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Division of Household Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Countries. Jean-François Mignot Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris Science Po, Paris Małgorzata Mikucka Małgorzata Mikucka Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences Conference, 20-23 June 2007, Prague, Czech Republic

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Page 1: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Division of Household Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Labor between Spouses:

Calculation or Values?Calculation or Values?An Empirical test on 23 European An Empirical test on 23 European

Countries.Countries.

Jean-François MignotJean-François MignotScience Po, ParisScience Po, Paris

Małgorzata MikuckaMałgorzata Mikucka Graduate School for Social Research, WarsawGraduate School for Social Research, Warsaw

Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences Conference,20-23 June 2007, Prague, Czech Republic

Page 2: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

AgendaAgenda

Direct determinants of housework divisionDirect determinants of housework division

Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision

Other predictionsOther predictions

Empirical resultsEmpirical results

ConclusionsConclusions

Page 3: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Direct determinants Direct determinants of housework division (1)of housework division (1)

Two classes of causal mechanisms:Two classes of causal mechanisms:– Rational calculationRational calculation

Spouses choose (un)equal division of housework because Spouses choose (un)equal division of housework because they profit from it in some sense; they consider advantages they profit from it in some sense; they consider advantages and disadvantages and disadvantages ((costs and benefitscosts and benefits)) of each possible of each possible modification of the housework division to find an optimal modification of the housework division to find an optimal one, preferred over all the othersone, preferred over all the others

– 2 mechanisms:2 mechanisms: Specialization according to comparative advantagesSpecialization according to comparative advantages Specialization according to increasing returns to scale Specialization according to increasing returns to scale

– Values concerning gender equalityValues concerning gender equality Spouses divide housework more or less equally based on Spouses divide housework more or less equally based on

their internalized values concerning appropriate gender their internalized values concerning appropriate gender roles and the desirable degree of equality between spouses roles and the desirable degree of equality between spouses (not the opportunities or constraints, but the (not the opportunities or constraints, but the desiresdesires vary vary across couples)across couples)

Page 4: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Direct determinants Direct determinants of housework division (of housework division (22))

Comparative advantageComparative advantageMarket work

hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

SHARE OF HOUSEWORK

performed by the SSHW

-

The higher the relative hourly wage of the housework-specialized spouse, the more equal the division of housework

The higher the relative hourly wage of the housework-specialized spouse, the more he/she would work in the market AND the less would his/her spouse work in the market-

+

Relative education of the SSHW

Page 5: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Direct determinants Direct determinants of housework division (of housework division (33))

Increasing returns to scale Increasing returns to scale

Total amount of housework

SHARE OF HOUSEWORK

performed by the SSHW

The inequality of housework division between the spouses will be all the greater since the total amount of housework done by the couple is greater

+

In household production just as in any other productive activity people “learn by doing,” i.e., become all the more productive (per hour worked) since they produce on a larger scale (in hours worked). Therefore, if the couple wishes to maximize its production of goods it should assign as much of the household (and market) production as is possible to one and only one of its members.

Page 6: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Direct determinants Direct determinants of housework division (of housework division (44))

Values concerning gender equalityValues concerning gender equality

SHARE OF HOUSEWORK

performed by the SSHWGender

equality values of one

spouse

-

Spouses who have internalized gender equality conceptions may act to promote gender equality in their couple and they will do so all the more since they are more attached to the value of equality between men and women

Contrary to the previous approach, this theoretical model assumes individuals aim not at maximizing their consumption but rather at attaining a situation of gender equality.

Page 7: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

AgendaAgenda

Direct determinants of housework divisionDirect determinants of housework division

Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision

Other predictionsOther predictions

Empirical resultsEmpirical results

ConclusionsConclusions

Page 8: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Indirect determinants Indirect determinants of housework division (1)of housework division (1)

Effects of individual characteristics on time Effects of individual characteristics on time allocationallocation For each spouse, the higher the hourly wage the higher the For each spouse, the higher the hourly wage the higher the

market value of his/her time compared to its housework market value of his/her time compared to its housework value, so the more they buy market substitutes to value, so the more they buy market substitutes to housework which reduce their total amount of houseworkhousework which reduce their total amount of housework

Market work hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

Total amount of housework

SSMW Education

SSHW Education

-

-

Page 9: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Indirect determinants Indirect determinants of housework division (of housework division (22))

Effects of individual characteristics on time Effects of individual characteristics on time allocationallocation For each spouse, the higher the income the more they buy For each spouse, the higher the income the more they buy

of all goods, among which time-saving devices which of all goods, among which time-saving devices which reduce their total amount of houseworkreduce their total amount of housework

