Distributing the Fish: Two-Level Games in theCommons

Review by Peter K. Mitchell

University of Connecticut

Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources.By Aslaug Asgeirsdottir. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008. 175 pp., $60.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7539-3).

FAO reports suggest that the upper limits on capture fisheries have beenreached, leaving little room for increasing production (FAO, 2002:3, 119–120).At the same time, the population of the world has increased, decreasing theavailable fish protein per capita. As a result, the world is faced with a situationwhere a significant source of animal protein used for human consumption isunder severe stress. Not surprisingly, this has contributed to a scholarly focus onthe impact of increasing scarcity on state behavior, including distributionalconflicts over fish resources.

As Asgeirsdottir notes, the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ and the challenges ofcollective action cast their shadow over the use and management of fish stocks(p. 19). There have been significant interstate confrontations over straddling fishstocks: the ‘‘Cod Wars’’ between the Great Britain and Iceland; the ‘‘TurbotWar’’ between Canada and Spain; the ‘‘Pacific Salmon War’’ between Canadaand the United States; and multistate disputes over fishing in the Donut Hole,the Loophole, and the Peanut Hole (see, generally, Bailey 1997; Stokke 2001).Many of these conflicts have involved states that would not be expected to resortto using force against each other. As one article noted, ‘‘Democracies Don’tFight—Except Over Fish’’ (Baden and Noonan 1996). Research has found littleevidence, however, that competition over fish has been a cause of violent conflictamong modern states (see, for example, Homer-Dixon 1999:138; Stalley 2003:44,49). Instead states have deferred to alternative resolutions. These include rede-fining the property rights in fish stocks by ‘‘fencing the commons’’ (Wijkman1982) and entering into negotiated agreements over shared fish stocks. Whatinterests Asgeirsdottir in Who Gets What? is explaining why, in the context ofnegotiation, states reach specific distributional outcomes.

Using a most-similar methodology, Asgeirsdottir looks at Norway and Iceland.She examines seven agreements negotiated between the states from 1980 to1999. These provide both cross-sectional (distributional outcomes of agreementsgoverning different stocks) and longitudinal (distributional outcomes of agree-ments covering the same stock that were negotiated over time) variation. Exam-ining the outcomes of these negotiations, Asgeirsdottir finds a puzzle also foundin negotiations over other common pool resources: the less powerful state, inthis case Iceland, often emerges from negotiations as more successful (pp. 5,114; see also Haftendorn 2000).

Guided by neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory, Asgeirsdottir brieflyexamines explanations at the international level. She finds that relevant interna-tional organizations did not play a significant role in determining distributionaloutcomes for the cases she examines (pp. 43–46). Looking at applicable rulesand norms, from her interviews she derives three principles—the rights of

� 2010 International Studies Association

International Studies Review (2010) 12, 150–152

coastal states, zonal attachment, and historical rights—that states have deployedin an instrumental fashion (pp. 41–43; see, for example, pp. 127, 129, 136). Herfinding that they do not provide satisfactory explanations of distributional out-comes is consistent with other scholars (see, for example, Hoel and Kvalvik2006). The one outcome attributed to the international fisheries regime, thedetermination which nation gets the largest share, reflects the development of anorm generally derived from but not explicitly required by the cited conventions(p. 8).

Moving to the domestic level, Asgeirsdottir places the analysis in the contextof Putnam’s two-level game theory (pp. 9–12). While there have been empiricalapplications of the theory in a variety of situations (see, for example, Trumboreand Boyer 2000; Lehman and McCoy 1992), this book applies it to a commonpool resource. Although a cost of the selected methodology is generalizability, itallows Asgeirsdottir to control for many of the theory’s hypothesized explanatorycauses. Additionally, because of the governmental structure of the two states andthe timing of the agreements, Asgeirsdottir is able to eliminate two of the morecommon explanations found in two-level game theory: electoral connection andratification procedures. This leaves the final major explanation, the role ofdomestic constraints, specifically veto players (p. 12). In the case of Iceland andNorway, due to their corporatist nature, she is able to focus on the role of inter-est groups representing domestic fisheries interests as the major domestic con-straint (p. 13).

