dnssec for the root zone - iana
TRANSCRIPT
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DNSSECfor the Root Zone
IETF’76 HiroshimaNovember 2009
Jakob SchlyterJakob Schlyter
Richard Lamb, ICANN Matt Larson, VeriSign
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This design is the result of a cooperation between ICANN & VeriSign withsupport from the U.S. DoC NTIA
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Design RequirementsKeywords
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Transparency Processes and procedures should
be as open as possible for the Internetcommunity to trust the signed root
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Audited Processes and procedures should
be audited against industry standards,e.g. ISO/IEC 27002:2005
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High SecurityRoot system should meet all NIST
SP 800-53 technical security controls required by a HIGH IMPACT system
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Roles and Responsibilities
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ICANNIANA Functions Operator
• Manages the Key Signing Key (KSK)
• Accepts DS records from TLD operators
• Verifies and processes request
• Sends update requests to DoC for authorization and to VeriSign for implementation
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DoC NTIAU.S. Department of Commerce
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
• Authorizes changes to the root zone
‣ DS records
‣ Key Signing Keys
‣ DNSSEC update requests follow the same process as other changes
• Checks that ICANN has followed their agreed upon verification/processing policies and procedures
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VeriSignRoot Zone Maintainer
• Manages the Zone Signing Key (ZSK)
• Incorporates NTIA-authorized changes
• Signs the root zone with the ZSK
• Distributes the signed zone to the root server operators
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ICANN VeriSign
DoCRZM SignerTLDOperator Signed root
KSK Management
DNS records sent fromTLD operator to ICANN
Verified datasent to DoC
Authorized datasent to VeriSign
ZSK sent from VeriSign to ICANN
Root Zonedistributed toroot servers
ZSK Management
Root Servers
KSK publishedby ICANN
Keyset is signed by KSK and sent back from ICANN to VeriSign
Unsigned root
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Proposed Approach to Protecting the KSK
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Facility – Tier 1 – Access control by Data Center
Facility – Tier 2 – Access control by Data Center
Facility – Tier 3 – Access control by Data Center
Cage – Tier 4 – Access control by Data Center
Safe Room – Tier 5 – Access control by ICANN
Safe #1 – Tier 6
HSM – Tier 7
Private Keys Key Ceremony Computer
Safe #2 – Tier 6
Safe Deposit Box – Tier 7
Crypto Officers' Credentials
Physical Security
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DPSDNSSEC Policy & Practice Statement
• States the practices and provisions that are employed in root zone signing and zone distribution services
‣ Issuing, managing, changing and distributing DNS keys in accordance with the specific requirements of the U.S. DoC NTIA
• Comparable to a certification practice statement (CPS) from an X.509 certification authority (CA)
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Community Trust
• Proposal that community representatives* have an active roll in management of the KSK
‣ as Crypto Officers needed to activate the KSK
‣ as Recovery Key Share Holders protecting shares of the symmetric key that encrypts the backup copy of the KSK
*) drawn from members of entities such as ccNSO, GNSO, IAB, RIRs, ISOC
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Keys to safe deposit boxesheld by security officers
SO cards stored on-sitein safe deposit boxes
9 Security Officercards generated atHSM initialization
SO Card #1
SO Card #2
SO Card #3
SO Card #4
SO Card #5
SO Card #6
SO Card #7
SO Card #8
SO Card #9
Crypto Officer #1
Crypto Officer #2
Crypto Officer #3
Crypto Officer #4
Crypto Officer #5
Crypto Officer #6
Crypto Officer #7
Disaster Recovery
Disaster Recovery
Authorisation Key – AAK
≥ 3 Security Officercards needed for key use
Crypto Officers
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Keys to safe deposit boxesheld by trusted persons
SMK shares stored off-sitein safe deposit boxes in
separate locations
SMK split into7 key shares at
HSM initialization
SMK Share #1
SMK Share #2
SMK Share #3
SMK Share #4
SMK Share #5
SMK Share #6
SMK Share #7
Trusted Person #1
Trusted Person #2
Trusted Person #3
Trusted Person #4
Trusted Person #5
Trusted Person #6
Trusted Person #7
≥ 5 key shares needed torestore SMK in case
of HSM failure
SMK is used to encrypt theKSK before backup
Root KSK
Secret Master Key – SMK
ICANN on-site backup
ICANN on-site backup
KSK Encrypted by SMK
Key Backup
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Auditing & Transparency
• Third-party auditors check that ICANN operates as described in the DPS
• Other external witness may also attend the key ceremonies
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Proposed DNSSECProtocol Parameters
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Key Signing Key
• KSK is 2048-bit RSA
‣ Rolled every 2-5 years
‣ RFC 5011 for automatic key rollovers
• Propose using signatures based on SHA-256
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Zone Signing Key
• ZSK is 1024-bit RSA
‣ Rolled once a quarter (four times per year)
• Zone signed with NSEC
• Propose using signatures based on SHA-256
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Signature Validity
• DNSKEY-covering RRSIG (by KSK) validity 15 days
‣ new signatures published every 10 days
• Other RRSIG (by ZSK) validity 7 days
‣ zone generated and resigned twice per day
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Key Ceremonies
• Key Generation
‣ Generation of new KSK
‣ Every 2-5 years
• Processing of ZSK Signing Request (KSR)
‣ Signing ZSK for the next upcoming quarter
‣ Every quarter
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KSR Processing
KSR transport protected using TLS with client-side authentication
ZSK signs DNSKEYsinside KSR
KSK signs DNSKEYsinside SKR
KSK ZSK
ICANNCertificate Authority
VeriSignCertificate Authority
Key Signing Request
Signed Key Response Signer
RootZone
Ceremony Administrator
ZSKAdministrator
ICANN CA issuescert for TLS
VeriSign CA issuescert for TLS
Out-of-band integrity verification of KSRat the key ceremony
VeriSign publish thesigned root via root servers
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Optional KSK rollover
KSKpublish
KSKpublish
KSKpublish
KSKpublish
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
Key Schedule
T+90T+80T+70T+60T+50T+40T+30T+20T+10T+0T-10
Quarterly time cycle is ~ 90 days
ZSK rollover
ZSKpre-publish ZSK
ZSKZSKZSKZSKpre-publish ZSK ZSK ZSKZSK ZSK ZSK
post-publishZSK
ZSKpost-publishZSK
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSK revoke+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSKpublish+sign
KSK removal
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Root Trust Anchor
• Published on a web site by ICANN as
‣ XML-wrapped and plain DS record
• to facilitate automatic processing
‣ PKCS #10 certificate signing request (CSR)
• as self-signed public key
• Allows third-party CAs to sign the KSK
• ICANN will sign the CSR producing a CERT
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Proposed Deployment
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Goals
• Deploy a signed root zone
‣ Transparent processes
‣ Audited procedures
‣ DNSSEC deployment
• validators, registries, registrars, name server operators
• Communicate early and often!
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Issues
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DO=1
• A significant proportion of DNS clients send queries with EDNS0 and DO=1
• Some (largely unquantified, but potentially significant) population of such clients are unable to receive large responses
• Serving signed responses might break those clients
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Rollback
• If we sign the root, there will be some early validator deployment
• There is the potential for some clients to break, perhaps badly enough that we need to un-sign the root (e.g., see previous slide)
• Un-signing the root will break the DNS for validators
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Proposal
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Deploy Incrementally• Serve a signed zone from just L-Root,
initially
• Follow up with J-Root
• Then other root servers
‣ M, I
‣ D, K E,
‣ B, H, C, G, F
• Last, A-Root
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Deploy Incrementally
• The goal is to leave the client population with some root servers not offering large responses until the impact of those large responses is better understood
• Relies upon resolvers not always choosing a single server
‣ Note we propose leaving A until last
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DURZ
• “Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone”
• Sign RRSets with keys that are not published in the zone (but with matching keytag…)
• Publish keys in the zone which are not used, and which additionally contain advice for operators (see next slide)
• Swap in actual signing keys (which enables validation) at the end of the deployment process
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DURZ
. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AwEAAa++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++THIS/KEY/AN/INVALID/KEY/AND/SHOULD /NOT/BE/USED/CONTACT/ROOTSIGN/AT/ICA NN/DOT/ORG/FOR/MORE/INFORMATION+++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++/= ) ; Key ID = 6477
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DURZ
• Deploy conservatively
‣ It is the root zone, after all
• Prevent a community of validators from forming
‣ This allows us to unsign the root zone during the deployment phase (if we have) to without collateral damage
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Measurement
• For those root servers that are instrumented, full packet captures and subsequent analysis around signing events
• Ongoing dialogue with operator communities to assess real-world impact of changes
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Testing
• A prerequisite for this proposal is a captive test of the deployment
‣ Test widely-deployed resolvers, with validation enabled and disabled, against the DURZ
‣ Test with clients behind broken networks that drop large responses
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Communicationwith non-technical audiences
• Reaching the non-technical and semi-technical audiences with press releases and other means.
• PR departments with people who know how to do this will be engaged.
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Communicationwith technical audiences
• Reaching the technical audiences via mailing lists and other means
‣ IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNSOP)
‣ non-IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNS-OARC)
‣ General operator lists (e.g. NANOG)
‣ …
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Draft Timeline• December 1, 2009
‣ Root zone signed
• Initially signed zone stays internal to ICANN and VeriSign
‣ ICANN and VeriSign begin KSR processing
• ZSK and KSK rolls
• January - July 2010
‣ Incremental roll out of signed root
• July 1, 2010
‣ KSK rolled and trust anchor published
‣ Signed root fully deployed
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Documentation
• NTIA Requirements
• High Level Technical Architecture
• Draft DPS for ICANN and VeriSign
‣ http://www.ntia.doc.gov/dns/dnssec.html
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Thoughts?
• Feedback on this proposal would be extremely welcome
‣ Queue at the mic
‣ Email to [email protected]
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Root DNSSEC Design Team
Joe AbleyDavid BlackaDavid ConradRichard LambMatt Larson
Fredrik LjunggrenDavid Knight
Tomofumi OkuboJakob Schlyter
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