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National University of Political Studies and Public Administration

Faculty of Communication and Public Relations

Master in EU Communication and Governance

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

EU COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

Course Notes

Loredana Radu

Bucharest, 2014

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DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

- Course Notes -

Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3

2. Communicating Europe – Why does it Matter? .................................................................................... 3

2.1. Pre-Crisis EU Communication ...................................................................................................... 3

2.2. Case study: the promotion campaign for the Regional Operational Programme ............................... 4

3. Public Communication and Public Communication Campaigns ........................................................ 13

3.1. Public Communication ................................................................................................................ 13

3.2. Public Communication Campaigns ............................................................................................. 13

3.3. Public Communication Campaigns for EU-funded Programmes and Projects ........................... 14

4. Communicating Europe in the Context of the Crisis .......................................................................... 17

4.1. Crisis in the EU – a Brief Introspection ...................................................................................... 18

4.2. Euro Crisis or the Crisis of the European Union? ....................................................................... 23

4.3. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 26

5. What is at Stake: a Brief Incursion into the Meaning of the (European) Public Sphere ..................... 27

5.1. EU Communication and the Public Sphere ................................................................................. 28

5.2. Case Study: Mass Media Role in Broadcasting the “Europe’s Single Voice” during the ”Arab Spring” .................................................................................................................................................... 32

6. Communicating Solidarity .................................................................................................................. 39

7. Management of EU Communication campaigns: from idea towards results ..................................... 40

8. References ........................................................................................................................................... 44

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1. Introduction

EU’s recent enlargements have raised the stake in building an efficient communication strategy that would “close the gap” between EU and its citizens. People’s confidence and support for EU’s policies will reinforce the idea of creating a modern, democratic, secure and economically viable structure that would successfully face contemporary challenges. The programmes and projects financed by the EU represent a way to achieve the above-mentioned goal. These specific tools can be of a great help in promoting the European dimension and increasing EU’s visibility in the world. We shall focus next on the way in which the European Commission and its representatives in member states act according to a well-established communication policy principles to promote EU’s initiatives and actions. We shall also look at the goals of EU’s communication policy as they are stated in the documents issued by the Directorate General Communication. Moreover, we shall distinguish between the core concepts of a public communication campaign and explain their role in ensuring the success of the publicity for EU-funded programmes and projects in Romania.

2. Communicating Europe – Why does it Matter?

2.1. Pre-Crisis EU Communication

During the last years, EC and the DG Communication, in particular, have drawn attention on the importance of identifying a set of principles on which the EU’s communication policy to rest. Some major events in the history of the EU have shown that there is a significant gap between what Brussels considers to be a priority and how EU citizens feel about that. The rejection of the EU Constitution in two of the founders of the Union, in summer 2005, has made it clear that this gap must be bridged, and the DG Communication has been given the task to propose ways in which the dialogue between the EC and the citizens need to be improved. At that time, several documents have been issued in order to reinforce the communication inside and outside the European Union. At the beginning of 2006, DG Communication released the White Paper on a European Communication Policy, a collection of official documents containing action plans towards the elimination of the communication failure between EC and the citizens. The White Papers follow the direction launched in 2005, in a document called Plan D – Democracy, Dialogue, Debate. The White Papers have been submitted to public consultation between February and September 2006. Given the observations and comments on the White Papers, EC has reviewed and updated its policy proposal and has issued a document in

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which the principles of the EU’s communication policy are stated. Communicating Europe in Partnership (CEP) – launched in October 2007 – gathers the most recent assessed objectives of EU’s communication strategy. EU’s communication policy rests on the major idea that “the debate on Europe has to be made available outside the institutional framework, to its citizens”(CEP: 3). This is also evidenced by the European Council, in June 2007, which underlined the crucial significance of an efficient communication with the EU citizens, which to encourage them to express their opinion on EU’s actions and to ensure the diffusion of correct information on EU. CEP clearly indicates the main directions which EU’s communication policy should be set up on:

- Coherent and integrated communication. This involves more consistent public consultation on EC major decisions, promotion of the dialogue with the citizens and consolidation of institutional transparency.

- Involvement of EU citizens. This requires the building of specific structures and tools in order to ensure the public participation in decision-making process.

- European public sphere. Promotion of EU policies should engage public debates and consultation concerning the common interest of EU and its citizens.

2.2. Case study: the promotion campaign for the Regional Operational Programme The Regional Operational Programme – General Framework

The Regional Operational Programme (ROP) is one of the post ascension EU-funding programmes, which supports the development of Romania in various fields, such as infrastructure, tourism, or business. “The ROP global objective consists in supporting and promoting a sustainable balanced economic and social development of the Romanian Regions, giving priority to the lagging behind ones by improving business environment and infrastructure conditions for economic growth” (ROP, 2007: 97). This objective will be achieved through a differentiated financial allocation by region, connected with their level of development and in close coordination with the actions implemented by other Operational Programmes.

ROP budget for the 2007-2013 period totals 4,4 billion euros, 84% of which from the European Commission and 16% from the Romania side. ROP offers no reimbursable funds for projects that are related to: urban services (including public transport), roads infrastructure (county level), hospital infrastructure, social services, tourism, and entrepreneurship. The eligible beneficiaries for these funds are: public authorities (county or local councils, schools, hospitals, NGOs, small and medium-sized enterprises, and academic bodies.

Financing is granted through dedicated call for offers that are organized for each specific priority axis and operation. The ROP priority axes are:

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1. Support the urban development of the towns – main urban growth centers 2. Improvement of the local and regional transport infrastructure 3. Improvement of the social infrastructure 4. Strengthening the local and regional business environment 5. Sustainable development and tourism promotion 6. Technical assistance

Except for the axis 6 “Technical assistance”, which is a horizontal priority – since it funds the specialty expertise necessary to implement the projects funded the other five axes - ROP targets specific regional and local needs. These needs are – at least theoretically – documented in the National Development Plan 2007 – 2013. Also, there are specific beneficiaries’ types for each priority. Among the Operational Programmes (available for Romania between 2007 and 2013), ROP is maybe the most specifically customized and tailored – actually, its priority axis are self-explanatory as far the eligible beneficiaries are concerned. For example, it is clear that the potential beneficiaries of the priority axis 2 “Improvement of the local and regional transport infrastructure” are public authorities that manage the local public transport, while the priority axis 4 “Support the local and regional business environment” more specifically addresses SMEs and the local business associations.

By addressing local and regional priorities, ROP is complementary to the Sectorial Operational Programmes (SOP) that address specific action fields (e.g. Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resource Development, Sectorial Operational Programme for Economic Competitiveness, Sectorial Operational Programme for Transport etc.). Technically, ROP focus is on the local level – it is more concerned with local specific development issues, while SOPs have a more in-depth and specialized approach.

The ROP Awareness Campaign - Success or a Glorious Failure Only?

In order to make ROP popular among target groups, an awareness campaign was carried out in 2007. It was a complex campaign, composed of a variety of communication tools – starting from the traditional press conferences and interviews and finishing with large broadcasting campaigns (for TV and radio spots). It was quite an aggressive campaign composed of several key elements:

- Dedicated web site - Media relations (through press conferences, press releases, press informal meetings) - Information leaflets - Practical guidelines - TV spot - Radio spot Apart from these rather visible elements, the campaign was also focused on creating and

promoting communication guidelines and visual identity rules. These rules became operational through two documents: “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines” and “ROP Communication

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Guidelines”. At a first glance, the campaign created a certain level of visibility for ROP. In the following chapters we are going to take a close look at the specific aspects of this campaign, which seems to respect a rather commercial than an awareness approach.

Campaign Objective – Wanted… Each communication campaign has to answer a simple, yet sometimes overwhelming

question – “Why do we communicate?”. This basic question is usually ignored or taken as implicit. Still, reality shows that campaigns’ managers are so commercial-oriented, that the first idea that comes in their mind is “Let’s sell this product / service / brand”. In EU communication this commercial feeling is related to some booming principles, such as “citizens’ empowerment” or “European public sphere”. What sometimes one stubbornly fails to understand is that these booming principles are not associated to the promotion of a certain EU programme or project, but to the European communication policy as a whole.

It is high time we underlined the difference among EU policy, EU-funded programme, and a EU-funded project.“A well-formulated project should derive from an appropriate balance between the EC’s development policy priorities and the partner’s development priorities.” (EC, 2004: 8). Within the scope of these policy priorities, the executive arms of government or non-governmental agencies formulate the broad areas of work required to implement policy decisions. These broad areas of work are often called programmes, which, like projects, may vary significantly in scope and scale. The definition of what a programme is depends essentially on how the responsible authorities choose to define it. Following this terminology, ROP is a EU-funded programme, derived from the European regional development policy, and that funds eligible projects.

A properly conceived and adequately resourced communication policy is an essential element in the range of EU policies. It combines proximity to the citizens together with a reach extending across the Union and beyond its current borders to the countries aspiring to become members as well as to the rest of the world.

As we showed, there is a big difference between the European communication policy and the EU communication campaigns. These differences mainly deal with communication approach, campaign purpose and target, messages, and, finally, specific activities. Of course, the EU Communication Policy (actually formalized in “Communicating Europe in Partnership” official document) is supposed to form the basis, the “red wire” of all EU communication initiatives. Still, the overall objective of the EU communication policy is to strengthen coherence and synergies between the activities undertaken by the different EU institutions and by Member States, in order to offer citizens better access and a better understanding of the impact of EU policies at European, national and local level. This purpose is clear, which make us conclude that EU communication policy sets the philosophical principles, while the specific EU-funded communication campaigns translate these principles into real-life practices.

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Apart from differentiating between EU policies and practical activities that derive from these policies, one has to take into account the specific aspects associated with promoting EU-funded programmes, on one side, and promoting EU-funded projects, on the other side. As we have already mentioned, campaigns for EU-funded programmes must focus on informing their potential beneficiaries, while campaigns for EU-funded projects look at persuading project stakeholders on adopting a certain behavior.

The ROP communication campaign failed to underline the key purpose of a campaign designed for a EU-funded programme, namely to inform potential beneficiaries. It became a marketing, almost commercial tool, targeted at a wide audience. The answer to the question “Why do we communicate?” is not clear at all. For example, the TV spot that was aggressively broadcast on national and local TV stations, aimed at presenting an extremely general view on the ROP goals. In itself, the idea of using a TV spot in order to promote a EU-funded programme (that is characterized by technical and financial details, targeted according to the potential beneficiaries’ types) is an odd one. The same applies to other communication tools, such as information leaflets or practical guidelines.

Information, Awareness, Persuasion or…Simply Commercial Marketing?

The campaign purpose is dependent upon the communication approach that one may choose. As we argued, there is a significant difference among related communication concepts, such as “information”, “awareness”, or “persuasion”. These concepts also stand for specific communication approaches:

- information campaigns are meant to offer objective, verifiable information on some matters of public relevance;

- awareness campaigns are more concerned with a specific questionable social aspect, such as awareness raising activities for AIDS prevention;

- persuasion campaigns are more behavior-oriented, such as the campaigns that want to orient people’s behavior to selective waste collection.

