document of the world bankdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · document of the world bank...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003790

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-75710)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$80 MILLION TO THE

UNITED MEXICAN STATES

FOR A

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

June 24th, 2016

Transport and Information and Communications Technology Global Practice Colombia and Mexico Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Exchange rate at appraisal, effective January 14, 2008

Currency unit = Mexican Peso MX$10.91 = US$1

Exchange rate at closing, effective December 31, 2015

Currency unit = Mexican Peso

MX$17.24 = US$1

FISCAL YEAR: January 1–December 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMITI Asociación Mexicana de la Industria de las Tecnologías de la Información (Mexican Association for the Information Technology Industry)

CANIETI Cámara Nacional de la Industria Electrónica de Telecomunicaciones y Tecnologías de la Información (National Chamber for Electronics Industry of Telecommunciations and Information Technologies)

CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration

CPS World Bank Country Partnership Strategy

DGCIED Dirección General de Comercio Interior y Economía Digital (General Directorate for Digital Economy and Domestic Trade)

DGDEON Dirección General de Desarrollo Empresarial y Oportunidades de Negocio (General Directorate for Business Development and Business Opportunities)

DGISCI Dirección General de Innovación, Servicios y Comercio Interior (General Directorate for Innovation, Services, and Domestic Trade)

DNS Digital National Strategy (Estrategia Digital Nacional) (Mexico)

ERR Economic Rate of Return

FI Financial Intermediary

FIT Financing of IT accreditation program

FM Financial Management

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoM Government of Mexico

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICR Implementation Completion and Results report

ICT Information and Communication Technologies

IP Implementation Progress

ISR Implementation Status and Results report

IT Information Technology

ITES Information Technology-Enabled Services

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MexicoFIRST Mexico Federal Institute for Remote Services and Technology

MS Moderately Satisfactory

MTR Mid-Term Review

MU Moderately Unsatisfactory

NAFIN Nacional Financiera S.N.C. I.B.D. (National Financing Agency)

NDP National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo)

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PDO Project Development Objective

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PROSOFT Programa para el Desarrollo de la Industria del Software (Program for the Development of the Software Industry)

PPF Project Preparation Facility

PPP Public-Private Partnership

S Satisfactory

SE Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy)

SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit)

SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises

SOA Service Oriented Architecture

WDI World Development Indicators

Senior Global Practice Director: Pierre Guislain

Sector Manager: Boutheina Guermazi

Project Team Leader: Arturo Muente-Kunigami

ICR Team Leader: Eva Clemente Miranda

UNITED MEXICAN STATES Information Technology (IT) Industry Development Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design .............................................. 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 73. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 144. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcomes ....................................................... 235. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 246. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 267. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 28Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 30Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 32Annex 3. Economic Analysis ........................................................................................ 45Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 48Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 50Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 83Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 84Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 85Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 86

MAP

i

A. Basic Information

Country: Mexico Project Name: Information Technology Development

Project ID: P106589 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-75710

ICR Date: 06/28/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO

Original Total Commitment:

USD 80.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 73.15M

Revised Amount: USD 73.15M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Secretary of Economy (Secretaría de Economía)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 06/18/2007 Effectiveness: 04/20/2010 04/20/2010

Appraisal: 01/18/2008 Restructuring(s): 09/04/2012 09/04/2014

Approval: 07/10/2008 Mid-term Review: 03/12/2012 03/12/2012

Closing: 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately SatisfactoryImplementing Agency/Agencies:

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

ii

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Information technology 83 83

Public administration- Information and communications 17 17

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 11 11

Other Financial Sector Development 44 44

Other Private Sector Development 45 45 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox

Country Director: Gerardo M. Corrochano Axel van Trotsenburg

Practice Manager/Manager:

Boutheina Guermazi Philippe Dongier

Project Team Leader: Arturo Muente Kunigami Eloy Eduardo Vidal

ICR Team Leader: Eva Clemente Miranda

ICR Primary Author: Pau Puig Gabarro F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to assist the Government of Mexico to implement an alternative strategy for PROSOFT (Program for the Development of the Software Industry, or Programa para el Desarrollo de la Industria del Software) to foster the creation of jobs in IT (Information Technology) companies in Mexico by improving their competitiveness and efficiency through access to: (a) a larger supply of trained personnel; (b) technologies,

iii

quality standards, and global marketing networks of multinational corporations; and (c) private debt finance. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO (Project Development Objective) was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : IT/ITES jobs created by the IT Industry as a result of training programs (jobs) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 20,000 40,918

Date achieved 07/10/2008 06/30/2013 10/26/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

204.6% achievement. Appraisal indicator; dropped at the 2012 restructuring. Final value provided by PROSOFT's monitoring and evaluation framework at the ICR mission; not from the official project M&E framework.

Indicator 2 : IT Companies' satisfaction rating with the IT Links Program (percentage of good and better responses)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

- 75%

Date achieved 07/10/2008 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Appraisal indicator; dropped at the 2012 restructuring.

Indicator 3 : Increased overall debt portfolio of IT Companies in the financial system (US$ million)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

5.8 20.0 36.0 47.20

Date achieved 07/10/2008 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 10/26/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achievement (against the revised target): 131.1%

Indicator 4 : Satisfaction with effectiveness of Mexico First training programs Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 80.00 87.00


New indicator. Achievement: 108.7%

Indicator 5 : Companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets

Value 0.00 390.00 701.00

iv

quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/10/2008 10/31/2015 10/26/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

New indicator. Achievement (against the revised target): 179.7%

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Component 1. Number of certificated persons from MexicoFIRST Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

- 30,000 64,293 102,527


Achievement (against the revised target): 159.5%

Indicator 2 : Component 2. Local companies associated to the IT.LiNKs program Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

- 75



Indicator 3 : Component 3. Number of IT Companies that participated in the FIT Accreditation Program

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

-- 250 100 100


Achievement (against the revised target): 100%

Indicator 4 : Component 4. Number of IT Park's projects supported by technical assistance and/or infrastructure


- 4 6 6


Achievement (against the revised target): 100%

Indicator 5 : Component 5. Outsourcing of Government Services

v

1. Government entities trained 2. Feasibility studies


- 10 4

12 5

15 6


Achievement (against the revised target): 125%; 120%

Indicator 6 : Component 6. Number of regulations affected by the project Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

- 30



Indicator 7 : Number of public officials trained on IT Sector Legal Framework Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 450 796



Indicator 8 : Number of IT clusters supported by the PROSOFT program Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0.00 14.00 16.00



G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/01/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 05/13/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 05/19/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 4 12/28/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 5 06/29/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 6 02/26/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.86 7 07/31/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.86 8 03/19/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.95

vi

9 06/05/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.95 10 01/02/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 25.27 11 07/10/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 25.27 12 04/05/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.54 13 12/16/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 55.59 14 07/20/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.06 15 01/05/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 68.92

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

09/04/2012 N MS MS 5.95

Change in: (1) Closing Date; (2) Reallocation of Funds; (3) M&E indicators and target values; (4) implementation arrangements. Reason: initial delayed in implementation, low disbursement rate, and low performance.

09/04/2014 N S MS 46.39

Change in Closing Date due to initial implementation delays. Reallocation of Funds to allow the project to impact areas with higher need for intervention such as training and certification of IT companies and labor pool and reducing barriers to access to financing.

vii

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Country Context. Over the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, Mexico implemented impressive reforms that led to a more open economic and political system and better integration within the world economy. At the time of project appraisal in 2007 Mexico belonged to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and had achieved investment grade. However, Mexico still faced substantial development challenges. The previous Administration (2006-2012) had outlined a National Development Plan (2007–2012) based on five strategic pillars: competitiveness, security and the rule of law, effective democracy, equality of opportunity, and environmental sustainability.

2. Sector Context. The offshoring of global services offered a distinct opportunity for Mexico to improve its competitiveness and generate employment. At the time of project identification in 2005, the addressable market for global offshoring of information technology (IT) services and IT-enabled services (ITES) was roughly US$300 billion, of which only about 10 percent had been realized. While the offshore IT industry grew at 21 percent annually from 2001 to 2005, the offshore information technology-enabled services (ITES) industry grew at an impressive 49 percent. India, by far the biggest player in this field, generated export revenues of US$31.4 billion in FY2007, and employed 1.6 million people in the IT/ITES industry. According to some international estimates, each job in the IT/ITES sector creates three to four jobs in sectors such as transportation, construction, health, entertainment, and others. However, Mexican firms did not use IT extensively in their business processes. The IT industry in Mexico, with about 80,000 employees at that time, accounted for only 3.1 percent of the GDP, compared to a 5.3 percent average in Latin America, 7.1 percent in high-income countries, and 8.8 percent in the United States. In 2006, at the time of appraisal, IT was deemed an essential ingredient in raising the productivity and improving the competitiveness of Mexican firms; however, the limited number of skilled and certified manpower was a major constraint for IT/ITES industry growth.

3. Government Strategy. A number of public initiatives were put in place to support the development of the IT industry. The main one was PROSOFT (Program for the Development of the Software Industry or Programa para el Desarrollo de la Industria del Software), which was launched in 2004 to promote growth and create jobs in IT/ITES. As of December 2006, it had provided around US$70 million for 580 projects, including company certification, staff training, technical assistance, and equipment procurement. The program had successfully implemented a complex yet comprehensive strategy and managed the federal PROSOFT fund aimed at public-private partnerships at the State level (upon request from the private sector) to foster the development of the industry. However, at that time, PROSOFT faced limitations mainly because: (i) only short-term initiatives supported any given annual feature of the program; (ii) the duration was uncertain due to annual approval of any new budget; and (iii) funds were limited for administration, promotion, monitoring, and evaluation.

2

4. Government Commitment to the Project. The Government of Mexico (GoM) requested the World Bank’s support to assess the IT and ITES sectors in Mexico. Accordingly, the Bank carried out a study on the “Development of an IT and ITES Services Industry in Mexico” and as a result the GoM requested the Bank’s support to help improve and expand PROSOFT seeking its technical expertise to expand initiatives in the medium term.

5. Rationale for Bank Involvement. The development of the sector required a multi-dimensional approach, and the Bank had a wide range of technical expertise in relevant areas. Furthermore, the Bank’s convening power and its global experience offered unique support to the GoM, in addition to the experience gathered in supporting similar initiatives in a number of countries, including India, Russia, and Sri Lanka1 which put the Bank in a strong position to provide qualified support to PROSOFT.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

6. The objective of the Project was to assist the GoM to implement an alternative strategy for PROSOFT to foster the creation of jobs in IT companies in Mexico by improving their competitiveness and efficiency through access to: (i) a larger supply of trained personnel; (ii) technologies, quality standards, and global marketing networks of multinational corporations; and (iii) private debt finance.2

7. The following indicators were used to monitor progress toward achieving the Project objective.

IT/ITES jobs created by the IT industry as a result of training programs (jobs) IT companies’ satisfaction rating with the IT LiNKs Program (percentage of “good” and

“better” responses) Increased overall debt portfolio of IT companies in the financial system (US$ million).

1.3 Revised project development objective (PDO) (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

8. The PDO was not revised. On September, 2012, an adaptive restructuring was approved to drop the following PDO indicators3:

PDO Indicator 1: “IT/ITES jobs created by the IT Industry as a result of training programs (jobs)”. Reason: Training programs provided by MexicoFIRST (Mexico Federal Institute for Remote Services and Technology) were initially envisioned to be aimed at people who wanted to get into the IT industry. However, as the entity was

1 infoDev, March 2007, “International Best Practice for Establishment of Sustainable IT Parks” (report prepared by Price Waterhouse Coopers).

2 The PDO definition in the PAD is slightly different (Mexican IT companies vs. IT companies in Mexico). The ICR team understands it is a minor semantic discrepancy, highlighted here for the record.

3 A “split evaluation,” per Appendix B of the ICR Guidelines, is not considered feasible or meaningful for this ICR even though PDO indicators were modified. At the time of the restructuring, only US$6.15 million had been disbursed (8.4 percent of total loan amount). With so little disbursed and so little achieved at that stage, actual measurements of most indicator values were not available. The ICR takes into account the post-restructuring indicators in assessing the Project outcomes.

3

designed, there was also a need to upgrade the existing labor pool. Thus, the indicator was not capturing the whole impact of the program and a new one was proposed.

