dissertation export bans food security tanzania_sdengler
TRANSCRIPT
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
On the rationale to use export bans for food
security: the case of Tanzania
Candidate number: 77951
MSc Environment and Development
Wordcount: 9988
29 August 2013
2
Abstract
Export bans were used by many countries in 2008 to counteract rising food prices. Since
then, the debate on the rationale for discretionary government intervention in
agricultural markets has revived. This paper analyses the motivations for using export
bans from the perspective of the Tanzanian government, using a mixed-method analysis
including interviews and newspaper articles. Three different arguments from the
literature that support export bans as a second-best choice were investigated. Overall,
there was strong support for political incentives after 2010, while more neutral factors
such as information and market failures played a key role beforehand. There was
evidence of a strategic interaction between the private and the public sector that led to a
vicious circle between imperfect information, speculative behaviour and ad hoc
interventions from the state. Moreover, the repeated use of export bans despite evidence
of their ineffectiveness appeared to be partly due to a lack of constructive policy
dialogue between the various stakeholders involved in the process.
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Table of contents
I Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5
II Literature review ....................................................................................................................... 8
Market and institutional failures ............................................................................................... 8
Information constraints ........................................................................................................... 10
Political economy .................................................................................................................... 12
III Case study and methodology .................................................................................................. 16
Case study ............................................................................................................................... 16
Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 18
IV Analysis and discussion ......................................................................................................... 21
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 21
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 32
V Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 34
Appendix 1 – Abbott’s (2010) theoretical framework ................................................................ 36
Appendix 2 – Interview participants ........................................................................................... 37
Appendix 3 – Interview guide ..................................................................................................... 38
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 40
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the interviewees for making this research possible and my
supervisor, peers and family for their invaluable support.
5
I Introduction
Export bans were used by many countries in 2008 to counteract rising food prices. Since
then, there has been an on-going debate on the rationale for discretionary government
intervention in agricultural markets (Demeke et al. 2011, p.208; Gouel 2013, pp.2–3). In
the context of this debate and given that the frequency of food crisis is expected to
increase in the future, it is of crucial importance to understand why governments use
export bans (hereinafter EBs) to ensure food security and whether they are effective.
This dissertation will focus on the impetus to use EBs in a small developing country, as
the consequences have been studied in-depth in the literature (Mitra & Josling 2009;
World Bank 2009; Sharma 2011; Porteous 2012; MAFAP 2013, pp.183–192).
The choice of analysing the question from the perspective of a small developing country
is motivated by the fact that they have in general been depicted as the victims from
beggar-thy-neighbour-policies in times of food crisis (Bouët et al. 2010; McMahon
2013, chap.6). However, the fact that a number of developing countries regularly
implement EBs shows that there must be internal motivations for using this policy tool.
This dissertation will analyse these from the perspective of the Tanzanian government,
using insights from different strands of research to interpret results. Admassie’s (2013)
paper that analyses the rationale of policies implemented in Ethiopia during the last
food crisis has been an inspiration for the research question and the methodology of this
dissertation.
Tanzania is an interesting case study for three reasons. Firstly, the government has
regularly implemented EBs since the beginning of the decade1, which will provide a
longer time frame of analysis than other studies on EBs that have mostly focused on the
crisis in 2008. Secondly, the country has officially embraced liberalisation and is seen
as the future main provider of maize in the region, which seems to be a contradiction to
the use of EBs. Thirdly, Tanzania amidst other African countries, committed at an
official G8 meeting in May 2012 (G8 Cooperation Framework 2012) to refrain from
using EBs in the future.
1 EBs have been mostly imposed on maize and the analysis will concentrate on this staple crop.
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The literature describes a variety of economic, socio-political and institutional factors
that can warrant the use of EBs (Mitra & Josling 2009, pp.3–4; Abbott 2010, p.9;
Rausser & Roland 2010, pp.105–106). This dissertation will contribute to the literature
by undertaking an empirical study to analyse three possible explanations for the use of
EBs. The first two are described in the literature on price stabilisation, namely market
and institutional failures and political economy. The third argument that governments
may not choose the optimal alternative because of information failures or lack of
knowledge has been inspired by the literature on policy learning (Heclo 1974; Sabatier
1999; Strydom et al. 2010; Maxwell et al. 2013).
Three specific research questions were derived to analyse the question of why the
government of Tanzania used EBs for food security:
1) Was the use of EBs justified by market and institutional failures?
2) Was the use of EBs an informed decision?
3) To what extent was the decision to use EBs influenced by political actors?
This paper argues that EBs constituted a second-best choice in the short term from the
government perspective given a number of distortions in the economy, the inefficiency
of institutional mechanisms and political pressures. This is in line with Rodrik’s (1992)
argument that drastic trade reforms might not be the best choice in the short run in
developing countries.
The approach in this dissertation was to keep an open mind about the possible factors
leading to EBs in Tanzania. As the purpose was not to prove a particular theory, a
qualitative methodology that gives more flexibility for new insights to arise from the
data was chosen here. The analysis was conducted using triangulation of primary data
collected through interviews and secondary data collected from online newspapers, in
addition to, published and grey literature. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first
time that this type of data analysis has been used in the literature on EBs, and the
insights therefore complement the quantitative and theoretical analysis that has
prevailed to date.
7
Overall, this dissertation has shown that there was strong support for the political
economy argument after 2010, while more neutral factors such as information and
market failures played a key role beforehand. There was evidence of a strategic
interaction between the private and the public sector that led to a vicious circle between
imperfect information, speculative behaviour and ad hoc interventions from the state.
Moreover, the repeated use of EBs despite evidence of their ineffectiveness was
probably due to a lack of constructive policy dialogue between the various stakeholders
involved in the process.
The paper will start by describing the relevant literature that applies to this research
question. The second part will describe the case study and the methodology used. The
results will then be presented and discussed and finally, the last chapter will draw
conclusions and suggest possible avenues for future research.
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II Literature review
This chapter will present theories and studies that are relevant to the analysis of why
EBs were used in Tanzania. The theory of EBs is still in its early stages, which is why
the literature review draws from several research fields that are important for the
analysis to follow. A description of the main three aspects investigated in this paper will
be given, namely market and institutional failures, information constraints and political
economy. This will be based on the literature on stabilisation policy and policy learning.
To conclude this section, detailed hypotheses will be derived and will then be
investigated in Part IV Analysis.
