digital mantras: the languages of abstract and virtual worldsby steven r. holtzman
TRANSCRIPT
Leonardo
Digital Mantras: The Languages of Abstract and Virtual Worlds by Steven R. HoltzmanReview by: Paul HertzLeonardo, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1995), pp. 338-339Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1576208 .
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tion of Darwinian selection and thus
opens the possibility for the reification of all sorts of nineteenth-century Dar- winist notions. In addition, certain as-
pects of the community seem all too
willing to adopt the "DNA-as-algorithm" dictum, which is open to a critique simi- lar to one the authors of Embodied Mind level at cognitivism: that the analogy with the digital computer may be inap- propriate. In contrast, the authors of Embodied Mind offer a rather liberating notion of "evolution as natural drift" as a component of their theory. The core of this notion is the movement from a
position that "evolution forbids any- thing that is not survivable" to "evolu- tion admits anything that can survive"-
opening the evolutionary field to mutations that do not impair survivabil-
ity. This allows the possibility of seeing evolution as "bricolage," meaning spe- cies exist not because they fulfill some ideal design but simply because they are possible. "There are therefore rea- sons to ask whether the very program of
studying evolution as trait fitness opti- mization is not fundamentally flawed"
(p. 189). And later: "Baldly stated, representationism in cognitive science is the precise homologue of
adaptationism in evolutionary theory, for optimality plays the same central role on each domain" (p. 194).
The stance of rejecting the possibility of objectivity and simultaneously reject- ing the stability of the cognizing subject is timely and resonates with post-struc- tural critical theory of the last 20 years in the humanities (a tradition that the authors make only scant reference to). Their position also resonates with cri-
tiques of the scientific method, from Paul Feyerabend to the Endo-physics of Otto R6ssler, et al. By associating them- selves with these various schools of
thought, and with the phenomenologi- cally informed critiques of AI, the au- thors make it plain that they are inter- ested in placing their discussion not
only within the confines of the disci-
pline of cognitive science, but also within the broader debate on the scien- tific method and the tradition of the enlightenment.
Noting that in the U.S. and in cogni- tive science in the U.S., phenomenology has remained a relatively uninfluential
philosophical school, the authors cite the fundamental intuition of "double
tion of Darwinian selection and thus
opens the possibility for the reification of all sorts of nineteenth-century Dar- winist notions. In addition, certain as-
pects of the community seem all too
willing to adopt the "DNA-as-algorithm" dictum, which is open to a critique simi- lar to one the authors of Embodied Mind level at cognitivism: that the analogy with the digital computer may be inap- propriate. In contrast, the authors of Embodied Mind offer a rather liberating notion of "evolution as natural drift" as a component of their theory. The core of this notion is the movement from a
position that "evolution forbids any- thing that is not survivable" to "evolu- tion admits anything that can survive"-
opening the evolutionary field to mutations that do not impair survivabil-
ity. This allows the possibility of seeing evolution as "bricolage," meaning spe- cies exist not because they fulfill some ideal design but simply because they are possible. "There are therefore rea- sons to ask whether the very program of
studying evolution as trait fitness opti- mization is not fundamentally flawed"
(p. 189). And later: "Baldly stated, representationism in cognitive science is the precise homologue of
adaptationism in evolutionary theory, for optimality plays the same central role on each domain" (p. 194).
The stance of rejecting the possibility of objectivity and simultaneously reject- ing the stability of the cognizing subject is timely and resonates with post-struc- tural critical theory of the last 20 years in the humanities (a tradition that the authors make only scant reference to). Their position also resonates with cri-
tiques of the scientific method, from Paul Feyerabend to the Endo-physics of Otto R6ssler, et al. By associating them- selves with these various schools of
thought, and with the phenomenologi- cally informed critiques of AI, the au- thors make it plain that they are inter- ested in placing their discussion not
only within the confines of the disci-
pline of cognitive science, but also within the broader debate on the scien- tific method and the tradition of the enlightenment.