PDO Indicator 2: “IT companies’ satisfaction rating with the IT LiNKs Program (percentage of ‘good’ and ‘better’ responses)”. The scope of Component B grew beyond the IT LiNKs Program to assist IT clusters and their companies in a more comprehensive way. Given that the impact of the Project turned broader, a new PDO indicator was proposed to indicate the number of companies that are able to access new markets for their products and services.

9. To replace those indicators, the following PDO indicators were created: PDO Indicator 4: “Satisfaction with effectiveness of MexicoFIRST training

programs”. PDO Indicator 5: “Companies with technical capacity, quality standard

certifications, and access to new markets”. 10. The target of the original PDO indicator that was kept was modified as a result of the increased focus on financing of IT accreditation (FIT) program:

PDO Indicator 3: “Increased overall debt portfolio of IT companies in the financial system (US$ million)” Original Target Value: 20.0 Formally Revised Target Value: 36.0

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

11. The Project beneficiaries were IT companies (and IT professionals) and Universities (and students pursuing IT-related degrees) that requested support for projects from PROSOFT through an IT Chamber such as the National Chamber of the Electronics Industry of Telecommunications and Information Technologies or Cámara Nacional de la Industria Electrónica de Telecomunicaciones y Tecnologías de la Información (CANIETI) and the Mexican Information Technologies Industry Association or Asociación Mexicana de la Industria de las Tecnologías de la Información (AMITI), or a Promotion Agency (e.g., State Promotion Agency).

1.5 Original Components

12. The original Project components are the following:

a. Human Skills Development ($38.3 million). This component would help the IT/ITES industry to ramp up and compete globally by increasing the quantity and quality of skilled manpower through training grants for technical, managerial, and English courses; certifications; seminars and workshops for faculty, students, and industry professionals; and potential recruits for the IT Industry.

b. Strengthening of IT Clusters and Selected State Agencies ($9.0 million). This component would help existing IT clusters and associations in promising States having high potential in the IT/ITES sector through: (i) providing access to technologies, processes, and markets by linking up with global IT companies; (ii) designing strategies to develop the IT/ITES sector; (iii) raising awareness among local businessmen on the benefits of

4

outsourcing and the usage of information technology in business and production processes; and (iv) awarding certification grants through the PROSOFT fund.

c. Financing of the IT Industry ($2.9 million). This component would support technical assistance to create and implement an accreditation program to improve IT companies’ access to finance. This program would seek to reduce the information asymmetry between financing intermediaries (FIs) and enterprises and thus facilitate credit to the sector. Business schools and other training centers would be invited to participate in the FIT program.

d. Supporting Infrastructure ($10.1 million). Experience in other countries shows that the IT industry can develop faster through agglomeration and clustering of small, medium, and big companies in close proximity to research centers, universities, financial institutions, and incubators. This component would support: (a) the design and bid specifications preparation and (b) the public sector investment in PPPs (public-private partnerships) to build and operate the IT parks.

e. Outsourcing of Government Services ($2.7 million). Experience in many countries has shown that the Government, being one of the most important users of IT and IT services, can help promote the development of the local IT industry by strategically sourcing its requirements from the private sector. This component would support the execution of a handful of subprojects at the Federal, State and municipal levels using innovative outsourcing and PPP approaches. It would also support the creation of an Integration Competency Center and the setting up of cost-effective technology escrow arrangements to improve the prospects of SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in securing business within and outside of the Government.

f. Strengthening of the Legal and Regulatory Framework and Institutions ($6.1 million). This component would include: (i) technical assistance to draft changes and improvements to the legal and regulatory framework; (ii) awareness raising campaigns for specific improvements of sector laws and regulations such as the “Sellos de Confianza” program; (iii) tailor-made professional training for legislators, judges, public officers, law enforcement officers, and technical experts in trials; (iv) creation of a center for disputes settlement within the Mexican Software Consortium; and (v) the creation of a local masters program in IT law to train professors of law on IT issues, regulations, and enforcement of best practices.

g. PROSOFT Strengthening and Project Management ($3.6 million). This component would include: (i) the creation and operation of an International Consultative Commission in PROSOFT to advise SE (Ministry of Economy or Secretaría de Economía) on new developments in the global IT industry to formulate new policies for the sector; and (ii) support to the SE to manage, implement, monitor, and evaluate the results of the Project.

1.6 Revised Components

13. Components were not revised (see Annex 1 for detailed information on reallocation of funds for components).

1.7 Other significant changes

5

14. On May 14, 2012, the GoM officially requested the restructuring of the project due to: (i) Low disbursements. As of 2010, only US$3 million out of the US$80 million had been disbursed4; and (ii) Low performance: as of 2010, several indicators did not achieve the milestones planned. NAFIN (National Financing Agency or Nacional Financiera S.N.C. I.B.D.) explained that additional time granted through a project extension was needed because of the long approval, contracting, and disbursement process, which was represented as follows: (i) subprojects approval by PROSOFT’s board; (ii) subprojects approval by World Bank; (iii) contracting process; (iv) subproject implementation; (v) presenting results and proof of payment; (vi) process reimbursement; and (vii) impact in indicators. This long sequence of processes explains that several project indicators did not reflect much progress in the first years.

15. Changes in schedule. Given the slow start since the institutional restructuring affecting the implementation unit, the Project was restructured after the mid-term review; where a two-phase extension (the second extension was subject to satisfactory implementation) was granted. The original project closing date (June 2013) was extended twice. First, on September, 2012, after the mid-term review, the Project was extended to December 31st, 2014. As after the first extension, implementation was satisfactory; in September 2014, the Project was extended to December 31, 2015 (see section 2.2).

16. Changes in Implementation Arrangements. The institutional arrangements of the Project also changed during preparation and implementation. During preparation, the SE unit that was supposed to manage both the Project and PROSOFT was the General Directorate for Domestic Trade and Digital Economy (DGCIED or Dirección General de Comercio Interior y Economía Digital). Soon after the loan agreement was signed, the SE decided that the Project and PROSOFT would be managed by the SE’s Business Development and Opportunities General Directorate (DGDEON or Dirección General de Desarrollo Empresarial y Oportunidades de Negocio) to leverage the capacity of its staff managing other larger funds. In January 2011, since the DGDEON’s team managed a large portfolio of funds that diluted the focus on PROSOFT and the Project, institutional arrangements inside SE changed and both the Project and PROSOFT were then managed by the SE Innovation, Services, and Domestic Trade General Directorate (DGISCI or Dirección General de Innovación, Servicios y Comercio Interior), which actually was the same original DGCIED team that had been renamed. In summary, institutional arrangements related to the implementation unit changed as follows: (i) DGCIED during project design, (ii) DGDEON during the first phase of implementation, and (iii) DGISCI during the second phase of implementation.

17. Changes in Funding Allocations. In 2012 and 2014 the Project was restructured according to the feedback received from the industry on its evolving needs, reallocating each component’s funds (see Annex 1).

18. Changes in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Indicator Targets. The targets of the following original intermediate indicators were modified. Higher revised targets were set due to the increased Project focus on activities in Components 1, 4, and 5, while

4 It is worth noting that the World Bank restructuring paper states a still low disbursement of US $6.14 million as of April 31, 2012.

6

Component 3 targeted value indicator was reduced due to the delay in implementation (see section 2.3 on M&E design).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

19. The Project was designed in close collaboration with the GoM. To inform the Project design, the Bank team provided significant technical support gained from its experience with similar initiatives in various countries, including China, Malaysia, India, Chile, and the Philippines.5 These experiences were especially relevant to the design of the Human Skill Development, Cluster Support, and Infrastructure components, and contributed to the success of activities such as the creation and successful operation of MexicoFIRST.

20. A key lesson was that the best outcomes are obtained when the private sector actors participate in the design and implementation of the programs to develop the industry. Therefore, the Project was designed with a strong private sector participation objective. Actually, the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY2008–FY2013 highlighted that the Project “was designed with strong private sector participation” as a lesson learned to be applied to future projects.

21. The project design reflected the desire of the client for comprehensive support from the World Bank for the full PROSOFT strategy. This produced a project with seven components—as outlined above—intended to generate impacts in all the key areas that were considered to constrain the industry’s development. Its disadvantage was that the level of complexity of the project was fairly high, which became demanding for the project implementation unit (PIU). To successfully manage such a complex project, an organizational structure was devised that includes a coordinator role, component managers with technical specialists for each component, and resource managers for fiduciary aspects. This organizational structure was successfully adopted by DGISCI with good results.

22. The multiplicity of components required that funds be transferred to numerous “implementing” or “beneficiary” entities 6 . This eventually led to some delays and inefficiencies due to inadequate capacity of the beneficiaries and/or their difficulties in complying with FM (financial management) and procurement requirements. In retrospect, it might have been advisable to limit components and beneficiary entities to a more manageable number. On the other hand, none of the components were dropped during the restructuring of 2012, when the opportunity presented itself (though some, like the infrastructure component, were downsized), reflecting the view of the client that the original comprehensive scope remained appropriate.

23. The risk that the Project’s institutional complexity and related procurement difficulties would contribute to implementation delays was not foreseen because the change of implementing agency occurred after project preparation. At the project design stage,

5 For further information, see Project Appraisal Document, Section D. 6 For further details, please see Table 5 of the Project Appraisal Document.

7

according to the PAD (Project Appraisal Document), the financial management risk was rated substantial, but it was focused on MexicoFIRST, and a financial management-oriented action plan to support MexicoFIRST was designed as a mitigation measure. However, other beneficiary institutions, which had to manage financial management and procurement-related processes through successive required clearances with SE, NAFIN, and the World Bank, did not receive similar readiness support ex ante, though such assistance was provided later. Moreover, as the Project was composed of many activities and funds were limited, some of these activities were at risk of not having sufficient funds to achieve maximum impact. For instance, the studies carried out under Component G, Strengthening of PROSOFT and Project Management, were useful to inform policy decisions and raise awareness, but were not focused on generating substantive outcomes such as implementation of reforms or improving the efficiency of systems.

24. The Project’s industry-driven approach ensured relevance and impact of the activities implemented under the Project. The fact that project activities were identified, prioritized, and proposed in direct collaboration with the IT industry itself (including academia), and endorsed by the State Governments, greatly strengthened the relevance of project interventions. Furthermore, the support provided by international experts participating in the International Consultative Commission set up by the Project ensured that activities were implemented in consistency with global IT Industry trends.

25. The two key outcomes in the PDO – (i) foster the creation of jobs in Mexican IT Companies (ii) by improving their competitiveness and efficiency – contributed directly to the achievement of higher level objectives such as “improvement of Mexico’s competitiveness in general, through the development of its IT industry” and “creation of quality jobs,” as described in the Project Appraisal Document. The PDO definition itself was too convoluted, as it included some introductory phrase (“support the GoM to implement an alternative strategy for PROSOFT”), subordinate clauses that obscured key outcomes, and intermediate outcomes (“a larger supply of trained personnel; technologies, quality standards and global marketing networks of multinational corporations; and private debt finance”). The PDO outcomes “creation of jobs” and “improving [the] competitiveness [of Mexican IT companies]” correspond well to the project design. However, the difference between “competitiveness” and “efficiency” of the IT industry was vague in the PDO and the Results Framework. Overall, the Project would have been better served by a simpler, clearer PDO.

2.2 Implementation

26. Despite initial delays and the Project’s technical and organizational complexity, implementation proceeded in an overall smooth manner —particularly in the second half of the Project, after the 2012 turnaround—and all project activities were implemented and concluded by the Project’s closing date. Under the Project, a total of 520 activities were successfully implemented.

27. After Board approval of the Project in July 2008, the SE decided to transfer the PROSOFT fund to the SE’s SME Unit. At that time, the SE had implemented a plan to consolidate the internal administration of the various funds managed among the SE’s Units

8

based on a rationale of cost optimization. As the SME Unit managed the largest funds within the SE, it was the unit selected for the reallocation of funds, including PROSOFT. This plan raised some concerns on project implementation, particularly due to (i) the potential disconnection of policy execution (new unit) from policy design (original unit); (ii) the loss of PROSOFT fund relevance if combined with the management of larger funds; and (iii) the need to ensure ownership in the new unit. In the missions conducted during that period, the Bank’s task team and management, the SE, and Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP or Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) worked closely together to assess and address these concerns. They also worked with the SME Unit, which had expressed its commitment to form a well-staffed PIU, on a plan to meet effectiveness conditions.

