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Diffusion of Precommercial Inventions Developed in Govern ment-Fu nded Research Institutions in Nigeria

Titus Adeboye

April 1988

PERIODICALS PEMODIQUES

DIFFUSION OF PRECOMMERCIAL INVENTIONS DEVELOPED IN

GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA

Titus Adeboye

Consultant-Coordinator, West African Technology Policy Studies Network

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IDRC-MR180e

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Material contained in this report is reproduced as submitted and has not been subjected to peer review or rigorous editing by IDRC Communications Division staff. Unless otherwise stated, copyright for the material

in this report is held by the author. Mention of proprietary names does not constitute endorsement of the product and is given only for information.

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FOREWORD

In this report, Dr. Titus Adeboye describes the extent to

which technological inventions made in three of Nigeria's R and D

institutions advanced beyond conception, through the intermediate

stages, to commercial application in industry. The institutions whose

inventions were studied are the Federal Institute of Industrial

Research, Oshodi (FIIRO), the Leather Research Institute of Nigeria

(LERIN) and the Project Development Agency (PRODA).

The importance of the subject of this report will be readily

recognized. R and D institutions such as those whose inventions are

considered here were established, often at relatively great cost, for

the purpose of generating technologies for the local economies.

Clearly, knowledge of the extent to which that purpose is being served

in practice is important. It is even more important in periods of

economic crises through which Nigeria and other African countries are

now going; then there is the further expectation that the institu-

tions will work even harder to bring ,quick reprieve from the crises.

There is, moreover, a,related question about the links that

R and D institutions need to_,maintain with potential users of their

inventions in order to assure wide application of those inventions.

Although it is believed widely (no doubt correctly) that links between

African R and D institutions and the productive sector are tenuous,

systematic studies to document this belief are still rare. Weak arti-

culation of the aims of domestic R and D institutions to the needs of

local industry is believed to explain why few usable technologies come

from those institutions, but the evidence remains largely anecdotal.

By contrast, this report attempts a systematic examination of the

factors that seem to determine whether an invention will advance all

the way to commercial application or whether it will stop with a

demonstration of purely theoretical principles.

I hope that researchers in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa

will find this report useful, and that they will wish to make similar

studies of other R and D institutions. I must emphasize, however,

that the International Development Research Centre does not necessari-

ly agree with the views and recommendations contained in it.

Paul Vitta

Senior Programme Officer

Social Sciences Division

International Development Research Centre

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Nigeria faces many crises. There is massive unemployment, partly because

of retrenchment in government and business. The fluctuations in

international oil prices mean that Nigeria has had its share of financial

crises -- not because of the size of its debt, but because of its

lessening inability to repay it. There is the crisis that results from

depending on imports not only for consumption, but as input to domestic

manufacturing. Given the shaky position of its reserves of foreign

currency and the massive underuse of present production capability, the

national government has been pressed to seek ways of reducing waste,

cutting out unnecessary imports, putting idle resources to productive

use, eliminating or reducing the serious price distortions that plague

Nigeria and, indeed, restructuring the entire economy.

The crisis that has resulted from excessive dependence on imports

seems to have worsened in the last few years. Nigeria not only imports

the bulk of its manufacturing machinery, but also depends on imports for:

Most of the agricultural raw materials for its manufacturing such as

wheat and maize (until imports of these grains were banned),

oilseeds, and sugar;

All the intermediate inputs required in industry such as chemicals,

petrochemicals, dyestuffs, soft-drink concentrates, barley malt,

citrus fruit concentrates and spirit;

All the components used in the assembly plants that have mushroomed

in the country.

Recently, the foreign exchange crisis has seriously reduced the

availability of these industrial inputs. Foreign-exchange licensing and

quantitative restrictions have forced many factories to shut down, and

those still operating carry unacceptable levels of excess capacity (a

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recent survey shows capacity utilization in manufacturing was only 30% in

1985). In 1980 the manufacturing sector grew by 17.6%; this was its

best year of growth. Growth was 9.5%, 2.7% and -12.3% in 1981, 1982 and

1983 respectively.

Early in 1986 the Nigerian government announced that it would phase

out imports of certain industrial raw materials, on the grounds that

local substitutes have been developed. Prominent are wheat for flour and

barley malt for beer brewing. Maize and rice imports were banned. All

import-dependent manufacturers now have to go to a new second-tier

foreign-exchange market to acquire the inputs they need. The implication

is that costs will escalate.

Through the years, however, the federal government, some state

governments, universities, polytechnics and even private establishments

have been funding research on the country's problems, and all these

research institutions have been and constantly are developing technically

feasible solutions. It is of great interest, therefore, to find out to

what extent the problems of manufacturers, especially with respect to

imported inputs, have been solved by the research institutes and adopted

by manufacturers. Apart from the effects of the activities of research

institutes on the formal manufacturing sector, to what extent have these

institutes offered better alternatives to traditional technologies?

Objectives

The narrow objective of this investigation is to find out the extent

to which precommercial inventions developed in relevant government-funded

research institutes in Nigeria have been applied in industry. The basic

question is: have research institute inventions been adopted by

commercial ventures? If not why not and, if so, why? In explaining the

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extent of diffusion, we hope to reveal policy implications.

By precommercial inventions we mean products or processes that are

patentable but have not yet reached the stage (described in the economic

literature as "innovations") at which they become commercialized.

Precommercial inventions have been demonstrated to be technically feasible

and in most cases have been shown to be economically feasible. Our

definition does not extend to minor improvements, inasmuch as these

usually are not patentable.

This paper covers manufacturing technologies developed at three

Nigerian research institutes since their inception -- the Federal

Institute of Industrial Research at Oshodi (FIIRO), the Leather Research

Institute of Nigeria (LERIN) and the Project Development Institute (PRODA). The Nigerian government also funds 20 other research institutes -- 18

devoted to agriculture, one to medicine and one to highways -- the work at

which is not relevant to this paper.

Methods

In general, we first examine the precommercial inventions and later

summarize the important ones. Our study began with desk work. We

examined the annual reports of the three institutes, and other published

materials covering their activities, including periodicals, journals,

briefs, workshop and seminar papers, technical information bulletins and

special research reports.

At this stage we classified the inventions into two broad categories.

The first, product inventions, included new product introduction, radical

transformation of existing products and substitutes for existing products.

The second, process inventions, included new raw materials for producing

existing local products, indigenous substitutes for imported raw materials,

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new uses for otherwise unused resources, new artifacts for performing

existing manufacturing tasks, and radical modification of existing

artifacts for performing new manufacturing tasks.

