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Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion Distributed Detection of Tor Directory Authorities Censorship in Mexico UNAM/DGAPA/PAPIME PE102718 Gunnar Wolf • IIEc-UNAM / FI-UNAM TICS • ICN • NexConn, Valencia, Spain

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Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Distributed Detection of Tor Directory AuthoritiesCensorship in Mexico

UNAM/DGAPA/PAPIME PE102718

Gunnar Wolf • IIEc-UNAM / FI-UNAM

TICS • ICN • NexConn, Valencia, Spain

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Contenidos

1 Introduction

2 Probable Tor censorship in Mexico

3 Results and discussion

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

The Tor network

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Motivation

Anonymity loves company

Anonymity loves diversity↪→ Tor wants more volunteers offering anonymizing relays tofurther the anonymity guarantees against state-level attackers

As widely distributed across jurisdictions as possible↪→ Many users believe in Tor’s mission and want to support it,offering their available resources

≈ 6300 relays worldwide for ≈ 2 million daily users*

April 2017: Tor Project’s Global South working group

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Motivation

Anonymity loves companyAnonymity loves diversity

↪→ Tor wants more volunteers offering anonymizing relays tofurther the anonymity guarantees against state-level attackers

As widely distributed across jurisdictions as possible↪→ Many users believe in Tor’s mission and want to support it,offering their available resources

≈ 6300 relays worldwide for ≈ 2 million daily users*

April 2017: Tor Project’s Global South working group

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Motivation

Anonymity loves companyAnonymity loves diversity↪→ Tor wants more volunteers offering anonymizing relays tofurther the anonymity guarantees against state-level attackers

As widely distributed across jurisdictions as possible↪→ Many users believe in Tor’s mission and want to support it,offering their available resources

≈ 6300 relays worldwide for ≈ 2 million daily users*

April 2017: Tor Project’s Global South working group

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Anonymizing relays in Tor

Image source: https://2019.www.torproject.org/images/htw2.png

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Number of relays over time

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Relays

Bridges

Number of relays

Number of relays and bridges over time, 2010–2019Source: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Contenidos

1 Introduction

2 Probable Tor censorship in Mexico

3 Results and discussion

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Uneven Tor participation by geographic origin

Users of the Tor network by2014: 10,000 ≈ 15,000 dailyusers

Same range as Sweden orAustriaTen times the populationFar worse score on humanrights, freedom of thepress

Providers to the Tor network(relay or exit nodeoperators): Barely a blip onthe radar

. . . See the censorship inlate 2015?

Number of relays in Mexico,2008–2019Source:https://metrics.torproject.org/,processed by Vasilis Ververis

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Uneven Tor participation by geographic origin

Users of the Tor network by2014: 10,000 ≈ 15,000 dailyusers

Same range as Sweden orAustriaTen times the populationFar worse score on humanrights, freedom of thepress

Providers to the Tor network(relay or exit nodeoperators): Barely a blip onthe radar

. . . See the censorship inlate 2015?

Number of relays in Mexico,2008–2019Source:https://metrics.torproject.org/,processed by Vasilis Ververis

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Censorship: Architecture or policy?

End-users cannot get relays working in Mexico. Why? Is it adeliberate policy?

Questions to answer:

Do ISPs actively interfere with connections?Technical measures purposefully set up to block Tor?

Does the ISP perform Deep NAT?Does the ISP allow end users to reconfigure their routers andreceive incoming connections?

Rights to set up the modem. Whose property is it, all in all?Can users reconfigure their modems? (valid security concerns!)

Which ISPs are most amenable for setting up relays?

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

How to get our data

Challenge Set up a quick call for participationAsk individuals to make a quick check on theirnetworks and report back to us

Constraint Users might test from different platforms.They might test only once from a given device↪→ We don’t install any nonstandard software,work only with OS-provided tools

Decision Ask participants to provide traceroute reports to theeleven Tor DirAuths

2 ≈ 8 minutes per probeRequires interaction with the command line(non-user-friendly!)Unix, Windows outputs equally parsable(Mobile platforms are left out)

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Data reporting interface

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Contenidos

1 Introduction

2 Probable Tor censorship in Mexico

3 Results and discussion

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

Numerical

Time frame Five monthsNumber of reports 79States covered 12 (out of 32 countrywide)Dominant ISP Telmex (as expected!)

ISP ReportsTelmex 32Axtel 1oIzzi 7Total Play 7AT&T 6Megacable 4Alestra 2UNAM 2

Only one: Avantel, Bestel, Cablevisión, Express VPN, Maxcom,Prrovsor, Nextel, Telcel

Introduction Probable Tor censorship in Mexico Results and discussion

At a glimpse

Percentage of reachable ISPs from a given particular proxy.