

31. Ruth J. Levy, "Predicting Police Failures," Journal ofCriminal T aw, Criminology, and Police Science, 1967,Vol. 58, No. 2.

32. Ruth J. Levy, "Investigation of a Method for the Identifica-tion of the High-Risk Police Applicant," Can High RiskPolice Applicants , Institute for Local SelfGovernment, Berkeley, California, July 1971.

33. Ibid. , p. 35. A "current" here is defined as a man with atleast seven years of service.

56

34. For example, a first-born child, as compared with later-borns, tends to identify most particularly with authority,discipline, and parental prohibitions and moral values;exercises dominance and uses more physical power; has agreater tendency to conform when under group pressure andstress; and, therefore, other things equal, would be lesslikely to fail than a later-born child.

35. Ibid. , p. 35.

36. James M. Newman, William E. Rogin, William K. Hunter,Shanti Vora, "Investigation of a Method for Identificationof the High-Risk Police Applicant: An Analysis and Inter-pretation Based on Available Data," Can High Risk PoliceApplicants Be Identified? , Institute for Local Self Govern-ment, Berkeley, California, July, 1971.

37. Data supplied by Lamar M. Vaughn of the Oakland CivilService Department.

38. Lamar M. Vaughn and Allen Tenenbaum, "Oakland's Re-cruitment and Selection Methods: A Historical Overview, "James M. Newman, Assessment of Police Recruitment,Selection and Training: An Interdisciplinary Approach,Final Report: Recruitment and Selection, Berkeley,California, Education/ Re search, Inc. , February,1972.

39. See also: Robert Hogan, "Successful Oakland Police: APersonological Profile;" Christine M. Miller, "A Studyof the MMPI as a Selection Device for the Oakland PoliceDepartment:" Eric P. Sanders, "Oakland Police Sample:A Descriptive Psychographic Study:" and William K. Hunterand Thomas J. Culligan, "An Analysis of Factors to PredictWork Performance of Oakland Police Officers, " all in JamesM. Newman, Assessment of Police Recruitment, Selectionand Trainin : An Interdisci linary A..roach, Final Re sort:Recruitment and Selection, 2.2. cit.

40. William K. Muir, "Personal Characteristics that Contributeto Good Police Work, " in James M. Newman, Assessmentof Police Recruitment, Selection and Trainin : An Inter-disciplinary Approach, Final Report: Recruitment andSelection, 22. cit.

57

41. Ibid. , p. vii- 7.

42. Ibid. , p. vii-7. To explain Muir's context more fully, hesees that the policeman can give little positive inducementto the citizen to compensate him for his pains in desistingin an antisocial act, giving humiliating or inculpatoryinformation, going to jail. The policeman recurrentlyexercises the power to harm to extort cooperation. In this,he is a man of politics.

In politics, where threat rather than exchange is themode of behavior, the common sense of the everyday,nonpolitical world does not always obtain: paradoxesoccur, causing conventionally conceived "good"actions to serve counterproductive ends and conven-tionally conceived "bad" means to serve sociallyessential and desirable ends. A politician'sirrationality, nastiness, detachment and disregard(or reputation for these qualities) may be the ex-clusive means to dieter the irrationality, nastiness,eetachment and disregard of others under somecircumstairmes. Likewise for a good policeman; anda good policeman must have the moral skills toreconcile these sometimes necessary politicalpractices with his previously felt moral obligationsto be reasonable, kind, rmpathetic, and creative.He frequently encounters conflicting moral imperatives,and he must reconcile them while maintaining a complexsense of "right" and "wrong" without a loss of selfesteem or belief in civility. A good policeman has tohave the moral skills to be .mean opportunisticallywithout becoming mean compulsively.

At the same time he must have the philosopher's itch-,a "correct" sense of place, time and purpose. He mustdevelop an accurate perception of the motives of man-kind, an awareness of the trends of past and future,and a standard of success in keeping within both thelimits of his individual capacities and his impulse forpublic service. This social, historical, and ethicalperspective compensated for the unique distortions ofinformation which befall a man in power -- distortionsresulting from a steady diet of life's pathologies, fromthe organizational necessities of maintaining intensely

58

high morals (to overcome fear, hardship, and frustra-tion), and from the authority of office (which scaresthe timid citizen and attracts the obsequious one).

43. Ibid. , pp. vii-81.

59

CHAPTER 3

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

How well is the labor market performing in equilibrating

the demand for policemen by police departments with the supply

offered by individuals? How can the problem of persistent

"shortages" of "qullified" applicants be explained? Are wages too

low, are qualifications too high, or is the problem even more

complicated? What role is played by the institutional adjustment

mechanisms in the labor market, the recruitment, selection and

training processes? Is the market distorted by non-economic

factors" Is the market characterized by static monopsony, by

dynamic monopsony, and by problems of imperfect and uncertain

information? This chapter reviews and assesses the contribu-

tions of economic reasoning to understanding the problems posed

by the labor market for policemen.

THE SUPPLY OF POTENTIAL POLICEMEN

Calculation of Present Value of Expected Lifetime Earnin s

An individual considering becoming a policeman may

compare the present value of his expected lifetime earnings as

a policeman with the present value of his expected lifetime

earnings in his next best alternative, assuming the psychic

6o

components of the jobs are equal. If he becomes a policeman,

he may expect to receive a stream of earnings, Wri , WP2...

WPn over periods 1, 2, n, respectively. If he does not

become a policeman, his best alternative is a stream of

earnings WAI, WAz... WAR. The returns to becoming a police-

man would be the present value of the sum over periods 1 to n

of police earnings; the returns to not becoming a policeman

would be the present value of the sum of alternative earnings.

In deciding whether or not to become a policeman, the individual

would compare the expected present value of police work

1) VP = .2; -1--j-WP.j

1 + r)

with the expected present value of his next best alternative

nWA'L) VA = (1 + r)J

jr-1

If VP - VA, he would choose VP; if VP VA, he would choose

VA; if VP = VA, he would be indifferent between them.1

Since we are concerned here with expected lifetime

earnings, a term may be added to VP including the expected

earnings in future jobs should he quit or retire from the force.

His future job options should be improved because of his police

experience. He would also be concerned with evaluating whether

61

his expected lifetime as a policeman would be shorter than in

alternative occupations.

Age-Earnings Profile

Occupations may differ not only in current earnings, but

also in the temporal distribution of the expected earnings or the

age-earnings profile. For example, one occupation may have a

long training period with low or even negative earnings (direct

and opport,nity costs of schooling) followed by increasing

earning:, which peak at age 45 to 55 and then decline dramatically.

Another occupation may have no training period and earnings

which remain level throughout the working life. Present earnings

are worth more than future earnings; the interest rate is positive.

Therefore, to determine the relative pecuniary attractiveness of

the two occupations a calculation must be made which discounts

for futurity. It is the present value of the net returns for each

occupation that must be compared. In making this calculation

one would also include the relative physical exertion and other

factors which might affect the expected length of the working life,

the seasonality or cyclical sensitivity of the job, the length and

direct cost of the training period, the direct occupational

expenses required during the working life, the probability of

unemployment, and the effect of the tax structure. Different

62

individuals, given perfect information and identical tastes,

will make the same evaluation of these factors, People prefer

higher net returns to lower, other things equal. A relative wage

rate which would make the capital values in two occupations equal

can theoretically be determined.

The police job appears to have a flat age-earnings profile,

similar to that of blue-collar workers, but very different from

that of professionals. Training is done on-the-job. An Oakland

Police Department recruit in 1970 earned $926 per month during

his first year, while being trained, $960 per month during his

second year, $994 his third year, and $1, 025 his fourth year.

After his fourth year, however, he would receive only general

civil service pay increases until he retired, unless he were

promoted to sergeant. Promotional opportunities are limited to

those who can pass civil service examinations. Seventy-five

percent of the sworn personnel in Oakland are patrolmen, 15

percent are sergeants, and 10 percent are in the rank,., of

inspector, lieutenant, captain or deputy chief. Discharge from

the force is for cause only, so the policeman is protected from

swings of cyclical unemployment. The probability that he would

cont inue to earn his fourth year salary plus regular civil

service increments until his retirement (half-pay after 25 years

6.3

of service or 20 years at age 55) is high. Also included in the

actuarial comparisonwould be the value of the fringe benefits

in the police job and the alternative, the possibility of holding a

second job concurrently, and the probability of death or injury

on the job.

Shape of Supply Curve

If there were perfect competition, perfect and costless

mobility and information, and identical tastes and abilities

among individuals, everyone would evaluate identically the

relative merits of different occupations based on an actuarial

assessment, and there would be some relative wage at which

everyone would be indifferent between becoming a policeman or

doing anything else. The supply curve to an occupation would

be horizontal. It is the existence of differences among

individuals in tastes, abilities and information which leads to

differences in their evaluations of the relative wage rates

which would make two occupations equally attractive. The

supply curve to a particular occupation, therefore, will be

positively sloped.

Uncertainty

We turn now to factors which will be evaluated differently

by different people, thereby imparting a slope to the supply

64

curve. The individual decision maker will want to know not

only the present value of expected net returns, but also the

probability distribution of present values. Two occupations

may be equally attractive actuarially, but one may offer a

particular return with reasonable certainty and little probability

of variation (i. e, , the police job cited above) and the other may

offer a small chance of a very large return and a large chance

of a small return (i. e. , baseball player). Individuals will

differ in their tastes for uncertainty, and, therefore, will

assess its relative merits differently.

Tastes

The most troublesome component of the present value of

expected lifetime earnings are tastes for particular jobs.

Tastes can be expected to vary greatly among people and are

difficult or impossible to enumerate or measure. When we

define the present value of expected lifetime earnings to include

only actuarial earnings, we can also define a coefficient

measuring relative preference for police work, d. Then an

individual would choose to become a policeman if VP > (1 + d) VA,

where

VP present value of expected lifetime earnings as

a policeman

65

VA present value of expected lifetime earnings

in alternative occupation

d = coefficient measuring the taste or distaste

for police work

That is, if d is not zero, an individual would not be

indifferent between police work (P) and the alternative (A) if the

present value of expected lifetime earnings in P just equaled

those in A, but would reqiiire some compensating differential.

If, for example, he receives more psychic income in A, d is

greater than 0, and he would become a policeman only if he

receives earnings in P greater by at least d(VA) than those he

could receive in his best alternative A. In the extreme case of

a perfectly inelastic supply curve, some people would prefer

any alternative to becoming a policeman, and some people

would prefer becoming a policeman to any alternative, regard-

less of the relative pecuniary returns.

If there were no differences in tastes and abilities among

individuals, in the perfectly competitive world occupational

supply curves would be horizontal or infinitely elastic and all

wage differences would be equalizing the attractiveness of

different occupations. That is, people would be indifferent as

to which occupation they pursued. There would thus be no

66

"rents" or payments in excess of opportunity costs to any

individual. If supply curves were completely inelastic and

people chose jobs solely on nonpecuniary preferences in which

there were wide differences, relative wages would be determined

by demand, given relative supplies, and all wages would be

"rents." In the general case of a positively sloping supply

curve, returns will be equalizing only at the margin. Some

individuals will be receiving a rent in the sense that they would

be willing to work at their occupation at a lower total return.

Noncompeting groups

The exi stem e of "noncompeting groups" would also give

rise to nonequalizing wage differentials. Noncompeting groups

are formed by barriers to entry to certain occupations. These

restrictions un free choice may arise from deliberate restric-

tions on entry such as immigration laws, licensing, or trade

union power, from geographic immobilities, from differences

in ability, L from socio-economic stratification and from racial

discrimination.

The height, weight, and visual acuity standards of police

departments create a unique sort of noncompeting group peculiar

to police. William F. Danielson, Director of Personnel, City

of Berkeley, California, estimates that of 1, 031, 503 California

men between the ages of 21 and 30 in 1966, 477, 000 were 5'9"

or taller, 238, 500 were also high school graduates, and 150, 000

of these could meet other police physical, psychiatric,3

back7

ground, and mental aptitude standards. The political contro-

versies generated by these standards, and their increasingly

frequent revision, demonstrates public recognition of the

importance of these barriers to entry in the police labor market.

Nonequalizing transitional wage differentials between

occupations may also be expected from the fact that the supply

of a particular type of labor is much less elastic in the short

run than in the long run, so an change in demand would have a

much larger effect initially than ultimately. Therefore, what

is defined as an occupational wage differential depends partly

on the time period and the training for the occupation being

considered.

THE SUPPLY TO THE POLICE EMPLOYER

In a perfectly competitive world, the supply curve of a

particular kind of labor to any one employer would be infinitely

elastic or horizontal. An individual employer would be too

small to exercise independent influence on the wage, which is

set in the market at the intersection of the sum of all firms'

68

demand curves for labor of a particular kind and the sum of all

individual supply curves of labor of that kind. The employer

can hire as many workers as he wants at the market wage rate;

how many he hires is determined by his demand or value of

marginal product (VMP) curve for that labor. There should be

no persistent job vacancies, no recruiting activity by firms, no

wage discrimination, and no information costs. In a perfect

market, all potential bids and offers are known at zero cost to

every other person. Characteristics of every good need to be

known perfectly at zero cost.

However, in the real world an employer will often have

some control over his wage. He will face an upward sloping

supply curve if 1) many small firms demanding the same type

of labor are distributed over a wide geographic area; 2) workers

prefer particular jobs and places of work and/or residence;

3) information is imperfect and costs must be incurred to

inform workers of the existence of vacancies in a particular

firm. These conditions imply that to expand employment a

firm must increase wages or incur higher labor costs. The

supply curve facing him is not perfectly elastic. He has some

degree of monopsony power.

The existence of monopsony implies job vacancies at

69

equilibrium. The monopsonistic buyer will hire the number of

workers indicated by the intersection of his VMP curve with

his marginal factor cost (MFG) curve, which will be higher than

the supply curve because he will have to pay a higher wage not

only to the additional worker attracted, but also to all other

workers in his employ (assuming that he cannot discriminate

among workers). Thus, in the diagram below, he will hilt'

Q workers at wage W1, and will have vacancies at that wage

equal to Q2 -

Figure 3-1

SS

No. ofWorkers

70

Therefore, when persistent shortages appear in the real

world, monopsony is often sought as the culprit. In a competitive

framework, wages in a shortage occupation should rise relative

to wages in other occupations, thereby attracting a greater

number of workers and, ultimately, eliminating the shortage.

Indeed, David Blank and George Stigler, in their study of

the market for engineers, conclude that a "shortage exists when

the number of workers available (the supply) increases less

rapidly than the number demanded at the salaries paid in the

recent past. Then salaries will increase, and activities once

performed by engineers must now be performed by a class of

worker less well trained and less expensive. "5 In their

empirical work, they find no evidence of an increase in relative

earnings of engineers and no evidence of monopsony in the market

to distort the fu.nctioning of the wage adjustment mechanism.

They conclude, therefore, that there had been no shortage of

engine( rs.

Also, in a 1950's study of the market for engineers,

Kenneth J. Arrow and William M. Capron emphasize the role of

imperfect information and begin to formulate a simple dynamic

explanation of shortages, foreshadowing the recent more

rigorous work of Armen A. Alchian, Dale T, Mortensen,

71

Donald F. Gordon and Allan Hynes. Arrow and Capron

explain shortages--"that is, a situation in which there are

unfilled vacancies in positions where salaries are the same as

those being currently paid in others of the same type and

quality"7--by postulating a lag in the response of salaries to

demand curve shifts, a dynamic shortage. The magnitude of

the dynamic shortage depends upon the rate of increase in

demand, the reaction speed in the market, and the elasticities

of supply and demand. The lag arises from 1) the time it

takes the firm to recognize the existence of the shortage at

the current salary level; L) the time it takes to decide upon the

need for higher salaries and the number to be hired at such

salaries; and 3) the time it takes employees to realize and

react to the new alternatives available or the firm to adjust

the salaries of present employees. If there are continuing

increases in demand, then there will be a chronic shortage.

THE DEVINE MODEL

A detailed treatment of the shortage question, which

combines the roles of monopsony and imperfect information, is

developed by Eugene J Devine 8 and applied specifically to three

categories of local government employees! teachers, nurses

72

and policemen. Dev,ne argues that local governments experience

persistent shortages in these categories, though not for other

workers, because they are sufficiently large employers of

teachers, nurses and policemen to be irmonoipsonists in the labor

market, while they are competitive emptoyers for other job

categories. Moreover, a monopsonist who is unable to engage

in wage discrimination will experience job vacancies in equil-

ibrium, and will neither raise wages nor intcrease recruitment

expenditures sufficiently to eliminate them.

With imperfect. information, a monopsonist's labor supply

curve will shift downward and to the right as he increases his

recruitment expenses. Curve So in Figure 3-2, below, shows the

number of workers the firm may secure at various wage rates

if it did not engage in any recruitment activity. The Smax

curve indicates the number of persons willing to work for this

firm if they knew about its wages and employment conditions,

i. e. , if the firm were willing to incur whatever costs Were

necessary to inform these workers. OL is a "minimum avorage

outlay curve' showing the sum of the average wages and average

recruitment4costs which is the least-cost combination for

securing the number of workers indicated on the horizontal axis.

The MOL curve is the marginal outlay curve

Figure 3-2

73

No. oforkers

Q2

Devine shows that the combination of wages and recruitment

costs which is least-cost is unique for each quantity of workers.

The average wage and average' recruitment cost associated with

each number of workers is determined by an isoquant-iso-

average outlay analysis from which is derived the unique least-

cost combination of wages and recruitment costs at which each

74

quantity of workers could be obtained. The OL curve will lie

somewhere within the limits set by the So and Smax curves.

If it pays the firm to recruit in order to secure any given number

of workers such as Q1, the average total outlay must be less than

the average wage indicated by the So curve, or it would be

equally or less costly to secure 01 workers without recruiting.

On the other hand, no amount of recruitment expenditure would

enable the firm to secure 01 workers at a wage lower than that

indicated by the Smax curve, and some recruitment cost would

be necessary to get Q1 workers at that wage. The lowest average

outlay at which 01 workers could be secured is 01, as indicated

by the OL curve. Suppose this outlay consists of the sum of

some average wage Q1 -a and some average recruitment expendi-

ture 01-b (equals am). The monopsonist would be willing to hire

Qz-Qi additional workers at the equilibrium wage rate, but he

would be unwilling to pay a higher wage or to incur additional

recruitment costs to attract them. The solution presented in

Figure 3-2 is consistent, therefore, with the existence of job

vacancies.

Devine then marshalls descriptive evidence for the city

and county of Los Angeles to persuade the reader of the applica-

bility of his model to policemen, nurses and teachers. The

75

problems deriving from monopsony are intensified for police

depa:ments, for example, by the prevalence of institutional

constraints mandating parity between policemen and firemen

wages. Therefore, any increases in wages to attract additional

policemen would have to be paid not only to all policemen

already employed, but also to all firemen. The existence of

queues of qualified labor for firemen's jobs and shortages of

qualified labor for police jobs shows, moreover, that workers

are not indifferent between the two jobs at the same wages, and

adds to the difficulty of police recruiting.

David Lewin, in his complementary work on the parity

question, confirms Devine's analysis of its distorting role in

the police labor market. 9 "A policy of wage parity contributes

to these vacancy and recruitment problems by retarding the

growth of police salaries. "10 Lewin takes no position on the

monopsony explanation, but does recommend abolishing parity.

Devine's analysis should be applicable to other types of

personnel costs which may be substituted for higher wages to

increase labor supply, such as improved working conditions and

provision of on-the-job training. Yet, Devine does not deal

with the alternative implication of a monopsony analysis

developed earlier by Martin Bronfenbrenner, who points out

76

that an employer may choose not to exercise fully his monopsony

power in order to be more selective among applicants. 11 At the

monopsony wage, an employer may have to hire "nearly all

minimally qualified.workers, regardless of any special

standards of skill, experience, education, etc. which the firm

might wish to impose, and regardless also of any personnel-

office prejudices regarding age, sex, race, nationality, religion,

and so on. "12 At a higher wage, the employer will be able to

pick and choose among applicants, applying whatever hiring

standards he likes, and leaving a rejected fringe of unemployed

workers presumably composed of those least desirable to him.

Since the police shortage is a function not of insufficient

supply offered but of insufficient supply deemed e,ualified, that

is, selected, this analysis is critically important to us. Perhaps

it was ignored because it implies queues of unselected workers,

while Devine is trying to explain vacancies. Theoretically, the

two analyses can be reconciled by arguing that a wage les. than

the competitive wage but greater than the monopsony wage will

be set, therefore allowing room both for selectivity and

vacancies.

The apparent theoretical paradox of the simultaneous

existence of vacancies and queues under monopsony, combined

77

with the descriptive paradox of increasing rather than decreasing

hiring standards in the context of shortages, should serve as an

alarm that perhaps the problem is more complicated than a

simple monopsony theory allows. It is to explore one element

of this complexity tliat this thesis becomes involved in analyzing

further the selection process for policemen. Before we turn to

that, however, we would like to deal with some further theoret-

ical complexities of public employee wage determination, a

model that begins to deal theoretically with the complexities,

and, finally, some general empirical evidence.

THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC SECTOR DECISION-MAKING

There is another problem with Devine's framework. Can

conventional economic analysis, with its profit-maximizing

basis, be applied to decision-making in the public sector,

where profit-maximization is clearly inappropriate? Public

agencies may be maximizing service subject to fixed budgetary

constraints, engaged in incremental budgetary exercises,

engaged in complex political bargaining or *.n some combination

of these. 13 How is the derived demand for labor to be defined

in a decision-making context more complex than profit-

maximization? The demand curve for labor may have to be

78

inferred indirectly through "voter expressed demands for

government services and directly through political bargaining

between governments and employee groups" rather than through

the traditional marginal revenue product curve. 14 A more

explicit consideration cf the motivation of public managers,

public workers and political processes is needed.

Devine gets around the subject by arguing that without

getting into an extended discussion of the meaning of the value

of the marginal product curve to a government agency whose

output is not priced and sold on a market and who is not profit-

maximizing, it is reasonable to assume that the VMP curve

would be negatively sloped. He postulates that the VMP curve

would show the value of the marginal produce of additional

workers to the utility-maximizing administrator of the agency.

The administrator's utility function would contain such suggested

components as the size of the agency's budget, the number of

employees supervised, his own salary, prestige, power, etc.

Nothing is said about the position of the VMP curve, or its

relation to a curve showing marginal social benefit, but it is

postulated that the curve has a negative slope because 1) the

administrator does face a budget constraint: he is competing

with other government agencies. for limited resources, and the

79

public sector is competing with the private sector; 2) he is not

immune to the consequences of his actions, and marginal social

benefits do decline as the agency expands its staff and activities;

and 3) the evidence provided by the adjustments made by local

governments to rising wages and/or vacancies is consistent

only with a VMP curve of negative slope. The evidence includes

substitution of capital for labor, reduction of the quality of the

labor force, substitution of lower-skilled employees for higher

skilled, increased recruiting activity to attract inexperienced

or cheaper labor from outside the area, on-the-job training and

improvement of working conditions.15

THE EHRENBERG ANALYSIS

A more thoughtful formulation is provided by Ronald

Ehrenberg in his superior work on the demand for state and

local government employees.16 The governmental agency is

assumed to possess a Stone-Geary type utility function which

it seeks to maximize, subject to the constraint that the total

employment budget is exhausted. That is, it seeks to maximize

nU(M) = E a

klog (f--r:)kMk ekbk)

(2.1)n

ak

> 0; ak 1; Mk-bk> 0k=1

80

subject to

where

n

E Wk Mk = Bk=1

(2. 2)

Mk is full-time equivalent state and local government

employment in the kth functional category.

ek is the factor of proportionality that converts per

capita employment into a per capita service flows

measure for the kth class.

bk is the "necessary" quantity of type k employees.

P is state population.

Wk is monthly payroll costs per employee of the kthcategory.

j is the decision-making unit.

B is the total state budget for state and local government

employees.

There are n employment categories and ak is the relative

importance of the kth type of government service. in

the decision-maker's utility function.

Maximizing (2.1) subject to (2. 2) yields employment

demand functions of the form

-W

kbka .

kW.T) =1 P

M. b.

j= 1, 2... ,n

(2, 3)

81

The notion of incremental budgeting is incorporated into

the model by assuming that the "necessary" level of employment

for a category is a function of the lagged employment level in

that category.

t-1 < <bk ak

Mk , 0 - a k - 1; k = 1, 2, , n (2. 4)

If ak = 1, employment decisions are strictly incremental; if

ak

= 0, the entire employment portfolio is a decision variable.

Intermediate values indicate that functional employment levels

can be cut to some extent.

Since tastes differ across states or within a state over

time, the relative importance of each type of government service

in the decision-makers' utility function (a ) is assumed to be a

function of a set of sociodemographic variables reflecting age

distribution (which would affect the relative importance of

educational, health and public welfare services), population

density, proportion of the population living in SMSA's, etc.

ak Vok k(X.ist)(2. 5)

The X. are those socio-demographic variables in state s inist

year t which are expected to influence the relative ma rginal

utility of the ith employment class. Then combining (2. 3)

through (2. C) and taking logs we have:

M. a.M. t -1log - = log (Voj) + L Vij log (Xist)

i=1(2. 6)

n

- log (W.) + log -Wkak M

k= 1,2, ..., n17

k=1

t -1

k

82

On the supply side, an infinitely elastic supply of labor to

each category at a predetermined wage rate has been assumed.

If the government employer does face positively sloped labor

supply curves, the estimated wage coefficients will be biased in

a positive direction. The estimates based on the previous

equations would therefore understate (in absolute terms) the

wage elasticity of demand for public employees.

Ehrenberg then attacks directly our fundamental question,

the explanation of "substantial, persistent, and wide-spread job

vacancies or shortages among certain classes of urban govern-

ment employees. "18 The model he presents is consistent with

the one we have just discussed if we assume that the recruitment

division for each specific agency is separated from the decision-.

makers who choose the authorized employment levels for all

the functional categories. The overall decision-makers were

assumed to take the quality level for each class as fixed, while

83

the recruitment division is assumed to have knowledge of the

quality distribution of applicants. 19

Ehrenberg's analysis will show that the existence of

persistent vacancy rates can be explained independently of

the existence of monopsony. Moreover, he will resolve our

apparent contradiction between vacancies and queues by showing

that vacancies are "compatible with there being a greater

number of appli-:ants than there are positions, at a wage rate

that is predetermined through either a legislative process or

collective bargaining. In particular, if applicants vary in

quality, then under certain conditions a rational government

employer will choose to employ fewer employees than his

predetermined authorized employment level. That is, the

employer will choose an equilibrium positive vacancy rate. "20

Moreover, contrary to the implications of the monopsony model,

increasing wage rates may actually increase rather than

decrease observed vacancy rates. Because this work deals so

directly with our central concerns, we will present it in

greater detail. 21

It is assumed that a government agency is allocated,

through a political process or by some other means, an

authorized employment level and a fixed wage rate per employee.

84

At this exogenously determined wage, the agency is assumed

to attract more potential applicants than it has authorized

vacant positions. The decision-makers then have to decide

whether or not to hire an applicant as he presents himself. One

way of doing this is to choose a set of minimum hiring standards

or a minimum acceptable quality level so as to maximize the

expected net gain to society. The model I s restricted to a

single period so that labor turnover and the possibility of

altering the quality distribution of applicants by either recruiting

or training expenditures can be ignored.

Applicants are assumed to be heterogeneous with qi

(where 0 qi - 1) being the expected service flow from the

.th applicant. The expected quality of each applicant is

assumed to be known once he presents himself, but the flow of

applicants to the recruiting office is a random variable with

distribution f(q). The minimum acceptable quality level is

designated as q*. All applicants exceeding this minimum hiring

standard will be employed; all others will be rejected. The

expected quality of the accepted and rejected applicants is then

given by A(q*) and .R(q*) respectively, where,

A(q*)f (q )

fqL q f (q) dq(2.14)"

fclo* o f (q) dqR (q*)

Ci) 4

(2.15)

Let W denote the specified wage rate and M denote the

authorized employment level given by the political process.

Let v denote the value per unit of the public service to society.

Let E be the total number of applicants to the agency. This

number is assumed to be greater than the number of available

positions, the entire authorized employment level (M). Given

q*, the number of applicants accepted is then

N = n(q*) E

whe re

i*

1

n(q*) = f(q)dqq(2.16)

85

An increase in the minimum acceptable quality level

increases the expected quality of both the accepted and rejected

applicants and decreases the proportion of applicants that are

accepted.

(A' , R' > 0, n' < 0)

The expected value of the net gain to society from employ-

ing this particular class of public employees when positive

vacancies exist is assumed to be given by

V = vA(q*)n(q*)E - Wn(q*)E - v1M-n(q*)E1 R(q*) (2.17)

86

The first term represents the value of the public service- -

the expected number of "quality-units" of public employees

multiplied by the value per unit. The second term represents

the direct cost--the expected wage bill. The last term represents

the opportunity cost of having vacancies--the expected loss of

public service due to the existence of vacancies. This is

assumed equal to the expected number of vacancies multiplied by

the average quality level of rejected applicants anti the value per

quality-unit of the service. It is assumed that committed funds

to pay for vacant positions sit idle. If they are used for other

purposes, the value of those uses should be added onto the

objective function.