28. The new counterpart did not take full ownership of the Project and a PIU was not established. As a result, the loan was declared effective in April 2010, 21 months after board approval. At that stage, only about US$3 million of the loan had been disbursed. Effective project implementation only started in January 2011 after the Project was returned to the original DGCIED7. During that period of time, only activities that had started before the transfer of the Project were continued (mainly related to components A and F), though at a slow pace. Once the Project was transferred back, a fully functional PIU was rapidly established, and the pace of implementation of all components accelerated.

29. Even so, the rate of disbursement remained low until the 2012 restructuring, due to a combination of the following factors: (i) the time needed by participating entities to climb the World Bank procedures and project complexity learning curve; (ii) the need to update operational processes for some components; (iii) the inherently long implementation cycle for key PROSOFT programs, especially the skills development program (Component A) and the IT clusters program (Component B); and (iv) the fact that in Mexico, the Bank as lender does not provide budgetary additionality to implementing agencies, that is, the source of funds becomes a World Bank loan instead of from SHCP, but the amount is not necessarily increased. During the first half of the Project, withdrawal applications were submitted to the Bank in one block towards the end of each year because availability of funds did not depend on timely withdrawal applications.

30. A mid-term review (MTR) was held in March 2012, at which time the loan had disbursed only US$6.14 million. The MTR produced a plan for restructuring the Project, which included a first-phase extension of the closing date by 18 months, a commitment by the Government to reduce the PROSOFT project cycle from 20 to 15 months, a reallocation of project funds (see section 1.6), and revisions to some key and intermediate indicators and targets (see sections 1.3 and 1.7). The restructuring was accompanied by an understanding that the closing date would be further extended by 12 additional months if (i) the PROSOFT project implementation cycle was successfully reduced to 15 months and (ii) disbursements targets were met, which were US$20 million in 2012 and US$25 million in 2013. As it turned out, after the restructuring project implementation accelerated significantly, the disbursement and project cycle targets were met, and so in September

7 In the interim, it was renamed the Directorate of Innovation, Services, and Domestic Trade (DGISCI or Dirección General de Innovación, Servicios y Comercio Interior)

9

2014 a further 12-month extension of the closing date was granted (to December 31, 2015). Hence, as disbursements increased significantly and targets were met, restructuring can be considered highly effective.

31. The MTR provided an excellent opportunity to assess and redesign the Project in collaboration with the SE and the industry. The MTR convened the Project’s stakeholders (e.g., CANIETI, AMITI, INFOTEC), and a wide array of stakeholders from the sector, including beneficiaries, financing institutions, academia, and other government agencies. In this way, the MTR identified the Project’s weaknesses and strengths, particularly with regard to technical and implementation matters affecting the achievement of project objectives. As a result, the approach for some components was redesigned and additional actions, including those already mentioned, were outlined during the MTR to foster project performance.

33. In the case of Component D, Infrastructure (IT Parks), in which new infrastructure investments were initially planned and funded at US$10 million, it was determined at the 2012 MTR that such a level of investment in new IT parks was no longer necessary; rather, the focus should be on strengthening existing IT parks. In particular, this is the case given that, as a study carried out under the component revealed, the industry needed to address the significant weaknesses of the more than 30 such parks that were in operation at that time8. Therefore the amount of funds allocated in the Project for this component was reduced almost by half in the 2012 restructuring.

34. On the other hand, the Human Skills and Strengthening of IT Clusters components increased in scope. After the MTR, an additional US$3.6 million of funds were allocated to the skills component, as well as US$4.1 million to strengthen IT clusters (an increase of 45.9 percent). The MTR evidenced MexicoFIRST’s high performance (78 percent of people trained achieved the level of knowledge required to obtain a certification) and the key impact of capacity building and certifications for individuals and IT cluster companies, in the creation of jobs and the IT industry competitiveness.

35. Throughout implementation, procurement management proved to be challenging. This was not only because of the numerous beneficiary agencies participating, but also due to (i) NAFIN’s own procurement review, on top of which the World Bank’s due diligence was added; and (ii) ceilings for Bank prior reviews were low for the average size of procurement processes of this specific Project (particularly for Quality and Cost-Based Selection).

36. Exchange rate fluctuations had a negative impact on eventual loan disbursements. When the loan was signed, the exchange rate was about MX$13 per US$1, while at project closing it was about MX$18 per US$1. A final amount of MX$73.15 million was disbursed by April 30, 2016, which would have been about US$78.7 million, at the original exchange rate. The remaining US$1.3 million shortfall is accounted for by 64 subprojects that were canceled during the course of implementation because the Board (Consejo Directivo) of PROSOFT disapproved them as not in compliance with the operational rules of the fund.

8 “Modelo y Estrategia para el desarrollo de parques tecnológicos de México,” study funded by SE and presented at the MTR.

10

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

37. Design. The M&E system of the Project was reasonably well designed, as it enabled measuring all aspects of the PDO and components. It was positive that the key and intermediate indicators were revised to better measure the impacts achieved by the Project (see 1.3 and 1.7). Arguably, the PDO indicators introduced in the restructuring as replacements for “jobs created” (“Companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets” and “satisfaction with effectiveness of MexicoFIRST capacity building programs”) were not related to job creation or enhancement. The following component indicators were dropped, because they were not easy to collect or did not reflect precisely enough the development objectives: (i) intermediate result indicator for Component B: “Local companies associated to the IT.LiNKs program;” and (ii) intermediate result indicator for Component F: “Number of regulations affected by the Project.” They were replaced by the following indicators: (i) intermediate result indicator: “Number of IT clusters supported by the PROSOFT program”; and (ii) intermediate result indicator: “Number of public officials trained on IT Sector Legal Framework”. Given the difficulty to track the number of regulations that are being affected by the Project, the PIU (project implementation unit) proposed tracking the number of people that are being trained in IT law.

38. The strongest feature of the M&E system was—and remained so throughout the project life—that the indicators and data collection were integrated into PROSOFT’s overall M&E system and databases, rather than being a stand-alone system for the Project only. It is worth mentioning that the Project included tools to measure its impact, such as comprehensive surveys of MexicoFIRST participants, which enabled tracking the evolution of parameters such as industry demand trends and attribution of job creation to certifications obtained under the Project.

39. Implementation. M&E data were not reported in implementation status and results reports (ISRs) before 2014, due to the fact that the Project was largely stalled until 2011, and then restructured in 2012. However, the PROSOFT program did generate annual reports with output indicators and evaluations of the MexicoFIRST program. SE’s M&E system continued compiling data useful to measure job creation9 under the Project even though it was dropped in the 2012 restructuring.

40. Utilization. The Project’s M&E system measured relevant outcomes, not merely outputs. It was clear from the aide memoire of the MTR and the restructuring paper of 2012 that the M&E results, even though not reported in ISRs, influenced the redesign of the project (restructuring) and even the wider PROSOFT program. For example, the revision of Component B, IT Clusters, was informed by low numbers of firms participating, per the M&E indicators for this component. The SE counterparts reported to the Bank’s ICR (Implementation Completion and Results report) team that information generated by the Project’s and program’s M&E system, including satisfaction surveys of MexicoFIRST

9 SE measured job creation from IT companies participating as beneficiaries in activities funded by PROSOFT. This measurement was based on the IT companies’ commitment of potential new jobs to be created within a two-year timeframe.

11

beneficiaries, influenced the design of PROSOFT 3.0, with its new focus on expanding IT applications across numerous sectors of the economy.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

41. Safeguards. The project classified as Category “B” and triggered OP4.01 on Environmental Assessment, OP4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement, and OP4.10 on Indigenous Peoples. At the time of project preparation, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared. These safeguards were triggered mostly because of the infrastructure activities in Component 4 as designed at the appraisal stage, and an ESMF was prepared accordingly. However, due to the reduction of scope introduced with the 2012 restructuring (e.g. strengthening existing IT Parks instead of building new ones), no additional safeguards-related interventions were needed.

42. Fiduciary performance was significantly affected by the decision to transfer the Project to a different unit from the original one. Once the Project returned to its original unit, fiduciary issues were effectively addressed and financial and procurement performance proceeded well.

43. Financial Management was rated as “Satisfactory” (S) or “Moderately Satisfactory” (MS), except in the February 2011 ISR No. 6, where it was rated as “Moderately Unsatisfactory” (MU) because “the combination of weakness in financial management still jeopardizes the system’s capacity to provide timely and reliable information to manage and monitor the implementation of the project but the entity is likely to address the weakness soon.” Indeed, in the next ISR of July 2011, the financial management rating was upgraded to MS, as the deficiencies had been largely remedied. Overall there were no substantial FM shortcomings: financial reports were of good quality and provided on time and audits were delivered on schedule and indicated no significant problems.

44. Procurement was rated as “S” through 2010 (along with all other ratings), despite the severe effectiveness shortcomings and implementation delays, until it was downgraded to “MU” in February 2011 based on “no project implementation unit and no procurement specialist.” Procurement was upgraded to MS in June 2012 in response to the PIU being established and a procurement specialist was hired. However, the procurement rating was downgraded to “Unsatisfactory” (U) in the next ISR after a post-review found numerous instances of consultants selected out of compliance with Bank requirements. The procurement rating was restored to MS in April 2014, and it remained MS through the end of the Project.

45. Funds were managed by SE, but procurement documents were prepared by various institutions aggregating beneficiaries’ demands, such as IT chambers, and then submitted to SE, which submitted them to NAFIN, which sought the Bank’s non-objection prior to award of a contract. Often the first version of such procurement documents did not comply with the Bank’s requirements; hence, there were many instances of revisions and back and forth between the entities in that administrative chain. Such processing delays were particularly acute in the first years of the Project, prior to restructuring, when all the participating institutions were still becoming familiar with the procurement policies and procedures. This may have contributed to the first years’ low disbursement rates. Workshops organized with participating institutions and continued support from SE,

12

NAFIN, and the Bank supervision team, including procurement specialists, helped to alleviate this problem.

46. Another issue that hampered the disbursement rate was that ceilings for the Bank’s prior procurement review were too low, increasing the number of procurement processes. SE, NAFIN, and the Bank team made the case for raising the ceilings, which were eventually raised, but too late to have a significant effect under this Project.

47. No issues or impacts related to safeguards were identified.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

48. The Bank started collaborating at the technical level with SE in 2007, when the first phase of PROSOFT (2003–07) was ending; hence, the Bank’s timely engagement contributed valuable technical assistance for the two re-design processes undertaken to create PROSOFT 2.0 (2008–13) and PROSOFT 3.0 (2014–24).

49. A number of the Project’s institutional, technical, and financial contributions will continue in place under PROSOFT3.0. For instance, through the Skills Development, Clusters, and Outsourcing components, the Project helped to shape the strategy of PROSOFT 3.0 to foster IT adoption by other productive sectors, under the Digital Markets and Intelligent Rationalization strategies. Furthermore, MexicoFIRST, which was designed and created under the Bank-supported Project, will continue operating under the PROSOFT 3.0 Talent of Excellence strategy.

50. PROSOFT’s own funding allocation will continue after the Project. Likewise, MexicoFIRST, which was created under the Project, will continue operating with similar staffing given that prior to the end of the Project it had attained operational sustainability. Such continuity can be tracked through PROSOFT’s monitoring framework, which goes beyond the Project’s M&E framework. Thus, for instance, the level of satisfaction with the effectiveness of MexicoFIRST’s capacity building programs, and the number of companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets will be indicators that can be tracked beyond project closing.

51. Moreover, as a number of the activities implemented under the Project are considered good practices, project stakeholders could be active parts of South-to-South knowledge exchanges, such as the study tours provided to the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Nicaraguan delegations in 2014 and 2015 to Mexico to visit the Project. Mexican authorities and stakeholders participating in the Project could disseminate lessons learned during design and implementation in knowledge sharing events such as brown bag lunches at the Bank’s offices.

13

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

52. The Project’s objective was relevant for the goals in the National Development Plan (NDP or Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) established for the years 2007–201210, particularly in the second of its five pillars: economic competitiveness and generation of jobs. Moreover, several of the strategies in the NDP relied on ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) for (i) increasing labor force productivity and the Mexican economy’s competitiveness; (ii) increasing access to public services (education, health); and (iii) increasing the reach, efficiency, and accountability of the Government.

