Canadian Slavonic Papers

Détente in the Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and the Russians by Hugh RagsdaleReview by: Harold IngleCanadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1981), pp.339-340Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40867911 .

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Vol. xxiii, No. 3 Book reviews | 339

accurate. For example, it is not true that the edinoverie movement "lost momentum with the death of Potemkin": in actual fact it grew and came to fruition in the next reign. In her Conclusions the author points to the "demilitarisation of government" which she sees as a major general effect of Catherine's domestic policies and "an extremely important, though frequently overlooked, element in the development of civilised society" (p. 586). The suggestion is that this healthy trend was not main- tained, which in turn led to Russia's increasing "backwardness" evident in the fol- lowing century. This is merely one of a number of interesting issues of a general character which the book raises and which, it is to be hoped, will stimulate lively debate among scholars. In the author's own words, she wrote "the history which can be written, not the history which ought to be written." Whatever the latter may mean, the present fruit of her labours represents a remarkable scholarly achieve- ment and an important contribution to the studies of eighteenth-century Russia.

As far as the details of presentation are concerned, there are some incon- sistencies in transliteration (e.g., Yacov but Yakovlev, Kartashov, but Cherny- shev and Pugachev) and the occasional grammatical-semantic lapses in Russian such as gorodskaya golova (pp. 143, 3Ö2). The incidence of minor typographical errors or misprints seems to be rather in excess of what might be expected in a book published by a reputable University Press.

K. A. Papmehl, University of Western Ontario

Hugh Ragsdale. Détente in the Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and the Russians. Lawrence, Kansas: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980. xii, 183 pp. $17.50

Bonaparte's policy in the alignment with Russia that followed the disintegration of the Second Coalition in 1 799 and ended abruptly with the death of Paul I in 1 80 1 holds special significance because it was in this period that he first grappled with the problem of incorporating Russia in his grand design. Ragsdale has advanced a new interpretation purporting to reveal the "illusions" which attended a "détente." Bonaparte's policy was influenced by the "Testament" of Peter the Great, now known to be apocryphal. He came to believe that he could win Paul's cooperation by promising to support the aggressive aims set out in the "Testament," and thus neutralize Prussia and Austria and isolate Britain. But he was misled because Paul, also a victim of illusions, had rejected the designs entertained by his mother, Catherine the Great, which might have given the "Testament" validity as a guide. According to Ragsdale, although Paul was somewhat mad his policy was consistent and "morally immaculate" (p. 141), being the first to embody the idea of the concert of Europe, and compatible in spirit with the later Holy Alliance. He might have been a willing collaborator in a peaceful continental system, since his passion for order made it possible for him to accept Bonaparte and the Republic as legiti- mate. Ragsdale's somewhat gratuitous conclusion is that with better information his hero, Bonaparte, might have succeeded.

Ragsdale's interpretation will come as something of a shock to historians

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340 I Revue Canadienne des Slavistes Septembre 1981

familiar with the diplomacy of the period, as will his presentation. He has based his case as much on the dramatic effect of his tendentiously selected material as on any real analysis. The text is laced with anecdotes, for example an account of the voyage of the British fleet to Copenhagen, while vital matters are dealt with in- adequately. The partition of the Ottoman Empire, its role in Bonaparte's assess- ment of the Near East as crucial to future French power and as an inducement to Paul, is skimmed over in a few pages; the invasion of India, undertaken at con- siderable effort and expense by Paul, and arguably the most active manifestation of the two powers' cooperation, is merely mentioned in passing. A military align- ment or alliance is not a détente, a recent term in diplomacy, and it is easy to see that the subject would lose its implied relevance, and that the interpretation of Paul's policy would be undercut, if what occurred was in fact the former and not the latter. Harold Ingle, Ar cata, California

Frank W. Thackeray. Antecedents of Revolution: Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom, 1815-1825. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1980. 197 pp. $15.00

Frank W. Thackeray, in this study of Alexander I's policies towards the Poles in the decade after 1815, cares little for those historical interpretations that have depicted the tsar as a weak and ineffectual dreamer or as an increasingly unstable mystic, whose rule can be neatly divided into "liberal" and "reactionary" phases. In his policies towards the truncated kingdom of Poland, Thackeray's Alexander appears as "a consistent and hardheaded ruler" and "a forceful realist" (p. 32). Despite his liberal facade, "Alexander always remained a paternalistic autocrat at heart, an enlightened despot par excellence" (p. 53). Constitutionalism signified to him no more than a means to achieve more efficient administration. The tsar never intended the octroyé Polish Constitution of 1815 "to limit and define the sovereign's power and prerogatives . . . nor did he perceive in a constitution a docu- ment of abstract political principles designed to guarantee the rights of the nation and its citizens through representative government" (p. 53).

Thackeray argues that within these limitations the tsar did initially make a sincere effort to placate the Poles; but revolutionary challenges were spreading across Europe by 1820, and Alexander tacitly condoned violations of constitution- al principles in order to tighten the government's grip on the Poles. As the "succes- sion crisis" deepened he was willing to appease his brother Constantine in Warsaw, knowing full well that this step meant increased repressive measures in the Polish kingdom. Thackeray maintains, however, that Alexander never lost favour among most Poles; he succeeded repeatedly in playing what the author terms "the Lithuan- ian card," dangling prospects of union of the Congress kingdom with the remain- ing Russian possessions of the former Commonwealth. Alexander remained the "authentic master of Polish affairs" throughout the period (p. 1 12). Novosil'tsov, the evil genius in many accounts, is depicted as a clever opportunist, usually able to divine his master's intentions and thereby remain a step ahead of his rivals for the tsar's favour.

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