We have been guided by the final use of an invention. Thus, where an

invention is used by a manufacturer, even when the inventor sees it as a

new product, we define it as process invention. This is important in

measuring diffusion.

our field work consisted mainly of interviewing research personnel

and the recipients or prospective recipients of the technologies under

study. The purpose of the interviews was:

To examine the problems that the inventions solve, the cost of

development, the technical problems encountered during development,

the sources of solutions, the various disciplines involved and how

these factors have affected the rate of diffusion;

To determine'for each invention the years elapsed since the

demonstration of technical feasibility and number of adoptions of the

invention or extent of diffusion as defined by growth in market share;

To evaluate performance problems, raw material availability,

equipment, specification, input-output efficiency and utility usage

efficiency in the experience of users and prospective users;

To identify the bottlenecks to greater diffusion such as product or

process engineering, administrative, institutional, commercial,

financial or other problems; and

To discover policy implications for better rates of diffusion.

We measured diffusion at two stages:

First we specified the inventions and the number of years since the

demonstration of technical feasibility. From research institute responses

we obtained the number of recipients of the inventions. At this first

stage the crude measure was the number of businesses started on the basis

of patents or agreements reached with the research institutes to use their

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technology. Where no such business was started, diffusion was assumed to be zero.

The second stage of measuring diffusion related to percentage of

market share. The rate of diffusion of a technology at this second stage

was defined as the increase in the number of adopters divided by the time

over which the increase occurred in any given product group.

As all three research institutes under study run programs to aid

prospective adopters of their technology, part of the diffusion process

can be assumed to take the form of training courses. For accuracy,

therefore, it is necessary to distinguish these elements of diffusion:

0 Attendance at courses to train prospective investors or their staffs

in the use of the technology;

Purchase of a patent licence or process technology for commercial

operation;

Purchase of equipment and other fixtures and artifacts based on a

research institute's design or licence;

Commercial scale operation on the basis of a research institute's

technology.

We are also interested in diffusion through the decision of research

institute personnel to start their own business using the technology they

developed. This is known as technological entrepreneurship.

We did not use questionnaires.

The institutes

FIIRO

The Federal Institute of Industrial Research at Oshodi was

established in 1956 to conduct applied research in the general area of

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manufacturing. As at the time of this report the institute's staff

strength was 515. Its functions are:

To conduct applied research into Nigerian raw materials to find out

their potential industrial uses;

To develop processes that can be most effectively used to convert

these raw materials into finished products;

To carry out pilot-scale trials of processes found in the laboratory

to be technically feasible;

To assess the viability of such processes if established on a

commercial scale; and

To develop import-substituting products and thus conserve foreign

exchange for Nigeria. FIIRO is the most developed of the three institutes under study,

having more direct R & D graduate-level personnel, scope of activities

and engineering facilities. Of the 515 employees, about 125 had

university degrees or the equivalent. Of these, 35 had higher degrees.

Disciplines included mechanical, chemical, civil, electrical and

industrial engineering, chemistry, physics, biochemistry, biology, food

technology and systems engineering. Recently, an experienced design

engineer was employed by the institute. Situated on about 5 ha

of ground at Oshodi, the institute has wide engineering capability,

including design, detail engineering, fabrication, installation, trouble

shooting and maintenance. The engineering capabilities of the three

institutes are compared in Table 1 and Table 2. FIIRO also interacts with

many subsectors of manufacturing through contracts for such technical

services as analysis of materials, material testing, engineering,

fabrication of parts and electroplating, training and workshop courses and

patent services to Nigerian inventors.

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LERIN

The Leather Research Institute of Nigeria started operations in 1964 under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at the request of the Government of Nigeria. The FAO project came to an end in June 1972. The institute then functioned as a division of the federal

livestock department between 1972 and 1976. As part of the federal

national science policy, the Ministry of Science and Technology was created. In 1986 LERIN came under it along with other research institutes. LERIN was formally established under a decree of 1973, its main objectives being:

To collaborate with the relevant government departments and

organizations to provide raw materials, labour, leather, and

standardization in production;

To conduct fundamental and applied research in leather science and

technology with a view to ultimately developing the leather and

allied industries to maximize the quality of production for domestic

and export purposes;

To conduct periodic market surveys at home and abroad and thereby

gain market intelligence for use by the Nigerian leather and allied

industries;

To investigate vegetable tanning materials and other leather

auxiliary chemicals indigenous to Nigeria, toward developing a strong

base for their supply to the leather industry;

To build up a national information system on leather science and

technology; and

To develop the institute into a fully fledged regional centre for

leather and leather products.

It had a total staff strength of 248 at the time of our survey. Of

this number, 56 had graduate qualifications in the physical sciences and

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leather technology. of these about 18 had postgraduate training in

various fields of leather technology. There was one mechanical engineer.

The institute is organized around five divisions -- administration,

research and extension, training, production and maintenance. It had 14

research programs at the time of this study. These were: hides and skins

improvement, collagen, tanning agents and mechanisms of tannage, leather

auxiliaries, tanning and finishing, footwear and leather goods, quality

control and standardization, leather trades engineering, slaughterhouse

and tannery byproducts, control and treatment of effluents, economics and

marketing, technical training, research extension and library,

publications and documentations.

LERIN has the weakest engineering base of the three institutes under

study. Maintenance is constrained by lack of spare parts, and at the time of

our study such machine tools as it had were unserviceable.

PRODA

The Projects Development Institute is an industrial research and

development organization established by the defunct East Central State

Government in 1977. It was taken over by the central government in 1976

and is one of the research institutes under the federal Ministry of Science

and Technology. Its main aim is the development of industrial projects

using local raw materials and indigenous manpower through laboratory and

pilot plant investigation. Its range of activities covers:

Chemical and physical analysis of food and food products, chemicals

and drugs and industrial raw materials;

The manufacture of science equipment for educational and industrial

establishments;

Geological investigations covering soil testing for engineering

purposes, drilling for mineral deposits, water-well drilling, and

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hydrological investigations;

Ceramic research, including research on whitewares (pottery), heavy

clays, refractories, physical and chemical characteristics of clays

and ceramic raw materials;

Engineering design, fabrication of miscellaneous machine parts,

production of castings in aluminium and brass and pre-investment

surveys; and Pulp and paper raw materials.

At the time of the study, PRODA employed 534 people. Of this number,

about 180 were graduate-level research and development personnel. It was

then developing its new 55-ha site at Enugu; several laboratories and

the staff quarters were already built.

The inventions

We first examined the broad range of inventions developed in the three

institutes and categorized them as adopted and non-adopted. They were

further examined in detail with a view to explaining why they were adopted

or not adopted by users.

Table 3 shows that 21 of the 31 inventions of FIIRO are product

inventions while only 10 are process inventions. FIIRO, however, sees all

inventions as products. On the other hand, all the inventions of LERIN

are process inventions, which is how LERIN also sees them. Of PRODA's 30

inventions, 18 are product inventions and 22 are process inventions. It

is clear that the bulk of the inventions are agro-based. Both FIIRO and

PRODA have done extensive R&D on the crop, cassava, from which different

staple foods are derived. Five product and two process inventions from

FIIRO are from cassava, as are seven of PRODA's process inventions.

