developing board strategic capability in sport organisation s: the national–reg ional governing...

Developing board strategic capability in sport organisations:The nationalregional governing relationship

Lesley Ferkins *, David Shilbury

Sport Management Program, School of Management & Marketing, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125, Australia

1. Introduction

Thosewho lead sport are facing increasing scrutinywhich has inevitably resulted in questions of governance practice. Thetransition of many sports from predominantly volunteer administered organisations anchored in an amateur ethos, toprofessionally managed entities catering to a more sophisticated market place has created unique challenges for thegovernance of sport (Cuskelly, Taylor, Hoye, & Darcy, 2006; Schulz & Auld, 2006; Shilbury, 2001). The question remains,however, as to the options available to national sport organisations for identifying suitable structures and processes ofgovernance that combine the essence of good business practice within the leisure framework in which sportingorganisations operate.

Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) noted . . . there is no universally agreed denition of sport governance (p. 9). They drew ondenitions cited by Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2006) and the Australian Sports Commission (2005) to dene sportgovernance in noting that it involves concepts of direction, control and regulation. Explicit denitions offered by authors arealso limited and the terms board and governance are often used interchangeably. In the corporate setting, Tricker (1984)captured a meaning of governance which has remained relevant for todays environment observing that it involves thecreation, use and limitation of powers to direct, control and regulate activitieswithin an organisation. In essence, governanceis the responsibility for the functioning and overall direction of the organisation and is a necessary and institutionalisedcomponent of all sporting codes from club level to national bodies, government agencies, sport service organisations andprofessional teams around the world (Kikulis, 2000).

Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 2 May 2009

Received in revised form 12 November 2009

Accepted 20 January 2010

Keywords:

Sport

Board processes

Governance

Inter-organisational relationships

Power-sharing

Board strategic capability

Action research

A B S T R A C T

It is well established that the strategic function is a central role of the non-prot sport

board. Little is known, however, about board strategic capability in any context. This study

investigated how boards of national sport organisations might develop their strategic

capability. Interpretive action research focusing on the case of Tennis New Zealand

(TNZ) found that the boards strategic role is signicantly impacted by its inter-

organisational relationships. In particular, the boards ability to enact its strategic

priorities could be enhanced by creating amore collaborative partnership with its regional

entities and engaging in a power-sharing approach that seeks to develop regional

capability.

2010 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published byElsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 925 17407; fax: +61 3 925 17083.

E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Ferkins).

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

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1441-3523/$ see front matter 2010 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.smr.2010.01.009

This present study seeks to advance our understanding of governance by investigating how boards of NSOs can developtheir strategic capability. The strategic role of the board, while recognised as a key function, is a fuzzy concept for many. vander Walt and Ingley (2003) found that . . . little empirical or theoretical research has been conducted on the boards role instrategic decisions and strategic outcomes (p. 17). Stiles (2001) agreed, stating that, Unpacking this concept is . . . rare inthe empirical literature (p. 629). While this study targets the specic board grouping, it also encompasses aspects that areseen to impact directly on the boards ability to be strategic. The broader governance system such as the structure of thesport, member organisations, people and processes were therefore part of this investigation. Henry and Lee (2004) made thedistinction between thework of the board in sport organisations, which they term corporate governance, and the interactionof organisations and groups working across the sport as systemic governance. In both instances, there are obvious gaps inthe body of empirical knowledge on the governance of sport, as it applies to board strategic capability by virtue of thisemerging discipline and the small volume of active researchers in the eld (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Ferkins,Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009). This lack of academic interest is not necessarily reective of the intensifying interest frompractitioners.

National sport organisations (NSOs) in New Zealand were chosen as the population for this study. The nature and form ofNSOs have been well developed in sport organisation theory (Babiak, 2007; Inglis, 1997a, 1997b; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings,1995; OBrien & Slack, 2003). NSOs are the national representatives of their sport. These organisations are responsible formaintaining the rules and organisation of a particular sporting code and have traditionally worked with state, regionalassociations and clubs of the same code to deliver services to their members. NSOs in New Zealand have evolved, like theirAustralian and Canadian counterparts, from small and independent member-based associations with volunteer executivesto organisations with paid staff and administrative ofces. While the role of an NSO has come to encompass the governanceof the sporting code at all levels, there exists within that jurisdiction, multiple separate legal entities (i.e., national, state/region, club/local). Each entity is most typically an incorporated organisation and has its own constitution and governingcommittee. This together yet separate structure has created a tension in the way these entities have interfaced in thedelivery of sporting opportunities (Sport & Recreation New Zealand, 2006). As is demonstrated by this study, this has provedto be a major stumbling block in the national boards ability to enact its strategic priorities.

In order to best address the research question and to enable the research process to directly benet the participating sportbody, action research was used as the research method. This highly collaborative approach to research (where the researchsubjects become research partners) is designed to create change and to provide rich empirical data fromwhich new andimproved methods of governance practice are promoted. The use of action research in this setting is rare, but has thepotential to facilitate a deep level of understanding found to be missing in governance research to date (Leblanc, 2004;Parker, 2008).

The action research programme developed in collaboration with Tennis New Zealand, as reported in this paper, drew onrelevant theories to inform the intervention as it unfolded. Relevant theories included stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984),resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and supporting theoretical constructs including inter-organisationalrelationships (Thibault & Harvey, 1997), aspects of board power (Pettigrew &McNulty, 1995), and board strategic capability(van derWalt & Ingley, 2003). Although these theories emerged during the action research programme, they are introducedin the rst half of this paper to provide context for the ensuing results and discussion presented in the second half of thispaper. The second half of the paper describes the action research approach used and specically the four phases of theresearch programme. Each phase is then used to tell the story that emerged from the intervention designed incollaboration with Tennis New Zealand.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Stakeholder and resource dependence theory

The tenets of stakeholder theory are considered central to the strategic management of organisations encompassinggovernance and board strategic function (Freeman, 1984; Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Stoney, 2001). Proponents ofstakeholder theory argue that organisations need to take into account the range of individuals and groups affected by thework of the organisation (Stoney, 2001). Sternberg (1997) distinguished between the original meaning of the concept,claimed to be rst used in the 1960s, and the contemporary meaning, in stating: Originally, stakeholders were identied asthose without whom an organisation could not survive, those in whom the organisation had a stake. Now, in contrast,stakeholders are more commonly identied as those who have a stake in an organisation (p. 3).

There is much debate however, regarding the extent to which boards should be representative of their stakeholders(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Stoney, 2001; Sternberg, 1997). In the corporate context, Sternberg (1997) argued there is littleplace for such a philosophy. Stakeholder theory is indeed intrinsically incompatible with all substantive objectives, andundermines both private property and accountability (p. 3). In contrast, Stoney (2001) considered stakeholder theory to berelevant for corporate and non-prot organisations alike in claiming . . . from blue chip companies to the Royal Society ofArts (RSA) the stakeholder concept is being embraced and actively promoted as an inclusive philosophy and framework forsustainable development (p. 604). The issue of stakeholder representation and the extent towhich the board assimilates theviews of individuals and groups affected by the work of the organisation arose during the course of this action researchproject and, as later discussed, helped explain and untangle events as they unfolded.

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254236

Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is considered by some to be the dominant theoretical approachused to guide research efforts focused on non-prot boards of directors (Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen, 2003). The theory isfounded on the notion that organisations are open systems and do not operate in a vacuum, rather, they rely on otherorganisations for resources and must adapt to changing external circumstances (Scott, 2003). Indeed, Pfeffer and Salancik(1978) argued that the ability to acquire and maintain resources is essential to organisational survival. In relation to thegovernance of non-prot organisations, Cornforth (2003) asserted that organisations enter into inter-organisationalrelationships (IORs) in order to obtain the resources and information they need for their ongoing development. Cornforthalso considered that . . . the main function of the board . . . is to maintain good relations with key external stakeholders inorder to ensure the ow of resources (p. 8). For the present research, resource dependency theory highlighted the boardsboundary-spanning responsibility and offered insight into ways in which board power and inuence had the capacity toaffect inter-organisational relationships.