Market and institutional failures
This section will explain why market and institutional failures and the lack of
alternatives in the short term can justify EBs and will outline those that were described
in the literature and are most relevant to the analysis in Tanzania. The identification of
market and institutional failures relevant to the research question is based on Abbott’s
(2010) framework describing “Objectives relevant to stabilisation policy choices” that
can be found in Appendix 1.
There are two possible ways to explain the use of EBs. The first is from an international
perspective, where large exporting countries impose EBs to improve their terms of trade
and small developing countries respond to it to protect their populations from rising
food prices (Bouët et al. 2010; Anderson et al. 2010; McMahon 2013, chap.6). The
general conclusion from this strand is that countries should refrain from using EBs as
the domino effect induced reduces global welfare. However, the second strand of the
literature analyses EBs from an individual country’s perspective and warrants them
given a variety of economic, socio-political and institutional factors (Mitra & Josling
2009, pp.3–4; Abbott 2010, p.9; 25–30).
9
� Market failures
A combination of market failures means that although a country like Tanzania (Ihle et
al. 2010, p.3) can be self-sufficient nationally, the private sector does not supply the
market to optimum effect, and pockets of food insecurity are arising in the country on a
regular basis. These market failures justify discretionary government intervention to
enhance the efficiency of food provision and to protect agents against risk (Abbott
2010; Timmer 2010) as well as price fluctuations (Timmer 2002; Cummings et al.
2006). Timmer (2010) argues that pro-cyclical government intervention can be
explained by the lack of incentives for the private sector to finance the long-term
investments that are essential to enhance the responsiveness of producers to price
signals. Abbott (2010, pp.25–27) warrants stabilisation measures and interventions from
parastatal agencies because of market power from traders, while Gouel and Jean (2012)
emphasize uncertainty as a key reason to protect risk-averse consumers by imposing
taxes on exports.
Both types of market failures have been described in Tanzania. Firstly, physical and
financial limitations have prevented private actors to effectively take over the marketing
of inputs and output (Mahdi 2012, p.2; Musonda & Wanga 2006, p.560; Wolter 2008,
p.3; MAFAP 2013, p.178). This in turn led to poor storage, a concentration of
marketing services in easily accessible areas and a reduction of fertilizer use by farmers
that affected productivity and the capacity to respond to price increases (Musonda &
Wanga 2006, p.567). Secondly, the low price transmission between Tanzania and other
countries (Minot 2011, pp.20–21; Ihle et al. 2010, p.2) gives a high incentive for
arbitrage and therefore both formal and informal trade on the borders. Informal flows
are especially high between Tanzania and Kenya, as the country experiences regular
food shortages and therefore high domestic prices. The combination of high prices
abroad and lack of infrastructure means that external trade is more profitable than
selling to other regions in the country.
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� Institutional failures
These market failures could arguably be solved by more efficient measures than an EB.
First of all, from a long-term perspective investment in infrastructure or the provision of
safety nets would be necessary to ensure the provision of food to remote areas.
However, to be effective safety nets need to be well-targeted and managed, which is a
lengthy procedure and therefore makes them less suitable as a response to short term
food crisis (Timmer 2010, p.7). The focus will therefore be laid on existing alternatives
that the government had at the time when EBs were used.
One of the alternatives to EBs is to import maize from other countries. However, the
ability to import in the presence of high prices will depend on the budget constraints or
on the size of aid flows in times of food crisis (Abbott 2010, p.29). Marketing boards
and public storage were introduced in African countries to handle market failures but
have been shown to be often ineffective or inefficient (Abbott 2010, p.27). Budgetary
constraints and competition from private traders were some reasons why the National
Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) in Tanzania was often unable to buy stocks from
farmers in sufficient amounts to cover eventual needs, in particular in times of high food
prices (Temu et al. 2010, p.333). Nyange and Wobst (2005) show that interventions
from the NFRA have been ineffective for the support of farmers, since they increased
producer prices during procurement but depressed them during release. They also show
that trade was more effective at reducing price volatility.
The market and institutional failures outlined above could have provided a justification
for the use of EBs in Tanzania. One of the purposes of this dissertation is to see whether
these failures were perceived by officials as important reasons to restrict the export of
food.
Information constraints
This section presents important concepts that will be used to analyse the information
aspect of the decision to use EBs. Information constraints can arise at several stages of
the decision-making process. Firstly, the accuracy of the data used to assess the food
11
security situation in the country is crucial for a sound decision base. Secondly, the
evaluation of alternatives is important to avoid using the same policy tool for situations
that would require different solutions.
Maxwell et al. (2013, p.4) describe the ideal way decisions should be made for
responses to food crisis situations. Their framework comprises the assessment of needs
and a causal analysis of underlying factors, the evaluation of first- and second-best
options and the inclusion of general factors such as logistical capacity or external
funding. However, they present results from a field study that included interviews with
staff in various organisations and conclude that choices were often made on the basis of
past experience or rapid assessments, so that a single policy choice often became a
dominant response in the institutions. Moreover, some authors argue that in African
countries agricultural policy is more ad hoc than planned and evidence-based
(Farrington & Saasa 2002). This could be due to the lack of national research capacities
(Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade 2004). Babu and Mthindi (1995, p.305) give another
explanation, namely that political survival is an essential factor to take into account, as
decision-makers will weigh up the certainty of research findings against the risks
associated with policy change. Strydom et al. (2010) confirm the multitude of factors
that influence decision-making and emphasize that the credibility of the information and
the experts as well as the compatibility of values between scientists and decision-
makers plays a crucial role for the success of communication between them. They also
state that the inclusion of policymakers in the process of knowledge creation is
important for the success of the acceptance of evidence. This draws the link to the
policy learning literature that is concerned with the dimension of collective learning
within institutions, and between institutions and actors in the economy (Rietig 2013).
The focus will be here on the aspect of non-learning that is important for the EB, which
was repeatedly implemented as a policy tool despite evidence of its ineffectiveness.
The phenomenon of non-learning is described by Heclo (1974, p.312) when
assimilation of new knowledge is hindered at the individual or institutional level. This
can be due to limited time or resources (Janis & Mann 1977) so that trial-and-error or
incrementalism (Lindblom 1979) will be preferred to a meticulous examination of
12
different policy alternatives. It can also be due to an unwillingness to learn and therefore
the task of addressing the problem will be delegated to other individuals or in time
(Janis & Mann 1977). This would meet the point from Farrington and Saasa (2002) that
agricultural policy in African countries was often characterized by defensive avoidance
of problems leading to reactive governance (Rietig 2013, p.9). Finally, individual
learning might not be transmitted to the institutional level and this “blocked learning”
can explain why policy change is a lengthy procedure (Zito & Schout 2009). Sabatier
(1999) expressed three hypothetical conditions amongst others under which a
productive dialogue to induce policy change can occur: there must be sufficient
technical resources on both sides to discuss the subject with a common understanding of
the problem, the debate has to occur in an apolitical but prestigious context and it
should be possible to measure the problems on a quantitative scale. Information
constraints and a lack of policy learning could have been reasons for the EB to be used
despite its ineffectiveness, which will be further analysed below.