Noting that in the U.S. and in cogni- tive science in the U.S., phenomenology has remained a relatively uninfluential
philosophical school, the authors cite the fundamental intuition of "double embodiment" of Merleau-Ponty. "For
Merleau-Ponty as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential
embodiment" of Merleau-Ponty. "For
Merleau-Ponty as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential
structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms" (p. xvi). They call for a "radically new ap- proach to the implementation of
Merleau-Ponty's vision" (p. xvii). It is here that the authors pull a rather sur-
prising trump card, which becomes a central theme of the book. They assert (the work of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Husserl and Nietzche notwithstanding) that although the Western philosophical tradition is largely bereft of tools to deal with the issue of the insubstantial na- ture of the self, there exists a long tradi- tion of experientially based philosophy of cognition in certain aspects of Bud- dhist thought (the Madhyamika tradi- tion), which has been developed and re- fined for many centuries.
It is in the Madhyamika tradition that the authors find both an experiential dimension of study that complements and redeems cognitive science from be-
ing lost in abstraction and a system of
thought that finds no need for objective ground, indeed counsels against the
clinging to or grasping of such ground as fallacious. There ensues an introduc- tion of groundlessness and of the nonunified or decentered self in the Buddhist tradition, and the explication of a system for enlightened living based on this notion of groundlessness and
egolessness in the same tradition. They find in this system support for their pro- gram of Enactive cognitive science.
The expansive reach of this work is
breathtaking. The book swings between a focused and specialized examination of the discipline of cognitive science and a philosophical discussion that
steps beyond the limits of the Western tradition by placing the entire tradition in relation to the idea of groundless- ness as discussed in Buddhist teachings. There is a certain thrill in the auda- ciousness of this position. Their ap- proach implicitly takes cognitive sci- ence researchers to task in two ways: it
critiques the philosophical basis of their
methodology within cognitive science, and it critiques their inability to incor-
porate the results of their research in their lived lives.
Over the years there have been nu- merous attempts at a holistic reconcilia- tion of science with spiritual traditions, both Eastern and Western, typified by the works of such authors as Fritjof Capra and Paul Davies. These works
structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms" (p. xvi). They call for a "radically new ap- proach to the implementation of
Merleau-Ponty's vision" (p. xvii). It is here that the authors pull a rather sur-
prising trump card, which becomes a central theme of the book. They assert (the work of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Husserl and Nietzche notwithstanding) that although the Western philosophical tradition is largely bereft of tools to deal with the issue of the insubstantial na- ture of the self, there exists a long tradi- tion of experientially based philosophy of cognition in certain aspects of Bud- dhist thought (the Madhyamika tradi- tion), which has been developed and re- fined for many centuries.
It is in the Madhyamika tradition that the authors find both an experiential dimension of study that complements and redeems cognitive science from be-
ing lost in abstraction and a system of
thought that finds no need for objective ground, indeed counsels against the
clinging to or grasping of such ground as fallacious. There ensues an introduc- tion of groundlessness and of the nonunified or decentered self in the Buddhist tradition, and the explication of a system for enlightened living based on this notion of groundlessness and
egolessness in the same tradition. They find in this system support for their pro- gram of Enactive cognitive science.
The expansive reach of this work is
breathtaking. The book swings between a focused and specialized examination of the discipline of cognitive science and a philosophical discussion that
steps beyond the limits of the Western tradition by placing the entire tradition in relation to the idea of groundless- ness as discussed in Buddhist teachings. There is a certain thrill in the auda- ciousness of this position. Their ap- proach implicitly takes cognitive sci- ence researchers to task in two ways: it
critiques the philosophical basis of their
methodology within cognitive science, and it critiques their inability to incor-
porate the results of their research in their lived lives.