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Measure of diffusion

To determine the diffusion of these inventions we counted the number

of users of each invention. Two types of diffusion must be distinguished

here. The first type relates to the outright purchase of the R&D

institute's invention as a final product. The second type is the starting

of production facilities on the basis of an institute's invention.

Only seven of the 31 inventions of FIIRO (mechanized garri, potable

spirit, palm-wine bottling, Nico cream, smoke curing of fish, sparkling

wine and soap making) have been diffused to outside manufacturers and

therefore qualify as innovations. Soy-ogi, perhaps one of the oldest of

FIIRO inventions, has not been successfully commercialized to any outside

group. Discussions are, however, still being held with two large

multinational companies for commercialization. The first three inventions

in Table 4, soy-ogi, garri flour and fufu, are currently being produced by

FIIRO itself in pilot plants. They are, however, products that have been

commercialized by the institute itself. The institute also produces and

sells garri on a limited scale from its pilot plant.

The two most widely diffused inventions of FIIRO are palm-wine

bottling and soap making, with 40 and 60 users respectively. Calculations

show that only these two inventions have significant shares of the

market. FIIRO technology users have the entire bottled palm wine market

in Nigeria. In spite of the large numbers of users of FIIRO technology in

soap making their share of the laundry and bath soap market at the time of

this report was about 5%.

Five of the 31 PRODA inventions have been diffused and thereby

qualify as innovations, the most important ones being related to garri

making. The science laboratory equipment factory set up in Enugu was

responsible for more than 40% of all science equipment distributed to

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schools by the federal government in 1986.

The traffic lights invention is still being produced by PRODA. No factory has been started to do this.

The number of attendances at courses is much higher than the number of actual enterprises started; this is especially true of palm wine and soap making, as can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 5 shows that the PRODA inventions were diffused by the direct sale of equipment and machinery.

To date not too many patent licences have been taken out for the use of technologies developed by the research institutes. None the less, several licensing agreements have in fact been concluded, although the technologies have not yet been put into operation. Table 6 shows licensing agreements made for FIIRO technologies.

However, despite these agreements and the extent of the diffusion

that has already been reviewed, we have to conclude that as yet most of the inventions from the research institutes remain unused. In particular, those that appear to address the import-dependence problem do not appear to have been diffused (see Table 7).

In view of the ban on importing wheat and the proposal to phase out barley malt imports, one is surprised that neither sorghum malt nor the composite flour products have been adopted by the industries most

affected. The importance of this question is further underlined by the

import dependence of Nigeria implied in Table 8. Why were these

inventions, which seem to address more directly the country's import-

dependence problem, not diffused?

Several studies on diffusion of new technologies have shown

conditions that help or hinder diffusion. It has been shown that where

innovation was a direct response to expressed need, especially by the

ultimate user, diffusion was swift (Schmookler 1966). In this sense,

contract R&D in direct response to a user's request is more likely to be

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diffused than inventions produced independent of an identified user

(Freeman 1974). Inventions that demonstrate clear advantages over

existing alternatives are diffused more easily than those where no clear

advantage is shown (Rogers 1971). Usually the advantage results in higher

profitability or a better product. Where prospective adopters perceive

the effects of an invention as positive, they are more likely to adopt it

(Agarwala 1972). The lower the risk involved with the new technology, the

higher the chances of diffusion. Technical risks, real or perceived, tend

to prevent diffusion. Inventions that change the habits of users in any

substantive way tend not to be diffused. On the other hand,

inventions compatible with existing values, needs or habits tend to be

diffused more widely. Finally, the type of innovation decision affects

the rate of diffusion.

Is it possible to identify the conditions that led to diffusion in

the case of the inventions of the three research institutes under study

here? This question was approached first from the point of view of the

researchers, and then from that of the users.

Respondents at the research institutes gave reasons for successful

diffusion. In the cases of palm wine and soap it was their opinion that

diffusion was due to the recipient's perception of high profitability and

the fact that the institute was prepared not only to train entrepreneurs

but also to supply equipment and technology required to operate the new

business. Moreover, no royalties or patent fees were required, and the

initial equipment costs were quite low -- about NGN 32000 for

soap and NGN 30000 for palm wine.

Ten soap makers and eight palm-wine bottlers were subsequently

interviewed, as were five mechanized garri manufacturers. The most

frequently given reasons for adoption of the institutes' technologies were

their relative technical advantage, low investment risk and the absence of

technical problems. With respect to palm wine and soap, respondents said

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that the training they had had made them very conversant with the technology involved. Their only problem was the availability of raw material. Low investment cost was also underscored by the recipients. The responses are summarized in Table 9.

Explanations for non-diffusion

To explain the non-diffusion of the bulk of FIIRO inventions,

particularly those relevant for relieving import dependence, it is

pertinent to examine the inventions in greater detail. It would be cumbersome to treat all the unexploited inventions; therefore we shall examine those most important for saving foreign exchange.

SORGHUM MALT

History

Traditionally malt is "barley malt". It is obtained by steeping malt in water, allowing it to germinate, drying it in kilns, and grinding it to flour. Lager beers are normally brewed from barley malt. But foreign

exchange constraints have put pressure on the continued use of barley.

It was estimated that Nigeria. was spending over NGN 140 million on imports of

barley malt annually. After several years of research, FIIRO developed

malt from a variety of sorghum, which is a staple food in the whole of

northern Nigeria and is widely grown. Short Kaura sorghum was found to

have very good malting qualities. Although the development of sorghum

malt was started in the early 1970s, it was only after the Brewing

Industry Research Foundation, Nutfield, made malting and brewing equipment

available to FIIRO in 1976 that the work made progress. Seven sorghum

cultivars were malted and the malts were combined to comprise one portion

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of sorghum-barley composite malt (i.e. a ratio of 1:1) for the first trial production of the seven sorghum cultivars: YG5760, L-1412, FD1, FFBL,

MDW, RZ1 and SK5912. The malts worts and the beers were fully analyzed.

The lager beer was acceptable and had a shelf life of 26 weeks. Short

Kaura sorghum (SK5912) was chosen as a result of these tests. In 1984

commercial scale brewing was done by a major brewer using two replacement

levels of 25% and 50% of SK5912 sorghum malt. The two products were

branded Femos Special and Femos Extra. The analyses of the two beers are

included in Table 10.

After the initial success with both brands of Femos beer, the

products were market tested in 1984. The criteria used were taste,

flavour, aroma, after-palate strength, after-effect, clearness and

foaminess. The markets used were Lagos, Jos, Makurdi, Port Harcourt, Aba

and Benin -- the main beer-consuming centres of the country. The locally

dominant beer was used as the reference lager in each town. The result

showed that Femos Extra was preferred to all the reference beers and to

Femos Special.