Political economy
This section introduces political incentives that could have explained the use of EBs,
drawing from the literature on political economy. There is evidence of political motives
influencing interventions in the Tanzanian agricultural sector. Temu et al. (2010, p.324)
argue that maize is politically sensitive and that therefore interventions are more
frequent to ensure its availability than in the case of other crops. Moreover, Therkildsen
(2011, p.28) shows the importance of political motivations to explain the choice of
investments and the size of applied tariffs in rice production in Tanzania.
� Internal influences
The literature on the political economy of trade distortions (for an overview, see
Anderson (2010)) describes two main constituencies that the government takes into
account when making decisions on trade instruments, which are voters and lobbyists.
The main dilemma faced by the government in times of food crisis is between the
perceived need to protect consumers and the negative consequences of abrupt measures
13
for actors in the value chain (Chapoto et al. 2009, p.26). The general perception in the
literature is that decision-makers in developing countries are much more responsive to
needs of the median voter than to lobbying, in contrast to governments in developed
countries (Abbott 2010, p.28; Gawande & Hoekman 2010, p.243). The analysis will
purposely use a stylised view of constituencies for simplification, although it is clear
that within groups of constituencies interests may differ.
The use of EBs goes against predictions of the median voter model, as in Tanzania 75%
of the population depends on agriculture and therefore the majority of voters are also
farmers (FAO 2008). This can be explained by the “urban bias” described in the
literature, whereby African governments would favour urban constituencies - which are
the main beneficiaries from a price reduction due to the EB - at the expense of rural
constituencies (Maxwell 1999, p.3; Bezemer & Headey 2008, pp.1342–1343; Anseeuw
2010, p.248). In fact, farmers do not generally have much power in developing
countries, which has been explained by their lack of income and education (Woolverton
et al. 2010, pp.8–9; Mkunda 2010). However, Bates and Block (2010, pp.317–318)
show that although their lobbying power may be weak because of geographic dispersion
and their large number, these very factors can make farmers very powerful as voters,
which would confirm the median voter model. They show that this especially applies to
countries with competitive elections, which is the case in Tanzania.
As far as traders are concerned, the analysis of Jayne and Tschirley (2010, pp.124–128)
takes the examples of Kenya and Malawi to derive a new theory of strategic interactions
between the private and the public sector explaining discretionary interventions. Their
framework is based on the premises that the values of the private and the public sector
are different, which leads to a lack of trust between them. Moreover, there is imperfect
information so that both parties base their decisions on expectations of the other’s
behaviour. This problem arises particularly in countries where government interventions
are not always based on clear-cut pre-defined rules and where there is a lack of a
consultative process.
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� External influences
In addition to internal constituencies, external influences from trade partners and donors
could also have played a role in the decision for EBs. As Tanzania is part of two
regional agreements and the WTO, trade partners would be expected to have an
influence on the choice of trade measures (Gawande & Hoekman 2010, p.241).
Regional trade agreements have been proven to impact on the level of protectionism in a
country (Cadot et al. 2010, pp.355–356) and in the case of the EB, trade partners are
likely to protest in particular when they are net importers. However, Gouel (2013)
argues that the choice of policies such as the EB can be individually rational when
countries do not trust each other and when there is a lack of adoption of similar policies.
Moreover, WTO regulations have a clause in article XI that allows “Export prohibitions
or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of
foodstuffs” (GATT 1994).
Aid has been shown to have a major influence on policies in African countries (Moyo
2009) and various aid actors have been said to play an important role in agricultural
interventions in Tanzania (Cooksey 2012, pp.22–23; Temu et al. 2010, p.334). Major
donors for Tanzania such as USAID or the World Bank have been promoting the
dismantling of EBs so that aid should not have had a major influence on the motivations
to use this policy tool. However, USAID has played a main advisory role for the
government of Tanzania where EBs are concerned, and therefore their perception of the
motivations to apply them is essential. Kagira (2009), a trade policy advisor for USAID,
explains that conflicting policies arise in Tanzania due to the primary objective of self-
sufficiency. Furthermore, he presents several motivations for EBs (Kagira 2011),
namely the preservation of national food stocks, price stability and the provision of food
to areas experiencing shortages. The key assumptions from the government were that
EBs would keep food in the country and therefore reduce prices and that the private
sector would not provide food to deficit areas because of infrastructural constraints. He
concludes that the availability of correct information and the fostering of regional
integration are key solutions for preventing the use of EBs.
15
From a review of the literature, detailed hypotheses were formulated for each of the
research questions that will be investigated in Part IV Analysis.
1) Was the use of EBs justified by market and institutional failures?
1.1) The ineffectiveness of the private sector was a reason to impose EBs.
1.2) The EB was motivated by the lack of effectiveness of alternative measures.
2) Was the use of EBs an informed decision?
2.1) The EB was based on perceptions of food shortage.
2.2) Decision-makers were not aware of the negative effects of the EB.
2.3) Decision-makers were unwilling to take into account evidence about the EB.
3) To what extent was the decision to use EBs influenced by political actors?
3.1) The government favoured concerns of consumers over farmers.
3.2) There was a strategic interaction between the private and the public sector.
3.3) Trade partners played a minor role in the decision-making process.
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III Case study and methodology
Case study
Tanzania, officially the United Republic of Tanzania (URT)2 is situated in East Africa
with access to the Indian Ocean and is bordered by eight countries. The official capital
is Dodoma but the political capital Dar Es Salaam is also the principal commercial
centre and port of the country. This democratic republic is considered as a model of
political stability and governance, explaining why recent allegations of corruption have
been countered with drastic measures by the President (BBC News May 2012).
Tanzania is part of two regional agreements, the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).