Over the years there have been nu- merous attempts at a holistic reconcilia- tion of science with spiritual traditions, both Eastern and Western, typified by the works of such authors as Fritjof Capra and Paul Davies. These works clearly address a felt need of an entire generation. Although tempting, it would be a mistake to see Embodied Mind as fitting neatly into this category.
clearly address a felt need of an entire generation. Although tempting, it would be a mistake to see Embodied Mind as fitting neatly into this category.
Embodied Mind is not working on the level of poetic associations. Like the Buddhist tradition it sources, it is rug- gedly, steadfastly pragmatic.
DIGITAL MANTRAS: THE LANGUAGES OF ABSTRACT AND VIRTUAL WORLDS
by Steven R. Holtzman. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., 1994. ISBN: 0-262-08228-4.
Reviewed by Paul Hertz, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Academic Computing and Network Services, 2129 North Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208-2850, U.S.A. E-mail:
What we hold for laws are perhaps only laws which permit us to under- stand, but not the laws which are the foundation for a work of art.
-Arnold Schoenberg, Harmony
In Digital Mantras, author Steven Holtzman guides us through a labyrinth whose architecture continually shifts, appearing now as words, now as form and color, and again as music or binary code. He argues that "visual art, music, mathematics, mantra, numbers, and form are all investigations of structure," whose essential nature is linguistic. Without supplying a map, he neverthe- less makes a convincing case that each of these architectures might be a single labyrinth, a "deep structure" derived from the nature of language itself and its imbrications in the human psyche. From this insight he derives creative, aesthetic and mystical implications in which the computer appears as the ulti- mate manipulator of structures.
For the clarity with which it weaves to-
gether separate strands of discourse in the history of linguistics, musical com-
position, abstract visual art and the evo- lution of computing devices, Digital Mantras deserves serious consideration as a work of intellectual synthesis. Holtzman begins with the work of the early Sanskrit grammarians and a con- cise introduction to Western music
theory, then proceeds to the ground- breaking investigations of Wassily Kandinsky, Arnold Schoenberg and Noam Chomsky into formal systems for visual art, music and language. He sees
Embodied Mind is not working on the level of poetic associations. Like the Buddhist tradition it sources, it is rug- gedly, steadfastly pragmatic.
DIGITAL MANTRAS: THE LANGUAGES OF ABSTRACT AND VIRTUAL WORLDS
by Steven R. Holtzman. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., 1994. ISBN: 0-262-08228-4.
Reviewed by Paul Hertz, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Academic Computing and Network Services, 2129 North Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208-2850, U.S.A. E-mail:
What we hold for laws are perhaps only laws which permit us to under- stand, but not the laws which are the foundation for a work of art.
-Arnold Schoenberg, Harmony
In Digital Mantras, author Steven Holtzman guides us through a labyrinth whose architecture continually shifts, appearing now as words, now as form and color, and again as music or binary code. He argues that "visual art, music, mathematics, mantra, numbers, and form are all investigations of structure," whose essential nature is linguistic. Without supplying a map, he neverthe- less makes a convincing case that each of these architectures might be a single labyrinth, a "deep structure" derived from the nature of language itself and its imbrications in the human psyche. From this insight he derives creative, aesthetic and mystical implications in which the computer appears as the ulti- mate manipulator of structures.
For the clarity with which it weaves to-
gether separate strands of discourse in the history of linguistics, musical com-
position, abstract visual art and the evo- lution of computing devices, Digital Mantras deserves serious consideration as a work of intellectual synthesis. Holtzman begins with the work of the early Sanskrit grammarians and a con- cise introduction to Western music
theory, then proceeds to the ground- breaking investigations of Wassily Kandinsky, Arnold Schoenberg and Noam Chomsky into formal systems for visual art, music and language. He sees in their work the foundation for later "structure manipulators," such as Terry Winograd, Pierre Boulez, Iannis Xenakis and Harold Cohen. He places
in their work the foundation for later "structure manipulators," such as Terry Winograd, Pierre Boulez, Iannis Xenakis and Harold Cohen. He places
338 Reviews 338 Reviews
This content downloaded from 91.229.229.162 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 12:01:41 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
the apogee of structuralist discourse in the digital world, where binary code
may represent mathematical concepts, images, sound or motion, each of whose
separate grammars can unite in a virtual world. Within virtual worlds, isomorphic structures can leave the realm of ab- stract symbols and become manifest si-
multaneously in different sensory streams.