Assuming that an interior solution exists, the first order

necessary condition to maximize (2.17) requires that the minimum

acceptable quality level (q*) be chosen to satisfy

vE [A(Oni(q9+ A' (e)n(q*)1 - WEni(e) -

v LM - n(q9Ei R' (q*) + vnt(q9ER(q*) = 0 (2. Its)

The interpretation of this condition is straightforward. An

increase in the minimum acceptable quality level has three effects.

First, it results in a smaller expected level of employment, but

increased average quality of those accepted. Secondly, by

87

decreasing the expected employment level, it decreases the

expected direct wage cost. Finally, since it causes an increase

in both the expected number of vacancies and the average quality

of rejected applicants, it increases the opportunity cost of the

potential service foregone. The agency must choose the minimum

acceptable quality level such that the net impact of these three

effects is to maximize the expected value of the net gain to

society.

Totally differentiating (2. 18), and making use of the

second-order necessary condition for (2. 18) to have a relative

maximum, we find that

a q*/ a v , a cocia M <0; a cexia w, a qqa E> 0 (2. 19)

That is, an increase in the average wage of public employees or

in the number of applicants, and a decrease in the value of the

public service or the authorized employment level, all :.mplv,

ceteris paribus, an increase in the minimum acceptable quality

level.

The minimum. acceptable quality level (q*) is not directly

observable. In practice it may consist of a vector of hiring

standards such as education levels, physical and mental charac-

teristics and health, test scores, and even residence require-

meats. Indeed, it is with defining the minimum acceptable

quality level, the vector of hiring standards, for one particular

shortage occupation, policemen, and one particular city, Oakland,

California, that the empirical focus of this thesis will be

concerned.

The ratio of actual to authorized employment (one minus the

vacancy rate) is directly observable.

(2. 20)

Differentiating (2. 20) with respect to each parameter then yields

directly

a Ev/ alAr <0; a E*/ av> 0: apq a E, aE*0 m 0 (2. 21)

Either an increase in the average wage of public employees

or a decrease in the value of a unit of the service to society will

decrease the expected ratio of actual to authorized employment,

and consequently increase the expected vacancy rate. Thus,

increasing the average wage of public employees to reduce the

number of vacancies would be a self-defeating policy. The

impact of a change in the number of applicants is in general

ambiguous, because an increase in the number of applicants

causes a reduction in the expected proportion of applicants that

are accepted. Similarly, a change in the authorized employment

89

level has an ambiguous impact. If applicants are distributed

with a uniform quality distribution, however, then an increase

in the number of applicants or a decrease in the authorized

employment level can be shown to unambiguously decrease the

vacancy rate.

If the government agency has monopsony power so that

its applicant flow will increase when there is an increase in its

average wage relative to the alternative wages which its

potential applicants perceive, the implications of the model

must be modified. The increase in the flow of applicants can

be interpreted either as an increase in the number of applicants

or as an upward shift in the quality distribution of applicants.

If the increase in the number of "higher" quality applicants is

exactly offset by a decrease in the previously lowest quality

applicants who withdraw upon observing the higher minimum

standards that have accompanied a wage increase, an upward

shift in the quality distribution alone would occur. It can be

shown that an upward shift in a uniform distribution of

applicants by quality will cause a decrease in the vacancy rate.

Indeed, here is the hope implicit in the mind of police chiefs

who advocate increasing hiring standards in the context of

shortages.

90

Thus, an increase in the average wage of public employees

will have, in this special case, one positive and two negative

impacts on the equilibrium vacancy rate. Without numerical

estimates of the magnitude of these offsetting impacts, there

should be no presumption that increasing the wages of public

employees would prove to be an effective method of reducing the

number of job vacancies in public employment.

THEORY AND REALITY

I have detailed Ehrenberg's analysis here because its

contribution to understanding our problem is outstanding. He

provides a rational theoretical underpinning, based on a

utility-maximizing decision model, for the existence of equili-

brium vacancy rates in the context of a queue of applicants and

for the possibility of raising hiring standards in the context of

shortages. He shows that increasing wage rates may not be

effective. He underscores the importance of understanding the

components of the minimum acceptable quality level, the vector

of hiring standards on which our work will attempt to cast some

light. Most importantly, his explanation is divorced from the

crutch of monopsony.

The monopsony explanation is particularly weak when

applied to policemen, whatever its validity may be for teachers

91

and nurses, both of which constitute a licensed profession.

(Shortages of teachers, however, have certainly disappeared.)

For, as we discussed in Chapter 2, the police job is amorphous,

the standards are undefined. How can an employer of ambiguous

skills and qualities be a monopsonist? A policeman becomes a

policeman not by acquiring any particular set of skills and

training (as teachers and nurses do), but by being accepted for

employment by a police departmert. Police applicants come

from a wide range of alternative jobs, spanning almost every

other occupational category. An employer who is not a large

buyer of a unique and specified type of labor, but rather seeks

certain ambiguous qualities found among people spanning the

occupational spectrum, cannot reasonably be considered a

monopsonist. Surely there are countless competitors for the

bundle of qualities, particularly good character and trainability,

that police departments seek.

Devine rationalizes this by claiming that, even for police-

men, "educational or other qualifications are such that employees

are drawn from a relatively small part of the total labor force;

none are drawn from the unskilled or semi skilled segments of

the labor force. H23 This assertion, for policemen, is just not

true,

92

Indeed, our data show just the reverse. If we classify the

applicants to the Oakland Police Department from 1965 to 1971 by

the occupational category of their most recent employment prior

to applying (usually the job held at the time of application), we

find that over two-thirds were either in the Army or in operative,

service and laborer jobs, 8 percent were craftsmen, about 17

percent were in clerical and sales jobs, and less than 9 percent

were in the professional and technical or managerial and pro-

i..rictor categories.

The tables on the following pages show the occupational

classification of applicants to the Oakland Police Department

between 1965 and 1971. Table 3-1 shows the occupational cate-

gories of the first four jobs listed on the employment history

section of the employment application. Job 1 is the job held

immediately prior to or concurrent with applying, Job 2 is the

ioh held before that, Job 3 the job held before that, etc. Many

applicants have a work history consisting of only one or two

jobs, so the number reported declines considerably as we move

towards Job 4.

Table 3-2 shows the classification of Job 1 separately for

each year to pick up any distortion of the aggregate table by

phenomena peculiar to one or two years. The unusually high

Tab

le 3

-1.

Job

App

lican

ts to

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent,

1965

-197

1, b

y oc

cupa

tiona

l cat

egor

y

Job

1Jo

b 2

Job

3Jo

b 4

Num

ber

Perc

ent N

umbe

r Pe

rcen

tN

umbe

rPe

rcen

tN

umbe

rPe

rcen

t

Prof

essi

onal

, tec

hnic

al a

ndki

ndre

d12

55.

3511

05.

5561

4.37

264

20

Man

ager

s, o

ffic

ials

,pr

opri

etor

s80

3.42

613.

0828

2.01

91.

45

Cle

rica

l and

kin

dred

260

11.1

224

212

.22

221

15.8

485

13. 7

3

Sale

s13

3.)

- 69

141

7.12

795.

6645

7.27

Cra

ftsm

en, f

orem

en a

ndki

ndre

d19

18.

1711

96.

0181

5.81

284.

52

Ope

rativ

es a

nd k

indr

ed46

820

.02

437

22.0

630

621

.94

114

18.4

2

Serv

ice

423

18.0

927

113

.68

204

14.6

280

12.9

2

Farm

labo

rers

, for

emen

and

man

ager

s4

.17

15.7

63

.22

71.

13

Lab

orer

s15

96.

8019

69.

8915

611

.18

7411

.95

Arm

y, N

avy,

Air

For

ce49

521

.17

389

19.6

425

618

.35

151

24.3

9

Tot

als

2338

1981

1395

619

Sour

ce: T

he d

ata

from

whi

ch th

is ta

ble

isco

nstr

ucte

d ca

me

from

em

ploy

men

t app

licat

ions

subm

itted

to th

e O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice

from

Janu

ary,

196

5, to

Jun

e, 1

971,

for

the

job

ofT

aui

Tab

le 3

-2.

Job

appl

ican

ts to

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent,

1965

-197

1, b

y oc

cupa

tiona

l cat

egor

y,fo

r Jo

b 1,

by

year

s

1965

1966

1967

1968

Num

ber

Perc

ent N

umbe

r Pe

rcen

t Num

ber

Perc

ent

Num

ber

Perc

ent

Prof

essi

onal

, tec

hnic

al a

ndki

ndre

d15

4.78

102.

37

164.

4223

4. 7

7

Man

ager

s, o

ffic

ials

,pr

opri

etor

s15

4. 7

813

3. 0

816

4. 4

218

3. 7

3

Cle

rica

l and

kin

dred

4012

. 74

5513

. 03

3710

. 22

438.

92

Sale

s19

6.05

286.

6423

6.35

214.

36

Cra

ftsm

en, f

orem

en, a

ndki

ndre

d33

10. 5

114

3. 3

234

9. 3

934

7. 0

5

Ope

rativ

e an

d ki

ndre

d70

22. 2

910

925

. 83

5615

. 47

101

20. 9

5

Serv

ice

4514

. 33

7818

. 48

8022

. 10

7014

. 52

Farm

labo

rers

, for

emen

ane

man

ager

s0

0.00

1.

241

.28

00.

0

Lab

orer

s25

7. 9

626

6. 1

627

7. 4

632

6. 6

4

Arm

y, N

avy,

Air

For

ce52

16. 5

688

20. 8

572

19. 8

914

029

05

Tot

als

314

422

362

482

Tab

le 3

-2, c

ontin

ued

1969

1970

firs

t 6 m

onth

s19

71

Num

ber

Perc

ent

Num

ber

Perc

ent

Num

ber

Perc

ent

Prof

essi

onal

, tec

hnic

al a

ndki

ndre

d10

3.41

144.

8137

21.2

6

Man

ager

s, o

ffic

ials

, pro

prie

tors

51.

71

103.

44

31.

72

Cle

rica

l and

kin

dred

3812

. 97

3110

. 65

169.

20

Sale

s15

5. 1

214

4.81

137.

47

Cra

ftsm

en, f

orem

en, a

ndki

ndre

d27

9. 2

239

13. 4

010

5.75

Ope

rativ

es a

nd k

indr

ed51

17.4

152

17. 8

729

16.6

7

Serv

ice

5619

. 11

6020

.62

3419

. 54

Farm

labo

rers

, for

emen

and

man

ager

s0

0. 0

02

.69

0e.

Oc!

Lab

orer

s20

6. 8

318

6. 1

911

6. 3

2

Arm

y, N

avy,

Air

For

ce71

24. 2

351

17. 5

321

12. 0

7

Tot

als

Z`3

329

117

4

Sour

ce: T

he d

ata

from

whi

ch th

is ta

ble.

: is

cons

truc

ted

cam

efr

om e

mpl

oym

ent a

pplic

atio

nssu

bmitt

edto

the

Oak

land

Civ

il Se

rvic

e O

ffic

e fr

omJa

nuar

y, 1

965,

to J

une,

197

1, f

or th

e jo

b of

,c)

polic

eman

.t.1

1

96

number of apphcants trorn the Army, 29 percent, in 1968, for

example, is explained by the Department of Defense 90-day

"early-out" program fo-! men entering law enforcement,

instituted in late 1967, in response to which Oakland developed

an aggressive recruitment campaign. The other really out-

standing phenomenon of the table is the marked increase from

less than 5 percent in all Other years to more than 20 percent

in the first 6 months of 1971 of men from professional and

technical occupations. This probably reflects the increasingly

difficult labor market for professionals (for example, teachers)

in the Bay Area.

In any case, the monopsony hypothesis seems substantially

useless when applied to the occupational context of the police job.

EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND ANSWERS

There have been several recent general empirical

attempts to estimate the determinants of municipal employee

wages and the elasticity of demand. In theory, one would

expect an inelastic demand for public employees. The demand

for government services is likely to be price inelastic, without

competing close substitutes. If unionized, there would be little

pressure from nonunion sectors either in the product market or

in the labor market. There is little scope for factor substitution

97

of capital for labor. The expenditures on any particular

functional category are a small part of total municipal expendi-

tures. Moreover, in the public sector political forces will

reinforce the inelasticity implied by economic ones, providing

optimal conditions for union growth and power. 24

The empirical evidence tends to bear out demand inelasti-

city. Ehrenberg estimates the demand for state and local

government employees, utilizing a time series (1958-1969) of

cross-sections with annual individual state data as the units of

observation, and finds significantly negative wage elasticities

of demand for almost all functional categories. Therefore, the

disemployment effects of real wage increases would be quite

low. His basic reduced form equation has per capita full-time

equivalent employees of category j as his dependent variable,

and includes as independent variables 1) average monthly pay-

roll cost per man, 2) the ratio of 1) to the average monthly

earnings of manufacturing production workers, 3) per capita

federal grants, 4) per capita personal income, and 5) those

sociodemographic variables which influence the demand for

class j employees. 25

Roger W. Schmenner offers some empirical work on the

determinants of teacher, police-fire, and a collection of common

98

function employee wage rates, using data for 11 American cities

over a span of 9 years, 1962-1970. His reduced form demand

equation, with the wage rate as the dependent variable, includes

1) the opportunity wage, 2) the fraction of employees with union

membership, 3) a dummy indicating the presence of formal

collective bargaining, 4) work stoppages per area employee,

showing the area's labor force militancy, 5) real property

assessments per capita, 6) the percentage change in the property

tax rate, and 7) the ratio of city population to metropolitan area

population (indicating scope for monopsony).

He concludes that unionization has played a significant role

if raising the wages of teachers: the total effect of a 0 to 100

percent membership increase and the imposition of formal

collective bargaining procedures is between 12 and .4 percent.

Police and firemen seem to benefit from complete membership

increases by about 15 percent, but the impact of formal collective

bargaining is unclear. Common function employees do not seem

to benefit from unionization, but results here are hampered by

significant data limitations.

What comparable private sector workers receive is the

most important determinant of local public sector wages, as one

would expect. Schmenner strongly agrees with our conclusion

99

that the monopsony argument could not be applicable to policemen.

"The expected positive sign and significance of the city population/

SMSA population term resoundingly destroys any notion that the

city can exercise monopsonistic power over police-fire wages. "27

He is making the point that larger cities do not have monopsony

power, but compete with smaller cities in their areas for police

labor. He does not, however, deal with the possibility of

potential monopsony power left unexercised for selection leeway,

or the problem of the definition of the police occupation. He

hypothesizes that the finding that the dominance of the central

city seems to increase salaries may indicate differences in

"tastes" among different cities or of wage differentials to compen-

sate for big city duty. Or, we might add, of higher selection

standards. For teachers, by the way, the city seems to wield

some monoptonistic power in reducing wages.

As for the other variables, pr:vate-sector labor militance,

as reflected in the number of area work stoppages, appears

important in general. The variables treating the financial and

administrative aspects of the city are of lesser importance.

James L. Freund's regression analysis demonstrates that

increases in the average weekly earnings of municipal employees

between 1965 and 1971 were signif:cantly related to inter-city

100

differences in market factors such as unemployment rates, the

pace of increases of nongovernmental wages, and the demand for

municipal workers as measured by changes in city expenditures.

Unionism, measured by the extent of organization, incidence of

strikes, and legal status of political activity by city employees,

exerted only a weak influence .28

Orley Ashenfelter's study of the effect of unionization on

firemen's wages concludes that in 1966 unionized firemen had

wages between 6 and 16 percent above those of nonunion, and

average annual duty hours of unionized firemen were from 3 to

9 percent below that of nonunion firemen.29 Ronald Ehrenberg,

also studying firemen, finds that in cities with union contracts

in 1969, hourly wages of fire fighters average from 2 to 18

percent higher than in cities without union contracts, divided

into a decrease in annual hours of between 2 and 9 percent and

an increase in annual earnings from 0 to 9 percent. 30

The contention that the demand for police services is

inelastic appears strong. It has been supported by the

empirical evidence to date. The effect, historical and

potential, of unionization, however, remains unclear, and

promises to be more elusive to measurement. For an excellent

institution discussion, see Police Unionism by Hervey A. Juris

31and Peter Feuille.

101

THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORY

Ehrenberg gives us a formal, rigorous decision model,

stemming from a utility-based demand function for government

services and moving to derived demand functions for each

category of labor. He then looks at the problem before a

particular functional department, say police, facing an

authorized employment level and a wage rate per employee

determined and fixed elsewhere in the political process. At the

exogenously determined wage, the decision maker attracts more

potential applicants of heterogeneous quality than he has positions

to fill. He then faces the problem of which applicants to accept.

One approach to this problem is to define a minimum

acceptable quality level, say through a set of minimum hiring

standards, and then to choose those applicants who meet the

standards and reject all others. Ehrenberg concentrates on how

to express this choice in the context of his formal, utility-based

decision model. He explores how to maximize the expected

value of the net gain to society from employing this particular

class of public employees. His model allows him to show

1) the formal conditions which must be satisfied by the minimum

acceptable quality level in order to maximize the expected value

of the net gain to society; 2) the theoretical effect on the

102

minimum acceptable quality level of a change in wages, number

of applicants, authorized employment level, or value of the

public service: and 3) the theoretical effect on the expected

vacancy rate of a change in wages, number of applicants,

authorized employment level, or value of the public service.

EhrenberCs model states the problem faced, in fact,

by real world s:ate and local government civil service agencies:

given authorized employment and wage levels, who shall be

hired to fill vacant positions? The rigor of his analysis also

highlights the complex interaction between wages, hiring

standards, authorized employment levels, and vacancy rates,

a complexity too often obscured by the simpler, classical model

which ignores the selection process and implies a more direct

relationship between wage levels and vacancies, previously

disturbed only in a monopsony framework.

Yet, Ehrenberg casts no substantive light on the minimum

acceptable quality level itself, which he characterizes as a

"vector of hiring standards such as education le%els, physical

and mental characteristics and health, test scores, and even

resident requirements. "32 In fact, he dismisses it as "not

33directly observable. However, the specific vector of hiring

standards chosen by an agency molds the economic character-

103

istics of its labor force and restricts the relevant labor supply.

It is in determining these standards that the decision-maker's

pragmatic problem begins, and it is here, and in the related

areas of recruitment and training, which Ehrenberg's single-

period framework must omit, that he has real discretion to

make choices.

To aid decision - makers and public policy formulation,

specific vectors of hiring standards must be observed and their

economic consequences must be traced and analyzed. In the

policy framework of the 1970's, with its consciousness of the

discriminatory effect of past hiring standards and the need for

affirmative action, it is as important to understand the economic

conaequences of specific sets of hiring standards as to analyze

demand elasticity, wages, and wage changes. Moreover, the

definition of the desired minimum acceptable quality level of

the labor supply may be as responsible for labor "shortage"

complaints as wages.

To observe directly a vector of hiring standards, one

must do just that, observe directly. We propose to study one

agency, the Police Department of the City of Oakland, California.

We will observe, define and analyze the vector of hiring stand-

ards used for the selection of Oakland policemen from 1965 to

104

1971, and its economic content and consequences. While the

details and results of the study are applicable only to Oakland

and to the time period defined, and while Oakland is unique in

some .respects, it should be clear that the general character-

istics of the selection process discussed is by no means unique

to Oakland, but represents a prototype of the process used in

police departments, and other civil service agencies as well,

throughout the country, well back into the 1920's at least.

Against this analysis, the challenges and controversies

of 1971 to 1974 can be better understood. The details of an

appropriate and nondiscriminatory vector of hiring standards

for police departments and other agencies are now in flux.

Some old standards, challenged in the courts under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its emerging case law, are

being judged inappropriate or discriminatory. New standards,

to replace them, are emerging slowly and amid great contro-

versy. In a few years, perhaps one will be able to compare the

economic consequences of the old and the new.

We would like to begin this task by tackling the problem

of observing vectors of hiring standards and analyzing their

economic effects. We will use the Oakland Police Department

in the 196 5 to 1971 period, and describe changes made up through

July, 1974, as we proceed.

105

CHAPTER 3

FOOTNOTES

1. The treatment in this section is based on Milton Friedman.Price Theory: A Provisional Text (Chicago: Aldine, 1962),pp. 211-225.

2. It may be difficult to distinguish differences in ability fromdifferences in tastes. For example, does the deep-seadiver reap a reward for the scarce ability of being willingto work under water in dangerous circumstances or for thenonpecuniary disadvantages of the trade.

3. William F. Danielson, Police Compensation (a reportsubmitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforce-ment avri Administration of Justice, 1967), pp. 30-32.

4. Armen A. Alchian, "Information Costs, Pricing andResource Unemployment, " in Edmund S. Phelps, Micro-economic Foundations of Emplo ment and Inflation Theory(New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 27-30.

5. David M. Blank and George Stigler, The Demand and Supplyof Scientific Personnel (New York: NBER, 1957).

6. See Armen A. Alchian, "Information Costs, Pricing, andResource Unemployment;" Dale T. Mortensen, "A Theory.of Wage and Employment Dynamics; " and Donald F. Gordonand Allan Hynes, "On the Theory of Price Dynamics," allin Edmund S. Phelps, et. al. , Microeconomic Foundationsof Employment and Inflation Theory (New York: W. W.Norton, 1970).

7. K. J. Arrow and W. M. Capron, "Dynamic Shortages andPrice Rises: The Engineer Scientist Case, " QuarterlyJournal of Economics, May 1959, p. 301.

8. See Eugene J. Devine, "Manpower Shortages in LocalGovernment Employment," Ph. D. dissertation,University of California, Los Angeles, 1969: Eugene 3.Devine, Analysis of Manpower Shortages in Local Govern-

106

rnent (New York: Praeger, 1969). See also GeorgeArchibald, "The Factor Gap and the Level of Wages, 'IEconomic Record, XXX, Novembex 1954, pp. 187-199;Richard W. Hurd, "Equilibrium Vacancies in a LaborMarket Dominated by Non-profit Firms: The 'Shortage'of Nurses, " Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. LV,No. 2, May 1973; Stuart H. Altman, "The Structure ofNursing Education and its Impact on Supply," in HerbertE. Klarman, ed. , Empirical Studies in Health Economics(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 335-352;R. T. Deane, "Simulating an Econometric Model of theMarket for Nurses, " Ph. D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, 1971; Donald E. Yett, ''Causes andConsequences of Salary Differentials in Nursing, " Inquiry,VII, March, 1970, pp. 78-99; Donald E. Yett, "The Chronic'Shortage' of Nurses: A Public Policy Dilemma, " in HerbertE. Klarman, ed. , Empirical Studies in Health Economics(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 357-389.

9. David Lewin, "Wage Parity and the Supply of Police andFiremen," Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, February,1973; David Lewin, "Wage Determination in Local Govern-ment Employment," Ph. D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, 1971.

10. David Lewin, "Wage Parity and the Supply of Police andFiremen," op: cit. , p. 82.

11. Martin Bronfenbrenner, "Potential Mono,psony in LaborMarkets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July,1956, pp. 577-588.

12. Ibid. , p. 581.

13. For discussions of theoretical models of public employeewage determination, see Robert J. Carlsson and James W.Robinson, "Toward a Public Employment Wage Theory,"Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 22, No. 2,January, 1969, pp. 243-248; Donald Gerwin, "CompensationDecisions in Public Organizations," Industrial Relations,Vol. 9, No. 2, February,1969, pp. 175-1841 Robert J.Carlsson and James W. Robinson, "Criticisth and Comment:Compensation Decisions in Public Organizations," Industrial

107

Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, October, 1969, pp. 111-113: JamesA. Craft, "Toward a Public Employee Wage Theory:Comment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol.23, No. 1, October, 1969, pp. 89-95. For a politicalanalysis of the bargaining process in Oakland, see FrankJ. Thompson, "The Politics of Public Personnel Policy ina Core City," Ph. D. dissertation, University of California,Berkeley, 1973.

14. Walter Fogel and David Lewin, "Wage Determination inthe Public Sector," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,Vol. 27, No. 3, April, 1974, p. 410.

15. Eugene J. Devine, "Manpower Shortages in Local GovernmentEmployment, " 2.2; cit. , pp. 25-29.

16. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Demand for State and LocalGovernment Employees (Lexington, Mass. : D. C. Heath,1972). In this discussion, we will number Ehrenberg'sequations as he does for the convenience of the reader whowishes to refer to his work.

17. For a more detailed discussion, see ibid. , pp. 11-16.

18. Ibid. , p. 17.

19. Ibid. , p. 18, footnote 14.

20. Ibid. , pp. 18-19.

21. Ehrenberg himself acknowledges the debt of his work to thethree papers by Alchian, Mortensen, and Gordon and Hynesin Phelps, cited in footnote 7, and to Dale T. Mortensen,"Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment, and thePhillips Curve," American Economic Review, Vol. 60,December, 1970, pp. 847-861.

22. Ehrenberg's own equation numbers are being retained herefor the ease of the reader who refers to his work.

23. Eugene J. Devine, "Manpower Shortages in Local Govern-ment Employment, " 2.2. cit. , p. 161.

108

24. See Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr. , TheUnions and the Cities (Washington, D. C. : BrookingsInstitution, 1971), pp. 17-32.

25. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Demand for State and LocalGovernment Employees, op. cit. , pp. 23-138.

26. Roger W. Schmenner, "The Determination of MunicipalEmployee Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol. LV, No. 1, February, 1973, pp. 83-91.

27. Ibid. , p. 87.

28. James L. Freund, "Market and Union Influences onMunicipal Employee Wages, " Industrial and Labor RelationsReview, Vol. 27, No. 3, April, 1974, pp. 391-404.

29. Orley Ashenfelter, "The Effects of Unionization on Wagesin the Public Sector: The Case of Fi re Fighters,"Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 2,January,1971, pp. 191-202.

30. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "Municipal Government Structure,Unionization, and the Wages of Fire Fighters, " Industrialand Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, October, 1973,pp. 3 6 - 48 .

31. Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism(Lexington, Mass.-: D.. C. Heath, 1973).

109

CHAPTER 4

THE INSTITUTIONAL 'FRAMEWORK:

SALARIES, VACANCIES, HIRING STANDARDS

THE COMPOSITION OF THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Oakland Police Department, as of October 30, 1973, has

698 sworn, uniformed members. Of these, 522, or 74.8 percent,

are partrolman; 134, or 19. 2 percent, are sergeants: 42, or 6

percent, hold ranks of inspector, lieutenant, captain, deputy chief,

or chief.

Table 4-1. Oakland Police Department members, by rank,October 30, 1973

Rank Number Percent of Department

Patrolman 522 74. 8Sergeant 134 19. 2Inspector 6 0. 9Lieutenant 22 3. 2Captain 10 1. 4Deputy Chief 3 0. 4Chief 1 0. 1

Total 698 100. 0

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

Advancement to the positions of sergeant, lieutenant and

captain is by Civil Service examination; the inspector rank is being

110

phased o.,t by merging it with sergeant' deputy chief and chief are

Civil Service exempt positions filled by appointment. To be

eligible to take the promotional exam for sergeant, for example,

three years of patrolman experience are required. A four hour

written test of 150 multiple choice questions on supervision and

leadership, analytic ability, investigation and interrogation,

operating departments, law, and rules and regulations must be

passed with a score of at least 70 percent. An oral exam must be

passed, and points are awarded for seniority. In composing the

final eligibility list, the Written counts 60 percent, the oral 30

percent and seniority 10 percent.

Because an entire generation of officers hired right after

World War II, in 1946, 1947 and 1948 reached 25 years of service

and retired by 1973, the current Oakland force is a young one.

Less than one-third of the members have ten or more years of

service: 43. 6 percent have been hired in the last five years

(see Table 4-2).

The career mobility, or pattern of advancement of cohorts

of Oakland policemen, is shown in Table 4-3.

111

Table 4-2.. Oakland Police Department members, by number ofyears of service, October 30, 1973

Number of Yearsof Service. Number Percent of Department

25 years or more(hired 1948 or before) 48 6. 9

20 to 24 years(hired 1949 to 1953) 84 12. 0

15 to 19 years(hired 1945 to 1958) 60 8. 6

10 to 14 years(hired 1959 to 1963) 33 4. 7

5 to 9 years(hired 1964 to 1968) 169 24. 2

Less than 5 years(hired 1969 to 1973) 304 43. 6

Total 698 100. 0

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

SALARIES

Since the 1958 passage of the Proposition "C" charter

amendment, Oakland Police and Fire Department salaries are

linked to those of manufacturing production workers in the San

Francisco-Oakland area and rise at the same rate. In 1968, the

Police Officer& Association pressured the Oakland City Council

to grant salary increases beyond those authorized by the Proposi-

tion "C" formula, arguing that "C" prescribed minimum salary

increases rather than precise amounts. Under intense pressure,

Tab

le 4

-3.

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent m

embe

rs, b

y nu

mbe

r of

yea

rs o

f se

rvic

ean

d ra

nk,

Oct

ober

30,

197

3

Num

ber

ofY

ears

of

Serv

ice

Patr

olm

anSe

rgea

ntL

ieut

enan

tO

the

rPe

rcen

tN

umbe

rof

Coh

ort

Perc

ent

Num

ber

of C

ohor

tPe

rcen

tN

umbe

rof

Coh

ort

Pe r

c -n

tN

umbe

rof

Coh

ort

25 y

ears

or

mor

e(h

ired

194

8 or

befo

re)

3164

.67

14.6

36.