Agriculture is a main economic sector in this low-income country as it employs 80% of
the workforce and represents 1/3 of GDP (World Bank 2012, p.1). The agricultural
sector in Tanzania is divided between food crop and cash crop production, whereby the
latter provides most of its foreign exchange (Ponte 2002, p.52). Maize has been
traditionally the staple food and is produced mainly for own consumption (Musonda &
Wanga 2006, p.561). However, some of the poorest households are obliged to sell
cereals for their livelihoods even if it forces them to repurchase stocks later (Musonda &
Wanga 2006, p.575), which means that they are particularly vulnerable to seasonal
variations in grain prices. Tanzania has been a net importer of maize in most years
between 2000 and 2010 (FAO 2013), although these figures are likely to be distorted
because of informal trade. Expenditures on the agricultural sector constituted 9% of
total government spending in 2011, whereby 50% on average came from donor
contributions (MAFAP 2013, p.198).
The Tanzanian government officially transferred the marketing and trade of food to the
private sector at the end of the 1980s but kept a number of mechanisms in place that are
meant to ensure effective provision of food in the economy. The NFRA, which is a key
2 In the text Tanzania and The United Republic of Tanzania will be used interchangeably.
17
player in the maize market, has the function of stabilising prices by purchasing maize at
prices above the market price, and of providing food to recipients in need identified by
local authorities (MAFAP 2013, p.177). To import and export food crops, traders are
required to ask for permits that usually last one month (Kagira 2009, p.14). The decision
to hand out permits is made by the NFRA according to its assessment of the impact on
domestic food supply. The removal of export permits is the main mechanism by which
the government imposes EBs (Temu et al. 2010, p.22).
According to recent evidence (MAFAP 2013, p.183; Porteous 2012; World Bank 2009,
p.18), the government started imposing EBs on maize in 2004. In the analysis, the
chronology from MAFAP (2013, p.183) will be used for the timing of the introduction
and the lifting of EBs, which is shown in Table 1 below. EBs were lifted and
reintroduced eight times in the last decade, which indicates a persistency in the
motivations for imposing them.
Table 1: Chronology of export restrictions events in the United Republic of Tanzania,
2004-2013
Date Event
2004 Withdrawal of all maize export permits given to traders and the
suspension of issuing new ones
January 2006 Export ban lifted for two months
March 2006 Export ban reintroduced
January 2007 Export ban lifted
January 2008 Export ban reintroduced
May 2008 Export ban lifted
January 2009 Export ban reintroduced
October 2010 (or
April 2010) Export ban lifted
May 2011 Export ban reintroduced
January 2012 Export ban lifted
Source: MAFAP 2013 p. 183
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Methodology
This dissertation uses qualitative research methodologies that are considered to be the
better choice when answering “why” or “how” questions (Denzin & Lincoln 2000). The
analysis adopts a multi-method approach based on primary and secondary data, namely
interviews with key stakeholders and newspaper articles in addition to grey and
published literature. Triangulation between different research methods and views from
various stakeholders was employed to enhance the validity of this study (Guion et al.
2011; Meijer et al. 2002, p.146) and also because the expression of a critical perspective
was expected to gradually increase from statements of functionaries to information in
the newspapers.
Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted between 15 and 29 July 2013 via
Skype, using Callnote as a recording device. The interviews were on average 45 min.
long (30 min. – 1 h 20 min). The criteria for selecting interviewees was purposive
sampling (Esterberg 2002), which means that participants were chosen according to
their expertise in agriculture and trade and their degree of involvement in the process
(see Fig. 1 below). The two types of interviewees were functionaries and advisors.
Functionaries were chosen because of their direct involvement in the decision-making
process while advisors were chosen because of their indirect influence on the decision
through providing information and expertise in matters of trade and food security.
Interviewees comprised3:
- Functionaries: four senior officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Cooperatives (MAFC), one official from the Ministry of Industry and Trade
(MIT)
- Advisors: one senior manager from a large trade association providing advisory
services to the government, three academics from two key research institutes in
the country, one professor at Sokoine University, one representative from USDA
(United States Department of Agriculture) and one former representative from
USAID
3 To protect anonymity, the interviewees will be referenced using numbers and quotations will not be
attributed (Appendix 2).
The semi-structured interviews were conducted using a template
therefore ensuring a certain amount of comparability between responses.
mainly gave an orientation
purpose of semi-structured interviews is to allow an interactive discu
interesting topics arising during the conversation can be further explored
2009, pp.581–582). The open
interviewer bias and therefore inaccuracy, as the
most cases the discussion could be directed towards the
directly about it. Moreover, interviewer bias is reduced for telephone interviews as
interviewees tend to talk more freely and feel less pressured
In this study, there was a clear trade
them to the interviewee. In fact, the difference in the degree of involvement in the
decision-making process meant that the questions had to be adapted accordingly.
Moreover, English not being the national language
low quality of connections to Tanzania, questions often had to be repeated or
reformulated during the interview, which constitutes a clear source of bias.
source of bias was that interviewees were asked retrospectively about the
for using EBs, while the decis
structured interviews were conducted using a template
therefore ensuring a certain amount of comparability between responses.
of the types of questions that would be asked
structured interviews is to allow an interactive discu
interesting topics arising during the conversation can be further explored
The open-ended questions were left rather neutral to reduce
interviewer bias and therefore inaccuracy, as the EB is a politically sensitive
most cases the discussion could be directed towards the topic of the EB
Moreover, interviewer bias is reduced for telephone interviews as
interviewees tend to talk more freely and feel less pressured (Novick 2008, p.3)
In this study, there was a clear trade-off between keeping similar questions and adapting
rviewee. In fact, the difference in the degree of involvement in the
process meant that the questions had to be adapted accordingly.
Moreover, English not being the national language of the interviewees
ons to Tanzania, questions often had to be repeated or
reformulated during the interview, which constitutes a clear source of bias.
source of bias was that interviewees were asked retrospectively about the
, while the decision by the government to refrain from using this policy
19
(Appendix 3),
therefore ensuring a certain amount of comparability between responses. The template
of the types of questions that would be asked since the very
structured interviews is to allow an interactive discussion where
interesting topics arising during the conversation can be further explored (Longhurst
neutral to reduce
is a politically sensitive issue. In
EB without asking
Moreover, interviewer bias is reduced for telephone interviews as
(Novick 2008, p.3).
off between keeping similar questions and adapting
rviewee. In fact, the difference in the degree of involvement in the
process meant that the questions had to be adapted accordingly.
of the interviewees and given the
ons to Tanzania, questions often had to be repeated or
reformulated during the interview, which constitutes a clear source of bias. Another
source of bias was that interviewees were asked retrospectively about the motivations
the government to refrain from using this policy
20
tool had already been taken. However, the analysis of newspaper articles was meant to
reduce this bias, and for this research question this was the best method available given
the time and resource constraints.