Total income of SSMW

Market work hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

Total income of SSHW Total

amount of housework

SSMW Education

SSHW Education

+

+

+

+

-

-

Page 10: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Indirect determinants Indirect determinants of housework division (of housework division (33))

Effects of spouses’ incomes on time Effects of spouses’ incomes on time allocationallocation Each spouse’s income decreases the other spouse’s Each spouse’s income decreases the other spouse’s

incentive to work rather than do houseworkincentive to work rather than do housework

Total income of SSMW

Market work hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

Total income of SSHW Total

amount of housework

+

+-

-

Page 11: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Indirect determinants Indirect determinants of housework division (of housework division (44))Effect of relative wage on time Effect of relative wage on time

allocationallocationMarket work

hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

Total amount of housework

SHARE OF HOUSEWORK

performed by the SSHW

Childcare

Relative education of the SSHW

-

-

+

The relative hourly wage of the spouse specializing in housework should reduce the couple’s number of children (opportunity cost of children)Children increase the total housework timeand decrease

market work time.

+

+-

Page 12: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

AgendaAgenda

Direct determinants of housework divisionDirect determinants of housework division

Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision

Other predictionsOther predictions

Empirical resultsEmpirical results

ConclusionsConclusions

Page 13: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Other predictions (1)Other predictions (1) Higher risk of divorceHigher risk of divorce Cohabiting vs. married couplesCohabiting vs. married couples

One of the risks confronting the spouse who specializes in One of the risks confronting the spouse who specializes in household production is that in case of divorce she may household production is that in case of divorce she may suffer from a drop in her living standard that is sharper than suffer from a drop in her living standard that is sharper than the one faced by the spouse who specialized in market the one faced by the spouse who specialized in market work. Thus, work. Thus, in less stable relationships people should tend in less stable relationships people should tend to be more wary of specialization in household productionto be more wary of specialization in household production

This is why in less stable relationships, when allocating their This is why in less stable relationships, when allocating their time between market work and housework, people should: time between market work and housework, people should:

(1) (1) try to reduce the share of their time allocated to try to reduce the share of their time allocated to houseworkhousework and and

(2)(2) to to be relatively less sensitive to their spouse’s incomebe relatively less sensitive to their spouse’s income

Page 14: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Other predictions (2)Other predictions (2) Another, independent prediction concerns the Another, independent prediction concerns the

effect of effect of gender equality valuesgender equality values on the share of on the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework. in housework.

Indeed, given the decreasing marginal value of Indeed, given the decreasing marginal value of income, the effect of gender equality values on income, the effect of gender equality values on the share of housework performed by the spouse the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework specializing in housework should be more should be more strongly negative in richer countriesstrongly negative in richer countries because at because at higher levels of income it is less costly in terms of higher levels of income it is less costly in terms of welfare to forgo the gains of specializationwelfare to forgo the gains of specialization

Page 15: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

AgendaAgenda

Direct determinants of housework divisionDirect determinants of housework division

Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision

Other predictionsOther predictions

Empirical resultsEmpirical results

ConclusionsConclusions

Page 16: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Empirical results (1)Empirical results (1)Full model – modifications to improve Full model – modifications to improve

the fitthe fitTotal income

of SSMW

Market work hours of SSMW

Market work hours of SSHW

Total income of SSHW Total

amount of housework

SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by

the SSHWGender equality values

Childcare

Relative education

of the SSHW

SSMW Education

SSHW Education

Correction for Correction for measurement errormeasurement error

Correlated residualsCorrelated residuals

Fit acceptable according to Fit acceptable according to NFI and CFI indexes (>0,90)NFI and CFI indexes (>0,90)

(non-normal data)(non-normal data)

Page 17: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Empirical results (2)Empirical results (2)Direct determinants of housework Direct determinants of housework

divisiondivision the relative educationthe relative education of the spouse of the spouse

specializing in housework tends to specializing in housework tends to reducereduce her her share of housework (supposedly because of share of housework (supposedly because of specialization according to comparative specialization according to comparative advantages)advantages)

the the total amount of houseworktotal amount of housework the couple the couple performs tends to performs tends to increaseincrease her share of her share of housework (supposedly because of increasing housework (supposedly because of increasing returns to scale in household labor)returns to scale in household labor)

egalitarian gender valuesegalitarian gender values tend to tend to reducereduce her her share of houseworkshare of housework

