detention operations in a counterinsurgencyintelligence drives operations case review legitimacy is...

United States Army Combined Arms Center

MAJ Mike KuhnUS Army & USMC COIN Center

DETENTION OPERATIONS IN A

COUNTERINSURGENCY

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1. REPORT DATE 2009 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Detention Operations in a Counterinsurgency

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027

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Report (SAR)

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18


Why talk about Detention Operations in

COIN?

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“The mistreatment by soldiers at Abu Ghraib in the fall of 2003 was documented in photographs and videos showing naked detainees being frightened, beaten and forced into humiliating sexual positions. President Bush ultimately apologized for the abuses, which military leaders acknowledge helped fuel the insurgency in Iraq.”

“U.S. Prisons in Iraq Nearly Full With Rise in Insurgent Arrests”, Washington Post, 21 JAN 05

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“What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight... is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are warriors, we are also all human beings."

GEN Petraeus 10 MAY 2007 Memo to MNF-I

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CARE AND CUSTODY WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT


Topics• Definitions

• COIN Concepts in Detention Operations

• Tactical Site Exploitation

• Operations By, With, and Through HN SF

• Questions & Feedback

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EPWEPWClearly identified as a member of the opposing forces e.g., wearing a uniform or possessing other specific identification as the OPFOR

Criminal Detainee:Criminal Detainee:Identified as committing a crime against the host nation people/government.

Security Detainee:Security Detainee:Identified as a security threat to US or other partner nation forces, ie; killing or attempting to assault or kill coalition forces, etc…

Definitions

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Enemy CombatantEnemy CombatantUsed to define the status of what the US considers to be unlawful combatants e.g.Al Qa’eida


GovGov’’t t SympathisersSympathisers

Sympathetic to Sympathetic to insurgentsinsurgents

Insurgent Insurgent FightersFighters

Active GovActive Gov’’t t SupportersSupporters

Uncommitted Uncommitted or neutralor neutral

Active Active Supports of Supports of insurgentsinsurgents

Consolidateand

StrengthenProtect

PersuadeDissuade

Deter Marginalize or Defeat

How does Det Ops fit into COIN?

SUPPORT RULE OF LAW KILL OR CAPTURE TO PROVIDE SECURITY

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United States Army Combined Arms Center 8

RAND Study done for TF 134 MAY 2008


Detention Operations LOOs

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INSURGENT INSURGENT

PASSIVE

GOV’T SUPPORT

PASSIVE

GOV’T SUPPORT

INFORMATION OPS

Security

Care and Custody

Visitation (Family)

Reconciliation Efforts

Isolation of Extremists

Quality of Life (Facilities)


“Soldiers performing COIN must understand that the activities that

occur within the realm of detention do not always remain within the

confines of the restricted area but can have a profound effect on public support and the overall theater-wide

COIN effort.”FM 3-24

COIN vis a vis Detention Operations

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United States Army Combined Arms Center June 11

Det Ops Overarching Themes

Detain with Purpose

House with Respect

Release with Dignity

RAND Study done for TF 134 MAY 2008


How Detention Operations supports Warfighters Outside the Wire in COIN

Care and Custody

Insurgents must be isolated from their cause

and support

Intelligence Exploitation

Intelligence drives operations

Case Review

Legitimacy is the main objective

Security under the rule

of law is essential

Reintegration ReconciliationInsurgents

must be isolated from their cause and support

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http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/enemydetention/images/050519-N-6939M-019.jpg


Det Ops at the Tactical Level …By, With, and Through

• Operations conducted as combined patrols – based on actionable intelligence and focused on gathering evidence that can be used to prosecute

• Detainees taken into custody by Host Nation Security Forces – in accordance with their laws

• Units may also be responsible for inspection of local Host Nation jails – purpose is to assure fundamental human rights norms are not violated, but most importantly to help prop up the legitimacy of the local Security Forces and promote Rule of Law

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Tactical Site Exploitation Why are my Steely Eyed Killers playing CSI???!

• Treating your OBJ as a Crime Scene– If your Soldiers think that they’re done once they’ve

captured the Target and do not pay attention to evidence…• Critical intelligence may be lost• Detainee may have to be released because there is no evidence to

prosecute them in HN Legal System– Leaders/Soldiers must understand HN Laws and what

constitutes “evidence”• Convictions are critical. Without a conviction in HN court the bad

guy might be coming back to your AO a lot sooner than you’d like…• Talk to your SJA for clarification

– If there are Military Police or civilian Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs) assigned to your unit, USE THEM!

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COIN in DetOps in action…

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“ One detainee leader said he originally came to Iraq to kill Americans, but his treatment in the camp had changed his view…He was sincere and there were occasions when he was helpful in calming detainees during disturbances, a true measurement of effective COIN.”

LTC John F. Hussey, “Counterinsurgency Operations within the Wire: The 306th MP Battalion Experience at Abu Ghraib”


What is the End State We’re Working Towards?

• Supporting / building Host Nation Capacity to conduct Rule of Law based detention that conforms with international norms and standards on Human Rights– Helping the HN towards a “Corrections” model

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If the populace sees the HN Security Forces (particularly If the populace sees the HN Security Forces (particularly their Police) as a dispassionate force that is part of a their Police) as a dispassionate force that is part of a functional overall Justice System this enforces the functional overall Justice System this enforces the

legitimacy of the HN governmentlegitimacy of the HN government


QUESTIONS & FURTHER DISCUSSION

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detention operations in a counterinsurgencyintelligence drives operations case review legitimacy is...

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