In general, communication campaigns for EU-funded programmes are more or less information campaigns. They aim at offering objective and accurate information on the funding schemes. Under an Operational Programme there are grouped several funding schemes (or priority axes). These axes have specific funding and eligibility rules, specific beneficiaries and schedules. One could not treat an Operational Programme as a whole. It is almost like advertising for a field (such as History), and not for an identifiable item of the field (such as a History Museum). By following this logic, creating an information campaign for an Operational Programme is a non-sense. In the ROP case this was quite visible in the campaign message “Local Initiative. Regional Development”. Technically, the ROP campaign brought up the

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concept of “regional development” and marketed it for the large public. As wired as it may sound, regional development is not a matter of general concern. One could not expect that each and every individual has a role in developing her or his town or region. Basically, the concept of “regional development” addresses special interest groups, such as public administration, NGOs, or business environment. This goes together with the general communication principle that an issue really is an issue if it is put in a certain framework, thus expressing a concern for a specific target group. From the communication point of view, there aren’t issues per se; regional development is not an issue per se. We wonder how regional development could become a concern for the average worker whose goal is to pay for his bank credit…or for the student who plans a summer trip with his friends?! Obviously, they are not the target group for the “regional development” concept.

If we follow this logical path, a ROP advertising campaign is not the best approach to follow. This approach is wrongly based on the idea that ROP is a commercial product or service, thus the focus being put on the marketing side, and not on the information dimension. The main goal of commercial marketing is

Who is the Public?

The very concept of “public” leads us to the idea of “identification”. The public of a communication campaign must be identified by using quantitative and qualitative data. This is an essential aspect that will eventually guide the elaboration of specific messages and communication activities.

Who is the public in the ROP campaign? After analysing the promotion materials used for this campaign (e.g. leaflets, posters, TV spot), we are able to underline that there is no specific public, that there is no segmentation. Most of the promotion materials are targeted at the general audience, which makes them useless for both interested parties (who do not get enough information on the funding opportunities) and general public (who simply are not able to understand how they are supposed to act). For example, the information leaflet gives a generic overview on the ROP by simply stating the priority axes and the ROP institutional framework. In addition, the TV spot invites everybody to get involved in local development initiatives.

As we stated, the concept of “regional development” is too wide and, thus, confusing, if not put in a certain framework. In the ROP case, there is no communication framework. We assume that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of the public identification and definition. By definition, a financing scheme or programme has a pre-defined public. In the EU terminology, these are the potential beneficiaries of the EU funds. As far as ROP is concerned, the potential beneficiaries are specific for each priority axis and indicative operation. There are several examples: for the priority axis 2 “Improvement of the local and regional transport

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infrastructure” only local public administration is eligible, for the priority axis 3 “Strengthening regional and local business environment” (area of intervention 3.3. Supporting local/regional entrepreneurial initiatives for micro-enterprises’ set up and Development) only SMEs are eligible.

We only found three booklets that would comply with this segmentation principle. Each of the three booklets apparently addresses the NGOs, the Universities, and, also, the local public administration. Still, if we take a closer look to the booklet designed for Universities, for example, we discover that it is not specifically targeted to the potential beneficiaries (in our case – Universities); in stead, the booklet describes all ROP priority axes and area of interventions that offer funding opportunities for education development – this in spite of the fact that some of these areas of intervention are not available for universities, but for local public administration. This fact is confusing, since there is a gap between the booklet title - “ROP Funding Opportunities for the Universities, and its content. We would have expected to find all specific activities that may receive funding via universities.

This aspect leads us to the conclusion that the ROP communication campaign faces an even more serious issue than public identification and segmentation. It mixed up some key concepts of what the European Commission understands through “stakeholders”, “beneficiaries”, and “target groups”. The European Commission considers stakeholders at the project concept stage; less importance is granted to stakeholders as far as their actual involvement in project activities is concerned. This is in spite of the fact that project team members are seen as project stakeholders. A basic premise behind stakeholder analysis is that “different groups have different concerns, capacities and interests, and that these need to be explicitly understood and recognized in the process of problem identification, objective setting and strategy selection” (PCM Manual, 2004: 61). In EC approach, project stakeholders have at least four different meanings and usages: “programme beneficiaries” and “project beneficiaries”. Basically, the programme beneficiaries are those who benefit from EU funding schemes, while project beneficiaries are those who benefit from the activities that will be implemented within the EU-financed projects. To turn back to the ROP case, we assume that – since ROP is a new financing programme, which comes with new rules and concepts – the campaign should have targeted the programme beneficiaries. Paradoxically, in this specific case the programme beneficiaries are not the same as ROP beneficiaries. ROP is, in fact, an “umbrella” that groups several programmes and areas of intervention. So, for the public segmentation to be correctly carried out, there should have been implemented specific information campaigns for each priority axis or area of interventions – depending on their complexity. This makes us stress again the idea that “regional development” is not a concept that would make sense per se. It must be put in a certain framework; the main communication driver that would help identifying this specific framework is public segmentation – which is addressing “programme beneficiaries” in our case.

The Formal Side – ROP Communication and Visual Identity Rules

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The ROP campaign contained a strong formal component, focused on elaborating specific communication and visual identity rules for ROP related campaigns. The specific deliverables resulting from this dimension are the “ROP Communication Guidelines” and the “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines”.

The “ROP Communication Guidelines” contains information related to:

− The structure of the communication plan − The use of the communication tools: media relations, publications, information

centres, call centres, press events, online campaigns, advertising; − Management of the communication campaigns: budget, schedule, human resources,

evaluation, communication briefing. As we passed through the information comprised in the “ROP Communication

Guidelines”, it became clear that it suffered from the same confusing approach as all the awareness materials did. In the first place, it is not clear what are the purpose and target of this document. For us it appeared as an internal document that would be very appropriate to support the ROP communication campaign. It is very suitable for the ROP Management Authority, since it seems to address a specific stipulation of EC Regulation 1083 (laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999): “the managing authority for the operational programme shall be responsible for publicity in accordance with the implementing rules of this Regulation adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 103(3)” (Regulation 1083, 2006: 56). The “ROP Communication Guidelines” contains information that may offer good foundations for the EU communication campaigns carried out by the ROP Management Authorities. It is not the most suitable tool to equip programme beneficiaries with the necessary tools and concepts to communicate on their ROP-funded projects. That is why we find the “ROP Communication Guidelines” as being inappropriately involved in the ROP communication campaign, a fact that gives us important hints regarding our assumptions related to defining the campaign purpose and identifying the public.

The “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines” describes the visual rules that must be respected by those implementing a ROP-funded communication campaign. It basically refers to visual rules for developing:

− Regio logos (including for each Romanian development region) − Usage of additional logos (European Union, Romanian Government, Structural

Funds) − Colours, backgrounds − Formatting − Compulsory information

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− Publications: brochures, leaflets, posters, banners − Press releases and special layouts − Billboards and commemorative plaques − Web pages These rules add up to the existing EU Visual Identity Guidelines, a document elaborated

by the EC Representation in Romania and that formally guides all EU-funded communication campaigns. The European Union visual identity elements presented below are to be used by implementing agencies/institutions, and beneficiaries/contractors/grantees, responsible for the implementation of the EU financed programmes / projects. The Visual Identity Guidelines is part of the Annex to the contracts for all EU-funded programmes. These guidelines have been drawn up to present the elements that have to be used by EU beneficiaries in order to promote the visual identity of the European Union, including graphic examples, the rules for using these elements, and the circumstances under which exceptions to these rules are allowed.

The “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines” creates a different identity for the ROP, thus overlapping with the EC identity rules that are already in place. We consider that this will be even more confusing for the ROP beneficiaries, that will face two different types of EU identity rules: the ones established by the EC Representation, on one hand, and the one formulated by the ROP Management Authority, on the other hand. Of course, there are many similarities between the two visual guidelines. Still, we think that the existence of two types of rules that technically stipulate the same thing will generate many question marks among beneficiaries and contractors. Also, launching a ROP visual identity rules – by setting up new colours, new logos, and new formats – means overlapping ROP identity on the European Union image. Actually, ROP is treated as a brand name – which is not consistent with the fact public authorities from the Member States are supposed to enhance the visibility of the European Union as a whole. Of course, EU visibility is mainly enhanced through EU-funded programmes and projects. In our view, this is not the same as creating brand names out of EU-funded programmes.

“Brand is a sign of consistency” (Ollins, 2006: 16). The visual identity guidelines developed by the EC Representation are clearly directed towards assuring the consistency of EU image. The “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines” seem to focus on ROP as a brand name; thus, we identify a gap between the EU as a brand and ROP, which is indented to become a brand derived from EU. The ROP campaign initiative to create a specific ROP identity is not based on the EU communication policy. In terms of EU communication, ROP is only a tool for enhancing EU visibility. That is why we consider that, by focusing on the brand awareness approach, the ROP campaign made an exaggerated point on creating a communication entity that actually overlaps with the EU image in Romania.

Conclusions and lessons learned

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We consider that the ROP communication campaign will most probably not attain its goal of stimulating potential beneficiaries to submit good quality project proposals to be financed under ROP areas of intervention. In brief, this opinion is supported by the following arguments:

− The ROP communication campaign failed to underline the key purpose of a campaign designed for a EU-funded programme, namely to inform potential beneficiaries on the application rules and eligibility criteria. The answer to the question “Why do we communicate?” is not clear at all. For example, the TV spot that was aggressively broadcast on national and local TV stations, aimed at presenting an extremely general view on the ROP goals. In itself, the idea of using a TV spot in order to promote a EU-funded programme (that is characterized by technical and financial details, targeted according to the potential beneficiaries’ types) is an odd one. The same applies to other communication tools, such as information leaflets or practical guidelines.

− The ROP communication approach was built on weak premises. In EU communication terms, the core issue is not to increase the visibility of an Operational Programme (which is composed of several funding schemes), but to address potential beneficiaries by underlining their specific needs and funding interest. So, information campaigns tailored to each of the ROP areas of intervention would have been a more effective approach.

− ROP communication campaign has no specific public segmentation. The ROP campaign brought up the concept of “regional development” and marketed it for the large public. Most of the promotion materials are targeted at the general audience, which makes them useless for both interested parties (who do not get enough information on the funding opportunities) and general public (who are not able to understand how they are supposed to react to the information “avalanche”).

− The “ROP Visual Identity Guidelines” creates a ROP identity, thus overlapping with the EC identity rules that are already in place. We consider that this will be even more confusing for the ROP beneficiaries that will face two different types of EU identity rules: the ones established by the EC Representation, on one hand, and the one formulated by the ROP Management Authority, on the other hand.

The most efficient communication tools used to promote EU’s policies and to contribute to a better communication inside and outside the Union are the public communication campaigns and public awareness campaigns. EU is strongly committed to ensure the success of its communication campaigns in member states and therefore a huge amount of financial and human resources are set apart for this purpose.

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3. Public Communication and Public Communication Campaigns

3.1. Public Communication

Nowadays, public communication is considered a real engine of social change, a consequence of the proliferation of crucial issues that affect the public and personal space of the individual. Such issues concern, for example, environmental matters, public health, or anti-drugs fight. Thus, public communication is a reaction to the incapacity of the legal system and of the socio-cultural rules to impose and preserve a healthy way of life and a solid attitude toward the environment. Pierre Chambat considers that the main goal of public communication is to act as a mediator between the public space (the society) and the private space (the individual). The public space is defined in a three-way manner: first sees the public space as a pace for social interaction, the second focuses on the notion of “public debate”, and the third emphasizes on the idea of a “set of institutionalized scenes where a number of organized and politically oriented actions are exposed, justified and decided” (Paillard, 2002: 68). To use public communication tools in order to submit a topic to general interest means to build a public communication campaign. Planning and designing a public communication campaign is based on theoretically acknowledged instruments that are adjusted to the specific goal of the campaign.