153 newspaper articles from January 2000 to July 2013 were retrieved from the internet
using Factiva and Google. Articles were first selected using the keyword “export ban”,
but the search was expanded to make sure that it encompassed all factors relevant to the
EB. The search for articles was also very much facilitated by the kind provision of data
from Obie Porteous at the University of Berkeley. The articles retrieved were from local
and international, independent and government-owned newspapers.
For the evaluation of both types of data, thematic analysis was used, which involves the
identification of passages in the text that are linked by a common idea and their
categorization into themes (Agar 1983). Following the approach of Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane (2006), a mixture of inductive and deductive approach was used for coding to
allow themes to emerge both from the data and from the theoretical preconceptions of
the researcher. This approach is warranted since this is mainly an exploratory study
where new themes are expected to arise (Dey 1993, pp.97–98). An open coding was
first conducted, followed by an organisation of thoughts into categories that were
partially inspired by theory. The findings will be presented in qualitative terms since in
thematic analysis the importance of a topic is not necessarily defined by its recurrence
in the text but rather whether it captures something essential related to the research
question.
21
IV Analysis and discussion
This section will present the main results from the qualitative analysis of interviews and
newspaper articles. The section is organised according to the research questions and the
hypotheses, for each of which a short answer will be given before presenting the
detailed findings. The section will conclude with a discussion of the main results.
Analysis
1) Export bans as a response to market and institutional failures
1.1) The ineffectiveness of the private sector was a reason to impose EBs.
There was no clear indication that EBs were used mainly because of pockets of food
insecurity, which would have indicated a response to market failures. However, there
was evidence of arbitrage and misuse of market power that could have justified the use
of EBs from the government’s point of view.
Interviewees mentioned a number of infrastructure constraints and price differentials
across borders that either prevented or did not incentivise traders to transport food from
surplus to shortage areas, which was also mentioned by officials in the news (Reuters
October 2011; Financial Times December 2011). Price differentials were also presented
as a key reason why the government had not been able to effectively fight informal
trade (Daily News October (a) 2012). Mostly functionaries [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] but also
advisors [2, 9] indicated that private-public partnerships or meetings were required to
coordinate national objectives with market activities. However, the EB was not
presented specifically as a response to market failures. There was a quasi-consensus that
the decision base for the EB was food shortage but interviewees defined it in different
ways such as a specific threshold [4, 8], droughts [7, 8, 10] and price increases [5].
Government officials in newspaper articles also declared EBs were a response to
various problems, namely pockets combined with price increase (Business Daily
22
April 2008) and food shortage combined with price increase (Dow Jones December
2009; Financial Times December 2011).
Market power was seen as a foremost constraint that required interventions from the
government. Advisors and functionaries [1, 4, 5, 12] explained that traders could use
their information advantage to transmit higher transaction costs to farmers as well as
buying their crops before harvesting to store them and then re-sell them during food
scarcity. One of the advisors [5] described the “middlemen competition syndrome”
(Daily News October (b) 2012) and said that middlemen were artificially inflating
prices by denying market entrance and making large profits by using their market power
over farmers. Another advisor [6] talked about speculation by traders from
neighbouring countries who would import food from Tanzania and then re-sell it to the
country in times of food scarcity. The issue of market power from traders was also
highlighted by President Kikwete (All Africa July 2012).
Farmers would be forced by poverty, lack of savings and insurance to sell their products
at low prices and so bear all the risks. This vicious circle would justify trade measures
according to one government official: “…the role of the government is because the
people themselves they can sell everything but very few months to come then they are
crying4 because they have no food. So through that experience the government has to
intervene to make sure that all products have to be sold at a limited number.” Moreover,
the government explicitly stated that it is putting an emphasis on the control of trade
flows, which has the purpose of avoiding scarcity in the country (Daily News March
2012) and to prevent traders setting high prices in the market as their registration
enables tracking (Daily News May 2011).
1.2) The EB was motivated by the lack of effectiveness of alternative measures.
Constraints on imports and especially the ineffectiveness of the NFRA seemed to be
important factors justifying the use of EBs. This can also explain why EBs were not
4 “Cry” was a term often used in interviews and the media and from the context means that people will
bring something to the government’s attention through various means, including discussions in
Parliament, the media, protests or advocacy.
23
solely used in the event of a national food shortage but also for price stabilisation and
avoiding pockets of food insecurity, which are the responsibility of the NFRA.
Interviewees described different measures used in times of food crisis. At the national
level, the most important option mentioned was importing [1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11]. On a
regional and district scale, the release of food stocks from the NFRA and international
assistance were seen as the main options [4, 7, 9, 10]. One of the advisors said that an
EB was simply the easiest measure to implement [10].
There was a recurrent theme about the constraints on imports. Surprisingly, only one of
the advisors mentioned budget constraints for imports [8] while three functionaries and
one advisor repeated in the conversation that imports had to be constrained by the
government [1, 3, 4, 5, 7]. The reasons mentioned were that farmers complained about
unfair competition, that there needed to be a control for diseases and that imports were
often not reaching vulnerable populations so that the food remained in the market and
depressed prices.
The NFRA was described by a majority of interviewees as playing a key role in the
country, but was described by one as expensive to manage [10] and not very effective
for food security, mainly because of the lack of funds [3, 6, 7]. Newspapers reported
lack of capacity and of budget to pay the farmers (Black sea grain online September
2010; Tanzania Reports November 2012; IPP Media April 2013). One article talked
about the lack of transparency of NFRA activities that leads to unpredictability for
market actors (Daily News June 2012) while the Deputy Chairperson of the Tanzania
Chamber of Commerce blamed the NFRA, accusing it of having favoured rich
commercial actors instead of farmers (Daily News February 2012). Even President
Kikwete admitted the ineffectiveness of the NFRA in an article in 2010 (Black sea grain
online September 2010). The NFRA and the EBs were often presented by interviewees
and in the news (RATIN February 2007; Daily News September 2011) as
complementary measures. In one of the articles the EB was described as a measure to
keep food stocks in the country, while the distribution of food from the NFRA had the
function of stabilising domestic prices (BBC Monitoring Africa July 2011).
24
2) Objectivity of the decision base and policy learning
2.1) The EB was based on perceptions of food shortage5.
Even though the EB was officially triggered by reports from the Early Warning System,
there were several indications of subjectivity in the decision base for the EB, in
particular for 2011. Moreover, there was mentioning of incentives to distort estimates of
food shortages.
