Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003568

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(TF-11069)

ON A

TRUST FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF US MILLION

(US$ 5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA

FOR A

STATE AND PEACEBUILDING FUND (SPF)

PARTICIPATORY SERVICE DELIVERY FOR REINTEGRATION PROJECT

September 30, 2015

Social Protection and Labor Global Practice

Middle East and North Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 21, 2015)

Currency Unit = Tunisian Dinar (TND)

TND 1.00 = US$ 0.52

US$ 1.00 = TND 1.93

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALMP Labor Market Programs

CBT Central Bank of Tunisia

CSO Civil Service Organization

DPL Development Policy Loan

FM Financial Management

G2P Government to People Payment

GOT Government of Tunisia

IA Implementation Agency

ISR Implementation Status & Results report

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MEVT Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training

MoSA Ministry of Social Affairs

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PDO Project Development Objective

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PNAFN National Assistance for Needy Families Program

SPF State and Peace-Building Fund

TND Tunisian Dinar

UTSS Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale

iii

Vice President: Hafez Ghanem

Country Director:

Sr. Global Practice Director:

Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly

Arup Banerji

Practice Manager: Yasser El-Gammal

Project Team Leader: Heba Elgazzar

ICR Team Leaders: Amr Moubarak and Suzanne Essama

iv

TUNISIA

State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)

Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... v B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... v

C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... v

D. Sector and Theme Codes .......................................................................................... vi

E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. vi F. Results Framework Analysis .................................................................................... vii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... x H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. x

I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................. xi

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 11

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 17

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 17

6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 19 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors .............. 20

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 24

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 25 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....... 27

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 28 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 30 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ........................ 31

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 41 Annex 10. Country Map ............................................................................................... 41

v

TUNISIA

State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)

Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Project

DATA SHEET

A. Basic Information

Country: Tunisia Project Name:

Participatory Service

Delivery for

Reintegration SPF

Project ID: P127212 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-11069

ICR Date: 08/18/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Grantee: REPUBLIC OF

TUNISIA

Original Total

Commitment: USD 5.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 4.76 M

Revised Amount: USD 5.00M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies:

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 05/23/2011 Effectiveness: 10/03/2012

Appraisal: 06/23/2011 Restructuring(s): 02/27/2014

Approval: 11/02/2011 Mid-term Review: 12/01/2013 12/01/2013

Closing: 03/31/2014 03/31/2015

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

vi

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem

Project at any time

(Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): No

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Health 20 20

Other social services 30 30

Vocational training 50 50

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Other human development 100 100

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Inger Andersen

Country Director: Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly Neil Simon M. Gray

Practice

Manager/Manager:

Yasser Aabdel-Aleem Awny El-

Gammal Enis Baris

Project Team Leader: Heba Elgazzar Heba Elgazzar

ICR Team Leader: Suzanne Essama/ Amr S.

Moubarak

ICR Primary Author: Suzanne Essama

Amr S. Moubarak

vii

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective of the Tunisia Participatory Service Development for

Reintegration Project (PSD, the Project) is to pilot participatory approaches to employment

generation through a cash-for-service program for vulnerable Tunisian households. The

Project supports the financing of Subprojects focusing on meeting social needs by

improving service delivery at the local level. The Project contributes to: (i) fostering social

cohesion and stabilization among disadvantaged populations following the January 2011

revolution, and (ii) mitigating the socioeconomic risks faced by Tunisians returnees fleeing

Libyan civil strife and by Tunisian communities near the border with Libya affected by

depressed cross-border trade and commerce.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

N/A

viii

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1:

Beneficiaries that have participated in implementing Sub-projects (Number)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 4000.00 6180.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 06/30/2014 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

At project completion, the total number of direct beneficiaries participating in

Sub-projects exceeded the target number by 55%.

This indicator was Achieved.

Indicator 2: Proportion of beneficiaries who perceived an improvement in job skills as result

of the training acquired through the implementation of Sub-projects (%)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 60 54

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

75% of beneficiaries indicated that "work experience", was the biggest reason

for an improvement in their job skills.

This indicator was Partially Achieved.

Indicator 3: Proportion of women among beneficiaries employed (%)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 30.00 70

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The proportion of women exceeded the target by over 200%

This indicator was Achieved.

Indicator 4: Members of communities benefiting from Sub-projects who receive services

through local Sub-projects (Number).

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 12000.00 62669.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 06/30/2014 10/17/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

By project completion, the number of community members exceeded the initial

target by more than 500%.

This indicator was Achieved.

Indicator 5: Proportion of communities members benefiting from Sub-projects who perceive

services received respond to local needs (%)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 60.00 67.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 06/30/2014 03/31/2015

ix

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

This indicator was Achieved

Indicator 6:

Proportion of beneficiaries and community members benefiting from sub-

projects who perceive greater involve in local decision-making regarding service

delivery (%)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0.00 60.00 56.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

This indicator was Partially Achieved (93% of target).

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1: Employment opportunities are generated and access to key basic services has

increased (%)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0.00 60.00 67.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Percent of community members that reported “additional services provided

beyond those in the public sector” in the beneficiary survey assessment.

This indicator was Achieved.

Indicator 2 :

Local community participation and job skills in social service delivery have

increased (Workers perceive service delivery training responds to job skills

development needs, at least 60 percent of workers, %)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0.00 60.00 72.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved target. Exceeded target (based on beneficiary survey).

Indicator 3 :

Central and local capacity for project management, monitoring and evaluation

has increased [Bi-annual project management (results matrix) targets have been

met by PIU UTSS central and regional staff, at least 70 percent of bi-annual

results met, %]

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0.00 70.00 100.00

Date achieved 11/02/2011 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

x

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved target. “Targets” refers to data collection and implementation targets

as per beneficiary enrolment and sub-project calls for proposal calendar.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 09/26/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00

2 05/21/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.50

3 02/15/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.21

4 11/12/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.23

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring

in USD

millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made DO IP

02/27/2014 S S 2.45

To extend the closing by 12

months from March 31, 2014 to

March 31, 2015. To allow

completion of some sub-

projects, completion of cash

transfer disbursements to 4000

project beneficiaries, and to

prepare beneficiary assessment.

xi

I. Disbursement Profile

1

TUNISIA

State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)

Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Project

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country Background

1. In January 2011, Tunisia experienced an unprecedented popular uprising, driven largely

by underlying social disparities, allegations of corruption against the government, and broad

frustration with lack of employment and economic opportunities. Protests swept Tunisia in

December 2010 and January 2011, which culminated in the ousting of the sitting president, Ben

Ali, and his regime, after 23 years in power. An interim government was established and tasked

with organizing the elections for the Constituent Assembly, which was elected in October 2011.

Within its capacity as a caretaker government, the interim Government of Tunisia (GoT) adopted

short-term measures to prepare the way for greater social and economic inclusion. Following

elections in November and December 2014, a permanent Government with a five-year mandate

was formed in 2015.

2. Since the 2011 uprising, Tunisia’s macroeconomic outlook has been considered uncertain

due to reduced tourism, trade and foreign investment following the revolution and the crisis, at the

same time, in neighboring Libya. Before the revolution, Tunisia’s GDP growth was steady at 5

percent, relatively high for the Middle East and North Africa region. Using a poverty line of US$2

per day, poverty in Tunisia was estimated to be 15 percent as of 2010, the latest available data (new

household survey data is expected by late 2016 to update the poverty estimates). Following the

revolution, unemployment was estimated to have grown from 13 percent (500,000 people) in 2010

to approximately 18 percent (700,000 people) in early 2011. An estimated 39 percent of the

unemployed have a secondary education and 32 percent have a university education.

Sector Background

3. As of 2011, Tunisia had made considerable progress in social outcomes for over two

decades, yet wide regional disparities in poverty, unemployment and human development

outcomes were evident. Human development indicators in poorer, western and southern

regions lagged behind the levels seen in other middle-income countries. With a population of

approximately 10 million (2011) and an average GDP per capita of US$3,072 (current dollars), life

expectancy at 74 years was considered relatively average for a middle-income country. The adult

literacy rate was estimated at 77 percent. The population was and remains largely urban at 65

percent. As low as 40 percent of the population in rural regions had access to modern sanitation,

compared to 95 percent in urban areas. Unemployment was estimated at 15 percent of the

population, exacerbated by a young population where 23 percent were below the age of 15. Youth

unemployment was estimated to be as high as 43 percent (ILO/World Development Indicators).

The infant mortality rate (IMR) was relatively low at 18 per 1,000 live births as of 2008, yet higher

than in middle-income countries such as Ukraine and Thailand. The rate of use of prenatal services

(4 or more visits) was also poorer in Tunisia than in most other middle-income countries.

2

4. Social policy in Tunisia has been based on principles of solidarity according to

Tunisia’s series of five-year National Development Plans, with social sector expenditures

accounting for over 18 percent of GDP. Increased investment in rural roads, housing programs,

food subsidies, cash transfers and free health cards had supported improvements of living

conditions of vulnerable populations. These programs, however, have not been adequately

designed given persistent regional disparities. Social sector expenditures in 2011 comprised

approximately: (i) 4 percent of GDP on pensions; (ii) 5 percent of GDP on health (7 percent of

total public expenditure); (iii) 6 percent of GDP on education (20 percent of total public

expenditure); (iv) 1.0 percent of GDP on active labor market programs; (v) over 3 percent on food

and fuel subsidies, and (vi) approximately 0.4 percent on social assistance programs (including

cash transfers and disability benefits).

5. In terms of social safety nets and economic inclusion, since 2003, the GoT had been

providing social assistance to vulnerable households through three main programs

administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), including a cash transfer program, a

free health card program. In 2011, the GoT had been providing monthly cash transfer allowances

to 185,000 households (7.2 percent of the population) and subsidized health insurance cards to

752,900 individuals (7.4 percent of the population). Beneficiary households received a cash

transfer allocation of 70 TND per month with an additional supplement of 10 TND per school-age

child, up to a limit of three children (average household size is 4). Prior to the 2011 revolution, the

number of household beneficiaries of income support was 135,000, which was increased by 50,000

after the January 2011 revolution. As of 2009, cash transfer beneficiaries were distributed as

follows: 52 percent of beneficiaries were female; 68 percent were older than 60 years; 49.5 percent

lived in rural areas; and 18 percent had a disability. The number of free health insurance card

beneficiaries also increased after the revolution from 175,000 to 195,000 (an increase of 11 percent),

with another 557,900 receiving subsidized insurance cards. In terms of disability benefits,

approximately 2 percent of the population was estimated to have had a long-standing disability;

MoSA provided disability benefits to 180,000 individuals as of 2011.