3.2. Public Communication Campaigns

Communication campaigns, in general, are “large, coordinated efforts oriented towards a certain objective or a set of interrelated objectives”, which ultimately lead to reach a long-term goal (Newsom, VanSlyke & Kruckeberg, 2003: 571). Rice and Atkin (1989) define public communiction campaigns as „non-commercial ways to inform and persuade people to change their behaviour by means of using communication instruments involving both the media and the interpersonal relationships” (Jeffers, 1997: 66). According to Newsom, VanSlyke & Kruckeberg (2003) there are several types of public communication campaigns:

- Awareness campaigns, whose topics concern general public; - Information campaigns, targeted at segments of the population, that are specifically

concerned with the topic; - Public education campaigns, whose goals are to change public behaviour in certain area

of activity; - Campaigns to re-instill adherence to common socio-cultural values; - Campaigns to alter incumbent beliefs.

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As far as the factors contributing to the success or failure of a public communication campaign are concerned, researchers have identified the following major items (Pratkanis & Elliot Aronson, 2001):

a. Success of the communication campaign - have a fun component; - avoid to directly attack incumbent beliefs of the target; - use persuasion techniques adjusted to the target. b. Failure of the communication campaign - adoption of a moralizing tone; - use of complex messages; - insufficient funds; - lack of media support.

These are factors that should be given special attention in any public campaigned, regardless of the goal for which it has been designed. There are, of course, many particular elements that come into play with respect to the topic on which the campaign is built. This is why a successful communication team working on the implementation of a public communication campaign will gather not only professionals in the field of communication, but also experts in the field to which the topic of the campaign belongs. This seems to be the case for the public communication campaigns on the EU-funded programmes and projects which Romania benefits as a member state.

3.3. Public Communication Campaigns for EU-funded Programmes and Projects

The EU-funded programmes and projects represent one of the most debatable “European issues” both at the global and local levels. The significant preoccupation with this topic is justified, on one hand, by the enormous amount of money engaged in the implementation of these funding opportunities. On the other hand, EU-funded programmes and projects are EU’s main means to promote European policies and enable development in every field. Helping each member state to reach a higher stage of development contributes to the overall development of the Union. EU’s policies are exploited and communicated as goals of the programmes and projects funded. There is no one-to-one mapping between one of EU’s policies and one funded programme or project, but there is no funding opportunity that does not address, in a specific manner, one of EU’s declared preoccupations.

Romania’s accession to EU represents a milestone in the country’s attempt to attain development in all fields. Although the country has not reached the desirable stage of development yet, significant efforts are made at local, regional and national level in order to urge this process. EU funding opportunities are a vital means for reaching development. The main financial instruments Romania could benefit from are the Structural Funds, and therefore,

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beginning with 2007, top priority is given to these financial instruments. In order to successfully access and spend European money, Romania needs highly specialized professionals who are well informed about EU-funded programmes and projects, and about EU’s initiatives in related fields.

The classification of EU funding opportunities in Romania have to closely follow the line drown by the distinction between different policies. For example, some programmes have been created to address the thematic policies of the EU, and others address the social and economic cohesion policy. Regardless of the funding instrument to be promoted, public communication campaigns should follow the same rules. However, it is essential that an important distinction between public communication campaigns on EU policies and publicity for the European programmes and projects is made. There is a significant difference between, on one hand, how EU actions are communicated to the citizens of member states and, on the other hand, how EU-funded programmes and projects are publicized in the member states by the designated authorities. Promoting EU’s policies and EU-funded programmes and projects are two equally important actions, yet they demand for different approaches when presented to the people, thus publicly communicated. The different approaches need to separately account for the target public and the goals of the type of public communication campaigns used to promote one or the other of the two EU actions. Nevertheless, the communication campaigns for EU’s policies and for EU’s funding opportunities have many things in common. The target of the public communication campaigns designed and implemented by the Commission is the citizens of the member states, and the ultimate goal of this communication tools is to gain the citizens’ support for the EU’s initiatives. Therefore, EU’s communication policy has to be citizen-centered and people’s views and opinions have to play a major role in planning, designing and implementing communication campaigns. However, EU is mainly visible among member states through the special financial assistance given to them (i.e EU-funded programmes and projects). Basically, the EU programmes and projects, designed to help member states reach higher stages of development, represent communication tools employed to promote the EU’s policies. Nevertheless, the target audience of the EU-funded programmes is not the citizens of a country. The publicity for the Union’s funding opportunities follows specific rules, despite the fact that it represents another way of promoting EU’s initiatives and policies. Therefore, we believe that the points where communication campaigns for EU’s policies and for EU-funded programmes and projects diverge are extremely important, but yet neglected so far in such campaigns implemented in Romania. Unfortunately, as we show later in this paper, the public communication campaign for the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) is no exception. Why is so important to distinguish between promotion of EU’s policies and publicity for EU programmes? First, and most significant, because there are two different types of public communication campaigns should be implemented. In one case, for promoting EU’s policies raising awareness of these policies among citizens of a country – therefore, an awareness campaign – is needed, and in the other case, some people (potential beneficiaries of the funds) need to be informed about the funding opportunities for which they could apply as citizens of Romania – an information campaign is the optimal solution to that. Secondly, apart from the specific identified targets for each of the

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two public communication campaigns, there are different institutions responsible for the implementation of such campaigns. The implementation of post-accession funds in Romania, for example, is supervised by special management units, and they should be primarily concerned with the public communication of these funds, whereas promotion of EU’s policies in Romania is the main concern of the EC Representation in this country.

The history of the implementation of the EU pre-accession funds in Romania has shown that the social and economic impact of these funds was very small. We assume that one of the key issues that caused this apparently contradictory situation (potential beneficiaries’ determination to access EU funds vs. EU-funded projects’ actual outcome) is the lack of visibility of EU-funded programmes and projects, whose most significant consequences were:

− lack of awareness of EU financing opportunities (projects and programmes); − ineffective public communication for EU-funded programmes and projects; − lack of actual outcome of EU-funded programmes and projects.

Bearing this in mind, it is advisable that stakeholders involved in the implementation of post-accession funds in Romania pay attention to the weak points of past relevant experience. One way to overcome the inconveniences of an incorrect public understanding of the philosophy of EU-funded programmes and projects is for the Romanian authorities to closely work with EU’s representatives. Nevertheless, at a practical level, it is essential that the Romanian units for management of the post-accession programmes understand that they must inform a certain segment of the population about the existence and usefulness of such funding. We’ll demonstrate that, judging from the public communication campaign designed for the ROP, no such segmentation of the target has been made. Public information campaigns for EU funds should be targeted at segments of the population that are specifically concerned with the topic. Public information campaigns do not aim at presenting a topic to all citizens of a country, for example. They are conducted to hit a specific audience and to produce maximum of effects. Awareness campaigns, respectively, aim at producing effects and impacting upon a larger audience that need not be strictly segmented. The topic addressed by an awareness campaign is usually a general one, which is of a certain interest for everybody, every member of a community or for every citizen of a country. Promotion of EU’s policies should raise awareness among member states, and every citizen should be given the opportunity to actively respond to the decisions taken in Brussels. The goal of EU’s communication policy is to ensure such public participation to the decision-making process and to promote the dialogue and partnership between the institutions and the people. According to Communicating Europe in Partnership – “more than eight out of every ten Europeans feel that it is important to be informed about European issues”. EU citizens feel that is important to know about the decisions that affect their lives and to be given the chance to react to those decisions.

However, there is a significant difference between being aware of the EU’s policies and having the possibility to express your opinion on that, and being informed about the EU funding

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opportunities and taking an action in this respect. Not everybody can be a beneficiary of the financial assistance of the EU, whereas, in principle, anybody can have an opinion and express it concerning the EU’s policies, as they are submitted to public debate. This is why the target of the awareness campaigns for the promotions of the EU’s policies may include the target of the information campaigns for the EU funds, but the vice-versa is not valid. Although we have emphasized mainly here the importance of the target and, therefore, the choice of the relevant type of public communication campaign, this is not the sole weakness of the publicity of the ROP. Other significant aspects will be identified and explained in the analysis of the public communication for this funding tool we have carried out.

4. Communicating Europe in the Context of the Crisis

The economic crisis began in the summer of 2007, being considered as an event with no precedent in the economic history after the Second World War. What makes this crisis very special is mainly its global character. We live in a networked world, thus we face a networked crisis. Even the Great Depression of ‘29 is eclipsed by the “crisis of 2008”. L. Wong put it simple: “the difference with 1929 is that the world is far more interdependent and the scale of the crisis is potentially far bigger” (2009, p. 58). As it has created a more integrated and interdependent world, “economic globalization has outpaced political globalization in terms of the change of mindset.” (Stiglitz, 2008, p. 177). In a nutshell, this meant that the global institutional set was not prepared for facing the challenges of a global economic system.

Another underlining characteristic of the crisis of 2008 is the analysts’ focus on the ethical side of this story. A veritable crisis philosophy, built around the crisis, gave birth to ethical and even religious explanations for the global economic warming. J.E. Stiglitz (2010) speaks about the “the avarice triumph over prudence”, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission points out to the “systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics” (2011, p. xxii), whereas Hudson and Maioli state that we need “to recover that common sense and morality we pushed aside” (2010, p. 56).

An anatomy of the crisis demands a more exact approach, focused on events. As the crisis bears a “made in USA” label, the history of the crisis leads us in the United States of America. In the April 2007 edition of the ”Global Financial Stability Report”, the economists at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed out that the American credit risk was highly concentrated among subprime borrowers—i.e., those borrowers with impaired or limited credit histories—which in 2006 accounted for over 14% of the residential mortgage-related securities market (IMF, 2007). According to the Mortgage Bankers Association National Survey, the subprime mortgage delinquencies increased sharply right before the crisis, from approx. 5% in 2005 to over 30% in 2007.

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Tightened credit rules and conditions was a double-edged measure. The most obvious and intended effect was to prevent the apparition of new mortgage-related delinquencies. The unintended and far-reaching effect was the impossibility of many subprime borrowers to pay back their credits. The impossibility of payment brought an injection of executable mortgages on the American market, which caused the collapse of the real estate prices. The first victims of the economic turmoil were several small to medium financial services companies, which went bankrupt at the end of 2006. In 2007 and 2008, several famous big financial corporations, such as Citibank, HBSC, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, faced serious problems.

Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize laureate in 2008, succeeds in elaborating a comprehensive and more balanced, I dare say, analysis of the American crisis. „To understand what happened, you have to begin by asking what the financial sector is supposed to do. It’s very simple: it is supposed to allocate capital and manage risk, both with low transaction costs. If I were to grade our (the US) financial system, I would have to give it an F.” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 322). Stiglitz „peels back the onion” and concludes that the American crisis has been unfolding in front of our own eyes during the last decade. In his own words, „the only surprise about the economic crisis of 2008 was that it came as a surprise to so many” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 53). The first signal, Stiglitz believes, was the American invasion in Iraq, which determined a fast increase in the price of the oil barrel – from only $34 in March 2003 to $137 in July 2008 (Stiglitz, 2010).

However, drawing an accurate and complete picture of the crisis is far beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, my focus is on discussing several key aspects, which would support me in building an honest understanding of the crisis. My ultimate goal is to establish whether there is any correlation between the Europeans’ opinions and trust, on the one hand, and the political evolutions taking place within the broader context of the euro crisis, on the other hand.

4.1. Crisis in the EU – a Brief Introspection

Global Contagion The American twilight soon caused the global sundown. A legitimate question is related to

the very short time span between the American crisis and the global crisis. How was it possible for the crisis to become global in only half a year? For many specialists globalization in itself is not a complete answer to this question.

In mid-2007, the IMF mentioned that it is unlikely that the American problems would affect other economies. One may assume that this reassuring approach of key international financial institutions was due to a lack of accurate estimation of how several existing vulnerabilities would combine and create a high market risk. The unexpected degree of global contagion started to be signaled at the end of 2007, when both IMF and European Central Bank (ECB) increased their market risk expectations.

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The American credit freeze was, probably, the most visible mechanism which led to the globalization of the “crisis of 2008”. The credit freeze had a devastating impact not only on the American economy, but also on other national economies that depended upon the purchasing power of the American consumers.

Several specialists under the umbrella of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2009, pp. 4-9) identify several rather subtle macroeconomic issues that facilitated the worldwide impact of the American economic issues. One channel of contagion was the global imbalances, an over debated subject in dedicated literature. In a nutshell, “global imbalances meant that there was excess saving from the surplus country, and excess saving lead to low interest rates, and low interest rates can feed bubbles.” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 325). After the end of the global system of Bretton Woods, it has become possible to identify an “Anglo-Saxon” part of the global economy, on the one hand, and a “Euro-Japanese” component, on the other. One key characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon economy was given by its rather liberal and laissez-faire character. The complete trust in the “invisible hand” was successful in stimulating growth and job creations, and, more important, in creating a consumption boom that was not funded from real domestic income. As regards the Euro-Japanese economies, growth remained rather sluggish, which meant that people were encouraged to make savings. The result was that, for example, at the end of 2010, the average household savings rate in countries belonging to the “Euro-Japanese” block (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland) was of 11,1%, whereas in USA and UK was of only 3,3% (OECD Economic Outlook No. 85, 2010). This is not only plain statistics, but also an important indicator of how people in the two different types of economies perceived and approached their own future.

The “savings glut”, which is another critical point of discussions about the global crisis, goes hand in hand with the global imbalances problem. Many countries from the Euro-Japanese side started to accumulate billions of dollars as a measure for securing themselves against the international risks (UNCTAD, 2009). However, these savings gave birth to what Joseph Stiglitz calls “the paradox of thrift” (2010, p. 326), this meaning that an increase in savings may actually lead to a weaker economy. The capital is not released in the economy and it is simply kept in the governmental safe. By not fueling the economy with liquidities, these economies contributed implicitly to the aggravation of the crisis.

The institutional contagion also had a big stake, as emerging economies tried to replicate the success stories of Anglo-Saxon corporations by simply replicating their business model. “For example, countries whose institutional environment historically encouraged savings saw a cultural shift and a move towards acceptance of debt and a softening of regulation.”(Hudson & Maioli, 2010, p. 60)

As regards the EU, the first reaction in relation to the American crisis was to simply decouple from the unappealing turmoil. This was hardly possible from various reasons, already described. In the first place, the belt-tightening exercise done by countries in the continental Europe (i.e. Germany and France) resulted in slow or no wage growth, which determined a decline in the consumption trends. In the second place, it is estimated that one fourth of the American “toxic”

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mortgages went abroad (Stiglitz, 2010). In this way, the US succeeded in exporting its own crisis to Asia and mostly in Europe. In the third place, the institutional contagion transformed many financial organizations in Europe, and made them rely on high debt and leveraging. Last but not least, the US exported their deregulatory philosophy and made European institutions believe in the emblematic “invisible hand” of free markets. Furthermore, A. Bârgăoanu points out to the fact that “the EU did not have an easy position before the crisis, taking into account the fact that the main international actors had better economic growth rhythms: China registered 8 to 10%, the USA had 3.5%, whereas the EU had only a 2% growth.” (Bârgăoanu, 2011, p. 13)

The Architecture of the European Monetary Union

Exploring the architecture of the European financial and economic system is a prerequisite

for a correct understanding of the euro crisis. The European Monetary System was created in 1979, with the ECU at its centre. The Single European Act, entered into force in 1987, was an important step for economic and monetary union, as it introduced the Single Market as a further objective of the Community. The Single Market was clearly subject to great expectations on behalf of European government, since it was supposed to link the national economies much more closely together and increase significantly the degree of economic integration within the Community. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) set the legal basis for the single monetary policy.

The Eurosystem is made up of the ECB and the National Central Banks (NCB) of the EU Member States whose currency is the euro, whereas the European System of Central Banks comprises the ECB and the NCB of all EU Member States.

Since the introduction of the euro in 1999 in 11 EU Member States, the euro area has undergone five rounds of enlargement that have brought the number of euro area countries to 17 (in 2011). There are currently 10 EU Member States whose currency is not the euro (i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Denmark and the United Kingdom have a special status (based on an “opt-out clause”); the other eight countries are prospective candidates for adoption of the euro (i.e. “Member States with derogation”).

The euro area is characterized by a combination of centralized monetary policy-making and largely decentralized, albeit closely coordinated, fiscal policy-making. (ECB, 2011, p. 15). In this regard, the EU’s system of economic governance is unique – it benefits from fiscal sovereignty that is “the power to levy taxes remains fully in national hands” (Gros, 2009, p. 53)

The ECB leads the Eurosystem and the centralized monetary policy, being independent from political influence. The ECB’s financial arrangements are kept separate from the financial interests of the EU: the ECB has its own budget, and its capital is subscribed and paid up by the national central banks from the euro area.

In order to address the financial crisis, the following mechanisms were created by the Eurosystem in 2010 (ECB, 2011): the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), operational since May 2010, and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), operational

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since August 2010. Both EFSM and EFSF can offer emergency loans to a Member State, if the benefiting state accepts a detailed and demanding set of policy conditions.On 1 January 2011 a new financial supervisory architecture became operational in the EU. It includes three new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for banking, insurance and securities markets and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), an independent EU body, responsible for monitoring the financial system within the EU. In March 2011 the EU Council decided to establish a permanent crisis management framework, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

The Anatomy of the Euro Crisis

Although the crisis originated in the United States, European banks were deeply affected by

it because they had also done extensive financial investments in that country. Impressed by the success of American financial services, large European banks had aggressively expanded in the USA. This rapid expansion was also due to the Financial Services Action Plan, an ambitious program launched by the EC after the introduction of the euro in 1999, strongly influenced by the American model, “giving priority to promoting market-based forms of finance, and encouraging financial institutions to become more competitive” (Evans, 2011, p. 98).

The institutional contagion was triggered by the American banking dream of making huge profits by using a rather small amount of real capital. Betting on subpriming and high leveraging was not a winning strategy in the long run, as I have already mentioned. According to estimates done by the IMF, the total losses incurred by euro area banks between 2007 and 2010 amounted to $630 billion, which places them rather close to the figure for American banks of $878 billion (IMF, 2010). Similar to the bail-out strategy put in place by the Federal Reserve in the US, European governments provided guarantees for bank lending in their attempt to equilibrate the financial market. The total commitment done by euro area governments accounted for 28% of the area’s gross domestic product (GDP), which is comparable to the total commitment done by the Federal Reserve of 26% of the American GDP (IMF, 2010). These are only a few of the striking numbers that can make us create a rather realistic picture of the crisis in Europe.

D. Dăianu identifies the roots of the strain in the EU (2011, pp. 5-23). A flawed financial intermediation system is one root of the problems. More specifically, this refers to mistakes in macroeconomic policy, the same errors (e.g. lack of regulation, excessive securitization, inadequate risk-assessments models) that contributed to the emergence of the American crisis. Another root is related to the premises of the EMU, which are those of a single market, but lacking a coherent risk management policy. The EMU has never solved several issues related to the distribution of responsibilities between home and host country. In addition, the EMU was not built on detailed burden-sharing arrangements in the event of a crisis. The third root is the failure of the Europe 2020 strategy to combine centralized decision making with national or regional initiatives in economic policy making. And, last but not least, EU has always suffered from a lack of integration and harmonization among Member States, this meaning that “conflicting

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views and interests among EU member states reduce its internal cohesion and harm its power projection externally” (Dăianu, 2011, p. 14).

The recession in the euro area officially ended in mid-2009, even though the social strain was still to come. In the second half of the year output finally began to rise again and growth strengthened in the first half of 2010. Nevertheless, output remained below the level it had reached prior to the onset of the crisis, while the unemployment rate did edge downwards in some countries, most notably in Germany. The first austerity measures were implemented by Ireland in December 2009, which included reducing civil servants’ pay, cutting welfare payments and child benefits (Financial Times, 2009). Other Member States (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland) soon embarked in the austerity train. These measures were subject to controversies, as they reduced the purchase power and, implicitly, the economic output in several countries. Furthermore, the austerity measures were too much about cutting salaries and they simply eluded the necessity for several specific indicators that would make the measures more equitable and certainly more bearable.

The Greek crisis was by far the gravest challenge that the single currency has faced since its creation, in 1999. In May 2010, the EC together with the IMF granted Greece with a 110 billion EUR loan. This is the most expensive country bail-out in the history of the EU. However, taxpayers in Germany and elsewhere were understandably riled with this decision. According to Eichengreene (2011), three factors compelled the opponents of the rescue fund to back down: EU solidarity, fear of unknown, and the estimated impact of the Greek crisis on the European banking system. Clearly, bailing-out Greece was a matter of financial calculations, but, also, a proof the Europeans’ officials concern to preserve a certain level of political and economic integration.

Another country hit very hard by the crisis was Ireland, which had to cope with the failure of its oversized banking system. As compared to Greece, Ireland was not a direct beneficiary of the Commission’s emergency funds. By middle 2011, the Irish government succeeded in funding its own skyrocketing deficit. In 2011, the Irish banks started to support their operations with support from the ECB, who repeatedly lent money to the Irish banking sector. In this way, Ireland succeeded in preserving its economic status quo.

Both the Greek and the Irish cases point out to a weakness of the EMU – the economic and monetary union can not be feasible in the absence of the fiscal union. When the institutional framework for the EMU was constructed during the 1990s this question was discussed under the heading: “Can a monetary union without a political union be stable?”. Many analysts and economists remained rather skeptical at that time. “One side implication of this strategic decision was that it became impossible to unify banking supervision in the common currency area.” (Gros, 2009, p. 106).

For A. Bârgăoanu, the technical explanations built around the euro crisis are not enough to explain the breadth of Europe’s political strain. ”Far from being a bureaucratic and technocrat crisis, the euro crisis reveals structural imbalances in the Euro zone, as well as the fact that the

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Chart 1 - Trust in the European Union

47%50%

47% 47% 48%

42% 43% 41%

34%

41%36%

40% 41% 40%

47% 45%49%

55%

12% 14% 13% 12% 12% 11% 12% 10% 11%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

EB69Spring2008

EB70Autumn

2008

EB71.1Winter2009

EB71Spring2009

EB72Autumn

2009

EB73Spring2010

EB74Autumn

2010

EB75Spring 2011

EB76Autumn

2011

Tend to Trust Tend not to trust Don't know

euro has been created as a single currency for economies which are much too diverse[…]” (Bârgăoanu, 2011, p. 22).

4.2. Euro Crisis or the Crisis of the European Union?

Surprisingly enough, the literature review that I carried out did not produce many results referring to the causal relationship between the economic fallout and citizens’ degrading trust in the economic conditions and financial institutions worldwide. In general, declining trust is only regarded as a consequence of the crisis. My underlining assumption is that the lack of trust could also be regarded an underlining cause or an aggravating factor of the actual crisis. As John Maynard Keynes put it, at crisis time, the trust is the most difficult thing to be rehabilitated.

The debate on the economic governance of the EU is one side of the story. The Euro crisis triggered vivid debates around several important themes related to European integration, European identity, and European cohesion. Clearly, Europeans’ trust in the European project seems to have been seriously shattered by the recent events and political decisions (see chart no. 1).

Chart 1: Europeans’ Trust in the EU

Chart no.1 aggregates the data about the Europeans’ trust in the EU, according to the

Eurobarometer surveys carried out between the spring of 2008 and the autumn of 2011. The question asked was: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? – the EU”.

Starting with 2010, one can observe an obvious erosion of Europeans’ trust in the EU. During the spring of 2010, the percentage of citizens who did not trust the EU surpassed the percentage of citizens who still trusted the EU (47% vs. 42%). We may assume that this was

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Chart 2 - Support for the European economic and monetary union and the Euro

60% 61% 61% 60% 56% 58% 56% 53%

33% 32% 33% 33%37% 35% 37% 40%

7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%0%

10%20%

30%40%

50%60%

70%

EB69 Spring2008

EB70Autumn

2008

EB71 Spring2009

EB72Autumn

2009

EB73 Spring2010

EB74Autumn

2010

EB75 Spring2011

EB76Autumn

2011

For Against Don't know

also due to the fact that, following the EC’s official announcement that Europe had exited the recession in mid-2009, Europeans had great expectations about the 2010 – 2011 period. Unfortunately, these expectations were never met. What the EC failed to explain was that by exiting the recession (i.e. through two consecutive quarters of growing GDP), the EU was not leaving the crisis behind.

However, the erosion of the citizens’ beliefs in the EU as a panacea of democracy and public participation is not a new phenomenon. It is a trend that was very visible during the process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty (1992–1993), in referendums held in France, Denmark and Ireland. The opposition of the citizens opened up what is often referred to as a new era, in which Europeans are not bound anymore to the so-called “permissive consensus” (Hix, 2005, p. 149), thus being “less likely to follow blindly the positions of their governments” (Hix, 2005, p. 151). Europeans “grew up” in terms of political judgment, which creates new challenges for European political bodies. The birth of the active citizenship demands constant commitment from two sides: EU’s commitment for transparency and access to information, on one side, and citizens’ commitment for freely expressing their opinions in the public arena, on the other side. Unfortunately, the European decision makers were not able to use the past events or the past EU legitimacy crisis in order to learn how to address the present Euro crisis.

Chart 2: Support for the European economic and monetary union and the Euro

Chart no. 2 aggregates the data about the Europeans’ trust in the Euro, according to the Eurobarometer surveys carried out between the spring of 2008 and the autumn of 2011. The question asked was: “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. – A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.”

We can notice that the Euro has also suffered from a decline in trust of the Europeans. Similarly to the Europeans’ trust in the EU, the Europeans’ trust in the single currency started its downward trend at the beginning of 2010. Still, as compared to the trust in the EU, the trust in

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the Euro is within satisfactory limits. The Euro is still seen as a reliable and trustworthy currency by 53% of the Europeans. Between 2008 and 2011, the decline in the trust granted to the EU was of 13 points (from 47% in 2008 to 34% in 2011), whereas the decline in the trust granted to the Euro as a single currency was of 7 points (from 60% in 2008 to 53% in 2011). If we compare the EB country reports in august 2011 vs. the EB country reports in spring 2011, we can observe two specific groups of countries that have contributed heavily to the decline in the confidence score granted for the Euro. The first group of countries is composed of those Member States from the euro zone that have been seriously hit by the crisis in 2010 and 2011. I am referring to Germany (-4%), Ireland (-2%), Greece (-4%), Italy (-1%), and Portugal (-7%). Part of these countries have also experimented open protests organized by their citizens against the austerity measures implemented by the national governments. The second group of countries is composed of Member States from the non-euro zone. Here the decline in trust is even more abrupt than in the case of the countries from the first group – i.e. The Czech Republic (-13%), Hungary (-10%), Poland (-9%), Lithuania (-6%). However, many countries from the euro zone preserve their confidence in the single currency (e.g. France, Spain, and Belgium).

Based on the data provided in charts 1 and 2, I argue that the Euro crisis is, above all, a legitimacy crisis. Paradoxically, the Euro crisis is not related to the Euro in itself or to the economic and monetary union. Many countries in the euro-zone appear to feel comfortable with the single currency. Rather, the legitimacy crisis is mainly triggered by the citizens’ declining trust in the EU as a political entity. Thus, at least as the European public opinion is concerned, it may be inaccurate to label the crisis Europe faces today as the “Euro crisis”. From the communication side, focusing on the Euro as a trigger of the European economic fallout might prove to be a wrong way to approach the crisis.

The European citizens perceive the present crisis as a crisis of the EU, which involves many aspects, many of them being related to the way the EU communicates with its citizens. Unfortunately, the communication gap between the Europeans and the EU grew bigger as a consequence of the crisis. This gap is also the result of a communication vacuum constantly fed by EC’s lack of communication initiatives related to the crisis. Even an outsider would be able to seize the EC’s lack of focus on crisis communication. For example, DG Communication has not implemented any communication campaign related to the crisis so far. The “Europe for Citizens Programme” (2007-2013), managed by DG Communication aimed at “giving the citizen a key role in the development of the EU” (http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship) does not address any priority related to the relationship between the EU and the Europeans during the crisis. Furthermore, the DG Economic and Financial Affairs does not publish on its web page (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/) any user-friendly information about the EU economic situation. Most of the publications about the crisis are very technical and clearly dedicated to specialists. The only section that could be easily understood by the general public is the section on “General interest publications”. This section is less specialized, but is mostly dedicated to the Euro. The same situation applies to the European Central Bank web page (http://www.ecb.int), where the focus is again on the Euro. The European institutions have invested many of its

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communication efforts in advocating the Euro. These efforts are, of course, salutary, but they are not enough and can not be a substitute for an effective crisis communication or for advocating Europe. What many European decision-makers seem to ignore is that the EU and the Euro are two different entities. And this may prove to be costly from the communication side.

4.3. Conclusions According to the EB between 2008 and 2011, the European citizens’ declining trust in the

EU is an evident trend. The Euro, as a single currency, still benefits from a good confidence level, especially in countries from the Eurozone. The Euro appears to be a more credible symbol of the EU than it is the Union in itself. This lead me to the conclusion that it may be wrong to assume that the present crisis is solely an Euro crisis; rather, the European public opinion tells us that its key concern is the EU and its eroding prerogatives.

Solving EU legitimacy crisis is like solving a very complex puzzle. Some pieces of this puzzle belong to the political actors; others belong to financial regulators, whereas others belong to the civic society. Even though European citizens are an important part of this puzzle, many European decision-makers seem to elude this. Jurgen Habermas, the creator of the public sphere, illustrates this aspect in his latest book -”The Crisis of the EU: A Response”, which was published in April 2012:”The supranational expansion of civic solidarity depends on learning processes that can be stimulated by the perception of economic and political necessities[…]” (extract published by the British newspaper The Guardian in November 2011). EU communication is a feasible way to create an accurate perception of economic and political necessities. Despite this, there is a gap between EC’s documents on EU communication - i.e. White Paper on a European Communication Policy, Plan D, EU’s Information and Communication Strategy, and the specific communication actions implemented by the EU in order to cope with the crisis.

I do not argue that EU communication is a universal solution. There are other actors in the European public sphere – i.e. mass media, political elites – that also have their role in rehabilitating the Europeans’ eroding trust.

Traditionally, EU communication policy was formulated as a remedy for Europeans’ (negative) attitudes towards the European project. Nowadays, European decision makers can make a step forward and they can use the past lessons in order to proactively communicate the crisis. The crisis is a good vehicle for active citizenship and it can be used as a stimulus for public participation. Communication can become a valuable partner and a good ingredient in any political decision. The European institutions, in general, and the EC, in particular, should take this into account when formulating their policies. EU communication has an important stake in recovering the Europeans’ lost trust in the European project. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, said that “during the crisis (…) we stumbled but did not fall.” (2010, p. 134) My belief is the EU communication has a big stake in preventing us from stumbling over and over again.

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5. What is at Stake: a Brief Incursion into the Meaning of the (European) Public Sphere

As Simon Hix has noticed ever since 2005, the erosion of the citizens’ beliefs in the EU

as a panacea of democracy and public participation is a trend that emerged during the process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty (1992–1993), in referendums held in France, Denmark and Ireland. The opposition of the citizens opened up what is often referred to as a new era, in which Europeans are not bound anymore to the so-called “permissive consensus” (Hix, 2005, p. 149), thus being “less likely to follow blindly the positions of their governments” (Hix, 2005, p. 151). Europeans “grew up” in terms of political judgment. The birth of the active citizenship demands constant commitment from two sides: EU’s commitment for transparency and access to information, on one side, and citizens’ commitment for freely expressing their opinions in the public arena, on the other side. As we will show below, this twofold commitment premised the creation of the EU communication policy. The most recent documents on EU communication issued by the European Commission seem to confirm what several authors predicted (e.g. McCormick, Ladrech, Eriksen) several years ago: the new European citizen should be seen as an active actor on the political scene, who will make herself or himself heard whenever (s)he will be granted with the opportunity to speak out. The European citizen has been subject to a paradigm shift – from the passive recipient of the European political decisions to the active voice that is made more and more audible on the political level.

If we take a close look to EU’s history, we will observe that EU communication is subject to a paradox. Technically, the crisis of the European governance model has premised the formulation of the European communication policy as a new horizontal policy aimed at “bridging the gap” between the European institutions and the European citizens. We will illustrate this assumption by taking a close look to several events that have put the European cohesion under the question mark. Such events are mainly related to the referendums organized around key momentums: Ireland’s refusal to support the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the negative vetos given by The Netherlands and France for the European Constitution in 2005, Ireland’s lack of support for the Treaty of Nice in 2001. In a nutshell, EU communication policy was formulated as a means of coping with Europeans’ (negative) attitudes towards the European project. Although these reactions are widely known under the label of “Eurscepticism”, we must admitt that Euroscepticism is not the only one to blame for citizens’ opposing attitudes towards the European Union. “The image of a mentally lethargic population lagging behind the political elites represents just one side of the icon.” (Habermas, 2009, p. 129).

In the theoretical field, there is a strong tendency to explain the Europe’s lack of cohesion by entering the rather complex field of European identity studies, which tackle several sensitive subjects, such as the Europeanization of the national cultures or the creation of a European public sphere or “Eurosphere”. Scholars interested in EU communication argue that Europe’s

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lack of cohesion or collective identity is a result of the European “public sphere deficit” (Gerhards, 1993), which is seen as a part of a larger democratic deficit. As any theoretical field, EU communication is subject to many controversies and opposing perspectives. Some believe that we cannot speak of a European public sphere in a meaningful way (Kantner, 2004), whereas others argue that public spheres “are out there waiting to be discovered by analysts” (Risse, 2010, p. 110). Thus, in order to understand the complex mechanism behind the creation of the European identity, we are going to structure our discussion around the public sphere as a concept “in the making” and we are going to propose and test a new way of analysing the way the European public sphere emerges. We assume that it is possible to configure the European public sphere under the pressure of external, non-European events taking place outside the European Union.

5.1. EU Communication and the Public Sphere

Despite its rather complex and long history, EU communication became a strategic

objective of the EC only in 2005. 2005 is the year when, spurred by the negative votes given by France and the Netherlands for the European Constitution, the European Commission issued several key documents aimed at “closing de gap” between EU’s institutions and EU’s citizens. If we make a simple count, we can observe a time gap of around 50 years between the creation of the European Community and the formulation of a European policy in the field of communication. This gap was filled with rather isolated initiatives in the field of EU communication, such as the creation of the Press and Information Service (1955) within the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community or the settlement of the Eurobarometer (1973), which still operates as the European opinion survey tool. Despite the fact that many European documents claim to be premised on the idea that the European citizen has the right of being actively involved in the political life of the European Union, the social and political reality shows us something different. Each time the Europeans have been granted with the opportunity to clearly state their political wish (e.g. within referenda), the European government had to cope with complex and problematic situations. There were situations in which not even those states that are positioned in the “avant-garde” of the European project (e.g. France, The Netherlands) were able to reach a political consensus. “One explanation for the unpredictability of referenda is that a politically mobilized population can make decisions without concern for professional politicians’ interest in retaining power.” (Habermas, 2009, p. 129). During referenda organized on European issues, political interests are irrelevant for the general public, who acts and behaves according to its own “code of honor”, which is mainly leveraged by a feeling of belonging to a common European reality or, more simple, by the “European we-feeling” (Eriksen, 2009). A poor European “we-feeling” translates into a low level of citizens’ involvement, which may be seen as an indicator of a poor communication between the European Union, on one side, and the European citizens, on the other side. Since citizens are not informed about the high-level

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European decisions, then they cannot make any educated decision regarding the EU; furthermore, they will lack the motivation to analyze the actual political context and, thus, they will try to deny or to reject whatever they do not understand. This would be the explanation formulated by a communication theorist.

If we analyzed this aspect through the lenses of the cultural anthropologist, then the situation is perfectly natural and logical. “In both qualitative and quantitative terms the development of the European Union represents one of the most sophisticated and mature attempts to construct an intergovernmental, and to a lesser extent, supranational framework for the initiation, implementation and enforcement of a variety of economic, political and public policy objectives.” (Ward, 2002, p. 1) In deed, the “European project” is one of the most ambitious endeavors in the contemporary history. When referring to the European Union, “diversity through unity” appears to be a credible slogan – at least as far as the institutional level is concerned. By building a transnational “state”, organized after its own principles, institutions, and laws, the European Union meets most of the formal prerequisites for becoming a vivid entity. At an upper political and institutional level, the European Union appears to be an engine of unity and solidarity. However, the history has put its fingerprint on the actual European picture, and, nowadays we see many “Europes” in terms of cultures, languages, norms, values, traditions, knowledge, political involvement etc. “…the plurality of Europe is more than a diversity of cultures and nations, but extends into its very civilizational nature” (Delanty & Rumford, 2005, p. 35).

If there are several “Europes” – Western, Northern, Southern, Eastern, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Slav, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant etc – does this mean that the European project is only a chimera fed by the enthusiasm that followed the end of the World War II? A thorough analysis of a deeper level of Europe can provide a pertinent answer to this question. This deeper level consists of the so-called “public sphere”, which creates the premises for “collective identity” or the European “we-feeling” (Eriksen, 2009). Why focusing on the public sphere? The public sphere is a prerequisite of the collective identity. In brief, “public sphere plays an important role for the emergence of a common identity” (Risse & Brabowsky, 2008, p. 1).

Whereas early research provided pessimistic prognosis for the emergence of a European public sphere, more recent findings (Risse, 2010; Van de Steeg, 2004) are more optimistic and point out to several already existing processes, which contribute to the making of an agora of the civil society or of the general public, a place for the exchange of information, ideas, opinions, a vehicle of contestation, and, thus, an engine of democratization. According to Jurgen Habermas, who is considered the “creator of the public sphere” (Bârgăoanu, 2011, p. 192), the emergence of the public sphere seems to be a fascinating and intriguing process that is mainly leveraged by the media and the public communication. ”…public communication is a force which both stimulates and orients citizens’ opinions and desires, while at the same time compelling the political system to adapt and become more transparent.” (Habermas, 2009, p. 136) Recent findings point out to the fact that communication is a key element in configuring the European public sphere. “Public spheres – whether local, regional, national, or issue-specific – are social constructions in the true

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sense of the word. They do not preexist outside communication, but are created precisely when people speak to one another, be it in interpersonal settings or through the media. Public spheres emerge through the process by which people debate controversial issues in the public. ” (Risse, 2010, p. 110).

The Commission’s White Paper on a European Communication Policy, published in February 2006 and aimed at laying the foundation of the EU communication policy, adopts “public sphere” as a “current bureaucratic term of reference” (Schlesinger, 2007, p. 67). This suggests a fruitful convergence of the academic and political interests, and, furthermore, it proves that the public sphere is not (only) an over-rated and over-theorized notion. Moreover, the 5th and 6th Framework Programmes, focused on funding international research projects, listed the public sphere as a specific field of research, which implies that the Commission tacitly confirmed that researching the public sphere is a necessity. But what is the public sphere? Or, to paraphrase M. Schudson, we could ask “Was there ever a public sphere? If So, When?” (Calhoun, 1996, p. 143)

At a rather trivial level, “public sphere” is a term to describe a communicative space populated by citizens who gather in order to freely express their opinions, to protest, to contest, to debate, to influence political decision; these citizens may act as a common voice, as a volonté générale; they want to make themselves heard. As the public sphere is regarded as key ingredient in finding the “Eldorado” of the European project, that is an European identity shared by all European citizens, the literature in the field of EU public sphere is abundant and still flourishing.

The concept of “public sphere” has been long theorized. Historically speaking, the public sphere was born twice, under two paradigms. The American paradigm intimately links the public sphere with the raise of the “public” and “public opinion”. In this light, the famous polemic between the philosopher John Dewey and the journalist Walter Lippman is eloquent. In 1927 this polemic became widely known through the publication of two important books: “The Public and Its Problems” (authored by John Dewey) and “The Phantom Public” (authored by Walter Lippman). The dispute was shaped by two opposite attitudes towards the public: J. Dewey inferred that the citizens should continue to participate in the public affairs and search for the legitimacy of their opinions, whereas Lippman concluded that the public can not lead a nation and that only well educated and informed people – the so-called “experts” - should be granted with the opportunity to make themselves heard in the public space. Both authors premised their arguments on the fact that democracy is an effective mechanism of conducting a nation. However, their perspectives of the role of the ordinary citizen in the democratic system are totally different and, to a certain extent, still applicable.

If the American inauguration of the public sphere is strongly influenced by mass media, publicity, and advertising, the European birth of the public sphere is more ideologically grounded. Seyla Benhabib (1996) delineates three different conceptions of the public sphere in the European context. The first one is called the “agonistic” approach; Hannah Arendt, its major representative, regards public space as a “republican virtue” or “civic virtue” (Calhoun ed., 1996,

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p. 73). The second one is the “legalistic” model of the public space, which brings into the limelight the notion of “public dialogue”; typical for the liberal tradition, this model was inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. The third and last model is mastered by Jurgen Habermas and is labelled as the “discursive public space”. The Kantian tradition played a very important role in the configuration of the Habermasian theory on the public sphere; Habermas has used the rational and normative perspective, typical for the Kantian system, in order to configure a public sphere which is regulated by the power of public debate and political communication.

However, the concept of “public sphere” has gained considerable popularity in the academic world since the translation in English of Jürgen Habermas’s book “Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit” (1962), known to the English speakers under the title “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1989). “Linguistically, the syntagm <<public sphere>> seems to be a recent construction, selected by a translator to find a label for a word that has been in regular use in Germany since the 18th century.” (Kleinsteuber, 2001, p. 96). As Habermas himself stated, “the usage of the words <<public>> and <<public sphere>> betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings” (Habermas, 1993, p. 1). The public sphere is “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, 1974, p. 49). According to Habermas, the public sphere is a space where private persons assemble to debate matters of public concern. The freedom of publicly expressing one’s opinions, ideas and beliefs, of getting involved in a public debate in order to identify the best solution for a collective problem, of debating on the political options is a basic feature of modern democracies. Without this freedom, the public sphere is a utopia.

In specialized literature there are many definitions of the public sphere. We will just review the most prominent ones. For Eriksen, the public sphere is “the place where civil society is linked to the power structure of the state” (Eriksen, 2009, p.120); for Fraser it is “the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state” (Fraser, 1990, p. 134); Trenz sees it as “the engine of democratization”, ”an open field of communicative exchange” (Trenz, 2008, p. 2); Risse focuses on an empirical definition of the concept by stating that the public sphere is a “a shared community of communication” (Risse, 2003, p. 7). Taylor has defined public sphere as a “metatopical space” (Taylor, 1993, p. 229) in order to capture the “non-assembly” character of this common space of thoughts, attitudes, and actions.

Claes H. de Vreese sums-up the different approaches related to the public sphere, by delineating between the “<<public sphere heavy>> notion of a singular, pan-European public”, and the “<<public sphere light>> notion of co-existing national public spheres in regard to European politics” (de Vreese, 2007, p. 8). The already widely rejected concept of a single transnational European public sphere (due to differences imposed by language, religion, access to mass media, etc), experienced a short delusive resurrection in 2003, when both Habermas and Derrida saw in the public demonstrations against US invasion in Iraq the empirical birth of the

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European public sphere. Since these popular reactions did not happen in Europe only, it is reasonable to agree that these events were “rather a manifestation of the <<maturing of global civil society>> and not an expression of a European public sphere” (de Vreese, 2007, p. 8).

The most recent conceptualizations of the public sphere are focused on its communicative character and underline the fact that public spheres are social constructs that emerge “in the process during which people engage one another and debate issues of common concern in the public. Public spheres and communities of communication come into being when people argue about controversial issues.” (Risse, 2010, p. 125). Habermas argues that the public sphere contributes to the legitimation of the political discourse, “by keeping it active, by steering – and filtering – it” (Habermas, 2009, p. 159). Thus, the public sphere could be understood as “an intermediate system of of mass communication, situated between the formally organized deliberations and negotiations at the centre and the arranged or informal conversations which take place in civil society at the periphery of the political system.” (Habermas, 2009, p. 159) Recent research on EU communication and public sphere is starting to surpass the already traditional discourse about the existence or non-existence of a European or Europeanized public sphere. Koopmans and Statham (2010, p. 38) arrive at three different types of Europeanization. The first is the emergence of a supranational European public sphere that consists of interactions “among European-level institutions and collective actors” (Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 38); the second is the vertical Europeanization, which consists of “communicative linkages between different European countries” (idem); the third is horizontal Europeanization, “which consists of communicative linkages between different European countries”. This shows that the scholars’ discourse on EU communication and public sphere has matured, thus starting to accept the idea that “the emergent public sphere of Europe is not the final stage of a full post-national and federal democracy” (de Beus. In Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 33).

5.2. Case Study: Mass Media Role in Broadcasting the “Europe’s Single Voice” during the ”Arab Spring”

Euronews.net and “Europe’s single voice” When analyzing the mass media role in the emergence of the public sphere,

Europeanization is a matter of adopting a tone and logic focused on “Europe’s single voice”. Mass media is often referred to as “the infrastructure of the public sphere” (Habermas, 2009, p. 164), which means that its role in the creation of the European identity is well-recognized and documented in various studies and research projects (e.g. Risse, 2003, Trenz, 2008, Koopmans & Statham, 2010). My assumption is that “Europe’s single voice” should be more visible and easily quantifiable when analyzing those mass media that are in close relation to the European Union and European Commission.

This may seem redundant, as the official goal of the media tools funded by the Commission (i.e. Euronews.net) is to frame the international events from the EU’s own

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perspective. In the Commission Communication of 9 July 2003, which called for an ad hoc evaluation of Community support for the EuroNews channel, it is explicitly stated that “EuroNews is clearly relevant to EU objectives” and that “it is efficient as a partner for the Commission compared to comparable alternatives and to industry norms.” This is coherent with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which clearly stipulates that the EU must promote a single unitary image on the international (non-European) stage. This “single image” should be centered on the core-values of the European Union, which are related to social and economic cohesion, decisional transparency, and respect for cultural diversity.

EuroNews was founded in 1992, following the First Persian Gulf War, during which CNN's position as the preeminent source of 24-hour news programming was cemented. Thus, the European Broadcasting Union decided to establish the channel to present information from a European perspective. Euronews was first broadcast on 1 January 1993 from Lyon. “By going outside the traditional national or international frameworks within which the journalistic profession functions, the members of the channel came to slowly define what news with a European perspective meant.” (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 9). Like most of the television channels that do news, Euronews depends on external sources. It is a so-called channel of post-production (without camera), as it depends on a plurality of sources for footage. This is due to financial constraints, as Olivier Baisnee explains (2010, p. 10). Since 2008, Euronews is available online through the web site euronews.net that broadcasts news related to European and non-European events.

Research Methodology and Background I have used qualitative framing as a means for exploring how euronews.net approaches

the “Arab Spring”. The final goal is to understand how the EU is framed in relation to important and very visible non-European events, such as the Arab revolutions. Qualitative framing is also used to see if the “Europe’s single voice” is promoted by the European news portal.

The qualitative framing was performed on all the news related to the Arab revolutions posted by euronews.net during February, March, and April 2011. This meant a research corpus composed of 42 articles: 18 articles published in February, 19 articles published in March, and 5 articles published in April. Following the political and military tensions, period comprised between February and April 2011 is rather rich in news and comments focused on the Arab revolutions.

In brief, the “Arab Revolutions” or the “Arab Spring” consisted in a wave of demonstrations and protests occurring in the Arab world. Since 18 December 2010 there have been: revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt; a civil war in Libya resulting in the fall of its regime; civil uprisings in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen; major protests in Israel, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman; minor protests in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara. Protests peaked in the Spring of 2011, which is the reason why I analyzed the February – April 2011 period. During “The Arab Spring”, the most violent protests took place in

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Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and escaladed very fast. The Tunisian President fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January following the Tunisian revolution protests; the Egyptian President resigned on 11 February 2011, after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency; the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-Azizia thereby effectively losing control of Libya.

Research Questions and Key Findings Research question 1: What are the key factors that influenced the agenda-setting of

euronews.net in the Arab conflicts? Most of the articles approaching the Arab revolutions were published by euronews.net

during two periods: 1. between the 21st and the 28th of February, and 2. between the 10th and the 28th of March. These two periods concentrate approx. 70% of the news related to the violent events taking place in the Arab countries. In the table below I explain the informational and communicational “thickness” of these periods by making correlations between the number of articles published by euronews.net and the political and military events:

Period Key events 21 – 28th February = 13 articles (30% of the total number of articles) Focus: Egypt (36%) and Libya (64%)

February 10: President Mubarak ceded all presidential power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, but soon thereafter announced that he would remain as President until the end of his term.

February 18: Human Rights Watch reported 84 deaths in Libya since the beginning of riots.

February 24: the European Union diplomats met to discuss sanctions. These included an EU travel ban, an asset freeze and an arms embargo.

US President Barack Obama stated that Gaddafi has “lost the legitimacy to rule” and must leave “now”.

February 26: The UN Security Council announced sanctions against Libya.

10th – 28th of March = 17 articles (40% of the total number. of articles)

March 11: the leaders of the 27 EU countries organized a special summit to discuss Libya. They said unanimously that Gaddafi must leave power immediately.

March 17: the United Nations Security Council

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Focus: Libya (80%), Tunisia (10%), Egypt (5%), Others (5%)

Resolution 1973 was adopted, authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces.

Table 1: Correlation between the propensity of news and the actual events around the Arab revolutions

As shown in Table 1, on euronews.net the most visible Arab country involved in the

“Arab Spring” is Libya, followed by Egypt. In February, over 60% of the articles were focused on the Libyan conflict, whereas during March euronews.net dedicated its news almost exclusively to the Libyan revolution. Other countries that were mentioned in the news posted on euronews.net were Tunisia and Syria.

By correlating the visibility of the Arab countries affected by the turmoil events with the international political events taking place during that period, one can conclude that, between February and April 2011, the agenda-setting for the “Arab Spring” was influenced by two factors – at least as euronews.net is concerned: 1. the political and military implications of the events for both the EU and the UN, and 2. the geographical proximity to Europe (e.g. Libya, Egypt, Tunisia). Thus, the political implications of an event/an organization/a country and its geographical proximity are key aspects that influenced the way euronews.net set the agenda in this international non-European context.

There were poor or no correlations between the actual gravity of the facts taking place in the Arab states affected by the revolutions and the agenda set by euronews.net. For example, the Syrian people were subject to the regime’s violent reactions, but hardly did euronews.net cover these facts. Two articles published in March and one article published in April illustrated the Syrian revolution, but euronews.net gave it a short shrift. As it is evident in the following quotes, euronews.net mentioned the facts with no additional explanations: “In the Syrian city of Deraa crowds have set fire to a building housing the local headquarters of the ruling Baath party.” (21/03)

One can notice that there is a difference between the way euronews.net comments the conflicts in Libya and Egypt – which are by far the focus of the European news portal, on the one hand, and the way it addresses the conflicts in other Arab countries, on the other. The news focused on Libya or Egypt is rather analytical and focused on the relationship between the EU or the UN and the specific events, whereas the news on Syria, Qatar or Tunisia are rather informational – they present the facts in a simple and plain language.

Analytical focus Informational focus

“The turmoil in Cairo is being felt by Egyptians around the world. In Brussels,

“Police in Tunisia have fired warning shots and tear gas to disperse crowds of

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scores of people marched through the streets to lend their support to calls for President Mubarak to step down. “Mubarak clear off,” they shouted, while some were even more blunt. EU leaders have urged Egypt to move swiftly towards democracy. But some say the 27-member bloc has been slow to respond to events unfolding in Cairo.” (www.euronews.net, 06/02/11 22:34 CET) “Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi now has all of NATO to reckon with. The 28-member military alliance has agreed to be in charge of the UN-backed western-led coalition intervening in Libya. A structure has been worked out to police the skies, enforce the arms embargo and safeguard civilian lives.”(www.euronews.net, 28/03 18:11 CET)

protesters in the centre of the capital, Tunis.” (www.euronews.net, 26/02/11 00:44 CET) “The Tunisian Prime Minister has announced resignation following a series of street protests.”(www.euronews.net, 27/02/11 18:13 CET) “At least 88 people have been killed in the latest protests in Syria says human rights organisation Sawasia.(…) Tens of thousands took to the streets with killings reported in one Damascus district and six of its suburbs, in the central city of Homs, Latakia, and in Izra’a in the south. Dozens more have been injured.” (www.euronews.net - 22/04/11 22:34 CET)

The UN involvement had a big stake in establishing how the euronews.net should

approach the Arab revolutions. By reviewing all news about the Arab spring, one can discover that “UN” was mentioned 29 times, the “US” was mentioned 8 times, and the ”NATO” was mentioned 30 times – each time in relation to the Libyan revolution. The focus of external non-European authorities was on Libya rather that on other Arab countries that were as well strongly affected by violent events. Thus, one may rightfully assume that non-European organizations played an important role in the way euronews.net approached the Arab revolutions. Of course, this assumption should be judged under the limitations which are somehow inherent to any pilot study: the limited period of analysis, the limited number of media channels, and the limited number of articles subject to my analysis. Despite these evident limitations, the study shows that the propensity of euronews.net towards certain events is highly influenced by the way external non-EU authorities relate to those events. One can notice an important difference between the way euronews.net builds its discourse on those countries that are its key focus and which set its agenda (e.g. Libya, Egypt) and the way it approaches other Arab countries. The analytical tone, used by euronews.net for describing the events taking place in the “agenda-setting” countries is mainly leveraged by the EU’s or UN’s direct involvement in peace-setting measures.

Research question 2: How is EU framed in relation to the Arab conflict?

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In order to answer the second research question, I used the qualitative framing. My focus

was not on general frames, as it is evident that the conflict frame would be predominant, taking into account the very subject of the news. Rather, I tried to identify several specific frames, which are relevant for how EU is actually positioned in relation to Arab revolutions. I have identified two main frames used by euronews.net in order to address the Arab conflicts: “the open supporting Europe” and “the closed defensive Europe”.

The “open Europe” reveals the humanitarian side of Europe; www.euronews.net points out to a Europe which is mainly concerned about the fate of the affected populations. This frame is approached in two ways. First, the EU is framed as a model of democracy for the Arab countries. In an article published on 22nd of February, euronews.net presents the EU foreign ministers’ determination “to provide support to those countries in the grip of unrest” and to “manage their peaceful transition to a peaceful government”. When an EU official frames the EU as a model of democracy, the result is almost apologetic. For example, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague speaks about the EU’s “historic responsibility” to fight the “instability on our frontiers” (22/02/11). The tone adopted by Jose Manuel Barroso is also very firm: “We must do everything so that the current regime leaves the country and stops its actions against the Libyan people.”(02/03/11). In another article, it is shown that “The European Union’s 27 leaders have said unanimously that the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi must leave power now”. (11/03/11)

The second way of framing the “open Europe” is by underlining the EU’s humanitarian values and its determination to provide unconditioned support to all those in deep need. For example, www.euronews.net explicitly mentions that the EU is very supportive for the Arab people in need of special assistance: “The European Union’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, at talks in Tunis, has expressed support for Tunisia’s caretaker administration, as increasing numbers of illegal migrants from that country bring calls for help from Italy.” Also, Kristalina Georgieva, the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, said: “In the Benghazi area, we have humanitarian teams already on the ground, and they report that there is a need for medical assistance. Because the Libyan health system had foreigners at its heart and they have left, leaving behind a huge void, which has to be filled.”(02/03/11). In addition, EC’s President declares: “We will step up our cooperation with international humanitarian organizations to alleviate the situation inside Libya and at its borders. We have already freed-up 37 million Euros and deployed teams on the ground.”(11/03/11).

The second frame is “the closed defensive Europe”. In this frame, we see a Europe that fears its own stability and who is prepared to act as a military ally in order to avoid further turmoil. The Italian Foreign Minister makes the EU officials aware of the dangers resting at the Mediterranean shores: “Italy is a first destination country where potentially an enormous number of migrants could make for….dozens of people who, due to disasters, chaos or violence could flood on to its shores.” (22/02/11) or “I’m extremely concerned about the self proclamation of these so-called Islamic Emirate of Benghazi. Would you imagine having an

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Islamic Arab Emirate at the borders of Europe? This would be a very serious threat.” (21/02/11) Germany’s Minister for External Affairs declares that Germany “will not participate with soldiers”, which does not mean that Germany is”neutral” or that it has “any sympathy with the dictator Gaddafi”. Rather, Germany’s non-intervention means that it “sees the risks” and that it has “reasons for its concern.”(21/03/11)

However, the predominant frame is the “open Europe”. In general, this frame is mainly advocated by EU officials, such as Jose Manuel Barroso or Catherine Ashton, who become very active in promoting the image of the “humanitarian and democratic Europe” .The “closed Europe” is mainly leveraged by several key representatives of the Member States – i.e. the Foreign Ministers from Italy or Germany. In the Arab context, EU’s officials’ tendency to position the EU as open and carrying is counterweighted by the need of several Member States to reaffirm their status quo concerning political and military decisions. In their quest for stability, the Member States use NATO as a panacea of military interventions. Thus, one may conclude that EU is not perceived by its Member States as a military or political construction; rather, it is positioned as a funding institution, which is ready to offer financial assistance to the victims of the Arab conflicts. This dichotomy is coherent with what political analysts and historians observed when analyzing the EU’s role in the Arab Spring. For T. Schumacher, the “EU clearly revealed itself as both an actor and spectator by resorting to both activism and passivism in a seemingly erratic fashion” (2011, 108). Furthermore, the Arab Spring revealed “regular displays of disunity among EU member states’ governments over how best to react and finally led to a policy response that reaffirmed, yet once more, the different degrees of importance the EU attaches to the southern Mediterranean and the Gulf countries.” (2011, 117).

If one takes a closer look to the visibility of the key actors mentioned by www.euronews.net within the analyzed period and in relation to the Arab Spring, the dichotomy between the EU’s and the Member’ States perspectives is striking. Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission is presented as a defender and promoter of humanistic values, his discourse being focused on how EU could support the Arab people subject to violence and crimes: “We must do everything so that the current regime leaves the country and stops its actions against the Libyan people.” Catherine Ashton, the European foreign policy chief, is also focused on “the open Europe”: “We are extremely concerned by the events which are unfolding in Libya. We condemn the on-going repression against demonstrators, and deplore the violence and the death of civilians.”

As regards the representatives of the Member States’ governments, the Great Britain has the greatest visibility through its Prime-Minister, David Cameron, and its Foreign Minister, William Hague. Interestingly, their focus is rather on the “closed Europe” than on the “open Europe”. The national officials are less concerned than EU officials about advocating the image of a an open, humanistic Europe, and more focused on making a clear point regarding the political and military stability of the EU.

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6. Communicating Solidarity

Nowadays, we can speak about Europe’s crisis of solidarity that is starting to become even

more acute, even more serious than the gravest economic effects of the Economic crisis. Given the actual context, we could rightfully state that the Europe’s belt-tightening exercise would easily be eclipsed by the EU’s crisis of solidarity. The current crisis has caught the European Union in the midst of fundamental reordering, when citizenship and identity were starting to coagulate. The economic turmoil revealed older tensions and created new ones among EU’s political actors. But, as Jürgen Habermas explains, the main conflict in Europe is not necessarily a purely political one, but rather the genuine expression of the gap between economic rationality and political vision. ”On the threshold between economic and political unification of Europe, politics seems to hold its breath and to play low profile.” (Habermas, 2012) The “crisis of the European Union” (J. Habermas, 2011) has emerged as a new angle of analysis. From this perspective, the current crisis should not be seen solely as a financial and economic crisis, but rather, as an intrinsically political crisis, generated by the EU’s lack of solidarity, by the fact that EU could not take concerted decisions in some moments that many have subsequently deemed as having been critical in the evolution of the crisis. There is general consent that the current economic crises, in general, and the euro crisis, in particular, place the European Union at a crossroads. The problems arising are not only of a practical (economic and financial) nature, but also highly symbolic. In a statement made by the Council for the Future of Europe (Europe is the solution, not the problem, 6th of September 2011) it is admitted that the vision of Europe that will succeed is that which “inspires the commitment of its citizens whose faith in a European future is shaken”. Some talk about Europe’s darkest moment: “The crisis in Europe is existential. It is a question of whether the EU survives as a recognizable entity.” (Giddens, 2012). Even though the outburst of the crisis did not happen on the European territory, but on the other side of the Atlantic, the effects of what started in 2007 are most enduring in the EU and one could safely state that most serious impact of the global crisis is on Europe itself: “what started as the subprime crisis in 2007 and morphed into the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009” (Eichengreen, 2011, 1). Now, we are dealing with a never-ending crisis - neither of the common currency, nor of the euro zone or of its banking system, but with a never-ending crisis of the European Union itself (Habermas, 2012). Europe’s crisis of solidarity is now very visible during the process of deciding on the new Multiannual Financial Framework. The disparity between nation-oriented interests and Europe-oriented visions is evident and represent the expression of clearly defined positions in terms of political power.

Under the pressure exerted by both intra-European (i.e. the dilution of convergence, the polarization of the Member States, the private debt in the new member states) and extra-European forces (the pressure of globalization, the emergence of China as a genuine global player), Europe is in the midst of a fundamental reordering. This means that we should indeed

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deal with those things that we have repeatedly managed to avoid in the past. The “multi-speed” Europe, which implies a division between the EU-17 (euro zone) and a slower non euro periphery, has been revealed in several instances during the EU’s crisis. The analysts have gone even further and discuss about a periphery of the euro zone, consisting in those member states that did not achieve considerable economic outputs and recovery. In 2011, Finland’s European Minister, Alexander Stubb, proposed a new “geometry” of the EU, based on economic ranking. “Within the EU-17 there is a divide between Germany, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands, a core Triple-A, net-payers, plus a second tier of Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia, neither Triple-A not net-payer. And, on the other side, we can find Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal that for a variety of reasons have failed to follow the rules. In between there are euro-area members such as AAA Luxembourg, AA+ France, and AA Belgium, net payers, whose positions on fiscal disciplines are somewhat more ambiguous.” (idem) Therefore, within the framework of the crisis, the “two-speed” Europe risks to become a “three-speed Europe”, split among the first tier of countries (Germany, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands), the second-tier countries consisting in the new periphery of the euro-zone, and a third-tier composed of the states outside the monetary union. In the logic of this new “geometry”, several questions mark regarding the survival of the European Project can be raised. Will Europe be able to cope with these new divisions? Will we have more Europe or less Europe after the crisis? Is European solidarity the victim of the current crisis?

7. Management of EU Communication campaigns: from idea towards results

Please, see also the seminar handbook.

Communication initiatives (campaigns or simple activities) need a thorough organization in order to attain their goals and to obtain public support. Project management – as a discipline – is a means of planning, organizing, and implementing communication campaigns. The meaning of the concept “project” has lately twisted from a rather limited view - specific for the construction and IT & C fields – to a more general one, which underlines the fact that “projects should be connected to policy-making and implementation”1. Thus, wider definitions for “project” were formulated by the main professional associations at international level. Project Management Institute (promoting the American project management approach) considers project to be “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result”2, while

1 Bârgăoanu, A., From Projects to Project Management, in Business Excelence, Constantin Brătianu, Dorin Lixandroiu, Nicolae Al. Pop, Bucharest, Academy of Economic Studies, 2006, page 57 2 ***Project Management Body of Knowledge, Project Management Institute, Pennsylvania, 2004, page 20

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Association for Project Management (focusing on the European project management) states that projects are “the most efficient way of introducing unique change”3.

Many consider that the practice of project management is a new “profession”, the discipline of managing projects successfully. Over the last few years, many discussions have been carried out within international conferences, publications and elsewhere, the conclusion being that “project management is a global profession”4. In 1990, during the Project Management World Congress of the IPMA – International Project Management Association, it was established that the performance of projects assures the competitiveness of companies and of nations. Ever since then, project management is being understood as a macro-economic strategy, which could also apply to developing regions and countries.

Management by projects and programs is an explicit strategy of the European Commission (EC). Development projects and programs are currently used by EC in order to implement the cohesion policy, which is built on the assumption that redistribution between richer and poorer regions in Europe is needed in order to balance out the effects of further economic integration.

The concepts of “European studies” and “European project management” appear to be very popular in Romania, at least as far as the usage of the terms is implied. This has happened as a result of European funds granted to Romania as a member of the European Union. EU-funded projects and programs represent a clear priority for Romania and are considered as one of the most important means for organizational, social and economic development. Eurobarometer opinion polls5 show that public sector (local, regional and national public administration), private sector, and non-governmental organizations are determined to benefit as much as possible from the support offered through EU programs (e.g.: 6 out of 10 small and medium enterprises representatives, 8 out of 10 public administration representatives, and 7 out of 10 NGOs representatives showed their raising interest in the implementation of EU financing projects.) Thus, Romanian economic, social and administrative actors need EU financial support in order to develop sustainable projects. Yet, pre-accession experience in Romania shows that the social and economic impact of EU-funded projects was very small.

One of the key issues that caused this apparently contradictory situation (potential beneficiaries’ determination to access EU funds vs. EU funded projects’ actual outcome) is the lack of awareness of project management methods, tools and techniques among managers of EU-funded projects. This fact results in focusing solely and even valorizing the bureaucratic dimension of the European projects, on transforming the team work in a continuous flow of individual assignments, and, nonetheless, on maximizing projects’ costs and deadlines.

In 1992 the European Commission adopted Project Cycle Management (PCM) as “its primary set of project design and management tools”6 (based on the Logical Framework

3 Dixon, Miles (Association for Project Management), Project Management Body of Knowledge, Cambridge Publishing House, UK, 2000, page 12 4 ***Professionalization of Project Management, Project Management Institute, Pennsylvania, 2004, page 1 5 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ 6 ***Project Cycle Management Guidelines – Supporting the effective implementation of the EC external assistance, European Commission, Brussels, 2004

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Approach7), and a first PCM manual was produced in 1993. The manual was subsequently updated in 2001, shortly after the publication of the EC’s most recent Development Policy document (April 2000), the latest version being issued in March 2004. Through these Guidelines, EC intends to provide European project managers with a comprehensive tool for the description of key tasks, quality assessment criteria, documented information requirements, and decision options at each stage of the project cycle. PCM approach offers a complex and strategic view on the way EU projects and programs are to be managed. It is primarily focused on objectives, on the specific final goals / outcomes that must be attained by implementing EU-funded projects. This implies that PCM is mainly targeted at EC Project Managers (at Delegations and in Brussels), being less concerned with the implementation processes of the EU-funded projects.

PCM offers the general strategic view, the EC approach on the way projects must be managed. By focusing on programming and evaluation issues, PCM is less appropriate for local project managers, who are not specifically bound to use specific project management tools and methodologies for performing within projects (from the financing decision to the closing-down). In fact, at local level, PCM is all about programming “EU money”, identification of projects tailored to best answering regional needs (in conformity with National Development Plan), formulation of project proposals (according to the “Applicants’ Guidelines), financing agreements, monitoring, evaluation, and auditing of EU projects. PCM is rather used within Romanian EU-funded projects as a guideline for elaborating progress reports, for concluding tender procedures and contracts, for performing audits and specific evaluations.

Since PCM is officially labeled by EC as a means for managing EU projects, many European project managers assume that this is the only tool needed for the proper administration of projects; in this way, they tend to use PCM as a substitute for project management. This trend is unconsciously encouraged through the training schemes for public administration, where training on “project management” is rather reduced to the “Project Cycle Management” (the way it is presented in the Project Cycle Management Manual, elaborated by EC).

As compared to PCM, which is focused on the project goals, project management is rather targeted at specific processes, made operational through specialized methods. Project management is defined as “the application of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements8”9, while “PCM provides an overall analytical and decision making framework”10. PCM is an iterative method, while project management allows us to get specific hints related to the progress in time, meeting of the scope, and performance of costs within projects. According to Roland Gareis (2005), successful project management is

7 In the context of the Logical Framework Matrix a project is defined in terms of a hierarchy of objectives (inputs, activities, results, purpose and overall objective) plus a set of defined assumptions and a framework for monitoring and evaluating project achievements (indicators and sources of verification). 8 In the case of EU-funded projects this implies that project activities will lead to the development of the project outcomes and products promised in the application form. 9 ***A Guide to Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), Project Management Institute, 2003 (3rd edition), page 23 10 ***Aid Delivery Methods, European Commission, 2004, page 2

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assured through the use of methods related to start-up, coordination, controlling, discontinuity management, and close-down.

We may conclude that sustainable EU-funded projects are based on a well balanced mixture of PCM (as a strategic dimension) and project management (as an operational way of making development happen).

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