53. The World Bank Country Partnership Strategy for the period 2008–13 fully supported Mexico’s NDP 2007–12 with targeted interventions including lending for projects such as this. For instance, the CPS supported “startup firms in business process outsourcing and other information technology focused activities,” recognizing that the offshoring of global services offered a distinct opportunity for Mexico to improve competitiveness and generate employment (Pillar No. 2 of the NDP).

54. The Project remains highly relevant to Mexico’s current NDP (2013–18), which identifies ICTs as key enablers of public modernization, social inclusion, productivity, and high quality education, among others. Under its Prosperity Promotion Pillar, the NDP sets increased productivity as a key objective. The Project’s current relevance is reinforced further by Mexico’s first ever Digital National Strategy (DNS or Estrategia Digital Nacional)11 launched in November 2013, in particular, given its second objective, Digital Economy, whose first priority is to foster competitiveness and innovation in the ICT industry, as well as integration of the IT industry with other sectors.

55. Similarly, the Project is included in the current Bank CPS (2014–19) for Mexico, which states that the Project contributes to the achievement of the outcome “enhanced innovation capabilities for companies and in target states and industries.” The current CPS defines one of its outcomes under Thematic Area II: Improving Competitiveness as “improving human skills, infrastructure, links between local and global companies, and the financial, legal, and regulatory framework for information technology (IT).”

56. The Project constituted a ground-breaking initiative to support the development of the IT in Mexico on a large scale. Each component of the Project addressed a specific dimension of the industry and aimed at solving specific problems faced by companies in the IT sector in a sustainable manner. Overall, the Project’s approach was holistic, as it targeted all key aspects for increasing the industry’s quality jobs, efficiency, and competitiveness; namely: skills, international certifications, access to financial services, regulatory and legal framework, awareness raising amongst policy makers, collaboration between IT firms offering complementary services, infrastructure, government as anchor client for outsourcing of services, measuring impact, and informing public policies.

10 The NDP is available in Spanish in http://pnd.calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/index.php?page=home 11 http://cdn.mexicodigital.gob.mx/EstrategiaDigital.pdf

14

57. Its design included innovative programs such as MexicoFIRST, an entity that helps close the gap between academic capacity building and private sector needs in an effective and efficient manner. MexicoFIRST delivered 111,707 in 931 international certifications at a cost 31 percent lower than the market price. This resulted in the creation of numerous opportunities for highly qualified employment for Mexican IT professionals. MexicoFIRST is currently considered best-practice in skills development and is being sought as a model by other countries in Middle East and North Africa, Central America and South Asia.

58. Furthermore, Project component activities contributed to the achievement of efficiency and competitiveness objective as, for instance, capacity building to obtain certifications such as Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) improved IT companies’ productive processes (systematized application internal quality control measures to reduce IT development time, coding errors, and product delivery uncertainty of software solutions. Likewise, the IT.Link component proved to be relevant as nearly 100 local IT companies been registered to IT.Link program and 25 were certified, while 12 Mexican companies signed collaboration agreements with multinationals. This way, companies acquired international experience contributing to increase their competitiveness in global markets. Also, the focus of the financing program for IT on enabling investment in assets and job creation to foster competitiveness resulted in over 300 credit operations for Mexican IT SMEs.

59. The Project’s holistic scope was complemented by including a legal component and a Government outsourcing component. Under the legal component IT legislation of all States and the Federal government was completed, and several best practice laws and regulations, to be used by State officials to adapt their IT regulatory frameworks, were drafted.

60. The key challenge affecting the relevance of Project design was probably caused by the rapid evolution of the IT industry. In acknowledgement of this sector feature, the Project design sough flexibility to adapt to a fast changing environment. However, along implementation some components turned less relevant than originally planned. The Project was prepared in 2007. Since then, the IT industry changed and even though the PDO and overall components remained relevant, the needs among them shifted along implementation. For example, MTR confirmed that there was no longer a need for investing in infrastructure for new IT Parks, instead support for the improvement of existing ones though technical assistance (business models, private participation, etc.) became more important. And, along implementation, the GoM approved a law to regulate Public Private Partnerships for Government services. Therefore, the emphasis of Component 6, shifted towards the design and implementation of new business models and technologies that foster the creation of PPPs to provide cost-efficient solutions for the government.

61. Thus the project design was highly relevant in comprehensively covering most of the key sectoral goals, in line with the PDO. Based on the above, the relevance of objectives and design is rated “High.”

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

15

62. The Project successfully supported the GoM in the implementation of a distinct strategy for PROSOFT under which more jobs were created among more competitive and efficient IT Mexican companies. The project had a direct impact on the productivity and attractiveness of the Mexican IT Industry, by increasing the quality of the labor pool and facilitating access by SMEs in Mexico to international markets and financing. The Project greatly surpassed its targets of increasing the IT industry talent pool, and the number of IT companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets. On average, the MexicoFIRST initiative alone generated almost one-third of the new jobs created in the entire industry during the project period.

63. This ICR considers that the essential PDO outcomes are: (i) “to foster the creation of jobs in Mexican IT Companies” and (ii) “improving their competitiveness and efficiency.” Annex 2 includes a table that summarizes the relation between each PDO outcome, corresponding indicators, and their level of achievement.

64. “Fostering the creation of jobs in IT Companies in Mexico” (High). The Project contributed to creating a total of 40,918 jobs. The data used here relate to a specific type of impact generated through a specific project activity: new jobs created for university students through the MexicoFIRST program over the period 2008 to 2015. The cumulative total of jobs created is; based on an initial total of 82,027 university students who attended MexicoFIRST courses, of whom 78 percent received certifications, and of those, 40,189 ended up with a new job in the IT industry with which they were satisfied.12 These new jobs are directly attributable to the Project, as MexicoFIRST was established under the World Bank funds. The target achieved is more than double than set in the original project results framework (40,918 vs. 20,000 new jobs).13 Having been a major contributor to the MexicoFIRST and IT Clusters programs, the Project also played a significant role in surpassing the targets for satisfaction with the effectiveness of MexicoFIRST’s capacity building programs by 8.7 percent over the target and persons certified under MexicoFIRST by 60 percent over the target. Satisfaction surveys from MexicoFIRST trainees revealed a strong causality relation between obtaining certifications thanks to the capacity building, and finding a satisfactory new job. The Project’s surpassing or fully achieving its targets for IT clusters supported, IT companies strengthened through the FIT accreditation program, and IT Parks improved also contributed to the job creation outcome.14

65. “Improving their [IT companies in Mexico] competitiveness and efficiency” (High). The Project greatly surpassed its target of the number of companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets. Specifically, the metric is the number of companies that received certifications proving that they and their staff have developed capacities enabling them to qualify to compete in international markets; many international clients will not deal with an IT company unless it has an internationally recognized certification. The Project reached a total of 701 companies compared with the target of 390 (180 percent achievement). The Project contributed to the creation and/or

12 MexicoFIRST, presentation prepared for World Bank ICR mission, March 2016, by Ing. Juan A. Saldívar Cabral. 13 During the life of the project, PROSOFT monitored the number of jobs in the IT industry that were “improved” and new “potential” jobs (committed by IT companies) as a result of participation in PROSOFT activities (“projects”). 14 As illustrated in Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results, capacity building activities under the project had a direct impact in the number of new jobs and promotions.

16

strengthening of the IT Legal and Regulatory Framework by, for instance, building capacity of 796 public officials on IT Sector Legal Framework. This way, decision makers have better capabilities to enhance an enabling environment that contributes to increasing IT Industry competitiveness. Moreover, the fact that the Project also trained 15 Government entities and produced 6 feasibility studies to foster outsourcing of Government services, contributed to facilitate that Mexican IT firms acquire experience in providing services to Government entities and therefore increasing its competitiveness in offering services in the public sector. The Project also made a major contribution to surpassing the PDO target of increased debt portfolio of IT companies in the financial system, which grew to US$47.20 million at the Project’s closing, over the original baseline of US$5.8 million. This was far above the original target of US$20 million and the revised target of US$36 million. This indicator is extremely important as a measure of increased competitiveness, as the diagnostics done during project preparation showed that lack of access to finance was a major impediment to the expansion of IT industries into new markets.15 This result was achieved through the Project’s substantial support for PROSOFT’s guarantee program under Component C (IT Companies Financing), its successful strengthening of 16 IT clusters through certifications, its support for improved creditworthiness of IT companies through the FIT financial accreditation program, its improvement of 6 IT Parks, and its capacity building of public officials.

3.3 Efficiency

66. The efficiency is rated as Substantial, mainly based on the positive results of the economic analysis carried out at completion based on estimates of new job creation. However, the delayed implementation of a total of 2.5 years in the beginning of the Project is deemed as a major shortcoming in terms of the Project’s efficiency.

67. The Project did not incur in cost overruns in any components. Most components over-delivered outputs (see Annex 2 on Project Outputs). Only the outputs of the IT Parks Infrastructure component were reduced, commensurately with the 45 percent reduction of budget for this component in the 2012 restructuring. Project results from the delivered outputs were attained with a project budget of US$73.5 million, lower than the US$80 million originally planned, mainly due to exchange rate fluctuation. Given the longer project implementation span (+2.5 years), project coordination costs were higher than planned. This was reflected in the increased allocation of funds to component G, although most of the 54 percent budget increase supported additional technical assistance studies. The Project did leverage funds from State Governments in support of PROSOFT’s activities, and from the IT industry companies that participated in the Project’s activities as beneficiaries. Moreover, capacity building and certifications were provided with an actual cost about 30 percent lower than the market price. This was through economies of scale, for instance, MexicoFIRST negotiated prices in bulk directly with international certification providers to get a 30 percent discount.

15 See Project Appraisal Document, page 5, paragraph 13.

17

68. The recently published World Bank report “World Development Report Digital Dividends” highlights the impact of digital technologies in creating jobs and increasing worker productivity16. In this regard, the projects executed across the various components improved the quality of IT professionals in the industry, contributing to close to 70,000 improved jobs from certification, and 41,000 new jobs through MexicoFIRST. To put these numbers in context, the IT industry as a whole grew from 226,000 jobs in 2002 to 625,000 jobs in 2013 (399,000 new jobs in 13 years), that is, an average of 36,000 new jobs per year17. As such, the MexicoFIRST component generated on average almost one-third of the annual new jobs in the industry during the project period.

69. The overall economic rate of return (ERR) of 725 percent evaluated at completion is substantially higher than the ERR of the Project evaluated ex-ante during appraisal (ERR 52 percent). This is due to several factors: (i) estimated new jobs from the Project are four times that of target at appraisal, (ii) an increase in income tax rate from 28 percent to 30 percent in 2010 resulted in a greater tax income contribution to GDP (gross domestic product) from new jobs, thus higher economic value; and (iii) an increase in the average savings ratio from 20 to 21 percent also bolstered the value contribution of each new job to the GDP. The evaluation of the economic analysis for this ICR follows the methodology of the economic analysis during appraisal. Likewise, following the original PAD, no financial assessment, nor cost benefit analysis was conducted for this ICR.

70. In addition to the high ERR, the economic analysis captures only one aspect of project outcomes of new jobs. Through interviews with the stakeholders and companies, it was clear that the Project also generated indirect economic benefits, such as increased exports by beneficiary companies, catalyzing further investments into capacity building and education by companies, and greater foreign direct investment as a result of the improved quality of IT professionals in Mexico.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

71. The High ratings for relevance of objectives and design, the High ratings for achievement of both of the key project objectives, and the Substantial rating for efficiency with delayed implementation considered as a main shortcoming, leads to an overall outcome rating of “Satisfactory.” 18 Even though the Project’s overall rating could qualify as “Highly Satisfactory”, the longer duration of Project implementation than originally planned is considered a significant shortcoming.