Table 1 : Overview of social assistance programs administered by MoSA, 2011

Program Expenditure

(million TND)

As

percent

of

MoSA

budget

(%)

No.

beneficiaries

Percent of

population

covered

(%)

Cash transfers: National Assistance

Program to Needy Families (PNAFN)

146 87.4% 740,000

(185,000

households)

7.2%

Health Insurance Card Program n/a n/a 752,900 7.4%

Disability Assistance 12 7.1% 180,606 1.8%

Social Counseling, Child Care and

Adult Education Programs

9 5.5% n/a n/a

TOTAL 158 100.0% n/a n/a

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, 2011. Reflects government estimates as of April 2011.

3

6. In terms of governance and transparency in service delivery, the period

leading up to the 2011 revolution witnessed serious issues of governance,

transparency and accountability that weakened citizens' voice and undermined

economic prospects. Government’s agenda did not include international technical

assistance and collaboration on the topic. Following the revolution, the Interim

Government established an independent governance commission to investigate corruption

and embezzlement allegations against the Ben Ali regime (2011). Although the

Government adopted a reform to implement participatory monitoring of public services,

this approach had not yet been implemented in the employment arena at the time of the

project design. Participation of the private sector and civil society in general regarding the

identification, selection and implementation for employment programs was lacking. A

lesson learned for government strategy and the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note has been to

identify areas of investment that respond to the demands for good governance,

transparency, accountability and better service delivery as part of the shared and

sustainable growth goals for the country.

Government Strategy

7. At the time of project approval in 2011, Tunisia’s interim Government had garnered the

support of the May 2011 G8 Summit for its Social and Economic Program. This program focused

on two key pillars for the transition period: (i) improving transparency and accountability in a

quick and visible way to respond to the aspirations of the population and to signal that Tunisia is

creating a level playing field for private sector-led employment growth, and (ii) taking immediate

measures to relieve the plight of the unemployed and the most vulnerable of families and accelerate

the development of lagging regions.

Rationale for Bank Assistance

8. The social impact of the Libyan conflict was acute in Tunisia’s regions that bordered

Libya. These regions had historically relied heavily on trade and remittances from Libya as

important sources of revenue. Prior to the conflict, Libya was host to 87,177 Tunisian workers.

Following the Libyan conflict, Tunisian migrants, largely low- and semi-skilled workers, returned

mainly to poorer governorates. They were predominately male, aged 30-50 years, with dependents.

MoSA requested the World Bank’s support in piloting social assistance programs in fragile

communities, with an influx of refugees and returning Tunisian migrants facing social unrest, in

regions bordering Libya. This request came under the auspices of creating a pilot that could

generate rapid employment opportunities for the disenfranchised communities most affected by the

Libyan crisis, with an emphasis on also improving service delivery to areas that were economically

inactive. The selection of these service delivery activities (or sub-projects) involved community

participation (see section 2.1).

9. World Bank assistance for the Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration

Project (the Project), financed by the State and Peace-building Fund (SPF), was mobilized to

support state building by mitigating the negative economic and social effects on households

associated with conflict-affected regions bordering Libya. The Project was to support the SPF

objectives of state and peace building through the following: (i) employment or income-

generating activities through inclusive development sub-projects which can increase access to

basic services in conflict-affected areas; (ii) peace-building through reintegrating returning

migrant workers and building trust in emphasizing a participatory nature to the selection and

monitoring of these service delivery activities to these communities affected socially and

4

economically by the ongoing crisis. It would complement earlier World Bank support for Tunisia’s

Social and Economic Recovery Program provided through the Governance and Opportunity

Development Policy Loan (DPL), approved in June 2011 which included measures of improving

transparency in the public sector, increased participation and citizen voice in provision of services.

This DPL also supported Tunisia’s policies to expand civil society involvement in monitoring

service delivery in the social sectors, and ramping up employment generating activities.

10. The Project targeted the regions of Tataouine and Medenine that had among the

poorest economic and social outcomes in Tunisia. In 2011, unemployment was estimated to be 23

percent in these regions (as compared to 18 percent nationally). Local livelihoods depended heavily

on trade, commerce and agriculture. The region of Medenine included several districts with high

poverty rates, refugees (including foreign nationals) and a high proportion of vulnerable families

whose livelihoods had previously been dependent upon trade with Libya. The Project supported

the GoT’s broader vision for improving livelihoods and stability in these regions.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The Project Development Objective was “to pilot participatory approaches to employment

generation through a cash-for-service program for vulnerable Tunisian households.”

11. The Project’s Results Framework (RF) presented six PDO Indicators against which

progress towards the PDO would be measured, and five intermediate results indicators. The PDO

indicators did not, however align fully with either the Project’s PDO as defined, or with the project

design (Section 2.1).

12. The PDO Indicators were:

1. At least 4,000 workers are employed to implement projects

2. At least 60 percent of workers perceive improvement in job skills as a result of sub-project

training

3. At least 30 percent of workers employed are women

4. At least 12,000 community members receive services through local sub-projects

5. At least 60 percent of community members perceive services received respond to local

needs

6. At least 60 percent of workers and community members perceive greater involvement in

local decision-making regarding service delivery

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and

reasons/justification There were no revisions to the either the original PDO or to its key indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. As identified in project documents, the Project’s primary beneficiaries were semi-skilled,

unemployed workers from vulnerable households in the poorer governorates of Tataouine and

Medenine bordering Libya. Local bureaus of the Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (UTSS)

would be responsible for selecting beneficiaries. Specific household expenditure criteria and other

relevant details were described in the Project’s Operational Manual (OM). As employment in social

5

services tended to attract female labor force participation, the Project specifically included a target

indicator for female employment. The number of Tunisian migrants as of the end of May 2011 in

the governorates of Tataouine and Medenine was estimated to be 4.3 percent of the total number

of returnees, or 2,021 potential workers. Eligibility criteria was used to target beneficiaries in an

equitable manner given that the wage to be offered (minimum wage) was likely not low enough to

allow for efficient self-targeting (whereby lower-skilled and poorer workers would have been the

majority of applicants). To that end, a number of proxy indicators of vulnerability were used as

eligibility criteria as detailed in the Project Document. Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries were

similar to those used by MoSA for its National Program for Assistance to Needy Families

(PNAFN).

14. Indirect beneficiaries included local community members who would receive services

provided by workers employed by the Project, such as other vulnerable Tunisian and non-

Tunisian refugees from Libya. It was estimated that the Project would provide basic social services

to 12,000 community members, assuming 3 in habitants would benefit from every worker enrolled

in the program.

1.5 Original Components

15. The Project consisted of three components: (i) Pilot Local Service Delivery Sub-Projects

(estimated cost: US$4.3 million); (ii) Local Service Delivery Sub-Project Training (estimated cost:

US$0.43 million); and (iii) Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (estimated cost:

US$0.27 million). Each of the components are described below.

(i) Component A: Pilot Local Service Delivery Sub-Projects (US$4.3 million). The component was to finance wages paid to beneficiaries and contracted services aimed

at providing basic service delivery through employment generating sub-projects. The sub-

projects were awarded and supervised by the Implementing Agency (IA), the Union

Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (UTSS). All project finances were to be managed by

the IA through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) established within the UTSS. Sub-

projects would be demand-driven and selected from proposals submitted by local NGOs

(legally established as “associations”) based on community and local government

consultations.

(ii) Component B: Local Service Delivery Sub-Project Training (US$0.43

million). This component was to finance consultants’ services and goods for training and

skills development for workers and technical assistance to sub-project teams and local

government in support of the local community sub-projects awarded to select NGOs

(Component A). Training activities on planning and management of service delivery sub-

projects, including administrative and financial management, social needs assessment, and

human resource management would be organized and managed by UTSS and provided to

local government and civil society.

(iii) Component C: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.27

million). This component was to finance consultants’ services, goods and office equipment

and supplies for the PIU of the UTSS for day-to-day management and monitoring of the

Project. It would support evaluating the performance of sub-projects, including periodic

interim and final evaluations. The PIU was to be staffed by UTSS staff as well as

consultants hired through the Project for additional support.

1.6 Revised Components

6

The Project’s components were not revised.

1.7 Other significant changes

16. Following a request from the Government in 2014, the Project was restructured on

February 27, 2014 to extend the closing date by an additional 12 months, i.e., to March 31,

2015. This was justified to allow for the completion of the following activities: (i)

finalization of the sub-projects that had not yet been completed; (ii) completion of cash

transfer disbursements to 4,000 project beneficiaries, which had turned out to take longer

than had originally been anticipated; and (iii) preparation of the project beneficiary

assessment, which would help develop recommendations for possibly scaling up this type

of project in the future.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

17. Project Development Objective and Intended Outcomes: As stated in section 1.2, the

wording of the PDO did not align fully with the Project’s design and the key indicators by which

progress would be measured. Further, the PDO was output oriented, with no outcome oriented

objectives. In view of this, this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) interprets

the Project’s intended outcomes as understood from a review of the project design, key indicators,

and implementation support and supervision documents. The intended outcomes were to have

designed and piloted a project that: (i) built participatory approaches for the target population, and

(ii) generated opportunities for employment (including self-employment) for the target population.

A secondary objective would be to improve service delivery in the communities. Key PDO

indicators have been aligned with these intended outcomes to measure progress, as follows:

Indicator

Number

Key Indicator Intended Outcome

1 At least 4,000 workers are employed to

implement projects

Employment and income-

generating opportunities

2 At least 60 percent of workers perceive

improvement in job skills as a result of sub-

project training

Employment and income-

generating opportunities

3 At least 30 percent of workers employed are

women

Employment and income-

generating opportunities

4 At least 12,000 community members receive

services through local sub-projects

Improving service delivery

5 At least 60 percent of community members

perceive services received respond to local

needs

Building participatory

approaches AND improving

service delivery

6 At least 60 percent of workers and community

members perceive greater involvement in local

decision-making regarding service delivery

Building participatory

approaches

7

18. Project Design. The Project’s overall design supports the intended development outcomes

above. The contracted sub-projects were implemented by adopting three approaches: (a)

identification of potential local sub-projects through open calls for proposals at the local level to

NGOs and the private sector to solicit designs for local workfare projects targeting community

services were the projects selected were expected to be labor intensive (specifically demanding

low-skill labor) (b) selection of projects through consultations with civil society groups against

specific criteria (as described in the PAD) to ensure that citizen participation plays a role in the

selection of sub-projects that addressed community needs, and (c) involvement of beneficiaries

(through employment in sub-projects or related income-generating activities) in delivering basic

community services promised through awarded sub-projects.