Later, higher sorghum substitution levels of 60%, 70% and 100% were

achieved in FIIRO laboratories. It was discovered that for 100% sorghum

malt the only modification to the process equipment required was the

replacement of the false-bottom filtration system with a press filter.

Industry resistance

The first pilot brew report was not accepted by brewers on the

grounds that sorghum was different from barley malt in carbohydrate

chemistry, taste, stability, high fat, tannin and nitrogen content. Even

after Femos taste acceptance tests had shown some of these fears to be

false, only one major brewer and a few minor brewers have shown any

serious interest in sorghum or composite malt.

Interviews held with personnel of the two leading beer brewers --

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Nigerian Breweries Ltd. and Guinness Nigeria Ltd. -- are revealing. The

most serious technical reason given for resisting sorghum malt is that any

beer not made from barley malt cannot technically be called a lager.

They also assert that sorghum malt does not contain husks and

therefore the enzymes required in the brewing process have to be sought

separately. Also, they resist any major investment on the basis of

laboratory results not,replicable in commercial scale production. Last,

they see sorghum malting as being still in its infancy, requiring several

years of genetic engineering to technically replace barley as a malting

medium. From the point of view of researchers at FIIRO the real reason

for industry resistance is the commitment of the different brewers to

brewing specific brands of lagers in the Nigerian market. In their view

an outright ban on the import of barley malt will force brewers to use

local resources.

Certain conclusions seem to follow the case of sorghum malt. Brewers'

perception of the product is different from the researchers' perception.

The brewers see it as experimental with many technical problems

still unsolved -- cultivars, chemistry, requisite changes in equipment and

tooling, market testing of 100% sorghum malt beers and the effects of

these on branding. Unlike the other diffused inventions, sorghum malt is

not perceived as having passed through all the stages from demonstration

of technical feasibility to full commercialization. A ban on barley malt

imports will certainly hasten the development of the process; it will not

obviate the necessity for further work, as brewers still have the final

consumer to deal with.

Composite flour

This product was introduced in response to the high demand for wheat

flour in Nigeria and the country's inability to produce more than 5% of

the requirements of the many large flour mills in the country.

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Composite flour is the name given to wheat flour that has been

diluted with non-wheat materials such as cassava, maize and sorghum, which

are more available in the country. Breads and other confectionery are

usually made from wheat flour, which contains gluten, a high-protein

source that gives bread the universal characteristic for which it is

known. The challenge of replacing wheat is that of finding suitable

substitutes for wheat gluten.

After several experiments diluting wheat flour with flours from maize,

sorghum and cassava, several baking tests and consumer acceptance surveys

were carried out. It was found that the most suitable dilution for

straight dough was 20% cassava starch, 5% soybean flour and 75% wheat

flour. For mechanical dough the respective percentages were 25, 5 and 70.

Thus, the wheat requirement is still substantial and the saving in

foreign exchange is less than 25%. Unfortunately, bakers have resisted

the composite flour because it involves a major change in their baking

habits. The majority of Nigerian bakers do not use the mechanized dough

process. Composite flour, being weaker than wheat flour, is more

susceptible to gluten damage in the process that Nigerian bakers use.

This risk probably explains the non-diffusion of this innovation since

it was introduced in 1974.

Recently, total elimination of wheat was achieved in laboratory

trials for composite flour. The new product is still experimental.

With the government ban on wheat imports as from January 1987, it

will be interesting to see whether that will hasten the development and

subsequent diffusion of the composite flour invention.

Certain conclusions seem clear from the composite flour project. The

invention requires a major change in the baking habits of bakers and

involves a high risk of loss. It is not surprising that is has remained

largely undiffused. In its non-wheat form, it is still an invention with

too many unanswered development problems. It requires a change of taste

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by consumers. As long as pure-wheat flour is available this invention is unlikely to be diffused, as no price advantage seems to accompany the required change.

SOY-OGI

This product was developed as a response to two problems. Low-income Nigerians feed their infants on pap, a corn meal high in starch and low in protein. This has resulted in a high incidence of Kwashiorkor, a disease that retards the mental and physical growth of children. On the other hand the enriched, imported baby foods that are high in protein are not

affordable for the poor. The FIIRO price for soy-ogi is about 60% of the price of imported equivalents.

Soy-ogi was developed to be both affordable and high in proteins,

minerals and vitamins. It is made from corn, soy beans, vitamins and essential minerals.

It was first introduced and test marketed in 1972-1973. Production

of it has continued in FIIRO's pilot plant. Unfortunately none of the big

baby-food manufacturers in Nigeria has been licensed to produce it.

Currently discussions are on with Nestle and Food Specialties -- two multinationals -- for the purpose of commercializing the product.

The non-diffusion of soy-ogi seems to be due to the initial problem

encountered with toxicity in the product after it has been introduced into

the market. It had to be withdrawn for safety reasons. The technical

problem has since been solved but consumer resistance remains. This

resistance has been helped by the availability of cheap, imported, baby

foods of known brands marketed by highly efficient multinational

companies.

In spite of soy-ogi's low cost and high nutritional value, it has

remained largely a pilot project produced and marketed by FIIRO.

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GINGER POWDER, OLEORESIN AND CONCENTRATE

Background

At the time this paper was written there were 41 operating soft-

drink bottling factories in Nigeria, all using imported soft-drink

concentrates. Although only five of these make ginger-based soft drinks,

the market potential for this invention has been estimated about NGN 8

million per annum. That represents potential savings in foreign exchange

of about NGN 3 million. Ginger in its raw form has taste and aroma that are gastronomically

important. However, it has to be processed to become edible. The purpose

of processing ginger is therefore to extract its desirable properties and

store these in concentrated form as powder, oleoresin or concentrates, to

be reconstituted according to the desired end. FIIRO has invented a

process to do this.

The various extracts are obtained through cleaning, drying, milling,

extraction, packaging, desolventization and encapsulation depending on

which ginger product is desired. Products obtainable from ginger include

ginger ale, which is bottled by five soft drinks plants, and ginger beer.

However, all the concentrates used in the industry are at present imported

although Nigeria is a leading and preferred producer of raw ginger, and

despite the FIIRO invention.

As well as having invented the product, FIIRO can fabricate most of

the equipment for processing ginger-washing troughs, picking tables and

cold extractors. Mitchell-type trays, air dryers, Apex hammer milling

machines and solvent strippers have to be imported.

Enquiries to soft-drink bottlers regarding reasons for non-adoption

of the FIIRO invention reveal two main reasons. First, ginger drinks

represent only about 5% of the soft-drinks market, and many bottlers do

19

not make it; those who do, produce under licence, and part of the condition of the licence is the purchase of concentrate from the licensor.