There seems to be a divergence of opinions between functionaries and advisors on the
subjectivity of the decision base for the EB. Functionaries tend to see the decision base
as very much data-driven and objective [1, 3, 4, 5]. Two advisors [9, 10] however
emphasised that measures for food security are in practice triggered by more subjective
perceptions such as “markets [that] are not having grain” or “once you’re convinced that
people are dying”.
The official basis for food shortage calculations was described to me as follows [4]: The
Early Warning System receives information about production forecasts from districts
and compares that with the minimum caloric intake assumed per household. This is
complemented by information about coping mechanisms of households that will ensure
their food access, so that food self-sufficiency ratios can be recalculated and then
aggregated. The coping mechanisms are identified in preliminary assessments
conducted normally in February and June while the final assessment is published in
December. This information is assessed by the Food Security Unit of the MAFC and the
Disaster Management Department from the Prime Minister’s Office before the decision
for or against the EB is made. Therefore, the EB in March 2006 was probably based on
the information of the second vulnerability assessment and the EBs in January 2008 and
2009 on the final focus report.
5 This hypothesis was inspired by a collaborative study coordinated under USAID’s SERA project (Feed
the Future February 2013) whose major finding was that the method used in Tanzania tended to
overestimate food shortages because it considered maize to be more important in diets than it was in
practice. However, the study has not been published yet, neither in the official nor in the grey literature.
http://feedthefuture.gov/article/research-findings-maize-strengthen-case-end-export-bans-tanzania
25
However, the EB in May 2011 was imposed in a period of harvest and in-between
reports from the Early Warning Unit. In fact, one government official stated that the
decision in 2011 about the EB was “a really quick decision” and “not very much
supported by the statistics on the ground”. He also stated that the evidence in the final
report in December would not have supported such a measure. The public also
questioned the rationale behind the EB in 2011 (The Citizen September 2011) since
rainfall was expected soon and therefore increased production. The measure was
justified by the Minister of Agriculture (Diaspora Messenger September 2011) to ensure
food security until food availability would be clearly assessed, which shows again that
the EB had been imposed hastily.
The methodology for harvest prediction was challenged by two of the advisors [10, 12],
one of them saying that calculations were likely to lead to an overestimate of shortages
because private storage capacities were not included. One of the functionaries
highlighted the subjectivity of the surveys they undertake during the vulnerability
assessments [4]. There was also evidence of distortions in data reporting: one of the
advisors [10] reported that there is a rationale for district commissioners to overestimate
food shortages because of the fear of losing their jobs if they gave optimistic yield
estimates and a food crisis then occurred.
This statement from a government official represents very well the dilemma faced by
the EWS: “Our system is governmental and it's to give the government information that
can be probably adequately accurate but it can be less accurate. As you know early
warning is sending out information very early, sometimes it's an issue, time is an issue
more than accuracy. Accuracy will follow later.”
2.2) Decision-makers were not aware of the negative effects of the EB.
It seems that decision-makers were aware of the negative effects of the EB but that there
were fundamentally different views about how to ensure food security that prevented
learning. There are several lines of evidence of “blocked learning” where transmission
from functionaries to the institution was prevented.
26
One advisor [12] said that research in academic circles was unlikely to reach the
government, unless it was commissioned by it. However, advisors have been talking
about numerous workshops organised to inform the government [7, 8, 11, 12] about the
EB and one of the advisors [7] said that these had started in 2010, for which there was
also evidence in the news (The Citizen November 2010). One advisor talked about
advocacy and lobbying that had started around 2008 [6], when they had access to
evidence showing that the EB was not effective.
One functionary [2] mentioned studies that had shown the ineffectiveness of the ban and
that they had learned from it. There were two instances before 2012 where high level
officials acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the EB, namely the Minister of East
African Cooperation Diodorus Kamala in June 2010 (The Citizen June 2010) and the
Minister for Agriculture in April 2011 (In2EastAfrica April 2011). However, the EB
was reintroduced in May 2011, which shows that the learning process has been blocked.
An alternative explanation is that the political motivations to take symbolic measures
against food price increases were very strong in 2011, which will be further elaborated
in the next section.
There was evidence of fundamentally different views about ways to ensure food
security. One advisor said that the government saw food production as a means for
security, including interventions of the NFRA, while other actors in the economy saw it
as a means for their livelihood [7]. Others added [6, 9] that it was an awareness problem
rather than unwillingness on the part of the government to align its action with
liberalisation. One government official [9] talked about the opposition in views between
the public and the government in 2008. The public protested against EBs that were
considered as harmful for farmers, and the government’s response was that the mandate
was to ensure food security notwithstanding the costs. This followed a general pattern in
discussions with interviewees that I noticed, namely that food security and trade were
seen as separate from each other and that the former was placed above the latter. This is
also represented at an institutional level: interviewees mentioned a general collaboration
between the MIT and the MAFC but not for trade measures to ensure food security,
27
where the latter would be responsible. Therefore, the possibility of learning across
institutions having possibly differing interests was low.
2.3) Decision-makers were unwilling to take into account the evidence about the EB.
The evidence indicates that before 2012 non-learning could have been due to a
defensive approach of the government and that a change in approach meeting all three
conditions for a constructive dialogue outlined by Sabatier (1999).
One of the advisors said that a report in 2008 that described the drawbacks of EBs had
not been considered by the government “because what they care is to ensure national
food security”. He added that the recent combined effort from various stakeholders
including USAID had been effective.
Various advisors [7, 9, 10, 12] mentioned key studies that had convinced the
government to refrain from EBs in October 2012, namely reports from the SERA
project from USAID, MAFAP (Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policies) and
studies from the ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in
Eastern and Central Africa). Prime Minister Pinda said that his decision had been based
on the findings from the SERA project (ACDI VOCA February 2013; Feed the Future
May 2013) and the Minister of Agriculture stated his support for the ASARECA
research project (IPP Media October 2012). The reports from the SERA project had
several characteristics that apparently differed from studies carried out before. Firstly, it
involved several well-known international organisations. Secondly, one advisor [10]
emphasized that the evidence was an empirical analysis as opposed to previous studies
that were mainly qualitative in nature. Thirdly, another advisor [12] said that the change
in approach to further engage the government in the evaluation and discussion of the
evidence within technical groups had led to a change in the position of the government
from “defensive” to “cooperative” since 2011.
28
3) Influence of political actors on the decision to use export bans
3.1) The government favoured concerns of consumers over farmers
It seems that generally consumers were favoured at the expense of farmers. In 2010, the
increase in attention paid to farmers’ concerns about the EB could have been related to
public opinion and the wish to win electoral votes in the countryside. This would match
the statement from Brian Cooksey (GREAT Insights September 2012) that there was
growing discontent in 2010 among the rural majority, usually the main supporters of the
CCM.