2.2. Inter-organisational relationships

Governance authors in a generic sense do notmake the connection between inter-organisational relationships (IORs) andboard strategic capability (e.g., Brown, 2005; Cornforth, 2003; Stiles, 2001). Scholars writing about the governance of sporthave more to say about the signicance of IORs and their impact on the governance function (e.g., Mitchell, Crosset, & Barr,1999). Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) in particular make the connection between IORs and the execution of the governancefunction for national sport organisations. However, they also noted Federated networks within non-prot sport have notbeen studied extensively and Studies of federated networks and IORs within the wider non-prot sector are also limited(p. 52). In particular, these studies, do not specically link national and regional sport organisation relationship issues to theboards ability to function strategically and as such perhaps miss the opportunity to inform the governing relationshipsbetween national and regional sporting bodies.

An increasing number of studies are emerging that consider why sport organisations enter into partnership relationshipsacross non-prot, government, and private sectors (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Shaw&Allen, 2006). Babiak (2007) claimed thatin order to deal with changing environmental factors the practice of collaborating, coordinating, developing partnerships,and co-operation between organisations, have become central principles for the strategic management of organisations. Ininvestigating IORs within the sport setting, she dened the concept as, A voluntary, close, long term, planned strategicaction between two or more organisations with the objective of serving mutually benecial purposes in a problem domain(p. 339). This denition had relevance for the present study and the connections made between the governing role of TennisNew Zealand and the governing relationship with its regional entities.

2.3. Board power

Power has been used as a construct to explain the relationship between senior professional staff (executive) and theboard in non-prot and sport settings (Hoye, 2006). It has also been used to understand the level of inuence exerted bychairmen and non-executive directors in the corporate setting (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995, 1998). In considering howboard members shape the content and process of corporate strategy (among other aspects), Pettigrew and McNulty(1995) designed the tripartite model of power and inuence. Using this model (see Fig. 1) in a governance study of thetop 50 United Kingdom nancial institutions, Pettigrew and McNulty found that the power and inuence of boardmembers . . . is shaped by the simultaneous and interactive effects of a set of structural and contextual factors,positions and skill in mobilizing a constellation of power sources and skill and will in converting potential power intoactual inuence (p. 845).

Fig. 1. The tripartite analysis of power and inuence. Source: Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, p. 845).

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254 237

In translating this model into a sport organisation context, there is much evidence to suggest that changing structuralaspects such as board composition, voting and selection, altered, in large part, by changing contextual forces, such as howbureaucratisation and professionalisation have impacted on the strategic role of the board (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003; Shilbury,2001). Countering this, there is a small body of work around institutionalisation of sport organisations which suggests thatconservative forces such as history and tradition have slowed the change process (Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis et al., 1995). Kikulisstated that In NSOs . . . the volunteer board is a deep structure and core practice that demonstrates traditionality (2000, p.308). In relation to the present study, this aspect of the model raised issues relating to structural and contextual factors andtheir inuence on the strategic functioning of the Tennis New Zealand board.

The second part of the model, that explored the sources of power available to board members of sport organisations,probes aspects such as legitimate power sources, the situational nature of power and stakeholder representation. Theseaspects are all potentially important sources of power for boards ofmember benet organisations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003). Auseful extension of the Hoye and Cuskelly (2003) study, which considered aspects of board performance and patterns ofpower, would be to consider how power sources (or lack of) impact on the boards strategic capability.

The nal part of the Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) model is the will and skill of individual members. At board levelswhere personalities may be large and individuals can be selected for personal qualities, then willingness to intervene andskill in matching behavior to the requirements of the situation can all be fateful for inuence and impact (p. 853). Again,there is much empirical evidence to suggest that the strategic capability of a sport board is directly affected by the ability ofindividual members (Hoye & Auld, 2001; Shilbury, 2001). In a national sport organisation setting, an exploration of how thewill and skill of individual board members might impact on the boards overall ability to think and act strategically is, as yet,undeveloped.

An important feature of themodel is its emphasis on the relationship between the three aspects. The reality of power andinuence in and around the boardroom requires the simultaneous, dynamic, and complementary analysis of context, andwill and skill in creating and using a constellation of power sources (p. 853). Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) arguedthat each aspect changes and inuences the other. Conceptualising the strategic capability of the board in terms of this three-part holistic model of power and inuence offered both a theoretically sound and empirically valid way of understandingwhat both enables and constrains board member strategic contribution.

2.4. Board strategic capability

In one of the few studies focusing on the boards strategic role in the non-prot setting, Edwards and Cornforth (2003)identied two primary problems in explaining board strategic contribution. The rst is the blurring of the boundary betweenoperational detail and strategic focus. The boards . . . understanding of strategic issues may come from exposure tooperational detail . . . (p. 78). In essence, they argued that operational detailmay be a necessary element of strategic decisionmaking. The second concern noted by Edwards and Cornforth (2003) is the distinction between policy and strategy. Theyemphasised that strategy relates to how organisations position themselves competitively, while policy is . . . about givingsubstance to collective values (p. 78). They considered that the boundary has become blurred in practice within the publicand non-prot setting and that . . . the discourse of strategy has become predominant (p. 79). In summary, the authorsconsidered that strategic contribution is a contested term: how boards interpret it depends on perceptions about the verypurpose of quasi-autonomous public and non-prot organisations (p. 79). For the purposes of their research theyarticulated strategic contribution as board . . . assessment of the organisations overall resource and capability strengths andweaknesses, their relative performance and their options and priorities for future development . . . (p. 79).

Work in the non-prot arena has also advanced support for the widely held assumption that a focus on strategicorganisational development will enhance organisation effectiveness (Brown, 2005). Indeed, the Carver model, althoughcriticised for its arbitrary distinctions between the role of paid staff and board members (Leland, 1999), strongly advocatesfor board members to focus their energies on strategic activities such as policy development. Work by Inglis and Weaver(2000) on prioritising strategic activities on the board agenda provided an insight into how particular actions can inuencethe level of strategic contribution by the board. Moreover, Hoye and Inglis (2003) presented an overview of non-protgovernance models and considered how these models could be adapted for the context of leisure organisations. In doing so,they noted the association between governance models, organisation effectiveness and strategic expectations. More studiesof this kind are needed in order to increase the empirical knowledge-base around how to build strategic capability.

In the for-prot setting, again there are few studies that have specically investigated the strategic function of the board.Although there is much support in the scholarly literature for a focus on strategic contribution as a central function of theboard, it remains under-researched (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc, 2004; Lorsch & Clark, 2008; Nadler, 2004; van der Walt &Ingley, 2003). Heracleous (2001) argued that accepted best practice in corporate governance has failed to nd a convincingrelationship between best practice and organisation performance. In doing do, he draws attention to . . . the need for anexplicit focus on the strategic role of the board of directors, by scholars, practitioners, and regulators, if meaningfulrelationships between corporate governance and organization performance are to be established (p. 165). Furthermore,there are an increasing number of studies that have identied a lack of strategic involvement on behalf of the board (Ingley &Van der Walt, 2001; Kerr &Werther, 2008; Siciliano, 2008; Stiles, 2001). Stiles (2001), for example, found that boards in thefor-prot setting fail to realise their potential in the strategic decision making process. While the size, resource imperativesand purpose for existence of sport organisations may differ, the central arguments found in the for-prot governance


literature are universal. That is, there is concern about the intensity of investigation and the latent role of the board,regarding its responsibility for strategic development.

In laying out this theoretical background, helpful questions become evident for the governance of sport organisations.What do we know about the strategic contribution of the board in sport organisations? What might be preventing sportboards from realising their potential in strategic decisionmaking?Withmuch evidence to suggest there needs to be a greaterstrategic focus, the present study concentrated on one primary research question: how can boards of national sportorganisations develop their strategic capability?

3. Method

In summarising the method used for the study, this section rst introduces the research paradigm, explains the actionresearch method and provides a rationale for the approach chosen. It then justies the choice of research sites, theparticipants involved and the techniques used to generate and analyse data. Research validity is also addressed.

3.1. Research paradigm and action research method

This study was undertaken within the framework of an interpretive research paradigm (Guba, 1990). The paradigmstresses the constructed and evolving nature of social reality and seeks to understand social reality through the eyes of thosebeing studied (Devine&Heath, 1999). There are few studies that have utilised the interpretive paradigm to study governancein any setting (corporate, non-prot or sport). Indeed the advancement of dominant theories of corporate governance hasbeen driven by quantitative and positivistic approaches (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc, 2004). McNulty and Pettigrew (1999)noted there ismuch known about board structure and composition in a quantitative sense andmuch less known about boardprocess and behaviour. Behaviour in UK boardrooms is not nearly as transparent as the structure and composition of UKboards (p. 47). There is still less understood about the behaviour of boards where knowledge has been constructed from aqualitative and interpretive paradigm.

Most often aligned with the interpretative paradigm and qualitative methods, the term action research creates theexpectation that those involved will be researching a particular situation with the intention of taking action that will make adifference. Signicantly, for this study, action research sought to combine practical transformation (Huxham & Vangen,2003, p. 384) and the advancement of knowledge. The basic premise of action research is that change and research are notmutually exclusive, that is, a simultaneous focus on improving practice and developing theory is possible (Coghlan &Brannick, 2001). The work of Heron and Reason (2001), Cardno (2003) and Coghlan and Brannick (2001) framed the actionresearch approach adopted for this study, chosen for the potential to create positive change and advancement for sportorganisations.

3.2. Research sites and participants

In selecting a research site, Stake (2003) argued that the primary basis for selection should be the potential to learn aboutthe phenomena. Purposeful samplingwas therefore used to select a case organisation that would rst and foremost offer theopportunity to learn about board strategic capability within the sport setting. Seven NSO research sites were deliberatelyselected by the researchers whose criteria also encompassed a willingness and ability to engage with the action researchprocess, logistical considerations (e.g., proximity and access), and high experience levels of the phenomena under study(Pettigrew, 1990; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). The selected research sites were also considered case studies. Merriam (2002)noted that a qualitative case study is a holistic and intensive analysis of a social unit, single instance, or phenomenon. Use ofthe case study approach assisted the researchers to understand the specic organisation context including the factors thatmight be impacting on the boards ability to develop its strategic capability.

Three case study organisations were selected from a list of seven possible sites. This paper reports on the experience ofone NSO case study, Tennis New Zealand (TNZ).While the researchers were known to personnel within TNZ through generalnetworks, they did not hold any insider position within the organisation. Discussion was therefore rst initiated with theCEO and thereafter the primary research participants consisted of the CEO, seven board members including the chairpersonand an additional three members of a board sub-committee. The eldwork component of the study spanned 18 months,beginning in July 2005 and concluding in January 2007.

3.3. Data generation and analysis: action research phases

The data generation and analysis process was guided by amodel specically developed for the present study and derivedfrom an amalgam of previous action research conceptualisations (Cardno, 2003; Coghlan & Brannick, 2001; Heron & Reason,2001). As presented in Fig. 2, four main phases were used for the study. Within these phases, a range of data generation andanalysis techniqueswere employed, namely, document analysis, participant observation, focus groups, interviews, reectivejournalingmemorandums, theming, writing andmember checking. The lead researcher also acted as facilitator in numerousboard meeting settings, drawing out data, testing and reecting on conclusions with research participants. All boardmeetings, focus groups and interviewswere video or audio taped, producing 20 tapes, comprising over 1200 hours of data for


the TNZ case study. For the purposes of this paper, quotations used from the TNZ case data have been coded as 3, denotingTNZ board members and 4 denoting the board sub-committee, followed by the letters ranging am. This allows data tobe cross-referenced back to individual participants, and demonstrates diligence in the data generation and analysis process.

The rst action research phase, Context Analysis, involved reconnaissance work where background data on theorganisation and its environment was collected. This involved both interviews and document analysis. Phase two, IssueIdentication, concentrated on exploring a focal area for the study. This was done in collaboration with the researchers andthe research participants. A broad question, derived from a gap in the literature, and informal discussion with boardmembers and other governance practitioners was established by the researchers. This was used as the starting point forcollaboration in each of the phases and guided the subsequent interventions. Phase three, Intervention and Action,encompassed a collaborative approach (between researchers and participants) to designing an intervention that would helpdevelop board strategic capability. In this phase, the planned strategies were put into action and were subject to purposefulmonitoring and reection to inform further action. As portrayed in Fig. 2, a second action step was also undertaken as part ofthis phase. Phase four, Evaluation of Intervention and Action, involved the researchers and participants critically reectingon the outcomes of the planned action in relation to the research question. Exploring change and learning was a centralcomponent of this phase.

The action research model developed for and employed by the present study also integrated the notion of meta learning(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). This involved the inclusion of mini-cycles placed around the outside of the square to promotea strategic view of the cycles and phases that were undertaken (see Fig. 2). This strategic view promoted simultaneousconsideration of content (what was happening); process (how it was happening); and premise (why it was happening). AsCoghlan and Brannick noted, it is the dynamic of these learning phases that . . . enables action research to be more thaneveryday problem solving (p. 19). In essence, it is . . . learning about learning, in other words meta learning (p. 19).

3.4. Research validity

Validity of the action research processwas achieved on a number of different levels. Specically, the research participantsregularly checked conclusions and written summaries to verify the ndings (Tolich & Davidson, 1999). This also involvedchecking that the goals of the research were being met as well as verifying that data recorded, matched participant reality

Fig. 2. Action research model for developing strategic capability.


(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). Triangulation was also used to protect the validity of the study (McTaggart, 1998). As well asmultiplemethods of data collection, information frommultiple sources was also gathered in order to generate layers of data.Such sources included ofcial documents (e.g., strategic plans, internal reports, annual reports, board minutes), paid full-time CEOs, and volunteer board members and co-opted sub-committee members. This information was used to analyseconsistencies and inconsistencies in establishing a representation of critical events.

In addition to considering research validity, it is useful to briey note the inherent limitations of using an action researchmethod to address the research question. In order to achieve change and formalised knowledge development, actionresearch is by nature a highly complex and contextualised research method (Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). This study was noexception. A challenge of this particular study was therefore the numerous distractions from the central question and thechallenge in merging the agendas of the researcher and research participants. More denitive and generalised outcomescould have been derived had a different method been used. A rich insight into the complexities in enacting what wasconsidered to be good practice was the pay-off achieved via this method.

4. Results and discussion

This section presents a summary ofwhat occurred during each phase of the action research process aswell as highlightinginsights discovered and changes that occurred for TNZ. Relevant literature is integrated into the discussion and tentativeconclusions are established in relation to board strategic capability.

4.1. Phase one and two: Context Analysis and Issue Identication

The reconnaissancework for TNZ spanned fourmonths from July to October 2005 and consisted ofmeetingswith the CEO,members of the board sub-committee (Maiden Committee) board advisors, and board members. The researchers rstMaiden Committee meeting (18 October, 2005) also formed part of the reconnaissance phase. In addition, a review of TNZdocuments was undertaken to establish the environment within which the study would take place. This reconnaissancework canvassed background information on the organisation, board function and a proposal to re-design the governancestructure of the sport.

At the time the eldwork commenced therewere seven staffmembers including the CEOworking for Tennis NewZealand(TNZ). In terms of playing numbers, there were approximately 43,792 registered tennis players, 477 afliated clubs, 66unafliated clubs, 25 regional associations, 28 sub-associations and six special interest afliates such as the veteransassociation, and the International Tennis Club of New Zealand. Of concern for the organisation were estimates ofparticipation gures showing a much higher number of people participating than registered as members. The Sport andRecreation New Zealand (2005) survey conducted for the period 20002001 determined there were 317,900 adults takingpart in tennis, the second highest individual adult participation sport in New Zealand behind golf.

In terms of high performance, New Zealand tennis players have produced mixed results at the international level with asmall number of players achieving top 20 world rankings. Since the mid-1990s, (and to the time of this research)international performance has waned, however, with players competing overseas struggling to make the top 100 in worldrankings. Financially, TNZs turnover was more than $1,400,000. While its reserves position was sound, the organisationrecorded a decit over the previous four years (20022005) ranging between $70,481 in 2005 and $410,026 in 2006.

During the time of the research project, the board comprised sixmales over 40 years of age and one female in hermid-30s.There was a mix of lawyers and business people and six of the seven members of the current board had been together sinceMay 2004. As stipulated by the constitution, the term of ofce was a maximum of three years at which time the incumbentmust retire and be re-elected if they wished to continue. Board members were also restricted from holding ofce as anelected regional or afliated association member or from being a staff member. This governance structure replaced a 10-member board of management, voted out at the October 1999 AGM. In an early interviewwith the CEO he noted that he wasnot sure the previous management committee . . . fully realised the implications of such a change (personalcommunication, 12 July, 2005). In particular, there was concern that the board, in effect, was 100% appointed and heindicated that the regions felt a certain disconnection between the national board and regional perspectives as aconsequence.

The CEO involved in this studywas appointed in January 2004 as part of amove to becomemore strategically focused. As aboard member for TNZ prior to his appointment, the CEO played a major part in preparing the strategic plan spanning theperiod 20042007. The CEO was previously a company director for a large New Zealand exporter. He had been involved intennis most of his life and was in his late 50s at the time of this research.

A health check on the state of tennis in New Zealand, carried out by TNZ revealed concerning trends in participation,Most areas are experiencing the same problems of declining senior numbers, resulting in diminishing interclubcompetitions, declining volunteer numbers, crippling nancial losses and a lack of funds to carry out basic maintenancerequirements (Tennis New Zealand, 2004a, p. 3). According to Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2005) statistics thenumber of registered tennis players in 1985 was 63,500, declining to 54,000 in 1990 and further declining to present levels.The health-check report also noted that 70% of clubs have fewer than 100 members. This health-check report alongside anumber of previous internal reports about the state of tennis in New Zealand provided the catalyst for the board to initiateaction around major structural change. In particular, the CEO noted in a presentation to the international club in 2004 that


the current structure of theNSO composed of 25 associations is convoluted and unnecessarily complex. Tennis NewZealandis hamstrung by associations and associations are the same. There is little convergence or alignment of goals (Tennis NewZealand, 2004a, p. 4). Signicantly, the CEO also noted the sport in its current form is ungovernable.

At the AGM on 23 July, 2005 a motion proposed by the board to restructure TNZ in the form of a regional model (that is,reduce the number of associations, currently numbering 25), was carried. It was also agreed that the board establish acommittee to undertake further consultation on the specic nature of an appropriate regional model and to formulatedetailed recommendations to the board of TNZ (Tennis New Zealand, 2005a). The committee chaired by Sir Colin Maidencame to be known as theMaiden Committee. Sir Colin had previously been Vice Chancellor of the University of Auckland andwas a commercial director and member of the International Tennis Club of New Zealand. The committee also comprisedseven other members including two TNZ boardmembers, four nominees from the regional associations and one high proleformer player. Additionally, the committee had the powers to recruit independent appointees to add expertise andknowledge.

While the current governance structure of tennis in New Zealand appeared to be the primary issue for the national board interms of its strategic capability, the individual interviews with board members revealed additional insights into the boardsperception of its strategic function. These perceptions included the composition of the national board and the emphasis on askills-basedboard as distinct fromregional representation.One boardmember conceded that, Down the road, the governancestructure (of the national board) may need to change (3a, 31 August, 2005). Another noted . . . the skills based board throwsopen the composition issueof representationversus appointed (3f, 1 September, 2005). This issuewas tobecomean importantaspect of the overall change process.

When the researchers approached TNZ, the organisation was already engaged in a major change process. The boardsdesire to transform the relationship with the regional associations was the major item on its agenda. Although heavilyengaged in this change process, throughout the CEOwas very open andprepared to support the research bymaking himselfavailable as requested. After ve meetings/contact with TNZ personnel, the developing picture for the researcher was oneof a sport grappling with a decline in on-court performance, participation and national inuence with its regionalstakeholders.

In the researchers opinion (drawn from the reconnaissance phase including individual interviews, 18 August1September, 2005), board personnel appeared to be highly capable, concerned for thewellbeing and future of the organisationand skilled in governance processes and practices. The organisation had undergone a Sport and Recreation New Zealand (thegovernment agency for sport and recreation also known as SPARC) capability review and had recently implemented anumber of actions to further improve governance processes. The interviews indicated that board members were committedto a change in the regional relationship and in the words of one board member: If TNZ can get to the stage where there is aframework where TNZ can assume responsibility for the sport, then weve done our job (3g, 1 September, 2005). Anotherpriority for several board members was a re-design and regional roll-out of the high performance programme potentiallythreatened by the current regional structure.

4.2. The emerging issue for Tennis New Zealand

After careful consideration of the internal reports and theMaiden Committee terms of reference, the researchers decidedthat involvement in this process would contribute to seeking answers to the research question. Data collected thus farindicated to the researchers that the national boardwas struggling to enact its strategic priorities because of the nature of therelationship with its regional entities. Currently, there is no vehicle for TNZ to do this to create a high performancepathway (3c, 30 August, 2005). It appeared that structural change was part of the strategy to redene the nationalregionalrelationship and allow greater governance of the sport from a national perspective. Another board member stated that TNZhas to achieve an effective merger of regional interests . . . Quite how it will manifest itself is uncertain (3b, 1 September,2005).

A previous internal report found that Tennis in New Zealand is ungovernable because it has been demonstrably unableto confront a raft of inter-related problems already identied. The response to successive reports over 12 years, all calling forsignicant change, has been ineffectual (Tennis New Zealand, 2004b, p. 6). In particular, the report goes on to state that Theambiguity about the relationship between Tennis NZ and major associations also means there is no agreed agenda for thesport. The duplication inherent in 25 associations is a confusing and possiblywasteful use of resources (p. 7). In otherwords,the ability of the TNZ board to strategically lead the sport appears to be hamstrung by the current regional governingstructure. Working with TNZ to assist in effecting structural change and tracking the results of this process so thatgovernance theory can be advanced, therefore, became a key aim for the researchers.

In framing the issue, which would lead to action designed to develop strategic capability, the researchers acknowledgedthe following conditions: the national board appeared to have personnel who were strategic thinkers and had a soundunderstanding of the sport and its environmental inuences, the board had been involved in designing and articulating itsstrategic priorities and the processes that encouraged a strategic focus appeared to be in place during board meetings. Theissue arose in the enacting of TNZs strategic priorities through its regional network. In the opinion of the TNZ board andmanagement, this was caused by an unwieldy regional structure, too many regional entities and within some regionalassociations, an imbalance in power and inuence that meant the national body was hamstrung in its desire to directnational initiatives.


For the purposes of this research the issue that emerged within the TNZ case study was therefore articulated as: anational sport organisation in decline seeking to rejuvenate by further centralising its functions, and by shifting thebalance of power in favour of greater national inuence in the governing of the sport. The strategy to enable this was achange in regional structure and reduction of the number of regional entities. This articulation of the issue was checkedwith board members and the CEO prior to the researchers presenting at a conference in early 2006. It was also formallyveried by the participants during the evaluation phase, with one respondent stating: Yes I agree. The key issue is aroundbeing more strategically focused and having the right delivery mechanisms. This interviewee further stated that I couldsee straight away there was a dysfunctional structure/delivery mechanism . . . and that they would have to change thestructure and business model to allow delivery of the strategy (4c, 9 November, 2006). The next stage of the actionresearch process was to work with the Maiden Committee to assist them in determining the nature of the new regionalmodel and nationalregional relationship.

4.3. Phase three: Research Intervention and Action

The intervention and action phase spanned a 10-month period between November 2005 and August 2006. This involvedmultiple iterations to maximise learning generated, and to strengthen the validity of the research process (refer Fig. 2). Theterms intervention and action have been chosen to represent the distinction between researcher-led steps (i.e.,intervention) and participant-led steps (i.e., action). At times, both terms are used jointly denoting integration betweenresearcher-led intervention and participant-led action. This is done to clarify researcher and participant roles and to furtheraid transparency of process and ultimately research validity.

The theoretical concepts that might explain what was occurring for TNZ and help direct the intervention and action weretwofold. The rst was drawn from Pettigrew and McNultys (1995) tripartite model of power and inuence. This related tothe proposed change in governing structure for the organisation aspired to by the board in order to further advance itsstrategic priorities. In the application of thismodel, the authors encourage consideration ofmultiple elements: structure andcontext, will and skill, and power sources, in order for potential power of the board to be converted into actual inuence.