37

14. 6

20 to

24

year

s(h

ired

194

9 to

195

3)53

63. 1

1619

. 07

8. 3

89.

5

15 to

19

year

s(h

ired

195

4 to

195

8)17

28.3

3355

.06

10.0

46.

6

10 to

14

year

s(h

ired

195

9 to

196

3)12

36. 4

1648

. 44

12. 1

13.

0

5 to

9 y

ears

(hir

ed 1

964

to 1

968)

111

65.7

5633

. 12

1. 2

00.

0

Les

s th

an 5

yea

rs(h

ired

196

9 to

197

3)29

898

. 06

2. 0

00.

00

0. 0

Sour

ce: O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice

113

five councilmen decided to show "good faith" and double the amount

Proposition "C" decreed. The courts upheld the increase.

The patrolman classification, until August, 1970, had three

salary steps: patrolman, first year; patrolman, second year;

patrolman, third year. In August, 1970, a fourth step was added:

patrolman, fourth year. The fourth step was added partly to per-

mit a decrease in the starting salary without threatening the pay

scale of incumbents and partly to widen the career ladder. Once

a patrolman reaches the fourth step, he must be promoted to

sergeant to increase his salary scale. If he is not promoted to

sergeant, his pay will increase only by yearly cost of living

increases for patrolmen, fourth year. There are no seniority or

merit increases. A patrolman on the force for 24 years will be

earning the same salary as a patrolman on the force for four years.

The monthly salary for each patrolman step, sergeant and

lieutenant from July, 1963, to July, 1974, is given in Table 4-4.

The salary differences between patrolman, first year,

patrolman, second year, patrolman, third year, patrolman,

fourth year, and sergeant are given in Table 4-5.

In other words, a patrolman's salary increases about three

and one-half percent between his first year of service and his

second year of service and between his second year and third

Tab

le 4

-4.

Mon

thly

sal

ary

of O

akla

nd P

olic

e D

epar

tmen

t mem

bers

, by

rank

, Jul

y, 1

963,

toJu

ly, 1

974

Patr

olm

anFi

rst Y

ear

Patr

olm

anSe

cond

Yea

rPa

trol

man

Thi

rd Y

ear

Patr

olm

anFo

urth

Yea

rSe

rgea

ntI

ieut

enan

t

July

, 196

3$6

2.5

$647

$667

$758

$836

July

, 196

464

666

968

978

386

4

July

, 196

566

368

670

780

388

6

July

, 196

668

671

073

183

191

7

July

, 196

771

173

675

886

195

0

July

, 196

877

380

082

493

61,

033

Aug

ust,

1968

823

852

878

992

1, 0

95

July

, 196

987

390

493

21,

053

1, 1

62

July

, 197

096

099

41,

025

1, 1

581,

344

Aug

ust,

1970

926

960

994

$1, 0

25Ju

ly, 1

971

977

1, 0

121,

048

1, 0

811,

221

1, 4

17

July

, 197

21,

058

1, 0

951,

134

1, 1

701,

322

1, 5

34

July

, 197

31,

134

1, 1

741,

215

1, 2

541,

417

1, 6

44

July

, 197

41,

201

1, 2

431,

286

1, 3

281,

527

1, 7

56

Sour

ce: O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice.

Tab

le 4

-5.

.D

iffe

renc

es in

sal

ary

of m

embe

rs o

f th

e O

akla

nd P

olic

e D

epar

tmen

t, by

ran

k,Ju

ly, 1

963,

to J

uly,

197

4

Patr

olm

anFi

rst Y

ear

to S

econ

d Y

ear

Patr

olm

an'

Seco

nd Y

ear

to T

hird

Yea

r

Patr

olm

anT

hird

Yea

rto

Fou

rth

Yea

r

Patr

olm

anL

ast Y

ear

to S

erge

ant

Dol

lars

Perc

ent

Dol

lars

Perc

ent

Dol

lars

Perc

ent

Dol

lars

Perc

ent

July

, 196

3$2

23.

52$2

03.

09

$91

13.6

4Ju

ly, 1

964

233.

56

203.

00

9413

. 64

July

, 196

523

3.47

213.

06

9613

.58

July

, 196

624

3. 5

021

2. 9

610

013

.68

July

, 196

725

3. 5

222

2. 9

910

313

.59

July

, 196

827

3.49

243.

00

112

13.5

9A

ugus

t, 19

6829

3. 5

226

3.05

114

12.9

8Ju

ly, 1

969

313.

55

283.

10

121

12.9

8Ju

ly, 1

970

343.

54

313.

12

133

12.9

8A

ugus

t, 1.

970

343.

6734

3. 5

4$3

13.

12

July

, 197

135

3. 5

836

3. 5

633

3. 1

314

012

. 98

July

, 197

237

3. 5

039

3. 5

637

3. 2

615

212

. 99

July

, 197

340

3. 5

341

3. 4

939

3. 2

116

313

. 00

July

, 197

442

3. 5

043

3.46

423.

27

199

13. 0

0

Sour

ce: D

ata

on w

hich

cal

cula

tions

are

bas

ed w

as s

uppl

ied

byO

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice.

116

year, and about three and one-quarter percent between the third

year and fourth year. Then, unless he advances in rank, he

receives only cost-of-living increases, pegged to the increase

in average earnings of Bay Area manufacturing production

workers.

The annual increases in patrolman, first year, classifica-

tion salaries and the annual increases in wages of Bay Area

manufacturing production workers are shown in Table 4-6.

The relative wages of Oakland patrolman and Bay Area

production workers changed most dramatically with the double

increase won by the patrolman in 1968. The patrolman'. s starting

salary averaged slightly over 115 percent of production workers'

wages before August, 1968, and over U5 percent afterwards.

Patrolmen in their last step went from about 125 percent of

production workers' wages before August, 1968, to close to 140

percent afterwards. Sergeants' salaries were about 140 percent

of production workers' wages before August, 1968, 157 percent

afterwards. The ratio of patrolmen's salaries, first and last

year, and sergeant's salaries, to average production workers'

earnings, is presented in Table 4-7.

It should be stressed here that the figures for Oakland

police salaries and for average production worker wages are not

Tab

le 4

-6.

Ann

ual r

ate

of in

crea

se, O

akla

nd P

olic

e D

epar

tmen

t pat

rolm

an a

nd S

anFr

anci

sco-

Oak

land

man

ufac

turi

ng p

rodu

ctio

n w

orke

rs, J

uly,

196

3 to

Jul

y, 1

973

Dat

e

Oak

land

Pat

rolm

an,

Firs

t Yea

rPr

oduc

tion

Wor

kers

in M

anuf

actu

ring

San

Fran

cisc

o-O

akla

nd

Ann

ual S

alar

yPe

rcen

t Rat

eof

Inc

reas

ePe

rcen

t Rat

eA

nnua

l. W

age

of I

ncre

ase

July

, 196

2$

7, 2

72$

6, 2

03Ju

ly, 1

963

7, 5

001.

56,

457

4. 1

July

, 196

47,

752

3. 4

622

2.6

July

, 196

57,

956

2.6

6, 9

154.

4Ju

ly, 1

966

8, 2

323.

57,

253

4. 9

July

, 196

78,

532

3.6

7, 3

210.

9Ju

ly, 1

968

9, 2

768.

77,

907

8. 0

July

, 196

910

, 476

12.6

8, 4

026.

3Ju

ly, 1

970

11, 5

2010

. 08,

549

1. 7

Aug

ust,

1970

11, 1

12-3

. 58,

621

0. 8

July

, 197

111

, 724

5. 5

9, 3

338.

3Ju

ly, 1

972

12, 6

968.

310

, 131

8. 6

July

, 197

313

, 608

7. 2

10, 8

597.

2

Sour

ce: D

ata

on w

hich

cal

cula

tions

for

Oak

land

are

bas

ed w

ere

supp

lied

by O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice.

Dat

a on

whi

ch c

alcu

latio

ns f

or p

rodu

ctio

n w

orke

rs in

man

ufac

turi

ng,

San

Fran

cisc

o-O

akla

nd, a

re b

aser

'. w

ere

supp

lied

by S

tate

of

Cal

ifor

nia,

Dep

artm

ent

of I

ndus

tria

l Rel

atio

ns, D

ivis

ion

of L

abor

Sta

tistic

s an

d R

esea

rch,

Cal

ifor

nia

Tab

orSt

atis

tics

Bul

letin

, Jul

y, 1

962,

to J

uly,

197

0, a

nd S

tate

of

Cal

ifor

nia,

Dep

artm

ent o

fH

uman

Res

ourc

es D

evel

opm

ent,

Cal

ifor

nia

Lab

or M

arke

tB

ulle

tin, J

uly,

197

1, to

July

, 197

3.

118

Table 4-7. Ratio of C-ikland Police Department patrolman andsergeant salaries to earnings of San Francisco-Oaklandmanufacturing production workers, July, 1963, to July,1973

Patrolman, 1 Patrolman, 3 SergeantDate Average Earnings Average Earnings Average Earnings

July, 1963 1. 16 1. 24 1. 41July, 1964 1. 17 1. 25 1.42July, 1965 1. 15 1. 23 1.39July, 1966 1. 13 1. 21 1.37July, 1967 1. 16 1. 24 1.41July, 1968 1. 17 1. 25 1.42July, 1969 1. 25 1.33 1. 50

July, 1970 1.35 1.44 1.63July, 1971 1.26 1.39 1.57July, 1972 1. 26 1.39 1.57July, 1973 1. 25 1.39 1.57

Note: Ratios are calculated by dividing annual salary of OaklandPolice Department member by average annual wages ofproduction workers in manufacturing in the San Francisco-Oakland area. For example, for July, 1973, patrolman,first year, the calculation is 13,608/10, 859 equals 1. 25.

Source: Data for Oakland were supplied by the Oakland CivilService Office. Data for production workers in manufac-turing, San Francisco-Oakland, were supplied by State ofCalifornia, Department of Industrial Relations, Division ofLabor Statistics and Research, California Labor StatisticsBulletin, July, 1963, to July, 1970, and State of California,Department of Human Resources Development, CaliforniaLabor Market Bulletin, July, 1971, to July, 1973.

119

measuring the same thing. The Oakland figures are derived

simply by multiplying the monthly salary rate in effect in July

of each year by 12. They represent salary scales, not actual

earnings. For example, overtime pay earned by policemen

would not be reflected. The production worker earnings figures

are derived by multiplying average weekly earnings of San

Francisco-Oakland SMSA production workers in July by 52. They

represent actual earnings and would reflect the number of hours

worked and overtime pay as well as wage rates. July figures

were chosen in both cases because the fiscal year in Oakland

commences in July and most salary changes take effect then.

The comparability is sufficient for our rough purposes.

An even more revealing set of relative wage calculations

can be provided for the census year 1969. In Tables 3-1 and 3-2,

we presented the previous occupations of the applicants to the

Oakland Police Department between 1965 and 1971. We know,

for example, that in 1969, 3. 4 percent of the applicants came

from professional, technical and kindred jobs, 1. 7 percent from

managerial, almost 13 percent from clerical, 5.1 percent from

sales, 9. 2 percent from craftsman, 17. 4 percent from operative,

19.1 percent from service, 6. 8 percent from laborer jobs and

24. L percent from the military. The 1970 Census provides us

120

with median earnings for San Francisco-Oakland SMSA workers

in each of the civilian occupational categories.) Table 4-8

compares the annual salary of Oakland patrolman, step 1,

patrolman, step 3, and sergeant, in 1969 with the median

earnings of San Francisco-Oakland SMSA workers in other broad

occupational categories. The ratio of the police salary to median

earnings in each occupational category is presented for the total

population and for the Negro and Spanish surnamed sectors

separately.

The Oakland figures are based on the monthly salary rate

after the July, 1969, increase. Again, salary scale figures and

earnings figures are not strictly comparable. The Census earn-

ings figures not only reflect overtime, but also include earnings

from second jobs or businesses. All members of the experienced

civilian labor force in the occupation are included, whether

employed or unemployed. The police salary scale figures do not

reflect overtime or second jobs or unemployment, as the earnings

figures do. Both overtime and second job opportunities represent

important additions to primary police salaries.

Because of its interest, we report the protective service

category in more detail than the other occupational categories.

Oakland patrolmen, step 1, earn only 86 percent of firemen's

Tab

le 4

-8.

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent s

alar

ies

for

patr

olm

an, s

tep

1, p

atro

lman

, ste

p 3,

and

ser

gean

t,re

lativ

e to

med

ian

earn

ings

in o

ther

occ

upat

iona

l gro

ups,

196

9, f

or S

an-F

ranc

isco

-Oak

land

SMSA

, tot

al,

Neg

ro a

nd S

pani

sh s

urna

me

Occ

upat

iona

l Cat

egor

y

Tot

alN

egro

Span

ish

Surn

ame

Med

ian

Ear

ning

sPa

t.1Pa

t.3Sg

t.M

edia

nE

arni

ngs

Pat.1

Pat.3

Sgt.

Med

ian

Ear

ning

sPa

t.1Pa

t.3Sg

t.M

. E.

M. E

.M

. F.

M. E

.M

. F.

M. E

.M

. F.

M. F

.M

. F.

Exp

erie

nced

civ

ilian

labo

r fo

rce,

all

$ 9,

073

1. 1

5I.

23

1. 3

9$6

, 968

1. 5

01.

611.

81

$ 8,

098

1. 2

91.

38

1. 5

6

Prof

essi

onal

, tec

hnic

al11

, 784

.89

.95

1. 0

78,

126

1. 2

91.

38

1. 5

610

, 178

1. 0

31.

10

1. 2

4

Man

ager

s,ad

min

istr

ator

s12

, 992

.81

.86

.97

9, 1

501.

14

1. 2

21.

38

11, 7

48.

89.

951.

08

Sale

s9,

372

1. 1

21.

19

1.35

6, 2

811.

67

1. 7

82.

018,

796

1. 1

91.

27

1. 4

4

Cle

rica

l7,

576

1. 3

81.

481.

676,

846

1. 5

31.

631.

857,

290

1. 4

4L

53

1. 7

3

Cra

ftsm

en9,

757

1.07

1.15

1.30

7, 8

581.

33

1. 4

21.

619,

076

1. 1

51.

231.

39

Ope

rativ

es, e

xc.

tran

spor

t7,

594

1. 3

81.

47

1.66

7, 0

481.

49

1. 5

91.

797,

466

1. 4

01.

50

1.69

Tra

nspo

rt e

quip

men

top

erat

ives

8, 6

661.

21

1. 2

91.

46

7, 5

811.

38

1. 4

81.

678,

951

1. 1

71.

25

1.41

Lab

orer

s, e

xc. f

arm

6, 6

191.

58

1.69

1.91

6, 8

541.

53

1.63

1. 8

47,

161

1. 4

61.

56

1.76

Farm

ers

and

farm

man

ager

s6,

696

1. 5

61.

671.

893,

364

3. 1

13.

32

3. 7

67,

065

1.48

1. 5

81.

79

Farm

labo

rers

and

fore

men

3, 8

602,

71

2. 9

03.

27

1.63

96.

39

6. 8

27.

714,

330

2. 4

22.

58

2. 9

2Se

rvic

e, e

xc. h

ouse

hold

6, 1

831.

691.

81

2. 0

45,

656

1.85

1.98

2. 2

36,

057

1. 7

31.

85

2. 0

9

Prot

ectiv

e se

rvic

e10

, 831

.97

1.03

1. 1

76,

241

1.68

1.79

2. 0

210

, 153

1. 0

31.

10

1. 2

4

Fire

men

12, 1

7286

.92

1. 0

412

, 292

.85

.91

1.03

Guz

.rds

and

wat

chm

en5,

869

1.78

1.91

2.15

4, 7

682.

20

2. 3

52.

655,

500

1.90

2.03

2.33

Polic

emen

and

dete

ctiv

es11

, 767

.89

.95

1. 0

79,

875

1. 0

61.

13

1. 2

810

, 633

991.

05

1. 1

9

Priv

ate

hous

ehol

d2,

531

4. 1

44.

42

4. 9

91,

882

5. 5

75.

94

6.71

Tab

le 4

-8, c

ontin

ued

Not

e: T

he a

nnua

l sal

ary

for

patr

olm

an, s

tep

1 (P

at. 1

),in

Jul

y, 1

969,

was

$10

, 476

: the

ann

ual s

alar

y fo

rpa

trol

man

, ste

p 3

(Pat

. 3),

in J

uly,

196

9, w

as $

11, 1

84: t

he a

nnua

l sal

ary

for

serg

eant

in J

uly.

1969

,w

as $

12,6

36T

he -

sig

n m

eans

that

the

med

ian

earn

ings

fig

ure

was

not

pre

sent

ed b

y th

e C

ensu

s be

caus

eth

e ba

seis

sm

alle

r th

an th

e m

inim

um n

umbe

r pr

escr

ibed

for

the

sam

ple.

Sour

ce: D

ata

for

Oak

land

wer

e su

pplie

d by

the

Oak

land

Civ

il Se

rvic

e O

ffic

e.D

ata

on m

edia

n ea

rnin

gs(M

. E.)

for

the

San

Fran

cisc

o-O

akla

nd S

MSA

, by

occu

patio

n an

d ra

ce, c

ome

from

U. S

.D

epar

tmen

t of

Com

mer

ce, S

ocia

l and

Eco

nom

ic S

tatis

tics

Adm

inis

trat

ion,

Bur

eau

of th

e C

ensu

s,19

70 C

ensu

s of

Pop

ulat

ion,

Det

aile

d C

hara

cter

istic

s, C

alif

orni

a, S

ectio

n 1

(PC

(1)

-D6

Cal

if.)

, pp.

Cal

if 6

-182

3 to

6-1

828,

Tab

le 1

75, "

Occ

upat

ion

of th

e M

ale

Exp

erie

nced

Civ

ilian

Lab

orFo

rce

byE

arni

ngs

in 1

969

and

Rac

e: S

an F

ranc

isco

-Oak

land

SM

SA."

123

earnings and 89 percent of all area policemen's and detectives'

earnings; Oakland patrolmen, step 3, earn 92 percent of fire-

men's earnings and 95 percent of all area policemen's and

detective& earnings. Yet, Oakland Police Department salaries,

along with San Francisco's, are the highest in the Bay Area, as

well as in the state. We know, too, that firemen's salaries are

pegged to policemen's salaries. Median earnings will be

affected somewhat by earnings of policemen in higher ranks than

patrolman. But the apparent puzzle is best explained by the

prevalence of both overtime and second jobs or businesses

among policemen and firemen. Therefore, one would expect

overall earnings figures to exceed those based on salary scales,

as our ratios demonstrate. Firemen, because of the arrangement

of their working hours into consecutive toll day and night duty

tours and consecutive days off, have even more opportunities

for additional earnings than policemen. It is not surprising,

therefore, that the differential between Oakland police salary

scales and average earnings is even greater for firemen than

for policemen. We can infer that roughly 95 percent of the total

earnings of the average Oakland patrolman, step 3, comes from

his stated salary scale; second jobs and overtime supply the rest.

Second jobs are permitted, but must be revealed and approved by

124

the chief. It should also he stressed here that graft is not a

problem in the Oakland Police Department and illegal income can

reasonably be ignored for purposes of our work.

The only other occupational categories in Table 4-8 in

which median earnings exceed Oakland patrolman earnings are

professional and technical and managerial and administrative.

It is not surprising that such a small percent of total police

applicants was drawn from these categories when Oakland

patrolmen start at 89 percent of the median earnings of pro-

fessionals and 81 percent of the median earnings of managers in

the area, and in their third year earn 95 percent and 86 percent

respectively of professional and managerial median earnings.

Even Oakland sergeants earn only 97 percent of the median

earnings of managers, although 107 percent, now, of those of

professionals and technicians.

Similarly, it is not surprising that most of the civilian

applicants to the Oakland Police Department come from service,

operative and clerical jobs. The Oakland patrolman's starting

salary is 169 percent of the median earnings of service workers

and 138 percent of the median earnings of clerical workers and

operatives. The differentials are even greater in the laborer,

farm, and private household worker categories, but workers in

125

these categories are much less likely to meet the other require-

ments, particularly high school graduation, of the Oakland Police

Department. It should also be noted here that Oakland patrolmen

start at 178 percent of the median earnings of private guards and

watchmen.

The differential between Oakland patrolman earnings and

median earnings in other occupational categories is greater,

across all categories, for the Negro and Spanish surnamed

population than for the total population. This is because median

earnings across all occupations is lower for Negroes and Spanish

surnamed individuals. Does this imply, as was so often argued

in discussions of a volunteer army, that the Oakland Police

Department is flooded with applications from the minority

community because becoming a policeman would have relatively

more pecuniary attractiveness to a minority person than to

others? We will deal with the minority composition of the

Department, and the issues surrounding it, in detail in Chapter

6. The answer to our question is clearly no, because pecuniary

attractiveness does not tell the whole story. In fact, minority

community members clearly are more reluctant than others to

become policemen. The distaste attached to becoming a police-

man is much greater in the minority communities because of the

126

feel ing, whether ove rt or inc ipient, that minority communities

have been occupied and harrassed by alien, hostile police forces

throughot.' their history, and that joining the police force would

be joining the enemy. On the personal level, the minority

policeman may be both rejected by his community and his fellow

officers. Moreover, minorities do not see themselves on police

forces, do not feel they would be selected or accepted. To

attract more minorities, large pecuniary incentives are not

enough. The taste problem must be tackled directly, through

recruitment campaigns aimed at the minority communities,

through changes in the image of the police force, through changes

in selection techniques, and, perhaps, through more fundamental

changes in composition and definition of the police job.

We can present one more set of interesting relative income

calculations for the census year 1969. We can show the relation-

ship of Oakland police salaries to the mean income of San Fran-

cisco-Oakland area men by years of school completed, age and

race. Income figures are even less comparable to scheduled

Oakland police salaries than the earnings figures presented

previously, because income includes not only earnings, but

interest, dividends, veterans' payments, social security,

pensions, etc. , L as well. Nevertheless, the comparisons allow

Tab

le 4

-9.

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent p

atro

lman

sta

rtin

g sa

lary

rel

ativ

e to

mea

nin

com

e of

all

San

Fran

cisc

o-O

akla

nd m

ales

, 18

and

olde

r, a

nd 2

5 to

34,

in 1

969,

by

year

s of

scho

ol c

ompl

eted

and

race

All

One

to T

hree

Five

Yea

rsE

duca

tiona

lFo

ur Y

ears

Yea

rsFo

ur Y

ears

Plus

Gro

ups

Hig

h Sc

hool

Col

lege

Col

lege

Col

lege

Mea

nIn

:. om

ePa

t. 1

Mea

nIn

com

ePa

t. 1

Mea

nIn

com

ePa

t. 1

Mea

nIn

com

ePa

t. 1

Mea

nIn

com

ePa

t. 1

M. I

.M

. I.

M. I

.M

. I.

M. I

.

All

mal

es,

18 a

ndol

der

Tot

al$9

,27

41.

13

$8,

609

1.22

$8,

855

1. 1

8$1

3.23

279

$15,

568

.67

Neg

ro5,

949

1.76

6,02

61.

746,

427

1.63

8,60

61.

2211

,35

0.92

Span

ish

surn

ame

7,88

41.

33

8,02

61.

317,

939

1.32

10,

949

.96

13,

527

77

Mal

es, 2

5 to

34

Tot

al$8

,90

31.

18

$8,

736

1. 2

0$8

,76

21.

20

$10,

059

1.04

$ 9.

970

1.05

Neg

ro6,

637

1. 5

86,

719

1. 5

67,

047

1. 4

98,

576

1.22

8,20

31.

25

Span

ish

surn

ame

8,21

91.

27

8,45

71.

24

8,30

01.

26

9,20

91.

149,

747

1. 0

4

Not

e: T

he a

nnua

l sta

rtin

g sa

lary

for

Oak

land

pat

rolm

an, s

tep

1 (P

at.

1),

in J

uly,

196

9, w

as $

10, 4

76.

Sour

ce: D

ata

for

Oak

land

wer

e su

pplie

d by

the

Oak

land

Civ

ilSe

rvic

e O

ffic

e.D

ata

on m

ean

inco

me

(M. I

.) f

or th

e Sa

n Fr

anci

sco-

Oak

land

SM

SA, b

y ag

e, r

ace,

and

yea

rsof

edu

catio

n, c

ome

from

U. S

. Dep

artm

ent o

f C

omm

erce

, Soc

ial a

nd E

cono

mic

Stat

istic

s A

dmin

istr

atio

n,B

urea

u of

the

Cen

sus,

197

0 C

ensu

s of

Pop

ulat

ion,

Det

aile

dC

hara

cter

istic

s, C

alif

orni

a.Se

ctio

n 2

(PC

(1)

-D6

Cal

if. )

,pp

. Cal

if 6

-233

6 to

6-23

38, T

able

197

, "In

com

e in

196

9 of

Pers

ons

18 Y

ears

Old

and

Ove

r by

Yea

rs o

f Sc

hool

Com

plet

ed,

Age

, Rac

e an

d Se

xSa

n Fr

anci

sco-

Oak

land

SM

SA. "

Tab

le 4

-10.

Oak

land

Pol

ice

Dep

artm

ent p

atro

lman

, ste

p 3,

and

ser

gean

t,sa

lari

es r

elat

ive

to m

ean

inco

me

of a

llSa

n Fr

anci

sco-

Cak

land

mal

es, 1

8 an

d ol

der,

in 1

969,

by

year

s of

scho

ol c

ompl

eted

and

rac

e

All

EzT

uca.

tiona

lFo

ur Y

ears

Gro

ups

Hig

h Sc

hool

Mea

nPa

t.3M

ean

Pat.3

Sgt

.In

com

e M

. I. M

. I. I

ncom

e M

. I. M

. I

One

to T

hree

Yea

rsC

olle

geFo

ur Y

ears

Col

lege

Five

Yea

rsPl

usC

olle

ge

Mea

nPa

t.3 S

gt.

Mea

nPa

t.3 S

gt.

Mea

nPa

t.3 S

gt.

.In

com

e M

. 1. M

. I.

Inco

me

M. I

.M

. I.

Inco

me

M. I

.M

. I

All

mal

es,

18 a

nd o

lder

Tot

alN

egro

$9, 5,

274

949

1. 1.21 88

1. 2.36 12

$8, 6,

609

026

1.30

1. 8

61. 2.

47 10$8

, 6,85

542

71. 1.

26 741.

43

1.97

$13, 8,

232

606

.

1.85 30

.

1.95 47

$15, 11

,56

835

0.72

.98

.8

1. 1

7,88

41.

421.

608,

026

1.39

1.39

7,93

91.

411.

59

10,

949

1.02

1.15

13.

527

.83

.9

Not

e: T

he a

nnua

l sal

ary

for

Cak

land

pat

rolm

an, s

tep

3 (P

at. 3

), in

Jul

y, 1

969,

was

$11

, 184

; the

ann

ual

sala

ry f

orse

rgea

nt (

Sgt.)

in J

uly,

196

9, w

as $

12,6

36.

Sour

ce: D

ata

for

Oak

land

wer

e su

pplie

d by

the

Oak

land

Civ

il Se

rvic

e O

ffic

e.D

ata

on m

ean

inco

me

(M. I

.) f

or th

e Sa

nFr

anci

sco-

Oak

land

SM

SA, b

y ag

e, r

ace,

and

yea

rs o

f ed

ucat

ion,

com

efr

om U

. S. D

epar

tmen

t of

Com

mer

ce.

Soci

al a

nd E

cono

mic

Sta

tistic

s A

dmin

istr

atio

n,B

urea

u of

the

Cen

sus,

197

0 C

ensu

s of

Pop

ulat

ion,

Det

aile

dC

hara

cter

istic

s, C

alif

orni

a, S

ectio

n 2

(PC

(1)

-D6

Cal

if.)

, pp.

Cal

if. 6

-233

6 to

6-2

338.

Tab

le 1

97, "

Inco

me

in 1

969

of P

erso

ns 1

8 Y

ears

Old

and

Ove

rby

Yea

rs o

f Sc

hool

Com

plet

ed, A

ge, R

ace

and

Sex-

San

Fra

ncis

co-

Oak

land

SM

SA."

OD

129

us to demonstrate that Oakland police salaries are considerably

more attractive to high school graduates than to college graduates.

In fact, if we look at all San Francisco-Oakland men over the age

of 18, Oakland police starting salaries are 122 percent of the

mean income of high school graduates, 118 percent of the mean

income of men with one to three years of college, and only 79

percent of the mean income of college graduates.

Oakland Police Department applicants, however, must be

between the ages of 21 and 32. The mean income for this younger

age group is below that for all men over 18. The Census data for

18 to 24 year old men is clearly distorted by school attendance

and part-time earnings. If we take men 25 to 34 years old, we

find that the Oakland police starting salary is greater than the

mean income of high school graduates and men with one to three

years of college, and 104 percent of the mean income of college

graduates. There is clearly a substantial difference in the

pecuniary attractiveness of police work for high school and

college graduates. The data are presented in Table 4-9 and

Table 4-10.