Flushed with the new wine of virtual
reality (VR), he dances from inquiry to
speculation. We are pleased to accom-
pany him, though a critical reader must revert to sobriety after the ball. He ar-
gues that if "music is the fusion of form and emotion in sound" (p. 254) emo- tion itself is a structure, electroenceph- alic in nature. Hence, structuralist in-
quiry applies not only "to all systems of
expression," but to our experience of
expression, too. Holtzman imagines that VR will one day "directly evoke the expe- rience of what we feel and what we emote" (p. 209). Perhaps so-but doesn't art already do just that through its culturally acquired codes of interpre- tation? Even if an artist could present us with the very stuff of emotion, it would still be in the guise of language, an exte- rior form that we transform to an inte- rior meaning. Emotion, whatever its bio-
logical manifestation, is also a situation, an intentional state whose object is so- cial. Structuralism has successfully illu- minated the morphological and syntac- tic aspects of symbolic systems; it sheds less light on their semantic and prag- matic aspects, which are the realm of
meaning. Aware that meaning is a tricky philosophical knot, Holtzman wonders if structuralist methods can untie it.
Meaning emanates from the system, but
meaning is not just a matter of form-or is it?, he asks. Perhaps meaning derives from a cultural totality, or from tran- scendental insight. In post-structuralist discourse, the meaning of a linguistic ut- terance (a text) appears to be so bound to each individual act of interpretation that structural analysis alone cannot ac- count for its emergence and evolution. The epistemological cut necessary to make a structure emerge as an object from its linguistic substrate may well leave the experience of meaning be- hind, within the subject.
In the arts, formal systems may be no more than scaffolding and catwalks, dis-
the apogee of structuralist discourse in the digital world, where binary code
may represent mathematical concepts, images, sound or motion, each of whose
separate grammars can unite in a virtual world. Within virtual worlds, isomorphic structures can leave the realm of ab- stract symbols and become manifest si-
multaneously in different sensory streams.
Flushed with the new wine of virtual
reality (VR), he dances from inquiry to
speculation. We are pleased to accom-
pany him, though a critical reader must revert to sobriety after the ball. He ar-
gues that if "music is the fusion of form and emotion in sound" (p. 254) emo- tion itself is a structure, electroenceph- alic in nature. Hence, structuralist in-
quiry applies not only "to all systems of
expression," but to our experience of
expression, too. Holtzman imagines that VR will one day "directly evoke the expe- rience of what we feel and what we emote" (p. 209). Perhaps so-but doesn't art already do just that through its culturally acquired codes of interpre- tation? Even if an artist could present us with the very stuff of emotion, it would still be in the guise of language, an exte- rior form that we transform to an inte- rior meaning. Emotion, whatever its bio-
logical manifestation, is also a situation, an intentional state whose object is so- cial. Structuralism has successfully illu- minated the morphological and syntac- tic aspects of symbolic systems; it sheds less light on their semantic and prag- matic aspects, which are the realm of
meaning. Aware that meaning is a tricky philosophical knot, Holtzman wonders if structuralist methods can untie it.
Meaning emanates from the system, but
meaning is not just a matter of form-or is it?, he asks. Perhaps meaning derives from a cultural totality, or from tran- scendental insight. In post-structuralist discourse, the meaning of a linguistic ut- terance (a text) appears to be so bound to each individual act of interpretation that structural analysis alone cannot ac- count for its emergence and evolution. The epistemological cut necessary to make a structure emerge as an object from its linguistic substrate may well leave the experience of meaning be- hind, within the subject.
In the arts, formal systems may be no more than scaffolding and catwalks, dis-
pensable once the architecture of an artwork emerges. Schoenberg sug- gested, in his monumental textbook
Harmony, that the formal system we use to understand and produce music is not
pensable once the architecture of an artwork emerges. Schoenberg sug- gested, in his monumental textbook
Harmony, that the formal system we use to understand and produce music is not
necessarily the fundamental structure or impulse from which music arises. Structures beget structures. The trans- formations that produce structure may themselves be structured by other trans- formations. Having once started the hare of meaning, we may pursue it ever
deeper and higher, to ever finer granu- larity or to overarching totality. Holtzman concludes that formal sys- tems may be the vehicle for mystical in-
sight, a form of mantra, leading us from surface appearances to deep structure and thence beyond structure to Brah- man. In this conclusion, he points up one of the principal historical difficul- ties of structuralism, which has served not only as a method of inquiry, but also as a critical assault on other ten- dencies. Structuralism rejected the atomistic approach of empiricism, with its emphasis on the accrual of motes of data that become schematized within a causal, diachronic frame. To this it op- posed a model for the behavior of sys- tems governed by constraints and trans- formations such that their internal, synchronic relations remain consis- tent-in effect, a cybernetic model. Within linguistics, psychology, ethnol-
ogy and mathematics, this model has led to the creation of formal descrip- tions of the behavior of specific systems. While these formalizations frequently become identified with the systems they describe, they are built on the premise that structure exists independent of its formalization. But what then is the na- ture of structure? If we regard it as more than an abstraction, yet immate- rial, we easily fall into Platonism, assign- ing to structures the role of archetypes. Historically, structuralism has resisted this temptation, rejecting models of
knowledge (such as gestalt psychology) in which the totality of possible forms assumes an existence beyond the indi- vidual emergence of form. On the other hand, the assumption that lin-
guistic structure may be an innate part of the brain, as Chomsky asserts, cannot
adequately explain the cultural forma- tion of symbolic structures, or of the
constraining processes that govern them. Structuralism attempts to medi- ate between the atom and the totality. Holtzman swings for the totality. This
may well be inevitable, when structural- ist inquiry serves as a method for exam-
necessarily the fundamental structure or impulse from which music arises. Structures beget structures. The trans- formations that produce structure may themselves be structured by other trans- formations. Having once started the hare of meaning, we may pursue it ever
deeper and higher, to ever finer granu- larity or to overarching totality. Holtzman concludes that formal sys- tems may be the vehicle for mystical in-
sight, a form of mantra, leading us from surface appearances to deep structure and thence beyond structure to Brah- man. In this conclusion, he points up one of the principal historical difficul- ties of structuralism, which has served not only as a method of inquiry, but also as a critical assault on other ten- dencies. Structuralism rejected the atomistic approach of empiricism, with its emphasis on the accrual of motes of data that become schematized within a causal, diachronic frame. To this it op- posed a model for the behavior of sys- tems governed by constraints and trans- formations such that their internal, synchronic relations remain consis- tent-in effect, a cybernetic model. Within linguistics, psychology, ethnol-
ogy and mathematics, this model has led to the creation of formal descrip- tions of the behavior of specific systems. While these formalizations frequently become identified with the systems they describe, they are built on the premise that structure exists independent of its formalization. But what then is the na- ture of structure? If we regard it as more than an abstraction, yet immate- rial, we easily fall into Platonism, assign- ing to structures the role of archetypes. Historically, structuralism has resisted this temptation, rejecting models of
knowledge (such as gestalt psychology) in which the totality of possible forms assumes an existence beyond the indi- vidual emergence of form. On the other hand, the assumption that lin-
guistic structure may be an innate part of the brain, as Chomsky asserts, cannot
adequately explain the cultural forma- tion of symbolic structures, or of the
constraining processes that govern them. Structuralism attempts to medi- ate between the atom and the totality. Holtzman swings for the totality. This
may well be inevitable, when structural- ist inquiry serves as a method for exam-
ining the arts, where structure and
meaning are inseparable. Thus, Kandinsky's formalization of abstract art in Point and Line to Plane develops meaning simultaneously with form:
ining the arts, where structure and
meaning are inseparable. Thus, Kandinsky's formalization of abstract art in Point and Line to Plane develops meaning simultaneously with form:
meaning is the resonance of form within the perceiving spirit.
In appraising structuralism as a method of inquiry applicable to the arts, Holtzman concerns himself with its artistic rather than its scientific possi- bilities. His is a romantic structuralism, a poetics of structure, a formalization directed toward the production of art rather than the production of knowl-
edge about art. Valuable though its sur-
vey of the process of formalization in the arts may be, Digital Mantras breaks new ground in pointing to digital tech-
nology as the realm where a grand uni- fied theory of formal systems in the arts
may be developed and applied. Like
any poetics that has been put into prac- tice (Holtzman's music is available sepa- rately on CD), Holtzman's poetics of
digital structure bears the mark of his
personal experience, within which he strives for universality. His originality, his scope, and the lucidity with which he musters both his arguments and his
provocations promise to make Digital Mantras a core text in the development of an aesthetic for the digital produc- tion of art.
ENGINEERING
AND THE MIND'S EYE
by Eugene S. Ferguson. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., 1992. 241 pp. $24.95. ISBN 0-262-06147-3.
Reviewed by Stephen Wilson, Art Depart- ment, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132, U.S.A. E-mail:
Engineering and the Mind's Eye, written by Eugene Ferguson, an emeritus profes- sor of the history of science at the Uni-
versity of Delaware, challenges several
assumptions often made about engi- neering. It highlights the over-reliance on mathematics and analytical thought and downplays intuition and nonverbal
thought in contemporary engineering. Presenting fascinating historical docu- ments of engineering from the last five centuries, it shows the importance of vi- sualization and drawing in the develop- ment of engineering solutions to prob- lems. Other sections show the
importance of hands-on experience in
building a repertoire of ideas, images
meaning is the resonance of form within the perceiving spirit.
In appraising structuralism as a method of inquiry applicable to the arts, Holtzman concerns himself with its artistic rather than its scientific possi- bilities. His is a romantic structuralism, a poetics of structure, a formalization directed toward the production of art rather than the production of knowl-
edge about art. Valuable though its sur-
vey of the process of formalization in the arts may be, Digital Mantras breaks new ground in pointing to digital tech-
nology as the realm where a grand uni- fied theory of formal systems in the arts
may be developed and applied. Like
any poetics that has been put into prac- tice (Holtzman's music is available sepa- rately on CD), Holtzman's poetics of
digital structure bears the mark of his
personal experience, within which he strives for universality. His originality, his scope, and the lucidity with which he musters both his arguments and his
provocations promise to make Digital Mantras a core text in the development of an aesthetic for the digital produc- tion of art.
ENGINEERING
AND THE MIND'S EYE
by Eugene S. Ferguson. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., 1992. 241 pp. $24.95. ISBN 0-262-06147-3.
Reviewed by Stephen Wilson, Art Depart- ment, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132, U.S.A. E-mail:
Engineering and the Mind's Eye, written by Eugene Ferguson, an emeritus profes- sor of the history of science at the Uni-
versity of Delaware, challenges several
assumptions often made about engi- neering. It highlights the over-reliance on mathematics and analytical thought and downplays intuition and nonverbal
thought in contemporary engineering. Presenting fascinating historical docu- ments of engineering from the last five centuries, it shows the importance of vi- sualization and drawing in the develop- ment of engineering solutions to prob- lems. Other sections show the
importance of hands-on experience in
building a repertoire of ideas, images and impressions that prove essential in the solving of problems encountered
years later. The book also demonstrates that
many of the problems encountered by
and impressions that prove essential in the solving of problems encountered
years later. The book also demonstrates that
many of the problems encountered by
Reviews 339 Reviews 339
This content downloaded from 91.229.229.162 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 12:01:41 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions