descartes, other minds and impossible human bodies · 2013. 10. 17. · descartes replied by citing...

volume12,no.16 november2012

Descartes, Other

Minds and Impossible

Human Bodies

Gideon ManningCalifornia Institute of Technology

© 2012 GideonManningThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012016/>

1. Introduction

Fornearlyacentury,skepticismaboutotherminds(SOM)hasbeenastandardprobleminepistemology.Inrecentaccountsofsocialcog-nition,however,thesuccessofsimulationtheoryandtheory-theoryhavemovedphilosophicaldiscussionaboutothermindsawayfromSOM.1 Precedent for this move can be found in an unlikely place,namely inRenéDescartes’philosophy, forDescartessodiminishedtheroleof thesenses ingainingknowledgethatSOMisprecludedfrom becoming a self-standing skeptical challenge. At most, SOMisjustonemoreincarnationofskepticismabouttheexternalworld.Further,Descartes rejected thenaturalpossibilityof ahumanbodyexistingwithoutamind.Weareallfamiliarwiththerealdistinctionbetween body andmind, which, at first blush, speaks against thisclaim,butwhileabodyingeneralcanexistwithoutamind,aunique-lyhumanbody cannot.Descartes indicated all this in anumberofplaces and especially in his correspondence with the CambridgePlatonistHenryMore,whoaskedhowweknowinfantshaveminds.Descartesrepliedbycitinggeneticfacts—naturalfacts—abouttheori-ginofahumanbodywhichassureus thatwherewefindahumanbodywenecessarilyfindahumanmind.Wecanthereforereconstructan answer to SOMonDescartes’ behalf that fundamentally rejectsskepticaldoubtsuniquetoourknowledgeofotherminds.And,asaconsequence,wecanfurtherunsettlethecommonpresumptionthatthehumanbodyisastraightforwardobjectofphysicalstudy.Tothecontrary, it looks tobeauniqueobject that, in itsentirety,belongsneithertothemetaphysiciannortothephysicist.

Inwhat follows, Iexpandanddefend theseclaims. I start in sec-tiontwowithSOM’strueprogenitor,theseventeenth-centuryFrenchCartesianGeraulddeCordemoy.ThereIwillshowthattheemergenceofSOMintheseventeenthcentury(andmoregenerally foranyonewhoisnotanidealist)istiedtoaconceptionofthehumanbodyasa living, functioning bodywith, atmost, a contingent relation to a

1. Thisalreadyvastliteraturecontinuestogrow.Foranaccessiblediscussionofthecompetingviewsandsomeoftheconceptualandmethodologicalissuesatstake,seeApperly2008.

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that“theothermindsproblemreceiveditsfirstclearformulationbyJohnStuartMillinthenineteenthcentury”.3Bufordisreferringtotheepistemological problem. To clarify this point, it will help to distin-guishthisproblemfromthreeothers.Thefirstistheordinary problem.Oncountlessoccasions,wewouldallliketoknowwhatsomeoneelseisthinking,andtheordinaryproblemisrootedinthissimpleeverydaychallenge:Whatjustifiesourbeliefthatsomeoneisthinkingaparticu-larthought?Theexistenceofothermindsisnotatissueinthesecon-texts,andnoonecouldpossiblyclaimtohaveintroducedthisproblem.Distinctfromtheepistemologicalproblemandtheordinaryproblemistheconceptual problem:HowdoIsomuchasconceiveofotherminds,orhowcanmymentalconceptsrefertoothers’mentalstates?4Finally,thereisthedescriptive problem:howdoweactuallygoaboutattribut-ingmentalstatestoothers?Thislastproblemhasreceivedthemostattentionoflate,withsimulationtheoryandtheory-theoryprominentanswersintheliterature.