BENEFITS

Oakland patrolmen receive benefits which add, by the

city' s estimates in May, 1971, an additional $5, 829 to an Oakland

130

Table 4-11 Total remuneration of Oakland patrolman, step 3,fiscal year July, 1970, to June, 1971

Source Dollar Amount

Salary $ 12, 300Retirement 5, 045Workmen's Compensation 386Health 180Dental 53

Uniform 165

Total $ 18, 129

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

patrolman's third year salary. 3 His total remuneration is shown

in Table 4-11.

The retirement program has the following featur.3s:

1) One half pay after 25 years of service. One half pay

at age 55 with 20 years of service.

2) Retirement pay is 50 percent of whatever current pay

is. That is, an officer who retired in 1950 receives 50

percent of today's top pay, or $512. 50 per month.

3) Seventy-five percent pay to an officer who is retired for

service-incurred disability. Upon reaching his normal

retirement date he assumes the normal 50 percent

salary.

131

4) Seventy-tive percent pay to dependents of a retired

officer who dies as a result of service injuries. Upon

normal retirement date this amount reduces to the

normal 50 percent.

5) One-third salary to an officer with a non-service

connected disability who has over 10 years service. 4

The health services provided are as follows

1) Sick leave benefits provide an officer off duty for

illness 60 days sick leave without loss of pay. If his

sickness continues, he is entitled to half pay for an

additional 60 days, and if his sickness further continues,

zie receives such pay as the city council may direct.

2) Medical plans are provided for the employee and

dependents. The City pays $15 monthly, which approx-

imates the employee's contribution. Dependents are

covered at the employee's expense.

3) Dental plan coverage is paid in full by the City for the

employ,7.e only.

4) An officer off duty for injuries rcceived in the line of

duty receives whatever medical, surgical or hospital

treatment, including medicine, nursing, and medical

and surgical supplies, he may need during the period

132

of disability, remaining on a full pay status until

return to duty or disability retirement, 5

Fifteen working days per year of vacation are provided,

increasing to a maximum of 20 working days. In addition,

officers are compensated for 11 holidays per year. 6

There are also several educational incentive programs,

providing cash payments to officers completing approved college

course work or continuing their education. 7

We have no comparable estimates of the pecuniary value

of benefits available to the average San Francisco-Oakland

worker. However, the police benefits, particularly the retire-

ment provisions which enable a man who joined the force at age

21 to retire at age 46 at one-half pay, should certainly compare

favorably, adding positively to the relative pecuniary attractive-

ness of the police job.

VACANCIES

Yet, the relative pecuniary attractiveness of the job did

not appear to be sufficient to offset an apparent distaste for

police work in the population, at least in the population of

applicants of interest to the Oakland Police Department. Oakland,

along with other major cities, complained bitterly in the 1960's

of shortages of qualified applicants, of an inability to fill vacant

133

positions quickly. 8 The city was very unhappy, for example,

with vacancy rates of over 6 percent of authorized positions which

prevailed in 1966 and 1968, in spite of elaborate nationwide re-

cruitment efforts.

This unhappiness contributed, of course, to the granting by

the city of the double wage increase to patrolmen in 1968, 8.7

percent in July and 6. 5 percent in August. This increased patrol-

men's starting salaries from 117 percent of average earnings of

production workers in manufacturing to 125 percent (see Table

4-7). Simultaneously, general econc nic conditions worsened,

political turmoil lessened, departmental image improved, and

attempts to attract more minorities to the force were launched.

The medicine of increased salary, aided by other conditions,

worked. The vacancy rate declined from 6.1 percent of authorized

positions in July, 1968, to zero in June, 1969. It remains very

small, in spite of the abandonment of national recruiting and the

adoption of residence preference. The history of the vacancy

rate from 1960 to 1973 is presented in Table 4-12. The complaints

today are not of general shortages of qualified applicants, but

only of shortages of qualified minority applicants.

134

Table 4-12. Oakland police officer vacancies, 1960 to 1973

Date

Number of Number ofAuthorized Filled Number of VacancyPositions Positions Vacancies Rate

June 13 toJuly 24, 1960 543 494 47 .087

June 26 toAugust 6, 1961 543 459 84 .155

May 28 toJuly 8, 1962 488 450 38 .078

June 11 toJuly 21, 1963 468 457 11 .024

June 23, 1964 468 465 3 .006July 5, 1965 468 458 10 .021July 11, 1966 511 479 32 .063July 19, 1967 511 496 15 .029July 1, 1968 511 480 31 .061June 30, 1969 532 532 0 000June 29, 1970 525 524 1 .002July 5, 1971 525 524 1 .002July 3, 1972 537 514 23 .043July 2, 1973 535 523 12 .022

Note: The vacancy rate is computed by dividing the number ofvacancies by the number of authorized positions.

Source: Oakland Police Department, Personnel Division, memofrom Lieutenant J. McArthur.

FACT AND THEORY

The disappearance of shortages following a marked increase

in relative wages seems to cast the final blow to those theories

which sought to explain the police shortages of the 1960's solely

through a monopsony model implying job vacancies in equilibrium

135

at a monopsony wage. More likely, if a simple, model is desired,

we were observing an Arrow and Capron dynamic shortage, in

which the lags in market adjustment were ultimately corrected.

Even some of Ronald Ehrenberg's inferences must be

modified. An increase in the average wage of Oakland policemen

did not increase the expected vacancy rate, as he suggested might

be possible, but decreased it, as simple conventional theory

would predict. However, the Ehrenberg model has sufficient

complexity and scope to remain interesting. He did not argue,

after all, that vacancy rates had to increase if wages increased,

only that they might. One would have to consider also changes in

the value of the service to society, the number of applicants, the

authorized employment level, the quality distribution of appli-

cants, the minimum acceptable quality level, and the proportion

of applicants that are accepted. In fact, for example, if the wage

increase is accompanied by higher minimum standards and/or

an upward shift in the quality distribution of applicants, then the

vacancy rate will decrease. Ehrenberg concludes simply that

without numerical estimates of the magnitude of the offsetting

impacts of an increase in the average wage on the vacancy rate,

we can presume nothing about the nature or direction of their

relationship. Nothing in this discussion is meant to suggest

136

that one experience in Oakland can prove or disprove a theory.

We are only trying to assess which theories seem most con-

sistent with our observed case.

As for the relationship between wage increases and

authorized employment levels, our evidence is ambiguous. The

large wage increases between July, 1968, and July, 1969, which

increased patrolmen's starting salaries from 117 percent of

average earnings of production workers in manufacturing to 125

percent, were accompanied as well by an increase of 21

authorized positions. Between July, 1969, and July, 1970,

relative wages jumped again, to 135 percent of production

workers' earnings, and authorized positions increased by 12.

In July, 1972, and July, 1973, both relative wages and authorized

positions remained stable, but salary increases reflecting in-

flation continued. In July, 1974, in spite of continuing stability

of the relationship of police salaries to production workers'

wages, 20 patrolman positions were cut, reducing authorized

positions to 515. This could well be an employment response to

continued salary increases brought about by the pressures of

inflation. The magnitude of the cut suggests strongly that the

response of public employment to wage increases may be stronger

than people think.

137

HIRING STAN DA R DS

We turn now to a description of the vector of hiring

standards that constitutes the minimum acceptable quality level

of the Oakland Police Department. It is these standards ti.lt

filter and restrict the available labor supply. It must be stressed

here that even in the 1960's there was no shortage of applicants

to the Oakland Police Department, only a shortage of applicants

deemed qualified. Table 4-13 shows the percent of all applicants

actually appointed to the department between 1960 and 1970.

Table 4-13. Percent of all applicants appointed to the OaklandPolice Department, 1960 to 1970

Year Percent Appointed

1960 0.761961 2.68196 2 3.811963 2.751964 4.301965 6.341966 8.531967 3.781968 5.951969 6.301970 3.79

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

Clearly, selection is at work.

Logically, selection standards for a job should be derived

138

irorn a Clear e%-aluation of the qualities nocessary for successful

job performance. A typist must know how to type; an acceptable

standard in terms of words per minute and accuracy can be

defined. However, as we discussed at length in Chapter a, the

policeman's job is more loosely defined and often involv.es

elusive and contradictory skills. Moreover, we are not quite

sure what we mean-by successful job performance.

In spite, even perhaps because of the difficulty in specifying

desirable traits, elaborate, detailed hiring standards evolved for

policemen. The standards conformed to the images of policemen,

police administrators and civil service personnel of the good

policeman. They translated these images into decision rules

which then were reinforced by widespread usage, advocacy, and

belief in their effectiveness. They were hallowed by tradition,

but not by empirical validation of their relationship to job

performance.

The selection standards and hiring procedures of the

Oakland Police Department were quite representative of those in

police departments across the country in the 1950's and 1960's.

We will enumerate and explain them as best we can.

First, there are the requirements explicitly listed on the

job announcement posted by the city. A potential applicant

139

should be able to ascertain himself whether or not he meets

these requirements. If he knows he does not, he will probably

not apply. If he is uncertain and submits his application, the

city should be able to ascertain quickly whether the require-

ments are 'satisfied or not. They are:

1) Age: 21 to 32, to age 35 with 2 years of college or

2 years of police experience.

2) Height: 5'7" to 6'7" measured without shoes.

3) Weight: 135 lbs. , must be proportional to height.

4) Vision: 20/70 uncorrected, correctible to 20/20 one

eye, 20/30 the other, normal color vision.

5) Education: high school graduate or GED with a total

score of 262.

6) Driver's license: possession of a valid unrestricted

license by date of hire.

Age

Minimum age requirements of 21 are widely adopted by

police departments because this is the age at which a person's

full legal rights and obligations as an adult United States citizen

commence. Maximum age requirements are widely justified as

necessary for the financial solvency of police retirement systems.

Clearly at work here as well are American mystiques about young

men in the prime of physical fitness.

140

All of California's 288 distinct law enforcement agencies

have minimum age requirements: all but 7 have maximum age

requirements as well. But the details of these requirements vary

widely. Mandated minimum ages rang,,. from 20 to 25, mandated

maximums from 25 to no maximum. 9 The most common age

standards among California law enforce'ment agencies are

enumerated in Table 4-14. We list, in order of popularity, only

those requirements chosen by more than five agencies.

Table 4-14. Common age requirements of California lawenforcement agencies in 1968

Age Range Number of Departments

21 to 35 13321 to 34 26

21 to 40 2421 to 31 19

21 to 45 9

21 to 32 8

21 to 3321 to no maximum 7

21 to 39 6

21 to 30 5

other 44

Total 288

Source: State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,October, 1969.

141

Height and Weight

Height and weight requirements also come from American

popular beliefs about what constitutes the physically fit male.

The minimum requirements satisfy the stereotype of the large

male police officer, called upon to perform duties in which size

and presence are assets. It is argued, for example, that size

may be needed to restrain hostile or struggling persons during

arrest or flight, to lift or carry persons, to pull persons from

wrecked automobiles, to subdue suspects, to climb fences, to

kick in doors, etc. 10 More sophisticated arguments are made

as well. One is that physical presence alone may enable a

policeman to dominate a situation that he might not otherwise be

able to control. Another is that small officers are more likely

to be involved in physical altercations because they present less

imposing physical prowess. Similarly, they may be more often

called upon to use lethal methods of self defense. 11 These

beliefs are deeply imbedded and passionately held in police

circles, despite the lack of empirical verification of their

reality.

The range of standards, however, alleged to satisfy these

needs is wide. Over 100 different combinations of height and

weight minima and maxima are embraced by the 288 California

142

Table Common height and weight requirements ofCalifornia law enforcement agencies in 1968

Height Rar:ge Weight Range Number of Departments

5'9" to proportional 27

5'9" to 150 lbs. minimum 19

5'8" to proportional 18

proportion tl proportional 145'8" to 6'6" proportional 13

5'8" to 6'5" proportional 11

5'9" to 6'6" proportional 9

5'8" to 6'4" proportional 8

5'8" to 1505'8" to 145 8

5'9" to 6'5" proportional 7

5'9" to 6'4" proportional 7

5'8" to 6'6" 150 6

5'9" to 6'6" 150 5

other combination 128

8

Total 288

Source: State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,Dctober, 1969.

law enforcement agencies. We list those chosen by more than

five departments, again in order of popularity, in Table 4-15.

Vision

Visual acuity standards conform to what is believed to

be necessary to perceive and describe situations and evidence

accurately, to defend oneself in possible combat, and to be an

expert marksman under all conditions. Departments became

143

less insistent on virtually perfect uncorrected vision after

contact lenses, believed more reliable than glasses, were

perfected. Table 4-16 presents the most popular visual acuity

standards in California.

Table 4-16. Common visual acuity standards of Californialaw enforcement agencies in 1968

Visual AcuityUncorrected Corrected

Vision to Number of Departments

20/40 20/ 20 120

20/70 20/30 53

20/30 20/20 25unspecified 20/ 20 23

no standard 18

20/30 unspecified 11

20/70 20/ 20 7

other standard 31

Total 288

Source: State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,October, 1969.

Education

All California police agencies require either a high school

degree or a passing score on the Army's high school equivalency

examination, the GED (test of General Educational Development).

Oakland's requirements here exceed the minimum only by

144

specifying an acceptable minimum passing score on the GED,

262, which means the candidate scored higher than 70 percent of

the people taking the test. It is taken for granted that high school

graduation represents a minimum achievement necessary for

acceptable trainability, performance and character. More

controversial is whether or not the standard should be raised to

require some college education.

In favor of raising educational qualifications is the argu-

ment that college experience provides essential understanding of

the complexities of the economic and social environment in which

policemen function, and that, therefore, more educated policemen

will be more professional, exercise discretion more intelligently,

and perform better generally. Moreover, policemen should not

fall behind the rising educational level of the population as a

whole. On the other side are the arguments that higher educa-

tional levels would exclude many young men who would make fine

policemen, that police departments, through their own recruit

schools, can provide the necessary general knowledge and

specific training, that on-the-job experience is the best teacher,

and that the relationship between education and job performance

is ambiguous. Also, policemen can be encouraged, through

educational incentive programs of all kinds, to continue their

education while on the force.

145

Less than 10 percent of California police agencies require

more than high school graduation. Of the 28 agencies that have

higher standards, three are State of California agencies, nine

require less than 30 units, eight require 30 to 59 units, six

require 60 units, one demands an A. A. degree and one demands

a B. A, degree. 12 The departments with higher standards

are of most interest to Oakland are Berkeley, San Jose, and

Walnut Creek, all of which ask for 60 units of college.

However, as we will show in detail in Chapter 5, the

probability of successfully passing through the rest of the Oakland

Police Department's testing process, particularly the Mental

Adaptability test, is increased by large magnitudes as years of

higher education increase from some years of junior college

through three to four years of senior college or a college degree.

So minimum requirements do not quite tell the whole story.

Filing the Employment AEplication

If a potential applicant feels that he meets all the specified

requirements, he files an employment application. He is asked

his name, address, age, sex, marital status, height, weight,

ti firth date, citizenship status, number of dependents, and

residence. He is asked if he was ever discharged or forced to

resign because of unsatisfactory service. He is asked if he has

146

ever been "arrested, indicted, summoned into court, convicted,

imprisoned, placed on probation or required to pay a fine of more

than $25." 13 He is asked for a complete military history,

educational history, employment history and medical history.

The application is then reviewed by the Civil Service Office staff

and either approved or disapproved. It may be disapproved for

a number of reasons. First, it may be clear that the applicant

does not meet a stated requirement, for example, he is over-age,

overweight, under-educated, etc. Secondly, the application may

indicate an undesirable citizenship history, which, upon further

investigation, is judged unacceptable. Reasons for rejection

here include the nature of the arrest record, excessive traffic

violations, avoidance of alimony or child support payments, or

less than honorable discharge from the military. Thirdly, the

application may indicate an undesirable employment history, such

as excessive job changing, or discharge for cause. Finally,

certain medical conditions will immediately disqualify a candi-

date, such as a history of back or knee injuries, epileptic attacks,

asthma, nervous disorders, etc.

Acceptance of the application means that an individual will

be allowed to proceed further through the testing process. If he

continues to succeed, all his application statements will be

147

reviewed again in greater depth in the background investigation

and medical examination at the end, Lack of truthfulness here

will always be uncovered, and will probably, in itself, he cause

for disqualification. A rejected applicant may try to clear up

his difficulties, if possible, and apply again.

Approximately 20 percent of all applications are rejected.

This means the applicant can proceed no further. Table 4-17

shows the number of applications filed and the number accepted

from 1960 to 1970.

Table 4-17. Number of employment applications for Oaklandpatrolmen filed and accepted, 1960 to 1970

DateNumber

FiledNumber

AcceptedPercentAccepted

1960 1, 185 1, 049 89

1961 934 787 84

1962 1, -...)6 963 80

1963 :8C0 726 91

1964 c 9 9 809 81

1965 ..'78 837 86

1966 961 732 76

1967 '321 549 67

1968 1, 518 1, 252 8Z

1969 1, 415 1, 093 771970 1, 609 1, 149 71

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

148

Mental Adaptability Test

Once the employment application has been accepted, the

applicant progresses to the Mental Adaptability test. Until

November, 1970, this test was either the Otis Self-Administering

Test of Mental Ability or the Army General Classification test,

both general multiple choice tests of verbal, mathematical and

reasoning aptitude. The Otis test, for example, was copy-

righted in 1922 and standardized in 19'i2 in Oakland. Items were

selected at that time to discriminate between a good group and a

poor group of students. Both groups had reached the same

average educational status, but the good group was two years

younger than the poor group. "Each item justified its inclusion,

therefore, because it distinguished between students who pro-

gressed slowly and those who progressed rapidly. "14

A candidate had to achieve a score of 52, equivalent to

an IQ of 110, on the Otis to pass. The passing point was chosen

to indicate people who are successful with college curriculums.

The passing point is justified considering the great amounts of

material we expect a patrolman to learn and understand. "15

In November, 1970, the old and allegedly culturally-biased

Otis test was replaced by a new, less culturally-biased version,

the Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test, emphasizing "measuring

149

the pupil's facility in reasoning and in dealing abstractly with

verbal, symbolic, and figural test content sampling a broad

range of cognitive abilities. "16 .The standardization procedures

for the new test "were designed to yield a stratified random-

cluster sample of pupils representative of United States school

pupils enrolled in grades K to la. The controls used in the

selection of these school systems were designed to provide one

of the most representative norming studies ever undertaken for

an entire test series of this type. Variables used in stratifying

school systems were: 1) enrollment, 2) type, i, e. , public,

private, church-related, 3) a composite socioeconomic index

based upon median family income and median years of school

completed by adults 25 years and older as reported for the

census unit served by the school system, and 4) geographic

Iregion.

7 The test items were changed, but the format was

similar to the old Otis, except for a greater proportion of non-

verbal or figural items.

A candidate had to achieve a score of 45, representative

of the midpoint or fiftieth percentile of the nation, equivalent to

an IQ of 98, to pass.

Chapter 5 discusses in detail the characteristics for which

the Mental Adaptability tests actually seemed to select. We will

150

Table 4-18. Number of Oakland patrolman applicants takingand passing the Mental Adaptability Test, 1960 to 1970

DateNumber

ExaminedNumberPassed

PercentPassed

1960 772 487 631961 506 205 411962 564 315 56

1963 534 179 341964 629 283 451965 606 268 441966 592 297 50

1967 439 266 61

1968 765 360 471969 56.6 351 621970 595 327 55

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

defer further discussion until then, except to indicate that only

about half the candidates taking this test passed. The number

taking the test and the number and percent passing between 1960

and 1970 are presented in Table 4-18.

Civil Service Test

The applicant who has not been weeded out moves on to the

Civil Service Test. This is a test written by the Civil Service

staff to measure general knowledge. It was designed to "measure

a candidate's knowledge on a wide variety of subjects since it was

assumed that the candidate who is well informed will make a

151

better policeman. "18 The typical test contains 100 multiple

choice questions, 50 on general knowledge, 35 on current events,

and 15 on analytical ability, usually reading comprehension. A

score of 70 out of the 100 questions was needed to pass.

About 82 percent of the candidates who took the test passed

it. This test, too, will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.

Physical Agility Test

The Physical Agility Test is revealed on the job announce-

ment for the patrolman examination which is posted around the

city and enumerates the other requirements. It consists of five

exercise events to be completed in order with approximately three

minutes rest between events. Candidates are scored on form as

well as number completed. The events are:

Squat thrusts: 25 required in one minute's time

Sit-ups: 25 required

Push-ups: 22 required

Squat jumps: 27 required

Pull-ups: 6 required

The Physical Agility Test, like the height and weight

requirements, rests on the assumption that strength and physical

skills may be needed on the job, and candidates who are insuffi-

ciently fit should be dropped. Between 1960 and 1970, 86 percent-

152

of the candidates who took the Physical Agility Test passed

it.

Oral Examination

Next, the candidate is scheduled for an oral examination,

which only 54 percent passed between 1960 and 1970. The inter-

view is conducted by two police officers and one representative

of the Civil Service Office. The candidate is judged on appear-

ance, bearing, and manner, ability to present ideas, social

adaptability, alertness, judgment, emotional stability and

interest. If he fails in any one area, he is judged clearly un-

acceptable. If he gets an overall rating of less than 70 percent,

he does not pass.

The interviewers have the candidate's employment applica-

tion in front of them and probe his personal history in depth. He

will be asked about any problems suggested by the application,

such as a divorce or separation, a complicated work or school

history, reasons for job changes, etc. The honesty and attitudes

revealed by his approach to the questions are as important as

the answers themselves.

In the early 1960's, a great deal of emphasis was placed

by oral boards on appearance and bearing, on command presence,

on how impressive a man might look in uniform. Stress inter-

153

view techniques were also used. The caLididate was placed in

a hypothetical difficult situation and asked to respond to it; the

interviewers would then seize his answers and try to box him

into an even more difficult situation. They were seeking to

evaluate his logical thought processes when making decisions,

his moral fiber, and how well he "stood up to the heat."

Stress interview techniques and emphasis on command

presence have been dropped in favor of attempting to find out

what the candidate know s about Oakland and the police job.

Attitudes toward the minority community and its problems are

probed. The board watts to know why the candidate is applying

for the job, what other jobs he has applied for, why he is

interested in Oakland. It seeks to evaluate, as well, his

reasonableness. Can he accept, for example, that there are

things in the world that he cannot handle, that he is not going to

save the world? The oral also serves to screen out the clearly

maladjusted or psychologically disturbed.

We will have some more to say about the results of the

oral in Chapter 5.

Medical Test

After passing the oral, a candidate is scheduled for an

extensive medical and laboratory examination by the city

154

physician. Twenty percent of the candidates are eliminated by

the doctor, whose decisions are final. The doctor evaluates the

candidate's physical condition both from the point of view of his

ability to perform a strenuous and stressful job successfully and

of the city's financial interests. Because of the extensive health

benefits enjoyed by policemen, the city is very careful to

minimize its risks and to refuse employment to anyone with a

potential medical problem. All doubts here are resolved by the

physician in favor of the city.

Psychiatric Evaluation

The psychiatric evaluation consists of clinical paper-and-

pencil tests, a Rorschach test, and a personal interview by the

department's psychiatrist, which discusses such questions as

the candidate's most memorable dream. It is most effective in

revealing any extreme personality deviance that was not picked

up in the oral. Designing good psychiatric tests is a subject all

its own, which we will not begin to tackle here. The experience

of the Oakland department psychiatrist has led him to believe

that some potentially effective indicators of successful police

performance are a non-defensive Rorschach and intense affect

reported in dreams; indicative of ability to feel. 20 Also positive,

he thinks, are such background factors as being a family man,

155

having a stable childhood with no step-father and an active

father, and having a positive social attitude. 21 In any case, 96

percent of the candidates pass the psychiatric evaluation.

Background Investi ation

The last hurdle is the background investigation. An Oak-

land police officer is assigned to check out the candidate thorough-

ly. He visits the candidate's neighborhood and makes inquiries

of friends, neighbors, local businessmen; he interviews the

candidate's wife and family; he visits schools attended and past

employers. Criminal and credit records are checked. All leads

are followed. Eighty-eight percent of the candidates between

1960 and 1970 passed the background investigation. All background

rejections must be reviewed and approved by the chief of police.

Rejected candidates have the right to appeal.

Barriers to Entry

Clearly, all these hiring standards and tests combine to

restrict seriously the potential available labor supply. The

Oakland Police Department itself did some rough calculations

of their effects. The conclusion was that less than half of one

percent of Oakland's population in 1969 would be eligible to

commence the testing and approximately one-tenth of one

percent of Oakland's population would pass successfully through

156

the selection process. If the male population 21 to 32 years of

age is used as a base, still only slightly over 2 percent of that

group would succeed in the tests. 22 It is no wonder that

national recruiting campaigns were launched.

We turn now to the empirical analysis. We shall describe

the economic characteristics of the applicants who are success-

ful on the Mental Adaptability, the Civil Service Test, and the

oral examination.

157

CHAPTER 4

FOOTNOTES

1. U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and EconomicStatistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Censusof Population, Detailed Characteristics, California, Section1 (PC (1)-D6Calif.), pp. Calif. 6-1823 to 6-1828, Table 175.

2. U. S. Dennrtment of Commerce, Social and EconomicStatistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Censusof Population, Detailed Characteristics, California, Section 2(PC (1)-D6Calif.), pp. Calif. 6-2336 to 6-2338, Table 197! and1970 Census of Population, General Social and EconomicCharacteristics, California, Appendix B, pp, app. 25 to app.27.

3. Estimates provided by the Oakland Civil Service Office

4 Taken from the City of Oakland announcement for PatrolmanExamination, September, 1970.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. See Raymond L. Bancroft, "Municipal Law Enforcement,1966," Nation's Cities, February,1966, pp. 15-17. "TheNation's police departments are encountering seriousdifficulty in maintaining their forces at authorized strength.A survey conducted by the National League of Cities in 1966disclosed that over 65 percent of the departments surveyedwere understaffed; that these departments were 5, 840officers, or 5 percent, below authorized strength; and were11, 864 officers, or 10 percent, below preferred strength...Since, on the average, police departments are currently 5percent below authorized strength, since the authorizedstrength of police departments has increased at the rate ofapproximately 3 percent each year, and since an average of5. 4 percent of existing personnel leave their departments

158

each year (due to resignation, dismissal, retirement, ordeath), 50, 000 new police officers will be needed in 1967alone. "

9. State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,October, 1969.

10. See the arguments in defense of height and weight require-ments in the recent local court cases: Veragene Hardy vs.William F. Stumpf, 1 Civ 32689, Court of Appeal, State ofCalifornia, First Appellate District, Division 3., March 15,1974; and Joan Hail vs. James S. White, U. S. DistrictCourt, Northern California, September 19, 1973. See alsoJ. Stanley Pottinger, Brief for the United States as AmicusCurie, No. 74-1038, filed with U. S. Court of Appeals, NinthCircuit, April 5, 1974, in the pending appeal of Hail vs.White, 29 pp.

11. See the testimony of Oakland Police Sergeant Anderson andInternational Association of Chiefs of Police researchscientist Terry Eisenberg in Hail vs. White, op. cit.

12. State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,October, 1969.

13. City of Oakland, Employment Application.

14. Arthur S. Otis, Otis Self-Administering Tests of MentalAbility, Manual of Directions and Key (Revised) for Inter-mediate and Higher Examinations, New York: Harcourt,Brace and World, 1922.

15, Oakland Civil Service Office memorandum, "Oakland PoliceDepartment Recruitment and Patrolman Selection Process, "

December, 1964.

16. Arthur S. Ctis and Roger T. Lennon, Otis-Lennon MentalAbility Test, Manual for Administration, New York: Har-court, Brace and World, 1967, p. 4.

17. Ibid. , p. L3.

159

18. Oakland Civil Service Office memorandum, "OaklandPolice Department Recruitment and Patrolman SelectionProcess, " December, 1964.

19. City of Oakland announcement for Patrolman Examination,September, 1970,

O. Dr. Floyd 0. Due, "History and Personality CharacteristicsFavoring Success as a Police Officer," 1972 unpublishedpaper.

Zl. Ibid.

LL. Oakland Police Department, "Demographic Analysis,"unpublished memorandum.

1'60

CHAPTER 5

THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTION TESTS

This chapter attempts to specify the characteristics for

which the Oakland Police Department's selection process between

1965 and 1971 is testing. It is a beginning in observing and

defining the elusive vector of hiring standards.

THE DATA

This study is based on information gathered from the

employment applications of all applicants to the Oakland Police

Department from 1965 to June, 1971. Only individuals for whom

all relevant information was available were included. Therefore,

the total number of applicants included in the study, 2,36' is

less than the total actually tested. For example, all applicants

for whom military service represented the only employment

experience would be eliminated because no meaningful salary

observation would b,e available for them, given the incomparability

of military and civilian wages. Sufficient applicants for whom all

information is available remain so there should be no serious

inherent bias in the study arising from necessary elimination.

One critical variable is missing for the bulk of the study.

We have no indication of minority status, because the Fair

161

Employment Practices laws in this time period prohibited any

indication of race on employment applications or processes.

