Disciplinary Action and Preventive Suspension

JOSON vs TORRES

Re:VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER EDUARDOJOSON AS GOVERNOR OF NUEVA ECIJA.

Facts:1.Private respondents filed a letter-complaint to the office of thepresident charging joson with grave misconduct and abuse ofauthority for his actions caused insult to the integrity of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

 2.According to the respondents, in one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan(SP) meeting, Joson belligerently barged into the hall and agrily kicked the doors and chairsand uttered treatening words at them because of the respondents resistance to a pending legislative measure to support the P150 Million loan of the province of Nueva Ecija from PNB.Respondents opposed the loan primarily because of Nueva Ecija's unliquidated obligation of more than P70Million.

 3.The President (FVR) acted on the complained and instructed the Secretary of DILG to take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions but "to break not the peace".

4.The Secretary directed the petitioner to submit verified/sworn answer to the complaint and immediately proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement where the petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province and the respondent to refrain from filing case that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.However, the peace agreement was not respected by the parties.Hence, theDILG asked both parties to file their answers with regard to the non-settlement of the issue. Joson keeps on asking for an extension tofile his answer for three times, and his request was granted forthree times. However, Joson still failed to file his answer, and DILG declared that Joson in default for he have deemed waived his right to file his answer and the Secretary then, issued an order to present evidence.

5.Petitioner, through his counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioneralleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it wasfiled with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had nojurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, toanswer the complaint and recommended him for suspension.

6.On recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive

Secretary RubenTorres issued an order, by authority of the President, placingpetitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pendinginvestigation of the charges against him. Secretary Barbersdesignated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until suchtime as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased toexist.

7.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with theCourt of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension andthe order of default. But,Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denyingpetitioner's.Hence, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation where he prayed that a formal investigation of his case beconducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23.CA However,dismissed Joson's petition.

8. DILG continued and declared that the submission of position papers substantially complied with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings and rendered a resolution finding Joson guilty of the the offenses filed and the Executive Secretary by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommndation of the DILG secretary and imposed on the petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for 6 months without pay. But SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the Order of the Executive Secretary.

Issue:1. W/N CA erred that the rules of procedure and evidence should not be striclty applied  in an administrative disciplinary and clearly punitive proceedings.2. W/N CA erred in applying the alter-ego doctrine for allowing DILG secretary to exercise the power of the President which are clearly vested by law ONLY upon the President or the Executive secretary.3. W/N petitioner was properly declared as in default when he filed a motion to dismiss instead of an answer.

Ruling:1.An administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective localofficials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, "A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Officeof the President. A complaint against an elective municipal officialmust be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of abarangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod orSangguniang Bayan.

On the petitioner's contention that the letter-complaint submitted to theoffice of the Pres was not verified by the respondents.SC ruled that Assuming, that the letter-complaint was unverified whensubmitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal.The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the Presidenthimself when he acted on the complaint. The lack of verification isa mere formal defect.

2.Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions againstelective local officials is lodged in two authorities: theDisciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant toAO 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President of thePhilippines, whether acting by himself or through the ExecutiveSecretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is theInvestigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute anInvestigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is notthe exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILGSecretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a SpecialInvestigating Committee.

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary casesagainst elective local officials is derived from his power ofgeneral supervision over local governments. The President's power ofgeneral supervision means no more than the power of ensuring thatlaws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers actwithin the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derivedfrom the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against localgovernment officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power toinvestigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as maybe constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not unduedelegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The Presidentremains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the powerto investigate, not the power to discipline.

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative

complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine ofqualified political agency. (QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY- dun s casedati ni Orbos- decision of executive officials is valid as if it isthe decision of the Pres).

3. On the petitioner's claim that DILG erred in declaring him in defaultfor filing a motion to dismiss where he alleges that a motion to dismissis not a pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and thereforeDILG Sec should have considered it and given him time to file hisanswer.

SC  ruled that, while it is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibitedunder the Local Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23.Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file a motion to dismissin the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested for extension oftime to file his answer citing as reasons the search for competentcounsel and the demands of his official duties. And, thrice, hisrequests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsideredand petitioner was given additional time to file answer. After allthe requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss

Petitioner, in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months after thefirst notice. Indeed, this was more than sufficient time forpetitioner to comply with the order to file answer. DILG did not errin recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventivesuspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension isauthorized under Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authorityat any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidenceof guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, thereis great probability that the respondent, who continues to holdoffice, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safetyand integrity of the records and other evidence. All were compliedin the case of Joson.

Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal

investigation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23.

However,the denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation iserroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelledout in the following provisions of A.O. No. 23, viz:Sec. 3 Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of thecomplaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determinewhether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution offormal administrative proceedings.After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall issue an order reciting the matters taken up thereon and shallschedule the formal investigation within ten (10) days from itsissuance, unless a later date is mutually agreed in writing by theparties concerned.

The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation deniedhim procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides thatat the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shallsummon the parties to consider whether they desire a formalinvestigation. This provision does not give the InvestigatingAuthority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigationwould be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motionfor formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded severalrights under the law.

The local elective official has the (1) the right to appear anddefend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confrontand cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right tocompulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentaryevidence.  (AO 23 and LGC)

The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing inadministrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointiveofficials but not to those elected. Suspension and removal areimposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights andthe evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the publicrespondent Executive Secretary is declared null and

void and is setaside.

Garcia vs Mojica[G.R. No. 139043.  September 10, 1999]

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city.  The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner.  This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132.  After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved.  Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.

ISSUES:

1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.

NO. “In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office.[24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct.  If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections.  It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.

For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor” as regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election.  On this point, we agree with petitioner.  That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge.  Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible.  Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned

from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.”

The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case.  Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.

The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term.  At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government.  Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed.  It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner.  Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract.  The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of

its powers by virtue of the LGC.

No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.  The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong.* The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

“SEC. 24.  Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,”

PABLICO v VILLAPANDO

DOCTRINE: Power to remove erring elective officials is lodged with the Court, it is a judicial prerogative. Office of President does not have this power.

FACTS:On August 5, 1999, Maagad, and Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against Alejandro

Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.Mayor Villapando in his official capacity entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Taipe, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. The complaint allege that this is against the Constitution because Article IX-B, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides for a one year prohibition of appointment to a government position of defeated candidates. They claim that the consultancy agreement is equivalent to appointment. The Sangguinian Panlalawigan found Mayor Villapando guilty. Upon appeal, the Office of the President also affirmed this decision. Mayor Villapando filed a MR, but while this was pending, Vice Mayor Ramir Pablico took his oath of office as Mayor. Due to this, Villapando filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, with preliminary injuction and TRO with the RTC. The Court granted a 72 hours TRO, but was no longer extended upon motion. Vive Mayor Pablico resumed assumption of Office of the Mayor. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan and the Office of the President declaring them void. Pablico was asked to vacate his new office as Mayor. Pablico’s MR was denied, thus the case was elevated to the SC for appeal.

ISSUE:.W/N local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, can validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective officials?

HELD:NO. Petition for review was denied. Sec. 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that “an elective official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the ff grounds: xxx An elective official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above AND BY ORDER OF THE PROPER COURT.” This signifies that the penalty of dismissal from service of an erring elected official may only be decreed by a court of law. Office of President was not granted the power to do so, it is exclusively vested with the Courts. There is clear legislative intent that vests the power to remove with the Courts only, a judicial prerogative. (Original case includes transcript of legislative deliberation between Sen. Pimental and Saguisag).

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which indicated that a local elective official may be removed by order of the proper court or the DISCIPLINING AUHTORITY whichever first acquires jurisdiction is NOT applicable. Implementing rules should conform and note clash with the law they implement. This provision is deemed void.

Teves vs Sandiganbayan Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros

Occidental was accused to have violated Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

He is said to have committed a crime by taking advantage of his official function, and conspiring and confederating with his wife for the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center (VCRC).

Edgar Teves is said to have a direct financial or pecuniary interest considering the fact that the said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: > They convicted petitioners Edgar and

Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law;

> Imposed upon them is an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 9yrs and 21 days as minimum and 12 yrs as maximum;

> The rights , interests and participation in the assets and properties of the VCRC will be confiscated in favor of the Government. As well as perpetual disqualification from public office

Grounds for conviction by the Sandiganbayan: The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that

> Nothing on records showed that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in the said cockpit;

> As of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the “owner/licensee” of the cockpit;

> Since they remained married from 1983 till 1992, their property relations as husband and wife was that of the conjugal property of gains.

Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property which the petitioners have pecuniary interest.

This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law

The Sandiganbayan absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a business permit or license to operate the VCRCfor not being well-founded.

The petitioners filed for a petition for certiorari on the grounds that: > The charge was for alleged unlawful

intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial pecuniary interest in the VCRC under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being

charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991.

> Their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest was not proved. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.

> His wife should not have been convicted because she is not a public officer.

Issue: 1. W/N the decision of the Sandiganbayan should

be upheld?

Held: The decision of the Sandiganbayan needs to be modified.

1. Edgar Y. Teves is convicted of violation of Sec. 3(h) of Republic Act. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and is sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000;

2. Teresita Z. Teves is hereby acquitted of such offense.

Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft law provides: Section 3. Corrupt Practices of public officers –

in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or take part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

Essential Elements of Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law

1. The accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect financial or

pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction;

3. He either a. Intervenes or takes part in his official

capacity in connection with such interest; or

b. Is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.

There are 2 modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

a. 1st mode: if in connection with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.

b. 2nd mode: when the Constitution or any law prohibits him from having such interest.

The charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the VCRC is “not well-founded.”

> Under the LGC of 1991, the Mayor is not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

o Section 446 – Composition (a) the Sangguniang Bayan,

the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer, the regular Sangguniang members, the president of the municipal chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the pambayang pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.

o Section 447 (3) of the LGC of 1991 which designates the Powers, Duties and Functions of the Sangguniang Bayan, they have the official capacity to grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permit or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

(v) any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamelocks.: Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced…

Points of Petition Ruling of SCCharged for violation of Sec. 3(h) of anti-graft law but convicted for violating Sec. 89(2) of the LGC of 1991

Variance Doctrine. Since some of the elements of the offense charged, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Sec. 3(h) of the anti-graft law are similar to

the elements of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in violation of sec. 3(h) of the anti-graft law, the variance doctrine can be applied. > This being so,

Edgar Teves was convicted under the offense proved.

Under the rule of statutory construction, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative will. Thus, the punishment to be upheld will be under the rules bound by the LGC of 1991 which states that any government official who violates the prohibitions provided in sec. 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with imprisonment for 6mos. and 1 day to 6yrs, or a fine of not less than P3,000 nor more than P10,000, or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.

alleged prohibited pecuniary interest was not proved

Even if the ownership was turned over to his wife, he would still have direct interest thereon because, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And sec. 143

of the civil code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the VCRC is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

His wife should not have been convicted because she is not a public officer.

Sec. 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, provides prohibitions applicable to private individuals, which states: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in sec. 3 hereof.

The court found that there was no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

MIRANDA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

1. The Ombudsman placed petitioner Mayor Miranda

(Santiago City, Isabela) under preventive

suspension for 6 months from for alleged violations

of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards for Public Officials and Employees).

2. Vice Mayor Navarro filed a Complaint with the

Office of the Ombudsman alleging that Mayor

Miranda committed the following acts despite the

continuing effectivity of the Ombudsman’s

preventive suspension order:

a. Issued a memorandum advising that he was

assuming his position as City Mayor

b. Gave directives to the heads of offices and

other employees

c. Issued an Office Order that authorized certain

persons to start work

d. Insisted on performing the functions of Mayor

despite Navarro’s requests to desist from

doing so without a valid court order and the

order of DILG Undersecretary directing him to

cease from reassuming the position.

2. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor

Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of

authority or official functions.         

3. In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Miranda asserted

that he reassumed office on the advice of his

lawyer and in good faith.

4. He contended that under Section 63(b) of LGC,

local elective officials could not be preventively

suspended for a period beyond 60 days. He also

averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he

received a memorandum from DILG

Undersecretary instructing him to vacate his office

and he immediately complied and that he left the

mayoralty post after “coercion” by the PNP.

5. Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an

Information against Mayor Miranda for usurpation

of authority.

6. Sandiganbayan ordered Coquia (Office of Special

Prosecutor) to conduct a reinvestigation of the

case. Coquia’s resolution was referred to the

Ombudsman’s Chief Legal Counsel for review.

The Chief Legal Counsel disagreed with Coquia’s

findings and recommended the filing of the case

against Miranda. He pointed out that Miranda’s

invocation of good faith was belied by the fact that

he received a memorandum from the DILG

informing him that his view of the preventive

suspension period was untenable and that he

should serve out its remaining period. He further

noted that Miranda violated the orders of both the

Ombudsman and the DILG. Ombudsman adopted

the Chief Legal Counsel’s recommendation, and

the case was re-raffled to Special Prosecution

Officer.

7. The prosecution filed before the

Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend Mayor

Miranda based on Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) Miranda

opposed the saying that the offense of usurpation

of authority or official functions under RPC is not

embraced by the RA which only contemplates

offenses which involve “fraud upon government or

public funds or property.”

8. Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor

Miranda from office for 90 days. The anti-graft

court held that a violation of Article 177 of the RPC

involves fraud “which in a general sense is

deemed to comprise anything calculated to

deceive, including all acts, omissions, and

concealment involving a breach of legal or

equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed,

resulting in damage to another or by which an

undue and unconscious advantage is taken of

another.” It further ruled that Miranda’s act fell

within the catch-all provision “for any offense

involving fraud upon government.”

9. Miranda’s motion for reconsideration was denied in

the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution, hence, the

present petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether Section 13 of RA 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property; and (2) whether Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion and (3) Whether the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves “fraud upon government or public funds or property”

HELD: SC rule in the NEGATIVE

First. Sandiganbayan properly construed Sec. 13 covering 2 types of offenses (any offense involving fraud on the government and any offense involving public funds or property).

Nothing in RA 3019 limits Sec. 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase “any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property” is clear. The word “public” precedes “funds” and distinguishes the same from private funds. RA 3019 should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.

Second.  Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioner’s act fell within provision “for any offense involving fraud upon government”.

The phrase “fraud upon government” means “any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government.” It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds. It ought to follow that “fraud upon government” was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position. (e.g. Accused indirectly dealt with the city’s funds as those persons appointed during his preventive suspension will be given their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary

consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out of the city’s funds)

 SC finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. 

Third.  We are not persuaded that petitioner reassumed office under honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension.

By petitioner’s own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left only a few days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his assertion that he immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez.

Petitioner alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer.  If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

Fourth.  It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the Sandiganbayan.  Under Section 13 of RA 3019, this suspension is mandatory if the information is sufficient.

Fifth.  The dissenting opinion also contends that the Ombudsman’s authority to preventively suspend local elective officials for 6 months is limited by Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code. Under the latter law, petitioner can only be suspended for a maximum period of 60 days. It then jumps to the conclusion that petitioner could not have usurped authority because he reassumed office after 60 days.

The dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before this Court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of the Ombudsman’s order of preventive suspension of the petitioner for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case.

Nowhere is it stated that the limits provided in the Local Government Code apply to the Ombudsman. In fine, the Court only ruled that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month preventive suspension since it was admitted that the documents required were already obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the imposition of the preventive suspension. SEC 63 (LGC) provision was only meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision. The President, governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the office which is protected by no less than the Constitution.

 The purpose of Section 63 of the Code is to prevent

the abuse of the power of preventive suspension by members of the executive branch. The Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides for a 6-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman (SECTION 24).

Petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.

Joson III vs CA

This is a petition for certiorari1 with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to set aside the Resolution dated 13 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78247 granting the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining Governor Tomas N. Joson III ("Governor Joson") and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija ("Sangguniang Panlalawigan") from conducting proceedings in the administrative case against Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas and from imposing the order of preventive suspension.

Facts: On 8 January 2003, eight members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija ("SB Members"), filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Elizabeth R. Vargas ("Mayor Vargas"), for dishonesty, misconduct in office, and abuse of authority. The SB Members alleged that Mayor Vargas submitted to the Provincial Budget Officer two falsified documents, namely, Appropriation Ordinance No. 1, series of 2002 ("Appropriation Ordinance No. 1") and Resolution No. 2, series of 2002, approving the enactment of Appropriation Ordinance No. 1. The administrative case was docketed as ADM. CASE No. 02-S-2003.

On 13 February 2003, Mayor Vargas filed a complaint for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages against the SB members before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City ("Cabanatuan RTC"). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4442.

On 18 February 2003, Mayor Vargas filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan a motion to suspend proceedings and/or motion to dismiss due to the pendency of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 4442, specifically questioning the genuineness of the documents she allegedly falsified.2 Without resolving the motion, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 80-S-2003, dated 3 March 2003, recommending to Governor Joson the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas for 60 days.3 On 17 March 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 105-S-2003, denying Mayor Vargas’ motion to suspend proceedings and/or motion to dismiss.4

Mayor Vargas appealed to the Office of the President praying for the reversal of Resolution No. 105-S-2003 of theSangguniang Panlalawigan. The case was docketed as O.P. Case No. 03-D-164.

In April 2003, Governor Joson issued an order of preventive suspension against Mayor Vargas. Mayor Vargas filed before the Office of the President a very urgent petition to set aside the suspension order.

On 22 April 2003, the Office of the President, through Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite ("Secretary Gaite"), issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant motion is GRANTED and the undated Preventive Suspension Order against Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas of the municipality of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija is hereby lifted and set aside.

Vice Mayor Victorino E. Reyes who may have assumed the position of Acting Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, is hereby directed to cease and desist from performing the duties of and functions of municipal mayor and vacate the same pending final resolution of Administrative Case No. 02-s-2003. Mayor Vargas may now reassume his (sic) position as such.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government is hereby directed to implement this Order immediately.

SO ORDERED.5

On 25 April 2003, Governor Joson filed with the Office of the President a motion for reconsideration. On 8 July 2003, the Office of the President issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, and the April 22, 2003 Order subject thereof is hereby recalled and set aside. Accordingly, the Order of Governor Tomas N. Joson III placing Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas under preventive suspension for a period of sixty (60) days is hereby reinstated.

The Department of Interior and Local Government is directed to implement this resolution immediately.

SO ORDERED.6

On 17 July 2003, Mayor Vargas moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 8 July 2003. On 18 July 2003, Mayor Vargas filed before the Office of the President an urgent motion to resolve O.P. Case No. 03-D-164.

On 23 July 2003, Mayor Vargas filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78247.

On 14 August 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, to the end that undue prejudice and/or injury may be avoided to any and all parties affected by these proceedings, as well as not to render nugatory and ineffectual the resolution of this Court of the issues herein presented, let a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued, to be effective upon service and for a period of SIXTY (60) days, unless sooner lifted. ACCORDINGLY, respondents Provincial Governor and the SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN of the Province of Nueva Ecija are hereby commanded to cease and desist from conducting proceedings in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 02-S-2003, and from enforcing the assailed July 8, 2003 Resolution of the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, which directed the reinstatement of the order for petitioner’s preventive suspension. Furthermore, in view of the serious issues involved, let the hearing and consideration of the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction be scheduled on September 2, 2003 at 10:30 AM, Paras Hall, Second Floor, Main Building, Court of Appeals, Ma. Orosa St., Ermita, Manila.

In the meantime, without necessarily giving due course to the instant petition for certiorari, respondents are directed to file a comment, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner, upon the other hand, has five (5) days from receipt of respondents’ comment, to file her reply.

SO ORDERED.7

On 13 October 2003, the Court of Appeals resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to further enjoin and restrain Governor Joson from imposing the order of preventive suspension and the Sangguniang Panlalawiganfrom conducting proceedings in the administrative case against Mayor Vargas.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues :Petitioners contend that:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH MANIFEST PARTIALITY, ARBITRARILY, AND IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDER BECAUSE –

a. RESPONDENT VARGAS AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY WHEN SHE FILED CA-G.R. SP NO. 78247;

b. RESPONDENT VARGAS CLEARLY FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF;

c. THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER WAS LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ISSUED.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED ARBITRARILY AND IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DIRECTING PETITIONERS "TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 02-S-2003."

3. THE INSTANT CASE PRESENTS A SITUATION WHEREIN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH BEFORE THE INSTANT CERTIORARI CASE CAN BE FILED.8

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Petitioners allege that Mayor Vargas should have filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Furthermore, Mayor Vargas filed the action for certiorari even while her motion for reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Office of the President. According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals acted with manifest bias and partiality when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners despite the filing of a wrong remedy and the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the writ of certiorari is proper when the following requisites are present:

1. It is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

2. Such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction; and

3. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Mayor Vargas filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Secretary Gaite. Thus, in a Resolution dated 14 August 2003, the Court of Appeals stated:

To question the foregoing Resolution of respondent Executive Secretary, petitioner interposed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, essentially posing the following issues: (1) was it proper for respondent Executive Secretary to have ruled that petitioner is considered in

default pursuant to Article 126, Rule XIX of the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991; (2) can the civil case filed by petitioner before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages be considered a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case; (3) has the respondent Sanggunian[g] Panlalawigan jurisdiction to hear the administrative case filed against herein petitioner, when the relief sought therein is her removal from office.