16 “World Development Report: Digital Dividends.” World Bank, 2016. Available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/01/13/090224b08405ea05/2_0/Rendered/PDF/World0developm0000digital0dividends.pdf 17MexicoFIRST, presentation prepared for World Bank ICR mission, March 2016, by Ing. Juan A. Saldívar Cabral. 18 As mentioned earlier, a “split evaluation,” is not considered for this ICR even though PDO indicators were modified (jobs creation remained an objective and other outcome targets were not reduced). Even if a “split evaluation” were used, with the pre-restructuring outcome rated “Unsatisfactory,” the overall rating would still be “Satisfactory”, based on the weighting of ratings per the methodology in the ICR because the project had disbursed only 8.4% at the time of the restructuring. The pre-restructuring score would be 2 (for Unsatisfactory) X 0.084 (for share disbursed pre-restructuring) = 0.168. The post-restructuring score would be 5 (for Satisfactory) X 0.916 = 4.58. Together, these sum to 4.664, or 5 for Satisfactory when rounded to the nearest whole number.

18

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

72. The Project did not pursue a specific impact on these overarching themes.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

The Project strengthened the capacity of the implementing agency and several other sector stakeholders. Actually, Components E, F, and G, pursued this purpose, including building capacity within the implementing agency and the wider imitative PROSOFT. The continued technical assistance provided by the Bank team during project supervision supported the design of PROSOFT, including the strategic revision that translated into PROSOFT3.0, which will drive the sector development until 2024.

73. In particular, technical assistance efforts completed under these components contributed to: (i) strengthening the PPP regulatory framework; (ii) providing recommendations to design PPPs to outsource Government services; (iii) building capacity among Government officials to design PPPs for eGovernment; (iv) supporting the creation of an Integration Competency Center; (v) supporting the adoption of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA); (vi) strengthening the IT legal and regulatory framework; (vii) building capacity among public officers on IT issues, regulations, and enforcement of best practices; (viii) supporting the creation of a dispute settlement center within the Mexican Software Consortium; (ix) supporting the creation and strengthening of local masters programs in IT law; (x) developing analytical work to inform the International Consultative Commission in PROSOFT; and (xi) providing exposure to international good practices that could benefit the IT sector in Mexico (e.g., in 2012, a SE delegation joined a study tour in Finland organized by the Bank).

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

74. The Project achieved important unintended outcomes. For instance, under Component B, awareness raising activities were carried out among local businessmen in several States on the benefits of outsourcing and the usage of IT in business and production processes. Thus, the Project contributed significantly to the creation of national cross-sector clusters (e.g., IT and agriculture), which translated into structured regional competition poles. Thus, Guadalajara is in the process of becoming a hub for the media and the digital industry, while Puebla is becoming a hub for digital design and innovation. Furthermore, this approach is precisely the focus of the PROSOFT3.0, to which the Bank team provided technical inputs during Project supervision.

75. The Project has been instrumental in strengthening the relationship between government and IT industry stakeholders, to the extent that public and private sector currently collaborate to design sector roadmaps.

76. The Project also contributed to increase transparency and supports Mexico’s Open Government Commitments. The Project supported activities for the initiation of Mexico in the Open Data agenda as a tool to promote innovation, efficiency, transparency, and better public services. The Bank’s open methodology Open Data Readiness Assessment19, carried

19 http://opendatatoolkit.worldbank.org/en/odra.html

19

out under the Project, provided a diagnosis and an action plan that set the ground for Mexico’s National Open Data Strategy. The Project also funded the development of a National Open Data portal (datos.gob.mx), the development of an Open Data Decree, and the identification of open data as one of the five enablers of the National Digital Strategy (Estrategia Digital Nacional)20. Recently, the GoM has identified open data as a strategic priority. As a result, Mexico has placed itself as an emerging open data leader in the region. The National Open Data Strategy (“open data to transform Mexico”) was issued in January 2014 together with an Open Government Action Plan. In 2015 Mexico hosted the Latin America and Caribbean Open Data Regional Congress, convening open data initiatives across the region.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and Stakeholder Workshops

77. In 2012, 2013, and 2015, satisfaction surveys were conducted among MexicoFIRST beneficiaries to measure its impact. The main results are as follows: (i) MexicoFIRST built capacity among students but mainly among employees; thus, its impact was also related to upgrading the exiting pool of professionals in the industry in addition to creating new jobs. In 2012, 84 percent of beneficiaries had a job when they joined the MexicoFIRST capacity building program; in 2013, only 52 percent; and in 2015, up to 95 percent. Also, between 13 and 36 percent of employed beneficiaries held executive positions; hence, the program focus had evolved toward increasing the capacity and skills of the IT industry workforce; (ii) The beneficiaries’ degree of satisfaction was very high. Satisfaction surveys conducted showed that between 55 and 64 percent of beneficiaries were very satisfied, 31 to 38 percent were satisfied, and 4 to 9 percent were unsatisfied; (iii) Beneficiaries were able to find a new job (51–83 percent), obtain a promotion (60–78 percent), improve their ability to perform better in their job (82–93 percent), increase their productivity (82–92 percent), increase the quality of their work (87–94 percent), increase their salary (50–77 percent), and improve their quality of life (77 percent).

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

78. The risk of not maintaining the development outcomes is rated “Low.” The contributions of the Project to the sustainable strengthening of the Mexican Government’s policies and programs in support of the IT industry are reflected in the approval and implementation of PROSOFT 3.0 2014–202421. This new strategy and plan (“Sectoral Agenda for the Development of Information Technologies in Mexico 2014–2024”) represents a further evolution of the Government’s approach. Whereas the previous focus of PROSOFT was on development of the IT industry itself, the new strategy emphasizes the application of information technologies to foster innovation and greater productivity in other sectors of the economy. PROSOFT 3.0 embraces and builds upon largely the same elements as those supported by the Bank’s Project, namely digital markets, entrepreneurial innovation, skills development, outreach to global markets, access to financing, regional

20 Available at: http://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/17083/Estrategia_Digital_Nacional.pdf 21 Agenda Sectorial Para El Desarrollo De Tecnologías De La Información En México 2014–2024.

20

specialization, a robust legal and regulatory framework, and governance. The ICR team was informed that PROSOFT 3.0 is receiving adequate budget allocations, and that the wide base of ownership of this program across a range of public and private sector stakeholders helps to assure that it will continue to be well resourced.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance on Ensuring Quality at Entry

79. The World Bank brought innovative international experiences to the design of the Project. Especially noteworthy was the Bank’s influence on the creation of MexicoFIRST, a pioneering model of public-private partnership for skills development in the IT industry. The Bank supported the effective participation of private sector organizations in the project design, which was key to its success and sustainability. During project preparation and appraisal the Bank’s team included senior technical and fiduciary specialists. The project design was complex, but this reflected the strong preference of the client for a comprehensive approach to supporting the PROSOFT program. The Bank ensured that implementing arrangements were adequate for the implementing unit with which the Project was designed. The Government unilaterally changed the responsible unit during the initial period of project implementation. The multiplicity of components required that funds be transferred to numerous beneficiary entities, and the need for ex ante capacity building of these in FM and procurement was not fully foreseen. The PDO’s phrasing was too complex, but the key project outcomes were specified. The shortcomings are minor, so the Bank’s performance at entry is rated “Satisfactory.”

(b) Quality of Supervision

The Bank fielded 14 supervision missions between loan approval and closing, approximately two per year. Fifteen ISRs were filed. Senior Bank specialists were consistently engaged in providing technical assistance on substantive matters throughout the life of the Project. Client representatives cited to the ICR team the important role of the Bank’s technical inputs in adjusting implementation to new circumstances and challenges. The PDO and IP (implementation progress) ratings were “Satisfactory” until June 2010, despite the fact that disbursements were extremely low and severe institutional problems were hampering implementation. The Bank showed good proactivity pursuing solutions to expedite project implementation, particularly in handling the effective MTR and project restructuring which was significant in bringing the Project back on track. The Bank could have been more prompt in taking action to alleviate procurement delays caused by low prior review ceilings and delays in granting non objections. Overall, the Bank’s supervision up to the 2012 restructuring appears to have had shortcomings, but afterwards it improved substantially. Based on these factors, the Bank’s performance in supervision is rated “Moderately Satisfactory.”

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

80. The overall Bank performance is rated “Moderately Satisfactory.”

5.2 Borrower Performance

21

(a) Government Performance

81. The Government performed well during project preparation by providing a strong team and being open to innovations, including creating a new entity, MexicoFIRST, for the skills development program. The decision to transfer the Project to DGDEON soon after Board approval was a major shortcoming, severely hindered project implementation for nearly three years, including a 21-month effectiveness delay and a further one-year delay for revamping implementation. Once the Project was restored to its original unit, the pace of implementation of all components accelerated, and the Project was put back on track to a successful, albeit substantially delayed, completion. From 2012, the project SE benefitted from consistent, direct support from the Deputy Minister and the Director of Digital Economy. NAFIN and SHCP were highly collaborative, facilitating implementation and taking remedial action when needed. For example, when it was agreed to increase the speed of PROSOFT’s project cycle, NAFIN worked closely with SE to identify potential time savings and committed to reduce its own interventions for the sake of the Project. Despite the Government’s good performance after the 2012 restructuring, its overall performance over the life of the Project is rated “Moderately Satisfactory” because of the severe delays during the first three years caused by its decision to change the implementing unit, leading longer than planned implementation.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

82. DGCIED, the original counterpart agency during project preparation, provided strong technical and administrative leadership for the Project’s design and approval. Despite the Project’s complexity and multiple stakeholders, DGISCI (the renamed DGCIED) performed well after it retook responsibility for the Project in early 2012. Under its management, the Project remained closely aligned with PROSOFT and achieved all of its output and outcome targets. DGISCI’s implementing unit remained well-staffed, including in the management, technical, FM, and procurement functions. When the second extension of the closing date was made conditional subject to certain commitments (disbursement rate and project cycle), DGISCI worked to ensure that they were achieved on time. DGISCI was proactive in foreseeing potential shortcomings and proposing solutions. For instance, in response to procurement capacity problems of beneficiary entities, DGISCI organized capacity building for them. When the IT Parks component lost relevance, DGISCI proposed a reallocation of funds toward other components with the most potential for contributing to achievement of the PDO. Based on these factors, the implementing agency’s performance is rated “Satisfactory.”

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

83. The overall borrower performance is rated “Moderately Satisfactory.”

6. Lessons Learned

84. Strong private sector participation along the various phases of the Project became fundamental for relevant design of policy interventions targeting the IT Industry.22 The active participation of private sector stakeholders at preparation stage enabled a

22 The CPS FY2008–FY2013 has already identified this lessons learned related to the Project.

22

comprehensive project design with an initial adequate response to industry needs. Similarly, throughout implementation, the Project highly benefited from active involvement of industry chambers, associations, academia, etc., particularly during MTR. In turn, the restructuring conducted after MTR boosted the Project’s progress towards the achievement of outcomes by, for instance, giving stronger focus on certifications. Therefore, policy interventions for the development of the IT Industry have to consider mechanisms for strong private sector participation throughout the entire project cycle.

85. The rapid pace in which IT Industry evolves translates into constant changes of the set of skills firms demand. On the other hand, universities ability to agilely adapt curricula to IT industry needs is limited. In order to bridge this skill gap, entities such MexicoFIRST, in the form of broker entities that can easily adapt and update a large portfolio capacity building offerings, emerge as a solution. For maximizing impact and relevance of IT capacity building programs a main lessons emerged from the Project: a constantly updated curriculum to cater to latest industry needs is required.

86. Another lesson connected to skills relates to MexicoFIRST’s dual scheme of incentives, with a focus on certifications given its higher impact for better access to markets. First, the scheme only funded beneficiary institutions when a minimum ratio of 80 percent of students certified over trained was achieved. This ensured vested interest in completion of certifications. Secondly, incentives focused on providing bonuses to capacity building institutions, rather than for individual students. Thus, monetary risk of failure was borne by capacity building facilitators, instead of beneficiaries. Capacity building institutions confirmed adequacy of the target ratio and comfortability with bearing this risk. Therefore, grants aiming skills development can be more effective when incentives for beneficiaries (i) include a clear commitment of certifications over capacity building, and (ii) remove the potential threat of economic hardship a certain certification level is not achieved.

87. One of the key drivers of investments in the IT/ITES sector relies on the availability of a talent pool that is conversant with English language. English skills, although not envisaged at project design, were identified along implementation as key enablers for exporting IT services. Thus it was necessary then to include a component of English language capacity building in the project. Future capacity building programs targeting the competitiveness of the IT industry should take into account English capacity building alongside IT capacity building.