The second reason is that soft-drink bottlers view the FIIRO invention with

caution.

Perhaps the technical barrier to diffusion among bottlers is that it

requires new investment by recipients whose facilities are geared to

production from concentrates. Perhaps the most promising avenue of

diffusion will be to erect legal or fiscal barriers to continued imports

of ginger in any form.

Explanation of the non-diffusion of LERIN products

None of the inventions of LERIN were diffused. Yet in each case

technical feasibility has been demonstrated.

Acacia nilotica (bagaruwa) pods have been shown to be a technically

feasible tanning agent. Trials yielded the following results: tannins,

60-65%; non-tans, 25-30%; moisture, 7-8%; insolubles, 2-3%; pH, 4.4%.

The institute researchers also were able to determine improved

conditions for leaching and filtration under a countercurrent system and

improved retention of active ingredients during storage.

Preliminary assessment shows that a commercial plant to make tanning

extracts is critical for successful commercialization. Another

prerequisite is the availability of A. nilotica pods on a commercial scale.

At present they grow as wild plants. For commercialization it is

necessary to develop plantations of the plant before a successful business

can be developed out of the new product. In other words, the project is

still far from commercialization.

The initial assumption was that the plant was widely available

throughout the northern states and that it was a wasting resource that

20

could be used productively. However, if large quantities of the pods are

required for every pilot plant, the problems of collection and regularity

of supply become critical. The next questions are: What quantity of the

plant can be collected? How is it to be stored for processing? Are the

plants sold commercially? At what price? Our initial enquiries show that

bagaruwa pods are sold commercially, but not in quantities that can be

relied on by a commercial producer of extracts. Availability is also

seasonal. So far two plantations of the tree have been developed in

Kaduna and Niger states. However, they are not yet ready for harvesting.

Storage is not a serious problem once the pods are sundried or otherwise

dehydrated.

Methods of producing extracts from the tannin have also been

developed on pilot scale, but commercial scale equipment for large-scale

production could not be developed locally. A European firm is currently

developing this.

The product is highly significant, because if extracts could be

commercialized up to NGN 5 million could be saved in foreign exchange as a

result of replacing imported tannins. The conclusion that seems clear as

regards the A. nilotica invention is that critical preconditions for

commercialization are largely unmet. Anogeissus schimperii (marke) leaves

and Parkia clappertoniana (dorowa) husks have also been shown to be viable

tanning materials. The constraints to commercialization are not the

availability of the raw materials, but those of artifact prototype

development. LERIN does not have either the design or the fabrication

capability for this. In this case also it is crucial to produce the

tannins in extract form rather than to use the vegetables directly.

In the case of leather fatliquors, research work at LERIN had

concentrated on edible oils. In all cases, products have been developed

that were technically acceptable but proved uneconomic because of

competition with human consumption. Ground-nut oil was developed first

21

but proved too expensive. At present oil from the rubber tree has been developed for use as a fatliquor in the tanning process. It has good promise because it is not edible. It has not been commercialized however.

Also the mangrove tree has been shown to produce fatliquor oil. It is a scientific success to the extent that it has been shown as a good

substitute for edible oils, but this development, as with rubber tree oil, has not been commercialized.

Work on a bating agent -- Adenopus breviflorus (tagiri) is in a similar state. R&D work is virtually completed and industrial_ trials have been done.

The PRODA inventions

Of the 31 inventions of PRODA analyzed, only five qualify as innovations. The remaining 26 have remained essentially uncommercialized.

For uniformity we examine four of these in some detail in order to explain their non-diffusion. We have selected the four with the most potential for foreign exchange savings from greater diffusion -- sorghum malting and beer brewing, alcohol distilling, palm-nuts processing and a bread oven.

SORGHUM MALTING AND BEER BREWING

The PRODA sorghum malt project was undertaken in the 1970s about the

same time as the FIIRO efforts were on hand. In it, sorghum grain was

steeped, drained and malted. A three-stage decoction mashing method was

used. Gelatinized maize starch and sucrose were used as adjuncts. Bottom

fermenting yeast (Saccharomyces uvarum) was used for fermentation. After

fermentation, the product beer was decanted and lagered.

The malt obtained from initial experimental work gave these results:

22

moisture, 5%; cold water extract, 5.2%; hot water extract, 22.8%; protein,

10.85%; nitrogen, 1.74%; extract (as is), 25.8%; extract (dry basis),

30.3%; apparent extract (0 plato), 4.65; diastatic power (0L), 10. The experimental beer was analyzed as indicated in Table 10.

The PRODA beer was made 100% from sorghum and was branded Dawa beer.

The engineering fabrication of a small pilot plant to brew 1000 bottles a

day of Dawa for taste acceptance was started in 1983 and completed in

1986. Also a pilot malting plant capable of malting 700 kg of sorghum

grain was built and is carrying pilot malting for Premier Brewery Ltd.

However, the project has remained essentially experimental.

Interviews reveal the same kind of industry-resistance that faced the

FIIRO project. These need not be repeated here.

ALCOHOL DISTILLING-

In view of the substantial expenditure of Nigeria on imports of

industrial (ethanol) and potable alcohols, PRODA developed an alcohol

distilling plant that could convert fermented raffia sap to ethanol,

extract ethanol from molasses and purify the local gin "ogogoro" into

potable alcohol by reducing to a minimum the methanol, fusil oils and

aldehydes in it. The plant comprised rectifying towers, a deodorizing

tower, boilers, a centrifugal pump, process control facilities etc. PRODA

is able to deliver this plant in three sizes, one of 180 1/d capacity

costing NGN 40 000, one of 500 1/d capacity costing NGN 72 475 and one of

1000 1/d capacity costing NGN90 000. In spite of excellent test results,

however, there has not been an order for such plants from any customer.

In view of the technical superiority of the PRODA plant over the local

distillers' facilities, it is surprising that it was not adopted.

It seems that non-commercialization of this invention is due to the

relative cheapness of the traditional process and the non-visibility of

23

the product superiority of the PRODA process. More important, one

researcher suggested that a lot of traditional distillers are able to

produce very cheaply because they do not pay the high excise tariffs that

they will have to pay once they adopt the bigger-scale, more efficient

PRODA machinery. This aspect was not verified by us, because the

traditional distillers were not interviewed.

PALM-NUT PROCESSING

At the time of our investigations, Nigeria's oil-palm resources were

estimated at 400 000 ha of scattered plantations and wild growth.

Before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Nigeria, palm

produce was the third major source of export earnings after groundnuts and

cocoa. All the exported palm oil and kernel oil was extracted by

traditional hand-operated mills until the Dutch-designed Pioneer oil mills

were imported in the 1950s.

But the Pioneer oil mills were found unsuitable for the small peasant

farmers who formed the bulk of oil processors. Moreover they broke down

frequently, were plagued with lack of spare parts and were inefficient and

inappropriate for the newer high-yielding oil-palm varieties introduced to

the plantations.

PRODA palm-oil mills were developed for use in rural communities to

take care of the technical shortcomings of the Pioneer oil mills. The

mills comprised a bunch stripper, which spikes out the nuts from bunches,

a palm-fruit cooker capable of holding up to 200 kg of loose palm nuts, a

digester, which is a cylindrical container with an axial rotating shaft

that mashes the oil pericarp, an oil press to extract the oil, a kernel

cracker, which cracks dried palm kernels, and a screen.

If this invention were diffused, it is estimated that it could save

Nigeria about NGN 10 million annually in imported machinery. It seems that

24

the invention was not commercialized for many reasons. PRODA did not have

the resources to fabricate the various components of the mill; it has only

the specification of the components and the prototypes. The only unit

available for sale was the kernel-nut cracker. The large plantations seem

to prefer imported machinery, while the small peasant holders continue to

use traditional methods.

PRODA BREAD OVENS

It was estimated that there were more than 10 000 bakeries in Nigeria

in 1984. Most were using either mud ovens or imported gas or electric

ovens. The small-scale bakeries rely predominantly on imported ovens.

PRODA saw its bread oven invention as a "welcome relief" to bakers. It

was described as cheap'and efficient, and made from local raw materials.

The technical problem that PRODA researchers set out to solve was that of

building an oven that would have even heat distribution and good heat

utilization as cheaply as possible. They built prototypes and tested

these. The oven is four-deck, each deck measuring 2.1 x 1.22 x 0.23 m, with its own inlet pipe from the heating unit. The heat is supplied to

the oven by a 320 000-btu/h oil burner with heat controls.

The oven has good distribution and high utilization of heat, and it

bakes bread evenly without burning. It takes about 20 minutes to bake 300

loaves of 450 g each. The bread oven is said to be in commercial use in many parts of

Nigeria. However, we were not able to visit any of the bakers said to

have purchased the ovens from PRODA. The invention is not commercialized

in the sense of an established factory geared to commercial production of

the ovens. PRODA itself is unable to cope with the production of the

ovens or any other of its inventions on a commercial scale for technical

and financial reasons.

25

Non-commercialization: a summary

After examination of some of the key inventions of the three research

institutes that were not commercialized, it seems useful to consolidate

the various reasons for non-commercialization.

The process of technological innovation has the following important

ingredients:

Idea generation;

The recognition of a need requiring a technical solution;

Research leading to invention or demonstration of technical

feasibility;

Development of a product or process, including raw materials, a

prototype, the design, fabrication and erection of equipment,

product and process debugging and modification, test marketing

and product promotion; and

Commercialization -- the design, fabrication, erection,

installation and commissioning and operation of a commercial

scale plant, The conditions for success at each of these stages are not the same.

The competence required at each stage is also different. The cheapest of

the stages is idea generation. Costs escalate as one moves along the

stages. The literature on innovation is replete with evidence that the

first three stages to invention are the cheapest and represent a small

fraction of the total cost to commercialization. Usually product

development and commercialization represent the bulk of the cost of

innovation -- varying from 60% to 90% of total cost. All the stages are

required for an innovation to result.

However, very few organizations have the capacity to provide all the

26

ingredients of innovation in-house. For instance, the largest and most

versatile R & D organization in the world is Bell Laboratories in the U.S.,

and some of the greatest technological breakthroughs came from it. But

most of the development work and eventual commercialization were done by

outside firms, some of which came into being merely to exploit the

inventions.

One other important fact that must be kept in mind in appraising

commercialization performance is the fact that only a small fraction of

inventions end up as successfully commercialized innovations. Several

studies show that the percentage is between 5% and 25%. The pruning

process usually takes place within the various development activities.

Given this basic framework the appraisal of the commercialization

efforts of the three research institutes becomes simplified. We reviewed

a total of 66 inventions, for the three institutes. Of these, 13 were

commercialized in the sense that new production facilities were started on

the basis of their innovation. This represents over 20% of the total

number of inventions. This is consistent with previous research findings

in the field. Furthermore, we have seen that the best equipped of the three

institutes also has the highest frequency of diffusion of its innovations.

However, even FIIRO, with its extensive design and fabrication capability,

is ill-equipped to develop all its inventions to the commercialization

stage. In fact, evidence shows that to attempt to do that would be

inefficient and probably a misallocation of resources. It is possible

that the bulk of the non-commercialized inventions could not survive the

development process. This is borne out by the cases discussed in this

research. The development problems ranged from perceived technical risk

to market resistance or the sheer absence of development capability.

Also, commercialization is closely linked with the process of

selection of research programs. It seems that R&D programs are chosen

27

around the broad functions set out in the legal instruments setting up the

research institutes. Within the broad programs individuals seem to

concentrate their research in accordance with their personal interests.

There seems a complete absence of government R&D contracts similar to

those that so stimulated Bell Laboratories. It seems that each institute

conducted research and development in accordance with its determination of

national needs. This probably explains the duplication of projects in the

two most developed institutes (for instance, the garri innovations are

repeated in both FIIRO and PRODA). Chances are that if more research and

development programs were given to the institutes with clear mandates and

budgets, better coupling would be achieved.

Finally, all three institutes seem starved of funds even to keep

present programs alive. The best-funded programs apparently had enough

money to pay salaries and purchase some basic consumables, according to

interviews we held with the researchers. It is, however, necessary to

investigate this issue more concretely to reach firmer conclusions.

Policy implications

The policy implications that come out of this research must be

qualified by certain limitations. The first limitation is that our

investigation did not concentrate on the dynamics of the innovation

process. It would have been enriched had we observed the various stages

of the innovation process in each of the institutes, including sources of

innovation ideas, the various disciplines brought to bear on the solution

of particular problems, the various constraints and how the hurdles were

scaled, the various actors in the process and the rivalries, intrigues and

infighting that usually characterize R&D organizations. The second

limitation of this research is that no attempt was made to assess the cost

28

of each invention and the cost of running each of the institutes. All we

collected were budget and plan allocations, which may have little bearing

on the actual expenditures. We have therefore avoided any assessment of

the direct or indirect benefits of their activities. These were not the

aims of the research, but data on these could have enriched the research

The first policy implication is that government-funded research needs

drastic rationalization. All the research programs of the institutes need

to be evaluated to:

Eliminate duplication by merging similar programs and assigning

each duplicated program to a single institute; this may require

some exchange or transfer of personnel in the case of important

programs;

Pool the institutes' meagre resources, which are fragmented in

duplicated projects; funds come from the Ministry of Science and

Technology; therefore, it should be easy to effect this pooling

with minimum disruption;

Discontinue projects and programs on which other institutions

already have inventions; examples of these are the ceramic

projects in FIIRO or the Sorghum malt projection in

PRODA; and

Cancel programs and projects that are carried forward from year

to year without adequate resources, unless these are seen to be

related to national needs.

Second, government should begin to fund R&D activities by identifying

specific social, economic, technical, and other problems needing R&D

solutions. The next step should be to develop research programs with

specific objectives and, after dialogue with R&D institutes, evolve means

for achieving the desired results. Funds should then be tied to specific

research programs. R&D institutes should sink or swim on the basis of the

number of viable need-oriented research programs they can attract and what

29

number of viable need-oriented research programs they can attract and what

they can do with the programs. This means ending the practice of blanket

funding of institutes.

Third, the basis of reward for R&D personnel should cease to be their

inventiveness or the number of feasible technical solutions they can devise

for problems. Rather, they should be rewarded in relation to the ultimate

utility of the solutions they devise.

Fourth, it seems that the federal government and the institutes should

stop trying to commercialize R&D inventions in house. It is a dissipation

of their meagre resources when they constitute themselves into

manufacturing outfits, trying to market their inventions. The best of them

lacks the range of capabilities for success. However, the Nigerian

entrepreneur will require substantial technical input from the R&D

institutes to commercialize the inventions. The commercialization role of

R&D institutes should be limited to:

Running training programs for prospective entrepreneurs who wish

to commercialize inventions. FIIRO already runs several courses

for this category of people in areas such as soap making, gum

Arabic production, palm-wine bottling, potable alcohol, and

peanut butter making;

Acting as technical consultants paid by entrepreneurs, providing

detail designs, specification of manuals, and other technical

services;

Encouraging technological entrepreneurship among those of their

personnel who have been responsible for inventions -- these

should be encouraged to branch out on their own to found their

own production facilities; and

Solving (for fees) various developmental problems encountered in

30

the course of commercialization.

Fifth, the R&D institutes need to use restraint in presenting their

inventions to the public and policymakers; they can otherwise give the

misleading impression that the demonstration of technical feasibility in

itself constitutes a sufficient condition for commercialization.

Nondiffusion tends to be seen as deliberate use resistance rather than the

fact that development has to precede commercialization. When inventions are

mistaken for innovations the required investment in further development is

not made, and commercialization is further delayed.

Sixth, the climate in Nigeria for the commercialization of inventions

has to be substantially improved for better diffusion. For this improvement

several steps need to be taken;

The need to commercialize the inventions has to be created or

forced on the nation. This has been borne out by the rushed

introduction of many brands of sorghum beer, once it was

announced that barley malt imports will be banned. Once a move of

this kind is forced on the nation, it must be sustained for a

long time for it be worthwhile for investors to commit resources;

Government policies that deter self-reliance must be scrapped if

commercialization of useful inventions is to take place. These

policies include liberalization of imports; blanket interest

rates for all classes of investment; indiscriminate withdrawal of

subsidies for agricultural inputs, which may badly affect local

raw materials; and deregulation of interest rates. The last

penalizes delayed returns, and as R&D projects involve varied

delays they are the hardest hit by interest rate deregulation.

Seventh, it is necessary to develop a specialized institution that can

provide nursery beds for R&D institute inventions. Such an institution

should be funded and made independent to enable it to:

0 Collect as many promising inventions as possible;

31

Evaluate each of them and determine the ones with sufficient

promise;

Select and fund the development of such promising inventions;

0 Hive off the successfully developed and commercially viable ones

to willing entrepreneurs. (The new entrepreneurship development

program of the federal ministry of Labour should be tied to these

activities);

Underwrite the losses from developed inventions that prove

commercially unviable.

Lastly, to make the R&D institutes more relevant to the needs of the

country, they should be allowed to sell their services to the private

sector as well. They should be enabled legally to compete for research

projects initiated in the private sector. For this to be effective the

government needs to provide incentives for the private sector to use R&D

services. A climate of liberal imports will not create the need to solve

problems from internal resources. The carrot should be in the form of

special tax rebates or outright matching funds for R&D expenditures,

especially when using indigenous R&D institutes.

32

Table 1. Metal-working facilities in FIIRO, LERIN and PRODA.

Type of machine

Number available

Specification Function FIIRO LERIN PRODA

Welding equipment High-pressure To weld metals 1 1 1 oxy-acetylene metals and alloys

Electric arc 1 - 1

Universal nibbling - Circular cutting, 1 - 1 machine dishing, straight

and rectangular cutting, round and square notching louvre cutting pipe beading

Hydraulic press 16-t with Press-shop 1 bits, dies, operations punches, 10- 20 mm

Hydraulic guillotine Shearing with Shearing mild 1 shear machine 3200 mm steel < 13 mm

thick and cutting stainless steel

33

TOTAL

Medium-duty Planing lathe Precision turn Gear cutting, and screw-cut- lapping, honing, ting lathe etc.

Universal mill -

Vertical type -

Grinding machines -

Other Shaping, bench drilling, cylin- drical boring, power hacksaw

1 1 1

1 1 1

1 - 1

1 - 1

2 - 1

6 - 2

31 4 9

34

Table 2. Foundry and other fabrication capability at FIIRO, LERIN and PRODA.

Number Available FIIRO LERIN PRODA

Foundries Melting 1-t iron 1 1

Melting 250 kg brass and other non-ferrous metals

1 1

Lift-out type for ferrous and non-ferrous

1

Heat treatment Electrically heated salt bath, oil bath, air furnace

2

Inspection equipment Quench tank 2

Ultrasonic tester 1

Magnetic particle tester 1

Hardness tester 1

Electroplating For cadmium, copper, bright nickel bright chromium and zinc plating

1

TOTAL 11 - 2

35

Table 3. Precommercial inventions developed in three Nigerian research institutes, 1971-86.

Institute Product inventions Process inventions

FIIRO 1. Cassava flour 1. Cassava peeling and grating

2. Cassava starch 2. Detoxified cassava 3. Gums, glues, adhesives

from cassava starch 3. Garri-making machinery

4. Garri and garri flour 4. Gluco-amylase enzyme 5. Fufu 5. Sorghum malt 6. Maize flour 6. Bottled palm wine process 7. Soy-ogi baby food 7. Refined kaolin and gypsum 8. Composite flour 8. Ginger powder, oleoresin

and concentrate 9. Sorghum flour 9. Dye ing jig

10. Femos beer 10. Fish kiln for fish smoke-curing.

11. Potable alcohol 12. Bottled palm wine 13. Pitto (local beer) 14. Table vinegar 15. Tomato puree, ketchup

and powder 16. Peanut butter 17. Salad cream and

mayonnaise 18. Full-fat soy grits

and oil 19. Nico skin cream 20. Laundry soap and bath soap 21. Smoked fish

LERIN 1. Tannins from Acacia nilotica (Bagaruwa) pods

2. Tanning extracts from Anageissus schimperii (Marke) leaves

3. Tannins from Parkia Clappertoniana husks

4. Local lime upgrading for modern tanning

5. Local fatliquors for leather continued

36

Institute Product inventions Process inventions

6. Unhairing and bating agents from Adenopus breviflorus (Tagiri)

PRODA A. Cassava-related 1. Laboratory equipment,

wood work products, glass products, thermometers

1. Cassava peeling machine

2. Steam cooker 2. Cassava grating machine 3. Air blower 3. Pulp dewatering screw

press 4. Traffic lights 4. Depulping machine 5. Multi-purpose grinder 5. Garri frying machine 6. Foundry products, (bearing 6. Garri screening machine

bars, bearing housing, (rotary or shaker) water valves, pulleys, metal ingots)

7. Refractory bricks 8. Industrial adhesive

7. Garri cyclone unit

B. Farming-related 1. Seed planter 2. Maize sheller 3. Palm oil mill (with

bunch strippers, palm fruit cookers, digester)

4. Kero-oil press 5. Sheff dryer 6. Solar dryer 7. Solar hothouse C. Miscellaneous inventions 1. Industrial blender 2. Low-cost oven 3. Bread oven 4. Ceramic pottery equipment

(blunger, vibrating sieve, spray booth, potter's wheel)

5. Alcohol distilling plant 6. Distilled water plant 7. Industrial washing

machine 8. Sorghum malt

37

Table 4. Number of users of research institutes' inventions, 1971-86.

Institute Invention Number of users

FIIRO 1. Soy-ogi baby food 1

2. Mechanized garri flour 1

3. Mechanized fufu 1

4. Mechanized garri production 6

5. Potable spirits production 4

6. Palm-wine bottling 40

7. Smoke-curing of fish using FIIRO kiln 1

8. Nico cream production 2

9. Sparkling-wine production 1

10. Soap making 60

PRODA 1. Automated garri processing factory 4

2. Village garri unit 2

3. Moi moi factory 1

4. Laundry and washing machine 2

5. Traffic lights 2

6. Science laboratory equipment factory 1 LERIN Nil

38

Table 5. Modes of technology diffusion.

Diffused invention Attendance at Institute course

Number diffused by patent purchase

Number diffused by

(Number attending) equipment purchase

Mechanized garri - 5

Potable spirits 3 3

Palm-wine bottling 46 40

Fish curing - 1

Nico cream 2 2

Sparkling wine 1 1

Soap making 63

Cassava peeling and automated garri processing

4

Village garri unit 2

Moi moi factory

Traffic light

1

Science laboratory equipment factory

1

TOTAL 115 3 57

39

Table 6. Patent agreements based on FIIRO technology.

Invention Patent fee Royalty due Number of recipients in negotiation

Nico skin cream 15000 2% of sales 1 Soy-ogi 30000 it if is 2 Femos beer 100000 it it it 1 Ginger powder, 89625 is to of 1

oleoresin and concentrate

Tomato puree, 15000 - 1 ketchup and powder

Refined kaolin 7500 2% of sales 1 and gypsum

Table 7. Inventions relevant to import-dependence.

Invention Product to be Industry Extent of Import substituted affected dependence (1982)

(NM)

Sorghum malt Barley malt Beer (38 operat- 140 ing brewers)

Composite flour Wheat flour Baking (15 large 125 users)

Soy-ogi Weaning baby Food industry 23 foods

Ginger powder Soft drink Soft drinks (41 52 oleoresin concentrates bottlers) concentrate

40

Table 8. Imports by major sections, Nigeria (NGN million).

'74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84

Food and live animals 155 298 441 736 1021 767 1438 2115 1756 1341 1052

Beverage and tobacco 9 48 64 133 71 50 12 17 11 9 7

Crude materials 64 74 79 79 108 112 157 202 172 168 144

Mineral fuels 55 100 175 129 175 207 155 176 151 132 111

Oils and fats 4 9 25 47 73 52 115 123 129 97 85

Chemicals 191 333 397 498 648 540 914 1256 1013 963 852

Manufactured goods 523 1008 1136 1565 1850 1524 1982 2641 2165 1928 1242

Machinery and Trans- portation equipment

612 1562 2445 3387 3588 3792 3650 5407 4653 3666 3257

Miscellaneous manu- facturing articles

114 278 372 510 665 415 645 953 711 582 418

Miscellaneous 11 12 15 9 14 14 29 29 11 18 11

TOTAL 1737 3722 5149 7094 8212 7473 9096 12919 10771 8904 7178

Notes: 1982 Figures revised. 1983, 1984 figures estimated.

41

Table 9. Critical factors leading to diffusion of research institute inventions.

Factor

Demand pull

Relative advantage (technology push)

FIIRO innovations PRODA innovations

Nico cream Laboratory equipment

mechanized garri (3) Automated garri process Sparkling wine (1) Village garri unit (1)

Perceived advantage Palm-wine bottling (8) washing machine (2) Soap making (6)

Low risk (technical or Palm-wine bottling (10) economic) Soap making (8)

Potable spirit (2)

Compatibility with Smoke curing of fish (1) existing habits, methods

Type of innovation decision

Note: Figures in parenthesis represent number of respondents who gave the factor as the reason for adoption.

42

Table 10. Analyses of PRODA and FIIRO beers.

PRODA FIIRO Dawa Extra Special

Colour at 430 mm (OSRM) 3.30 5.0 10.25

Specific gravity (200C) 1.01608 1.00351 1.0034

Apparent extract ($) 3.10 0.90 1.25

Real extract ($) 5.80 2.79 3.33

Alcohol by weight ($) 3.10 4.11 4.40

Alcohol by volume ($) 4.70 5.16 NA

Extract 8f original wort ( plato)

13.00 10.81 11.86

Real degree of fermentation ($)

55.5 74.00 71.92

Apparent degree of fermentation ($)

76.4 92.00 89.46

Total acidity 0.44 NA NA (eslacticacid) ($)

pH 5.00 3.75 4.40

43

References

Agarwala, A.N. 1972. University and the international dissemination of managerial techniques. In Solo, R.A., and Rogers, E.M., Inducing Technological Change in Developing Nations -- A Symposium, Lansing, MI, USA, Michigan State University Press.

Freeman, C. 1974. Economics of industrial innovations. London, UK, Penguin Modern Economics Texts.

Rogers, E.M. 1971. Communication of innovations: a cross cultural approach. New York, USA, Free Press.

Schmookler, J. 1966. Invention and economic growth. Cambridge, MA, USA, Harvard University Press.