19. Participatory Processes-Theory of Change: As the border communities’ economic

potential was very limited for private sector led job growth (Section 1.1), the service delivery sub-

projects chosen were considered some of the limited options available to generate employment or

income opportunities for low-skilled and semi-skilled beneficiaries in affected areas. The selection

of these sub-projects was participatory by bringing the beneficiaries and end users of infrastructure

into local decision-making. These participatory processes included: capacity building for

community facilitators; local communication strategies; call for proposals; service delivery skills

training; and, participatory monitoring assessments among others. Participation helped build trust

between communities and government officials, thereby helping to meet secondary SPF objectives

of peace-building and social cohesion. Also, as the sub-projects were designed in a participatory

fashion, the relevance of their design to local conditions was strong (in terms of income generating

opportunities, service needs). This in turn resulted in services and employment and income-

generating opportunities more responsive to beneficiary needs, thus improving service delivery and

job creation and placement.

20. Bank Preparation and Project Design. World Bank missions were held between

February and May 2011 to prepare the proposed project. During the preparation period, the stated

PDO and theory of change were less clearly articulated although the intent is reflected in elements

of project design. Specifically, clear definitions were prepared to guide participatory design, the

types of services expected to be delivered, eligibility criteria, and implementation arrangements

that show elements of comprehensive design. This included completed operational manuals and

PIU staffing arrangements which were defined prior to effectiveness.

21. Institutional Arrangements. The Project’s institutional arrangements were designed to

take into account the institutional capacity of MoSA and UTSS. MoSA provided overall strategic

direction and supervision of the Project’s effectiveness, while UTSS built on its current capacity

and prior experience working with development partners to develop a project for this unique pilot.

22. Technical and Background Analysis: Project preparation reflected international lessons

learned in using participatory approaches for employment generation through the provision of

community services and infrastructure support. Preparation and project design also considered

lessons in the design and implementation of social protection operations in Tunisia. Employment

opportunities and ensuring access to basic services at the local level can help to support social

reintegration in fragile and post-revolutionary contexts. The project design as described in the

PAD reflected lessons learned from similar approaches in Former Yugoslav Republic of

8

Macedonia1, Thailand2, Iraq3, Bulgaria4 and other Eastern and Central European countries5. In

Tunisia, participatory approaches in public service delivery in Tunisia had been limited, but

nonetheless the Project took into also account lessons learned from small-scale NGO projects

funded through private donations and the Government.

23. Country and Sector Risks: Country and sectoral risks were assessed during preparation

through extensive consultations with Governmental and civil society groups. Risks were considered

to be high due to the regional context at the time, and due to the fact that the pilot approach proposed

by the Project was to be the first of its kind in Tunisia. Stakeholder consultations were conducted

to allow for a participatory process, although they remained limited in the Project’s target regions

given the political volatility at the time. Previous operations and analytic work showed that

opportunities and ensuring access to basic services at the local level can help to support social

reintegration in fragile contexts. The World Bank team appropriately anticipated these risks to

achieving the PDO.

2.2 Implementation

24. The US$5M State and Peace-building Fund (SPF) Grant Agreement was signed on April

20, 2012. The four effectiveness conditions were met and the grant was declared effective on

October 3, 2012.

25. Initial Implementation Delays. The Project showed little progress during its first year

of implementation due largely to the need to mobilize and train new PIU staff (on World Bank

fiduciary requirements), and also to comply with effectiveness conditions (due to Government

staffing changes). By September 2012, the Project had shown no progress towards targets for key

indicators (most of which reflected outputs). Implementation began in earnest in 2013. By May

2013, 485 beneficiaries (out of a target of 4000) had enrolled in the program. Project

implementation accelerated significantly thereafter, and most activities were completed on time

thereafter.

26. Implementation of Activities Aligned with Project Design. The Project was

implemented in accordance with its design, as detailed in the Project Proposal, and the Operational

Manual The first component, employment opportunities through community service projects,

granted. Sub-projects that were supervised by the local associations that received the funds. The

second component provided training to beneficiaries who were hired under the subprojects. These

trainings included skill development (e.g., fishing, welding), financial literacy, among others.

27. Institutional Arrangements during Implementation: The Project’s institutional

arrangements remained as originally designed throughout implementation. Coordination improved

1 World Bank (2007). The FYR Macedonia Community Development Project: Empowerment through

Targeting and Institution Building. Washington DC: World Bank. 2 “Piloting Community Approaches in Conflict Situation in Three Southernmost Provinces in Thailand”,

State and Peacebuilding Fund Project Document, 2009. World Bank. 3 “Iraq Consultative Service Delivery Program”, State and Peacebuilding Fund Project Document, 2009.

World Bank. 4 “Social Assistance for New Employment: from pilot to policy: Introducing community-based social

services in Bulgaria”, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) project review, 2009, UNDP. 5 World Bank (2000). Moving from Residential Institutions to Community-Based Social Services in

Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Washington DC: World Bank.

9

between the Ministry of Vocational Training and MoSA, whereby verification of work status and

vulnerability were systematically provided by local MoSA offices. However, there was little

documentation provided on the role and inputs of the inter-ministerial Steering Committee to allow

for improvements as needed. UTSS through MoSA was the IA throughout project implementation

which was responsible for launch of all sub-projects during implementation until project

completion. According to ISR reviews and an interview with the project director, the project did

not experience any implementation challenges at the implementing agency level. All project

finances were managed by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), in close coordination with UTSS

regional offices, which provided on the ground capacity building support. For the most part, PIU

staff remained the same working through a design model as introduced during project inception

throughout project implementation.

28. In-Country Supervision and Implementation Support: The World Bank’s Task Team

Leader (TTL) and fiduciary team were based in Tunisia. Furthermore, the same team was

responsible for implementation support until completion. This allowed the TTL and team to sustain

on-the-ground assistance and implementation support on any issues that arose.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

29. Selection of PDO Key Indicators. The Project’s key indicators reflected the Project’s

intended outcomes in its three main areas (Section 2.1). Although the PDO could have been better

defined, the PDO Indicators mostly reflect intended outcomes and design. Two indicators were

output-oriented and linked directly to project implementation results. For the participatory

approaches objective and secondary objective of service-delivery, the Project would have benefited

from indicators to monitor how well both the selection and implementation process was

participatory to deliver services to target communities. Specific questions at baseline and end of

project on delivery of select services could have showed progress towards objective of improved

service delivery.

30. Project Monitoring. The PIU (with significant implementation support by the World Bank

team) established a project administrative database which was maintained and monitored by a

dedicated statistical M&E specialist. Data was collected by the local project coordinator and by

NGOs on approximately all 6,100 beneficiary demographics, sub-project details, NGO partner

organizations, indirect beneficiaries, beneficiary perceptions of sub-projects, and follow-up

employment data following project exit (for a sub-sample of approximately 1,450 beneficiaries) in

each sub-region.

31. For project evaluation, a survey firm was hired to conduct a final beneficiary assessment

survey during October-November 2014, near completion (Section 3.6). This survey provided

information on a sample of approximately 850 beneficiaries and a sample of NGO partners related

to demographics, beneficiary perceptions of training and work experience through the sub-projects,

and NGO perceptions of project implementation. The results of the project beneficiary survey

helped: (i) confirm the appropriateness of the project design model used in targeted communities

(i.e., labor intensive service-delivery sub-projects which are chosen by local communities); (ii)

confirm that interventions can lead to ‘increase in skill development’ and ‘satisfying local needs’

(as perceived by beneficiaries); and, (iii) provide insightful disaggregation to the effect of the

project in generating employment opportunities. These results will likely inform the future roll-out

of the program if expanded.

32. Robustness in Measurement of Outcomes. Based on the PIU’s January 2015

Implementation Report and information from the project M&E database, the number of indirect

10

beneficiaries for instance, is based on estimates of catchment areas rather than direct surveying or

monitoring. This was due to budget and feasibility in implementation constraints, which may have

inflated the number of indirect beneficiaries by accounting for all community members as having

benefitted from the public services provided through the community sub-projects carried out. The

Project would have benefited from tools to help improve monitoring such as the use of mobile

phones and digital technology.

33. Implementation and Utilization. The PIU compiled information on the progress of each

component by using information submitted in the context of disbursement processing and of site-

visits to monitor intermediate outcome indicators and through tracking MIS data on progress of

implementation and service delivery to beneficiaries. In an interview, the Project Director

confirmed that the PIU used this information to provide implementation and capacity building

support to NGOs experiencing delays in implementation of selected sub-projects.6

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

34. There were no safeguard and fiduciary compliance issues during the implementation. The

project was tagged as Category “C” (no safeguard triggers), and remained as such until completion.

There were no safeguards which applied to the project.

35. As for fiduciary compliance, during implementation support missions by the World Bank,

regular audits and interim financial reports were prepared and delivered as required. However,

some delays were experienced due to a lack of familiarity among PIU staff with Bank operational

procedures and technical requirements.

Financial Management and Disbursement

36. Financial management (FM) supervision was carried out throughout implementation,

including meetings with PIU staff and desk reviews in accordance with OP/BP 10. The main

purpose was to review the adequacy of the project’s financial management arrangements at

different phases of implementation. Overall FM arrangements in terms of staffing, accounting,

reporting, budgeting, internal controls, flow of funds and audit arrangements were reviewed

regularly.

37. The Project’s financial management, including budgeting, accounting, internal controls,

funds flow, financial reporting and auditing, was deemed adequate and provided: (i) accurate

financial information, and (ii) reasonable assurance that project funds were being used for the

purpose intended. However, there were initially a few challenges that were addressed in order to

fully comply with World Bank’s fiduciary requirements (Annex 9).

Procurement

38. An assessment of procurement capacity carried out during project preparation confirmed

that UTSS had the capacity, at both central and local levels, to manage and administer the project’s

procurement. Two grant effectiveness conditions were related to procurement and they were

satisfactorily met in October 2012. These included: (i) the establishment of the PIU which included

6 ICR author telephone interview with Project Director, Latifa Rahmani, UTSS, Tunisia. September 3, 2015

11

an officer in charge of procurement; and (ii) the adoption of the project Operational Manual,

including the procurement procedures to be followed.

39. Two major procurement risks were identified and rated to be Substantial: (i) the lack of

specific expertise on Bank’s procurement procedures, as this was the first Bank’s financed project

implemented by UTSS; and (ii) the potential lack of competition that could have affected the

implementation of the small sub-grants assigned to local NGOs. Adequate mitigation measures

were identified and agreed with UTSS, and were adequately implemented, particularly the

Guidelines for the Selection and Implementation of Project Sub-Grants (which were used for

Component 1) which were well prepared and adhered to, allowing the use of “Community

Participatory” procurement procedures as enlisted in the Grant Agreement.

40. Compliance with the procurement requirements was good as were control procedures. As

a result, procurement was rated Satisfactory throughout implementation. The administrative

structure was well organized and it was able to keep record of all appropriate sub-project

documentation, including those on procurement. The PIU adequately supervised procurement

procedures and ensured that they met the minimum number of bidders required under shopping for

goods and civil works contracts to guarantee a sufficient grade of competition. Over time the

capacity of the PIU to plan and execute relatively simple procurement in accordance with the World

Bank’s procedures increased. The procurement plan for components 2 and 3 were regularly updated

and received the Bank’s non-objection.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

41. Based on the performance and results of the Project, the GoT has expressed plans to

sustain the model piloted as part of its vision to enhance its social protection and labor system

through the following three pillars which are: (i) Strengthening economic inclusion through reform

of the National Assistance for Needy Families Program (PNAFN) to support program exit

strategies; (ii) Strengthening and modernizing the information and monitoring system at the

regional level of social programs and the digitalization of social transfers; and, (iii) Improving

financial inclusion through digitizing social transfers and government-to-people payments (G2P)

through financial service providers and banking.

42. The GoT has begun to prepare for continuing investments needed to scale-up and

integrate the model piloted under the Project within the framework of existing social assistance

programs. MoSA has sent a written request to the World Bank for a follow-on project scaling-up

the model it piloted and introducing reforms to its existing national cash transfer program for

graduation of beneficiaries into the labor market, in coordination with the Ministry of Employment

and Vocational Training.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: Substantial

43. Relevance of Objective. The project’s objectives are relevant for the Tunisian context

today as they were at the time of the inception of the project. Specifically, Tunisia continues to face

significant challenges in high unemployment (specifically for youth and low-skilled workers), and

lack of equitable access to services in rural areas. The country also continues to witness challenges

in improving transparency and participatory approaches to service delivery where currently few

12

government programs are implemented on the ground that respond to these various objectives. The

Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for Tunisia (2013 – 2014), in place at the time the Project was approved,

has been extended through 2015. The Project, if it’s objectives had been stated clearly, would

remain highly relevant to the ISN and to Tunisia in terms of job creation (ISN Area 1), improving

service delivery (ISN Area 2, Social and Economic Inclusion), and building participatory

approaches (ISN Area 3, Strengthening transparency and accountability). However, given that the

PDO statement did not clearly reflect the intended outcomes and was set at the level of outputs,

rather than the intended-outcomes as demonstrated in project design and implementation, the

relevance of objectives is rated Modest.

44. Relevance of Design. Given the intended objectives and theory of change as assessed in

this ICR (See Section 2.1), the design of the Project was and continues to be very relevant. The

overall scope of the project remains relevant where it focuses on two regions bordering Libya were

local services and local private-sector job opportunities lacked which has given way for

community-driven sub-projects to be piloted. These areas continue to have significant demand for

such an approach given little changes in the market demand and employment situation. The

intervention chosen (cash-for-work) continues to also be relevant as other possible solutions that

would have involved temporary employment were public works projects that faced community

skepticism and did not allow for a participatory approach in selection of projects. The pilot

operation, which was implemented through an NGO with a dedicated PIU team for the project, also

showed a break with the negative legacy and poor implementation record of previous government-

implemented public works projects. Finally, the flexibility in the implementation (which was part

of the application based/ community awarded) basis of the project, allowed for the participation of

several types of entities depending on context. The operators of the SPF project included CSOs,

firms, training centers and local professional trade associations. To that end, the project’s relevance

of design is rated Substantial.

45. Relevance of Implementation. Although the Project met some implementation challenges

during the first year, its implementation was both participatory and demand-driven by local

communities and NGOs which resulted in the development and implementation of relevant pilot

sub-projects. The implementation of these sub-projects addressed local needs in target areas and

contributed to achieving the intended outcomes. Relevance of implementation was especially

apparent in (i) addressing the contextual challenges which the project faced at the beginning of the

implementation; and (ii) through IA responsiveness to hiccups faced at the project onset. This

relevance was measured namely through the beneficiary surveys administered by a third-party firm

in the last year of the project. To that end, the relevance of implementation is rated Substantial.

46. Specifically, key operational tools were developed and tested which further supports the

rating of ‘Substantial’ for implementation. These tools can be scaled-up and applied to other

employment and training programs including:

(i) Participatory approaches to launching calls for proposals and defining local

development priorities and designing tailored solutions;

(ii) Results-based contracting with firms and training providers to improve mid-term

employability, which can be improved through gradually strengthening the terms of

the contract

(iii) On the ground supervision ensures consistency in dialogue and just-in-time response

to implementation challenges and issues before they are exacerbated.

(iv) Continuity in leadership of the Project (one TTL from inception until completion of

the Project) provided continuity and fulfilled the intended outcomes of the Project.

13

Similarly, PIU implementation team and leadership did not experience much

reshuffling which encouraged continuity in implementation the project design.

(v) Monitoring and evaluation tools to target and ensure accountability of training for

improving employability, which can be improved through increased investment and

more robust information systems.

(vi) Using financial literacy trainings to reinforce employability by promoting financial

inclusion and preparing beneficiaries for longer-term self-employment opportunities

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Substantial

47. The achievement of the PDO is assessed based on the three intended outcomes presented

in Section 2.1. Using these to measure achievement, the Project has, achieved its intended outcomes

and PDO based on the key indicators.

48. The project managed to meet most of the PDO indicators generally satisfactorily and

combined social safety nets (or cash transfers targeted to poor, low-skilled unemployed) with on-

the-job training, making them workfare plus sub-projects. In most cases, small firms and trade

associations took an active part in designing and delivering the on-the-job training, often reflecting

the skills demanded most by the local labor market. Specifically, a “tripartite” model of

implementation at the local level was created for the Tunisian context involving Government, civil

society and the private sector, but more can be done in the future to refine and improve local

participation in decision-making.

49. Overall, targets for four of six key indicators were achieved or exceeded, and for two were

partially achieved. This suggests a rating for Achievement of Objectives as Substantial.

50. Intended Outcome 1: Pilot sub-projects to increase employment and income-

generating opportunities.

There were three key indicators, which monitored the achievement of the above intended objective.

Indicator 1: At least 4,000 workers are employed to implement projects. The Project

resulted in 6,182 beneficiaries who were enrolled in 70 sub-projects. The total number of

direct beneficiaries therefore exceeded the target number by 55%. The key indicator was

achieved.

Indicator 2: At least 60 percent of workers perceive improvement in job skills as a

result of sub-project training. Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report

and information from the project M&E database, 54 percent of workers perceive an

improvement in jobs skills as a result of sub-project training. The key indicator was

partially achieved.

Indicator 3: At least 30 percent of workers employed are women. According to PIU

reports, 70 percent of workers employed were women. The sectors with the highest shares

of women were education and social assistance, where women accounted for 77 and 75

percent of all beneficiaries employed, respectively. The key indicator was achieved

exceeding target by over 200%.

51. Intended Outcome 2: Pilot sub-projects deliver services to communities in select

regions.

Indicator 4: At least 12,000 community members receive services through local sub-

projects. The target number of indirect beneficiaries has also largely been surpassed

14

(62,669 achieved versus 12,000 targeted). The number of indirect beneficiaries is based

on estimates of catchment areas rather than direct surveying or monitoring due to budget

and feasibility in implementation constraints, which may have inflated the number of

indirect beneficiaries. The key indicator was achieved.

Indicator 5: At least 60 percent of community members perceive services received

respond to local needs. This indicator appears to measure (i) whether the

participatory process in selection of community sub-project was successful; as well

as (ii) whether needed services are delivered. A total of 67 percent of community

members reported perceiving that services responded to local needs. Qualitatively,

communities, included neighboring households that benefited by services provided by

project beneficiaries, and authorities alike found the Project opened up career

opportunities in sectors and services with unmet needs, either because public services

were unable to reach certain households, or because the services had never been created.

The key indicator is achieved.

52. Intended Outcome 3: Pilot sub-projects build participatory approaches in

community decision making

Indicator 5 falls under this objective as well. The key indicator was achieved.

Indicator 6. At least 60 percent of workers and community members perceive

greater involvement in local decision-making regarding service delivery. By project

completion, 56 percent of workers and 47 percent of community members perceive

greater involvement in local decision-making regarding service delivery. 7 The key

indicator is partially achieved.

53. Detailed description of Achievement of Objectives by key indicator is available in Annex

9.B.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Substantial

54. The project’s investments yielded relatively high returns as compared to traditional,

non-cash for work based social safety nets (see Annex 3 for the detailed economic and financial

analysis). The value of the Project lies in its capacity to increase productivity of social safety net

beneficiaries and improve local community development incrementally to a greater extent than do

traditional social safety nets. The expectation was that within 1 year of program exit, at least a

share of these beneficiaries would be expected to have found income-generating activities, as a

result of the skills, work and collaborative experience gained. These activities would provide at

least the equivalent of Tunisia’s minimum wage (286 TND per month, which is also the average

for self-employed, low-skilled earners). The efficiency rating for the project was based namely on

the economic allocation of resources to achieve PDO indicators. A more rigorous impact evaluation

in the future may help collect the detailed data required for a full analysis in the future.

55. In terms of the cost-effectiveness of the Project, the comparator for purposes of this

analysis is the current social safety net program in Tunisia (PNAFN). PNAFN provides

benefits to 235,000 heads of households, or on average TND 130 per month per household over the

course of 2012-2015 when this project was implemented. Overall, during the period of 2012-2015,

the GoT spent approximately 420 million TND per year on PNAFN, or the equivalent of 0.4 percent

7Source: PIU (UTSS), in partnership with local associations.

15

of GDP. In terms of generosity, these cash transfers amount to nearly 21 percent of average

household expenditure. Furthermore, among the sample of 1,430 beneficiaries surveyed in the

project within 1 year of program exit, 13 percent had been employed for at least six months.

56. Were the Project to be scaled-up to working-age beneficiaries of PNAFN, this would

equate to approximately 30 percent of current beneficiaries, or 70,500 heads of households

(leaving 164,500 who would continue receiving unconditional cash transfers). On average, the

workfare program, assuming the same design, would cost 94 million TND per year in cash transfers

and an additional 14 percent in training and operating costs, or a total of approximately 107 million

TND. For the 107 million TND investment, this yields a rate of return (ROR) of approximately 15

percent after accounting for the additional earnings after program exit.

57. These additional benefits are expected to accrue at a financial cost that is nearly

equivalent to the current PNAFN budget and in line with average global best practice, making

the Project relatively cost-effective. Adding the cost of the productive social safety net (107

million) with PNAFN only among the 70 percent remaining (294 million), gives a total of budget

of 401 million TND (or just under 0.4 percent of GDP). This total amount is lower than the current

social safety net spending of 420 million TND, and is expected to have a higher return on

investment. This level of public spending on a scaled-up program, the coverage and transfer

amount would be in line with that of well-performing programs productive social safety net

programs elsewhere, such as Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

58. The overall outcome rating for the project is Satisfactory, reflecting an overall rating of

substantial for relevance of objectives, design, and implementation (Section 3.1), a substantial

rating for achievement of PDO (Section 3.2), and a rating of substantial for efficiency (Section 3.3).

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

59. Longer-term Employment and Income-generation Impact. Continued employment

was found at six months following the Project for some beneficiaries. Among 1,360 beneficiaries

who had completed and exited the Project surveyed by the PIU as of November 2014,

approximately 13 percent had found employment within six months after the completion of

workfare projects (Figure 5 Annex 9.C). Most of these beneficiaries have become salaried

employees in small firms (65 percent), with the remainder becoming self-employed (35 percent)

(Figure 6 Annex 9.C.). As a rough benchmark, among public employment programs in Tunisia

targeting the highly skilled unemployed (which also include additional job placement services), the

job placement rate was estimated to be approximately 20 percent within one year as of 2012.

60. Social and Economic Inclusion. The Project had a positive impact on income generation

and training particularly for the poor and women not benefiting from public employment services

and social safety net programs, as well as on social cohesion by promoting involvement in local

decision-making.

61. Gender Impact: The project’s key indicators included an outcome (which the PIU

has set partially as a goal) of having a proportion of 30% among the direct beneficiaries

(i.e., persons hired for service delivery sub-projects). The proportion of women exceeded the

16

target by over 200%, beyond program meeting its prescribed output. In part this was

achieved because of the design of the project which allowed women to take up

opportunities as direct beneficiaries through sub-projects that did not necessarily include

manual labor that is traditionally associated with males in public work projects. Although

the evaluation of the project lacked information beyond participation, the expected effects

on women empowerment are most likely aligned with similar projects. An impact

evaluation of the project is expected to provide more information on the impact of gender.

62. Beyond the impact of the project on direct beneficiaries, there has been recorded

effect of the project on the financial inclusion of females. Specifically, through the PIU

partnership with the Center for Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR) in delivering

three-day basic financial literacy trainings for female beneficiaries focused on bank services,

budgeting, debt management, savings, and financial negotiations. The objective of these trainings

was to reinforce employability through enhancing financial capability and better equipping

beneficiaries with tools for effective self-employment over the long-term. CAWTAR has since

2013 been delivering financial literacy trainings for low-income women and youth across the

MENA region, under the Enhancing Microfinance Amongst Women and Youth Project (P144655),

financed by the MENA Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). Beneficiaries who attended the training

were found to be more likely to access formal financial services as well employ budgeting and

savings to meet financial goals.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening.

63. The Project helped to develop a model for community-driven graduation mechanisms and

livelihoods support programs for the low-skilled, poor households not benefiting from public

assistance and for social safety net program beneficiaries. The model is institutionalized through

MoSA aim to scale-up and institutionalize the employment support through community sub-

projects. An assessment is ongoing in light of the lessons learned from this pilot looking at which

aspects of the community-driven participatory approach to selection and implementation of sub-

projects to include. Adoption of these elements will demonstrate institutional change to design

and implementation of a category of social safety nets programs.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

64. Financial Inclusion and Financial Literacy. Positive development outcomes were

realized that were not initially envisioned in the Project’s design. The Project piloted interventions

which sought to reinforce employment skills through promoting financial inclusion amongst

beneficiaries. The Government has requested that financial inclusion be included under a future

World Bank-financed operation focused on promoting employability in lagging regions.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

65. An external beneficiary survey was conducted after the mid-term evaluation by a survey

firm recruited by the PIU in line with terms of reference approved by the World Bank (see Annex

5 for details). The survey was conducted to assess beneficiary, community and partner

organizations’ perceptions of process and implementation of the project and, among beneficiaries,

the relevance of the workfare sub-project and training modules. Overall, the main benefits of the

Project were perceived to be work experience gained by beneficiaries and the services delivered to

communities. A total of 75 percent of beneficiaries reported that they benefited by gaining new

work experience. However, only 66 percent were satisfied by the content of the training module

17

they received, mainly due to the lack of formal certification offered by the primarily informal

training they received from individual instructors. An important negative effect reported by NGOs

and beneficiaries was related to delays in receiving payments and cash transfers. These delays

were due to lags in financial management and disbursement processing, largely due to familiarity

with forms required and Central Bank processing timelines.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

66. Although the overall high risk posed by the political and institutional context as identified

in the PAD was accurate and mitigation measures as described were put in place, the effectiveness

of those mitigation measures remained hampered by institutional and implementation challenges.

Regardless, the risk for development outcomes remains substantial given the country context

(which continues to pose similar political, economic and security challenges as on entry) and

institutional arrangement challenges to ensure adequate capacity and inter-governmental

coordination for implementation. Specifically, the government intention on using the pilot

approach to scale-up cash-for-work programs that are driven by community participation shows a

high-level of commitment. However, institutional level coordination between MoSA and UTSS is

still not clarified even now that the operation is closed. Furthermore, general delays in

implementation of public programs initiated after the revolution hamper the sustainability or scale-

up of new programs. Finally, Tunisia’s growth outlook (including decline in public revenues in

recent years) and continuous government reshuffles may make it difficult to finance larger

programs which justifies a rating of Substantial.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

67. The Project had a strong, appropriate and relevant design at Entry. It was prepared to

respond to a request by the Government of Tunisia in less than one year after the January 2011

revolution. That said, there were two limitations to the Quality at Entry. First, the PDO, as

articulated, did not reflect the extent of the intended outcomes (both primary and secondary), which

were reflected in the Project’s design and implementation. Two of the six indicators chosen to

measure progress were output-oriented and did not fully reflect type of robust indicators that the

Project could have adopted at entry to measure progress towards achieving the objectives. Second,

readiness to implement by the Borrower was delayed in part due to inadequate preparation and

training of the IA on World Bank on fiduciary procedures. Although these risks were highlighted

in the Project Proposal and described, more attention could have been paid to: (i) support provided

to developing and adopting the OM in advance of effectiveness, including guidance on

disbursement procedures and timelines required for the PIU and the Central Bank of Tunisia; (ii)

support provided to preparing and recruiting TORs for key PIU staff, despite budget constraints in

advance of approval; and (iii) launch of pilot activities to test implementation activities. Despite

these limitations, Ensuring Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

18

68. Bank implementation support missions were undertaken routinely and included day-to-

day support provided by both World Bank headquarters- and the Tunisia-based task teams,

including the TTL, financial management and procurement specialists. Throughout

implementation, support missions included a mix of skill sets, including (i) operational manual and

implementation support provided by the Operations Officer, Operations Analyst; (ii) financial

management training and support provided by two Financial Management Specialists over the

course of the project; (iii) procurement training and support provided by two Procurement

Specialists over the course of the project; (iv) local coordination and day-to-day implementation

support particularly over the first half of the project provided by a Project Management and Social

Development Consultant; (v) monitoring and evaluation training and support provide by a Social

Protection and Labor Economist; and (vi) additional World Bank support provided through

participation by the PIU and GoT project staff in World Bank-financed capacity-building and

knowledge-sharing events, including the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Employment and

Social Safety Nets Community of Practice (videoconferences and materials) during 2012-2104 and

the Brazil South-South Learning Forum in 2014. Quality of Supervision is rated Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

69. Overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on the ratings of

Moderately Satisfactory for Quality at Entry and Satisfactory for Quality of Supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

70. Government performance (Prime Ministry, and Cabinet at the central level; and, local

Governors at the local level) is rated as Moderately Satisfactory given the positive results which

the Project achieved despite early delays undertaking the necessary legal steps to making the

project effective and supporting its launch of activities. To some extent, these delays were

attributed to numerous Government reshuffles and lagging capacity, as Tunisia grappled with

broader political transition just after the January 2011 revolution, which relatively stabilized by

2013. The close involvement and guidance by local Governors in coordination with appointed

regional ministerial representatives suggests that coordination was generally adequate.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory

71. Implementing Agency (MoSA implementing through UTSS) performance is rated

Satisfactory. The Project, being a pilot, innovative initiative in several respects, witnessed a

number of implementation challenges at the onset due to having to develop and build capacity

among a new PIU. However, UTSS as the implementation agency, played a critical role in building

capacity to overcome these challenges. These challenges were largely overcome after the first year

of implementation, with capacity now strengthened for future operations. Also important to note

is that based on the mid-term evaluation, of the 58 NGOs enlisted in the Project, 77 percent of them

were new NGOs that were created after the 2011 revolution. This signified that most NGOs that

participated in the Project, as in most of Tunisia, have little or no experience in project management

(as revealed in on-going sub-project evaluations). Low capacity delayed project implementation

somewhat, a constraint that will gradually recede as NGOs gain more experience over time.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

19

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

72. Overall Borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on the ratings of

Moderately Satisfactory for Borrower Performance and Satisfactory for Implementing Agency

Performance.

6. Lessons Learned

Overall Main findings

73. The Project was implemented effectively in a tri-partite approach involving local

government, civil society and the private sector. It successfully funded “demand-driven” paid

apprenticeships, chosen and designed by community, local civil society groups, training centers

and firms and which focused on delivering basic community services but also generating

livelihoods in local markets

Specific Lessons Learned from this Operation

74. Through testing new approaches, the Project highlighted certain key lessons learned in

terms of: (i) implementation arrangements, (ii) mechanisms to boost employability through

delivering basic services, and (iii) participatory approaches to build social cohesion and address

accountability of service delivery in fragile contexts to various degrees.

75. Implementation through public-private partnerships is feasible in new contexts,

assuming contracting and monitoring are sound. In terms of implementation arrangements, the

Project showed that public-private partnerships can support the implementation of employment-

generating, cash-for-service programs and projects. Despite early delays in setting up the legal

institutional arrangements of the Project and training a new PIU on Bank procedures, this Project

exceeded targets and nearly fully disbursed all grant funds. Moving forward, monitoring and

results-based contracting can be gradually strengthened to boost the quality and effectiveness of

implementation further.

76. Employability through delivering basic services can help boost short-term

employment opportunities in specific sectors. In terms of employability, the Project shows the

importance of adapting designs to the profile of the unemployed and local markets. The gaps in

local service delivery provided short-term employment opportunities to semi-skilled beneficiaries.

As a result of the training and experience provided, the preliminary follow-up survey at six months

after program exit of a sample beneficiaries also showed that this experience in transferable, as a

share of beneficiaries found wage employment or became self-employed following program exit.

Moving forward, these efforts need to be coupled with boosting private investment more

strategically and more rigorous training for ensuring sustainability in those sectors that led to

employment. Broadening this kind of coordination help links beneficiaries to new employment

opportunities.

77. Participatory approaches can help foster social cohesion and accountability in service

delivery to varying degrees. Finally, in terms of participatory approaches to build social cohesion,

the Project showed the importance of involving local actors in selecting and targeting local

development needs and solutions. Giving greater choice and involvement to key stakeholders at

the local level, including public authorities, the private sector and civil society groups helped match

demand and supply in identifying the most viable, needed opportunities. However, greater local

capacity in terms of technical know-how and financial resources and more systematic coordination

between stakeholders are needed moving forward.

20

78. The lessons learned from the Project are relevant to the design of future social protection

and labor programs and reforms, notably in terms of: (i) introducing productive social safety net

(SSN) programs as part of Tunisia’s existing SSN framework, (ii) consolidating productive SSN

and active labor market programs (ALMP) through consolidating targeting for social protection

and labor (SPL) programs between the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) and the Ministry of

Employment and Vocational Training (MEVT), and (iii) public-private partnerships at the local

level for SPL programs, notably productive SSN and active labor market programs (ALMPs).

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors

(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies N/A

(b) Cofinanciers/Donors N/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

N/A

21

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

PILOT SERVICE DELIVERY

SUB-PROJECTS 4,303,000.00 4,300,000.00 99

SERVICE DELIVERY SUB-

PROJECT TRAINING 431,200.00 430,000.00 99

PROJECT MANAGEMENT,

MONITORING AND

EVALUATION (PIU SUPPORT)

264,900.00 270,000.00 98

Total Baseline Cost 4,999,100.00 5,000,000.00

Physical Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 0.00 0.00

Project Preparation Costs 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 0.00 5,000,000.00

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal

Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

State and Peace Building Fund 4.90 5.00 .00

23

(c) Disbursements by Category Categories Initial

Allocation (1)

U$

Initial

Allocation +

15%

Payment as of

31/12/2013

Payment as of

30/06/2014

Payment as

of 31/12/

2014 U$

Payment as

of 31 July

2015 U$

Cumulative

Payment as of

31 July 2015

Payments

/

Allocation

(2) / (1)

(%)

Remaining

balance at

project

closing

(1) Cash transfer to

Beneficiaries

4,030,000.00 3,884,500.00 1,306,336.28 1,263,166.00 243,813.24 828,925.27 3,642,240.79 93.76% 242,259.21

(2) Goods 205,000.00 235,750.00 24,763.35 161,017.24 24,947.49 26,687.93 237,416.01 100.71% -1,666.01

(3) Consultant

Services , training ,

workshops and

audits (Services

consultants,

formation,

workshops, audits)

645,000.00 741,750.00 283,431.03 157,535.00 213,236.04 84740.31 738,942.38 99.62% 2,807.62

(4) Operating Costs 120,000.00 138,000.00 7,576.38 32,566.98 39,268.89 56,617.10 136,029.35 98.57% 1,970.65

Total 5,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 1,622,107.04 1,614,285.22 521,265.66 996,970.61 4,754,628.53 95.09% 245,371.47

24

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component (as per PAD) Output

Component 1: Pilot Local Service Delivery Sub-

Projects

Capacity building for community facilitators has

been conducted

All facilitators have been trained

Local communication strategy has been

developed (messaging, outlets, and materials for

calls for proposals and job opportunities and

roster of local associations has been created)

40 sub-projects are initiated in Tataouine and

Medenine (or 4,000 workers have been

employed)

All facilitators have been trained

PIU UTSS has disseminated

communication to local UTSS,

local associations and community

communication outlets.

Sub-projects have been

implemented.

Component 2: Local Service Delivery Sub-Project

Training

Service delivery skills training certification has

been granted to employed workers

Local participatory monitoring assessments

have been disseminated publicly (available on

UTSS website)

Local facilitators have been selected and

training for service delivery has been conducted.

All workers have received training

certification for service delivery

sub-projects.

At least one participatory

monitoring report per sub-projects

has been published.

All facilitators have been recruited.

Component 3: Project Management, Monitoring and

Evaluation

Training has been conducted on Operations

Manual, capacity building, and operational

planning

Establishment of M&E framework and data

collection plan for future scale-up

Evaluation, lessons documentation and planning

for subsequent rounds has been conducted

Mid-term and final independent evaluation and

dissemination

All PIU staff have been trained

Improved M&E system in place

Evaluation reports are routinely

published

Workshops arranged for

dissemination of mid-term and

final evaluation reports

25

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

While there was no ERR/IRR estimated at appraisal, the Project’s investments yielded

relatively high returns as compared to traditional, non-workfare based social safety nets. The

value of the Project lies its capacity to increase productivity of social safety net beneficiaries and

improve local community development incrementally to a greater extent than do traditional social

safety nets. Given availability of the data to date, a basic framework is proposed here for evaluating

cost-effectiveness based on the additional benefits accrued in terms of earnings, and more broadly,

community externalities. The expectation was that within 1 year of program exit, at least a share

of these beneficiaries would be expected to have found income-generating activities, as a result of

the skills, work and collaborative experience gained. These activities would provide at least the

equivalent of Tunisia’s minimum wage (286 TND per month, which is also the average for self-

employed, low-skilled earners). The program would cost the equivalent or marginally more than

traditional social safety nets, but which would increase that overall cost-effectiveness of public

spending due to (i) incrementally more positive externalities to local community development,

services and infrastructure, and (ii) boosting purchasing power and local economic growth. A more

rigorous impact evaluation in the future may help collect the detailed data required for a full

analysis in the future.

The comparator is the current social safety net program in Tunisia (PNAFN). PNAFN

provides benefits to 235,000 heads of households, or on average TND 130 per month per household

over the course of 2012-2015 when this project was implemented. Over the course of 18 months,

therefore, the average head of household would have received approximately 2,340 TND in total.

Overall, during the period of 2012-2015, the Government spent approximately 420 million TND

per year on PNAFN, or the equivalent of 0.4 percent of GDP. In terms of generosity, these cash

transfers amount to nearly 21 percent of average household expenditure.

The SPF Project provided work experience and 220 TND per month for six months to one

person per household. For the first six months of the program, beneficiaries received a total of

TND 1320. Among the sample of 1430 beneficiaries surveyed within 1 year of program exit, 13

percent had been employed for at least six months, or approximately 186 beneficiaries. Assuming

this rate remains constant, of the 6180 total beneficiaries, this means that 803 beneficiaries were

working for at least 6 months at minimum wage within 1 year of program exit. 286 TND per month

is the equivalent of approximately 30 percent of total household expenditure.

These benefits also indirectly provider broader benefits not monetized or taken into account

in this analysis due to limited data. For example, as a result of one such sub-project in a remote

oasis town, non-beneficiary community members opened microenterprises to cater to beneficiaries

who were now earning. In principle, these dynamics boost broader community and economic

development over time.

Were the project to be scaled-up to working-age, able-bodied beneficiaries of PNAFN, this

would equate to approximately 30 percent of current beneficiaries, or 70,500 heads of

households (leaving 164,500 who would continue receiving unconditional cash transfers). On

average, the workfare program, assuming the same design, would cost 94 million TND per year in

cash transfers and an additional 14 percent in training and operating costs, or a total of

approximately 107 million TND. The return on investment (ROI) in terms of productivity as

measured by additional earnings would assume that at least 13 percent of these beneficiaries are

working after program exit at (at least) minimum wage for six months, or earning a total of nearly

16 million TND. For the 107 million TND investment, this yields a rate of return (ROR) of

approximately 15 percent.

26

These additional benefits are expected to accrue at a financial cost that is nearly equivalent

to the current PNAFN budget and in line with average global best practice. Adding the cost

of the productive social safety net (107 million) with PNAFN only among the 70 percent remaining

(294 million), gives a total of budget of 401 million TND (or just under 0.4 percent of GDP). This

total amount is lower than the current social safety net spending of 420 million TND, and is

expected to have a higher return on investment. Even under assumptions that the budget would be

marginally higher, the returns on investment are likely positive. This level of public spending on

a scaled-up program, the coverage and transfer amount would be in line with that of well-

performing programs productive social safety net programs elsewhere, such as Brazil’s Bolsa

Familia.

The results of this basic analysis are tentative, given limitations related to the assumptions

and the availability of data, but are nonetheless expected to hold directionally under other

scenarios. Although a full impact evaluation of the project has not been done currently Tunisia’s

PNAFN program does not have exit mechanisms, so most beneficiaries are assumed to remain in

the program. While in principle their inclusion is based on not having other sources of income, this

criteria is self-reported, so in this analysis it is assumed they mainly rely on monthly cash transfers

for income.

Overall, the total cost-effectiveness of the Project needs to be viewed in terms of both the increases

in productivity (earnings) and broader, non-monetized externalities to local community

development. The program is therefore relatively cost-effective in comparison to the overall

individual and community benefits.

27

Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending/Grant Preparation

Hebatalla Elgazzar Senior Economist GSPDR Team Leader

Shirley Foronda Financial Management Specialist GGODR Team Member

Jean-Charles Marie De

Daruvar Senior Counsel LEGAM Team Member

Maged Mahmoud Hamed Regional Safeguards Adviser OPSOR Team Member

Walid Dhouibi Procurement Specialist GGODR Team Member

Brooks Fox Evans Consultant GSPDR Team Member

Karen Majli Vega-Coronel Team Member

Mehdi El Batti Financial Management Specialist GGODR Team Member

Christina Wright Operations Officer GEDDR Team Member

Peter McConaghy Financial Sector Specialist GFMDR Team Member

Supervision/ICR

Aissatou Maisha Dicko Operations Analyst GSPDR Team Member

Jean-Charles Marie De

Daruvar

Senior Counsel

LEGAM Team Member

Amr Moubarak Social Protection Economist GSPDR ICR Co-author

Walid Dhouibi Procurement Specialist GGODR Team Member

Suzanne Essama Operations Officer GSPDR ICR Co-author

Mehdi El Batti Financial Management Analyst GGODR Team Member

(b) Staff Time and Cost Project:

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending 0.0 0.0

Supervision/ICR

Total: 36.78 248,628.84

28

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Background: An external beneficiary survey was conducted after the mid-term evaluation by a

survey firm recruited by the PIU in line with terms of reference approved by the World Bank.

Objectives: The survey was conducted to assess beneficiary, community and partner organizations’

perceptions of process and implementation of the project and, among beneficiaries, the relevance

of the workfare sub-project and training modules. The assessment included qualitative focus

groups and a quantitative survey among 1000 beneficiaries and 1000 community members.

Main results:

Perceptions of project benefits: Overall, the main benefits of the Project were perceived to be

work experience gained by beneficiaries and the services delivered to communities. 75 percent of

beneficiaries reported that they benefited by gaining new work experience. However, only 66

percent were satisfied by the content of the training module they received, mainly due to the lack

of formal certification offered by the primarily informal training they received from individual

instructors.

Beneficiaries reported additional benefits in terms of local development (Table 2): (i) greater social

cohesion and commitment to local community development; (ii) gaining entrepreneurial know-how,

which led many beneficiaries and community members to form small micro-enterprises in areas

where the project was implemented, given stronger purchasing power among beneficiaries; (iii) in

terms of gender, female beneficiaries and community members expressed becoming more active

publicly and socially as a result of sub-project community and follow-up activities; and (iv)

development of new local market and social networks as a result of connections formed between

and among beneficiaries, NGOs and local municipalities.

Table 2 Benefits perceived by beneficiaries in terms of local development (%)

Dimension % de ceux qui pensent que l’impact est positif

L’intégration sociale de la femme rurale 73%

Satisfaction des besoins au quotidien 68%

Initiateur de nouveaux projets 73%

Un coup de main donné aux institutions publiques 67%

Une solidarité sociale à travers la sensibilisation de la population à propos de certains problèmes

72%

Perceptions of process and implementation: In terms of implementation, partner NGOs reported

having had adequate levels of technical and financial resources to support local sub-projects.

However, the average duration of the training modules of 2 months was considered too short by

beneficiaries, and most suggested at least 4 months would be needed in the future to fully acquire

new technical trade-related skills.

29

An important negative effect reported by NGOs and beneficiaries was related to delays in receiving

payments and cash transfers. These delays were due to lags in financial management and

disbursement processing, largely due to familiarity with forms required and Central Bank

processing timelines.

Main recommendations:

Moving forward, the main recommendations from the beneficiary survey were to: (i) strengthen

the rigor and quality of the supplemental training offered to ensure technical and vocational skills

are certified; (ii) strengthen the oversight and resources offered to partnering NGOs supporting

supervision and training; and (iii) improve financial management and disbursement procedures for

more rapid processing and payments.

30

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Objectives: A stakeholder workshop was organized by the PIU towards project closing, held on

February 17-19 in Zarzis, Medenine. The main objectives of the workshop were to present the

main goals and results of the Project and discuss ideas for collaboration moving forward, as well

as to honor and present beneficiaries and local partner CSOs.

Participants: All central and local government, PIU, beneficiary survey firm (Emrhod Consulting)

and NGO implementation partners attended the workshop, as well as beneficiaries and other local

NGOs, for a total of approximately 200 participants.

Themes: The workshop was organized as three days of presentations, working sessions and awards

ceremonies, highlighting the range of diverse projects and local community impacts. Key sessions

included:

(i) presentations from government authorities (Governors, Ministry of Industry, Ministry

of Vocational Training and Employment and Ministry of Social Affairs) on sustaining

interventions from the project;

(ii) panel on operational mechanisms to support low-skilled unemployed youth;

(iii) panel on enhancing vocational training;

(iv) panel on mechanisms for collaborating with CSOs on professional development;

(v) panel on supporting entrepreneurship among youth through local collaborations;

(vi) A wrap up session on summarizing scale-up options and sustaining the program in the

future.

Results: The workshop resulted greater awareness of local and central decision-makers to project

results, which further boosted interest in scaling up the intervention moving forward. Subsequently,

a request for future World Bank support for scale-up was sent from MoSA to the Ministry of

Investment and International Cooperation (MICI) in May 2015, as a follow-up to an earlier request

sent at mid-term review (April 2014). As of August 2015, the request is being considered as a

potential component of the Government’s forthcoming 2016-2020 National Development Plan.

31

Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The Participatory Service Delivery Project for Reintegration in the governorates of Medenine and

Tataouine is an initiative of the Tunisian government, which is supported by the World Bank with

a US$ 5 million grant. The project was implemented over 30 months period.

This project was conceived as an emergency response to provide additional income to young people

from disadvantaged families in these two governorates and at the same time improve the

employability of a class of young people with low-skills (some education and no diploma).

As a pilot project, its implementation was a true experiment in terms of intervention approaches in

the field of learning, delivery of basic services, mobilization of civil society and mobilization of

young people and women in community and proximity approaches.

Thus, the project was implemented through the mobilization of 66 associations and through 92 sub-

projects in the field of social assistance, education, basic health and the environment. The actions

undertaken were distributed among services and works and have contributed to the facilitation of

the access to information and services to the communities targeted by the project.

Furthermore, the project has tried to answer the problem of employment for unqualified youth with

little education through informal training and exercise on site the theoretical knowledge acquired

in class and that, through the delivery of basic services to marginalized groups and especially with

special needs.

The statistical study conducted as part of the project showed that the majority (87%) of direct

beneficiaries had only primary or secondary education and about 74% of them are older between

18 and 32 years.

These direct beneficiaries were satisfied with their participation in the project; 41% of them were

enticed by the new experience and more than two thirds (68%) reported having acquired

professional experience during this project. While 54% found that the project helped them to

develop their communication skills, and 41% say that the project helped them to find a job

opportunity. Only 40% of beneficiaries have seized the opportunity to develop raw technical skills.

Service Delivery: As for community members (indirect beneficiaries) their satisfaction with the

services provided has been estimated at 68%.

Participation in decision-making: 56% of direct beneficiaries say that the project gave them the

opportunity to participate in a social activity while 47% of community members say they have

participated in project activities.

Lessons learned from the project: the project shows that the provision of opportunities to young

people, to acquire knowledge and professional experience relating to a trade, improves their

employability. Thus, to ensure high employability, training must be: 1) adapted to the profile of the

unemployed and 2) tailored for local markets while involving different stakeholders at the local

level i.e., the public services concerned by the technical specialty from the training, the

professionals in the private sector and civil society.

Moreover, these in-service training activities as they were tested in the project must be associated

with a system of validation of competence by government technical services and the assurance of

complementary training in management, marketing, life skills, entrepreneurship and financial

education.

32

And to complete the process, it is essential to have a fund to finance income-generating activities

with ideas deriving from training.

Another important aspect that has been treated in the project is "community services". While these

services have helped to visualize the impact of the project on the communities and to ensure their

participation, they should, however, be accompanied by an upstream mechanism guaranteeing the

sustainability of their achievements.

Moreover, these services related to matters which fall within the priority concerns of the targeted

communities in both targeted governorates and services provided as part of the implementation of

sub-projects, have highlighted the need, even the urgency of their consideration in the intervention

of public services programs. This will justify the need for the institutional anchoring of the project

in the future.

The associations have played an important role in the project and that, in formulating participatory

proposals that meet the expectations of communities and defend their interests with local authorities

and mobilizing various partners (public, private and OSC) for the implementation and success in

their projects. These associations need to be more implicated in the training process the non-

graduates of and in any employment initiative at the local level.

The partnership with public facilities and some private sector professionals should bring added-

value to the sub-projects but prevent that it follows a standard for random and specific and ad hoc

initiatives. It is recommended that this partnership be managed by an incentive system and therefore

an obligation for results for different stakeholders.

As contribution to the strengthening of the local governance, the project acted through associations

to encourage participation and citizen engagement with these different levels; namely, information,

consultation, cooperation, implementation of actions and evaluation of service delivery.

The project has gone through difficulties with administrative procedures (period devoted to the

amendment of the letter of grant agreement) and disbursement procedures that have influenced the

achievement of project objectives, but these difficulties have been overcome through the flexibility

demonstrated by the project management at the World Bank. Therefore, and to minimize these

difficulties, it is recommended, on one hand, to involve the implementing agency in the discussions

on the Agreement between the Bank and the Beneficiary and to require that the process of direct

payment via the system Client Connection be well stipulated in the agreement.

Furthermore, and for similar projects that are based on the participatory approach, it is

recommended: (1) to provide more time for the implementation period and (2) to devote more

funding to the project management components (20% allocated for this project were not sufficient).

Also, it is essential to provide a more transparent beneficiaries targeting mechanism that should be

accessible through online registration or through an independent office and it, along with an

institutionalized and effective complaints handling mechanism.

Project management has generated a large data flow for which it is essential to make provision for

the establishment of a monitoring web application integrating the collection, analysis, verification

/ validation and centralization of the information on project performance indicators.

33

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

None

34

Annex 9. Additional Supplemental Information

Annex 9.A. Additional Information on Financial Management (FM) Arrangements

The Project’s FM arrangements were deemed adequate and provided (i) accurate financial

information and (ii) reasonable assurance that project funds are being used for the purpose

intended. However, there were initially a few challenges that were addressed in order to fully

comply with Bank’s fiduciary requirements. They namely were:

(a) Systematic delays in submission of financial reports (IFRs, Audited PFS) that were

progressively reduced during implementation. The PIU was trained on several occasions

(joint fiduciary training, fiduciary clinics and specific on-demand trainings), which enabled

the PIU to submit IFRs on time particularly during the last year of the project. Nevertheless

some issues with the audited PFS persisted: (i) submission delays albeit reduced; and (ii)

quality issues regarding audits that were discussed with the PIU and that led to the revision

of the auditor’s TORs based on standard World Bank TORs. The final audit is expected to

be submitted by the end of August 2015, which covers the grace period (March 31 through

July 31, 2015).

(b) The Project’s budgeted activities per components and categories were revised as the level

of commitments for some categories exceeded planned amounts, namely operating costs

and training. As a result, the submission of requests for overdrafts to the World Bank were

recommended to allow the PIU to settle final payments for these categories as there were

no Government funds available otherwise.

(c) Disbursement of grant proceeds was made exclusively through the advance to the

designated account via the submission of withdrawal applications by the Central Bank of

Tunisia on behalf of the PIU, following the procedures and guidelines already in place and

used for existing projects financed by the Bank. The PIU requested a ceiling increase for

the designated account from USD 500,000 to USD 900,000 to accommodate project

expenditures, which was approved and reflected in the disbursement letter. Replenishment

of the designated account by the Central Bank of Tunisia had been relatively slow

according to the PIU and the ceiling increase allowed delays in payments to be reduced.

The disbursement ratio reached the amount of USD 4.756 million as of August 21, 2015,

or 95.12% of the total grant amount USD 5 million.

35

Annex 9.B. Detailed Description of Achievement of Objectives by Key Project Development

Indicator

(i) Indicator 1: At least 4,000 workers are employed to implement projects.

Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report and information from the Project

M&E database, a total of 6,182 beneficiaries had been enrolled in 70 local sub-projects. 91

percent of beneficiaries had either a primary or secondary education level, suggesting that

the right target groups were included (Figure 1) and most were youth (60 percent) (Figure

2). The total number of direct beneficiaries exceeded the initial target number of 4,000

beneficiaries. This equates to a total of approximately 6182 persons x 6 months per person

x 15 days per month (on average) of person-days worked, or 556,380 person-days worked.

Figure 1 Distribution of beneficiaries by educational level (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014. N=4260.

Figure 2 Distribution of beneficiaries by age group %()

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014. N=4260.

1%

42%

49%

2%7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Analphabète Enseignement debase

Niveausecondaire

Formationprofessionnelle

étudessupérieures

40%34%

15%11%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

moins de 25 ans entre 26 et 32 ans entre 33 et 39 ans plus de 40 ans

36

In terms of total enrolment by sub-project, most beneficiaries were enrolled either in

“social assistance” subprojects (37 percent of all beneficiaries, followed by “environmental”

subprojects (31 percent) (Figure 3). In terms of sub-project type, the vast majority of sub-

projects have been “social protection and local development” in nature, followed by

“education” and “health” sub-projects. The sub-projects have been selected through

participatory approaches where CSOs, in consultation with local citizens, propose projects

(as described in the project document and PIU mid-term implementation report). Of the

24 sub-projects in Tataouine, nearly 55 percent of sub-projects are classified as “social

protection” projects (such as support to older persons and those with handicaps), 27 percent

as “education” projects (such as basic civil works at primary schools) and 18 percent as

“health” projects (notably reproductive health awareness and education, as well as

environmental health projects such as those that rehabilitate oases and wells).

Figure 3 Distribution of beneficiary enrolment by sub-project sector (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014. N=4260.

In Medenine, 74 percent of projects were “social protection” projects, 19 percent have been

“health” projects and 7 percent have been “education” projects. Data from sub-projects

showed that that sub-projects mainly comprised service delivery, with some involving

public works. 78 percent of sub-projects have been service delivery projects (not involving

civil works) and 22 percent were minor civil works projects (such as landscaping and

painting considered category ‘C’ projects).

(ii) Indicator 2: At least 60 percent of workers perceive improvement in job skills as a

result of sub-project training.

Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report and information from the project

M&E database, 54 percent of workers perceive an improvement in jobs skills as a result of

sub-project training. Over 75 percent of beneficiaries rated their workfare “plus” on-the-

job training experience favorably, compared to an average of 16 percent among low-skilled

beneficiaries of public employment programs. The single biggest reason was “work

experience”, cited by 72 percent of SPF beneficiaries.

(iii) Indicator 3: At least 30 percent of workers employed are women.

Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report and information from the

Project’s M&E database, 70 percent of workers employed were women. The sectors with

Social Assistance (Services, Textiles,

Maconnerie)37%

Environment (Commerce agri-peche, infrastructure)

31%

Education22%

Sante9%

37

the highest shares of women were education and social assistance, with at 77 and 75

percent of all beneficiaries, respectively (Figure 2).

Figure 4 Distribution of beneficiaries by gender and by sector (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014. N=4260

(iv) Indicator 4: At least 12,000 community members receive services through local sub-

projects.

Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report and information from the Project’s

M&E database, the target number of indirect beneficiaries has also largely been surpassed

(62,669 achieved versus 12,000 targeted). The number of indirect beneficiaries is based

on estimates of catchment areas rather than direct surveying or monitoring due to budget

and feasibility in implementation constraints, which may have inflated the number of

indirect beneficiaries. In the future, additional resources and tools could help improve

monitoring and evaluation such as the use of mobile phones and digital technology.

(v) Indicator 5: At least 60 percent of community members perceive services received

respond to local needs.

Based on the PIU January 2015 Implementation Report reflecting information from the

project M&E database collected by the PIU and partner CSOs through local beneficiary

assessments, 67 percent of community members reported perceiving that services

responded to local needs on average. Qualitatively, communities, included neighboring

households that benefited by services provided by project beneficiaries, and authorities

alike found the project opened up career opportunities in sectors and services with unmet

needs, either because public services were unable to reach certain households, or because

the services had never been created to begin with. Given that the project did not

specifically target improving the quality of services (only basic supplemental access), these

results are considered realistic and the assessment credible.

25%

41%

23%

31%

30%

75%

59%

77%

69%

70%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Social (Services, Textiles, Masonry)

Environment (Agri-Fishery commerce,Utilities)

Education

Health

Total

% Male % Female

38

(vi) At least 60 percent of workers and community members perceive greater involvement

in local decision-making regarding service delivery. Based on the PIU January 2015

Implementation Report reflecting information from the project M&E database collected by

the PIU and partner CSOs through local beneficiary assessments, 56 percent of workers

and 47 percent of community members perceive greater involvement in local decision-

making regarding service delivery. 8 Given that the project did not specifically target

radically strengthening local governance and decision-making, these results are considered

realistic and the assessment credible.

8Source: PIU (UTSS), in partnership with local associations.

39

Annex 9.C. Additional Figures on Employment and Insertion at Six Months

Following Project Exit

Figure 5 Follow-up tracer data on employment status at six months following project exit (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014, Preliminary tracer survey at 6 months

following project exit, N=1360.

Figure 6 Employment status by type (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014, Preliminary tracer survey at 6 months

following project exit, N=183 employed beneficiaries.

In the Project, for sub-projects where these networks were the strongest and best coordinated, the

transition from training to jobs was the smoothest, reaching a 90 percent job placement rate for one

such project in fishery, capturing 64 percent of all beneficiaries employed among the sample

50% 7% 6% 3%13%

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Nu

mb

er o

f b

enef

icia

ries

su

rvey

ed

Number of beneficiaries in sub-projects Job insertion rate, unadjusted (%)

35%31%

50%

65%69%

50%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Total Medenine Tataouine

Shar

e o

f em

plo

ymen

t w

ith

in 6

m

on

ths

(%)

Region

Self-employment Salaried employment

40

(Figure 7). As project beneficiaries were predominately female, most of the employed after the

project were also female (Figure 8), with a small advantage in Tataouine, suggesting that the project

did not disproportionately benefit males in finding employment opportunities. This results is also

promising for future efforts to boost female labor force participation. Beneficiaries and their new

professional networks had created unforeseen opportunities, despite the fact that the project had

not explicitly included specific support to job placement or entrepreneurship.

Figure 7 Employment by sector (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014, Preliminary tracer survey at 6 months

following project exit, N=183 employed beneficiaries.

Figure 8 Employment status by gender and region (%)

Source: Tunisia SPF Project Database, November 2014, Preliminary tracer survey at 6 months

following project exit, N=183 employed beneficiaries.

Pêche (Salarié)

64%

Agro-business (Auto-emploi)

20%

Commerce général (Auto-emploi et

Salarié)6%

Maconnerie; Agro-business (Auto-

emploi et Salarié)3%

Textile/commerce (Auto-emploi et

Salarié)7%

37%

40%

30%

63%

60%

70%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Total

Medenine

Tataouine

% Male % Female

41

Annex 10. List of Supporting Documents

Emrhod Consulting (2014). Rapport d’evaluation finale. Projet des Services Participatifs pour la

Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2014). Manuel d’Operations. Projet des Services

Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2014). Plan de Passation des Marchés. Projet des

Services Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2014). Rapport d’Etat d’Avancement, mai 2014 (mi-

terme), Projet des Services Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2015). Note d’Etat d’Avancement, janvier 2015 (pré-

clôture), Projet des Services Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2015). Tableaux de Bord des Interventions à Medenine

et Tataouine, janvier 2015. Projet des Services Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2015). Tableaux des Bénéficiaires à Medenine et

Tataouine, janvier 2015. Projet des Services Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2015). Suivi du Budget, juin 2015. Projet des Services

Participatifs pour la Réintégration.

Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale (2015), Projet des Services Participatifs pour la

Réintégration, Site-Web : http://www.buildingcapacities.com/

World Bank (2012). Project Appraisal Document (PAD): Tunisia Participatory Service Delivery

for Reintegration Final Project Proposal. Project number P127212.

World Bank (2012). Tunisia Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Implementation

Status and Results Report, Sequence 01. Report No: ISR7697 (Archived 26-Sept-2012).

World Bank (2013). Tunisia Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Implementation

Status and Results Report, Sequence 02. Report No: ISR9240 (Archived 21-May-2013).

World Bank (2013). Tunisia Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Implementation

Status and Results Report, Sequence 03. Report No: ISR13326 (Archived 30-Dec-2013).

World Bank (2014). Tunisia Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration Implementation

Status and Results Report, Sequence 04. Report No: ISR16424 (Archived 12-Nov-2014).

World Bank (2014). Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the State and

Peace-Building Fund Participatory Service Delivery for Reintegration TF011069 April 20, 2012

to the Republic of Tunisia. Report No: RES13680.

Annex 11. Country Map

42