At first blush, the assailed resolution having being issued by the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, it would seem that the proper remedy is an appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A perusal of the instant petition for certiorari would, however, reveal that petitioner is alleging that the challenged resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond respondents’ jurisdiction, hence, the appropriate remedy is certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 43, the Supreme Court has oftentimes ruled that, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 43, in which case this Court chooses to do so, in view of the gravity and seriousness of the issues involved herein.9 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in assuming jurisdiction over the case. The special civil action of certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.10 All the issues submitted for resolution in the Court of Appeals involve questions of law which are reviewable on certiorari.11

Exception to the Application of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a litigant cannot go to court without first pursuing his administrative remedies, otherwise his action is premature and his case is not ripe for judicial determination.12 A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.13

However, the Court recognizes some exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As held in Paat v. Court of Appeals:14

x x x However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is

disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may likewise be dispensed with in the following instances: (1) when the claim involved is small; (2) when strong public interest is involved; and (3) in quo warranto proceedings.15

In this case, Mayor Vargas filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Secretary Gaite issued the Resolution dated 8 July 2003 with grave abuse of discretion. Mayor Vargas raised the following issues: (1) whether it was proper for Secretary Gaite to have ruled that Mayor Vargas is considered in default pursuant to Article 126, Rule XIX of the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991; (2) whether the civil case filed by Mayor Vargas before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case; (3) whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear the administrative case filed against Mayor Vargas, when the relief sought is her removal from office.16

The issues raised are questions of law which involve the interpretation and application of laws. Resolution of such questions constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power which is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such courts as the Legislature may establish.17 Since the issues involve purely legal questions which the court may review, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with.18

Propriety of the Preventive Suspension Order

Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be imposed (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues are considered joined when the complaint has been answered and there are no longer any substantial preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out.19

In its Order dated 22 April 2003, the Office of the President stated that the facts of the case do not warrant a conclusion that issues are deemed joined. Furthermore, the Office of the President found no basis for the issuance of the preventive suspension. The Office of the President explained:

In the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not file, so far, an answer to the complaint thus the issues could not have been considered joined. What she did was to file a Motion To Suspend Proceedings And/Or Motion To Dismiss which was treated by the sanggunian as her answer. However, nothing in the records can be inferred that the petitioner intended the said motion to be her answer. In fact, when the motion was denied on March 17, 2003 through SP Resolution No. 105-s-2003, she immediately appealed the said Resolution to this Office.

In fine, no inference can be had that the motion filed was considered her answer otherwise, petitioner could have stated so therein.

Finally, even assuming that petitioner’s motion was already her answer and therefore, the issues have been joined, it is observed that the grounds cited by the sanggunian in recommending the assailed preventive suspension are general statements – mere verbatim reproduction of the provision of law, unsupported by any factual and substantial evidence. There is no showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, with both parties charging each other with falsification of documents. In fact, that is the subject of Civil Case No. 4442. Moreover, it cannot be said that the continuance in office of respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The recitals in SP Resolution No. 105 s. 2003 are unconvincing.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant motion is GRANTED and the undated Preventive Suspension Order against Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas of the municipality of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija is hereby lifted and set aside.20 (Emphasis supplied)

It would thus appear that the grounds cited by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas were just general statements unsupported by any evidence. This is contrary to the requisites for a preventive suspension which require that evidence of guilt must be strong and that given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The haste in issuing the resolution recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas is unreasonable considering the gravity of the effects of such suspension. Suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have voted into office. As held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals:21

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions x x x because it is out of the ordinary

to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause (sic) of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

However, upon motion of Governor Joson, the Office of the President reversed its previous order. Citing the case of Joson v. Torres,22 the Office of the President held that Mayor Vargas’ failure to file her answer in ADM. CASE No. 02-S-2003 was deemed a waiver of her right to file answer and present evidence. As a consequence, the issues were deemed to have been joined.

In the Joson case, this Court found inexcusable the failure of petitioner there to file an answer despite the grant of three extensions of the period to file an answer. It was only seven months later and after the lapse of all the extensions of time for filing an answer that petitioner there filed a motion to dismiss.

In this case, Mayor Vargas moved for a 15-day extension to file an answer. Before the lapse of the period of extension, Mayor Vargas filed before the Cabanatuan RTC a civil case for annulment of Appropriation Ordinance No. 1 and the Minutes of the Session of 7 February 2002 which were the bases of the administrative charge against her. Four days after the lapse of the period of extension, Mayor Vargas filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and/or Motion to Dismiss due to prejudicial question. Without resolving Mayor Vargas’ motion, theSangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas for a period of 60 days. Unlike the Joson case, there was no unreasonable delay employed by Mayor Vargas in filing an answer. Instead of an answer, Mayor Vargas filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and/or Motion to Dismiss because of a civil case which she had earlier filed seeking the annulment of the appropriation ordinance and the minutes of session. The Joson case is therefore inapplicable to this case.

Validity of appellate court’s order for petitioners to cease and desist from conducting proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003

In a Resolution dated 13 October 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a preliminary injunction to further enjoin petitioners from conducting proceedings in the administrative case against Mayor Vargas in order to prevent injustice. The Court of Appeals explained:

In a Resolution dated August 14, 2003, in order not to render nugatory the resolution of the present petition by this Court, We issued a temporary restraining order

temporarily enjoining the Provincial Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Nueva Ecija from conducting further proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003, and from enforcing the assailed resolution of the Office of the President, which directed the reinstatement of the order for petitioner’s preventive suspension.

After taking into account the parties’ arguments for and against the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in a hearing conducted on September 2, 2003, as well as respondents’ comment and opposition dated August 25, 2003, and considering that the present petition is still pending resolution before this Court, We deem it wise to issue a preliminary injunction to further enjoin and restrain public respondents Provincial Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from conducting proceedings in the administrative case against herein petitioner, particularly in imposing the order of preventive suspension, so as to prevent any injustice and irreparable injury that might inure to herein petitioner if it is adjudged by this Court that a reversal of the assailed resolution is warranted.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby required to post a bond in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for the issuance of said writ, as required by Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioners allege that the only issue presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 78247 is the validity of the reinstatement of the preventive suspension order issued against Mayor Vargas as embodied in the Resolution dated 8 July 2003 of the Office of the President. According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals therefore acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to cease and desist from conducting proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003.

Petitioners’ contention is without merit. Two of the issues raised by Mayor Vargas in her petition to the Court of Appeals pertain to the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003, to wit: (1) whether the civil case filed by Mayor Vargas before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case, and (2) whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear the administrative case filed against Mayor Vargas, when the relief sought is her removal from office.24

It is, therefore, apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the administrative case is an issue in the certiorari case filed in the Court of Appeals. Mayor Vargas is questioning the propriety of the proceedings of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan despite the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case. Likewise, Mayor Vargas alleges that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is bereft of jurisdiction over the administrative case which seeks her removal from office since under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, only the proper court may order the dismissal from public office of an elective local official.25

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in issuing the Resolution dated 13 October 2003.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, and DENY the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED.

CABARON v. PEOPLE GR. 156981 (October 5, 2009)

Doctrine: As the tribunal with the full opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, the Sandiganbayan’s findings that the witness for the prosecution are to be believed as against those of the defense are entitled great weight.

Facts: The case traces its roots to the complaint for grave threats, extortion, bribery, dereliction of duty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and violation of R.A. No.  6713

ARTURO C. CABARON, a public officer, being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of his public functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with accused BRIGIDA Y. CABARON, his wife and a private individual, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously solicit/demand from onother Richter G. Pacifico, mother of Abraham Pacifico, Jr., who have pending cases before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency in consideration for the consolidation and handling by him of the case entitled “Ohyeen Alesna vs. Abraham Pacifico, Jr.,” for Rape (IS No. 96-11651), which is assigned to Provincial Prosecutor Rodolfo Go, with another criminal case entitled “Abraham Pacifico, Jr. vs. Alvin Alesna,” for Frustrated Murder, which is handled by accused  Arturo C. Cabaron, and the giving of a lawyer to defend Abraham Pacifico, Jr. who bears similar family name with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, in order that Abraham  Pacifico, Jr. can get a  favorable Resolution in the above-mentioned cases, thus, accused in the course of his official functions solicited/demanded anything of monetary value from litigants, which act is prohibited under Sec. 7(d) of R.A. 6713, “The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” to the detriment of public service and interest.

The Sandiganbayan, however, applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law and modified the dispositive portion of its decision

Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, alleging, among others, that the Sandiganbayan erred In its decision– 1.     in overlooking the fact that the case was merely a harassment case instigated by Atty. Valencia; 2.     in relying on the testimonies of Pacifico and Editha Baylon (Editha); and 3.     in not giving weight to the testimonies of defense witnesses Russo and Zoe. Issue: WON the Supreme court has jurisdiction over final orders of the Sandiganbayan based on factual findings.

Held:No, it is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law; it does not review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan which, as a rule, are conclusive upon the Court.

A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.   On the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.  The resolution of aquestion of fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations The tribunals in a better position to rate the credibility of witnesses after hearing them and observing their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial; it is not for this Court to review again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN, petitioners, vs.PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, respondent.

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong,

Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said local government unit.

On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 614 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts:

1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x.4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.

Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6 December 2004, Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending the administrative proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or until 8 August 2005.7

The Decision dated 28 July 2005 was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. On 3 August 2005, Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.9 The dispositive portion of the said Memorandum states that:10

The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent SEVERINO D. MARTINEZ is hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and DISCHARGE the functions of the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant JOSE CENEN SANTOS to CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said office in ACTING CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68 of Republic Act No. 7160.

On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. This case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard by Branch 28, but later raffled to Branch 27 of the trial court.11

On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a void order.

Issue:Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.

Held:The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so.

Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

x x x x.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,17 the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section

60 of the Local Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which provided that:

Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.

x x x x.

(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.

The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the "disciplining authority" the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez.

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring electivebarangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.24 Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. DesiertoFacts:

Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO) is a domestic corporation established in 1974, with the private respondents as its stockholders and officers.

MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accomodation with the NIDC, which was approved despite being undercapitalized and under-collateralized.

When MINCOCO's mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed, a memorandum bearing the late Pres. Marcos' marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure o the properties, hence, the government banks were not able to recover the amounts from MINCOCO.

These transactions were only discovered in 1992, when Pres. Ramos, issued AO13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). The committee was directed to inventory all

behest oans, and identify lenders and borrowers, includingthe principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms as well as, the persons responsible for the granting of loans who influenced the grant.

Criteria for determining behest loans: a) It is under-collateralized; b) The borrower corporation is

undercapitalized; c) Direct or indirect endorsement of high-

government officials like presence of marginal note;

d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;

e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

f) Use of corporate layering; g) Non-feasibility of the project for which

financing is being sought; h) Extraordinary speed in which the loan

release was made. The committee found that MINCOCO was one of

the corporations which obtained behest loans and a complaint was filed against MINCOCO's officers and NIDC's Board of Directors (private respondents) for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of RA3019, as amended. – Which was dismissed by the Ombudsman on the grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence.

The committee now filed the present petition for review.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman was correct in dismissing the complaint.

1) Whether the prescriptive period for filing of complaint has elapsed.

2) Whether there was insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling: No. The Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint.

1) Period of prescription for the crime charged has not elapsed. Art. XI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution provides that

the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. This however, only applies to civil actions

for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal case. – Therefore, the action for violation of RA3019 has a prescription.

Prescriptive period is only 10 years. The longer prescriptive period of 15

years provided in RA3019 does not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of BP195 (1982).

Crime charged in the petition were committed in 1976.

When prescription starts to run: General Rule: Prescriptive period shall

commence to run on the day the crime is committed.

Exception: Blameless ignorance doctrine. Prescription will not start where

the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.

The Blameless ignorance doctrine applies in this case. Prescription only started to run

upon the discoverty of the transaction on 1992.

Complaint was filed in 1997, therefore, only 5 years have elapsed – Action has not yet prescribed.

2) There is probable cause to file an information against the private respondents for violation f RA3019. While the Ombudsman has full discretion to

determine whether or not a criminal case is to be filed, the Court is may review the Ombudsman's action when there is grave abuse of discretion.

Private respondents are charged with a violation of Sec. 3(a) and (g) of RA3019: Sec. 3: Corrupt practices of public officers.

– In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shal constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any

party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharage of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract, or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The finding of the Committee that MINCOCO obtained behest loans based on the circumstances: that MINCOCO was under-

collateralized and undercapitalized; its officers were identified as cronies; Pres. Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the government's right to foreclose MINCOCO's mortgage liens; and, NIDC approved MINCOCO's Guarantee Loan Accomodation in an extraordinary speed of one month, should have been accorded great weight by the Ombudsman. Members of the committee are experts in

the field of banking and on account of their special knowledge and expertise, they are in a better position to determine whether standard banking practices are followed in the approval of loans/ guarantee or what would generally constitute as adequate security for a given loan.

Finally, the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation is to establish whether there exists probable cause to file information in court against the accused. Finding of probable cause needs only to

rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the crime.

Exhaustive display of evidence should be made during the trial.

And based on the circumstances, there is probable cause to file an information against the private respondents.

Office of Ombudsman vs Samaniego

Facts:1. COA filed 2 administrative complaints (OMB-L-A-03-1060-K) and (OMB-L-A-03-1061-K) against Respondent Joel Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay for dishonesty and grave misconduct. COA alleged that respondent incurred shortages in his accountabilities for 2 separate periods.

2. Respondent was requested to explain his  side and settle his accountabilities but respondent averred that the complaint (OMB-L-A-03-1060-K) lacks factual basis and that the amount in the 2 complaints were the same hence he pleaded defense of restitution of his alleged accountabilities.

3.In a joint decision, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct because he failed to explain his side and settle his accountability in OMB-L-A-03-1060-K and was meted the penalty of 1 year suspension but dismissed in the 2nd complaint OMB-L-A-03-1061-K.

4. Respondent, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with CA. The petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injuction was granted.

5. However, the office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to recall the writ of preliminary injunction but the motion were denied. The office of the Ombudsman claims that CA erred in denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was the subjectof the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary injunction should be recalled.

Issue:W/N CA erred and its decision and the Ombudsman has its right to intervene?

Ruling:       Yes, the office of the ombudsman is a unique position in the 1987 Constitution, it function essentially as complainants and action bureau. The Congress enacted RA 6770 providing its broad powers to perform its contitutionally-mandated function       "Sec 13. Mandate-The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner agaisnt officers or instrumentality thereof, including GOCC and enforce thier administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people".       Further, the Ombudsman is expected tp be an "activist watchman" not merely apassive onlooker RA 6770 should be liberally constued to advance the objectives forfor which it was created.       And with regards to the question of Intervention, Sec 1 Rule 19 of the Rules of court provides " A person who has a legal in the matter in litigation , or in the success of either parties or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected  by distribution or other disposition of property in the disposition of the court or of an officer thereof may with leave of court be allowed to intervene in the action.       Intervention is a remedy by which a 3rd party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding. Its purpose is to settle in one action and by single judgment the whole controversy among the persons involved. However, it is not an absolute right, the intervenor must comply with the requirement said down by Rule 19 of the Rules of court and must have a legal interest in any of the following:       1. the matter in controversy       2. success of either of the parties       3. against both parties       4. to be situated as to be adversely affacted by a distribution or other disposition    of the property in the disposition of the courtor of an officer.With this, the office of the Ombudsman as a competent disciplining body with the right to seek redress on the apparent erroneous issuance had a clear and legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent comitted acts constituting grave misconduct and was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the peopleand preserve the integrity of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the resolution of CA was reversed and set aside (the writ of preliminary injuction was lifted)  and ordered the office of Ombudsman to intervene.Paredes v. SandiganbayanSource:

http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/01/ceferino-paredes-jr-vs-sandiganbayan/

Facts: On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San

Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress.  The SC ruled:

“x x x.  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

Impeachment

FRANCISCO v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DOCTRINE: 1) Initiating an impeachment” means filing of the impeachment complaint and acting upon it by the House of Representatives. 2) More than one impeachment complaint cannot be filed against the same person within the same year.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice

Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. (FIRST IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT)

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. by Representatives Gilberto Teodor and Felix William Funetebella, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. (SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT – source of issue!)