The primary analysis is the impact of these interest groups on the size of thewin-set that each state brings to international negotiations. Asgeirsdottir identi-fies several mechanisms by which the interest groups influence internationalnegotiations, although the specific role each plays can not always be distin-guished. These mechanisms include influencing the selection of the interna-tional legal principle used by the state, as a domestic constraint (veto player)and as a direct participant in the negotiations. Asgeirsdottir finds that the com-paratively more central role that interest groups have played in Iceland explainswhy it has had a smaller win-set and has achieved distributional ‘‘wins’’ duringinternational negotiations. This outcome could also be explained through amore parsimonious approach from an economic security perspective (based onthe value of fisheries to each state’s economy). That approach, however, wouldobscure the impact of the various actors and the factors the government actuallybalances during international negotiations that Asgeirsdottir is able to identify.

An inherent challenge in Asgeirsdottir’s use of the distributional outcomes ofthe international agreements as the dependant variable is an underspecifiedmodel. While this variable provides an indirect measure of the size of the win-sets, once the negotiations shift to the international level, additional factors out-side domestic interest groups influence the size of win-sets and the actual distri-butional outcomes. For example, six of the agreements involve additional states.Tarar’s game theoretical model, on which Asgeirsdottir draws (p. 11), is limitedto dyadic relationships. As her research demonstrates, third parties introduce avariety of calculations that can alter the win-set, the distribution of the resource,and may well politicize the negotiations, a factor that Asgeirsdottir notes can con-strain interest group power (p. 128, 134). The book deals with these issuesthrough the rich description of the states’ international relations that haveaffected the agreements, as well as the roles played by the key internal actors:the government, scientists, and interest groups.

Some may find Asgeirsdottir’s treatment of international law and the law ofthe sea regime less than satisfactory. For example, there is some conflationbetween the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in the generalized discussion ofspecific Convention provisions some relevant nuances are lost. The law of the

151Peter K. Mitchell

sea regime discussion is limited to two main conventions, despite numerousother relevant conventions, organizations, principles, and norms that make upand contribute to the regime, including its application to fish stocks negotia-tions. These concerns are secondary to the analysis and do not impact thefindings.

Perhaps the greatest strength of this book is the detailed development for Nor-way and Iceland of how domestic factors set the stage for and constrain interna-tional negotiations. Asgeirsdottir effectively uses a variety of sources includinginterviews, governmental and non-governmental organization reports, pressreports, and parliamentary actions, and deploys selected quantitative data analy-sis to support the qualitative work. From a methodological perspective, it is agood example of the benefits of using a multimethod approach. This book willappeal to those interested in the interrelated role of domestic and internationalfactors on negotiations, and in how less powerful states can achieve distributionalwins during international negotiations. It is a welcome addition to the study ofhow states cooperate over common pool resources.

References

Baden, John A., and Douglas S. Noonan. (1996) Democracies Don’t Fight—Except Over Fish. Seat-tle Times, November 26.

Bailey, Jennifer L. (1997) States, Stocks, and Sovereignty: High Seas Fishing and the Expansionof Sovereignty. In Conflict and the Environment, edited by Nils Petter Gleditsch. Dordrecht, TheNetherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). (2002) The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture.Rome: FAO.

Haftendorn, Helga. (2000) Water and International Conflict. Third World Quarterly 21: 51–68.Hoel, Alf Hakon, and Ingrid Kvalvik. (2006) The Allocation of Scarce Natural Resources: The

Case of Fisheries. Marine Policy 30: 347–356.Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-

sity Press.Lehman, Howard, and Jennifer McCoy. (1992) The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game:

The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations. World Politics 44: 600–644.Stalley, Phillip. (2003) Environmental Scarcity and International Conflict. Conflict Management and

Peace Science 20: 33–58.Stokke, Olav Schram. (2001) The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime. In Governing High

Seas Fisheries, edited by Olav Schram Stokke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Trumbore, Peter, and Mark Boyer. (2000) International Crisis Decisionmaking as a Two-Level

Process. Journal of Peace Research 37: 679–697.Wijkman, Magnus. (1982) Managing the Global Commons. International Organization 36: 511–536.

152 Distributing the Fish: Two-Level Games in the Commons