Page 18: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Empirical results (3)Empirical results (3)Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision Spouses’ Spouses’ hourly wageshourly wages and and incomesincomes

moderately moderately decrease the total amount of decrease the total amount of houseworkhousework, which contributes to equality , which contributes to equality of housework divisionof housework division

Spouses’ Spouses’ relative relative wageswages hahaveve only a only a very very weak / insignificant effect weak / insignificant effect on market work on market work hours and fertilityhours and fertility

Each spouse’s income reduces the other Each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s market work hoursspouse’s market work hours

Childcare increases housework hoursChildcare increases housework hours

Education is only a very crude measure of market productivity

Page 19: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Empirical results (5)Empirical results (5)Other predictions Other predictions

People in cohabiting couples and higher-divorce countries People in cohabiting couples and higher-divorce countries should:should:– Rely more on their Rely more on their own characteristicsown characteristics when allocating when allocating

their timetheir time

– Reduce houseworkReduce housework more so as to avoid housework more so as to avoid housework specializationspecialization

This prediction is supported for cohabiting vs. married This prediction is supported for cohabiting vs. married couples:couples:

each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s employment hours less strongly in cohabiting couples employment hours less strongly in cohabiting couples

only in married couples does the relative productivity only in married couples does the relative productivity influence housework division and employment hoursinfluence housework division and employment hours

This prediction receives only partial support:This prediction receives only partial support: in cohabiting couples and high-divorce marriages spouses’ in cohabiting couples and high-divorce marriages spouses’

hourly wages hourly wages reduce the totalreduce the total amount of housework more amount of housework more stronglystrongly

in cohabiting couples:in cohabiting couples:– Increasing returns to scale have a stronger effectIncreasing returns to scale have a stronger effect– Childcare increases the amount of housework moreChildcare increases the amount of housework more

Page 20: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Empirical results (6)Empirical results (6)Discussion Discussion

The main two predictions are validated: The main two predictions are validated: both rational calculation and values both rational calculation and values influence housework divisioninfluence housework division

Impact of relationship stability:Impact of relationship stability:– Married (vs. cohabiting) rely more on the other Married (vs. cohabiting) rely more on the other

spouse’s productivity and the spouses’ relative spouse’s productivity and the spouses’ relative productivityproductivity

– BUT higher risk of separation does not motivate BUT higher risk of separation does not motivate partners to reduce total amount of housework partners to reduce total amount of housework

Correlated residuals are substantial, which Correlated residuals are substantial, which indicates that important determinants of indicates that important determinants of time allocation were not included in the time allocation were not included in the modelmodel

Page 21: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

AgendaAgenda

Direct determinants of housework divisionDirect determinants of housework division

Indirect determinants of housework Indirect determinants of housework

divisiondivision

Other predictionsOther predictions

Empirical resultsEmpirical results

ConclusionsConclusions

Page 22: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Conclusions (1)Conclusions (1)

Spouses divide housework Spouses divide housework rationallyrationally in that in that they they take advantage of their comparative take advantage of their comparative advantages and increasing returns to scaleadvantages and increasing returns to scale, , but but notnot as far as other questions of time as far as other questions of time allocation are concerned, and especially allocation are concerned, and especially not as far as insuring themselves against not as far as insuring themselves against the risks of union breakdown is concernedthe risks of union breakdown is concerned..

Moreover, spouses Moreover, spouses do take into account do take into account gender equalitygender equality values when dividing values when dividing housework.housework.

Page 23: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Conclusions (2)Conclusions (2) RRational-choice explanations ational-choice explanations areare self-sufficient self-sufficient

explanations – i.e., explanations that do not raise any explanations – i.e., explanations that do not raise any additional question;additional question; h however, their weakness may rely owever, their weakness may rely on their empirical accuracy, which is far from perfect.on their empirical accuracy, which is far from perfect.

The weakness of the explanations related to values is The weakness of the explanations related to values is that, even when they are validated empirically, they that, even when they are validated empirically, they still raise a question – still raise a question – e.ge.g., how come certain types of ., how come certain types of people tend to believe more (or less) in certain types people tend to believe more (or less) in certain types of values such as gender equality values?of values such as gender equality values?

Therefore, this paper illustrates the need for both Therefore, this paper illustrates the need for both stricter empirical tests of rational-choice explanations stricter empirical tests of rational-choice explanations and deeper theoretical research on the adherence to and deeper theoretical research on the adherence to values, or “preference formation” as some values, or “preference formation” as some researchers call it.researchers call it.

Page 24: Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris

Thank you!Thank you!