Today, these laws insist on the collection and reporting of such

data. Explicit data on minority status became available only in

1971. Therefore, a separate analysis of 213 applicants in the

first part of 1971 will be made in order to pay particular

attention to the minority data.

CENTRAL QUESTIONS

What characteristics would be expected to determine

success or failure on the battery of selection tests used by the

Oakland Police Department? Why would each characteristic be

included? What independent effect would it be expected to have?

How could it be measured?

We will be primarily concerned with explaining performance

on the Mental Adaptability test, the Civil Service test, and the

oral personal interview. We will consider both the determinants

of the probability of success on each test and the determinants of

the raw score. For each test, the following specific questions

will be asked: 1) passing the test is a function of what significant

variables? 2) a unit increase (decrease) in an independent variable

will raise (lower) the probability of passing the test by how much?

3) test score is a function of what significant variables? 4) a

162

unit increase (decrease) in a particular variable will raise (lower)

the test score by how much? We will consider the same set of

independent variables for each test.

DEPENDFNT VARIABLES

The dependent variables, therefore, are:

MA1 probability of passing Mental Adaptability test

MAL score on Mental Adaptability test

CS probability of passing Civil Service test

CST2

score on Civil Service test

OR1 probability of passing Oral exam

OR score on Oral exam

We will also consider briefly the probability of passimg the

Physical Agility tust, PA.

INDEPENDFNT VARIABLFS

Years of Fducation

We would expect that the probability of success on the

tests would be greater for applicants with more education, i. c.,

someone with three to four years of college would be more likely

to succeed than would a high school graduate. People with

college experience are likely to be better test performers (or

have higher measured I.Q.'s) than people without. Knowledge or

163

ability absorbed in college may help to pass tests. The debate in

professional police circles about the desirability of requiring

college education, and how much, if any, should be required,

has not been resolved. Yet the belief that better educated people

may be better able to deal well with the myriad challenges of

police work is widespread, although it has been neither proved

nor disproved. It is accompanied by the concern of police depart-

ments with professional image. Since education is a prerequisite

to professionalism, better educated men are desirable to upgrade

the department's image. Police departments also provide a

considerable amount of on-the-job training (Oakland has a 20-

week recruit school) and educational experience indicates train-

ability. (It is known from human capital literature that the better

educated receive the most on-the-job training.) Also, the depart-

ment can benefit from the general human capital already embodied

in education. Therefore, it is hypothesized that both qualities

inherent in the educated and policy decisions of police departments

which are consciously or unconsciously incorporated into selection

test design combine to increase the probability of passing as

education increases. In order to determine just how sensitive the

probability of passing is to differences in educational levels, and

because of the policy interest of the results, education will be

164

measured in rather line breakdowns. Junior college and college

will be considered separately because their products may be

quite different. The education variable is specified as follows:

J no junior college or college

J1

, less than on( year of junior college

J2 = one year of junior college

J3 more than one to two years of junior college

J4 = more than two years of junior college

J5 = A, A. degree

C0

= no college

Cl = less than one year of college

C2 = one but less than two years of college

C3 two but less than two years of college

C4 three to four years of college

C5

B. A. or B. S. degree

If an applicant reported both junior college and college experience,

the junior college years were combined with the college years and

reported in the college category. Overlapping was therefore

avoided and the junior college category includes only individuals

whose sole experience is with junior college.

Residence

The thilosophy of residence requirements is also in flux.

165

Historically, rules requiring policemen and other city employees

to live in their city were common. The movement of the middle

class to suburbia and the rise of the concept of the professional

policeman led to an elimination of residency requirements.

Oakland, in the forefront of the trend, dropped its residency re-

quirement in November, 1955, and launched a campaign of nation-

wide recruitment of police which became increasingly extensive

until 1969. Today, the pressures of unemployment and minority

politics are leading some cities to consider re-adopting residence

rules for city employment. Oakland, in fact, added a residence

preference rule in the fall of 1971. It dropped its elaborate

nation-wide recruiting campaigns in 1969 in response to the

pressures mentioned above and to anti-police demonstrations

encountered on some campuses.

Residence at the time of application will be classified into

three groups:

R0

out-of-state residence

R1 , Oakland area residence

R2 other California residence

On one hand, Oakland area residents might be expected to

have a higher probability of success than others because of a

greater degree of f am i 1 iarity with Oakland and its problems and

166

police force. On the other hand, people from out of the area have

invested considerably more time in search activity to discover the

Oakland Police Department and become interested. Hence, they

may be more committed, motivated or professional than an

Oakland resident who needed only to come in off the street. Also,

people from out of the area are more likely to have assessed their

chances of success before applying; the higher cost of applying

for them would lead to more self-selection. It seems unclear

a priori whether the positive or negative effect of living in the

Oakland area will prevail.

Minority Status

It is well known that members of minority groups are less

likely to pass standardized written tests which are not "culture

free" than majority members, at the same passing point. There-

fore, we would expect, other things being equal, minority status

per se would lower the probability of passing the tests. Unfor-

tunately, except for the first six months of 1971, we do not have

data to test directly this critical question. We will analyze the

first few months of 1971 separately to cast the light of even a

small amount of data on the matter. For that analysis

MD 7, majority member

MI black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Filipino,

and other minority.

167

Whereas it would he desirable to analyze each minority group

separately, there is an insufficient amount of data to attempt to

do so.

In an attempt to analyze the influence of minority status

even indirectly, proxies were sought for the study as a whole.

It is hoped that given the pattern of migration of blacks to

Oakland, a disproportionate number of applicants who attended

high school in the South would be black, and theref ore a variable

indicating region of high school attendance would pick up some of

the influence of race. However, we also know that education in

the South may be inferior even for whites, so the variable may

be measuring only generally poor schools in the South. In either

case, attending high school in the South would lower the probability

of passing the test. The variable is probably measuring some

combination of race and inferiority of schools.

H0

= attended high school in West, North Central or

Northeast

H1

attended high school in South

Specific Police Training or Experience

It could be hypothesized that specific police training or

experience as manifested by studying police science in college

or attending non-college police school or previous employment

168

as a policeman would increase an applicant's probability of

success. The department could benefit from the specific human

capital embodied in the person. Moreover, motivation, interest,

sincerity, would be demonstrated by the individual's own invelot,

ment in acquiring specific training. The effect of studying police

science in college or attending non-college police school is

expected to be weaker than that of actual ex-perience as a police-

man. Since the department has its own elaborate training program,

the courses may be extraneous and bear the risk of having to

reverse misconceptions. Experience as a policeman, however,

implies at least some knowledge of the realities of the job,

although perhaps in a very different setting, some concrete ex-

perience, and an application choice based on rational assessment.

Also, the man is likely to have passed a similar body of tests

elsewhere and the department can reap the benefit of another

department's appraisal and performance evaluation.

PS0 = did not study police science in college

PS1 = studied police science in college

PSC° = did not 'study in non-college police school

PSC, = studied in non-college police school

P0

= no previous employment experience as a policeman

P1 previous employment experience as a policeman

169

Previous Wagt.

It is hypothesized that applicants from higher wage groups

will be more likely to succeed than applicants from lower wage

groups, other things equal. Past wage or salary classification

should be indicative of alternative worth, human capital accumula-

tion, or marginal productivity. Other things equal, an individual

from a higher salary group should be more valuable and desirable

to the police department than an individual from a lower salary

group. Also, higher salaries indicate past success and possession

of such all-American virtues as ambition, motivation, productivity,

etc. The interpretation here obviously has to be modified if some

of flake observations on the lower end of the scale represent people

working part-time white in college or other non-standard depar-

tures from full-time entry into the wort of work.

W0

--- earning less than $300 per month on last job

W1

$300-$499 per month on last job

W $500-$699 per month on last job

W3 $700 or above per month on last job

We have not corrected for the general rise in wages between

1965 and 1971, We assume our broad categories retain their

validity.

170

Number of Jobs Fnamerated

More jobs enumerated indicate more experience which may

be desirable and increase the probability of success. Alternatively,

except for such jobs as carpenter, it may indicate instability or

emotional problems, and therefore decrease the probability of

success, particularly on the oral exam. It is not clear a priori

which effect will predominate. Number of jobs is included here

as a continuous variable.

E = number of jobs enumerated

Age

The older a person is at a given educational level, the less

likely he is to pass a standardized test. Knowledge and test-

taking ability depreciate. Therefore, we expect age, entered as

a continuous variable, to have a negative effect on the probability

of passing the first two tests. However, if the oral is testing for

maturity, among other things, age may have a positive effect on

the probability of passing the oral.

A = age (in years)

Physical Qualities

Physical qualities may have some effect on ability to pass

the physical agility, which will be discussed briefly, so we will

include:

171

B = height (in inches)

C = weight (in pounds)

METHODOLOGY

The effect of a unit increase (decrease) in an independent

variable on the probability of passing each test and on the raw

score will be explored through a multiple regression analysis.

For the probability equations the dependent variables will take

on the binary values 0 = failure, 1 = success. For the raw score

equations the dependent variables will have the conventional

continuous form. The problem with using regression analysis

for the dichotomous case is that the Gauss-Markov assumption

that V = I, i, e. , that the disturbance variances are constant from

observation to observation (homoscedastic) is untenable. It is

also possible, since the model is linear, to obtain probabilities

greater than one. A probit analysis model would correct these

problems. A probit program was obtained and experimented

with, but unfortunately proved to be inordinately expensive, at

least three times the cost of the multiple regression program.

Moreover, for those equations run on both programs, the

probit and regression analyses yielded the same results. Some

of the equations reported for the small sample separate analysis

172

of 1971 data do have the problem of probabilities greater than

one. However,. only multiple regression results will be reported.

The equations will contain two continuous variables, age

(A) and number of jobs enumerated (E). All other independent

variables will enter as sets of dummy variables as defined above

and sumnlarized here for convenience:

, no junior college or college

J1 = less than one year of junior college

J2

= one year of junior college

J3 = more than one to two years of junior college,

J4 = more than two years of junior college

5= A. A. degree

C0 = no college

C1 less than one year of college

C2 ont but less than two years of college

C3 = two but less than three years of college

C4 = three to four years of college

C5 = B. A. or B. S. degree

0= out-of-state residence

R1 = Oakland area residence

R2 -- other California residence

MO= majority member

173

M1 = minority member

HO = attended high school in West, NortbNCentral or

11Northwest

H1

= attended high school in South

PS0

= did not study police science in college

PS1 = studied police science in college

PSC0

= did not study in non-college police school

PSC. = studied in non-college police school

0= no previous employment experience as a

policeman

P1 = previous employment experience as a policeman

W0 = earning less than $300 per month on last job

W1 = $300-$499 per month on last job

W = $500-$699 per month on last job

W3 = $700 or above per month on last job

number of jobs enumerated

A = age

K = constant

In each case, the X0 category (J0, Co, R0, H0, PS0, PSC°,

P0, W0) indicates the reference category which is omitted from

the regression in order to avoid a perfect linear relationship

among the dummy variables in each set.

174

The equations, therefore, take the following form:

c 2C..2

+ c3

C3 + c4 C4 + c5 _c5 +d1R + da 112 e 1H1

11 PS1

+ g IPSCI h IP 1i1W1 i2 w2 + 13 W3

where b1 b5 represent the net (partial) regression co-

efficient

c1 c5

of dummy variables Ji J5, C1 C5, etc.

etc.

Each regression coefficient is to be interpreted as an

estimate of the net effect on the probability of an applicant being

successful of his belonging to the particular category in question

rather than to the reference category, all other variables remaining

constant. For example, a coefficient of .33 on C4 would mean that

having three to four years of college would increase an applicant's

chance of passing the MA by .33 probability points over his chance

of passing if he had no college, ether things equal. For example,

suppose that if an applicant were in the reference group in all

categories, he would have a . 50 probability of passing; if he

remained in the reference group in all categories but education,

and now had three to four years of college, his probability of

passing would now be .83, surely a significant increase.

The raw score equations (MA2, CST2, OR2) are of

175

identical form but deal with actual raw scores. A coefficient of

9. 71 on C4 would mean that, other things equal, having three to

four years of college rather than no college would raise the score

on the MA 9.71 points, say from a reference group mean of 60

to 69. 71.

A word of caution should be added in interpreting the raw

score equations. Results will be reported based on the experience

of all applicants from 1965 to 1971. The meaning of the score

does not remain the same, but changes throughout the time period,

particularly between test revision dates. As the test ages, items

lose validity and may be eliminated and the raw score passing

point may be lowered from, say, 55 when the test was designed to

48 eight months later. This is a problem particularly for the

CST. Also, for the purpose of research and to determine if

lowering pass points on test scores lowered the quality of man-

power, the minimum passing point on the MA was lowered from

52 to 48 to 40, during the time period reported. These problems

could be dealt with by analyzing each relevant period separately,

but the results reported here will be aggregate and incorporate

these difficulties.

If the probability equation results and the score equation

results, each with their own technical difficulties, seem to

176

indicate the same conclusions, perhaps the technical difficulties

are not critical for our purposes.

RESULTS

Mental Adaztability

The results for the Mental Adaptability test are based on

the information contained in the employment applications of 2, 36b

individuals tested between 1965 and 1971. Table 5-1 summarizes

the number applying in each category, the number successful in

each category, and the percent successful in each category.

Of those who did not attend junior college or college,

25.7 percent were successful. We can see, therefore, by looking

simply at the percent distribution that education makes a differ-

ence; 87.6 percent of those with a B.A. or B.S. degree and

83.9 percent of those with three to four years of college passed

the test. Percentages are useful descriptive devices. Multiple

regression analysis will enable us to say how much of the

increased probability of passing the MA is due to the independent

effect of having three to four years of college or to having a B.A.

or B.S. rather than no college, holding all other variables

constant.

The multiple regression results for the probabilities of

177

Table 5-1. Percent of applicants in each non-reference categorysuccessful on the Mental Adaptability

Category

TotalNumber

Applicants

TotalNumber

Successful

Percent ofApplicantsSuccessful

Total 2,366 1,375 58.1J1 422 251 59.5Jz 14g 95 64.2J3 232 154 66.434 244 187 76.6J5 44 31 70.5Cl 156 112 71.8C2 110 90 81.8C3 38 29 76.3C4 87 73 83.9C5 194 170 87.6R1 1,315 710 54.0R2 713 447 62.7H1 302 109 36.1PSC1 91 59 64.8PSI 437 295 67. 5

PI 213 151 70.9W1 917 506 55.2Wz 754 423 56.1W3 256 178 69.5

passing each test and the raw scores on each test are summarized

in Table 5-2 on the following page. The results for the probability

of an applicant passing the Mental Adaptability test are found in

column 1 of that table. Each coefficient represents the increase

or decrease in the probability of passing resulting from being in

the specified category, rather than in the reference group. For

example, the probability of a person in category C4 passing the

178

Table 5-2. Regression coefficients, all applicants, 1965 toTune 1971

(1)MAI

(2) (3)CST 1

1 1

(4)MA2

(5)CST 2

(6)OR2

K . 799 * . 811- . 507**(. 094) (. U /1) (. 145)

A . 015** . 002 . 008(. 004) (. 003) (. 006)

JI

. 083** . 013 . 061(.027) (.021) (. 043)

J .121** .041 . 055(.041) (.030) (. 060)

. 124** . 049 . 023(.036) (. 026) (. 052).134 ** . 064** -. 053

(.036) (. 024) (. 048). 116 . 015 . 097

(.073) (.051) (. 111).180 ** .045 .041

(.039) (.027) (.054).294 ** . 038 . 060

(. 046) (. 030) (. 061). 252'; . 071 . 035

(.076) (. 051) (. 108).334V* . 102** . 143*

(. 052) (. 033) (. 069). 347 1/4* . 081** . 008

(.037) (.024) (.049)-.025 .022 -. 124*(. 031) (. 023) (. 053)-.003 .010 -. 172**(.033) (.024) (.054)- 191** . 058* . 054(.029) (.027) (. 058).045 . -.008 . 100

(. 051) (. 037) (. 073)-.012 .026 .061(.028) (. 020) (. 040)

E .005* .0007 .0001(.003) (. 007) (.005)

. 078* . 028 . 179**(, 036) (. 026) (. 054)

2

J4

J5

ct

C2

C3

C4

C5

R1

R2

H1

PSC1

PS1

p1

55. 30**(2. 33)- . 36**( . 09)2. 36**

( . 67)3. 55**

(1.01)3. 83**

( . 88)3. 29**

( .88)2. 85

(1. 79)3. 50 **

( . 96)8. 13**

(1. 13)8. 00**

(1. 88)9. 71**

(1. 28)9. 93**

( . 91)-2. 74**( .77)-1.34( . 81)-7. 35**( .73)1.40

(1. 24)-2. 00*( .69)

.02( . 06)2. 30*

( .90)

54.02'*(2. 84)

. 16

( . 12)1. 43

( . 83)1. 94

(1. 20)1.08

(1. 03). 20

( . 97)1. 36

(2. 03)2. 72*

(1. 09)1. 30

(1. 20)7. 15**

(2. 03)7. 38**

(1. 34)7. 24**

( . 96)-3. 41**( 92)-2. 95 **( . 96)

. 59(1. 10)

. 23(1. 47)-.10( . 80)-.10( . 10)2. 40*

(1. 03)

60. 69**(4. 02)

. 45**( . 16)-. 69

(1. 19)3. 04

(1. 67)2. 04

(1. 44)-. 60

(1. 33)5. 70

(3. 09). 81

(1. 50)3. 66*

(1. 70). 87

(3. 02)3. 05

(1.91)1.45

(1. 35)-. 99

(1.47)-. 24

(1. 51)1. 51

(1. 62)2. 27

(2. 03)1.64

(1. 12). 04

( . 13)5. 07**

(1.49)

Table 5-2, continued

W

W

2

3

179

.002 -.012 -.095* . 66 -1. 43 -2. 76**(.028) (.021) (. 043) ( .68) ( . 84) (1. 20).029 -.011 -.048 .64 -1.51 -2.03

(. 030) (. 023) (. 047) ( . 74) ( . 91) (1. 29).155 ** .042 -.086 2.95 ** - 2.62' -3.86*

(. 040) (. 029) (. 057) ( . 97) (1. 15) (1. 59)

* = . 05 level of significance4* = . 01 level of significance

180

test is .334 points greater than that of a person falling into

category Co, other things equal: the probability of a person in

category H1 passing the test is . 191 points less than that of a

person the same in all other ways but falling in category H0.

The numbers in parentheses under each estimate give the

standard error of the estimate. The * or ** indicates that the

estimate is statistically significant at the . 05 and .01 levels

respectively.

Education. - We see that attending junior college has a

positive effect over not attending junior college (or college) on

the probability of passing the MA, ranging in magnitude from

.083 (J1) to . 134 (J4). All the coefficients except J5 are

statistically significant at the 1 percent level of confidence and

increase in magnitude as years of education increase. Suppose

that the probability of success for a person in the reference

group in all categories (i. e. , Jo, Co, R0, H0, PSC0, P0. W0)

was . 255; if he remained in the reference group in all other

categories but moved to 34, his probability of success would

jump by . 134 to .389.

All the coefficients of the college variable are positive,

statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and higher than

any of the junior college coefficients, ranging in magnitude from

181

. 180 to .347. If the probability of success for a person in all

the reference groups was . 255, if he remained in the reference

category everywhere else but moved from Co (no college) to C5

(B. A. or B.S.), his probability of passing would increase to .602.

Thus, while college is not required for Oakland Police

Department applicants, it significantly increases the probability

of passing the MA by large magnitudes.

MA in column 4 of Table 5-2, translates these effects

into absolute increases in score. All educat ion coefficients but

J5 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level; junior

college attendance would increase the raw score between 2.36

and 3.83 points more than it would be without attending junior

college; senior college attendance would increase the raw score

from 3.50 (CI) to 9.93 (C5) points over what it would be without"

attending college.

Residence. - Living in the Oakland area or elsewhere in

California rather than out of the state has a weak (i. e. , not

statistically significant) negative effect on the probability of

passing the MA; living in the Oakland area has a significant

effect, however, on the score, decreasing it by 2.74 points.

These results may represent an interaction between positive

and negative effects of local residence discussed above. The

182

differences between the probability and score effects may be

partially explained by the fact that sometimes favorable adminis-

trative decisions may be made in favor of an occasional Oakland

resident, particularly of a minority group, allowed to proceed

through the testing process at a lower score than normally

considered passing.

Attending high school in the South. - Attending high school

in the South is significantly different at the 1 percent level from

attending high school in any other U. S. region. It lowers the

probability of success by .191 and the score by 7. 35 points. It

is probably measuring the combined effects of a high relative

number of blacks in the category and generally inferior southern

high schools.

Specific police training or experience. - Having attended

non-college police school has a small, positive, not statistically

significant effect on the probability of success and t'e score.

Having studied police science in college has a negative but

not statistically significant effect on the probability of success

and a negative statistically significant effect on the score,

decreasing it by two points. The negative sign is explained by

the fact that almost 90 percent of the police science students

come from junior college rather than college.

183

Job experience as a policeman has, as predicted, a positive

statistically significant effect on both the probability of passing

(. 078) and the score (2. 30).

Previous wage. - Only the highest wage category, $700 or

more per month, is significantly different from $0-$300 per

month; it increases probability of quccess by . 155 and score by

2.95 points. A salary of $700 a month or above in the period

1965 to 1971 indicates a professional or managerial job or success

as a salesman, insurance agent, independent proprietor, or

skilled craftsman. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is

indicative of.greater ability in passing the MA than a lower

salary. It is interesting that salary becomes important as an

explanatory variable only at such a relatively high threshold

rather than in continuous gradations. This may partially reflect

an imperfectly defined reference group which may include within

it part-time workers who are college students, for example. It

may also be an interesting reflection of the imperfect nature of

the American wage and salary structure.

Age. - Age, a continuous variable, has the predicted

negative effect; an increase of one year of age would decrease

the probability of passing by 015 and the score by .36. The

coefficients are statistically significant and small in magnitude.

The mean age of the applicants is 23 years, 10 months.

184

Number of jobs enumerated. - Number of jobs enumerated,

also a continuous variable, has a statistically significant, very

small (. 005) positive effect on the probability of passing and a

statistically insignificant effect on the score. The mean number

of jobs enumerated is 3.77.

Civil Service Test

One thousand 375 applicants successful on the MA took the

Civil Service test; 1, 266 or 92.1% of them passed it. Therefore,

there is not much variance in performance to explain and we

would expect few statistically significant coefficients. Only

three of the education variables now stand out from their reference

groups: having more than two years of junior college increases

the probability of passing by .064 over no junior college; having

three to four years of college increases the probability of passing

by .102 over no college; and having a B.A. or B.S. increases the

probability of passing by .081 over no college. In the score

equations, none of the junior college variables are significantly

different from no junior college. All the college variables except

C have significant effects on the score, with G3' C4 and C5 all

increasing the score more than 7 points above Co. C4 and C5,

so important to MA performance, are still differentially important

here.

185

The residence variables have no significant effect on the

probability, but decrease the score by 3. 41 (R1) and 2.95 (R2)

respectively.

Attending high school in the South is no longer significant,

having already weeded out those it would. Age, number of jobs

enumerated, PSC1 and PSI are also not significant. P and WI

W1

are not significant for probability but add more than two signifi-

cant points apiece to score.

Oral Exam

Between the Civil Service test and the Oral is the Physical

Agility, which will be discussed briefly later. Of 1, 093 people

taking the oral exam, 607 or 55.5 percent passed. Their

categorical distribution is summarized in Table 5.3.

The oral exam is conducted by a board of three: two

police officers, one Civil Service representative. Its philosophy

has been changing from an emphasis on selection for command

presence, verbal ability, logical thought processes, moral

feelings and social awareness to include knowledge about Oakland,

its problems and its minority population. The oral has not

changed in its attempt to screen as well for responsibility,

stability, reasonableness and some understanding of the function

of the job. Since the exam is set up to test for qualities more

186

Table 5-3 Percent of applicants in each category successfulon the oral exam

Category

TotalNumber

Examined

TotalNumber

Successful

Percent ofExamined

Successful

Total 1, 093 607 55.5J1 202 102 50.5J2 79 48 60.8J

3 130 76 58.5J4 164 85 51.8J5 21 15 71.4C1 96 56 58.3C2 72 43 59.7C3 21 12 57.1C4 58 43 74.1C5 136 78 57.4R1 597 320 53.6R2 367 189 51.5HI 80 51 63.8PSC1 49 35 71.4PSI 248 153 61.7

114 87 70.2wP1I 390 195 50.0W2 334 195 58.4W3 159 88 55.3

amorphous than economic variables can define, we would expect

our variables to have less explanatory power for oral exam per-

formance than for the original written screening.

There is no particular reason to expect, for example, that

education would be correlated with the above qualities, particularly

since that would imply an effect over and above the one already

exercised in allowing the applicant to reach the oral stage. None

187

of the junior college categories are significant; £4 has a signifi-

cant positive effect of .143 on the probability of passing; C2 has

a significant positive effect of 3. 66 on the score.

Oakland area residence has a significant negative effect of

.124, other California residence a significant negative effect of

.172, on the probability of passing. Neither has a significant

effect on the score. The considerably increased investment

required of an out-of-state resident to get to the oral stage is in

itself an indication of some of the qualities sought by the oral

and helps to explain the results. This may be offset in the 1970's

by a shifting emphasis to knowledge of Oakland and its problems.

Also, as would be expected, previous employment exper-tience as a policeman has a significant positive influence on both

success and score, increasing the probability of success by .179

and the score by 5.07 poims, the largest significant coefficients

found on any explanatory oral variables. Experienced policemen

may have already been screened for similar qualities to obtain

their previous jobs; they would have had oral exam experience;

they certainly could be expected to be more likely to exhibit

command presence, verbal ability, social awareness, respons-

ibility, stability, reasonableness and a superior understanding

of the job.

The salary variables behave erratically, with negative

coefficients in relation to the reference group significant for

W1 on both the probability and the score and for W3 for the

score. The W1 effect is reasonable given the fact that oral

boards are suspicious of people who would experience a large

jumb in salary by becoming policemen, and the reference group,

particularly at this point, may contain some college students or

others earning part-time salaries. The W3 score coefficient is

strange, particularly since its probability coefficient is positive

but not significant.

There is an interesting change in the sign of the age

variable, negative for the standardized written test, now becom-

ing positive and significant for the oral score. This offers con-

firmation to the desire of the oral board to screen for some

evidence of maturity.

Physical Agility

For curiosity, and because the data were available, we

ran the probability of passing the physical agility test against

the same explanatory variables plus height and weight. Out of

1, 270 taking the exam, 1, 093, or 86 percent, passed it. Age

had a negative effect of . 011 on the probability of passing,

statistically significant at 1 percent. Height had a negative

189

effect of .007 on the probability of passing, statistically signifi-

cant at 5 percent. None of the education variables were signifi-

cantly different from high school graduation except possession

of the A.A. degree, which had a negative effect of .133. Most

interesting is that residence in the Oakland area had a positive

effect of . 253 (significant at 1 percent) and residence elsewhere

in California a positive effect of . 227 (significant at 1 percent)

over out-of-state residence. Oakland and California residents

may be more familiar with the requirements of the test, which

are publicized in the announcement; they may have access to

gymnasium facilities in which to practice; and it is significantly

easier for them to return and re-lake the test should they fail

it the first time.

The only other significant variable was W3 , positive, . 095,

perhaps indicative of higher drive and motivation to succeed in

higher income earners.

1971 Equations, Includin: a Minorit Status Variable

The 213 applicants in the first few months of 1971 for whom

minority-majority status data were available were distributed

among the categories as shown in Table 5-4.

It is immediately apparent that minority group members

have a much lower percent passing the Mental Adaptability,

190

Table 5-4. Percent of 1971 applicant3 in each non-referencecategory successful on the Mental Adaptability

Category

TotalNumber

Applicants

TotalNumber

Successful

Percent ofApplicantsSuccessful

Total 213 162 76. 1

137 26 70.3

J?, 13 10 76.9

J3 32 25 78. 1T4 41 37 90. 2J5 11 7 63. 6C1 16 15 93. 8C2 16 15 93.8C3 1 1 100. 0

C4 6 5 83.3C5 25 23 92.0P1 131 92 70.2R2 73 63 86.3H1 24 8 33.3PSC 1 9 8 88.9PS1 48 38 79. 2P1 12 11 91.7

WI 62 48 77.4

W2 63 47 74. 6

W3 51 39 76. 5

MI 44 21 47. 7

47. 7, than average, 76.1, and than any non-reference category

except attended high school in the South, which picks up some of

the same effects.

It is of interest also to compare the percent of total

applicants in each category for whites and minority members

(Table 5- 5).

191

Table 5-5. Percent of white and minority members in eachnon-reference category

CategoryWhite Minority

Number Percent Number Percent

Total 169 100.0 44 100. 0,T1 30 17.8 7 15. 9J2 10 5. 9 3 6. 8J3 26 15.4 6 13. 6

J4 33 19.5 8 18. 2J5 8 4. 7 3 6. 8C1 14 8.3 2 4.5C2 15 8.9 1 2.3C3 1 0.6 0 0.0C4 3 1. 8 3 6. 8C5 20 11.8 5 11. 4R1 94 55.6 37 84. 1R2 67 39.6 6 13. 6H1 10 5. 9 14 31. 8PSC1 8 4. 7 1 0. 2PSI 37 21.9 11 25. 0P1 9 5.3 3 6.8

W1 52 30.8 10 22. 7W2 49 29.0 14 31. 8W3 41 24.3 10 22. 7

White applicants are 80 percent, minority applicants are

20 percent of the total number of applicants. Of the white

applicants, 5. 3 percent, and 13. 7 percent of the minority applicants

had no higher education beyond high school graduation, a difference

less than one might expect from their differential performance.

