Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts:On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employeesPursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue:WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD:To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.SO ORDERED.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs.DAMBA-NSFW and DAR

FACTS:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislativepower from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No.6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act wassigned by the President onJune 10, 1988 andtook effect on June 15, 1988. Before thelaws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas &Co.] filed with respondent DAR avoluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O.No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Baniladwere later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR inaccordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent aletter to theSecretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural tonon-agricultural As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying forconversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub onthe interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE ANDTHE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS ASA TOURISTZONE, AND FOROTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application forconversion of its three haciendas from agricultural tonon-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as atourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co.filed with the DAR anapplication forexemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988on the basis ofPP 1520 and ofDAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all landsalready classified as commercial, industrial, orresidential before the effectivity of CARP no longerneed conversion clearance from the DAR.ISSUES:Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975all lands inthe Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone tonon-agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.s threehaciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;

RULING:PP 1520 DID NOTAUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THETHREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520declared the three municipalities as eachconstituting a tourism zone, reclassified all landstherein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use tonon-agricultural purposes.The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520identified only "certain areas in thesector comprising the [three Municipalities that] havepotential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of"necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas"toachieve its purpose. Which iswhy the PP directed the PhilippineTourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9the Court made it clearthat the "power to determine whetherHaciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage ofthe [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court." TheDAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in theaffected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that thePTA had not yet, atthat time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had nopending tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report fromthe Center forLand Use Policy Planning andImplementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areaswere planted with sugar caneand other crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of2004,12came up with clarificatory guidelines andtherein decreed thatB. Proclamations declaring general areas such aswhole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist zones that merely:(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas withinthe covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulasto be with potentialtourism value and charge the PhilippineTourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate specificgeographic areas within the zonewith potential tourism value and tocoordinate said areas development; or(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the PhilippineTourism Authority to coordinate said areas development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the landarea declared as tourist zone. Thisis sobecause "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation intosome specific use and "providing forthe manner of their utilizationand disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land useplan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the potential tourism value of certain areaswithin the general area declaredas tourist zone clearly does notallocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of theland area of thezone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct thatotherwise CARPable lands within the zone shallalready be used for purposesother than agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas would beunreasonable as it amounts to anautomatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in thename of tourism development. The same would alsoundermine the land use reclassification powers vested inlocal governmentunits in conjunction with pertinent agencies ofgovernment.C. There being noreclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply abasis for exemption of the entirety ofthe lands embraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DARs reading intothese general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in thepresent petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land.To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potentialtourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did notreclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one ispermitted to use it forother purposes

Just compensation in agrarian cases: what law applies; how computed.LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Vs. MAGIN FERRER, ANTONIO V. FERRER, and RAMON V. FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA, GR No. 172230, Feb. 2, 2011; with companion case - DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by Secretary NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN vs. ANTONIO V. FERRER and RAMON V. FERRER, GR No. 179421, Feb. 2, 2011.

X x x.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land.

Positions of the Parties

The LBP and the DAR basically argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for the subject property. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time, when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27.

As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. R.A. No. 6657 does not cover ricelands and cornlands acquired under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. The governments OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program under R.A. No. 6657 because 1) R.A. No. 6657 operates prospectively; and 2) Congress intended that lands subject to or governed by existing government programs such as the OLT and homestead under P.D. No. 27 are to be treated distinctly.

With respect to the appointment of commissioners, the LBP and the DAR argue that there was no legal basis therefor because 1) there were no long accounts or difficult questions of fact that required the expertise and know-how of the commissioners; and 2) the formula for just compensation was already provided under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.

On the other hand, the Ferrers adopted the common ruling of the CA stating that it did not err in applying the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 in fixing the just compensation for the subject property.

The Courts Ruling

The issue as to which agrarian law between P. D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 and R.A. No. 6657 should apply in the determination of just compensation has been laid to rest in a number of cases. In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad, 497 Phil 738 (2005). it was ruled that:Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. [Emphases supplied]

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manuel O Gallego, Jr., G.R. No. 173226, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 680, the Court handed down the same ruling. Thus:The Court has already ruled on the applicability of agrarian laws, namely, P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, in prior cases concerning just compensation.In Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil 473 (2001), the Court held that the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1248 (1999), the Court in Paris held that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 have suppletory effect to R.A. No. 6657, to wit:We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA [No.] 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD [No.] 27. Section 75 of RA [No.] 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD [No.] 27 and EO [No.] 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides

Sec. 7. Priorities.The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners of agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).

This eloquently demonstrates that RA [No.] 6657 includes PD [No.] 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to. In Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, this Court applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for PD [No.] 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18. [Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989)].Particularly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738 (2005), where the agrarian reform process in said case is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled, the Court held therein that just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under R.A. No. 6657.The retroactive application of R.A. No. 6657 is not only statutory but is also founded on equitable considerations. In Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415, the Court declared that it would be highly inequitable on the part of the landowners therein to compute just compensation using the values at the time of taking in 1972, and not at the time of payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof has not yet been transferred in their names. The same equitable consideration is applicable to the factual milieu of the instant case. The records show that respondents property had been placed under the agrarian reform program in 1972 and had already been distributed to the beneficiaries but respondents have yet to receive just compensation due them. [Emphases supplied]

The above rulings were reiterated in the recent cases of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido and Heirs of Romeo Barrido, G.R. No. 183688, April 18, 2010, and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Enrique Livioc, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.

The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that the agrarian reform process in this particular case was still incomplete because the just compensation due to the Ferrers had yet to be settled. Since R.A. No. 6657 was already in effectivity before the completion of the process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under this law.

With respect to the appointment of the commissioners, it is an issue not properly brought and ventilated in the trial courts below and only raised for the first time on appeal. At any rate, the appointment was proper because the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657.

X x x.

G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners, vs.LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.

HELD: Yes.Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.27 The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

(1)[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996]LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER ,VS.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.I. FACTSIn this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amountsrespectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. II. ISSUESWhether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.III. HELDThe provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.(1)[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996]LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER ,VS.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.I. FACTSIn this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amountsrespectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. II. ISSUESWhether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.III. HELDThe provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.[G.R. No. 118712.July 5, 1996]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner ,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.I. FACTS

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. II. ISSUES

Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.III. HELD

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor.He has no recourse but to allow it.His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.