18 cases were filed by different parties assailing unconstitutionality of the second impeachment complaint, that it IS NOT allowed by virtue of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution which states that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” These consolidated cases are filed by:

1. Atty. Francisco as member of IBP

2. Atty. Candelaria, et al as citizens and taxpayers

3. Arturo de Castro and Soledad Cagampang as citizens

and taxpayers

4. Francisco Chavez alleging locus standi based on

precedence (Chavez vs PCGG and Chavez vs PEA-

Amari cases)

5. Atty. Roque, et al as taxpayers and member of legal

profession

6. Representative Baterina and Deputy Speaker

Gonzalez as members of HREP

7. Leonilo Alfonso, et al as taxpayers

8. Public Interest Center, Inc. and Crispin Reyes as

citizens and taxpayers

9. Atty. Perito as citizen and member of Phil. Bar Assoc.

10. IBP

11. Atty. Flores

12. UP Law Alumni Cebu Foundation, et al. (class suit)

13. Father Ranhillio Callangan Aquino as taxpayer

14. Nilo Malanyaon as taxpayer

15. Attys. Flores and Hofilena as professors of law

16. Atty. Vallejos, Jr. (did not allege locus standi)

17. Phil. Bar Assoc.

18. Democrit Barcenas, et al. as citizens and taxpayers

In relation to this case, it is important to also note that the House of Reprentatives adopted Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings by virtue of Section 8, Article XI of the Constitution which states that “the Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section”. This was promulgated by the 12th Congress on November 28, 2001 (superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.)

ISSUE:1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?

2. W/N Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.

3. W/N the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

HELD:1. NO. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.

2. YES. It is UNCOSNTITUTIONAL. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Section 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment contravenes Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the Constitution because it states that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated 1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Jusitce that the verified complain and/or resolition is sufficient in substance, 2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Com. On Justice that the verified complaint is not sufficient in substance or 3) by the filling or endorsement before the Sec Gen of the HREP of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of members of the House – all incompatible with the Constitution’s definition of initiate.

3. YES. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

NOTE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW (discussed in length first 20 pages of ration):At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to

temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. It does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of govt or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of dicscretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

NOTE ON LOCUS STANDI (also discussed in length in the first part of the case, seeing as this is a consolidate petition of 18 cases):When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

Urgent Petition for Certiorari- Impeachment case against Chief Justice Corona

The defense counsel of Chief Justice Corona

(Petitioner) has filed this urgent petition for

certiorari wherein they invoke Par. 1, Art. VIII of

the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Arguments in this petition and their discussion

The impeachment complaint is null and

void because it was transmitted without

due notice and hearing to CJ Corona

> The probable cause to impeach CJ

Corona has not been established.

> This impeachment proceeding is

riddled with constitutional defects too

numerous to withstand even cursory

legal scrutiny.

> The Constitution requires the House of

Representatives shall have the

exclusive power to initiate all cases of

impeachment1. This complaint was filed

pursuant to Section 3(4) for Article XI,

which provides:

Sec. 3 (4) In case the verified

complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the members of

the House, the same shall

constitute the Articles of

Impeachment, and trial by the

Senate shall forthwith proceed.

> The Impeachment Court should have

refrained from proceeding to trial on the

basis of this Complaint because it

constitutionally infirm and defective, for

lack of probable cause. While the

Complaint is verified, that alone would

not justify the violation of CJ Corona’s

fundamental rights to due process.

> The public admissions by members of

the House of Representatives declared

that there was no opportunity to read

the Complaint. They also declared that

the majority of signatories signed

without reading the Complaint, but

reputably in exchange for material

considerations. It stands to reason that

the Senate Impeachment Court gravely

abused its discretion when it accepted

the Articles of Impeachment even if

1 The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 11 Section 3(1)

they were patently without probable

cause. (see p.18 number 26 and 27)

The Impeachment Court gravely abused its

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in retaining par. 2.3 of article II.

> Article II is a hodge-podge of multiple

charges. Hence, the charges discussed

in Paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of Article

II should be stricken out.

> The phraseology of both paragraphs

2.3 and 2.4 are almost synonymous

from a legal standpoint.

Par. 2.3 refers to reported

violation of the anti-graft and

corrupt practices act.

Par. 2.4 refers to the

respondent being suspected

and accused of having

accumulated ill-gotten wealth,

acquiring assets of high

values and keeping bank

accounts with huge deposits.

> Despite the similarity of the terms, the

Impeachment Court ruled that they

should be treated differently, without

any apparent basis for the distinction.

> The tenor of pars. 2.3 and 2.4 are all

premised on suspicion and/or hearsay.

The statements do not constitute

allegations in law, much less ultimate

facts upon which a valid charge can be

sustained. The Impeachment Court’s

action in differentiating par. 2.3 from 2.4

results to deprivation of CJ Corona’s

due process and any protection from

the onslaught of irrelevant and

immaterial evidence.

> The retention of Par. 2.3

accommodates inquiry into any

property in the guise of a search for ill-

gotten wealth over properties that do

not appear in the SALNs.

> Even if assuming Par. 2.3 is valid or

correct, the Impeachment Court gravely

abused its discretion because its ruling

effectively allows the introduction of

evidence under Par. 2.3 as vehicle to

prove Par. 2.4. The resolution therefor

brings no real solution or protection to

CJ Corona.

> The only allowable remedy to CJ

Corona is for this Honorable Court to

strike down Par. 2.3 because it is not

so different from Par. 2.4

Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the complaint are

based on pure speculation and

conclusions, which cannot be considered

as ultimate facts sufficient to support a

complaint.

> it is a basic principle in procedural law

that complaints should be based on

ultimate facts. “Ultimate facts” are

important and substantial facts that

either directly from the basis of the

primary right and duty, or which directly

make up the wrongful acts or omissions

of the defendant.

> The ultimate facts which are to pleaded

are the issuable, constitutive, or

traversable facts essential to the

statement of the cause of action; the

facts which are evidence on the trial will

prove, and not the evidence which will

be required to prove the existence of

those facts.

> The petitioners cite that for criminal

proceedings, which they find akin to the

instant impeachment proceeding, an

authority on criminal procedure

enumerates the Rules of Pleading

Criminal Cases.

Rules of pleading in criminal

cases. – since it is the

constitutional right of the

accused to be informed of the

nature and cause of the

accusation against him, it is

necessary there should be

reasonable certainty in the

statement of accusation. It is

said that a somewhat greater

degree of certainty is required

in criminal pleadings than in

civil pleadings because of the

penal consequences involved.

On the basis of this

requirement, the following

rules on criminal pleading

have been established:

(1) The facts must be alleged

in positive terms and not

by way of recital;

(2) The offense must not be

stated hypothetically or

argumentatively;

(4) Ambiguous allegations not

permissible;

(5) The statement of a

conclusion of law without

showing the facts is bad;

> It has been ruled that an information

which alleges that defendant is

accused of having committed an

offense (stating it), but which does not

directly charge that defendant

committed the offense, is insufficient.

Furthermore, since the charge in an

information must be made with such

definiteness and certainty to enable the

accused to prepare for trial, it must

follow that the charge must not be

stated hypothetically or

argumentatively. An information is bad

if it is stated that “there is probable

cause to suspect” that accused has

committed the crime, instead that he

did commit it.”

> An examination of paragraphs 2.3 and

2.4 shows that the allegations therein

are based on pure conjecture and

speculation not ultimate facts.

> The name of the game is fair play, not

foul play. We cannot allow a legal

skirmish where , from the start, one of

the protagonists enters the arena with

one arm tied to his back.

The presentation of evidence on corruption

and unexplained wealth violates

petitioner’s right to due process.

> Article II does not cite “graft and

corruption” or unlawfully acquired

wealth as grounds for impeachment. It

is also clear that under Section 2,

Article XI of the Constitution, “graft and

corruption” is a ground for

impeachment separate and distinct

from “culpable violation of the

Constitution” and “betrayal of public

trust.”

> Despite the undeniable fact that the

petitioner was not properly informed

that “graft and corruption” or unlawfully

acquired wealth are within the ambit of

Article II, the House of Representatives

posits that graft and corruption are

issues covered by Article II due to their

bare speculation that some of

petitioner’s assets are “reportedly” not

declared in his SALN in violation of

R.A. No. 3019

> The citation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-

Graft and Corruption Law) does not

necessarily mean that petitioner is

charged with graft and corruption. In

fact, nowhere in Article II and in

paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 of the

Impeachment Complaint does it allege

that petitioner committed any of the

acts prohibited under Sections 3, 4, 5

and 6 of R.A. No. 3019, which

provisions specifically pertain to

prohibited acts of public officers.

> In the Impeachment complaint itself,

R.A. No. 3019 was only cited in

accordance to CJ Corona’s SALN.

Hence, the House of Representatives

are only referring to Sec. 7 of R.A. No.

3019 which covers the duty of public

officers to file a SALN.

> That if found guilty under Sec. 7 of R.A.

No. 3019 evidenced by the fact that a

violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, it is

only punished with imprisonment of

6yrs and 1 mo. to 15 yrs, perpetual

disqualification, and forfeiture of

unexplained wealth. A violation of

Section 7 on the other hand, is

punished with a fine of P1,000 –

P5,000 and/or imprisonment of 1yr and

6mos.

> By allowing the House of

Representatives to introduce evidence

on matters outside the clear wording of

Article II will undoubtedly violate

petitioner’s right to due process. Article

III of the constitution even mandates

that due process be accorded to an

accused, and an element thereof is the

right to be informed of the charges

against the accused.

> The petitioner would suffer manifest

injustice if the offenses of graft and

corruption and unlawfully acquired

wealth are considered necessarily

included in the non-disclosure of SALN.

> A dangerous situation was also

apparent with language of Article II

since a single Article of Impeachment

(Article II) will charge CJ Corona

contained multiple offenses. This is

prohibited under the Section 13, Rule

110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure which requires a complaint

or information to only charge one

offense, except when the law

prescribes a singe punishment for

various offenses. In fact, an Information

which charges more than one offense

may be quashed pursuant to Section 3

(f) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure.

> While it is acknowledged that an

impeachment case is sui generis, the

Honorable Presiding Officer of the

Impeachment Court had already ruled

that in view of the charges in the

Impeachment Complaint, the

impeachment trial is akin to a criminal

proceeding. Hence, petitioner was

made to believe that the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure should be made

to apply suppletorily.

> The petitioner was not properly

informed of the charges against him in

view of the apparent conflict between

the charges stated in Article II and

complainants’ speculative allegations

under paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the

Complaint.

The impeachment court committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in issuing the

subpoena for all the bank accounts, as

requested by the prosecution

> As held in Marquez v. Desierto and

Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay,

before a bank can be examined, the

account must be correctly identified. In

this case, there was hardly any

independently obtained evidence that

would point to the bank accounts object

of the subpoena sought – the pertinent

information here was gathered by

means of the fishing expedition

permitted by the Impeachment Court. In

the case of the BPI Account, the

information was only discovered from

photocopies of the check payments

made by CJ Corona in behalf of

Charina Corona.

> In the case of PS Bank, however, the

initial Request was issued on the basis

of a published announcement that a

certain Renato C. Corona had won Php

1M in a monthly promotional raffle. The

initial request for a subpoena against

PS Bank did not contain any mention of

a foreign currency deposit account. In

fact, the Prosecution withdrew their

request for the subpoena even as

counsel for CJ Corona filed their

Opposition thereto.

> At the hearing of 2 February 2012, the

Honorable Presiding Officer flatly stated

the standard required for the issuance

of subpoena sought, the Presiding

Officer stated that when they

(prosecution) ask the Impeachment

Court to issue a subpoena, specify the

account number and the particular

transaction involved and the documents

that you want to be subpoenaed.

> In an illegal attempt to comply with this

requirement, the Prosecutors attached

to their Supplemental Request for

Subpoena/Reply an alleged Customer

Identification and Specimen Signature

Card, an Account Opening Form and

an Application and Agreement for

Deposit Account, covering a deposit in

dollars, allegedly given by an

anonymous small woman to

Congressman Reynaldo Umali in an

envelope.

> In glaring contrast to that version of

Cong. Umali, however, Cong. Miro

Quimbo announced to media that the

said prohibited documents were

“mysteriously found” in the office of the

Prosecution at the Senate.

> The attention f the Honorable Court is

drawn to the fundamentally illegality of

the subpoena. Since the submission of

absolutely confidential documents as

the basis for the Supplemental Request

for Subpoena is an illegality, the

prohibited possession by the

Prosecution of the submitted

documents cannot be the basis for the

issuance of any subpoena. On the

contrary, the mere possession of these

documents is enough to invite inquiry

into possible criminal wrongdoing by

these conspiring Congressmen.

Regrettably, the Impeachment Court

was content to elicit any explanation

the Prosecution had to offer. This is a

travesty of law and justice.

> The subpoena issued must be

squashed for being the fruit of a

poisoned tree – the illegality stems from

the mere possession of the bank

documents without any waiver from the

depositor. To be sure, the Prosecution

has not presented any such waiver on

the part of CJ Corona.

> From another angle, production of the

bank records which were ordered to be

subpoenaed cannot be countenanced.

Being the result of an illegal act, it is the

fruit of the poisonous tree, as held in

Peo v. Suelo. As already adverted to,

no written consent for the disclosure of

the bank accounts has been issued by

the depositor.

Application for TRO/Injunction

Petitioner has suffered grave and irreparable

injury due to the continuing violation of his

Constitutional rights by Respondents. Unless

a TRO is issued forthwith, the trial shall

continue and the banks and their

representatives will produce and disclose the

confidential statements, documents and

accounts of Petitioner, amounting to

irreparable injury from which Petitioner has no

appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy.

Relief

Petitioner respectfully prays that this

Honorable Court:

(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition,

issue a temporary restraining order or a

writ of preliminary injuction enjoining: (i)

the proceedings before the Impeachment

Court; (ii) implementation of Resolution

dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or

representatives of BPI and PSBank from

testifying and submitting documents on

petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts;

and (iv) the presentation, reception and

admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3

and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;

(b) After giving due course to the Petition,

render judgement:

(i) Declaring the Impeachment

Complaint null and void ab initio;

(ii) Prohibiting the presentation,

reception and admission of

evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and

2.4 of the Impeachment

Complaint;

(iii) Annuling the Impeachment

Court’s Resolution dated 27

January 2012 and 6 February

2011, as well as any Subpoena

issued pursuant thereto; and

(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of

preliminary injunction permanent.

Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.

Supplemental Petition

Based on the premise that they have observed

that some of the members of the Impeachment

Court had displayed bias and prejudgment against

him during the proceedings, the recent actions of

these members show that they have taken upon

themselves to be petitioner’s accuser, prosecutor,

judge and executioner. Even the public has

perceived these members as having the sole

intention of condemning petitioner. To be sure, this

abuse cannot be allowed.

Statement of Facts and the Case

> 28 Nov. 2011, Senator Drilon issued a

Press Release entitled “Drilon: Corona

voted in favor of Arroyo in all 19 cases

brought before the Supreme Court.” It

showed Drilon saying that he opted to

release “Corona’s voting pattern” to

media in the name of public

transparency and to support his call on

the Chief Justice to inhibit himself from

court proceedings involving Arroyo.

Before that, Drilon said Corona’s

history with Arroyo has created

perceptions that the SC was biased in

favor of the Pampanga lawmaker. He

noted that Corona once served as

chief of staff and spokesman of Arroyo

when she was a vice president. Drilon

also noted that Corona’s appointment

as chief justice in May 2010 stirred a

lot of controversy since it came so

close to the end of Arroyo’s term and

many considered him a “midnight

appointee.”

> On 12 December 2011, 188 members

of the House of Representatives led

by Senator Drilon’s godson, Niel

Tupas III, allegedly read and approved

the filing of the Impeachment

Complaint with the Senate, Article II of

which states the allegation that the

Respondent committed culpable

violation of the Constitution and/or

betrayed the public trust when he

failed to the disclose his SALN.

> After the prosecution ended its direct

examination of Atty. Vidal, Clerk of

Court of the Supreme Court, Senator

Drilon, in a clear attempt to remedy

the ineptness of the prosecution from

obtaining relevant evidence, forcibly

compelled Atty. Vidal to disregard this

Honorable Court’s established

procedure in the Alejandrino

Resolution, and produce the

petitioner’s SALN. (see p. 5 - 8 of the

Supplemental Petition.

> When Atty. Vidal candidly admitted

that she brought petitioner’s SALNs

with her, Senator Drilon pounced at

the opportunity and compelled Atty.

Vidal to produce the SALNs.

Thereafter, Senators Alan Peter

Cayetano, Francis Pangilinan, and

Teofisto Guingona III made separate

manifestations which effectively forced

Atty. Vidal to produce petitioner’s

SALNs.

> In view of the continuous objections on

the materiality and relevancy of the

testimonial and documentary evidence

presented by the House of

Representatives to Article II of the

Impeachment Complaint, the

Impeachment Court required the

parties to submit their respective

memoranda on the matter.

> After the parties filed their respective

memoranda, the Impeachment Court,

in its Resolution dated 27 January

2012, ruled as follows:

IN SUM THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:

1. To allow the prosecution to

introduce evidence in support of

Par. 2.4 of the Articles of

Impeachment;

2. With respect to which, the Court

shall be guided by and shall rely

upon the legal presumptions on

the nature of any property of

asset which may be proven to

belong to the Respondent Chief

Justice as provided under

Section 8 of Republic Act No.

3019 and Section 2 of Republic

Act No. 1379.

> Despite the clear mandate of the

Impeachment Court, the House of

Representatives continued to present

evidence on properties acquired by

the petitioner, which were in fact

reported in his SALN.

> In order to allow the prosecution to

present evidence on paragraph 2.4,

and to amplify or assist said

prosecutors, the allies of President

Aquino in the Senate abused their

authority and continued their

presentation of evidence for the

prosecution, without fear of objection.

(see p.10 - 12 of supplemental

petition)

> In view of these senators’

performance, it was reported that

President Aquino III thanked his

senator allies in delivering what the

prosecutors could not. (p. 12 - 13 of

supplemental petition)

> In another article in Journal Online, it

was reported that allies of President

Aquino, led by Senator Drilon, began

efforts to undermine the ruling of

Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile,

and were persisting to overturn the

ruling that the prosecutors could not

present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of

the Impeachment Complaint.

Argument

CJ Corona’s right to due process is being,

violated in the impeachment proceedings

because certain senator-judges have lost the

cold neutrality of impartial judges, by acting as

prosecutors.

Discussion

Petitioner respectfully submits that Sen.

Drilon’s opinion that impeachment proceedings

do not call for the cold neutrality of an impartial

judge, which is being followed by his allies, is

oppressive and blatantly violative of a citizen’s

basic and fundamental right to due process. In

fact, this goes against the very oath he took as

a Senator-Judge as follows:

“I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all the things appertaining to the trail of the impeachment of ___________________, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws of the Philippines: (so held me God).”

It cannot be denied that once the Senate

became an impeachment court, it

became a court of law wherein judicial

proceedings would be conducted and

procedural due process should be

secured. Procedural due process, in turn,

requires an impartial court, and every

litigant, such as petitioner herein, is

entitled to the cold neutrality of an

impartial judge.

The turn of events puts in question the

integrity of the proceedings and members

of the Impeachment Court. There is

clearly a blatant abuse of a senator-

judge’s right under the Rules of

Impeachment, which provides:

XV. Witness shall be

examined by one

person on behalf on

the party producing

them, and then cross-

examined by one

person on the other

side.

…

XVII. If a Senator

wishes to put a

question to a witness,

he/she shall do so

within two (2)

minutes. A Senator

may likewise put a

question to a

prosecutor or counsel.

He/she may also offer

a motion or order, in

writing, which shall be

submitted to the

Presiding Officer.

Rule XVII provides for the

right of a Senator to put a

question to a prosecutor or

counsel, or to a witness.

The express limitation in

Rule XVII on the right of a

Senator-judge to propound

a question that “he shall do

so within two (2) minutes.”

It is, however, incorrect to

assume that a Senator-

judge would be justified to

propound questions that

amount to prosecuting the

case or the witness, such

like the questions of some

Senator-judges that are

clearly intended to

accomplish what the

prosecution failed to do.

In the Impeachment

Proceedings, senator-

judges propound questions

more akin to cross-

examinations and loaded

with veiled threats,

securing for the

prosecution what they

failed to do for themselves.

As enunciated in Tabuena

v. Sandiganbayan, when

the judge takes the

cudgels for one of the

parties, he loses the cold

neutrality of an impartial

judge, amounting to

violation of the right of a

litigant to due process of

law. In other words, the

refusal of an openly partial

and biased judge is a

violation of the

Constitution.

Relief

CJ Corona respectfully prays that this Supplemental Petition be admitted, considered and thereafter GRANTED. CJ Corona respectfully reiterates the RELIEFS prayed for in the Urgent Petition docketed as G.R. No. 200242