Air Operations in the Khmer Republic

HQPACAF Directorate of Operations Analysis

CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division

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Prepared by: Major Elder Project CHECO 7th AF

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Air Operations in the Khmer Republic

HQPACAF D,irectorate of Operations Analysis

CHE,CO/CORONA HARVEST Division

C;ULF

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Prepared by: Major Elder Project CHECO 7th AF

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Air Operations in The Khmer Republic ISBN 0-923135-65-0

Reprinted by Daney Book Service

90 Kimball Lane Christiansburg, VA 24073 United States of America

(703) 382-8949

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREI~ORD .

CHAPTER I:

ell/WTER II: SUM~1AR OF AIR OPERATIOtlS DECEt1BER 1971 TO VIETN CEASE-FIRE . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER II I: AUTHO ITIES AND PROCEDURES AFTER THE VI ETNAr~ CEASE FIRE . . . . . . . . .

Operating Autho ities and Procedures . Command and Con ro 1 ..... . Convoy Protecti n Procedures ..

CHAPTER IV: THE AP LICATION OF U.S. AIRPOWER, 1973

AC-130 Beacon S rikes .. F-111 Beacon Bo bing ... . F-111 Pathfinde s ... . F-4 Pathfinders for B-52s B-52 Pathfinder •.•.. B-52 Beacon Born ing ' ... Support . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER V: SITUATliNS AND RESPONSES,

EPILOGUE . . . .. . ....... .

APPENDIX

FOOTNOTES

taLOSSARY .

viii

1973

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18

18 24 34

40

40 44 47 47 49 49 50

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75

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UNCLASSIFIED ()

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

:J Figure no. Page

1. Kinner" n(~pul>l ic .. Ii

2. Interdiction Areas Khmer Republic :3 I ::..~

3. Southern Khmer I{epublic .. 15

4. F-lll Beacon Locations as of 11 June 1973 46

5. Locations Hiqhlighted hy General Voqt .. 69 C)

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UNCLASSIFIED Of PART ME NT OF THE AIR FORCE

I Iofe:AOQUAfltTIE". PACIIJ'IC Aifit /fOfltCES

APO SAN "'''ANCI5CO .6553

PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterin$urgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia haslresulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements. These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of U~~F aerospace vehicles, suppo~t equipment, and manpower. As a result. operational data ana experiences have accumulated which should be collected, aoc~nted. and analyzed for current and future impact upon USAF. pol icies. concepts. and doctrine~.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA expe­riences was recog~ized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to esta~lish an activity which would provide timely and analy­tical studies' of USAF combat operations 1n SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air IStaff requirements and direction.

Project CHEcq. an acronym for Contet'tlporary Historical Examination of Current Operat10ns, was established to meet the Air Staff d1rective. Based on the polity guldance of the Office of Air Force History and managed by tlq PAC~F. with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECa provides a scholarly lion-going" historical examination, documentation. and reporting on USAF policies. concepts. and doctrine in PACOM~ This CHEtO report is pjlrt of the overlll docuaaentat10n and examination which is being accompl1~h.d. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveneSSj· of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must v.1ew the study in relation to the events- and circumstances at the time of '1~s preparation-.recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basils which restricted perspective and that the author· s research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area. j .

~/~'~ ROBI::RT E. HILLER! Chief, Operation$ Analysis DCS/Plans and Operations

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UNCLASSIFIED

FOREWORD

(U) This report is one in a series of CHECO reports on air opera-

tions in the Khmer Republic.* It begins where the preceding report

ended--l December 1971. The period from 1 December 1971 until the Vietnam

air operations in the Khmer Republic. During that period the focus of

Il.S. airpower was on florth Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. Follow-

inq the Vietnam cease-fire, and that in Laos within one month, American air-

power was concentrated against an insurgency effort which was directed

at the overthrow of the Khmer Government, and against North Vietnamese

logistics activities in the eastern Khmer Republic. The main emphasis

of this report, therefore, is on U.S. air operations in the Khmer Republic

after the Vietnam and Laotian cease-fire agreements came into effect.

(U) An overview of the U.S. air involvement in the Khmer Republic

since May lQ70 is presented, and the report briefly summarizes air orpr~-

tions during the period 1 December 1971 to 28 January 1973. It then con­

centrates on the U.S. air activities associated with the temporary stand-down

immediately following the Vietnam cease-fire and the subsequent intense

dpplication of airpower after mid-narch 1973. The main thrust of the report

is to describe how the Commander of the United States Support Activities

Group (COMUSSAG)/Seventh Air Force adapted to the requirefllent of proviLlin<j

air support in the Khmer Republic.

*formerly Cambodia.

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States

Cambodia w~s a

airpower supJort

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

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latecomer to the group of recipients of United

in SQutheas t As i a (SEA). There were reports of 1

secret U.S. air strikes in Cambodia in the spring of 1969,*' but it was not 2

until t1ay 1970 that a large-scale U.S. air involvement there began. ~fter

the coup which deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970, Marshal Lon

No1 requested U.S. h lp to counter Viet Cong (VC), North Vietnamese Army

(NVI\), dnu internal Khlller Insurgent pressure ugdinst his neutral ist govern-

ment. In response tiLon Nolls request and also to excise VC/NVA sanctuaries

III COIIIUOUI..I, Llle l'r'el:~luelll 01 the Ullilcu Slolc!:) orucr'eu LlII..! I r""y I~/u Lt'U~:"-

border incursion int) Cambodia from South Vietnam. United States and South

Vietnamese ground fo ces, supported by U.S. and South Vietnamese airpower,

ov~rran the ~nemyls ,taqinq areas. Then, as r1onnp.o, u.s. ~round forces

withdrew into South ietnam before 1 July 1970; but U.S. air support for 3

the Lon No' governmelt continued and was gradually expanded.

(TS) On 24 May 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the

Commander, U.S. 1111i ~ary Assistance Conmand, Vietnam (CQt4USI1I\CV), and his

deputy for air, the :onmander of Seventh Air Force, to begin air interdiction

operations in easter, Cambodia. The JCS operation plan called for interdic­

t; on of enemy base alreas, stored suppl ies, and movement of men and ma terie 1

along the lines of cllnmunication (LaCs); air support of friendly troops

*In July 1973, the P!ntagon confirmed these B-52 strikes.