Several functionaries emphasized the role of the government to ensure low and stable
prices [1, 4, 5, 7] for consumers. One of the functionaries highlighted the fact that
consumers are being hurt by high prices and that “they will cry”. In 2011 there was
evidence of pressure from the public following the rise of food prices (Business Times
March 2011; Reuters July 2011; All Africa August 2011). Moreover, the government
has explicitly used EBs to limit the price increase in 2011 (Daily News September
2011). In 2011 the government issued directives to ensure that the urban poor would
receive enough food (Business Daily May 2011). One of the advisors said that the
government also needs to ensure that enough food is kept in the country because of
political motivations [10]. He explained that it would be very negative for election
outcomes if the government were to be seen as “insensitive” to food shortages.
Functionaries talked about the opposition of farmers to the EB, one of them mentioning
the discussions in Parliament where farmer representatives expressed their disapproval
(TradeMark Southern Africa April 2010; Diaspora Messenger September 2011; Daily
News April 2013). One of the advisors mentioned that the public opposition to the EB
in line with farmers started in 2008 and then continued to grow (The Citizen
September 2011).
There were numerous articles reporting about the government neglecting farmers and
not keeping electoral promises (Daily News August 2011; Daily News February 2012;
Daily News April (a) 2012; Tanzania Reports November 2012), while favouring
29
businessmen (Daily News April (b) 2012) and consumers (Daily News April 2013).
This would mean that the government was not very responsive to farmer’s interests.
However, the lifting of the EB in April 2010 was presented as a response to the protests
of farmers against the measure (Daily News April 2010; TradeMark Southern Africa
April 2010). In one article there is mention of the Prime Minister advising the President
to lift the ban during his political campaign6 in Rukwa, one of the centres of agricultural
production in the country (Black sea grain online September 2010).
3.2) There was a strategic interaction between the private and the public sector
There is evidence indicating a strategic interaction between the private and the public
sector, since the three main premises from the framework of Jayne and Tschirley (2010)
could be identified.
In my conversations with functionaries, there appeared to be striking opposition
between the usual decision-making process and the way decisions were made for the EB
[2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12]. The usual process would involve consultation with stakeholders
and approval by Parliament. The EB would be decided directly by the Prime Minister
and announced by the Minister of Agriculture, even though it was discussed in
Parliament [1, 3]. Interviewees also confirmed that there was no law or rule [1, 3, 8, 10]
clearly indicating when the EB should be implemented. This ad hoc implementation
gave insufficient time to the private sector to adapt.
Three advisors and two government officials talked about a difference in interests
between the private and the public sector [3, 4, 6, 7, 9]. One government official
mentioned that the reason for implementing EBs was because farmers were interested
mainly in business and getting the right price, and would therefore sell abroad even
when there are pockets of food insecurity, while the government aims to ensure that
everyone in the country is food secure. The advisors confirmed this opposition several
6 The elections were held on 31 October 2010 (CEPPS 2013), which means that the campaign was in its
final stages.
30
times. One functionary explicitly mentioned that trade measures were justified given the
lack of reliability and transparency of private-sector action [5].
At the national level, two advisors and one functionary [1, 4, 9, 12] have reported about
the problem of hoarding and lack of information about private stocks in the country.
Notably, one of them reported about the dilemma faced by the government in 2008:
“1: So you said that maize was not imported because the price was too high?
2: No, it was clearly whether we don't have maize or the maize is stored in the private
warehouses. That was a very tricky situation. Because the government decided to do a
rapid assessment of the situation of warehouses, there was no proper cooperation from
the private sector so the government decided to use the NFRA to release food.
[...]
1: So there were enough stocks... but why then did they use the export restrictions if
there were enough stocks?
2: No it's because now it was not very sure whether these guys they have food or no
food because then they can still decide to sell it to Kenya, that's where the market was
lucrative or to sell it Sudan, you understand. But by putting that EB they forced them to
sell in the domestic market.”
3.3) Trade partners played a minor role in the decision-making process
From the evidence below, regional partners had little influence on decisions for the EB,
as the government of Tanzania placed national over collective interests.
Interviewees were aware that, as a main provider of grain for the region, Tanzania was
constrained in its decisions to impose trade restrictions [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12] by “the spirit
of regional cooperation”, as one advisor formulated it. It was striking that in many
interviews there was a repeated emphasis on the temporary nature of the EB [1, 3, 4, 12]
and that it was “not a policy” [2, 8], possibly because this is the conditionality for EBs
31
at the WTO. Regional cooperation was also mentioned as a key reason why the
government decided against EBs in 2012 [11].
Members of the EAC generally have to inform the EAC Secretariat before
implementing any trade measures but two functionaries and one advisor clearly stated
that this had not been followed in the case of EBs [3, 4, 12], which had been negatively
received by trading partners in the EAC. When functionaries and advisors talked about
the cooperation between Ministries responsible for trade and food security, none
mentioned the Ministry of EAC.
Newspapers reported that there were considerable pressures from members of the EAC
to lift the EB in 2011 (The Citizen July 2011; Standard Digital News August 2011;
TRAC Fund September 2012). However, the government refused to lift the EB, even
after negotiations with the delegation of Kenya that was experiencing a major food
crisis. The government explained that despite a national food surplus, exports could not
be allowed because of pockets of food insecurity (Standard Digital News August 2011)
and inflation (TRAC Fund September 2012). The Deputy Prime Minister Christopher
Chiza also mentioned that the measure was only temporary and therefore not at odds
with the principles of regional integration (The Citizen August 2011). The bans were
seen as “efforts to frustrate the actualising major East African Community Goals”
(Standard Digital News September 2012) and did real damage to the diplomatic
relations of Tanzania with regional partners.
32
Discussion
The figure below summarizes the main factors that were identified in the analysis as
motivating the use of EBs in Tanzania. This should be interpreted as a schematic
representation that could be complemented by further applied research.
Source: author, based on the literature and research findings described above
There were a number of market and institutional failures arising in the analysis of
interviews and newspaper articles that would have justified government intervention
according to certain authors (Rodrik 1992; Abbott 2010; Timmer 2010). Constraints in
terms of infrastructure and price differentials certainly existed across borders.
Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the NFRA and a lack of sufficient revenues for
importation constrained the government in its choices, even though there also appeared
to be protectionist motives to deliberately restrict imports.