While this model was designed in relation to the power and inuence of independent directors (non-executive directors)within the corporate boardroom, the model also offers insight into the tennis context. How much would the board rely onstructural change to exert increased inuence and how much would the behavioural aspects such as relationship buildingand communication with regional entities come into play? Would the legitimate power afforded by the constitution be thesource of the boards power base or would other sources of power, such as expert or referent power (i.e., a former highprole player), be utilised? How committedwere individual boardmembers to the change process in terms of exerting theirwill and skill? Indeed, would the structural change allow greater determination by the board of its strategic priorities?Would other signicant factors, not included in themodel, emerge from the research process?While some answers began toemerge during the intervention and action phase, many of these questions were not answered until the evaluation phase ofthe research process.

The second theoretical concept was connected to board composition in relation to issues of constituency representation.At the time of the researchers involvement, the TNZ board was a fully appointed board (by an appointments board asspecied in the constitution) as distinct from an elected system. Comment was made by board members in early interviewswith the researchers regarding the issue of regional representation at national board level, signalling that a change to theappointed model may be required. There is much debate in the literature regarding the extent to which boards should berepresentative of their stakeholders (Sternberg, 1997; Stoney, 2001). Similarly, within the TNZ situation there were varyingviews regarding the appropriateness of a representative board for TNZ. The presence of this issue within TNZ restructuringdeliberations provided an opportunity for the researcher to expose practitioners to aspects of this theoretical debate.Similarly, it also presented an opportunity for the researchers to draw from the empirical evidence to inform the theoreticalconversation.

4.4. First major intervention and action step: agreement on regional centres

The research intervention for TNZ emerged from the desire by the board to expose the Maiden Committee to theexperience of other sports and theories of practice that might inform decision making. As explained by one board member. . .we are keen to keep leading practice in front of theMaiden Committee (3f, 20 December, 2005). The CEO considered theresearchers role as providing . . . academic independence (20 December, 2006) to help provide answers to what, at times,would be a highly political debate. While the research intervention was a small part in a broader course of change for tennisin New Zealand, it allowed the researcher to become involved in the larger process and gain access to data that wouldcontribute to the overall research question.

It was agreed between researchers and research participants that a range of case studies detailing the experience of othersports would be prepared by the researchers. In total, three case studies detailing changes to regional governing structuresfor Squash New Zealand, New Zealand Soccer and New Zealand Cricket were prepared. A matrix comparing the regionalgoverning structures of nine other sports was also prepared as well as a matrix setting out the membership categories andvoting systems of seven other national sport organisations. This information was included in theMaiden Committee agendapapers for 29 November, 20 December, 2005 and 9 February, 2006 meetings.


A review of literature on governing models in Australia and New Zealand sport and other non-prot organisations(Shilbury, Ferkins, & Sherry, 2004) was also forwarded to committee members. The researchers worked closely with thecommittee project manager in determining the type of information required. The project manager would pose questionssuch as How have other sports managed their new structures to bring in everyone? What sort of committees and advisorygroups have they established? How do the new relationships between the national and regional levels work? (2 December,2005). In an attempt to address these questions the researchers included a section within each case study that summarisedthe lessons learnt for each sport as per their documentation.

In a summary of the rst round of information prepared for the 29 November, 2005 Maiden Committee meeting, theresearchers highlighted key lessons from other sports as well as conclusions from the literature regarding governingstructures and change processes (e.g., Kikulis, 2000; Shilbury et al., 2004; Skinner, Stewart, & Edwards, 1999). Summarypoints included:

That regional/state delivery structures appeared to be the number one issue facing NSOs in New Zealand and Australia. For some sports, it was considered an opportunity to build regional capability and for others it was considered necessary todismantle the existing delivery mechanism and to re-build as a centralised model.

The overall trend was to reduce the number of regional/state associations. Two NSOs in Australia had changed to a unitary model. In New Zealand, many NSOs had reduced the number retaining between 6 and 12 regional entities. One NSO had added alayer.

Many had found the implications of change very signicant and in particular had realised the need to re-orientate the NSOas a service organisation.

Committee members were attentive to the implications of a restructure in terms of the additional service role for theNSO. Im particularly interested in the lessons from soccer where you say the national body needs to play a proactive role insupporting the implementation of the federations. This is the greatest weakness to date, of the federation structure (4f, 29November, 2005).

After the research was discussed and the results of an a survey of regional associations was tabled, the Maiden Committeechairperson decided to . . . lead from the chin (29 November, 2005) and present his recommendations regarding a proposedregionalmodel that could thenbeopen todebateby the committee. I thinkwehave tomove forward in the interestsof tennis its a great sport and weve just got to do better. We just cant stay where we are otherwise we will continue to decline (29November, 2005). The chairperson then distributed a set ofwritten recommendations that after some amendments fromothercommittee members became the Maiden Committee recommendations to the TNZ board. Of the 11 recommendations, thecentral point was to reduce the number of regional associations from 25 to 6, creating regional centres.

After a short period of silence in the meeting where it appeared the reaction was uncertain, there were expressions ofstrong support for the recommendations from other Maiden Committee members. Of particular signicance was theendorsement received from members who were from regional associations and at times had expressed concern at theproposed restructure. Of the eight voting members, four held positions within regional associations. One such member wasrst to respond: I would like to endorse in general terms the proposed recommendations from the chair . . . There is a clearmessage that we must consult with our stakeholders and that the role of TNZ must be clearly dened (4d, 29 November,2005).

A further regional respondent stated: What youve come out with is certainly xs (regions) views. We do want to seethe number of regions reduced and we do want to see the role of Tennis New Zealand claried (4e, 29 November, 2005).Another commented about the positive nature of the six regional centres because . . . it places signicant responsibility backon the regions (4c). One of themembers, who also sat on the TNZ board, stated: I support it. It goes a long way to achievingwhat we want in terms of national leadership (4f).

Following some discussion regarding the detail of the recommendations the chairperson then proposed that . . . theserecommendations be given to the Tennis New Zealand board and that they are also sent to the regions along with the resultsof the survey (29 November, 2005). In response to this anothermember commented: I need a bit more detail as to how thesmaller regions might join with the larger regions. I think this should be included in what we send to the regions (4i). Inconcluding, and further justifying his choice to promote six regions, the chairperson stated: I looked at all options includingthe unitary model and having three regions, and after the survey I decided that the unitary model is just not on at themoment and probably not appropriate at the moment.

4.5. Second major action step: constitutional recommendations

Once a recommendation was agreed by the Maiden Committee to designate six associations as regional centres, the nextstep was to agree on draft constitutions that would set the framework for the proposedmodel. It was intended that both thenational and regional constitutions would change as a consequence of the change in governing structure. Two key issuesfrom this action were particularly relevant for the research project: the decision regarding the make up of the TNZ board interms of appointed positions versus elected positions; and the wording regarding regional autonomy and the regionalcentres.


The debate as to the composition of the TNZ board was an intriguing one. The committee members were working from adraft constitution prepared by a sports lawyer who formed part of the professional services team for theMaiden Committee.The solicitor had provided an opinion advising the committee to adopt a hybrid board with a mix of three elected and veappointed directors. She noted that some all-appointed boards have trouble understanding the sport at a practical level andall-elected boards often result in inadequate skills around the table.

The solicitor also advised that TNZ directors should not be ofce holders of regional associations in order to reduce thepotential for conict of interest. The chairperson asked the lead researcher for her opinion on this in terms of conclusionsfrom the literature. The researcher agreed that current good practice was a hybrid board. There was initial agreement on theve appointed; three elected split but members were not in favour of excluding regional ofcer holders. Im not so sureabout that I think we need the best people for the job. It doesnt matter where they come from they should act in the bestinterests of TNZ (4a, 20 December, 2005). It was agreed that nominees for the elected positions could hold regionalpositions. However, a clause was added into the nal constitution explicitly allowing this provided the rules regardingconict of interest and duties of the board were noted and applied.

The second major issue of particular interest for the study was the debate regarding the powers of TNZ and the desire bysome regional personnel tomaintain full regional autonomy. This issuewas raised to varying degrees of intensity throughoutthe Maiden Committee deliberations but came to a head at the 9 February meeting. The issue was prefaced by thefollowing exchange: I think my major concern from an x (association) point of view is (4m, 9 February, 2006). Anothermember interjected before the rst speaker could nish in stating: Youre here as a representative of a committee of TennisNew Zealand acting with a hat on as a Tennis New Zealand representative so take your Tennis New Zealand hat off and putyour x (association) hat on and tell us what you think (4a).

The ensuing debate revealed the tension in attempting to align national and regional interests. The original speakercontinued stating that I think the associations are going towant to preserve their autonomy. I think this is a key intention ofthis constitution and I think its going to be very important (4m). Another member disagreed. The whole idea is tostrengthen Tennis New Zealand so that tennis in New Zealand does better . . . And so there will be some constraints nottotally autonomous regions so that the strategies are aligned (4a). In response, the association-based speaker explained: Iwould suggest that its important to recognise that the members control TNZ ultimately. There is an ownership issue there.Because the current structure is ownership by the clubs who own the regions and the regions effectively own TNZ (4m, 9February, 2006). In response, the chair asked for the views of other members regarding what had been said. One regionallybased member said he was strongly in favour of greater direction from TNZ (4i). The debate moved to the next clause in theconstitution for discussion. The issue did not appear to be resolved at this time.

As illustrated by the exchange detailed above, it appeared there was a clear difference of opinion regarding the levelof autonomy for regional centres. From a national perspective, regional autonomy had and would potentially inhibit theability of the TNZ board to enact its strategic priorities and to effectively govern the sport. From a regional perspective,national control threatened independence and the regions ability to effectively govern their region. Complicating thiswas the issue of ownership which potentially held different meanings for the different parties. Who owns TNZ?Certainly, based on the previous quotation the regional person considered TNZ was owned by the associations andtherefore should be owned by the six new regions. From a national perspective, the researchers gleaned that ownershipwas not at issue. Rather, the challenge was about how to work more effectively with regional entities to deliver nationalstrategic priorities. In so doing, TNZ would be discharging its governing duties. Shilbury (2001) stated that . . . sportingorganizations exist in an ownership vacuum (p. 260). Is it possible that the notion of governance was being confusedwith ownership?

Shilbury (2001) also pointed out in relation to sport organisations that . . . there is usually no one individual orindividuals who legally own the rm and, as a consequence, control is often a blurred concept (p. 260). He goes on to saythat, Ownership of sport organizations andmany non-prots is a collective phenomenon and thereforemore closely alignedwith stewardship theory which posits shared, cooperative and collective behaviours . . . (p. 260). The challenge thatappeared to be presentwithin this debatewas how to overcome the regional concerns regarding loss of autonomy in order tocreate a structure that encouraged cooperative and collective behaviour. The new structure would need to preserve theduciary responsibilities that regional entities held for tennis within their jurisdiction while at the same time allowcollective decision making that could advance national aims.

Were issues of ownership and control also at the heart of the debate regarding national board composition and the needto allow an election process? Certainly, the preservation of regional inuence on the TNZ board was an important element.Was ensuring regional inuence at the national board table a way of protecting owner inuence or was it a mechanism toinclude a stakeholder perspective? A stewardship theory of governance advocates behaviour and decision making that iscollectivistic and has . . . higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours (Davis & Schoorman, 1997, p. 25). Davisand Schoorman explain that . . . even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the stewardperceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and behaves accordingly . . . (p. 25). There is evidence from the MaidenCommittee discussion previously detailed that committee members considered the role of the TNZ board was to act asstewards on behalf of the organisation. If this role was to be undertaken by including a stakeholder perspective, then thenational or collective principles could easily apply.

However, if the concept of governing was considered from an ownership perspective (i.e., the TNZ board was there togovern on behalf of the owners) then why would the owners (i.e., regional centres) risk being disadvantaged by collective


decisions thatmay not address their regional concerns? Thismight especially apply in a situationwhere the regional entitiesare considered by the national body to be one of many stakeholders (e.g., sponsors, media) and not necessarily the principalowners. From the evidence that was emerging, the two distinct points of view could be framed as:

NSO view: the regional entity exists to deliver national priorities and programmes and keep the sport alive at the regionallevel.

Regional view: the national body exists to coordinate our wishes as owners of the sport. We tell themwhat to do andwhatthe strategic priorities are.

In order to unravel the issues and for the restructuring process to achieve the stated aims of creating a regional structurethatwas best for tennis in NewZealand, the issue of ownership and how itwas perceived by the different entitieswould needto be better understood.

4.6. Monitoring the TNZ intervention and action steps

The nal outcome for the Maiden Committee was a set of recommendations to the TNZ board regarding six new regionalcentres. The committee also provided a recommended national constitution and a regional template to the TNZ board. Theseconstitutions made nomention of the word control or ownership within the objects or powers and responsibilities withthe exception of a clause regarding control of money. Instead terms such as promote, develop, enhance and protectwere used in both draft constitutions. In contrast, the former TNZ constitution and, for example, Tennis North Harboursconstitution both containedmultiple citings of theword control within the objects. The rst object in the TNZ constitutionwas To foster, control and develop the sport of Tennis . . . (Tennis New Zealand, 2005b, p. 2). Similarly, control featured inthe rst object of the Tennis North Harbour constitution.

The nal report also contained an introduction, background on the case for change, a transition timeframe and detailregarding the implementation process including the respective responsibilities of TNZ and the regional centres. The nalreport of the Maiden Committee to TNZ also noted that it did not achieve a consensus of opinion on some key issues. Themost controversial issues in concluding this report were voting powers of proposed regions, andwhether or not members ofclubs, and individual clubs, should be members of Tennis NZ. The committee was divided on both of these issues (4a, 17February, 2006).

Both issues appeared to be a manifestation of the differing perspectives on control and ownership between regional andnational personnel. In particular, the desire by national personnel to engage directly with individual players and clubmembers was motivated by the desire by TNZ to maintain an . . . accurate national database for sponsorship and otherpurposes, and its ability to obtain personal information and revenue from a growing number of casual players (4a, 17February, 2006). From a regional perspective the opposition to this direct line to clubs and individual players was based onthe view that they considered clubs and players to bewithin their jurisdiction and should remain under regional control (4m,9 February, 2007). In the nal report, two voting options were proposed for consideration, representing the differingopinions. In addition, the regional centres remained as the exclusive members of TNZ (plus afliates and life members, etc.).As presently written, the proposed constitution of Tennis NZ gives the power to effect both these objectives (i.e., a nationaldatabase and revenue from casual players) without the members of clubs, and clubs, being members of Tennis NZ (4a, 17February, 2006).

In terms of monitoring the recommendations by the Maiden Committee, the next opportunity was the special generalmeeting (SGM) followed by the AGM scheduled for 12 August, 2006. It was intended that the motions proposing changes tothe TNZ constitution and structurewould be put forward. Leading up to thismeeting, therewere a number of further changesproposed by two of the major associations, primarily relating to issues of regional autonomy.

The motion to replace the existing TNZ constitution with a new constitutionmandating six geographical areas, known asregional centres, was approved unanimously by themembers of TNZ at the SGMon 12 August, 2006. Despite the controversyrelating to regional autonomy and TNZ board authority, this was arguably the most signicant change to the national bodysince it was established and as such a major achievement for all concerned.

4.7. Phase four: Evaluation of Intervention and Action

The formal evaluation phase took place over a three-month period between October 2006 and December 2006. Theprocess of how change and learning within the TNZ setting might be evaluated was discussed with some of the researchparticipants. Based on their advice, and direction from authors of action research literature (Cardno, 2003; Coghlan &Brannick, 2001), the researchers decided to undertake the majority of interviews individually. An interview prompt sheetwas designed by revising the key issues previously identied, reviewing the major steps and questions of the interventionand action phase and relating these to the overall research question.

The researchers chose vemajor areas of questioning. First, the researchers veried their articulation of the issuewith theresearch participants about which therewas full agreement. Second, a series of questionswere posed to reveal the perceivedstrengths and weaknesses of the change process. Third, there were questions relating to the role and impact of theresearchers involvement and, fourth, there were questions about the impact of the change. Final summary questions were


asked of the participants to identify the most signicant change for them and what they considered to be their primarylearning. This format has been condensed into three sections as set out below.

Participants were interviewed between 29 October and 7 December, 2006. In total, 11 people were consulted. Ten peoplewere interviewed face-to-face and one person providedwritten comment because of geographical distance. Those consultedwere the TNZ CEO, TNZ board chairperson, Maiden Committee chairperson, one other TNZ board member not part of theMaiden Committee plus 8 of the 12members and advisers involved in theMaiden Committee (not counting the researchers).A total of ve of the eight TNZ board members were included. For reasons of convenience on behalf of the participants, two(4d and 4g) were interviewed together. The researcher noted a particular willingness to engage in the evaluation phase onbehalf of the tennis participants. Many interviews lasted at least 1.5 hours and some up to 3 hours. The researchers alsodetected a sense of excitement and curiosity in evaluating the change process. Participants appeared willing to throwaround tentative research conclusions and theoretical constructs relevant to their experience. In some instances, theevaluative interview process appeared to take on a cathartic quality and participants appeared to relish the opportunity toexpress their personal views and reect on their experience.

4.8. Evaluating the process of change

Perspectives were drawn from regional and national ofce holders as well as independent committee members on thestrengths and weaknesses of the process of change. A participant on the national board stated that I think the processworked really well. The one . . . negative is not being able to get to other business. Its affected where we are at in highperformance (3c, 8 November, 2006). Another noted that We had full blown legal, nancial and research support [for theMaiden Committee]. The project advisory support and resources were a major positive (4f, 28 November, 2006). Severalconsidered the appointment of Sir Colin Maiden as chairperson of the committee to be a major milestone and a positiveaspect of the process. I believe the committee worked well under a highly skilled chair, and its recommendations were, onthe whole, . . . exactly what would have progressively overcome the problems tennis has faced in the past few decades (4i, 9November, 2006). Representative of a number of views, another respondent stated Sir Colins appointmentwas amilestone.It was the rst time someone has stepped up to lead this issue. His ability to cut to the chase and lead it was a key to theprocess (4j, 27 November, 2006).

There was also a consistent view that a major challenge of the Maiden Committee process was the requirement todetermine constitutional detail. It broke down when the detail was asked for. The detail is where the stumbling block was.However, at the end of the day Im pleased the general thrust [of the Maiden Committee recommendations] has beenexecuted (4a, 6 December, 2006). A different respondent noted TheMaiden Committeewas given a brief far beyondwhat itcould do (4b, 29 November, 2006). Another theme relating to the perceived strengths of the process was involvement fromthe government agency, SPARC. A tipping pointwas SPARC placing a lot of pressure on sports to get their act together (4b,29 November, 2006). Similarly, a second participant stated, SPARCsmoney helped sway thinking. SPARC became a leveragepoint (3a, 29 October, 2006).

Finally, there were several comments from both TNZ boardmembers and outsiders regarding the national board functionduring the process. One non-TNZ board member stated There was healthy debate and team contribution. The chair, whowas a facilitator, drew on different strengths at different times (4j, 27 November, 2006). In recognising theway the nationalboard operated as an agent in the process of change, this participant went on to say The board were leading the decisionmaking and the CEO was providing his views. All board members were committed to the outcome. Similarly, a TNZ boardmember stated, I was able to air my point of view there was no criticism of me or of each other (3c, 8 November, 2006).This board member went on to pose the question How can this culture be developed at regional level? We need to includepeople, to involve people, provide feedback and be available. In respect to this aspect, a non-TNZ board member alsocommented that There was common sense and motivation from the board of TNZ to effect change (4b, 29 November,2006).

4.9. Impact of intervention and structural reform

In order to gauge a better understanding of the impact of the research intervention as dened earlier, the lead researcherqueried her rolewith participants. Therewas a sense frommost that the information providedwas indeed useful backgroundfor decision making. Everyone valued it at the time and found it useful to understand and benchmark against (4c, 9November, 2006) was one comment, for example. Another participant noted that It provided a landscape gave somecontext kind of like a peep out the window. It also offered, of course, an independent perspective which served to educatepeople about the topic (4j, 27 November, 2006). This participant also considered that . . . it would have been better if youwere able to talk to it more there were some important lessons in there. Other participants also noted the educative valueof the information. We wanted . . . to knowmore about what others had done (4a, 6 December, 2006). A further participantnoted, Your comments gave us a good method of approach it was very helpful to have some independent input weneeded to have a balance (4h, 10 November, 2006).

A signicant portion of the interview time was spent determining the perceived impact and outcomes of the structuralreform. There was little disparity in comments between national and regional ofce holders. The lead researcher askedquestions relating to both the impact of the change in structure as well as the impact of the process of change.With regard to


the former, a regional ofce holder stated, I feel more condent. There is now a more efcient business model. There is amuch more eet of foot structure and for communication, this has got to be better (4c, 9 November, 2006). Anotherregional ofce holder asked and answered the question Has the structural change allowed for the outcomes desired? Yes . . .Now that we have six regions, four of which have been challenged to lift the bar up. I want six strong regions (4d, 7December, 2006).

A similar sentiment was expressed from a national point of view: With the six regions, everyone now has the chance ofbeing more equal (3a, 29 October, 2006). Also from a national point of view, one participant commented that, Therestructure is a new drawing board. We have established a dened relationship with the regions and the MOUs[Memorandums of Understanding] have claried issues (3c, 8 November, 2006). The participant went on to explain: Imgetting feedback from people regarding communication with TNZ . . . Theres been an acceptance of responsibility of issuesand solutions. TNZ has stood up and accepted responsibility. People dont feel like they are in a vacuum any more.

Another national ofce holder described a similar outcome stating, We have a better culture and awareness of the needfor change and the cost of not seeing it through. We are more aligned. Weve come through a tough negotiation process andweve still kept those relationships intact (4f, 28 November, 2006). Similarly, another participant considered that the . . .biggest achievement was engagingwith each other.Whats decided on paper wont succeed if they dont continue to engage.The process was effective in the end because they got a result that everyone was happy with (4j, 27 November, 2006). Theparticipant went on to say, Now there are clear boundaries and expectations regarding how the organisations can worktogether. A regional ofce holder concurred. There is more accountability and an opportunity for greater focus (4d, 7December, 2006).

As part of the questioning process regarding the impact of change, the researcher specically probed the issues ofregional autonomy, ownership and national control. Again, there was remarkable consensus regarding the collectionof national and regional views relating to this issue. The general view was that the new constitution had indeed retainedregional autonomy and had not granted any further powers to the national body and that this was a workable outcome formost parties. A regional respondent stated that There is no real change from a legal perspective. The regions havent lost anyability to make autonomous decisions and I dont think TNZ has gained any greater inuence (4c, 9 November, 2006).Another participant commented, As it [the constitution] is written now, TNZ doesnt have enough power to dictateanything (4a, 6 December, 2006). Also in reference to the respective powers within the new constitution, a national ofceholder said, Lets get to the starting line and at least we know we are in the race. And over time, as there is more trust andcommunication, we can develop it (4g, 7 December, 2006). The respondent also rmly stated, It is wrong for the nationalbody to have the mentality that it owns the sport. A regional respondent also explained, There is room for autonomy to beexercised at regional level (4d, 7 December, 2006).

Another TNZ board member also articulated this point of view by explaining, You cant come in and dominate. We needto have a collaborative approach to integrating the strategy into the programmes and to draw on the expertise within theregions (3c, 8 November, 2006). Another national boardmember described their point of view by using ametaphor relatingto the Americas Cup yacht race. Dean Barker steers the boat but he gets his information from and consults with nine othersregarding which way to go. Its TNZ who is steering but there are six regional entities who can now be involved in decision-making (4g, 7 December, 2006).

Some concernwas expressed relating to the potential lack of constitutional power on behalf of TNZ. In terms of structure,theyve made a leap, however, I do have some concerns that the regions could become more entrenched (4j, 27 November,2006). Another participant stated that in order to move forward . . . it will require a lot of good will . . .. A three year reviewwill be terribly important (4a, 6 December, 2006). Similarly, a further respondent explained that, We have a constitutionthat is a vanilla product without teeth from an authority point of view. I sense its swung a little too far back to theregions in terms of power (4c, 9 November, 2006).

In contrast to the idea that the regions had not relinquished any of their powers, a regional ofce holder considered thatWemade concessions to allow TNZ to govern and inuencemore. From a regional point of view there was somemistrust ofTNZ previously (4d, 7 December, 2006). This respondent went on to say, however, Im quietly condent that over the nextve, six, seven years that given new leaders and successors, I believe we could naturally move to a model with more controlat the top.

Overall, the researchers gleaned a sense of enthusiasm and optimism from respondents that surprised them. The processof change had demanded signicant energy, was drawn out and difcult. However, the evaluation interviews clearly showeda shift away from the them and us attitude that had pervaded the sport at the commencement of the Maiden Committeeprocess. The researchers noted a much greater willingness on the part of key national and regional personnel to worktogether. Somehow, the structural change had facilitated a shift in the perception of collaboration within the sport. Thisperception is summed up by the comment from a regional ofce holder, For me, its been a demonstration of teamwork anda willingness to consult (4d, 7 December, 2006).

These comments contrast sharplywith thosemade a year earlier regarding the level ofmistrust and noted difculty in therelationship between the national and regional entities. Indeed, there was reference to a . . . misunderstanding, suspicionand fear (4h, 10 November, 2006) that appeared to characterise the relationship, within the evaluation interview as anhistorical state. What springs to mind was some of the emotion and perception like hijack, asset grab, unitary model(4g, 7 December, 2006) was a statement made in reference to how the relationship was previously perceived. TNZ weresaying one thing verbally but constitutionally said a different thing from a regional point of view (4d, 7 December, 2006).


Even as late as April 2006, there was still a large measure of concern regarding the nature of communication betweennational and regional entities. What we want with TNZ is far greater communication and cooperation (4e, 29 April, 2006).

There is signicant evidence within the evaluation interviews that the boards desire to transform the relationship withthe regional associations was in fact achieved. As alluded to earlier, the structural change as difcult as it was to achieve wasthe rst part of a strategy to redene the nationalregional relationship and allow greater governance of the sport from anational perspective. Clearly, the national boards ability to govern, lead and inuence appears to now be dependent onforging newly dened collaborative relationships. In the absence of constitutional power a truly collaborative partnershipwill be essential. Interestingly, there was not a hint of disappointment from national board members that they hadeffectively conceded constitutional power. Rather, therewas excitement at the sea change that had reportedly taken place.

There was a sense that the national board was indeed on the cusp of creating an environment where it could enact thestrategic priorities designed with the regions as distinct from for the regions.With six regions providing greater equity interms of playing numbers and voting power across regional centres and a sense of teamwork, which contrasted sharplywithprevious descriptions of the relationship, it was understandablewhy this optimismexisted. Having noted this shift, however,there was also a sense that there was a lot more work to be done regarding the level of national and regional collaboration toallow the sport to move forward.

4.10. Learning about board strategic capability

There were several standout messages in terms of how the structural change might impact on the boards ability to enactits strategic priorities. The rst was concerned with how the agreed change in nationalregional relationships might enablethe organisation to work in a more collaborative way. In the model we came up with, the regions will all participate in thestrategic plan. Having agreed on it, why couldnt it then be implemented? (4a, 6 December, 2006). It also appeared thatmostparticipants considered that the new structure of six regional entitieswould facilitate this enhanced relationship. The secondpoint, also acknowledged by most participants, related to the imperative now placed on the quality of the nationalregionalrelationship because of the lack of constitution powers afforded to the national body in the new constitution. We still donthave the ability to enforce board decisions at regional level was a comment made by a national ofce holder in regard toboard strategic capability (4h, 10 November, 2006). That participant went on to say, however, that board leadership wassomething that they believed peoplewanted to see . . .wehave greater trust for this now. These pointswere captured in thefollowing statement:

The ability to deliver strategies across the sport is not about words in a constitution. Its through relationships . . . Whygo through the process because its the process that has allowed them to get to this point of communication. It waspart of a process to create new and improved ways of working together. (4j, 27 November, 2006)

Several other participants also raised the notion of improved opportunity for national body leadership as distinct fromgreater control in the delivery of strategic priorities. In particular, there was a sense of an enhanced relationship regardingthis. Weve tapped into the goodwill of members. The most signicant change for me has been a change in the culture andattitude (4f, 28 November, 2006). This national board member also went on to say, . . . there is an element of openness andtransparency. The signs are there butweve got a lot of work to do . . .. Other participantswho heldmore of an independentrole on the Maiden Committee also echoed this sentiment. Trust and condence have improved. Everyone has aired theirdirty linen and there is a sense ofmoving on (4j, 27November, 2006). The . . . in-ghting hopefully has gone.Wemight haveturned a corner in working together (4b, 2 November, 2006).

Another perspective on an improved leadership relationship related to the view that in driving the process of change, thenational body had rstly engaged the regions in a way that had not been previously achieved and secondly encouraged theregions to consider a national view of the sport and its declining performance. There was an acceptance by the tenniscommunity for change (3c, 8 November, 2006). This national board member also went on to say,

I think its been led really well because everyone has been encouraged to keep their eye on the big picture. There was anegative culture that wasnt necessarily collaborative it was focussed on individual concerns. I can see now howwecan break down that barrier. I can see a change in culture. Regional people are interactingwith national. People look atTNZ differently we are not seen as the bad guy because wewere the ones who instigated the change. It has openedup the organisation people are more positive. (3c, 8 November, 2006)

Another stated, I think there was learning for the membership regarding their contribution they have a responsibilitytomake a contribution that if theywanted to have their say, they needed to give it when asked (4j, 27 November, 2006). Inrelation to the national bodys initiation of the changes, a regional ofce holder stated that it, . . . seemed to galvanise peopleinto taking a personal stake in the change process (4c, 9 November, 2006). Another commented that it . . . forced the hand ofassociations to become involved (4b, 29 November, 2006). When asked about the most signicant change a national ofceholder noted that, . . . we have created an environment where TNZ can lead nationally where there are KPIs [keyperformance indicators] and a focus on outcomes (4g, 7 December, 2006).

Further learning regarding national board strategic capability was expressed in terms of a greater appreciation for otherpoints of view. I learned the importance of . . . understanding where your stakeholders are coming from. Understandingwhere you have common ground and where you differ, for example, autonomy and ownership (4f, 28 November, 2006).


Similarly, another participant noted that, People learned about other points of view. The process cleared the air in a lot ofareas (4b, 29 November, 2006). Everyone has quite a different thinking approach and way of looking at it in a changesituation (4c, 9 November, 2006). Another participant considered there was learning regarding . . . where others werecoming from (4b, 29 November, 2006).

The sentiments noted above further demonstrate how the process of change has created a positive shift in therelationship between national and regional entities. This shift, perhaps an unwitting one, has established an environmentwithin which greater national board leadership can be achieved. As noted by one board member in an initial interview withthe researcher, TNZ has to achieve an effective merger of regional interests . . . Quite how it will manifest itself is uncertain(3b, 1 September, 2005). The notion that TNZ would not gain greater constitutional power and the regional entities wouldretain their autonomy in an environment that allows the merger of national and regional interests, was a situation none ofthe research participants had previously articulated. While the desired sequence of events as described below is yet to playout, there are strong indications from participants that it could be achieved. While there is legal autonomy [for theregions], the constitutions will be aligned. TNZ can say heres our idea and we can debate it and have something agreed once agreed, the national body can co-ordinate it (4h, 10 November, 2006).

There appears to have been signicant learning from the TNZ experience for the participants generally and for the boardmembers in relation to their strategic role. As noted in the evaluation interviews, the learning appears to have come from agreater understanding of the role of regional entities and their desire to remain autonomous with an ownership stake in thenational body. The learning regarding the strategic role of the board concentrated on the importance of engaging withregional personnel to build a relations

developing board strategic capability in sport organisation s: the national–reg ional governing...

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