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InternatIonal boundary

PrOVince boundary

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TOP SIEREY

in contact (TIC); land reconnaissance. The original interdiction area (later

FREEDOM IDEAL) was that part of Cambodi a east of the r~ekong River

I 4 'Jf i(Olltei 13. Befiire the end of 1970, howevp.r, the ,l(S h,1d rXII,lnc!rd

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the interdiction alrea to the west and south as shown in Figure 2; rRE[DOI~ I

U[AL lil:LdIlH: lhe !I i t~k!ldlll(! rOt, lhe en lin.! <.Ired. 1 hen:. lhe I(u I c:, u r LnYtlgc­

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ment (ROE) ~er~ittfd 7AF to conduct tactical air (TACAIR), gunship, and

[1-'52 :-;':rikes againh enemy troops and supplies. Initially, air strikes

outside FR[E:10M DE1L requireo specific JCS approval; however, in May 1971 !

the JC"', (")n'/': r:()r1IJS~ACV di'lcretionary authority for TflCAIR <lnci !Junship inter­

{..Iiction o1":r",'here irl the Khmer Republic* in any situation that posed a

thl".,'t tc ::cJJ::;r i(hJer positions whose loss wou1d be a military or psycho­

lesieal ':0'., In..J~ne 1971, COMUSMACV delegated4li. discretionary authority . 5

:2 tr~ (Oi,H~.~nder", 7AF. I

'·'h.ough t-he U.S. air involvement in the Khmer Republic was planned

as an inter~~:tlon ~ffort, most strikes provided close air support Cf direct

cdr SUtJf·)()t·t fur the iKhll1er r';epublic's ground forces, the Forces Armees r~ational [

Khmer (FANK). rl~vcr:thelc$':, in November 1970, 7AF directed its CC"lfl~lilt I

Imitr

, to repnrt dll ilj.S. ;lir strikes in the Khmer Rcpuhlic as in~erdic­I

Ii,;" i'~I\.',l:"";. f.:l!' 1'..:tiolld:C belnCl that tiny ,\ir support. whidt helped rt:!tdl'd

lIw ('nclI1y':i illUVI-!IIICnl! of men dnJ suppl ies t1troUtjh the Khtl\(!r Hepubl ic to

I 6 South 'lietnam was, iin effect, interdiction.

I

'::.:t:Jter ;970, the Lon itol government established

:>;,: te"'''' "Cambod~ a II was abandoned. ' the Khmer Republic,

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IllTERDICTION AREAS

KHMER REPUBLI C

FREEDOM DEAL

FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION

LATER ADDITIONS

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(5) The so-called interdiction effort in the Khmer Republic continued

essentially unchan ed in nature from June 1970 into 1973, although it

the Illajor ~lVA offe sive in South Vietnam and against targets in North 7

Vietnam. The cha acteristics of the enemy threat and MACVj7AF's focus

on the protracted ommitments in South Vietnam and Laos left the Khmer

Republic with a lo~ priority for air operations. The NVA and VC con­

trolled more than ~ne-half of the Khmer Republic's territory and were I

apparently content Ito wage a war of attrition. While they harassed the i

FANK dnd tile KIllller iGoveY'llUlen t wi til sllor t JUt·a Li on d t tJcks desi Ylled to i

keep the FMK on t1e defensive and impede the flow of supplies to popula-

tion centers, they avoided direct confrontation of the Khmer forces at 8

a level that would produce a more intense U.S. air response. The

enemy's strategy c:anged, however, after the cease-fire in Vietnam.

(S) The Vietnrm cease-fire became effective on 28 January 1973.

The cease-fire agr~.~nt specified that 'foreign countries 'hall put

an end to all militlary activities in Cambodia, totally withdraw from

and refrain from i~trodUCing troops, military advisers and personnel, arma-I 9 .

ments, munitions, ~nd war material." On 28 January, r"larshal Lon No1

.nnounced a unilat~ral suspension of Khmer offensive actions, effective

29 January. The e lemy, however, exploited the lull which resulted from

the FANK stand-dow and the associated decrease in U.S. air operations.

By mid-r~arch, the nemy had begun what the U.S. Defense Attache Office 11

(USOAO) in Phnom described as a "major countryside offensive."

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(S) The USUAO and the FANK agreed as to the severity of the threat,

but not on the composition of enemy forces. The indigenous Khmer 1nsl1r-

gents (KI) had assumed an increasing share of the enemy activity during

1972. Now, the IJSlJAO described the enemy as primarily KI, advised and

supported by the VC/NVA. The FANK, on the other hand, claimed that VCI

[JVI\ uniLs \',~re engaging in Jirect comvat activity against the government

fo)'(:cs. ['joLinq that thQ rl\NK claims were undocumented, the IISDI\O r'('<1sollcd

that the VC/NVA were emphasizing logistics support to their operational

elements in Sl")uth Vietnam and logistics and combat support to the KI, but

j-~';lt foll rjl;/cllf"j the Vietnam cease-fire they intended to keep a low profile

in ':ill: :',h:1Ier f\epublic by avoiding any activity which could be directly

~-I"tr'ihut':?d to them. According to USDAO estimates, the VC/NVA had approxi­

=tr'v 35,000 total personnel in the Khmer Republic. Of these, about 3,500

:" ,:,.'ry and sapper support, while as many as 2,000 others served

as cadre in f:,l units. USOAO also estimated that the KI main force (combat)

2xceeded earlier estimates of 27,000 to 33,000 men. Whatever the case, Lon

Nol considered the situation sufficiently grove to proclairll ;j stolt-I' or siege 12

on 18 r1arch 1973.

(TS) f1y 1:tlat. time, the U.S. had already increased air strikes in the

KII:m:r i<erul)] ie. Ldr'l ier, in the spirit of Lon 1/01 IS unilutcral ce,lse-fire

rtestlJrp in ,1.1 nd(lY'y, the .J(S had limited the air opcflltinC] Il\lth()rHi(~(", t.o

porriliL U.S. air sLrikes only to counter specific hostile acts against the 11

Ii,' : II ' I '. \I 'I I" I II. " 'II I I ,J . 1.1 : c I/\r If, . lIuweve r, wheni L beCJllIe dIJIJd ren t in early

f1drcll Lh<.lL Lllc VL/NVA-backeJ KI were making an unprecedented effort aga-inst

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the Khmer Governllle"lt, and that the VCjNVA were continuing to move men and

supplies through tie Khmer Republic into South Vietnam, restraints on

the employment of lirpower were eased. Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the

JCS, notified Admi al Noel Gayler, C:ommander-in-Chief, Pacific Command

(CINCPAC), to dire:t an "appreciable weight of B-52s, TACAIR and gunships 14

against fixed and leeting targets in Cambodia," and rescinded the

restriction that air strikes were permitted only to counter specific hos­

tile acts against :he FANK. Air Force General John W. Vogt, Jr., commander 15

of the newly forme! U.S. Support Activities Group* (USSAG), nakhon Phanom

Royal Thai Air For:e Base (RTAFB), Thailand, was given the responsibility 16

for developing an !ffective campaign against these targets.

(S) General V)gt, as COMUSSAG and 7AF Commander, had operational

responsibility for all U.S. combat air operations in SEA. In mid-~arch

he began to apply lis air assets on an expanded scale against the VCjNVA

lines of communica :ion and VCjNVAjKI ground forces. By the end of ~1arch,

the lJSAF R-S2, TAC JR, and CJunshi p effort in the Khmer RA[JlJh 1 i c htlrj i ncre,) SPO

17 to about 220 sorti s per day. This was about six times the combined

sorL it.!

(VNAF)

effort

but the steadily i creasing KI pressure on the Khmer LaCs and population

centers, especiall Phnom Penh, changed the priorities. In May 1973, the

*On 15 February 19 '3, USSAGj7AF assumed SEA force employment responsibility from nACV, Saiqon.

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'·OF SI!ERiT

rnately 110 ::--.:15,30 fl-7s, a~,d 12 AC-130 qunships. In addition, th('l'(> was

part of this air effort v~as now in direct or close air support of FANK 19

forces, friendly population centers, and government supply convoys.

(S) The increase in en0l11Y activity in the Khmer RefJublic tiJd elicited

all escalation of the II.S. all" effort at a time when U.S. forces in SEA

had expected ~) be in 3 cease-fire environment. Air operations in the

<,)'",1,}' :>i'''''~t {-:~Y' operations. Consequently, these operations received an

un~recedented amount of attention from the press, the U.S. Congress, and,

,:- course, ,]cS, CINCPI\C, and COMUSSAG. Operdting authorities, targeting

_ .!: C\.:i~·:I(:1nd and control authority changed in reaction to the 20

sitt.;Jtion, as did the scope dnd intensity of air operations. Operating

methods once widely used in combat in South Vietnam and Laos presented new

problems when applied in the Khmer Republic. More than at any other time

in tile SFA conflict, tll0. destiny of an I\llied C]overnrn(~nt (")eclil(~d to be in

I.!H' hcJw!s (Jf /'\I:Il!t'ir>ltl "innen. /\t tIle sallie t.illle, the U.S. air effort was

perso~n~l from participating in any in-country military training or advi­')' <-I

C,;: l.'l :'. r- .- - ': i tie <; • rlll·i othpr llct.ivities in the Congrcs~ ';llfj()f)'>tcd Lila/.

further restr~ints were forthcoming. Both the U.S. Senate and House of

:~ept'esenti1ti,.,;,,:~Uoduc;ed measures aimed at ending or reducing the U.S.

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SEEAIi~

I involvement in SEA, and the Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously

I . approved an appropriations bill amendment prohibiting any funding whatso-

I 22 ever for bombing ir the Khmer Republic.

(S) Although the FANK had held its ground with high levels of U.S.

air support, and tile enemy offensi ve seemed to falter by the end of i,lay i

1973, the USDAO re~orts from Phnom Penh were not optimistic. The FANK,

battered by monthsiof defensive fighting, were tired and discouraged. The

fate of the FANK a~d the Lon Nol government appeared to hinge on U.S. air I

support~ which POSiibl y would soon terminate. The USDAO predicted that

"June, if not the entire rainy season, will be pivotal as the future role i 23

of U.S, air in Cambodia is determined." I (IJ) Thp II.S. Confjress deterrnined the futurf" rolf' of II.S .• 1ir':llrport.

I for the Lon 1101 govf!nllllenL in July uy forcing Llie Presidenl or llie UlliLeJ

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to ~1 15 I\ugust 1973 deadline for the cessation uf U.S.

I States to u<Jree

24 bombing. If U.S.[ airpower were to bring the KI to the negotiating table,

it would have to dol so in less than six weeks, which was clearly impossible.

Thus, the announcem~nt of the impending bomb halt removed much of the

existing pressure o~ the KI to negotiate. If the KI could survive through i

15 Au~ust, their rrl'spects for a military victory over the Lon Nol govern-25

ment would brighten consi-derably.

(U) The KI proJeu to be <1 determined enemy. Rather thun Wtl i Ling until

the U.S. bombing stdpped, the insurgents continued to carry the battle to

the FANK. In so do~ng they showed that their forces were greater than !

U.S. intelligence sdurces had indicated at the end of 1972. Thus, in the !

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lioht of subsequent events, 1972 was apparently a vital building period

for the f<I. \~ith the he 1 r of the VCjNVA, the insurgents deve loped into

u formidable, determined fig~ting force in 1972 and proved it in 1973.

0)

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CHAPTER II

SUr~MARY OF AIR OPERATIONS

DECEMBER 1971 TO VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE

r a decrease in their already relatively low intensity,

air operations in the Khmer Republic from December 1971 until the Vietnam

cease-fire remain d essentially as described in tile preceding CHECO report,

____ --I __ -+_n_s.....:,~N..:..o..;..v_7~O~-_N;,:.O..;..v_7:....:.l.. T ha tis, the ope ra tin q r'u 1 e s, l d rg c t

res, and command and control relationships did not change--

only USAF and VNAF strike sorties reached a relative

high point in Dec .mber 1971 in support of an abortive FANK offensive (CHENLA

II) and during th! U.S. Commando Hunt VII dry season interdiction campaign.

In January 1972, lowever, the sortie rates dropped dramatically and remained

low until after t e ce~se-fire: the number of USAF and VNAF TACAIR sorties 26

in 1972 was about one third the number in 1971. (See Appendix, page 75.)

(S) TACAIR s pport for the Khmer Republic decreased during the first

three months of 1 172 because the enemy was content to let the FANK rest

in the purely def!nsive posture they assumed after their severe defeat

during CHENLA II. The VC/NVA were preparing for their spring Nguyen Hue

Offensive iHldinst South Vietnam and apparently preferred to avoid major

engaqelllents wi th I_he FM1K ur South Vietnamese Army (AI~Vtl) forces in Lhe

Khmer Republic. An increased number of B-52 sorties were requested against

the growing of NVA/VC logistics targets in the northeastern, tri-

horder area Khmer Republic, but approvals were delayed until after 27

the enemy offensi had begun.

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( (' ) ,.) When the NVA spring qffensive began at the end of I~arch, U.S.

and 'J1lAF TACP.IR assets were diiverted from the Khmer Republ i c to South

Vie~nJ;~:. Sorties available fo!r the Khmer Republic were further reduced

when the bombing operations ov~r all of North Vietnam began in April and

intensified in May. For the r~st of the year, even after the VC/NVA offen­

s °i 'Ie fi'll tered in f1Ii d·-June, U. S. and VNAF TACAIR supported ARVN efforts to

retake lost ground, and U.S. aircraft continued to operate over North

rosture and the VC/iJVA I s lO~1 rtofile in the Khmer Reruol ie, ker t TM~ATR ?B

c;;,,""'r' J'"," t,hl"ill!iI')':; dt (1 lO\~ 'level throu9hout 19/2.

I; ,'li:C LICHT strikes in the Khmer Republic also reflected the Vel

d '.J 'i.::;',J ,lUriS ugJin:,t )OUtil Vietnam. The number of str'jkes, which had

" .. j:'';;,~ in f1iJrch aqainst the VC/NVA build-up in the portion of FREEDO~1

~r~th Vietnames~ border, dropped sharply in April when

t::e f"orthVi;::tr:arnese surged acdoss the. border into South Vietnam. The

further decrease in May corres~onded to the initiation on 10 May of the

LI1IE8ACKEF: interdiction campaigln against North Vietnam's transportation 29

The numhi.pr of n-5:' stri kes in t.hf' Khlll0r f\f'I,"111 i ('

t')(~qMI tu ri~·'; (Ifjain in ,June as ithe enemy offensive waned dnd till' VC/NVA

r'd r'~J ted into Ule Khmer Repub 1 ~ c to regroup. The intense LINE8ACKER II

[3- Ij 2 ra i ds over north Vietnam from 18 through 29 Decelilber caused the Khrne r

Repub1;c sortie tate for tha t m6nth to decrease. For the entire yp(!r",

I~ h () 11 ( Iii, I !1f' I;_f;? (I rforl. in th(~ t:hlllcr Hcpul>lic w() 5 urea ter in 1072 Uldn l()

In I 'J / I . ( ~t:t~ i\p f,)end ix, pdge:75.) Generally, the 8-52s struck enemy

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LOCs, supply areas, truck parks, and base camps, while TACAIR provided

close and direct air support for the FANK.

(S) USAF A-37s, F-4s, A-7s, and AC-130s provided most of the air

support for the FAtlK during 1972. (USAF A-7s had arrived in SEA in October

for use in the TACAIR role.) The 8th Special Operations Squadron at Bien

Hoa Air Base (AB), South Vietnam, deactivated, turning their A-37s over

to the VNAF. I~arine Corps A-4s out of Bien Hoa began flying attack sorties

in the Khmer Republic in May 1972; and from June through the end of the year

they averaged some 150 sorties per month. Although the VNAF did support

the FANK, most of their A-l, A-37, and F-5 TACAIR sorties supported ARVN

incursions into the eastern border areas of the Khmer Republic. VNAF AC-119

gunships supported* FANK ground units so that the Khmers could use their

AC-47 gunships on other missions, such as night surveillance of Phnom Penh's 31

Pochentong Airfield.

(S) Khmer Air Force (KAF) operations remained fairly constant during

1972 as USAF and VNAF participation decreased. On 31 May, for example,

the KAF had 103 aircraft, a figure which included 24 T-28s for TACAIR,

18 0-10 FAC aircraft, and 6 AC-47 gunships. The remaining aircraft (about

one half of them helicopters) were used for training or resupply. Durinq

May (a typical month for YJ\F operations) the Khmers flew 329 T-2[\, 168 FAC,

115 ~unship sorties, and 1,131 combat support sorties. During the same

month, USAF TACAIR, gunship, and B-52 sorties totaled 266, and the VNAF

flew 131 TACAIR and gunship sorties in the Khmer Republic. The number

*It should be noted that this support was limited as a result of the lan­guage barrier. [Ed.]

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of IJ5AF TACAIR sorties (239) was the lowest since the 1970 incursion.

Also in that month, the 8-52 and VNAF sortie rates showed marked decreases,

since the ~.5. ~nd South Vietnamese assets were countering the VC/NVA offen-32

.' I v, II. :.VtI.

',) t'ltllOu~h the VC/IIV/\ focused their militilry efforts on ~.;out.h Vietnalll,

tiley, with the Khmer Insurgents, maintained an offensive position with

"espeet to the FAiiK and repeatedly frustrated FAUK efforts to attain their

lliilit,ary objecl.ives. Those objectives, as stated by the FANK in I~arch 1972,

were to (1) secure L.OCs and major Surply routes, (2) eliminate major enemy

llnits, (3) reestablish the Khmer Government infrastructure, (4) protect

and hold ~aJor population centers, and (5) maintain constant pressure on

ti;( n:1er.;y bv increased USAF, VNAF, and KAF i nterdi cti on. The FANK rea 1 i zed

",.; ·jr its l)cjectives, however, because "hit and run" enemy tactics kept

:'ined to defensive positions along major LaCs and in urban

centers. ~ry offensive actions taken by the FANK would have reqllired heavy 33

'.'.5. ilir sur-port, but U.S. assets were heavi1y conrnitted to South Vietnam.

(5) The willingness and ability of the KI to playa more active role

in enemy acti'/ities against the Khmer Government was one reason tile enemy

"'J<,<.''';sflJll'1 h:pt the I-/\NI; off halance even when the VC and NV/\ were occuri('(i l4

fly uireclill') ';tilnu-off attack'" :,dbotill)e, vnd terrorist

Jltivities dgdinst tIle Khmer populace, the numerically-inferior KI forces

were dble to keer the FANK in defensive positions in their continuing effort

to protect tIle population centers. For example, in the Phnom Penh area

III ,July 1~12, ,,11\'1"2 were 70 to 80 FANK battalions defending against 10

enemy battalions.

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(S) On the basis of one estimate, enemy main force strength throughout 35

the Khmer Republic was 5,000 to 6,000 hard-core troops. At the end of

December 1972, the force estimate was the same.* However, according to

U.S. sources the war had become largely a FANK versus KI struggle, with 38

the VC/NVA providing logistics, fire, and training support to the KI.

(S) The FANK initiated an offensive action against the VC/NVA after

the ,enemy had withdrawn the; rtroops into the Parrot's Beak area of south-

custern CdllllJouid following heavy losses in South Vietndlll in Illio-1972.

(See Figure 3.) COMUSI1ACV concentrated B-52 and TACAIR strikes in the

area, and FAtll( forces launched an offensive to open Route 1 from the

Mekong River toward the Parrot's Beak. SimultaneolJsly, ARVfl units hegan

a drive to clear the route east of Svay Rieng. The FANK and ARVN objec­

tive was to make Route 1, which had been interdicted by the enemy for

several lIIonths, sdfe foy' truck convoy truffic. Supported by u IdY'Ve USA/"

TACAIR effort, the FANK enjoyed a 1 imited and temporary success by open-39

i ng Route 1 between fleak Luong on the t1ekong and I(ompong Trabek.

(S) The enemy forces reacted sharply to the FANK incursion into their

sanctuary, because it posed a serious threat to their vital supply line

into the 0011.01 rc~ion of South Vip.tnilm. f)cIIIOYl<;tr,ltiIl0 I.i,('ir d('i."'·lllindi.illll

to pro tec t the i r LaC, the North Vi etname se i nt roduc ed T -S4 IOcd i Ulll tiln k s

*(S) This estimate of enemy combat troop strength at the end of the year is suspect since the USDAg in May 1973 estimated the KI combat strength alone to be over 30,000. 3 General Vogt in July 1973 estimated that the KI strength had grown from about 30,000 in December 1972 to about 50,000 in July 1973, primarily through conscription by threat. 37

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and PT-76 light amphibious tanks into the battle, apparently the first

time the enemy had used armor in the Khmer Republic. Although USAF TACAIR

destroyed six of the T-54 tanks on 6 August, the NVA successfully countered

the FANK off0nsive. l3y t1'he e'1q, of November, Route 1 from Neak Lunn,] to Svay 40

Rieng was again in enemy hands.

(C) As the NVA drove its counteroffensive along Route 1 using armor,

artillery, and sizeable 'ground forces, FANK forces at Kompong Trabek became

surrounded, and so required aerial resupply. In response, USAF C-130s of

the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing airdropped supplies at Kompong Trabek and

at Svay P.ienq where the ARYN troops were based. Although the FANK and ARVN

terminated offensive moves along Route 1 and hoped to maintain a status quo

there, the C-130s continued to resupply Svay Rieng through the end of the 41

year. The 374th TAW airdropped approximately 1,594 tons of rice, 42

JIIUIIUllili()lI, dtHllltcdiCdl ~upplie,~ t.o SVdY Hien~ ill 19/~. Iii" USI\I ctir

drops at Svan Rienq and other areas where FANK and ARVN forces became 43

isolated were complemented by VNAF C-123 aerial resupply.

(C) The requ i rements for USAF and VNAF aeri a 1 resupply spread to other

areas of the Khmer Republic as the enemy, anticipating a cease-fire, increased

offensive activities in January 1973. By interdictin,] LOCs i'\nd hilrilssin'l

rOJ,luliltion centers, the enemy achieved dual benefits: they (1) kept the

FI\NK away from VC/NVA supply lines into South Vietnam and (2) forced aerial

resupply to isolated population centers. Kompong Thom (about 80 miles north

centers which required aerial resupply in January. These and other areas 44

continued to require C-130 support after the cease-fire.

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~"-"'

(S) The enemy established a definite pattern during 1972. The Vel

['iVI\, w;Lh 1.1",;," dLL""Lion ["ocused on SouLh Vietndlll, sti II exerteu enough

pressure to keep the FANK off balance while they Ilelped the KI become a

vi;]hlc militarv force. This released more VC/NVA troops for deployment

to South Vietnam. Their success in developing a formidable KI fighting

force was evidenced by the KI's sustained offensive after the cease-fire.

The KI's determined drive to isolate Phnom Penh and topple the Lon Nol

government, combined vlith the fWA's logistiCS activity in the Khmer Republic,

'.'voked the concentrated application of U.S. airpower in the Khmer ,qepublic

he~inning 'n '~uch 1973.

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CHAPTER I II

AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES AFTER THE VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE

(S) The operating authorities and control procedures for air opera-

tions in the Khmer Republic changed significantly during and a;ter the

cease-fire. Although U.S. intelligence personnel did not necessarily

expect Marshal Lon Nol 's unilateral cessation of offensive actions to

evoke a similar response from the enemy, the United States' policy was

to give the cease-fire every chance to succeed. Secretary of State

William P. Rogers directed the cessation of all U.S. TACAIR and 6-52

strikes as of 0700 hours Phnom Penh time on 29 ,Jilnuilry 1973, but he kcrt

an option open for further U.S. strikes depending on the post-cease-fire 45

situation. The U.S. Ambassador to the Khmer Republic, Emory C. Swank,

pointed out that in any case "the use of USAF resources [in the Khmer 46

Republic] will henceforth have substantial political implications."

Thus, the JCS and the Secretary of State promulgated rules and proced-47

ures for air operations in a cease-fire environment. Within two

months, however, the rules were changed to give COMUSSAG the flexibility

to blunt the enemy offensive.

Operating Authorities and Procedures

(S) Ilefore the cease-fire, 7l\r's TI\CI\IR was responsive t.o rl\NK groollJ

---.. _ ..... __ ... _--

commanders' requests through USAF FACs and to requests from the FANK General

Staff through the FAtIK liaison office in the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center

(TACe). In the first case, the FANK liaison office validated the target and

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if possible, talked to the ground commanders before the TACC would approve

tile strikes. The American Embassy in Phnom Penh was not involved in the 48

process.

(s) As the cease-fi re approached, the JCS and the Secreta ry of State

direc~Qd tna: ,I\mbassador Swank's approval would be required fOl' all post­

cease-fire air strikes in the Khmer Republic. The Embassy would have final

strike appl'oval from a political standpoint if the strike request met the

ROC ~nd was ,'pproved by 7AF. The Senior Defense Attache in Phnom Penh,

::.s:. Army Colonel Ray l. Burnell, Jr., proposed strike requests and target 49

',"lidaticn procedures "hich met Washington's requirements. The JCS

""pd tile new procedures, and 7f\F implemented them on 2 February,

! c<Jmmanders were responsible for identifying to the FAfjK

Staf" judged Khmer t~ir Force resources insufficient to meet the threat,

whrther or not the situation required USAf support and, if so, would for­

'tlard the val idated request to BLUE CHIP, the command and control center

in tl,e TACe at 7AF. BLUE CHIP would check the request against the current

!'OF before directing any strikes. On a case-by-case basiS, 7AF would launch

FACs tc Ile1p the Embassy evaluate the threat.. If a FAe received a request

'Ti,e :,;;ulh Vielnamese stopped ground and air support for the Khmers when ':11>2 cr;"';i:-Fire wrnt into effect.

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for air support from the FANK, he would forward it to the Embassy for KAF

support or Embassy validation as outlined above. The Battle Staff Commander

at BLUE CHIP, considering the FArlK ground commander's evaluation, deter-50

mined the type and amount of ordnance for all strikes. Contrary to sub-

sequent press charges, the Embassy did not target or control air strikes in 51

the Khmer Repub1ic--those responsibilities were exclusively General Vogt's.

(5) As the new procedures went into effect, Colonel Burnell assured

Brigadier General Jack Bellamy, 7AF Assistant Director of Operations, that

the Embassy was taking a "rigorous view of their role in approving U.S.

,1ir activity in the Khmer Republic." He noted that the rmh,lssy had r('ceived

the first FANK request for U.S. air support on the night of 29 January,

the first evening of Lon Ilol's cease-fire, but that after I\mbassador Swank

explained the nevI policy permitting U.S. strikes only in response to hostile :)2

enemy acts, the General Staff decided th~t U.S. intervention was not necessary.

(S) The Embassy forwarded the first requests for limited U.S. air

support to 7AF on 9 February. The FANK General Staff made the requests

to bolster key tactical positions against which the enemy was exerting

heavy pressure. General Vogt, under authorities granted to him by the

JCS, approved the use of limited U.S. airpower in principle, but retained

approval authority for each individual request. During this time, in

Saigon, MI\CV was being deactivated, and 7AF was moving to Nakhon Phanom 53

RTfIFB.

(S) For the first three weeks of February, U.S. air activity in the

Khmer Republic remained at a very low leve'\ because of U.S. hopes for Lon

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Nol', cp.ilse-fire ilnd bec,1Ils!' 7M's ilir assets were bein') direcLed o'lainst

I'n!'r;]y !.JY'(F't '; in l.<lOS in dn (!ffort to preSSUY'C the enemy into d cedse-

54 fire Jqreerlent tl,ere.

The enemy took advantage of the decreased FNIK

ground and :~;.S. ai~ operations and increased their aggressiveness. {~t

the same time, ii.S. reconnaissance and intelligence sources revealed a

SUilCt.,l'1t; ',' Incr p,lse in ("WillY logistics activities in the northeaster'n

reqirH1{; of tlw nlr'1pr Herllhlir. Thp II.~. int'f'lliflr'n(:p P(~l""',o!\n('l ill!,')

!J!.J pretet1 this as a reneHcd threat to South Vietnam.

(S) The 22 February cease-fire in Laos reinforced tire theory tl10Jt

lile COll':'~lItral.';(! ilPlll icdtion of airpower was an effective way to bring

about serious cease-fire neqotiations. This conclusion militated in

fovor of ,1n intensified ~.5. air effort in the Khmer Repub1ic. Although

USAF TAc!\lR sorties increased from 35 'in the third Iteek of February to

56 247 in the fourth Vleek to break an enemy siege of Kompong Thorn,

Amb?ssador SI;ank was nevertheless still optimistic about Lon 1101 's

ced".,-fitc. r;ef'21Tinq to the KOl1lpong Thom effort as a "one time air

,-eturn to tl1e nloce' of operations under which 7AF would assist the FAflK

con';i,;tent. !Villi Lon Nol 's cessation of offensive activities. I\t tile

s,ln\\' tillie, hDwever, he acknowledged that the continuing level of enemy

ilctivitv !Voulct require I\C-130 SPECTRE SUpPOy·t on 26 and 27 February, dnd

h.· 01111, if. iI'd I.I'd 1.1i(~ need ror gunship, rAe, and TACAIR support for the remain­

der of that ",eek. lie requested FI\C coverage of Kompong Thom, the Route

15/Route 1 area, Routes 2 and 3, and possibly Routes 4, 5, 6, and 7. To

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give the FAC OV-10s operating from Ubon RTAFB more time on station, the

Ambassador permitted them to refuel at Pochentong Airfield but cautioned

them to avoid publicity because of the U.S. troop limitation in the Khmer 57

Republic. The USAF sortie rate did drop the first week in r~arch, but 58

the reduction was only temporary.

(TS) Viewing the build-up of North Vietnamese supplies, equipment,

and personnel in FREEDOM DEAL, and the increasing enemy pressure on Khmer

Government positions, the JCS on 8 March suggested an expansion of the air

operating authorities. On 9 March, the Ambassador and the FANK Chief of

Staff approved the new JCS authorities and new operational procedures pro­

posed by General Vogt. The new rules permitted air interdiction of the

VC/NVA supply routes, storage areas, and transshipment points throughout

FREEDOM DEAL. They also increased the scope of air operations throughout

the Khmer Republic by permitting the use of the full spectrum of U.S. air

strike forces against targets posing a threat to friendly forces and pop-

ulation centers, thus deleting the requirement that air response be pro-

vided only to avert actual loss of positions. The FANK General Staff

reestablished the prevalidated LOC structure in FREEDOf.1 DEAL, and 7AF

developed validation procedures for all other tar<]ets. Altholl'1h Embassy

and FANK approval were no longer required for TACAIR and gunship strikes

in FREEDOI~ DEAL, FACs would control all TACAIR sorties. For B-52 strikes

in FREEDOM DEAL, 7AF would submit the targets through the Embassy to secure

FANK ilpproval. Any strike outside FREEDOr~ DEAL still required [",bassy 59

validation.

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(S) The nlllllb",rs of B-S2 and TACAIR strikes incrrased substantiillly

cillly as tile militilry situation in the Khmer Republic became more critical.

US~,F TACAIR ~;orties went from 365 in the second week to 1,392 in the third 50

while FdIC LIGHT strikes went from 165 t.o 409.

(TS) WII.il t.he tremendous increase. in the numner of strikes, the vali-

dation procedure soon became what Ambassador Swank described "a very onerous

uuy'den" for t'>le [mbil ssy. Onl7 April the Ambassador explained tha t even 61

when augmented by TDY personnel to the limit of the in-country ceiling,*

Lill' ';-,,1..11 t,il' '.I.\.;\clle ';,,:,ff had "to work night ilnd day under enO)'lliOUS pres-

sures to meet exact"i1g operational requirements in a siltisfactory manner."

:Ioting that the political advantages of separating the Embassy from the

operational TACAIR role ~Iere evident, Ambassador Swank strongly recommended

that CIMCPAC approve a proposal that General Vogt had made to delete the

requirement for the Embassy's validation of each TACAIR strike outside 6;>

FREE00t1 DEAL,

(S) Genera 1 Vogt I s proposed va 1 i dati on procedures, approved by CI NCPAC

and Washinnton, became effective on 19 April. The Embassy and the FANK

hart alreo(ly qiven indefinite validation for TACAIR and gunship strikes

within FREEOOM DEAL 'except for friendly areas. Now, for 3D-day periods,

the Embassy gave blanket validation for TACAIR and gunship strikes out­

side !!{LLUilH ~!E!\L, dlthough the FANK continued to validate each target

*T11e Forei,!" i\,;slstdnce !\ct of 1971 (Public Law 92-226) imposed a ceiling of 200 U.S'. and 85 third country national employees of the U.S. government in tile Khmer Hepulll ic at anyone time.

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there. Both Embassy and FANK approvals were still required for each 8-52 63

strike in tile Khmer Republic.

(C) Tile removill of tho [llIb"SSY frolll the TI\CI\l!{ Llt'<)CL vdl idilt,ion 1'''0-

cedure also removed 7AF's communication link with the FANK high command.

The USDAO had been providing the vital link for air support coordination

between 7AF and the FANK Combat Operations Center (COC) through an opera­

tion known as Area Control. Area Control was a radio relay center in the

Embassy where USDAO personnel passed targeting information back and forth

betWeen 7AF command and control personnel and the FANK COC, giving the

Embassy's political approvals for air strikes. Its removal required the 64

development of an entirely new command and control concept.

COlllllldnd dliU Lontr'o I

(C) Hhen the American Embassy withdrew from the TACAIR tarqet vali-

dation procedure in April 1973 and closed I\rea Control, tllere were several

projects underway which 7AF, the Embassy, and the Khmers were able to weld

together to serve in place of Area Control as the command and control link.

One of these was the newly-established Khmer Direct Air Support Center 65

(KDASC) •

(S) Al though the primary function of the Khmer Air Force was to pro­

vide close and direct air support for the FANK, the KAF did not have a

KDASC to affect the essential coordination between Khmer air and ground

forces. In mid-February 1973, 7AF di spatched a four-man survey team from

the deactivating 505th Tactical Control Group at Tan Son

Vietnam. to Phnom Penh to advise the DAO on implementing

24

Nhut AB, South 66

a DASC. The

------------r-'-----.------' -------------'-----'-

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team \Vos 0ventuill1y succrssflll, but the situ,li:ion it. initi,tlly ('"countet'eu

Vias inuicative of the undeveloped state of KAF capabil ities.

(S) The survey team members reported that when they arrived in Phnom

Penh on 12 February, no Tactical Air Control System (TACS) existed and

that "the r'lere establishment of a DASC will not sol ve the Tactical Air

Contru1 proLlelliS pl'esent in the Khmer Air Force." The team recommended

the development of a rudimentary TACS with the KDASC as the major opera-

tin",)l component designed to direct, control, and coordinate close air

sunnort in the Kinner Republic. The KDASC l~ould also coordinate tacti­

Cell t'~connais,ance ilnrl tactical airlift with the Air Operations Control () j

Cf~nter,

wi t': the

,·"';ell was not used extensively by the rANK who prefert'ed to deal GD

7..1.F TACC. I~hile the primary function of the KDASC would be

~c ",'c'/1de ii'lITifJiate air sup?ort for Khmer Army and Navy forces, it would

ills'; h·, ,"esponsilJle for preplanned air strikes, possibly including inter-

ciction missions. The team noted, however, tliat the KDASC would not perform

one of the pr'iriary functions of a DASC--diverting sorties to imnediate 69

turgets--because that authority was retained by 7AF.

(~) In dJdition to the teChnical problems, Khmer intra-service

riVdlrll", r·I'I..tnJeod lh(~ KIJN;C's development. The KAF was reluctant to

Cl)llocdtc tile IJASC wit.h till' Ft,:IK he~dquarters because the KAF believed it

Wd s the fi r s t. step of an Artny effort to tak'2 over the KAF. Although the

pri!',-)r, i'Ur,l:lS" of the DASC was to support the FANK, the KAF wanted the

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It is a knotty situation involving strange political undercurrents and jealousies. MG Fernandez [then FANK Chief of Staff] is apparently aware of this and is trying very hard to smooth out the problem. Unfor­tunately, some commanders who theoretically are under Fernandez's command do bypass him and deal directly wi til Lon Nol.

Colonel Burnell recommended that the DASC be established at FANK headquarters 70

as planned. He said that the Army would run it if the KAF wouldn't.

(S) The nppointment of a hi~hl'y qual ified ~JlF officer i1S the KnASC

director resolved the jurisdiction dispute, and tile KOASC was located at

the FAI!K Combat Operati ons Center. The KDASC was manned entirely by the

KAF, including several English-speaking Khmers to communicate with American

ainnen. It began limited operations on 30 March 1973, aSSisting in valida-71

tion of targets for U.S. TACAIR outside FREEDOM DEAL. The KDASC (known

as Bakheng Control) eventually replaced Area Control in April as the pri­

mary avenue by which 7AF received FANK target validations and air support

requests. The 7AF contact with Bakheng Contro 1 was through the Ai rborne

Battlefield Corrmand and Control Center (ABCCC), the key element in another 72

project already on the way.

(S) To aid in coordinating U.S. operations, the ABCCC* had been in

operation over the Khmer Republ ic or southern laos since the Vietnam cease­

fire. Prior to the cease-fire, however, the 7AF TIICC (GLUE CHIP) had exer­

cised command and control of immediate U.S. air strikes in the Khmer

Republic via Sundog Alpha, a radio relay station at !lui Ba Dinh ilountain,

*The ABCCC is a C-130 equipped with a command and control capsule.

26

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South Vietnam. (FACs and gunships controlling strikes communicated with

BLUE CHIP through Sun dog Alpha.) BLUE CHIP contacted the 7AF Target Manage­

ment Office to ascertain that the targets were val idated by the FANK and

compl ied ",it.!>. til<c ['()E. if so, and the assets were available, BLUE CHIP

authorized the strikes and directed the aircraft with the proper ordnance 73

to the target areas where the FACs took charge. Shortly after the cease-

fire, the deactivation of Sundog Alpha and the transfer of BLUE CHIP to

t1akhon Phanorn broke the radio communication link between BLUE CHIP and the 74

FACs operating over the Khmer Republ ic. Therefore, 7AF moved the ABCCC

(whic!l had coordinated air strikes in Laos for several years) to the Khmer

Republic. Initially, the ABCCC served as little more than a radio relay

platform bet\~een Area Control and BLUE CHIP, where 7AF validated the tar-75

qets, a time-consuming procedure.

(5) The lack of rapid Communications hl,came a problem in early ~larch

as the number of targets in the Khmer Repub"lic increased markedly. Seventh

Air Force reinstituted a visual reconnaissance strike list so that targets

of a non-fleeting nature would be recorded and disseminated to all FACs

for timely covera~e; but the comlnand and control system needed further

stredlillinin~ to ,Ilorten the target processing and validation time in

CY"itical sitIJiltions, in [lilrticular for the protection of r1ekon0 River

convoys. I\t the suggestion of the Embassy the 7AF target management per­

sonnel, in coordination with the 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron

at Korat kfAIG, ueveloped a proposal to delegate BLUE CHIP's target manage-

lIlent and validation functions to the Director of the ABCCC Air Battle Staff.

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The authority would be issued only for specific operating areas for 1 imited

time periods, since General Vogt felt that the sensitive nature of the U.S.

involvement in the Khmer Republic required the full control of U.S. airpower 76

to be within his headquarters.

(el Seventh Air Force first implemented the new proposal on a limited

basis in support of ~\ekong Hiver convoys in April 1973. The experilllent

(nicknamed Special t1ekong Air Sector--S11AS) significantly reduced response

time for bringing U.S. strike aircraft to the aid of the convoys. With

this success, General Vogt saw the elements of a truly responsive command

and control system, capable of immediate reaction to the unpredictable

ground situation in the Khmer Republ ic. Since the IIBCCe and the KDASe

were already there, he decided to delegate 7AF's authority for approving

all immediate air strikes in the Khmer Republic to the senior battle staff 77

member aboard the ABCCC.

(S) The new command and control arrangement worked well. Personnel

approval procedures for the Khmer Republic. The need for a FANK liaison

office at 711F for tar<jet validation was eliminated because the ABCCC COIll­

n~nicated directly with the KDASC. Seventh lIir Force headquarters fragged

air into the contested areas day and night, but the IIIlCCe determined its

utilization based upon the immediate situation. The /\nCCC with its speci<ll-

ized crew was making on-the-spot judgments normally done on the ground 78

by a U.S. DASC or TACC. Daily guidance was provided by Hq 7AF, and the

ABCCC staff referred any target

authorities to COMUSSAG/7AF for

requests not clearly within 79

approva 1 .

28

their delegated

._ .. _ .. _--_ . ...-..-__ ........ ------

SICItET.

(S) General Vogt noted the practical success of the concept after 80

it \,as in effect for one month:

i;e are employing ABCCC aircraft 24 hours a day and

the entire [air] war is being controlled by airmen,

in the air, in direct contact with troops on the

(jround. The Emb~$Sy is completely Qut of the tacti

cal air business. We now have a situation where

tln,I'e is a ilIun on the ground work i ng with a FAC who, in tun1, is in contact with ABCCC. ABCCC has tile

authority to call in the kinds of air and [determine]

the manner of air employment necessary to do the job.

It is highly l'esponsive. We never had this in Laos

and, if we had to return, I would I-ecomffiend a similar prLlqrcHli.

I lid t:t:cI, li)':.l n:po)'I." inuitdLed that the new procedure had reduced target 81

vaHdat ion ti:ne ny one half.

(C) I~nother element whi ch further stream1 i ned the improved command

and control system was the identification, for the first time, of FANK

ground Commanders qualified as Forward Air Guides (FAGs). A similar FAG

;!)'ogram had reduced reaction times for air support in Laos. To adopt the

CCl1cept in til~ l;illner Republ ie, the FANK General Staff granted select ground

cor:'''I<1nders lla1it.icdi ano lllilitary approval authority far air strikes in

support of the; r opel'ations. Upon the insistence of Genera 1 Vogt and the

IISDF,O, 1.1,,, Gener01 Staff's selection of the !'AGs was extremely stringent

unti each nomi nee had to be specifically approved by USDAO and 7 AF . The

IISOAO ruillishud ,In initi,)l list of 12 fllGs on 28 April and supplemented

il. Vii III 13 nK)!,l' in nay.' [ddl lAG WdS t.J1g1ish-speaking or had an English-

speakinq radio operator 'lv~ilahle to him for conlllunication with American

FACs, The FAGs began operatin9 On 1 ~1ay 1973 after the resolution of a

82 brief problem concerning tile FAGs' limits of authority.

29

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