Figure 2: Internal motivations to use export bans in Tanzania
33
Both market power and uncertainty mentioned by Abbott (2010) and Gouel and Jean
(2012) were recurrent themes in the analysis and led to hoarding and speculative
behaviour. Market power was especially pictured as the misuse of information
advantage from traders over farmers. Moreover, there appeared to be a vicious circle as
in the framework of Jayne and Tschirley (2010) between the lack of information about
private stocks, the uncertainty about each other’s behaviour and the government feeling
compelled to impose EBs.
The government had no real alternatives at hand for the EB, which could explain why
research on the ineffectiveness of the tool was not taken into account before 2012. Other
possible reasons were blocked learning (Zito & Schout 2009) from bureaucrats to the
institutional level, the lack of inclusion from the government in the evaluation of
evidence and the lack of thorough quantitative evidence, therefore an absence of the key
factors for informed decision-making from Strydom et al. (2010). Overall, the decision
on EBs seemed to be only partially informed before 2012, meeting mainly the parts in
the framework of Maxwell et al. (2013) regarding the assessment of needs and
consideration of external factors.
After 2010, the decision seemed to be based on subjective perceptions of food shortage
while the EB increasingly became a politicised subject, which would confirm insights
from Babu and Mthindi (1995). There was evidence of an urban bias Bezemer and
Headey (Bezemer & Headey 2008) as farmers’ protests about the EB were neglected
until 2010, when their power as voters appeared to be a main reason for the lifting of the
ban, confirming Bates and Block (2010). As pressures from regional partners were
unheard in 2011, their influence on decisions for EBs seemed to be negligible.
Therefore, the advice from Kagira (2011) to solve information constraints seemed
retrospectively to be a more important measure to avoid EBs in Tanzania than
promoting regional integration.
In 2012 a constructive dialogue in the sense of Sabatier (1999) seemed to be a key
factor for the change of attitude by the government. However, the increase in farmers’
power after 2010 and the growing support from donors for commercialisation also
arguably played a role here.
34
V Conclusion
This dissertation aimed to analyse the motivations for implementing EBs from the
perspective of the Tanzanian government and to show evidence that could support it as
being a second-best choice. EBs seemed to be the best choice in the short term given the
combination of misaligned incentives from traders, the ineffectiveness of the NFRA and
the lack of knowledge about feasible alternatives. In addition, political incentives played
an increasingly important role in particular after 2010. However, given the
methodological limitations outlined above and the small number of interviews, the
results should be interpreted with caution and seen as possible, but not exhaustive
explanations for the use of EBs.
There were three main causes that were identified as important for the choice of EBs
from a political economy perspective. Firstly, there was evidence of a strategic
interaction with the private sector leading to a vicious circle between uncertainty and ad
hoc interventions. Secondly, there was evidence of an urban bias and the reason why
interests of farmers were taken into account in 2010 was probably because of upcoming
elections. Thirdly, regional partners had little influence on the government’s decisions
as national interests were prioritised, even when EAC members commonly disapproved
of the measure in 2011.
There was evidence that the use of EBs was not an entirely informed decision. Although
decisions were officially based on information from the Early Warning System, there
were instances where decisions were taken hastily and seemed to be based on subjective
perceptions of food shortage. Moreover, research on the ineffectiveness of EBs was not
really taken into account, which could be explained in part by the lack of involvement
of the government that led to a defensive attitude.
Although this study was meant to be exploratory, the tentative conclusions have
implications for future research. The advice often heard to counter the implementation
of EBs is to strengthen international regulations and foster regional integration.
However, in the case of Tanzania it was shown that in times of crisis national interests
of food security were prioritised “no matter what the costs”, including diplomatic
relationships. It would therefore be interesting to conduct similar studies in other
35
countries such as Zambia or India and for other crops, to confirm whether internal
factors are found to be as important as for EBs on maize in Tanzania. Other conclusions
are likely to be derived from these studies, which could further deepen the
understanding of motivations for using EBs in developing countries.
The commitment from the government of Tanzania in May 2012 to refrain from using
EBs was received with enthusiasm by national constituencies, regional trade partners
and the international community. A number of programmes have been set up to foster
commercialisation and production. For example, the Southern Agricultural Growth
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) aims to enhance the functioning of the value chain
with investments in infrastructure and partnerships between agri-business, the
government and donors. If those initiatives manage to build trust between the private
and the public sector and enhance linkages in the country to avoid problems of localised
food shortages, the risk of policy reversal experienced in the past would be reduced.
Appendix 1 – Abbott’s (2010) theoretical framework
Source: Abbott 2010 p. 26
Abbott’s (2010) theoretical framework
36
37
Appendix 2 – Interview participants
Table 2: Interview participants
No. Occupation
1 Senior official from the MAFC
2 Senior official from the MAFC
3 Senior official from the MAFC
4 Senior official from the MAFC
5 Official from the MIT
6 Senior manager from a trade association
7 Academic from a research institute
8 Academic from a research institute
9 Academic from a research institute
10 Professor from Sokoine University
11 Representative from USDA
12 Former representative from USAID
38
Appendix 3 – Interview guide
Introduction
1. Can you tell me about your position and main responsibilities at X [Ministry,
Research Institute…]?
2. How long have you been working at X?
Stakeholders
1. Who is the most important decision maker for trade measures related to food
security?
� For advisors: How does X support the government for decisions on trade and
food security?
2. Who are the experts or organisations that advise the Ministries for trade measures?
� What is the role of research institutes in Tanzania to inform trade policy?
3. What other actors influence the decision on trade measures?
Decision making
1. How does the government of Tanzania intervene when there is a food crisis?
2. When trade measures are to be implemented, what are the steps that need to be
taken? What is the legal basis for trade restrictions?
� What is the role of the Ministry in the creation of policies? What is the role of
the Parliament?
� How has the decision making processes changed over time?
3. What information do ministries require in order to make decisions on trade
measures?
Motivations for the export ban
1. How important are trade measures for food security? Have they been effective?
2. Who is affected by trade measures to ensure food security in Tanzania?
3. Did other policies exist to solve the problem of food security? Why were they not
adopted?
39
4. How did the government of Tanzania consider the impact on other countries when
implementing export restrictions?
5. Why did the government decide to stop implementing export restrictions? Is it a
legal commitment?
6. How did the government of Tanzania react to the media coverage on export
restrictions?
Conclusion
1. Do you have any questions for me or is there anything that you would like to add?
2. Can you recommend anyone that I should speak to at X?
40
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