Otherwise, particularly at the highest levels, C4 and C5, the

educational distributions are surprisingly similar. A higher

192

percentage of minority applicants (84.1) than majority applicants

(55. 6) come from the local area. It is most interesting, from the

point of view of our 1965 to 1971 analysis, that 31. 8 percent of

the minority applicants and only 5.9 percent of the majority

applicants attended high school in the South. This creates a pre-

sumption in favor of our assumption that H1 was behaving partly

as a proxy for minority status.

We ran the same multiple regression equations for the 213

1971 applicants as we did for the 2, 366 1965 to 1971 applicants,

adding M1 = member of a minority group. With such a small

number of observations and so many cells, it is difficult to get

statistically significant coefficients, but for those which are

significant, the interpretation can be very strong. The results

are reported in Table

The most significant observations are in regard to the

behavior of the minority variable, M1. Being a member of a

minority group, other things equal, lowers the probability of

success on the Mental Adaptability by . 229 (statistically

significant at the 1 percent level) and lowers the score by 11.70

points (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This is a

decisive and disturbing conclusion. Hi, which we believe is

co-linear with M1, also lowers the probability of success on the

193

Table C-6. Regression coefficient January to June, 1971,applicants

(1)MA

I

(2)CST

(3)OR

(4)MA2

(5)CST2

(6)OR 2

K 1. 056** 1. 14** .772** 6 2. 78** 36. 69** 68. 31**( . 283) ( . 235) (. 384) ( 8. 36) ( 4. 74) (11. 15)

A -. 021* -. 008 .049 57 -.07 - .05( . 010) ( . 009) (. 014) ( . 30) ( . 17) ( . 42)

J1 -. 054 . 081 . 018 1. 55 2. 44 . 34( . 079) ( . 06 4) (. 107) ( 2. 33) ( 1. 30) (3. 10)

J2 -.018 . 010 . 312* 1.31 2. 01 9. 23*( . 117) ( . 093) (. 156) ( 3. 46) ( 1. 88) ( 4. 54)

J3 .001 . 044 . 134 2. 53 1. 59 5. 39( . 083) ( . 06 5) (. 111) ( 2. 46) ( 1. 32) (3. 22)

J4 .089 . 105 . 187 5. 07* 2.64* 6.59*( 079) ( 059) (. 097) ( 2. 34) (1. 20) ( 2. 81)

J5 -. 192 -. 050 . 56 2** -2. 20 1. 45 10. 53( . 130) ( . 07 5) (. 205) ( 3. 84) ( 2. 32) ( 5. 95)

C1 . 130 -. 015 -. 125 4. 39 . 55 -1. 16( . 105) ( . 075) (. 124) (3. 10) (1. 51) (3. 61)

C2 . 196 . 016 -. 169 9. 96** - . 82 -2. 68( . 108) ( . 079) (.128) ( 3. 18) ( 1. 60) ( 3. 73)

C3 .322 . 073 . 091 I 2. 58 1.30 8. 66( . 413) ( . 288) (. 455) (12. 18) ( 5. 80) (13. 22)

C 4 . 139 . 107 -. 130 12.92 ** . 77 -4. 08( . 166) ( . 128) (. 252) ( 4. 91) ( 2. 59) ( 7. 32)

C5 . 202* . 083 . 126 7. 54** 1.08 2.47( . 090) ( . 066) (.1 08) ( 2. 6 5) ( 1. 34) ( 3. 14)

R1 .081 -.071 -. 666 ** -3. 70 -3. 82 -10. 36( 149) (.119) (. 19 1) ( 4. 39) ( 2. 40) ( 5. 53)

R2 . 129 -. 057 - .744 ** -1.65 -4.08 - 13.98*( . 155) ( . 123) (. 196) ( 4. 57) ( 2. 47) ( 5. 69)

H1 -. 314** -. 035 -. 020 -8. 16** -1. 13 - . 25( . 092) ( . 10 2) (. 174) ( 2. 71) ( 2. 05) ( 5. 06)

PSC1 . 094 -. 041 .302 6. 12 -.33 4.68( . 139) ( . 101) (. 173) ( 4. 08) ( 2. 03) ( 5. 04)

PS 034 -. 030 .060 -1.70 -.66 1.95( . 072) ( . 057) (. 094) ( 2. 13) ( 1. 15) ( 2. 73)

E 026 -. 00 4 -.0002 1.03 . 6 2* . 57

( . 020) ( . 015) (.026) ( .58) ( .31) ( .74)Pl 208 . 096 .354* 3.02 2. 13 7.08

( . 127) ( . 09 2) (. 151) ( 3. 74) ( 1. 86) ( 4. 38)

194

Table 5-6, continued

W1 . 046 . 024 -. 116 . 04 -. 50 2. 81(. 083) (. 065) (. 106) (2. 46) (1. 30) (3. 08)

W2 . 051 . 005 . 020 4. 35 -. 04 4.64(. 084) (. 065) (. 109) (2. 47) (1. 32) (3. 15)

W3 . 075 . 046 -. 053 1. 45 . 09 4. 06(. 099) (. 079) (. 128) (2. 93) (1. 59) (3. 72)

M -. 229** -. 0291. 515** -11. 70** -3. 78** 10. 76**

(. 073) (. 067) (. 115) (2. 14) (1. 35) (3. 35)

* = . 05 level of significance** = . 01 level of significance

195

MA by . 314 points (significant statistically at 1 percent) and the

score by 8.16 points (significant statistically at 1 percent). The

probability equation for the Civil Service test has no statistically

significant results; on the score equation minority status lowers

the probability of success by 3. 78 points (statistically significant

at 1 percent).

On the oral, the effect of minority status is reversed,

however, becoming positive and raising the probability of passing

by . 515 and the score by 10. 76 points (both statistically significant

at 1 percent). This is an explicit reflection of a policy attempt to

hire more minority members, but the attempt begins only after

successful performance on the written. On the oral, the inclusion

of knowledge of Oakland, its minority community, and its problems,

appears to assist in the performance of the minority candidates.

These results, however, underscore the critical importance of

careful evaluation and interpretation of the use of standardized

written exams and their results for selective purposes, particu-

larly where it is essential and desired to increase minority

representation.

The behavior of all other variables simply bears out, in

much weaker fashion because of the small number of observa-

tions, the conclusions already discussed in the more general

analysis, and therefore won't be belabored here.

196

CHAPTER

THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970's

This chapter will discuss the extremely significant policy

changes, particularly in the minority composition of the force,

between 1971 and August, 1974. It will raise, as well, some

further economic policy questions for the Oakland Police Depart-

ment to consider, particularly about options that may be open to

revise economic incentives to attract and retain the type of labor

force it desires.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION

According to the 1970 Census, the City of Oakland is over

one-half minority. The population is 34. 5 percent black, 9.8

percent Spanish surnamed, and 6. 5 percent other minorities. 1

Yet, in 1966, just 3 percent of the Oakland police force was

minority; by the end of 1970, the percent minority had increased

to 6. 5. 2 The relationship between the under-representation of

the minority communities on the force and the apparently

discriminatory selection instruments discussed in Chapter 5

was clear to the minority communities.

The Legal Environment

On October L7, 1969, a suit was filed in the United States

197

District Court, Northern District of California, the case of

Clarence Penn vs. William Stumpf, Civil Action No. C-69-239

OJC, "seeking equitable relief to remedy an alleged pattern and

practice of discrimination in hiring for the Oakland Police

Department" violating civil rights. 3 The complaint, which was

more than 20 pages long, generally alleged that the processes of

selecting applicants for appointment for positions with the Oakland

Police Department unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiff

and other minority, i. e., black and Spanish surnamed persons,

in the following ways:

1. By the use of a written examination which:

a. is not practical in nature,

b. does not fairly test the fitness of the person

examined to discharge the duties of a police

officer,

c. measures skills substantially unrelated to

that position,

d. requires linguistic, verbal and other facilities

unrelated to the position,

e. discriminates against Negro and Spanish

surnamed minority group males solely on

account of their race, education and racial

198

and cultural backgrounds,

f. has never been subjected to an impartial

professional validity study,

g. lacks predictability of success,

h. has kept worthwhile qualified minority males

out of the Department.

2. By using a background investigation as a screening

method which investigation:

a. uses as screeners persons who are themselves

unfamiliar with minority life styles and

cultures,

b. uses Caucasian officers to screen who have

not been educated or trained for that purpose,

c. uses Caucasian officers who themselves are

unscreened as to the existence of racial

prejudice on their part. From the screening

process information is obtained about appli-

cants and used to bar them from the position

despit,.1 the fact that such information is com-

pletely unrelated to the question of whether the

applicant is capable of performing the duties

of an officer hi the Oakland Police Department

199

and therefore serves to keep out minority

members.

3. By using recruitment policies which:

a. utilize white personnel who have little or no

contact with potential minority group police

officer applicants,

b. recruit at schools and other institutions where

the vast majority of potential applicants are

Caucasian, and thereby

c. prevent minority group males who might be

potential applicants from learning of openings.

4. By the use of a psychiatric and oral examinations

which:

a. are conducted by persons unfamiliar with the

culture and life styles of black and Spanish

surnamed societies,

b. are conducted by persons who use medical

and mental frames of reference appropriate

to white middle class culture as a result of

which the plaintiff and other minority members

are discriminated against.

5. With respect to the oral interview, it is alleged

200

that this interview is conducted by Caucasians who

are unscreened for their familiarity with minority

groups and who either harbor feelings of race

prejudice or are ignorant of the history, culture

and background of minority group persons so that

they are unable to make valid judgments as to

qualifications of individuals from those groups. 4

On February Z, 1970, the court denied a motion to dismiss

filed by the city and held that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a

cause of action. 5 The City of Oakland filed an answer on Feb-

ruary 11, 1970, which denied all material allegations.

On March 8, 1971, it became apparent that changes in

selection devices or results would have to be made. On that

date, the United States Supreme Court rendered its unanimous

decision in the landmark case of Willie S. Griggs v. Duke Power

Company, Z8 L ed 2d 158, brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S. C. 2000e, et. mg.). The Supreme

Court ruled that if the use of certain tests and educational re-

quirements for screening job applicants results in a higher re-

jection rate for blacks than for whites, the employer must

demonstrate that passing such tests is significantly related to

successful performance on the job. "If an employment practice

201

which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related

to job performance, the practice is prohibited. "6

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guide-

lines on Employee Selection Procedures 7 underscores the re- .

quirements more clearly:

For the purpose of the guidelines in this part, the term

"test" is defined as any paper-and-pencil or performance

measure used as a basis for any employment decision.

The guidelines in this part apply, for example, to

ability tests which are designed to measure eligibility

for hire, transfer, promotion, membership, trait.ing,

referral or retention. This definition includes, but is

not restricted to, measures of general intelligence,

mental ability and learning ability; specific intellectual

abilities; mechanical, clerical and other aptitudes:

dexterity and coordination: knowledge and proficiency;

occupational and other interests; and attitudes pel .on-

ality or temperament. The term "test" includes all

formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques

of assessing job suitability including, in addition to

the above, specific qualifying or disqualifying personal

history or background requirements, specific educational

202

or work history requirements, scored interviews,

biographical information, blanks interviewers' rating

scales, scored application forms, etc. 8

Discrimination is defined as "the use of any test which

adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer, or any other

employment or membership opportunity of classes protected by

title VII" 9 unless "the test has been validated and evidences a

high degree of utility. "10 The protected classes are defined by

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. "11 "Evidence

of a test's validity should consist of empirical data demonstrating

that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with

important elements of work behavior which comprise or are

relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being

evaluated. "12

Moreover, empirical evidence to support a test's validity

must be based on generally accepted procedures, approved by

the American Psychological Association, 13 for determining

criterion-related validity. Where criterion-related validity is

not feasible, evidence of content or construct validity may be

acceptable, if "accompanied by sufficient information frOm job

analyses to demonstrate the relevance of the content (in the case

of job knowledge or proficiency tests) or the construct (in the

203

cast: of trait measures), Evidence of content validity alone may

be acceptable for well-developed tests that consist of suitable

samples of the essential knowledge, skills or behaviors composing

the job in question, " not including "those which can be acquired

in a brief orientation to the job. "14

It became amply clear from the developing case law and

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (P. L. 92-261,

86 Stat. 103) which extended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to public

employers that the City of Oakland could be forced by the courts

to answer two questions: 1) does any selection device have a

discriminatory adverse effect on the hiring of minorities? , and

2) if so, can that selection device be shown to be job related?

If a selection device does have adverse effect, even if it is job

related, the employer must also show that he knows of no alter-

native technique that would have less of an adverse effect on

protected groups and is equally valid. 16

Minority Composition of the Oakland Police Department

Adverse effect, somewhere in the Oakland recruitment and

selection process, seemed clear, particularly until 1971, from

the statistics on the percent of new appointees to the Police

Department that were minority group members. Table 6-1 pre-

sents the statistics on the percent of new appointees that were

204

minority group members from 1961 to 1973. Note that the per-

centages doubled in 1971 over 1970, and doubled again in 1973 over

1972 to a dramatic 61 percent of new appointees from minority

groups. Policy changes had to be at work:

Table 6-1. Percent of new appointees from minority groups,Oakland Police Department, 1961 to 1973.

YearNumber of

New AppointeesNumber from

Minority Groups

Percent of NewAppointees fromMinority Groups

1961 24 1 4.11962 44 5 11.31963 49 3 6.11964 43 0 0.01965 61 3 4.91966 81 6 7.41967 49 7 14.21968 91 16 17.61969 69 14 20.31970 73 11 15.11971 85 30 35.31972 94 28 29.71973 72 44 61.0

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

The changes in the total number of Police Department

positions filled, over all ranks, by members of the various

minority groups, is shown from December, 1966, to December,

1973, in Table 6-2. At the end of 1966, just 3 percent of the total

Tab

le 6

-Z

.T

otal

num

ber

and

perc

ent o

f O

akla

nd P

olic

e D

epar

tmen

t pos

ition

s fi

lled

by e

ach

min

ority

gro

up,

Dec

embe

r, 1

966,

to D

ecem

ber,

197

3

Dat

e

Tot

alFi

lled

Posi

-tio

nsB

lack

sSp

anis

hSu

rnam

eA

sian

Am

eric

anN

ativ

eA

mer

ican

Tot

alM

inor

ityN

umbe

r Pe

rcen

tN

umbe

rPe

rcen

tN

umbe

r Pe

rcen

tN

umbe

r Pe

rcen

tN

umbe

r Pe

rcen

t

Dec

embe

r,19

6666

115

2.27

40.

601

0.15

00.

0020

3.02

Dec

embe

r,19

6764

818

2.77

40.

611

0.15

00.

0023

3.55

Dec

embe

r,19

6865

820

3.03

40.

601

0.15

10.

1526

3.95

Dec

embe

r,19

6968

228

4.10

71.

020

0.00

10.

1536

5.27

Dec

embe

r,19

7070

534

4.82

101.

411

0.15

10.

1546

6. 5

3D

ecem

ber,

1971

714

385.

3211

1.54

40.

563

0.43

567.

85D

ecem

ber,

1972

700

557.

8615

2.14

131.

852

0.30

8512

.15

Dec

embe

r,19

7369

571

10.2

122

3.17

162.

303

0.43

112

16.1

1

Sour

ce: O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice

206

force was minority: by the end of 1973, 16 percent of the force

was minority.

Of the men on the force in October, 1973, 19. 2 percent of

the Caucasians were hired after 1971; 56.3 percent of the blacks,

57.1 percent of the Spanish surnamed, and 70.6 percent of the

other minorities represented (Asian-Americans, Filipinos,

Hawaiians and Native Americans) were hired after 1971. For a

detailed breakdown of the force, by ethnic groups and year of

hire, see Table 6-3.

Partly because the minority group members have come on

the force in numbers only since 1971, there are only four minority

officers, all blacks, above the rank of patrolman. Two are ser-

geants, one is a lieutenant, one a deputy chief.

Administrative Attitudes

What was going on in 1971, 1972 and 1973 to produce such

dramatic changes? It should be clear that Oakland's Police

Chief, Charles Gain, and Personnel Director, James M. Newman,

both superior professionals, recognized the urgency of drawing

in more minorities and actively supported research and analysis

of existing procedures and possible changes therein. The legal

developments, in fact, seemed almost to provide them with the

necessary political leverage, against more obstructionist groups

207

Table 6-3. Oakland Police Department members, by date ofappointment and ethnicity, October 30, 1973

Number NumberYear of Number Number Spanish OtherAppointment Caucasian Black Surnamed Minority Total

19401941

1 1

0

1942 2 2

1943 2 2

1944 1 1

1945 6 1 7

1946 5 5

1947 25 1 26

1948 4 41949 28 2 301950 4 4

1951 27 1 28

1952 3 1 1 5

1953 lt 1 17

1954 ?.0 10

19C; 9 9

1956 13 13

1957 19 19

1958 9 9

19 59 ) 9

1960 1 1

1961 3 3

1962 9 2 11

1963 8 1. 9

1964 17 17

1965 24 1 25

1966 37 Z 1 401967 28 1 1 301968 48 7 2 57

1969 58 6 2 1 671970 50 7 3 601971 44 10 4 2 60

1972 44 10 2 7 631973 25 20 6 3 54

Total 589 71 21 17 698

Percent of force 84. 4 10. 2 3, 0 2. 4

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

208

on the police force and in the community, to institute policies

which would work in the right direction. They knew, and could

argue persuasively, that if they could not voluntarily design ways

to hire more minorities and improve the statistics, they would

soon be under much less palatable court orders.

Both men were extremely sensitive, as well, to the need

to preserve high quality standards. Admitting inferior candidates

would pose unacceptable risks both to the quality of the police

force and to the effort to bring in more minorities. They were

sophisticated, however, about the difficulties of choosing

appropriate selection instruments to measure quality. Through-

out the 1960's they had encouraged interested researchers to use

departmental data to try to relate selection devices to job per-

formance. The results were inconclusive. If adverse effect

were demonstrated in court, it would be very difficult to prove

that selection devices, particularly the written tests, were job

related. It might be easier to remove the adverse effect.

Research Efforts

There are several important barriers to demonstrating

conclusively through empirical research that a test discriminates

well between good and bad job performers. Foremost among

these difficulties is that selection test failures are not given an

209

opportunity to show whether or not they can perform on the job.

Therefore, there can be no observations about the job performance

of failures. Supervisors' evaluations show very little variance;

paired comparisons are time-consuming and often unreliable:

turnover data tells little about performance; and, particularly

in a force the size of Oakland's, there may be too few performers

at either extreme to yield statistically significant conclusions.

William K. Hunter and Thomas J. Culligan, for example,

in an attempt to identify which factors could be used to predict

police performance, asked police supervisory personnel to

compare and evaluate prior subordinates who had subsequently

left the lepartment, on a forced-choice paired comparison basis. 17

They used people who had left the department in an attempt to

reduce many potential biases from work unit associations and

active friendships. From an original group of 146 policemen

who had left the department, 120 were chosen who had sufficient

time on the force and sufficient experience with supervisors.

Then, the sample to be studied was confined to the top 28 and

bottom 28 individuals as ranked. 18

The result of most interest to us here is that as a group,

they don't do significantly differently on the written test. The

average score of the top 28 on the Otis Self-Administering Test

210

of Mental Ability was 54. 5. The average score of the bottom 28

was 53. 2. An F-test shows that the difference is not statistically

significant. 19 On the other hand, the high scorers were definitely

more capable of handling the Civil Service oral examination.

The average oral score of the top 28 was 84. 75, of the bottom

80. 0. An F-test shows a statistically significant difference at

a better than 1 percent level of confidence. 20

In William K. Muir's in-depth, but small, study of 27

Oakland policemen, we find that the intelligence tests, particu-

larly the Army General Classification Test, do appear to be use-

fullyfully related to the best professional performance. Muir

argues that this is because they test verbal experience, and "the

professionals' enhanced verbal experience eases the task of

coping with the social cross pressures of the job, of resolving

the dilemma of power, of developing a philosophy, and of being

a leader within the department. '122

Muir also finds that the Civil Service general knowledge

test is useful. Muir's "impression is that the narrower the

experience and the less diverse the social grown with which the

candidate has warm familiarity, the worse he ctcores',23 and that

"a poor performer on the CSW ought to be marked as a candidate

with real inadequacies in his familiarity with the world. "24 He

211

believes that a preannounced current affairs test should be

included in the testing battery, particularly as an opportunity for

a candidate to excel "if he has the motivation and minimal learning

skill to do so. "25

High value is also placed by Muir on the oral interview,

which "assesses motivation and maturity in a way no written test

can and is critical in the evaluating process. "26 Muir would be

the first to stress, however, that his findings are suggestive and

not statistically significant. They seem to caution against a too

hasty abandonment of traditional selection methods under court

attack.

Personnel Director James M. Newman summarizes the

research attempts as indicating that the Mental Adaptability and

Civil Service tests had no real predictive validity corresponding

to success on the street. The strongest demonstration that could

be made was that test scores were correlated with performance

in the police academy and that performance in the police academy

was correlated with later performance evaluations. 27 But no

direct correlation could ever be demonstrated between the test

scores themselves and performance, 28

A "Content Valid" Written Exam

By November, 1970, the beleaguered Civil Service test of

212

general knowledge and current events was replaced by a written

test basically of reading comprehension. The test has 50 ques-

tions; 30 must be answered correctly to pass. The first section

consists of 25 multiple choice questions related to six pages of

crime reports, to be answered in 40 minutes. The second

section consists of 25 multiple choice questions related to eight

pieces of narrative material, to be answered in 40 minutes. By

the middle of 1971, this test replaced the Mental Adaptability tests

as well. Therefore, neither the Mental Adaptability tests nor the

Civil Service test which we analyzed in Chapter 5 is currently

being used. The written reading comprehension test replaces

them.

The new written test has not been validated technically as

related to job performance. However, high scores have been

shown to correlate positively with high perforMance in the

recruit academy. It is argued, therefore, that the test is

constructed only to predict success in the recruit academy, in

which an applicant will deal with similar material. Therefore,

it is reasonable on its face and content valid.

The Affirmative Action Survey by the California FEPC

still is critical of the test as indicating "only one skill: the

ability to analyze, under pressure, difficult reading material. "30

213

According to the Fog Readability Index, the second part of the

examination is beyond high school reading level. 31

However, in the Consent Decree in the Penn v. Stumpf

case, signed December 20, 1973, it is agreed that: "The Civil

Service Board will continue its efforts to develop or obtain a

demonstrably job-related written test for the selection of police

officers. The present examination may continue to be used on a

pass-fail basis per:ding those efforts. "32

College seniors or college graduates with majors in

Administration of Justice, Law Enforcement, Police Science,

Criminology, Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration, or

related fields, are now able to request a waiver of the written

examination by submitting their transcripts for review.

The revision of the written exam has not removed the

adverse effect on minorities. As Table 6-4 shows, 84.7 percent

of the Caucasians taking the test between January, 1972, and

September, 1973, passed, compared to 41.6 percent of the

blacks, 66. 7 percent of the Spanish surnamed, and 73.0 percent

of the A3ian Americans. Of all waivers granted, 72. 4 percent

were to Caucasians, 20. 7 percent to blacks.

Yet, the exam now does have content validity and will be

retained provisionally until something better can be developed,

Tab

le 6

-4.

Exp

erie

nce

of e

thni

c gr

oups

on

patr

olm

an e

xam

inat

ion,

Jan

uary

,Se

ptem

ber,

197

319

72, t

o

Patr

olm

an A

pplic

ants

Cau

casi

anB

lack

Span

ish

Surn

ame

Asi

anA

mer

ican

Nat

ive

Am

eric

anT

otal

Tot

al e

nter

ing

test

ing

prog

ram

884

502

6145

81.

500

Perc

ent o

f to

tal

58. 9

33. 5

4. 1

3. 0

0. 5

100.

0

Num

ber

taki

ng w

ritte

n72

745

757

375

1, 2

83N

umbe

r pa

ssin

g w

ritte

n61

619

038

275

876

Perc

ent p

assi

ng w

ritte

n84

.741

.666

.773

.010

0.0

68.3

Num

ber

of e

xam

s w

aive

d15

745

48

321

7Pe

rcen

t of

ethn

ic g

roup

wai

ved

17. 8

9.0

6.6

17.8

37.5

14. 5

Perc

ent o

f al

l exa

ms

wai

ved

72. 4

20. 7

1. 8

3. 7

1. 4

100.

0

Tot

al r

emai

ning

aft

er w

ritte

n77

323

542

358

1, 0

93

Tot

al h

ired

7441

76

112

9

Perc

ent h

ired

9.6

17.4

16. 7

17. 1

12. 5

11. 8

Sour

ce: O

akla

nd C

ivil

Serv

ice

Off

ice

215

if possible. Recruits, we should note, must pass successfully

through a 22-week training academy after they are hired. The

academy emphasizes academic as well as practical knowledge;

for example, constitutional and criminal law, criminal evidence,

criminal investigation, community awareness, report writing,

and patrol procedures. Many of these subjects are taught by

college level textbooks. Basic verbal and reading comprehension

skills are essential for successful academic performance in the

academy, and, one might argue, might well be necessary on the

job.

Therefore, the Police Chief and Personnel Director are

very anxious to retain a written test as a quality screening

device. They would prefer to concentrate on attracting a suffi-

cient number of qualified minority candidates to enter the selec-

tion process so that acceptably large numbers will survive the

written exam. It would be interesting, as the data accumulate,

to test empirically whether the qualities needed to pass the

revised written exam are the same as or different from the

qualities needed to pass the Mental Adaptability and Civil Service

tests. Scope for future research is clearly indicated.

Other Changes in the Selection Process

Our study of the 1965 to 1971 period showed that minority

216

group status was no longer a disadvantage once a candidate

reached the oral exam. In fact, in the first half of 1971, minority

status raised the probability of passing by . 515 points and the

score by 10. 76 points (both statistically significant at 1 percent).

The positive effect of minority status on the oral continued

through 1971, 1972 and 1973. In the January, 1972, to September,

1973, period, 66. 2 percent of the Caucasian candidates failed the

oral; 44. 3 percent of the blacks, 47. 6 percent of the Spanish

surnamed, 54. 3 percent of the Asian Americans, and 50. 0 per-

cent of the Native Americans failed the oral. 33

Indeed, the Affirmative Action Survey by the California

FEPC states that "the adverse effect of the written is totally

dissipated by the oral. "34 Since the written examination is now

only qualifying, it is the oral score that determines a candidate's

position on the eligibility list. The oral board consists of three

members, an Anglo police captain who is the Police Department

Personnel Officer, a black sergeant, and a Civil Service repre-

sentative, also Anglo. The team remains consistent and constant

and has developed a high caliber interviewing technique, which

carefully probes a candidate's attitudes toward minority and low-

income groups. 35

According to the FEPC's assessment, the Physical Agility,

217

the. Medical Examination, the Psychiatric Examination, and the

Background Check do not yield any significant evidence of ad-

verse effect on minorities. The background investigation has

been improved recently by attempting to eliminate the use of

police officers on overtime. All investigations would then be

conducted by the two officers, representative of minorities,

assigned full-time to do background checks. All rejects must be

approved by the Police Chief and there is an appeal process.

As Table 6-4 shows, between January, 1972, and Septem-

ber, 1973, 9. 6 percent of the Caucasians who passed the written

were actually hired; 17. 4 percent of the blacks, 16. 7 percent of

the Spanish surnamed, 17.1 percent of the Asian Americans and

12. 5 percent of the Native Americans who passed the written were

actually hired. In actual numbers, this meant 74 Caucasians, 41

blacks, 7 Spanish surnamed, 6 Asian Americans, and 1 Native

American were hired in this period.

Active Recruitment of Minority Candidates

One way of hiring more minorities, even without making

changes in the selection procedures, is to attract more qualified

minority candidates to apply. The City of Oakland had always

devoted a great deal of attention to attracting qualified police

candidates. Indeed, it pioneered ambitious, nationwide, college

218

police recruiting efforts and visited a wide range of college

campuses in the 1960's. Nation.al recruiting campaigns were

ended in late 1969 as the result of a few unpleasant campus

demonstrations, mounting political pressure to intensify local

recruitment efforts, and indications that nationally recruited

candidates were more likely to leave the force. In Table 2-7

we showed, for example, that between August 1, 1962, and

August 1, 1971, 43.6 percent of the out-of-state residents re-

signed from the force, compared to 20. 2 percent of local resi-

dents and 19. 3 percent of other California residents.

On July 20, 1971, the pendulum had swung full cycle. The

residence requirement, which had been removed by Oakland

voters in 1956, was reinstituted. Open competitive examina-

tions for civil service appointments were restricted to city

residents, to the extent that resident applicants are available. "36

In practice, non-residents are allowed to take the police exams,

but they cannot be appointed until all residents on the list have

been appointe,:. If appointed, a declaration of intention to move

into Oakland within nine months after appointment is required.

Enforcement has been somewhat ambiguous, partly because of37some doubt about the constitutionality of residence requirements,

but a preference for residents is clear.

219

On October 26, 1971, the Oakland City Council adopted a

much heralded and publicized Affirmative Action resolution

which "sets a goal for eliminating any disparity between the mi-

nority composition of City employment and total City population,

and calls for parity to be achieved in all City departments at all

salary levels and in all job classifications. "38 The specific

implementation of the Affirmative Action program for the Oak-

land Police Department has been incorporated in the Penn v.

Stumpf Consent Decree and requires that:

A. For all minority persons whose employment with

the Oakland Police Department terminated for any

reason during each year, minority persons on the

eligibility list shall be hired to fill the vacancies

created within the same year period.

B. For all new hires other than those covered by sub-

section A, the percentage of minority persons

hired each year from the Oakland Police Depart-

ment's eligibility list shall at least equal the

current percentage of minority persons in the pop-

ulation of the City of Oakland. In carrying out this

procedure the Oakland Police Department shall

hire minorities from each ethnic group in general

220

proportion to the City's ethnic composition,

assuming an adequate representation of minorities

of each ethnic group on the eligibility list. 39

The Consent Decree specifies further that these are goals, not

quotas, and that no employees shall be dismissed to achieve the

goals. The hiring of unqualified persons who have not passed the

examinations and hiring requirements, or of persons within the

lowest 10 percent of the candidates on the eligible list, is not

required to achieve the goals.

If, at any time, the Oakland Police Department cannot hire

minority persons according to the goals because an insufficient

number of minorities have passed the initial hiring requirements,

then the department is required to proceed with continuous testing

procedures, make special efforts at recruiting minorities, and

notify the attorneys for the plaintiffs of the insufficiency and try

to explain the reasons. 41

Active recruiting is viewed as a primary prerequisite of

success in achieving minority hiring goals and maintaining

quality standards. Job opportunities are publicized through

local organizations, high schools, junior colleges and colleges

with substantial minority enrollments. Since December, 1972,

local college placement centers are visited and contacts are

221

made v,Itn faculty personnel and minority student counselors for

referrals of qualified prospects. After an applicant is referred,

the "one-on-one" approach is used--that is, an appointment is

made to meet him personally and provide individual attention

and information about the selection process. This approach is

viewed as more successful than meeting groups of potential

applicants, because the departmental representatives do not have

to be on the defensive against possibly hostile individuals or

negative peer group pressure.

In 1973, a media saturation program was launched, funded

by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration through the

California Council of Criminal Justice. Four Bay Area depart-

ments, Oakland, San Francisco, Berkeley and Richmond, co-

operated in mass media advertising aimed at the minority popu-*

lace and designed by Anrich, Inc. of Oakland, a minority-owned

advertising agency. The campaign consisted of 30 and 60 second

spot commercials on television and radio, using real minority

police officers, billboards, posters on transit vehicles, etc.

Interested people were invited to call in to a telephone center,

manned by Oakland, for further information. Callers were con-

sidered eligible for recruitment only by the police agency in their

city of residence for 48 hours, after which he could be considered

222

by the other cities as well. Oakland tried to schedule an inter-

view with all interested callers to discuss in depth the advantages

and disadvantages of police employment, the selection process,

and the employment application and to arrange for interested

applicants to tour the police facility or to "ride along" with a

patrol officer. This continued the "one-on-one" approach to

rec ruiting.

Between April 24 and October 11, 1973, the telephone center

processed 2, 102 calls. Twenty percent of the callers were

apparently ineligible because of citizenship, age, height, weight,

or some other requirement: 76 percent of the eligible callers

lived in Berkeley, Richmond or San Francisco. Oakland received

490 calls from apparently eligible Oakland residents. Two

hundred and 34 individuals took the initial written test; 93, or

39.7 percent, passed the written test. Fifty-three people (57

percent of those who passed the written) passed the oral. Fifteen

blacks and four Mexican Americans were hired by the department

as a result of the Minority Recruitment program; it is projected

that a total of 36 minority persons will have been hired by Oak-

land by the project's end. As for the other participating depart-

ments, Berkeley received inquiries from 83 eligible candidates,

Richmond from 68 and San Francisco from 591, but what

happened to these candidates is not known. 42

223

The cost to Oakland, exclusive of $28, 368. 27 in Federal

funds, as of October 1, 1973, was $44, 524. 11, or $2, 120.19 per

minority person recruited. The Oakland Civil Service Office

estimates that in past years approximately $1, 000 per recruit

has been spent for each minority officer. If the projections of

36 minority persons hired are correct, the 1973 project will have

cost the Federal government $30, 618 and Oakland $68, 054, or

$1, 890.41 per recruited person for Oakland. 43

Most importantly, through all these public relations and

recruitment efforts, the public image of the department has

changed. It is now amply clear that the department wants minor-

ity candidates to apply. Moreover, minorities are seen on the

force in ever-increasing numbers, visible proof that they can

succeed in the selection process and be accepted as members of

the fcrce. The minorities hired in the past few years can refer

interested friends and relatives. In short, to quote Personnel

Director James M. Newman, "The more you have, the more

44you get. Sixty-one percent of the new appointees in 1973

were from minority groups. All passed through the selection

process and were deemed qualified. If this success can con-

tinue for the next few years, and there is every indication so far

in 1974 that it can, the Oakland Police Department's worries

224

about minority representation will be over. So will Oakland's

legal troubles on that front, since if the statistics do not bear

out adverse effect, individual selection devices do not have to be

validated as job related. Oakland's experience in 1973 demon-

strates clearly what can be accomplished with motivation and

effort.

WOMEN

Challenges have come, however, from another protected

class as well: women. Patrolman and policewoman had always

been two distinct categories of police officer. There were seven

policewoman positions in the department. The women were

assigned not to patrol duties but to the juvenile division, the

women's prison, rape cases, etc. Requirements were different

for policewomen and patrolmen. The women could be shorter

and lighter: 5'4". and 120 pounds, minimum height and weight.

They were also required to have either a college degree or four

years of relevant work experience. They were given the same

written examinations as the men but a different Physical Agility

designed especially for women. The rest of the hiring process

was the same. Whereas there was continuous recruiting and

testing of male applicants, policewoman positions came up

infrequently.

225

Two 1aws11:ts were brought, one by an applicant seeking a

patrolman's position, one by a policewoman seeing a promotion

to sergeant. Under legal pressure, on February 1, 1974, the

Oakland City Council merged the patrolman and policewoman

classifications into one new classification, police officer. 45

They set a standard height and weight requirement, 5'7", 135

pounds, minimum height and weight. The differences in educa-

tional requirements were dropped.

A class suit was brought against the height and weight

minima, arguing that they impermissibly discriminated against

women as a class. On March 15, 1974, the California Court of

Appeals struck down the city's height and weight requirements

in the case of Veragene Haidy vs. William F. Stumpf. 46The

Court argues that over 80 percent of all American women are

excluded by such a size limitation. The trial court's finding

that the size requirements are reasonable and necessary to the

normal operation of the police patrolman's duties is unsupported

by the type of evidence needed to justify discriminatory treat-

ment. The Court did not dispute that physical strength may be

related to performance, only that a person must be 5'7", 135

pounds to possess the necessary strength. In fact, Justice

Brown added this statement:

226

The police arm functions not only to protect the public,

but to instill in that public confidence that it is being

protect d--an increasingly difficult task in these days

of rising crime rates. Some non-discriminatory

minimum size requirement is entirely in order, and

to the extent that the opinion in this case may be deemed

to strike down all such limitation as a matter of law,47we cannot agree.

The Court invited the city to reexamine the evidence that

the requirement is discriminatory, based on local and recent

data, or to demonstrate conclusively that it is required. On

May 10, 1974, the California Supreme Court denied a hearing in

the case. The decision of the Court of Appeals, abolishing

minimum height and weight requirements, became final on.

April 15, 1974.

The city feels that without the height and weight require-

ments, the Physical Agility test is of doubtful use as a screening

device, because it w,,s designed assuming the minimum height

and weight of candidates. Testing was suspended and applica-

tions held in abeyance during the summer of 1974 to allow foi

the development of a new Physical Agility test applicable to the

new circumstances.

227

in the promotion case, Joan Hail vs. James S. White, a

policewoman alleges that she has been denied an opportunity to

become a sergeant, for which she was otherwise qualified,

solely because of sex discrirnination. 48 An officer must have

had three years of experience as a patrolman to be eligible to

take the sergeant's examination. On this basis, Joan HRH was

refused permission to take the exam. Finally, under pressure,

the city allowed her to take the written examination, which she

passed, and the oral, the results of which are sealed, until the

legal issues are settled. On August 2, 1973, the Federal

District Court upheld the city's requirements, arguing that they

are neither unreasonable nor non-job related, that Ms. Hail's

inability to meet the conditions for promotion is a product of hur

personal inability to meet the rcasonable requirements of patrol

49service.

The case is still in the C our t of Appeals, and the appeal

looks like it may well be successful. An Amicus Curiae brief

submitted by U. S. Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley

Pottinger argues that the District Court erred in employing a

standard of reasonableness rather than a standard of business

necessity for employment practices which have a discriminatory

50impact. Pottinger argues that Hail is concededly qualified to

228

be a police sergeant, except for her lack of experience as a

patrolman, her height and weight, and the fact that she never

took the Physical Agility test required of patrolmen. Requiring

that she have three years of experience as a patrolman needlessly

perpetuates the effect of past discrimination, since she was

denied that experience on the basis of her sex. Moreover, the

Oakland Police Department made no showing that three years as

a patrolman are necessary to do the work of police sergeant.

Not all sergeants have had patrol experience and most are not

assigned to patrol duties. Moreover, Ms. Hail had experience

similar to that of a patrolman, including patrol duties as a

policewoman. There are no height, weight or Physical Agility

requirements for promotion to sergeant, and the height and

weight requirements for patrolmen were struck down by Hardy

vs. Stumpf. The height, weight, and Physical Agility have not

been demonstrated to bo a business necessity. Therefore, it is

considered very likely that the Court of Appeals will rule in

favor of allowing Ms. Hail to compete for promotion.

The support for admitting women to the force on an equal

basis with men is far less than that for admitting ethnic minorities.

The image of the strong, male policeman dies hard. The strength

and agility issues have not been resolved. The rank-and-file

229

patrolman fears that he might have to rely on a "weaker and

more fragile woman" in a life and death situation. There is no

hard evidence that women either can or cannot perform as well

physically as men, but lots of strongly held beliefs. There is

also a powerful, culturally derived reluctance among policemen

to work intimately with women. If a man and a woman were

partners, they would be riding together in a patrol car for long

hours, day after day. Sexually compromising situations are

feared. Policemen's wives are unhappy. The issues are deep

and powerful. Their resolutior remains to be seen. The sub-

stantive changes that a fully integrated and representative police

force might bring to police work are fascinating to contemplate.

L2SSONS FROM TURNOVER EXPERIENCE

The other side of recruiting and selecting people is re-

taining them as members in good standing of the police force.

In our brief discussion of turnover experience in Chapter 2, we

found that of the officers appointed between August, 1962, and

August, 1971, 25, or 4. 25 percent, were fired and 144, or

24. 48 percent, resigned (see Table 2-6). Of the Oakland

residents, 20. 2 percent resigned; of the other California

residents, 19. 3 percent resigned; of the out-of-state residents,

43. 6 percent resigned (see Table 2-7). The residence require-

rent and shift in emphasis to local recruiting should certainly

decrease the number of resignations,

Broken down by educational level, 16. 51 percent of the high

school graduates, 25. 56 percent of those with less than two years

of college, 19. 38 percent of those with more than two years of

college. and 45.83 percent of college graduates resigned (see

Table 2-8). This is consistent with our finding in Chapter 4 that

police salaries are U2 percent of the mean income of high school

graduates and only 79 percent of the mean income of men with

four years of college (see Table 4 -9). Yet Chapter 5 showed

that applicants with more education were more likely to be

selected, at least with the old written tests.

The implication here is that if the Oakland Police Depart-

ment wishes to attract and retain college graduates, perhaps

some system of differential rewards for higher education should

be offered. Similarly, if the department wants to encourage re-

cruits to go back to college and continue their education, perhaps

more than incentives during schooling is needed. Increased re-

wards after the schooling is completed may be necessary as

well.

It is true that college graduates have a better chance of

being promoted than others. Promotional examinations are

231

written tests similar to those discussed in Chapter 5. People

with higher levels of education should have a better chance of

passing them than others. Promotional opportunities, however,

are limited.

The more difficult question is whether educational differ-

entials should be built into the salary structure at a given rank.

Should patrolmen with more education get paid more? Would this

help to retain those who might be apt to resign? Even if so, would

there be overriding disadvantages to a system of differential pay

as well?

We seek some evidence on these questions from a detailed

analysis of the 163 departmental resignations between July, 1966,

and June, 1971. The individuals who resigned are grouped by

years of education in Table 6-5.

Table 6-6 shows the category of position they took after

resigning, by years of education. Of the total group, 47 individ-

uals, or 28.7 percent, went to another state or local police

agency: another 11 individuals, or 6.8 percent, went to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Federal Bureau of Nar-

cotics. Over one-third of the total individuals resigning, there-

fore, remained in the law enforcement field. Of the 34 officers

with B. A. degrees, 18, or 52.8 percent, remained in law en-

232

Table 6-s. Educational level of individuals who resigned fromthe Oakland Police Department, July, 1966, to June, 1971

Education Number Percent

Less than high school* 5 3.1High school graduate 36 22.1Less than 2 years junior college 25 15.3More than .2 years junior college 11 6.7A. A. degree 3 1.8Less than 2 years college 18 11.02 to 4 years college 31 19.0B.A. or B.S. degree 34 20. 9

Total

Source: Oakland Civil Service Office

163 100.0

Note: *Before the end of World War II, some people wereadmitted with less than a high school education.

forcement; of 18 officers with less than two years of college,

eight, or 44.6 percent, remained in law enforcement; of 11

officers with more than two years of junior college, 6, or 54.5

percent, remained in law enforcement. On the contrary, of the

36 high school graduates, eight, or 22.3 percent, remained in

law enforcement; and of the 25 with less than two years of

junior college, four, or 16 percent, remained in law enforcement.

Over half the college graduates, therefore, went to more

attractive opportunities within the field of law enforcement.

None had been promoted in Oakland. Seven of these went to the

Tab

le 6

-6.

Typ

e of

job

take

n by

indi

vidu

als

who

res

igne

d fr

om th

e O

akla

nd P

olic

e D

epar

tmen

t,Ju

ly, 1

966,

to J

une,

197

1, b

y ed

ucat

iona

l lev

el

Typ

e of

Job

or R

easo

n fo

rT

otal

Lee

s th

anH

igh

Scho

ol

Hig

hSc

hool

Gra

duat

e

Les

s th

an2

Yea

rsJu

nior

Col

lege

Mor

e th

an2

Yea

rsJu

nior

Col

lege

A. A

.D

egre

e

Les

s th

an2

Yea

rsC

olle

ge

Mor

e th

an2

Yea

rsC

olle

ge

B. A

.or

B. S

.D

egre

eR

esig

ning

No.

%N

o./0

No.

%N

o.N

o.%

No.

%N

o.%

No.

%N

o.%

Tot

al16

310

0.0

510

0.0

3610

0.0

2510

0.0

1110

0.0

310

0.0

1810

0.0

3110

0.0

3410

0.0

Bay

Are

alo

cal p

. d.

2213

.5

240

.0

411

.1

14.

05

45. 4

527

.82

6. 5

38.

8O

ther

Cal

if.

loca

l p. d

.9

5.5

120

.0

25.

61

4.0

19.

13

9.6

12.

9C

alif

orni

a H

igh-

way

Pat

rol

31.

81

4.0

15.

61

3.2

Out

-of-

stat

elo

cal p

. d.

21.

22

11. 2

Out

-of-

stat

est

ate

p. d

.10

6.1

25.

61

4.0

13.

26

17. 6

Cam

pus

y. d

.1

.6

12.

9

Cum

ulat

ive

tota

l, st

ate

and

loca

l pol

ice

agen

cies

4728

.7

360

.0

822

.3

416

.0

654

. 58

44. 6

722

. 511

32. 2

FBI

53.

15

14. 7

Fede

ral B

urea

uof

Nar

cotic

s6

3.7

412

.92

5.9

Tab

le 6

-6, c

ontin

ued

Typ

e of

Job

or R

easo

n fo

rR

esig

ning

Tot

al

Les

s th

anH

igh

Scho

ol

Hig

hSc

hool

Gra

duat

eN

o.%

No.

%N

o.%

Cum

ulat

ive

tota

l, al

l law

enfo

rcem

ent

agen

cies

5835

. 53

60. 0

822

.3

Bay

Are

alo

cal f

ire

d.4

2. 5

25.

6O

ther

Fed

eral

agen

cies

42.

5T

each

ing

21.

2

Cum

ulat

ive

tota

l, al

l pub

-lic

em

ploy

men

t 68

41.7

360

. 010

27.9

Priv

ate

busi

ness

3521

. 54

11.1

Atte

nd s

choo

l9

5. 5

25.

6M

ilita

ry6

3. 7

Pers

onal

2817

.21

20. 0

1233

. 3A

sked

tore

sign

127.

45

13.9

Ret

ired

53.

11

20. 0

38.

3

Sour

ce: O

akla

nd C

ix it

Ser

vice

Off

ice

Les

s th

an2

Yea

rsJu

nior

Col

lege

No.

%

416

. 0

416

.0

1040

.01

4. 0

14.

06

24. 0

312

.0

Mor

e th

an2

Yea

rsJu

nior

Col

lege

A. A

.D

egre

e

Les

s th

an2

Yea

rsC

olle

ge

Mor

e th

an2

Yea

rsC

olle

ge

B. A

.or

B.S

.D

egre

eN

o.N

o.%

No.

%N

o.N

o.c-

c,

654

. 58

44.6

1135

.418

52 8

133

. 31

3. 2

133

. 33

9.7

15.

61

2. 9

654

.52

66.6

950

.215

48.3

1955

.7

218

.26

33.3

619

.47

20.6

19.

12

6. 5

38.

83

9.7

25.

91

9. 1

133

. 31

5. 6

516

. 11

2. 9

19.

11

5.6

25.

91

5. 6

235

prestigious Fede ral agencies, the FBI and the Bureau of Nar-

cotics. Of the seven, one had six years on the force, two had

five years experience, three had four years, one had three

years. Of the seven, four were from out-of-state, two from

elsewhere in California, only one from Oakland. This is clear

evidence of the risk of trying to be part of a national, professional

labor market. For people whose primary loyalties are to a

national law enforcement professional career, it would be diffi-

cult for Oakland to compete with the FBI.

This conclusion is reinforced if we look further behind the

statistics. Six more of the 18 college graduates who remained in

law enforcement went to out-of-state police agencies; five of

these, all originally from Florida (two with five years of

service, two with four, one with three) went to the Florida Bureau

of Law EnforceMent. The other, originally from Berkeley, be-

came Director of Law Enforcement for the State of Illinois, after

three years of service in the Oakland Police Department. We

have now accounted for 13, over two-thirds, of the college grad-

uates who resigned from the Oakland Police Department and re -.

mained in law enforcement.

What about the other five? One became an Assistant Chief

of Police with the Northern Arizona University Campus Police

236

Department, after six years of experience in Oakland. One,

originally from Fresno, joined the Bakersfield Police Depart-

ment after five years of Oakland service. Oakland's top patrol-

man salary was $932 a month in 1968; Bakersfield's top salary

was $874 a month. 51 But he was not promoted in Oakland;

perhaps he was promoted in Bakersfielu.

The remaining three joined the Walnut Creek Police De-

partment, two (from out-of-state) after five years of Oakland

service, one (from Oakland) after four years. Walnut Creek is

essentially a quiet Bay Area suburb of 33,850 people, It has a

b2-man police force and requires 60 units of college credit.

Although its 1968 starting salary, $801 a month, was lower than

Oakland's $874 a month, its top patrolman salary was $974,

higher than Oakland's $932. 52 Even at the same salary, Walnut

Creek is a far easier place in which to work than Oakland, with

all the problems of an urban core city. The men may have been

promoted as well.

We have explained, therefore, why 18 college graduates

resigned from the Oakland Police Department but remained in

law enforcement work. They went to prestigious Federal

agencies, to home state agencies, to possible promotions and to

quieter jobs. Could we argue convincingly that if the incentives

237

of more money or of promotion had been available they would

have remained? Not unambiguously, because we cannot separate

out taste factors and pecuniary ones to determine at what price

the apparent distaste for Oakland could have been bought off.

Returning to a home agency or leaving a core city may be quite

powerful emotions. Perhaps those who followed their call would

not have continued to be good Oakland patrolmen and should not

have been encouraged to stay.

What about the 16 college graduates who left the law en-

forcement field after they resigned' Seven went into private

business, about which we have no further information. Three

left to attend school and one to teach. Two left to join the mili-

tary, two were asked to leave, and one left for personal reasons.

Again, we have no evidence about the relative power of tastes

and money and no evidence that these men should have been en-

couraged to stay for Oakland's benefit.

Of the 45 men with over two years of junior college or

college or an A.A. degree, 17 resigned and rerliained in law

enforcement occupations. Four of these joined the Federal Bur-

eau of Narcotics, only one went out of state, to the Alaska State

Police. The remaining 12 men, all with one to six years of

service, joined California police departments. The departments

238

chosen and their 1968 top monthly patrolman salary are listed

here (the Oakland salary was $932 per month): San Jose Police

Departmen, ($944); Contra Costa Sheriff's Department ($927);

Concord Police Department ($927); Fremont Police Department

($927-2 men); California Highway Patrol ($893); Fresno County

Sheriff's Department ($855); Pleasanton Police Department

($841); South Lake Tahoe Police Department ($841); Modesto

Police Department ($819); and the Pleasant Hills and Livermore

Police Departments (no salaries available). 53

For this group of observations, one can make a stronger

case that greater economic incentives or promotional opportu-

nities in Oakland may have compensated for the disadvantages

of central city service. San Jose, with a 60 units of college

credit requirement, was the only department that actually paid

more than Oakland, but Contra Costa, Concord and Fremont

came within $5 a month and are far easier and more pleasant to

police. We have no information, moreover, about whether pro-

motions were involved in any of these changes, particularly

likely in the smaller, lower paying departments mentioned. The

potential for pecuniary and promotional incentives to have made

a difference seems better for this group than for the college

graduates. The men remained closer to home and seemed to be

239

motivated primarily by a desire to leave Oakland, rather than

to pursue a more prestigious opportunity. How much of a

differential might have been necessary to overcome the taste

for suburban or rural departments is, of course, unknown.

Of the 18 men with less than two years of college who

resigned, eight remained in the law enforcement field, a per-

centage of 44. 6. Two went out of state to small town depart-

ments in Minne3ota and Washington. Two joined the San Fran-

cisco Police Department, then paying a top salary of $983, $50

a month higher than Oakland. The others went to Concord,

Fremont, Hayward ($862), and the California Highway Patro1.54

Again, for this group, it appears that improved economic

opportunities within Oakland might have made a difference.

Only 12 of the 61 men with less than two years of junior

college or a high school degree remained in law enforcement

occupations, a lower percentage than in the more educated

groups. Three went out of state, nine remained in California

departments: Fremont; San Leandro ($927): the California

Highway Patrol; three to the Marin County Sheriff's Department

($870) with substantial promotions; South Lake Tahoe; and the

Ventura and Sierra County Sheriff's Departments (no salary55information available). There were a greater number of

240

resignations for personal reasons and men asked to resign in

this group than in the groups with more education. Economic

opportunities may well have convinced those who joined other

local departments to remain.

Does following up the futures of the Oakland resignees

yield any revealing patterns') For the more than one-third who

remained in the law enforcement field, one must ask why Oakland

lost men to competing agencies and whether or not changes in the

economic incentives or promotional opportunities open to Oak-

land patrolmen might have retained them. There seem to be

several overlapping types of labor markets here. One is a

national, professional labor market of college educated law en-

forcement men, mobile, seeking the best available professional

opportunities, like college professors or young business school

graduates. Because of Oakland's elaborate national recruiting

campaigns at colleges in the 1960's and because of its excellent

reputation as a professional department, the city could compete

in this market. It offered initial on-the-job training and patrol.

experience. However, for this group of professionals, if more

prestigious opportunities appeared, on they moved. To retain

them, the city would have had to provide equivalent upward

mobility channels, either through establishing more higher

241

level positions which could be attained more quickly by college

graduates, or through significant pay differentials for education.

Educational pay differentials, however, would have serious

costs, not merely budgetary. Comraderie, team loyalty, equality

play a vital role in the functioning of police departments. Accen-

tuating divisions among men by differential incentives based on

education may undermine the principles upon which the organiza-

tion functions. Local school systems and major universities have

faced.a similar problem. Should teachers of subjects with more

attractive alternative opportunities get paid more than others?

Should teachers of more difficult or more prestigious subjects

get paid more than others? The educational field seems to

accept higher pay for graduate school credits or Master's

degrees, but resists further differentiation on economic gro.unds.

A fine economic case can be made for differential incentives for

teachers in shortages fields to obtain them without raising the

pay of teachers who can be attracted at lower salaries. 56 The

trend in school systems, on the contrary, is towards equalizing

salary schedules and employee organizations prod further in

this direction. Differentiation among teachers on economic

grounds is repugnant to the very values upon which school sys-

tems are based, in a way very similar to that in which differ-

242

entiation among policemen on educational or economic grounds

would be viewed by police organizations. The institutional re-

quirements of harmonious and equal working relationships among

colleagues may far outweigh economic rationality. It is not even

clear that economic incentives would work or that Oakland could

hope to compete with the FBI.

If an unambiguous case cannot be made for offering law

enforcement professionals incentives to stay, should they be

hired at all? Here again, a clear judgment is difficult. Per-

haps the intangible benefits to the department, in high level

performance and professional tone, outweigh the investment lost

when the men leave. With the abandonment of national'recruiting

and the establishment of residence preference, fewer men will

be hired from a national market and these questions are likely

to become moot. It will be interesting to observe the turnover

experience with the local college graduates that are hired.

There are two local labor markets, majority group and

minority group, each with a range of educational experience.

Caucasians who resign and remain in law enforcement are most

likely to leave the core city for quieter local positions, often

with better promotional opportunities. The relevant economic

incentive to retain this group would be larger pay differentials

243

over suburban or rural cities to compensate for the battle scars

and anxiety of big city duty, as well as more promotional

opportunities for experienced patrolmen. Increased vacation

opportunities or sabbatical leaves to provide the refreshment of

distance from tension are often suggested as well. These latter

proposals may have independent merit for all policemen, but not

for the city treasury. The men who leave for more peaceful

cl2partments, however, may be just the men who should be en-

couraged to leave, because they have lost their desire to cope

with Cakland, its problems, and the nonpecuniary stresses of the

job. This cannot always be predicted in advance, and turnover

costs here may be well worthwhile.

There has been too little experience with the local minority

community labor market to be able to evaluate its turnover. Mi-

nority group members woult be less likely to be lured by the

attractions of small enclaves and more likely to be committed to

core city problems. Incr.. g the minority composition of the

force may well have signifi.:.ant side benefits in reducing overall

turnover, particularly if the general hostility between the police

and minority communities can be reduced.

What about the almost two-thirds of the resignees who

leave the law enforcement field? The largest group, 35 indi-

244

viduals, 21. 5 percent of all resignations, left to enter private

business; the next largest group, 28 individuals, 17.2 percent

of resignations, left for personal reasons. We have rio more

det- fled information about the jobs they took. We can only infer

that a more attractive combination of pecuniary and nonpecuniary

incentives emerged for these people outside of law enforcement;

we can say nothing about the relative pushes and pulls of money

and tastes. It is interesting to note that the less educated groups

were more likely to leave for personal reasons and less likely

to remain in law enforcement work than others, suggesting per-

haps that college exposure enables people to make more informed

and better career choices. Included in the group who left for

personal reasons are those unhappy with the demands of the life-

style of a policeman--night work, marital and family pressures,

and general tensions. Again we can argue that such turnover

should not be discouraged; indeed the unhappy or unsuited should

be encouraged to leave.

Our speculations about resignations have led us to con-

clude that educational pay differentials would not be a desirable

means of reducing turnover, Some of this turnover will be

taken care of by recruiting Oakland residents and minorities.

The possible effectiveness of differentials in retaining highly

245

educated men would be swamped by the morale effects on the

police organization. Given the nature of the police job, some

turnover has its value, particularly in so far as people with

distaste for the city or the work leave. Perhaps we should be

more concerned about people who remain on the force, despite

dissatisfaction, because of a lack of attractive alternative

opportunities or motivation. In any case, educational differen-

tials are likely to create more problems than they solve.

Substantive restructuring of the job, however, to make it

more flexible and to better match duties with individual skills

and interests, may well be called for. More promotional

opportunities may well be provided in the context of a general

restructuring of the job. Perhaps the changing composition of

the force, adding women as well as minorities, will provoke such

changes. To do justice to the rich possibilities here, an addi-

tional study would be required.

The monopsony hypothesis is contradicted once more by

the evidence gleaned from our study of resignations. Indeed,

there is competition among police departments. Big city status

seems to yield not monopsony power to offer low wages, but the

need for higher wages than surrounding departments to compen-

sate for the disutilities involved in big city duty. Roger W.

246

Schmenner's empirical work, discussed in Chapter 3, gave him

the suspicion that this might be true. 57 Our discoveries offer

some confirmation. Police departments do not seem to wield

monopsony power.

247

CHAPTFR

FOOTNOTES

1. U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and EconomicStatistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Censusof Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics,California.

Z. Oakland Civil Service Office.

3. United States District Court, Northern District of California,Clarence Penn et al. vs. William Stumpf, et al. , CivilAction No. C-69-239 OJC.

4. City of Oakland, "Inter-office Letter from City Attorney Ed-ward A. Goggin and Deputy City Attorney William C. Sharpto James M. Newman, subject Penn v. Stumpf," April 10,1972.

5. Clarence Penn vs. William Stumpf (1970) 308 Fed. Supp.1238.

b. Chief Justice Warren Burger, Willie S. Griggs v. DukePower Company, 28 L. ed 2d 158, paragraph 12.

7 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines onErn_ployee Selection Procedures, Federal Register, Volume35, Number 149, August 1, 1970, Washington, D. C. , pp.12333-1 to 12333-3.

8. , pp. 12333-1.

9. Ibid.

1'). .bid.

11. Cr.,i1 Rihts Act of 19(4 (42 U. S. C. , 2000e, et. seq. ),Section 703 (a) (2).

12. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines onEmployee Selection Procedure, 22. cit. , p. 12333-1.

248

13. American Psychological Association, "Standards for Educa-tional and Psychological Tests and Manuals," (Washington,D.C. : American Psychological Association).

14. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines cryEmployee Selection Procedures, 22. cit., pp. 12333-2

15. For an excellent summary discussion of the case law, seeRichard F. Biddle, Discrimination: What Does It Mean?(Chicago: International Personnel Management Association),

16 16 pp. Also see State of California, Fair EmploymentPractices Commission, Guidelines on Employee SelectionProcedures, October, 1972: and Betty R. Anderson andMartha P. Rogers, Personnel Testing and Equal EmploymentOpportunity (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government PrintingCffice, December, 1970).

16. Richard E. Biddle, Discrimination: What Does It Mean? ,2. cit. , p. 7 referring to Moody v. Albermarle, Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals.

17. William K. Hunter and Thomas J. Culligan, "An Analysisof Factors to Predict Work Performance of Oakland PoliceOfficers," James M. Newman, Assessment of PoliceRecruitment, Selection and Training: An InterdisciplinaryApproach, Final Report: Recruitment and Selection (Berkeley,California: Education/Research, Inc. , February, 1972).

18. The middle individuals were eliminated because their in-clusion would cloud the process of discriminating betweentop and bottom performers and because the differences inthe raw scores on which the rankings are based was notnearly as distinctive for the middle 60 as for the top andbottom 30. Two more were eliminated due to lack of testscores and background information. See William K. Hunterand Thomas J. Culligan, ibid. , pp. vi-3.

19. Ibid. , Table 1, pp. vi-10.

20. Ibid.

21. William K. Muir, "Personal Characteristics that Contributeto Good Police Work, James M. Newman, Assessment of

249

Police Recruitment, Selection and Training: An Inter-disciplinary Approach, Final Report: Recruitment andSelection, 22. cit.

22. Ibid. , pp. vii-33.

23. Ibid. , pp. vii-37.

24. Ibid. , pp. vii-38.

25. Ibid. , pp. vii-42.

26. Ibid. , pp. vii-43.

27. Dr. Floyd 0. Due, "History and Personality CharacteristicsFavoring Success as a Police Officer," unpublished paper,1972.

28. Talk with James M. Newman, Personnel Director, City ofOakland, July 17, 1974.

29. State of California, Fair Employment Practices Commission,Affirmative Action Survey Thy California FEPC, May, 1974,58 pp. , unpublished paper.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. United S.trates District Court, Northern District of California,Clarence Penn et al. vs. William Stumpf et al. , Civil ActionNo. C-69-239 OJC, Consent Decree December 20, 1973,p. 5.

33. Oakland Civil Service Office.

34. State of California, Fair Employment Practices Commission,Affirmative Action Survey by California FEPC, 22.. cit.

35. Ibid.

36. Oakland Civil Service Rule 4:03, July 20, 1971.

250

37. See Silas Ector v. City of Torrance, 2 Civil No. 39769,California Court of Appeals.

38. Oakland City Council Resolution No. 51836, October 26, 1971.

39. United States District Court, Northern District of California,Clarence Penn et al. vs. William Stumpf, et al. , Civil ActionNo. C-69-239 OJC, Consent Decree, December 20, 1973,P. 3.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Oakland Civil Service Office, "Interim Progress Report onMinority Recruiting Program for the Bay Area," unpublishedpaper.

43. Ibid.

44. James M. Newman, July 17, 1974.

45. Oakland City Council Resolution No. 41933, OCCB, andOrdinance No. 8850 C. M. S. , February 1, 1974.

46. State of California, Court of Appeals, First AppellateDistrict, Division Three, Veragene Hardy vs. William F.Stumpf, 1 Civ. 32689, March 15, 1974.

47. Ibid.

48. Federal District Court, Joan Hail vs. James S. White,g st 2, 1973.

Ibid.

50. J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, "Brief

Appeals, Ninth Circuit, April 5, 1974, 29 pp.

51. State of California, Commission on Peace OfficersStandards and Training, A Career in Law Enforcement,

Hail vs. James S. White, " No. 74-1038, U. S. Court offor the United States as Amicus Curiae, in case of Joan

October, 1969.

251

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Joseph A. Kershaw and Roland N. McKean, TeacherShortages and Salaries (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962).

57. Roger W. Schmenner, "The Determination of MunicipalEmployee Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol. LV, No. 1, February, 1973, pp. 83-91.

252

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our search for an explanation of and a solution to the

alleged shortages of police manpower in the 1960's has led us

to three distinct theoretical models.

First, the simplest economic solution to the problem is

to raise relative wages of policemen sufficiently to eliminate

the shortage. The slightly richer Arrow and Capron concep-

tion of dynamic shortages adds that information gaps must be

filled and institutional decisions made, so the wage adjustments

might take some time. If demand continues to increase faster

than supply, moreover, a shortage could be sustained indefi-

nitely; the adjustment process would be an ongoing one.

Secondly, it is argued, most persuasively by Eugene J.

Devine, that local governments are monopsonistic employers

of certain categories of labor, including policemen. Therefore,

shortages in these categories arise because a monopsonist will

experience job vacancies in equilibrium, at a monopsony wage,

and will neither raise wages nor recruitment costs sufficiently

to eliminate them. The shortage, then, is a function of market

power and an equilibrium result.

253

Thirdly, in the most rigorous treatment, Ronald Ehren-

berg stresses the complex interaction between wages, hiring

standards, authorized employment levels, and vacancy rates.

He combines them in a utility maximizing model and emerges

with a set of formal relationships among them, which are

spelled out clearly but are too complex to yield simple conclu-

sions. He explores, as well, the problem of selecting employees

from heterogeneous applicants, given authorized employment and

wage levels, by choosing a minimum acceptable quality level,

defined perhaps by a vector of hiring standards. He specifies

theoretically how to choose this minimum acceptable quality

level in order to maximize the expected value of the net gain to

society. He presents in detail the effect of changes in wages,

number of applicants, authorized employment level, or value

of the public service on the minimum acceptable quality level

and on the expected vacancy rate.

How useful are these models in understanding the exper-

ience of the City of Oakland in the 1960's and 1970's? Particu-

larly high vacancy rates of 6. 3 percent in 1966 and 6.1 percent

in 1968 existed (see Table 4-U). Complaints of shortages of

qualified applicants were loud and persistent, in spite of well

developed national recruiting campaigns and starting salaries

254

equal to 113 percent in 1966 and 117 percent in 1968 of the average

earnings of San Francisco-Oakland area production workers in

manufacturing (see Table 4-7). Did the apparent shortages re-

flect a disequilibrium situation which would be resolved by

relative wage increases? Did they reflect a monopsonistic

equilibrium? Did they emerge from the definition of quality

inherent in the selection process? Can we choose one explana-

tion, or a combination of explanations, or none?

Our evidence is consistent with a dynamic shortage ex-

planation, in which the lags in market adjustment were ultimate-

ly corrected. In 1968, patrolmen's starting salaries were in-

creased twice, 8. 7 percent in July and 6. 5 percent in August.

The starting salary relative to production workers' wages rose

from 117 percent in July, 1968, to 125 percent in July, 1969, to

135 percent in July, 1970, and back to 125 percent thereafter.

Simultaneously, general economic conditions worsened, poli-

tical turmoil lessened, departmental image improved, and

attempts to attract more minorities to the force were launched.

The vacancy rate declined from 6.1 percent of authorized posi-

tions in July, 1968, to zero in June, 1969, and remains very

small. The complaints have shifted from general shortages of

qualified applicants to shortages only of qualified minority

applicants.

255

The implications of conventional economic postulates are

supported as well by the removal of 20 authorized patrolman

positions in July, 1974, a classic employment response to con-

tinued salary increases brought about by the pressures of infla-

tion. The demand for public employees may well be responsive

to wage increases.

We reject the monopsony explanation that the shortages of

the 1960's were equilibrium positions at a monopsony wage.

There is no eviderce of the exercise of monopsony power. Po-

lice departments compete for ambiguously defined qualities like

trainability and good character with a wide range of private

employers. Policemen do not possess specific, unique skills

or licenses which can only be sold to police departments. More-

over, core city police departments compete with surrounding

suburbc,n and rural departments. Their status does not yield

monopsony power to offer lower wages, but demands compen-

sating differentials for the greater difficulties and tensions in-

volved.

We believe, however, in greater complexity than the

simplest economic explanation allows. We support Ehrenberg's

emphasis on the interactions among wages, hiring standards,

authorized employment levels and vacancy rates. We would

256

add recruitment and training as well. Ehrenberg stresses the

theoretical importance of the minimum acceptable quality level

chosen, but dismisses its substance as "not directly observable."

We have concentrated on observing and defining the vector of

hiring standards of the Oakland POlice Department, and the

changes therein, between 196r. and 1974. We have found that the

particular recruitment sources, hiring standards and selection

processes used determine directly the available labor supply

and the substantive composition of the police force.

The policing job does not lend itself to clear economic

analysis by specifying a production function, determining derived

demand functions, and stating the qualities required of the labor

supply. It is not only a public service, with all the attendant

difficulties. of defining prices and outputs, but it is a politically

sensitive public service with inherently contradictory elements.

The ambiguities of the job, and, therefore, of the qualities

necessary for its successful performance, are discussed in

Chapter 2.

Nevertheless, prevailing ideas about the minimum accept-

able characteristics of policemen were translated into detailed

requirements about age, height, weight, vision, and education,

and screened further by Mental Adaptability, Civil Service,

257

Physical Agility, and Oral selection examinations, all of which

seriously restricted the available labor supply. The Oakland

Police Department's Personnel Division estimated that less

than half of one percent of Oakland's total population in 1969 was

eligible to apply and approximately one-tenth of one percent

would pass successfully through the selection process. If the

male population 21 to 32 years old is used as a base, still only

slightly over 2 percent of that age group would succeed in the

tests. Clearly the qualifications and selection devices chosen

were partly responsible for the shortage complaints.

What characteristics were sought by the Mental Adapta-

bility tests, the Civil Service test, the Physical Agility test, and

the Oral examination? Using data from 2, 366 employment appli-

cations submitted between 1965 and June, 1971, and multiple

regression techniques, we investigated the determinants of

success in the selection process. We find, for example, that

while high school graduation or its equivalent is the only formal

educational requirement, the probability of success in the Men-

tal Adaptability is increased by large magnitudes as years of

higher education increase from some years of junior college

through three to four years of senior college or a college de-

gree. Senior college education still has a significant effect,

moreover, on the ability to pass the Civil Service test.

258

Local residence appears on balance to have a negative

effect on the probability of selection in these years of national

recruiting. Out-of-state candidates, particularly those found

on college campuses, would be functioning in a national, pro-

fessional labor market for law enforcement personnel, seeking

out the best career opportunities. They would be likely to have

invested in more search and more self-selection before applying,

and, therefore, to be more motivated or interested than the

average local resident. Turnover figures show, however, that

out-of-state residents would also be more likely to resign than

California residents (see Table 2-7) to take better professional

opportunities elsewhere.

Minority status, whether measured directly or indirectly

by the proxy of high school attendance in the South, had a large

and significant negative effect on the probability of passing the.

written tests. In 1966, only 3 percent of the Oakland police

force was minority: by the end of 1970, the percent minority

had increased to 6. 5 (see Table 6-2). The small minority

representation seemed to be a direct result of recruitment and

selection policies which reinforced the suspicious attitude of

the minority community towards the police, an alien organiza-

tion.

259

The pressures of the 1970's have produced policy changes

which have significantly increased minority representation on

the force to 16 percent of the whole force and 61. 0 percent of

the new hires in 1973. Moreover, the Oakland experience has

demonstrated that minority representation can be improved

without sacrificing standards of quality. Widely publicized

changes in recruitment emphasis, rendered concrete and

credible by a residence requirement, an Affirmative Action

program, mass media advertising, and demonstrable results,

have clearly changed the composition and the public image of

the department. The Mental Adaptability and Civil Service

general knowledge tests have been replaced by a more content

valid written test, primarily of reading comprehension. Mi-

nority group members are still substantially more likely to

fail the written test than others (see Table 6-4). It wo.Ild be

interesting, in future research, to compare the determinants

of success on the new written test with the determinants of

success on the Mental Adaptability and Civil Service tests be-

tween 1965 and 1971. Yet, in spite of the continued use of a

written test, Oakland, through concentrated efforts on other

fronts, seems well on its way to eliminating the adverse effect

of its selection process on the minority composition of the

260

police force. Even in 1971, those minority members who passed

the written had a higher probability of passing the Oral than

other candidates: this continues to be true. No other device in

the selection process has an adverse effect on minority candi-

dates, and today's t ggressive minority recruiting has clearly

brought positive results.

As for other characterisLics sought by the selection pro-

cess, specific investment by applicants in police science courses

is unimportant, but previous experience as a policeman does

have a significant, positive effect on the probability of success

at. all stages of the process. The role of previous salary as an

indicator to the department of an applicant's potential perfor -

mance is clouded by the difficulties of filtering out partmtime

from full-time work. The highest previous salary category,

$700 a month or more, does have a consistent, significant

positive effect on the probability of a man being accepted. Other

salary groups were inconclusive. If, however, we minimize the

distorting effects of part-time work by looking separately at the

group with no college experience, higher salaries do indicate

progressively greater probabilities of being selected, as econ-

omic theory would predict. The number of previous jobs enum-

erated on the application is unimportant. Age has a.small,

261

negative effect on passing the Mental Adaptability, resulting

from the well-known attrition of test-taking ability with age,

holding education constant. Age, however, has a positive effect

on passing the Cral, reflecting a concern with the candidate's

maturity.

The legal insistence in the 1970's that if a selection device

has an adverse effect on the employment of groups protected by

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it must be demonstrably job-

related, and the empirical difficulties inherent in proving job-

relatedness, have led women to challenge other standards

hallowed by tradition. The distinction between patrolman and

policewoman has been removed by Oakland through the estab-

lishment of the combined category, police officer. Height and

weight stattlards which would exclude the majority of women

from the police officer job have been abolished by court order.

Another substantial change in the composition of the Oakland

Police Department seems imminent. All hiring has currently

been suspended while a job-related Physical Agility exam which

will adequately screen the strength and physical abilities of

women is developed. How many women will succeed in being

selected and how well women will be able to perform as police

officers remains to be seen. Far reaching cultural adaptations

262

may well be required of the police organization. Perhaps they

will lead to a long overdue substantive restructuring of the job

based on a more careful appraisal of matching particular police

functions and individual skills.

Thoughtful analysis and restructuring of the job may well

yield a conception of a professional police officer based not on

qualities like college graduation, which have only an ambiguous

relationship to job requirements and performance, but on a

clear understanding of the dimensions and demands of the job.

We rejected differential economic incentives to retain more

educated police officers because, in the existing structure, its

threats to morale, equality, comraderies, and organizational

effectiveness seemed to far outweigh any possible gain. Far

better use could be made of economic incentives in the context

of a clear understanding of the performance requirements of

the job.

We have concluded, therefore, that economic incentives,

recruitment and selection must be viewed together. More

attempts must be made to understand their interaction, both in

theory and in practice. Techniques must be developed to

observe, analyze and understand vectors of hiring standards

and their economic functions. In the pol ice case, the vector of

263

hiring standards used defines not only the potential labor

supply, but the nature of the job itself. It will be fascinating

to watch the substantive effects of changes in the vector of

hiring standards on the police job of the future.

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Miller, Christine M. , "A Study of the MMPI as a Selection Devicefor the Oakland Police Department," in Newman, James M. ,and Rogin, William E. , Assessment of Police Recruitment,Selection and Training: An Interdisciplinary Approach,Final Report: Recruitment and Selection. Berkeley, Calif.Education/Research, Inc. , February, 1972, pp. IV-1 - IV-21.

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Mort3nsen, Dale T. , "A Theory of Wage and EmploymentDynamics, " in Phelps, Edmund S. , Microeconomic Founda-tions of Employment Theory. New York: W.W. Norton, 1970, pp. 167-211.

"Job Search, the Duration of Unemploy-,

ment, and the Phillips Curve," American Economic Review60 (December,1970), pp. 847-861.

Muir, William K. , "Personal Characteristics that Contribute toGood Police Work, " in Newman, James M. , and Rogin,William E. , Assessment of Police Recruitment, Selectionand Training: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Final Re-port: Recruitment and Selection. Berkeley, Calif. :Education/Research, Inc. , February, 1972, pp. VII-1 VII-124.

Mullineaux, Jewel E. , "An Evaluation of Predictors Used toSelect Patrolmen," Public Personnel Review 16, pp. 84-86.

Newman, James M. , Rogin, William E. , Hunter, William K. ,and Vora, Shanti, "Investigation of a Method for Identifica-tion of the High-Risk Police Applicant: An Analysis andInterpretation Based on Available Data," Can High RiskPolice Applicants Be Identified? , Institute for Local SelfGovernment, Berkeley, California, July, 1971.

0i, Walter, "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal ofPolitical Economy LXX (December,1962), pp. 538-555.

Sanders; Eric P. , "Oakland Police Sample: A DescriptivePsychographic Study," in Newman, James M. , and Rogin,William E. , Assessment of Police Recruitment Selectionand Training: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Final Re-port: Recruitment and Selection. Berkeley, Calif., :Education/Research, lnc. , February, 1972, pp. V-1 - V-33.

Schmenner, Roger W. , "The Determination of Municipal EmployeeWages," Review of Economics and Statistics LV(1) (February,1973), pp. 83-91.

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Tent, Deborah Ann, and Eisenberg, Terry, The Selection andPromotion of Police Officers: A Selected Review of RecentLiterature, " The Police Chief 39(2) (February, 1972), pp.20 - 29 .

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Wentworth, Kenneth L., "Development and Use of Written Tests,"in Donovan, J. J. , editor, Recruitment and Selection inthe Public Service. Chicago: Public Personnel Association,1968, pp. 112-122.

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Whalen, Charles, and Zannini, Susan, "Trends in Police andFire Salaries," International City Managers' AssociationUrban Data Service Reports 3 (October,1971), pp. 1-16.

Wilensky, Harold L. , "Varieties of Work Experience," in Borow,Henry, Man in a World at Work. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1964, pp. 125-154.

Wilson, James Q. , "Generational and Ethnic Differences amongCareer Police Officers," American Journal oflociologyLXIX(5) (March, 1964), pp. 522-528.

Yett, Donald E., "Causes and Consequences of Salary Differen-tials in Nursing," Inquiry VII (March,1970), pp. 78-99.

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PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Anderson, Betty R. , and Rogers, Martha P. , Personnel Testingand Eaual Employment Opportunity. Washington, D. C. :U. S. Government Printing Office, December, 1970.

Baehr, Melaney E. , Furcon, John E. , and Froemel, Ernest C. ,

Psychological Assessment of Patrolman Qualifications inRelation to Field Performance. Washington, D. C. : U. S.Government Printing Office, November 5, 1968.

City of Oakland, California, City Planning Department, Optionsfor Oakland: A Summary Report on the Oakland 701 Project.December,1969.

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S. C. , 2000e, et Eq. ), Section 7C3(a) (2).

Cohen, Malcolm S. , Rea, Samuel A. , Jr. , and Terman, RobertI. , "A Micro Model of Labor Supply, " U. S. Department ofLabor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Staff Paper No. 4.Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,1970.

Danielson, William F. , Police Compensation , a report submittedto the President's Commission on Law Enforcement andAdministration of Justice, 1967.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines onEmployee Selection Procedures, Federal Register, 35(149)(August 1, 1970). Washington, D. C.

Germann, A. C. , "Recruitment, Selection, Promotion and CivilService, " President's Commission on Law Enforcement andthe Administration of Justice. Washington, D. C. : U. S.Government Printing Office, 1967.

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,"Report on the Police " Washington, D. C.: U. S.Government Printing Office, 1931.

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LawEnforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department

274

of Justice, "Predicting Patrolman Performance" (asummaiy blurb of the Baehr, et al. study).

"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968," PublicLaw 90-351, 90th Congress, HR 5037, June 19, 1968.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administrationof Justice, Task Force Report: The Police. Washington,D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administrationof Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,February,1967.

State of California, Commission on Peace Officers Standards andTraining, A Career in Law Enforcement. October,1969.

State of California, Commission on Peace Officers Standards andTraining, California Law Enforcement Recruitment Pro-kram. Law Enforcement Assist. Proj. 232, August 31, 1968.

State of California, Department of Human Resources Development,California Labor Market Bulletin. July. 1971, to July, 1973.

State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, Divisionof Labor Statistics and Research, California Labor Statis-tics Bulletin. July, 196L. to July, 1973..

State of California, Fair Employment Practices Commission,Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. October,1972.

U. S. Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report on theNational Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. NewYork: Bantam, 1968.

U. S. Bureau of Employment Security, Dictionary of OccupationalTitles, 3rd edition. Washington, D. C. : U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1965.

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275

1 and Section 2. Washington, D. C. : U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1972.

U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 General Social and EconomicCharacteristics, Final Report PC (1)-C6 California.Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,1972.

U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of InvestigationNational Academy, The FBI Pledge for Law Enforcemer:tOfficers. Washington, D. C. : Federal Bureau of Investi-gation National Academy, 1959.

OTHER SOURCES

American Psychological Association, "Standards for Educationaland Psychological Tests and Manuals." Washington, D. C. :American Psychological Association.

American Trial Lawyers Association, "Crime and Its Cause inLos Angeles." Lancaster, Calif." Golden West PublishingCompany, 1966.

Aussieker, M. W. , Jr., "Police Collective Bargaining." Chicago,Ill. : Public Personnel Association, 1969.

Bay Counties Peace Officers Association and State of California,Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training,"Symposium: Professional Police: Fact or Fantasy."April 3, 1968.

Berman, Louise, "An Empirical Study of Economic Determinantsof Public Employee Salary Schedules: City Policemen,Firemen, Typists and Stenographers, " unpublished paper,University of California, Berkeley, 1968.

Biddle, Richard E. , Discrimination: What Does it Mean?Chicago: International Personnel Management Association,

City of Oakland, City Council, Oakland City Council ResolutionNo. 41933, OCCB, and Ordinance No. 8850 C. M. S. ,February 1, 1974.

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City of Oakland, City Council, Oakland City Council ResolutionNo. 51836, October 26, 1971.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, Announcement for Patrol-man Examination, September, 1970.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, Files.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, "Interim Progress Reporton Minority Recruiting Program for the Bay Area, " un-published paper: 1973.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, "Oakland Police DepartmentRecruitment and Patrolman Selection Process, " December,1964, unpublished memorandum.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, Oakland Civil Service Rule4:03, July 20, 1971.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, Employment Application.

City of Oakland, Civil Service Office, "Inter-Office Letter fromCity Attorney Edward A. Goggin and Deputy City AttorneyWilliam C. Sharp to James M. Newman subject Penn v.

" April 10, 1972.

City of Oakland, Police Department, "Demographic Analysis,"unpublished paper, 1973.

City of Oakland, Police Department, Personnel Division, Memofrom Lieutenant J. McArthur, unpublished, 1973.

City of Oakland, "The City of Oakland's Affirmative ActionProgram," unpublished paper, 1973.

Cohen, Bernard, and Chaiken, Jan M., Police BackgroundCharacteristics and Performance. New York: New YorkCity Rand Institute, August,1972.

Deane, R. T. , "Simulating an Econometric Model of the Marketfor Nurses," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Universityof California, Los Angeles, 1971.

277

Devine, Eugene J. , "Manpower Shortages in Local GovernmentEmployment," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Universityof California, Los Angeles, 1969.

Due, Floyd 0. , "History and Personality Characteristics FavoringSuccess as a Police Officer," unpublished paper, 1972.

, "Psychiatric and Psychological Screeningof Police Applicants to an Urban Department: ComputerAnalysis of 113 Cases," paper delivered to meetings ofAmerican Psychiatric Association, May 13, 1970.

Encyclopedia of Careers and Vocational Guidance, revised edition,IL Chicago: J. G. Ferguson.

Hogan, Robert, "A Study of Police Effectiveness. " Washington,D. C. : Experimental Publication System, AmericanPsychological Association, June, 1970.

Hoover, J. Edgar, "Should You Go into Law Enforcement? "New York: New York Life Insurance, 1961.

Lewin, David, "Wage Determination in Local Government Em-ployment," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, 1971.

Mayall, Donald, Human Resources Development for Oakland:Problems and Policies, SRI Project ID-5638. Menlo Park,Calif. Stanford Research Institute, December, 1968.

Newman, James M. , and Rogin, William E. , Assessment ofPolice Recruitment, Selection and Training: An Inter-disciplinary Approach, Final Report: Recruitment andSelection, CCCJ Grant No. 0156. Berkeley, Calif. :Education/Research, Inc. , February,1972.

Newman, James M. , and Rogin, William E. , Assessment ofPolice Recruitment Selection and Trainin: Interim Resorton Training, CCCJ Grant No. 0156. Berkeley, Calif. :Education/Research, Inc. , March, 1971.

New York Times, Wednesday, August 15, 1973.

New York Times, Sunday, December 3, 1973.

-

278

O'Connor, George W. , "Survey of Selection Methods. " Washing-ton, D. C. : International Association of Chiefs of Police,1962.

Otis, Arthur S. , Otis Self-Administering Tests of Mental Ability,Manual of Directions and Key (Revised) for Intermediateand Higher Examinations. New York: Harcourt, Braceand World, 1922.

Otis, Arthur S. , and Lennon, Roger T. , Otis-Lennon MentalAbility Test, Manual for Administration. New York:Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967.

State of California, Fair Employment Practices Commission,Affirmative Action Survey by California FEPC, unpublishedpaper, May,1974.

Thompson, Frank J , "The Politics of Public Personnel Policyin a Core City," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Universityof California. Berkeley, 1973.

Tobin, James, "The Application of Multivariate Probit Analysisto Economic Survey Data, " unpublished Cowles FoundationDiscussion Paper No. 1, July 14, 1955, as revised December1, 1955.

Watts, Harold W. , "An Introduction to the Theory of BinaryVariables (or All About Dummies)," unpublished SystemsFormulation and Methodology Workshop Paper 6404, SocialSystems Research Institute, University of Wisconsin,April 23, 1964.

Yett, Donald, "An Economic Analysis of the Hospital NursingShortage," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, 1968.

COURT CASES

State of California, Court of Appeals, Silas Ector v. City ofTorrance, 2 Civil No. 39769.

State of California, Court of Appeals, Veragene Hardy vs.William F. Stumpf, 1 Civil No. 32689, March 15, 1974.

279

U S Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Joan Hail vs. James S.White, "Brief for the United States vs. Amicus Curiae, '1No. 74-1038 J Stanley Pottinger, April 5, 1974, casepending

U S District Court for Eastern District of Virginia, RichmondDivision, United States of America v Virginia Electricand Power Compaq et al. , Civ. A. No. 638-70-R, May4, 1971

U S District Court. Massachusetts, Julius Arrington et al v.Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Civ. A. No.69-681, December 22, 1969

U S District Court, Minnesota, Fourth Division, Carter et al.vs Hugh Gallagher et al March 9, 1971

U. S District Court, Northern District of California, ClarencePenn et al. vs William Stumpf et al. (1970) 308, Fed Supp.1238

U. S District Court, Northern District of California, ClarencePenn et al vs William Stumpf et al , Civil Action No.C-69-239 OJC, Consent Decree, December 20, 1973

U. S Supreme Court, Willie S Griggs v Duke Power Company,28 L ed Zd 158, March 8, 1971.