88. When applying an industry-driven approach that implies a variety of stakeholders managing some procurement tasks, it is important to (i) assess the impact on procurement cycle of project activities; and (ii) plan procurement capacity building sessions for stakeholders at early stages of the project. Organizations such as IT chambers prepared procurement documents for the activities of several components, linking the project and sector stakeholders. While these organizations were familiar with Government procurement processes, they had limited knowledge of World Bank procurement processes and as such found an incredibly steep learning curve adapting to the preparations for procurement. Once this shortcoming was detected, the situation was mitigated by organizing workshop sessions with private sector stakeholders. A tailored capacity building in World Bank procurement-related administrative processes for stakeholders (e.g., IT chambers) for preparing procurement documents funded by the Project alleviates the procurement delays, especially if capacity is built at early stages.

23

89. In countries in which, as in Mexico, World Bank funds do not provide budget additionality, it becomes important to work with the client on planning submissions of withdrawal applications in several trenches along the fiscal year. Before 2013, the Project’s disbursement rates were not capturing accurately actual implementation progress as disbursements to the Bank were submitted only in one block towards the end of each fiscal year. Once issue was explained and addressed jointly with the borrower, withdrawal applications were submitted in various semesters along the fiscal year.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/Implementing Agencies 90. The Borrower reviewed this ICR, did not raise any substantive issues and agreed with the evaluation of the results and outcomes of the Project. Annex 7 includes a summary of the main comments received during the ICR mission.

(b) Cofinancers

91. Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

92. Project stakeholders did not raise any issue on this ICR, but they did provide substantive inputs and comments about the Project results and implementation during the ICR mission. Those comments are reflected in Annex 8.

24

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

A: Human Skills Development 38.3 48.14 125.59

B: Strengthening of IT Clusters and Selected State Agencies

9.0 13.16 146.22

C: Financing of the IT Industry 2.9 1.31 45.17

D: Supporting Infrastructure 10.1 0.44 4.35

E: Outsourcing of Government Services

2.7 0.73 27.04

F: Strengthening of the Legal and Regulatory Framework and Institutions

6.1 2.05 33.61

G: PROSOFT Strengthening and Project Management

3.6 7.11 197.50

Total Baseline Cost 72.6 72.95 100.48

Physical Contingencies 7.3 n.a.

Price Contingencies 0.0 n.a.

Total Project Costs 79.8 72.95 91.42

Front-end Fee Project Preparation Facility (PPF)

0.0 0.00 n.a.

Front-end Fee International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

0.2 0.20 100

Total Financing Required 80.0 73.15 91.44 On September 12, 2014, the Project was restructured, reallocating each Component’s funds as follows:

Components Appraisal

Estimate (USD millions)

Changes at Restructuring (USD millions)

Post-Restructuring Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Change

A: Human Skills Development 38.3 +3.6 41.9 +9.5 B: Strengthening of IT Clusters

and Selected State Agencies 9.0 +4.1 13.1 +45.9

C: Financing of the IT Industry 2.9 +1.9 4.8 +66.3 D: Supporting Infrastructure 10.1 –4.5 5.6 –45 E: Outsourcing of Government

Services 2.7 –0.2 2.5 –8.1

25

F: Strengthening of the Legal and Regulatory Framework and Institutions

6.1 –0.6 5.5 –9.8

G: PROSOFT Strengthening and Project Management

3.6 +1.9 5.5

+54.4

Total Baseline Cost 72.6 +6.2 78.8 +8.5 Physical Contingencies 7.3 –6.2 1.1 –86.2

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

80.00 73.15 91.44

26

Annex 2. Outputs by Component The following table that summarizes the relation between each PDO outcome, corresponding indicators, and their level of achievement. In this analysis, each indicator is linked only to one PDO key outcome, though certain indicators could apply to both. It is important to note that this ICR retains the original PDO indicator “IT/ITES jobs created by the IT Industry as a result of training programs,” even though it was dropped as a formal project indicator in the 2012 restructuring. This indicator is essential for substantiating the key PDO outcome “to foster the creation of jobs in Mexican IT companies.”

Outcome statement Objective Hierarchy Related PDO Indicator(s) Related Intermediate Indicator(s)

Indicator’s level of achievement

“To foster the creation of jobs in IT Companies in Mexico”

Key PDO outcome IT/ITES jobs created by the IT Industry as a result of training programs (indicator dropped in restructuring of 2012 but retained for this ICR)

204.6% (40,918 /20,000)

Satisfaction with effectiveness of MexicoFIRST training programs (%)

108.7% (87/80)

Outsourcing of Government Services 1. Government entities trained 2. Feasibility studies

125% (15/12) 120% (6/5)

“By improving their competitiveness and efficiency”

Key PDO outcome Companies with technical capacity, quality standard certifications, and access to new markets (number)

179.7% (701/390)

Number of IT clusters supported by the Project with action plans under implementation

114.3% (16/14)

Number of IT companies that participated in the FIT Accreditation Program

100% (100/100)

27

Number of IT parks projects supported by technical assistance and/or infrastructure

100% 100% (6/6)

Number of public officials trained on IT Sector Legal Framework

176.9% (796/450)

“Access to: a larger supply of trained personnel”

Intermediate outcome that supports the job creation PDO outcome

Number of certificated persons from MexicoFIRST

159.5% (102,527/64,293)

“Access to technologies, quality standards and global marketing networks of multinational corporations”

Intermediate outcome that supports the improved competitiveness and efficiency PDO outcome

“Access to private debt finance”

Intermediate outcome that supports the improved competitiveness and efficiency PDO outcome

Increased overall debt portfolio of IT companies in the financial system (US$ million)

137.1% (47.2/36.0)

28

Outputs by component. Please note that the following list is not comprehensive. As the Project produced more than 400 outputs, the following list includes only those of a value equal or above MX$1.2 million (about US$ 70,000); including co-financing.

Component

Name of activity o expense item Beneficiary Deliverable Type of activity

A M1:01:13: TRAINING NACIONAL 2013 MEXICOFIRST DIPLOMA CAPACITY BUILDING

A M1-12-M1: MEXICOFIRST, TRAINING NACIONAL MEXICO FEDERAL INSTITUTE FOR REMOTE SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY A.C.

DIPLOMA CAPACITY BUILDING

A M1-11-M1: MEXICOFIRST, TRAINING NACIONAL MEXICO FEDERAL INSTITUTE FOR REMOTE SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY, A.C.


A M1:03:14: PROYECTO DE CERTIFICATES AVANZADAS MEXICOFIRST 2014

MEXICOFIRST DIPLOMA CAPACITY BUILDING

A M1-12-M1: MEXICOFIRST, INGLÉS Y HABILIDADES PARA LA INDUSTRIA DE TI

MEXICO FEDERAL INSTITUTE FOR REMOTE SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY A.C.


A M1-11-M1: MEXICOFIRST, INGLÉS Y HABILIDADES PARA LA INDUSTRIA DE TI

MEXICO FEDERAL INSTITUTE FOR REMOTE SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY, A.C.


A M1:02:13:CERTIFICACION ACADEMICA Y AVANZADA

MEXICOFIRST DIPLOMA CAPACITY BUILDING

A M1-11-M1: MEXICOFIRST, TRAINING NACIONAL ACADÉMICA



A M1:2014:PROYECTO ESTRATEGICO DESARROLLO DE TALENTO PARA LA INDUSTRIA DE MEDIOS CREATIVOS-DIGITALES

MEXICOFIRST CERTIFICATE CAPACITY BUILDING /CERTIFICATION

29

A MÉXICOFIRST CANIETI STUDY CONSULTING

A PROGRAMA DE TRAINING EN HERRAMIENTAS TÉCNICAS Y DE NEGOCIOS A ESTUDIANTES, MAESTROS Y EMPRESAS DEL SECTOR DE TI.



A M1: MÉXICOFIRST SONORA MEXICO FEDERAL INSTITUTE FOR REMOTE SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY A.C.


A M1: HABILIDADES Y CERTIFICATION EN PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL (PMP), PERSONAL SOFTWARE PROCESS (PSP), HERRAMIENTAS MICROSOFT Y CISCO



A M1: MÉXICOFIRST SINALOA TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION FIDSOFTWARE



A M1: MÉXICOFIRST SINALOA TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION BISOFT



A M1: MÉXICOFIRST SINALOA TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION ESOFT



A M1: MÉXICOFIRST SINALOA TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE SINALOA



A M1: MÉXICO FIRST SINALOA TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION OPERADA POR CUSTOMSOFT



A M1: OPENTI TRAINING Y CERTIFICATION MEXICOFIRST


DIPLOMA TRAINING

30

A ACTUALIZACION DE ESTRATEGIA GENERAL Y DEFINICION DE MEXICOFIRST 2.0


STUDY CONSULTING

A M1-2011-M1: MEXICOFIRST, OPERACIÓN E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE ESTRATEGIAS


STUDY CONSULTING

A GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO SEGUNDA ETAPA



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO –INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE ORIZABA



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE ALAMO TEMAPACHE



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE MINATITLÁN



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO



31

DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE TANTOYUCA

A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE VERACRUZ



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO SUPERIOR DE COATZACOALCOS



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO SUPERIOR DE COSAMALOAPAN



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA, EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO – INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO SUPERIOR DE HUATUSCO



A M1: PROGRAMA DE CERTIFICATION EN LA PLATAFORMA .NET DE LA UNIVERSIDAD TECNOLÓGICA DE AGUASCALIENTES



A M1: GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA Y CERTIFICADA EN EL INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO SUPERIOR DE FRESNILLO (1) COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA



32

PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO DE ZACATECAS

A M1:GENERACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA CAPACITADA Y CERTIFICADA EN EL INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO SUPERIOR ZONA NORTE (1) COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO DE ZACATECAS



A M1: CERTIFICATION DE MANO DE OBRA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE NIVEL SUPERIOR EN EL ESTADO DE VERACRUZ COMO MECANISMO PARA FORMAR LA PLANTILLA DE DESARROLLO DE SOFTWARE EN EL ESTADO SEGUNDA ETAPA



A M1: PROGRAMA DE CERTIFICATION EN JAVA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE AGUASCALIENTES



A M1: MÉXICO FIRST SINALOA CAPACITACIÓN Y CERTIFICACIÓN TECHSOFT



B DIPLOMADO DE NEGOCIOS PARA EL DESARROLLO DE EMPRESARIOS DEL CONSEJO PARA EL DESARROLLO DE LA INDUSTRIA DE SOFTWARE DE NUEVO LEÓN

CONSEJO PARA EL DESARROLLO DE LA INDUSTRIA DE SOFTWARE DE NUEVO LEÓN, A. C.

STUDY CONSULTING

B DIPLOMADO DE NEGOCIOS PARA EL DESARROLLO DE EMPRESARIOS DEL CLUSTER DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN TLAXCALA A.C.

CLUSTER DE TECNOLOGIAS DE INFORMACION TLAXCALA A.C.

STUDY CONSULTING

B PROYECTO PARA LA EVALUACIÓN DE DESEMPEÑO DE ITLINK Y SATISFACCIÓN DE EMPRESAS PARTICIPANTES

CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA ELECTRÓNICA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN (CANIETI)

STUDY CONSULTING

33

B DIPLOMADO DE NEGOCIOS PARA EL DESARROLLO DE EMPRESARIOS DEL CLUSTER INTEQSOFT

INTEGRACIÓN TECNOLÓGICA DE QUERÉTARO A.C.

STUDY CONSULTING

B STUDY DE DISEÑO E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA RED DE ENLACES DE EMPRESAS DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN (IT-LINK)

ASOCIACIÓN MEXICANA DE LA INDUSTRIA DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN, A.C

STUDY CONSULTING

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA NOVUTEK, TI SONORA EN EL MODELO CMMI-DEV NIVEL 5

NOVUTEK S.C. CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA MEDISIST, SA DE CV DEL CLÚSTER IJALTI EN EL MODELO CMMI DEV V 1.3 NIVEL 5

MEDISIST, S.A. DE C.V. CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA LA EMPRESA ASPEL DE MÉXICO, S.A. DE C.V., CLUSTER CITI YUCATÁN EN EL MODELO CMMI DEV NIVEL 4

ASPEL DE MÉXICO, S. A. DE C. V. CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA VEDASOLUTIONS PROVIDER SC, CON CLÚSTER PROSOFTWARE, EN EL MODELO CMMI SVC NIVEL 4

VEDASOLUTIONS PROVIDER S.C. CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVES DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA LA EMPRESA IDS COMERCIAL, S.A. DE C.V., CLÚSTER PROSOFTWARE EN EL MODELO CMMI-DEV NIVEL 5

IDS COMERCIAL, SA DE CV CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA (SISTEMAS AVANZADOS INTEGRALES, S.C., IJALTI) EN EL MODELO (CMMI-DEV NIVEL 3)

SISTEMAS AVANZADOS INTEGRALES SC

CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

34

B PROYECTO PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE EMPRESAS A TRAVÉS DE MODELOS DE CALIDAD PARA TECNOLOGÍA DE GESTIÓN Y COMUNICACIÓN, SA DE CV, CLÚSTER CHIHUAHUA IT CLUSTER, EN EL MODELO CMMI DEV NIVEL 4

TECNOLOGÍA DE GESTIÓN Y COMUNICACIÓN SA DE CV

CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATES

C CONSULTING PARA EL DISEÑO DE MATERIALES DE DIFUSIÓN E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DEL PROGRAMA DE ACREDITACIÓN FIT PARA EMPRESAS DE TI


STUDY CONSULTING

C DESARROLLO DE CONTENIDOS PARA VINCULAR A LA BANCA PRIVADA EN MÉXICO AL PROGRAMA FIT


STUDY CONSULTING

C STUDY DE DIAGNÓSTICO PARA DETERMINAR LAS PRINCIPALES OPORTUNIDADES DE LOS ESQUEMAS DE FINANCIAMIENTO EN EL SECTOR DE TI

WY TELECOM, S.A. DE C.V. STUDY CONSULTING

C DISEÑO DEL PROGRAMA DE ACREDITACIÓN DE EMPRESAS DE TI (FIT – FINANCING FOR IT INDUSTRY)


STUDY CONSULTING

C DESARROLLO DE MATERIALES INTERACTIVOS SOBRE EL ESQUEMA DE FINANCIAMIENTO PARA EMPRESAS DE SOFTWARE Y SERVICIOS RELACIONADOS

CSOFTMTY STUDY CONSULTING

C METODOLOGÍA PARA LA GESTIÓN DE LA INNOVACIÓN. (HERRAMIENTA DE ANÁLISIS EN LÍNEA)

CANIETI STUDY CONSULTING

C MARKETPLACE DE LA INNOVACIÓN CANIETI STUDY CONSULTING

C PROGRAMA ACELERADOR DE EMPRESAS SOBRE ESQUEMAS DE FINANCIAMIENTO EN EL SECTOR DE TI


35

D ESTRATEGIA PARA REDUCIR LA BRECHA EN MEJORES PRACTICAS INTERNACIONALES EN PARQUES DEL SECTOR DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN – PARQUE TECNOLÓGICO SONORA SOFT

OPERADORA SONORA SOFT S.A. DE C.V.

STUDY CONSULTING

D ESTRATEGIA PARA REDUCIR LA BRECHA EN MEJORES PRÁCTICAS INTERNACIONALES EN PARQUES DEL SECTOR DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN – TECNO PARQUE UACH

UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE CHIHUAHUA

STUDY CONSULTING

D STUDY DE FACTIBILIDAD PARA LA CREACIÓN DEL PARQUE DE TI EN EL ESTADO DE CHIAPAS

ASOCIACION DE EMPRESAS DE TECNOLOGIAS DE INFORMACION DEL ESTADO DE CHIAPAS AC

STUDY CONSULTING

D STUDY DE FACTIBILIDAD PARA LA CREACIÓN DEL PARQUE DE TI EN EL ESTADO DE ZACATECAS

CLUSTER PARA EL DESARROLLO INNOVACION Y TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIAS DE LA INFORMACION DE ZACATECAS, A.C.

STUDY CONSULTING

D HABILITACIÓN DE ESPACIOS Y FORTALECIMIENTO/MEJORA DE INFRAESTRUCTURA DE PARQUES DE TI – TECNO PARQUE UACH

UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE CHIHUAHUA

GOODS GOODS

E TRAINING PPP PARA ENTIDADES DE LA APF PROCESOS 2013

AMITI STUDY CONSULTING

E GESTIÓN DEL CAMBIO EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA FEDERAL PARA LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN DEL NUEVO MODELO EN TRÁMITES Y SERVICIOS


E UTILIZACIÓN DE SOFTWARE EN EL GOBIERNO Y TENDENCIAS INTERNACIONALES


E ANÁLISIS E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE ESTRATEGIA SOBRE CENTROS DE DATOS


F ARMONIZACIÓN NORMATIVA A ESTADOS (DIAGNÓSTICO, SEGUIMIENTO, ROADSHOWS)

AMIPCI STUDY CONSULTING

36

F AUTODIAGNÓSTICO PARA GENERAR CONOCIMIENTO Y CULTURA DE COMERCIO ELECTRÓNICO

ASOCIACION MEXICANA DE INTERNET A.C.

STUDY CONSULTING

F AUTOSOSTENIBILIDAD DEL COMPENDIO NORMATIVO DE TI


STUDY CONSULTING

F DISEÑO Y APLICACIÓN DE LA TRAINING EN CASCADA DEL MARCO NORMATIVO EN MATERIA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS


STUDY CONSULTING

F TOOLKIT PARA EMPRESAS EN MATERIA DE SEGURIDAD DE LA INFORMACIÓN

NYCE STUDY CONSULTING

F MAESTRÍA EN DERECHO INFORMÁTICO INFOTEC STUDY CONSULTING

F FORTALECIMIENTO Y DESARROLLO DE CAPACIDADES DE EMPRESAS EN MATERIA DE COMERCIO ELECTRÓNICO Y LAS TI

CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA ELECTRÓNICA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN

STUDY CONSULTING

F STUDY SOBRE EL VALOR ECONÓMICO DE LOS DATOS PERSONALES


F LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL AL SERVICIO DE TU EMPRESA (PLATAFORMA DE DIAGNÓSTICO EN LÍNEA)


F STUDY DEL MARCO JURÍDICO NACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL EN MATERIA DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL ASOCIADO AL SOFTWARE


F ANÁLISIS DE ACCIONES ESTRATÉGICAS DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA QUE IMPACTAN EL MARCO LEGAL PARA EL SECTOR DE TI


F ARMONIZACIÓN NORMATIVA A ESTADOS (DIAGNÓSTICO, SEGUIMIENTO, ROADSHOWS)


G M1-2014-M1:MEXICOFIRST, UNIDAD COORDINADORA DE PROYECTO (UCP) DEL BANCO

MEXICOFIRST STUDY CONSULTING

37

MUNDIAL PARA EL CIERRE DEL PRÉSTAMO 7571-MX

G M1-2013-M1:MEXICOFIRST, UNIDAD COORDINADORA DE PROYECTO (UCP) DEL BANCO MUNDIAL


G M1-2012-M1:MEXICOFIRST, UNIDAD COORDINADORA DE PROYECTO (UCP) DEL BANCO MUNDIAL


STUDY CONSULTING

G FUENTE DE INFORMACIÓN ESTRATÉGICA DEL SECTOR DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN LÍNEA- BASE


G STUDY COMPARATIVO INTERNACIONAL DE PROGRAMAS PÚBLICOS PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DEL SECTOR DE TI Y SERVICIOS RELACIONADOS


STUDY CONSULTING

G ANÁLISIS DE LA EFECTIVIDAD DE LOS PROYECTOS APOYADOS POR PROSOFT


G STUDY DE IDENTIFICACIÓN DE NICHOS POTENCIALES BASADOS EN SERVICIOS DE INTERNET EN MÉXICO


G MINERÍA DE DATOS DEL PROSOFT CON MODELO DE VISUALIZACIÓN DINÁMICA


G STUDY DE EVALUACIÓN DE IMPACTO DEL PROSOFT


STUDY CONSULTING

G GESTOR ESTRATÉGICO DE CONOCIMIENTOS DEL CONSEJO CONSULTIVO INTERNACIONAL (CCI) DEL PROSOFT 2.0


STUDY CONSULTING

38

G ESTADO ACTUAL Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL CAPITAL HUMANO EN EL SECTOR DE TI Y SERVICIOS RELACIONADOS


STUDY CONSULTING

G M1-2011-M1: MEXICOFIRST, CREACIÓN DE LA UNIDAD COORDINADORA DE PROYECTO (UCP) DEL BANCO MUNDIAL


STUDY CONSULTING

G STUDY COMPARATIVO SOBRE COMPETITIVIDAD ESTATAL EN EL SECTOR DE TI EN MÉXICO


STUDY CONSULTING



STUDY CONSULTING

G DIÁLOGOS CON EL SECTOR DE TI PARA IDENTIFICACIÓN DE ESTRATEGIAS LOCALES


STUDY CONSULTING



STUDY CONSULTING

G M1-2013-M2:MEXICOFIRST, PROGRAMA DE CREACIÓN E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE UN PLAN ESTRATÉGICO PARA LA UCP


G COMPENDIO DE CASOS DE ÉXITO DEL PROSOFT CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA ELECTRÓNICA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN

STUDY CONSULTING

G STUDY PARA LA IDENTIFICACIÓN Y DEFINICIÓN DE INDICADORES DEL SECTOR DE TI EN MÉXICO

ASOCIACIÓN MEXICANA DE LA INDUSTRIA DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN, A.C.

STUDY CONSULTING

39

G SERVICIOS DE LOGÍSTICA CCI G-516 CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA ELECTRÓNICA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN

EVENT EVENT

G ANÁLISIS DEL ENTORNO DE CLÚSTERES DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN EN MÉXICO EN BASE A MODELOS PARAMÉTRICOS DE PROBADA EFICIENCIA


G CONSEJO CONSULTIVO INTERNACIONAL PARA PROSOFT 3.0

CANIETI EVENT EVENT

G BASE DE CONOCIMIENTO SOBRE EL PROSOFT 2.0 SUSTENTADA EN EL ANÁLISIS DE STUDYS PREVIOS


STUDY CONSULTING

G LIBRO AZUL DE EMPRESAS QUE IMPLEMENTAN ESTÁNDARES DE CALIDAD


G SERVICIOS DE LOGÍSTICA PARA EL EVENT DEL CONSEJO CONSULTIVO INTERNACIONAL


EVENT EVENT

G ARREGLOS LOGÍSTICOS PARA LA VISITA DE LOS CONSEJEROS INTERNACIONALES


EVENT EVENT

G CONSULTING PARA GENERACIÓN DE AGENA SECTORIAL Y CCI G- 517


STUDY CONSULTING

40

G EVENT PROSOFT 3.0 G-518 CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA ELECTRÓNICA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN

EVENT EVENT

G EVALUACIÓN Y REINGENIERÍA DE PROCESOS PROSOFT 2014


G DEMANDA DE PRODUCTOS DE TI POR EL SECTOR AUTOMOTRIZ


G SEMINARIO: HACIA UNA MATRIZ DE INTERRELACIONES DEL SECTOR DE TI EN MÉXICO


G PRESENTACIÓN DE TRABAJOS DE LA MATRIZ DE INTERRELACIONES DEL SECTOR DE TI EN MÉXICO


G STUDY SOBRE LA COMPETITIVIDAD DE LA INDUSTRIA MEXICANA DE CENTROS DE CONTACTO Y TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN EN BPO (BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING) PARA SU EVOLUCIÓN A KPO (KNOWLEDGE PROCESS OUTSOURCING) A NIVEL MUNDIAL


G IMPLEMENTACIÓN DEL MODELO DE INNOVACIÓN ABIERTA

ITESO STUDY CONSULTING

G LIBRO BLANCO DEL PROYECTO DE DESARROLLO DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LAS TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN PRÉSTAMO 7571-MX DEL BANCO MUNDIAL


41

Annex 3. Economic Analysis

Table A3.1

The economic analysis follows the same methodology as that undertaken at project appraisal. Parameters were updated from WDI (World Development Indicators) for income taxes, (income tax rate increased from 28 percent to 30 percent in 2010), gross savings ratio (updated to 21 percent) and imports as a percent of GDP (updated to 32 percent). Average salary per month was kept at the original level as Mexico saw average wage rates decrease by 2.1 percent over this period, while IT job salaries have increased across the world. The number of new jobs is estimated at 40,918. This was calculated from the total number of university students who have received certification, and is inferred from survey instruments from the MexicoFIRST impact evaluation: minus the percentage of university students certified who are unemployed (within the sample), minus the percentage of respondents who are unhappy with their jobs, and multiplied by the percentage of attribution of certification by students in getting their new job. That is, it estimates the number of jobs attributable to receiving training. The MexicoFIRST survey had annual respondents between 250 and 350 (out of an annual certification sample in the range 2,258–29,936). The aggregate number is distributed across years to calculate ERR according to the proportion of certifications of university students certified each year (see below for distribution).

42

Source: MexicoFIRST, presentation prepared for World Bank ICR mission, March 2016, by Ing. Juan A. Saldívar Cabral. The calculated ERR is substantially higher than the originally anticipated ERR at appraisal as the number of jobs is estimated to be more than four times that at appraisal. Furthermore, the increase in income tax rate from 28 to 30 percent in 2010 results in a greater tax income contribution to GDP from each new job as well; the increase in average savings ratio from 20 to 21 percent also contributed to a much higher economic contribution to GDP. In addition to the estimate of new jobs created by the training and certification, data also suggest that the Project contributed to helping IT professionals gain better jobs. According to data collected by PROSOFT, MexicoFIRST contributed to total of 69,029 improved jobs due to certification and training received under Bank project funds (FF2) (see Table A3.3). Table A3.3. Improved Jobs Due to Support of MexicoFIRST

Year M1 FF1 M1 FF2 Total

2008 4,067 ‐ 4,067

2009 8,126 ‐ 8,126

2010 17,000 ‐ 17,000

2011 ‐ 15,635 15,635

2012 ‐ 22,496 22,496

2013 ‐ 26,757 26,757

2014 11,230 4,141 15,371

Total 40,423 69,029 109,452 Source: MexicoFIRST, presentation prepared for World Bank ICR mission, March 2016, by Ing. Juan A. Saldívar Cabral.

43

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Esperanza Lasagabaster Practice Manager GTC06 Arturo Muente Kunigami Senior ICT Policy Specialist GTI09

Felix Prieto Arbelaez Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT -

HIS

Randeep Sudan Practice Manager GTIIC Manuel Antonio Vargas Madrigal

Lead Financial Management Spec GGO23

Eloy Eduardo Vidal Consultant GTIDR

Supervision/ICR Maria Clara Cabrera Orjuela HQ Consultant ST GTIDR Jannina Flores Ramirez Program Assistant CMGAF Elena Gasol Ramos Senior ICT Policy Specialist GTI09 Dmitri Gourfinkel Financial Management Specialist GGO22 Arturo Muente Kunigami Senior ICT Policy Specialist GTI09 Gabriel Penaloza Senior Procurement Specialist GGO04 Marta Lucila Priftis Consultant GTIDR Randeep Sudan Practice Manager GTIIC Eloy Eduardo Vidal Consultant GTIDR Eva Clemente Miranda ICT Policy Specialist GTIDR Rosanna Chan Economist GTIDR Alan G. Carrol Consultant GTIDR Pau Puig Gabarro ICT Policy Specialist GTIDR

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY07 2.8 16.94 FY08 43.41 290.89 FY09 - - FY10 - - FY11 - - FY12 - - FY13 - - FY14 - -

44

FY15 - -

FY16 - - Total: 46.21 307.83

Supervision/ICR

FY07 - - FY08 - - FY09 21.94 121.10 FY10 19.88 105.07 FY11 22.12 112.12 FY12 23.43 112.78 FY13 40.01 160.79 FY14 26.87 120.49 FY15 44.11 206.72 FY16 16.99 105.67

Total: 215.35 1,044.74

45

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

78

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results n.a.

79

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 93. The Borrower (SE, NAFIN, and SHCP) reviewed this ICR, provided minor comments and agreed with the evaluation of the results and outcomes of the Project. They did not provide a separate assessment about the Project results. In addition, below is a summary of the main comments received during the ICR mission: 94. The following comments were raised by the project counterparts and stakeholders during the ICR mission. This section will be revised following the receipt of comments of the draft ICR from the client.

95. In Mexico, World Bank financing is not additional to Government funds; thus the total public expenditure is the same, but part of it comes from the World Bank loan. However, the multiannual commitment of World Bank funds for the Project provided substantial stability to the implementing agency, which enabled mid-term planning and reduced project cycle dependency on Government financial cycles.

96. The technical assistance provided by the Bank team during project design and supervision was highly appreciated, and even had an impact in the revision of the design of programs larger than the Project, such as PROSOFT. Likewise, the Bank team provided technical assistance by providing technical inputs to analytical work carried out under the Project (e.g., Component G). 97. SE and NAFIN explained that most undisbursed funds (81 percent or US$ 5.7 million) can be attributed to the fluctuation of the U.S. dollar/Mexican peso exchange rate (approximately from US$1:MX$13 to US$1:MX$18). The rest (19 percent or US$1.3 million) accounts for 64 canceled subprojects due to causes such as IT firms not reaching the planned certification level.

80

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinancers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 98. Project Stakeholders provided the following comments and views about the Project during the ICR mission. 99. Stakeholders expressed that they would have preferred a higher number and frequency of calls to apply for subsidized trainings. Given the complexity of World Bank procurement policies and procedures, training institutions tended to group training offers in a relatively low number of calls, which were launched once every several months. Thus, beneficiaries said that they would have preferred to have more opportunities to apply for capacity-building activities.

100. PROSOFT Government funds had two sources: the Federation and the States. Federation funds availability seemed to be more predictable, particularly because State’s electoral cycle is shorter (three years vs. six years), and State government transitions have a huge effect on the flow of funds. Hence, in a year in which State funds were not available, the Project was interrupted for that particular State.

101. Certain beneficiaries who had been certified in CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration) acknowledged that it enabled the firm to reduce by about 35 percent the time to develop a product, to enable to increase customer satisfaction up to almost 100 percent, and to predict with much more precision the time and workload needed for each assignment, thanks to the quality control mechanisms put in place.

102. Beneficiaries highlighted that the fact that MexicoFIRST was able to offer internationally recognized certifications at the lowest prices in the market (about 31 percent below market prices) was a key factor, because it lowered the economic entry barrier for a large share of students and professionals.

103. Finally, it is worth noting that grouping demand under the Project was key to achieving lower prices for trainings and certification, because these internationally recognized certifications became affordable for a larger share of current and future IT sector professionals. According to the price elasticity analysis completed as part of the impact evaluation process, half of the people certified would not have been able to afford the training if it had been priced at MX$30,000 (about US$1,730) or higher. Also, certified students estimated the payback of their investment in these trainings at about nine months, thanks to salary increases and promotions.

81

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

n.a.

Citlaltépetl (5,747 m) Citlaltépetl (5,747 m)

Si e r r a

Ma

dr e O

c c i d e n t a l

S ierra Madre del Sur

Si e

r r a M

ad

r e O

r i e nt a

l

CAMPECHECAMPECHE

CHIAPASCHIAPAS

TABASCOTABASCO

OAXACAOAXACA

GUERREROGUERRERO

COLIMACOLIMA

JALISCOJALISCO

NAYARITNAYARIT

ZACATECASZACATECAS

TAMAULIPASTAMAULIPAS

NUEVONUEVOLEONLEON

C O A H U I L AC O A H U I L A

C H I H U A H U AC H I H U A H U ASONORASONORA

D U R A N G OD U R A N G O

SAN LUISSAN LUISPOTOSIPOTOSI

MICHOACANMICHOACAN PUEBLAPUEBLA

VERACRUZVERACRUZ YUCATANYUCATAN

QUINTANAQUINTANAROOROO

S INA

LOA

S I NA

LOA

MazatlánMazatlán

TorreónTorreónMatamorosMatamoros

LaredoLaredo

OjinagaOjinaga

Los MochisLos Mochis

NavojoaNavojoa

NogalesNogalesSanSan

FelipeFelipe

LoretoLoreto

SonoitaSonoita

AguaAguaPrietaPrieta

GuaymasGuaymas

TehuantepecTehuantepec

FronteraFrontera

VillahermosaVillahermosa

TuxtlaTuxtlaGutierrezGutierrez

OaxacaOaxaca

ChilpancingoChilpancingo

ColimaColima

GuadalajaraGuadalajara

TepicTepic

DurangoDurango

SaltílloSaltíllo

ChihuahuaChihuahua

CuliacánCuliacán

HermosilloHermosillo

MexicaliMexicali

GuanajuatoGuanajuato

PachucaPachuca

AguascalientesAguascalientes

QuerétaroQuerétaro

MoreliaMoreliaTolucaToluca

CuernavacaCuernavaca PueblaPuebla

TlaxcalaTlaxcala

JalapaJalapa

San LuisSan LuisPotosíPotosí

CiudadCiudadVictóriaVictória

ZacatecasZacatecas

MonterreyMonterrey

MEXICOMEXICOCITYCITY

Yaqui

Rio Bravo

Fuerte

Salado

Lerma

Balsas

Conchos

BAJABAJACALIFORNIACALIFORNIA

BAJABAJACALIFORNIACALIFORNIA

SURSUR

MEXICOMEXICO

MORELOSMORELOS

DISTRITO FEDERALDISTRITO FEDERAL

HIDALGOHIDALGOGUANAJUATOGUANAJUATO

AGUASCALIENTESAGUASCALIENTES

TLAXCALATLAXCALA

QUERÉTAROQUERÉTARO

Usuummacinta Rio Grande

GUATEMALAGUATEMALATapachula

PuertoEscondido

Acapulco

Puerto Vallarta

Mazatlán

TorreónMatamoros

Laredo

Ojinaga

Los Mochis

Navojoa

Nogales

Ensanada

Tijuana

SanFelipe

SantaRosalia

Loreto

Cabo San Lucas

Sonoita

AguaPrieta

Ciudad Juárez

Guaymas

Veracruz

Tampico

Tehuantepec

Cozumel

Cancun

Frontera

Chetumal

Merida

Villahermosa

Campeche

TuxtlaGutierrez

Oaxaca

Chilpancingo

Colima

Guadalajara

Tepic

Durango

Saltíllo

Chihuahua

Culiacán

Hermosillo

Mexicali

La Paz

Guanajuato

Pachuca

Aguascalientes

Querétaro

MoreliaToluca

Cuernavaca Puebla

Tlaxcala

Jalapa

San LuisPotosí

CiudadVictória

Zacatecas

Monterrey

MEXICOCITY

CAMPECHE

CHIAPAS

TABASCO

OAXACA

GUERRERO

COLIMA

JALISCO

NAYARIT

ZACATECAS

TAMAULIPAS

NUEVOLEON

C O A H U I L A

C H I H U A H U A

BAJACALIFORNIA

BAJACALIFORNIA

SUR

SONORA

D U R A N G O

SAN LUISPOTOSI

MICHOACAN

MEXICO

MORELOS

DISTRITO FEDERAL

PUEBLA

HIDALGOVERACRUZ

GUANAJUATO

AGUASCALIENTES

TLAXCALA

YUCATAN

QUINTANAROO

S INA

LOA

QUERÉTARO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GUATEMALA

BELIZE

HONDURAS

ELSALVADOR

Yaqui

Rio Grande

Rio Bravo

Fuerte

Salado

Lerma

Balsas

Usumacinta

Conchos

PACIFICOCEAN

Gulf of Mexico

Bay of Campeche

Gulf ofTehuantepec

Gulf of

Honduras

Gu

l f of C

al i f o

r ni a

To Los Angeles

To Gila Bend

To Albuquerque

To Alamogordo

To Midland

To San Antonio

To San Antonio

To Houston

To San Salvador

Si e r r a

Ma

dr e O

c c i d e n t a l

S ierra Madre del Sur

Si e

r r a M

ad

r e O

r i e nt a

l

Citlaltépetl (5,747 m)

115°W

30°N30°N

25°N

15°N

25°N

20°N

15°N

110°W

110°W

105°W 100°W 95°W 90°W

105°W 100°W 95°W

85°W

MEXICO

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

0 100 200

0 50 100 150 200 Miles

300 Kilometers IBRD 33447R

NO

VEM

BER 2008

MEXICOSELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

STATE CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

STATE BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES