digests for admin

8/6/2019 Digests for ADMIN

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G.R. No. 169493 March 15, 2010

STA. CLARA SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. EUGENIA T. SAN PABLO, Respondent.

Facts:

Sta. Clara filed an application with Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate MV King

Frederick. Said application was granted on January 26, 2004. Accordingly, a CPC was issued to Sta. Clara. Meanwhile, Republic Act(RA) 9295 and its implementing rules and regulations were issued which requires existing operators to apply for CPCs under the new

law. Thus, on May 4, 2005, Sta. Clara filed with the Legaspi Maritime Regional Office (LMRO)another application for a new CPC to

operate MV King Frederick and two other vessels. Respondent opposed the MARINA decision and sought for its reversal to the CA,

which the latter set aside the decision on May 31, 2005. On June 6, 2005, LMRO granted the application of Sta. Clara for a new CPC

Respondent San Pablo filed another motion to the CA to hold Sta. Clara in contempt of court and to cancel its new CPC granted by

the LMRO. On June 24, 2005, Sta. Clara filed a motion for reconsideration of the previous decision of CA without disclosing that it

had obtained a new CPC for MV King Frederick. CA denied Sta. Clara's motion for reconsideration and rescinded the LMRO decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly took judicial cognizance over the case.

Ruling:

No. Although Sta. Clara filed with the CA a motion for reconsideration without disclosing the foregoing developments, by the time

the CA resolved the motion for reconsideration, it was already aware of the changes in the situation of the parties: specifically, that

Sta. Clara had filed a new application under RA 9295 and that the LMRO had issued Sta. Clara a new CPC. More significantly, the

new CPC issued to Sta. Clara was now subject to the rules implementing RA 9295. Under Rule XV, Sec. 1 of RA 9295, a peculiar

process of administrative remedy provides that the MARINA Administrator, and not the CA, is vested with primary jurisdiction over

matters relating to the issuance of a CPC.

The CA should have refrained from resolving the pending motions before it and should have declared the case mooted by

supervening events. Besides, questions on the validity of the new CPC are cognizable by the MARINA Administrator and, consonant

with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, the CA should have referred San Pablo to MARINA for the resolution of her

challenge to the validity of the new CPC of Sta. Clara. The CA ought to have given due deference to the exercise by MARINA of its

sound administrative discretion in applying its special knowledge, experience and expertise to determine the technical and intricate

factual matters relating to the new CPC of Sta. Clara.

The January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and the old CPC are now defunct. The passage of RA 9295 and the filing by Sta. Clara of an

application for a new CPC under the new law supervened and rendered the January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and old CPC of no

consequence. There was no more justiciable controversy for the CA to decide, no remedy to grant or deny. The petition before the

CA had become purely hypothetical, there being nothing left to act upon.


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G.R. No. 168726 March 5, 2010

PIO DELOS REYES (Deceased), represented by heirs, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLEWALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy

Executive Secretary, Office of the President, HONORABLE RENE C. VILLA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Land

Reform (formerly Department of Agrarian Reform), THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (PARO) OF DINALUPIHAN

BATAAN, THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (MARO) OF HERMOSA AND ORANI, BATAAN, and FORTUNATO QUIAMBAO,

Respondents.

Facts:

Pio delos Reyes applied for exclusion from the coverage of operation land transfer, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 274 and

Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474, of parcels of land. In 1988, Pio and his children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, which

included the properties subject of the application for exclusion or retention. In the proceedings for his application Pio failed to

submit the deed of extrajudicial partition. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject landholdings within

the coverage of P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474. Resulting therefrom was the cancellation of certificates of land transfer issued in favo

of private respondent Fortunato Quiambao, a tenant-farmer in Pios landholdings and a farmer beneficiary. Thus, the latter appealed

to the DAR Secretary, claiming that, Pio converted portions of their landholdings into residential lands. The DAR Secretary granted

the appeal.

Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed petitioners appeal for being filed out of

time. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners then filed a petition for relief from denial of appeal. The Officeof the President dismissed the same. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, xxx DISMISSED for lack of merit. XxxNo further pleadings shall be entertained.

Instead of filing in the Office of the President a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order, petitioners filed in the

Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. CA dismissed for prematurity. The appellate court found that petitioners

failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available from the dismissal of their petition for relief.

Issue

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed for prematurity the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners.

Ruling

YES. Petitioners claimed that the filing for motion for consideration was useless because the decision was already final and executory

on its face as the order itself stated that no further pleadings would be entertained. We are not convinced that this constitutes an

exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination o

whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. Petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the

order of the Office of the President. They cannot prematurely resort to a petition for certiorari on the wrong assumption that a plain

reading of the order hinted that it was already final and executory. The parties are presumed to know the hornbook rule that judgments become final and executory only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal or to file a motion fo

reconsideration without any appeal or motion for reconsideration having been made.

We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no

other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration.

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their

functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. To this end, administrative

agencies are afforded a chance to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity, and

convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.


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G.R. No. 127965 January 20, 2009

FRANCISCO SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. REYNALDO DE LEON represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, FELICIANO JABONILLA, Respondent.

Facts

Respondent lodged a civil complaint against petitioner for the recovery of possession of real property. Respondent alleged that he is

the real owner and that he merely tolerated petitioners stay over the land. Respondent won said civil case. Petitioner filed a motion

for reconsideration but which was denied. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals contending mainly that the dispute

between him and respondent involved a tenancy relationship over which the trial court had no jurisdiction. In the meantime

petitioner initiated a case before DARAB against respondent for the settlement of his claim as a tenant of the latter. The DARAB

ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner submitted a copy of the DARAB Decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of

Appeals still rejected petitioners arguments and denied his appeal. The CA ruled that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case

as the allegations in the complaint make out a case cognizable by the court a quo, to wit: (1) the [herein respondent] is the

registered owner of a parcel of land, which was: (2) tilled by the [herein petitioner] by [respondents] mere tolerance; and (3)

[petitioner] refused to surrender possession of the land despite demand. Expectedly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was

denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue

Whether there is an agrarian dispute between petitioner and respondent as to warrant the jurisdiction of the DARAB

Ruling

YES. The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving an adverse relationship between a landlord and his tenant. The

reason for petitioners refusal to surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent is that petitioner is allegedly his

tenant, and has a right that is protected under the agrarian reform laws, a claim which respondent denies. There is, thus, a dispute

as to the nature of the relationship between respondent and petitioner.

The jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial agency, over the subject matter of a complaint or petition is determined by

the allegations therein. However, in determining jurisdiction, it is not only the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject o

the controversy that should be determined, but also the status or relationship of the parties.

The dispute herein between respondent as landowner and petitioner as tenant is agrarian in nature falling within the jurisdictional

domain of the DARAB. This is in line with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which precludes the regular courts from resolving a

controversy over which jurisdiction has been lodged with an administrative body of special competence.


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G.R. No. 174129 July 5, 2010

HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., and ROMEO E. ESPERA, Petitioners, vs. Mayor SULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of Naga City

Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Naga, and Peafrancia Memorial Park Corporation, Respondents.

Facts

Respondents issued Resolutions No. 2000-263 and No. 2000-3546 and Ordinance No. 2000-0597 which the two resolutionsapproved the application of private respondents for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC) for a First Class Memoria

Park as well as its application for Development Permit (DP) to develop the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park located at Barangay

Balatas, City of Naga and further favorably endorsing the same to the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) for

appropriate action. Petitioners herein sought for Declaratory Relief and/or Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order

against said issuances. However, the RTC dismissed petitioners petition. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but to no

avail. CA held that the filing of the petition for declaratory relief with the trial court had no basis, as there can be no issue ripe for

judicial determination when the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the HLURB. Thus, as

consequence, inasmuch as the filing of the petition below was premature, appellants application for temporary restraining orde

and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which is merely ancillary to the petition, has no leg to stand on." Hence this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the prayer for Declaratory relief was proper

Ruling

No. It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:

1] The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or

regulation, or ordinance;

2] The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;

3] There must have been no breach of the documents in question;

4] There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;

5] The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

6] Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

The issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance

does it show that the public respondents acted on private respondents application with finality.What appears therefrom is that the

application of private respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB) for appropriate action, the latter being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues fo

resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of theadministrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination

requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an

administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.


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