ThomasBuford’sclaimabouttheoriginofSOMnotwithstanding,Descartesisfrequentlyidentifiedasthesourceofallthingsskeptical.5 And,ofcourse,Descarteswroteagreatdealthatmightbereadasei-theraformulationofSOMoranunintentionalbequeathingofSOMtotherestofus.AtthebeginningofMeditationTwo,forexample,when

3. Buford1970,xii.Buford’sclaimoverlooksthefactthatMalebranche,Leibniz,Berkeley,ReidandevenKant,nottomentionFichteandtheotherGermanIdealists,allreflectexplicitlyontheepistemologicalproblemofotherminds.AnitaAvramides’recentOther Minds(2001)ishelpfulonanumberofpoints,butitexcludes,mostimportantly,Cordemoy.Similarly,the“OtherMinds”en-tryintheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(availableathttp://plato.stan-ford.edu/entries/other-minds/;lastvisitedMarch2011)leavesoutanumberofrelevanthistoricalfigures.

4. Although Iam focusinghereon theepistemologicalproblem,Descartes isnotwithoutananswertotheconceptualproblem.Roughly,Descarteswouldmaintain that our knowledge of what we are as thinking things involvesknowledgeofaprimaryattributeofsubstance,whichis,byitsnature,aprop-ertythatappliestomindsingeneralandnotourmindsinparticular.

5. Forexample,inachaptertitledsimply“Descartesandotherdisasters”,JohnSearle’s recent Mind: A Brief Introduction links Descartes to SOM (Searle2004,Chapter1).

mind.Insectionsthreeandfour,Isupplementthisclaimbyarguingthat Descartes did not distinguish SOM from skepticism about theexternalworldinanyofhispublishedwork.Inparticular,insectionthree, I show that SOM is not considered anywhere in theMedita-tions.Insectionfour,Ipresentaninterpretationofthe“languagetest”fromtheDiscourse on Method(Discourse)accordingtowhichDescartessoughtonlyto falsifyourbelief thatanimalshavesoulsorminds,aviewprominentamonghisscholasticAristoteliancontemporariesaswellassixteenth-andseventeenth-centuryinnovatorslikeMicheldeMontaigneandPierreCharron.2Thisleavesus,soIclaiminsectionfive,withDescartes’correspondencewithMore.Iarguethatthiscor-respondence,whichcontainsDescartes’onlygenuineencounterwithSOM,includesanexplicitappealtoacommon“nature”sharedbyallhumanbodiesandanimplicitappealtotheconsistencyofGod’sac-tivity in theworld.From theseassumptions,Descartes inferred thathumanbodiesfittobejoinedwithamindalwayshavebeenandal-wayswillbe.Inotherwords,givenwhathetellsMore,Descartesdoesnothavetherightconceptionofthehumanbody,asdescribedinsec-tiontwo,forSOM.IconcludeinsectionsixbydiscussingthetensionbetweenDescartes’conceptionof thehumanbodyandstandardac-countsofhisanti-Aristotelianstrategyinphysics.

2. SOM: A brief history

ThereareavarietyofwaystodemarcateSOM.Iaminterestedindis-cussingthe epistemological problem,andIwillproceedontheassump-tion that it is synonymouswithSOM.Thequestionmotivating thisproblemrelatestohowweknowothermindsexist:Whatjustifiesourbeliefthatagivenbodyhasamindorthinks?Itisthisversionoftheproblemofotherminds forwhichwehave competinghistorical ac-counts.Onefinds,forexample,ThomasBufordintroducingananthol-ogyonphilosophicalissuesrelatedtoothermindswiththesuggestion

2. See Desmond Clarke’s recent work for a comparison between Descartes’viewsonanimalsoulsandtheviewsofMontaigneandCharron(Clarke2003,72ff,andClarke2006,334–335).



The absence of such a proof troubled the first-generation Car-tesianGerauld de Cordemoy.10 In fact, Cordemoy became the firstseventeenth-century figure, and perhaps the very first person ever,togiveanunambiguousformulationofSOM.WritingeighteenyearsafterDescartes’ death,Cordemoybegins hisDiscours Physique de la Parole (Discours):

AmongsttheBodies,IseeintheWorld,Iperceivesome,that are in all things likemine, and I confess, I have agreatinclinationtobelieve,thattheyareunitedtominds,asmine is.Butwhen I come toconsider, thatmyBodyhathsomanyoperationsdistinctfromthoseofmymind,and that nothing ofwhatmaketh it subsist depends atallfromHer,IthinkIhaveatleastgroundtodoubt,thatthoseBodiesareunitedtominds,until Ihaveexamin’dalltheiractions:AndIdoevenseethatbythemaximsofgoodsenseIshallbeobligedtobelieve,thattheyhavenomind,iftheydoonlysuchthings,whereofIhavefoundinmyselfthattheBodyalonemaybethecause.11

AlthoughCordemoy’smonographprovidesnumerousinsightsintothestateofseventeenth-centuryanthropologyandlinguistics,itsopeningparagraphcastsitasasustainedattempttoanswerSOM.Cordemoydevelopstheepistemologicalproblembyspecificallytakingforgrant-edknowledgeofhisownmindandbodyand thenfinding “groundtodoubt”thatother“bodiesareunitedtominds”.Asaninterpreterof

10.Cordemoy is littlediscussed in theEnglish-speakingworldapart from in-frequentreferencestohisatomism,hisoccasionalismorhisroleinthecor-respondencebetweenLeibniz andArnauld. See, however,Ablondi 2005forsomeofthebroaderdetailsofCordemoy’slifeandnaturalphilosophy.Cordemoy’splaceinthehistoryofSOMwasbroughttomyattentionbyVandePitte1975andGabbey1990.

11. In1668,thesameyeartheDiscours waspublished,anEnglishtranslationap-pearedasA Philosophical Discourse Concerning Speech, Conformable to the Carte-sian Principles.Alltranslationsaretakenfromthe1668EnglishtranslationoftheDiscours.TheoriginalFrenchisreproducedinCordemoy1968,201–256.

reflectingonwhatheisnolongerconvincedexists,Descartes’medi-tatorconcedes“thatthereisabsolutelynothingintheworld,nosky,noearth,no minds,nobodies”.6 JustasthedoubtsraisedinMedita-tionOnethreatenourpretensetoknowtheworldonthebasisofthetestimonyof thesenses, theyalsorenderdoubtful theexistenceofmindsknownsolelyonthetestimonyofthesenses.Themeditator’sfirstconstructivestepistoestablishthathisownmindexistswithouttheaidofthesenses—heisan“I”,thatis,a“thinking”andnotaveridi-callysensing“thing”—yetwelookinvaininthesubsequentmedita-tions foranexplicitproof, letalone forevidence, thatothermindsexist. IntheSecondReplies,Descartesevenacknowledgesthat“inmyMeditations…my suppositionwas that no other human beings[homines]wereyetknowntome”.7Nevertheless,Descartesusesthefirst-personpluralanumberoftimesafterMeditationTwo,asifotherhumanbeingsareknown tohim.8Whateverwemakeof this shiftfromsingular toplural,whichsuggests,at the least, thatDescarteswasnotattentivetoSOM,thereisnospecificprooffortheexistenceofothermindsintheMeditations.9

6. IciteDescartesusing“AT”torefertothestandardoriginallanguageeditionofAdamandTannery,followedbyvolumeandpagination.IhavegenerallyreliedontheCambridgetranslationsofDescartes’work,whichincludetheoriginalATreferencesinthemargins.TheCambridgetranslationswillhence-forthbereferredtoby“CSM”followedbyvolumeforvolumesoneandtwoandby“CSMK”forvolumethree,afterwhichI includethepagination.ThepassagequotedabovecanbefoundatATVII25,CSMII16.(Emphasisadded.)

7. ATVII142,CSMII102.ThisremarkispartofDescartes’explanationforwhyheisseekingobjectivetruthandnotmerelytruth“relativetohumanbeings”.

8. See,forexample,ATVII21,30and32.

9. Itmightbeobjected that theproof for theexistenceofGod inMeditationThree isacounterexample.Perhapsonemightalsoclaimthat thesupposi-tionofanevilgeniusinMeditationOneneveractuallyisolatesDescartesinaworldwithoutotherminds.Ineithercase,however,themannerinwhichthese“otherminds”areintroducedorknowntoexistcannotgeneralize.TheprooffortheexistenceofGodisuniquetoGod,andthesuppositionofanevilgeniusisaboutdenyingusknowledge,notprovidingit.



In the remainder of this section, I will elaborate on the way inwhichCordemoypresentsSOMandtheassumptionsthathemade.IthenaskwhetherDescartessharedCordemoy’sassumptions.Aswewillsee,Descartesandhisfollowersharemanycommonassumptions,butwhileCordemoydrawson theMeditations,Descartesmakes ad-ditionalclaimsthatCordemoyfailstoacknowledge.Inparticular,Cor-demoydoesnotrecognizeDescartes’rejectionofthepossibilitythatahumanbodywithoutamindcouldexistinthenaturalworld.ThisfurtherclaimbyDescartesshort-circuitsanyefforttomotivateSOM,aswewillseeinlatersections.Thus,whileDescartesandCordemoysharesomeofthenecessaryassumptionsleadingtoSOM,theydonotsharetheassumptionthatthehumanbodyhasacontingentrelation-shipwithamind.

The most obvious assumption relevant to SOM is the privilegeinitially assigned to self-knowledge inMeditation Two’s cogito argu-ment.Inthenineteenthcentury,JohnStuartMillarguesthatthisprivi-legeleadsirrevocablytoSOM.Eventhe“moststrenuousIntuitionist,”writesMill,“doesnotincludethis[knowledgeofotherminds]amongthethings that Iknowbydirect intuition. Iconclude…[othermindsexist]fromcertainthings,whichmyexperienceofmyownstatesoffeelingprovestometobemarksofit”.12InhisanalysisofDescartes’relationshiptoSOM,GarethMatthewsechoesMill’sassessmentandlikewise identifies thisprivilegeas a condition forSOM.Lacking “aworry about how I can be justified in inferring that there are othermindswhentheonlyoneIcanobserve directlyismyown,”insistsMat-thews,“thereisnoProblemofOtherMinds”.13

Thebasic ideasharedbyMillandMatthewsisbothsimpleandentirelyjustified.TogenerateSOM,theremustexistanasymmetrybetweenthewaysinwhichweknowourownmindsexist—self-ev-idently, intuitivelyordirectly through introspection—and thewaysinwhichwecouldpossiblyknowothermindsexist—onthebasisof

12. Mill1865,242.SeealsoNormanMalcolm’sfamousrebukeofMill,wherehecallsthisprivilege“themostfundamentalerror”Millmakes(Malcolm1958,74).

13. Matthews1986,142(emphasisadded).

Descartes,heisnoticingthataprooffortheexistenceofothermindswouldseemtoberequiredifwebegin,asDescartesclearlydoes inMeditationTwo,with“nosky,noearth,no minds[and]nobodies”andthenproveonlytheexistenceofbodies.

Countless of our beliefs lack a specific justification afterMedita-tionOne,however, so it isworthpausing toconsider theoversightthatCordemoyidentified.Specifically,whydoesCordemoywriteonlyaboutourbeliefthatothermindsexist?Whatmakesothermindswor-thyofseparatetreatment?IfweimaginetheMeditationsasaguidetohowwejustifyourbeliefs,wemightbetterappreciatethequestionIamputting toCordemoy.Likeaworkofmathematics that explainshow toperformmathematicalproofsbut fails toprove thePythago-reanTheorem,Descartes’Meditations explainshowtogainknowledgebutfailstoprovethatothermindsexist.Intheformerinstance,afail-uretoprovethePythagoreanTheoremmaybeanoversightforsome-oneinterestedinthePythagoreanTheorem,butitishardlyaflawinaworkshowinghowtoperformmathematicalproofs.SolongastheexplanationofhowtoproduceamathematicalproofcanbeappliedtothePythagoreanTheorem,theworkhasaccomplisheditspurpose.

What prevents us from reaching the same conclusion about theomissionofaprooffortheexistenceofotherminds?Descartesdoesnotofferaspecificprooffortheexistenceoftheskyortheearth—theotherthingslistedinMeditationTwo—yetthisisnotamajorlacunain the text. It seems safe to conclude thatCordemoymust bemoti-vatedbytheabsenceofaproofandthefurtherbeliefthattheMedita-tions doesnotequipustojustifyourbelief intheexistenceofotherminds.Inotherwords,intheDiscours, CordemoyproceedsasthoughDescartes’claimsintheMeditations leaveuswithadistinctiveepiste-mologicalproblem(astowhetherothermindsexist)thatcannotberesolvedinthesamewayastheproblemoftheexternalworld.Mindsare not comparable to the earth or the sky. The oversight thatCor-demoy identifiedwas that it is one thing to show that bodies existbutsomethingelsetoshowthatmindsexistattachedtothosebodies.Descartesequipsustoshowtheformerbutnotthelatter.



existenceofbodiesofacertainkindhasbeenestablishedthatSOMgainsCordemoy’sattention.

This is nomore a historical accident than the privileging of self-knowledge inthegenerationofSOM.Thethreatofmodernorpost-Cartesianskepticism is strongestwhen itunseatsourbestclaims toknow.15SuchisthecasewiththeexplicitdoubtsraisedinDescartes’Meditations.Forinstance,theydonotstopwiththereliabilityofthesens-eswhenobservingobjectsfaroffinthedistance.Instead,thedoubtsofMeditationOneunderminethesensesasaguidetotrutheveninthosesituationswherethesensesareusedtocorrectthemselves:

Yetalthoughthesensesoccasionallydeceiveuswithre-spect toobjectswhichareverysmallor inthedistance,therearemanyotherbeliefsaboutwhichdoubtisquiteimpossible,eventhoughtheyarederivedfromthesens-es—forexample,thatIamhere,sittingbythefire,wear-ingawinterdressing-gown,holdingthispieceofpaperinmyhands,andsoon.16

Offeringreasons todoubt thereliabilityof thesenseseven incaseslikethese,whenobjectsarerightinfrontofus,takesskepticismtoitslogicaland,inthecaseofmodernskepticism,itsdistinctiveextreme.Likewise,skepticaldoubtsabouttheexistenceofothermindsdonottarget human bodies in the far-off distance or lifeless bodies lyingdeadbeforeus.Rather,theyprovidereasonstodoubtthatthelivingandbreathinghumanbodiesrightinfrontofushaveminds.Shortof

15. ThisaspectofDescartes’skepticismisemphasizedbyHarryFrankfurt,whonoticesthat“theperceptionsinwhichcertaintyistobesought[accordingtoDescartes]willbethoseofanideallyqualifiedperceiverunderidealexternalconditions”(Frankfurt2008[1970],55).StanleyCavellemphasizesthesamepointwhenheuses the label “best caseofknowledge” todescribe the tar-getofskepticaldoubt(Cavell1979,129ff.).FordiscussionofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenAcademicandPyrrhonianskepticismascomparedtoDescartes’ “modern skepticism”,which uniquely calls into question ourknowledgeoftheexternalworldinacompletelygeneralway,seeBurnyeat1982;cf.Fine2000andBroughton2002,90–92.

16. ATVII18,CSMII12–13.

sense experience supplementedwith argument or inference or, ina word, indirectly. Cordemoy’s presentation of SOM assumes thisasymmetry. He writes of what “I see”, “I perceive” and “I confess”,workingwithconfidenceinhisfirst-personbeliefs.He“consider[s]”whatheknowsabouthisownbodyandmindandconcludesthathemustexamine“all…[the]actions”ofotherbodiesbeforedrawinganyconclusionsaboutotherminds.Put simply:Cordemoyknows thathismindisunitedtohisbody,butheknowsthisinawaythatjeop-ardizeshisknowledgeofotherminds. If this isallCordemoyisas-sumingintheDiscours, thenthelogicoftheMeditations impliesthatSOMcouldariseanytimeafterDescartesprivilegesself-knowledgeinMeditationTwo.

Itmaycomeasasurprise,then,thatforCordemoy,MeditationTwodoesnot,byitself,leadtoSOM.HeexplicitlyenvisionedhisDiscours asakintoaMeditationSeven,addedontoDescartes’originalsix. “Iproposed in the Six Discourses which preceded this, themeans toknowOurselves,&madeitmanifest,thatitonlyconsistedindiscern-inginustheOperationsoftheSoul,andthoseoftheBody.NowIpro-posethemeansofknowingOthers.”14Anotherdiscoursewasneededbecausedualismandthereturnoftheexternalworldstilllefttheexis-tenceofothermindsunresolved.ButwhileCordemoybelievedDes-cartes’responsetothedoubtsfromMeditationOnewasincomplete,attentiontowhathesayshereandintheopeningpassageoftheDis-cours revealssomething lessobvious.Cordemoybelieved thatSOMemerges with respect to the already-established existence of bod-ies“thatareinallthingslikemine”.Itisthesebodieswhose“actions”needtobe“examin’d”. Inotherwords, it isonlyonceweknowthattheexternalworldexistsandincludesotherbodieslikeourownthatCordemoyasksaboutotherminds.Thus,while theremaybeotherassumptionssupportingSOM—suchastheprivilegeDescartesgivestoself-knowledgeidentifiedbyMillandMatthews—itisonlyoncethe

14. GeraulddeCordemoy1668,preface,unpaginated.



Tobringthispointoutmoreclearly,noticethat ifweacceptthatthehumanbodydependsonorotherwisenecessarilyinvolvesamind,thenquestioningtheexistenceofothermindsistantamounttoques-tioning the existence of humanbodies.Additionally, it follows thatfindingahumanbodyistantamounttofindingahumanmind.19ForSOMtorepresentaself-standingskepticalchallenge, these linksbe-tweenmindsandhumanbodiesmustbebroken.Whatisneededisthepossibilitythatthereareliving,breathinghumanbodiesthat,forsomereason,perhapsevenareasongivenbytheskeptic,bearacon-tingentrelationtominds.AsCordemoyindicated,itisthispossibilitythatsetstheframeworkforSOM:“myBodyhathsomanyoperationsdistinct fromthoseofmymind,andthatnothingofwhatmaketh itsubsistdependsatallfromHer,IthinkIhaveatleastgroundtodoubt,that thoseBodiesareunited tominds”. I conclude that forSOMweneedtoacceptthatwhatweperceiveisnotalivinghumanbodywithamindbutamere human body.

Itmayseemalltooobviousthatmerehumanbodiesexist,butrealinnovationwouldhavebeenrequiredintheseventeenthcenturytomakesuchaclaim.Consider just thecaseof thescholasticAristote-lianismthatdominatedineducational institutions.Accordingtothehylomorphicviewat the coreofAristotelianphilosophy, allnaturalbodiesarecompositesofmatterandform.20Shiftstowardamorero-

referencesinChristianWolff,C.M.PfaffandtheEncyclopédie(formoreon“egoism”,seeMcCrackenandTipton2000,178–79).TheversionofSOMthatarisesforimmaterialistsishardtodistinguishfromthequestionsthosewhobelieveinimmaterialsoulscommuningintheafterlifemustconfront.

19. AsIwillshowinthesectionsahead,itisthislatterstrategythatbestcharac-terizesDescartes’positiononhowwerecognizeotherminds:Wheretherearehumanbodies, therearenecessarilyhumanminds.Andwhatmakesahumanbody?Descartes’answerinthecontextofSOMisthatitmustbepro-ducedinaveryspecificway.

20.ThecentralityofhylomorphismtoAristotle’sthoughtiswelldocumented,butforan introductoryaccount, seeShields2007,49ff.Discussionofhylomor-phismanditsvariouscomplicationsinthemedievalperiodcanbefoundinPasnau2010.ThepersistenceofhylomorphismandthemodificationsmadetoitduringtheearlymodernperiodaredescribedintheessayscontainedinManning2012a.

doubtingwhatweknowinthesecircumstances,theskeptichasfailedtochallengeourbeliefsaboutotherminds,becauseshehasfailedtocastdoubtonourbestcaseofknowing.Inotherwords,wewillonlyhavearrivedatamodernskepticalversionofSOMifwehaveques-tionsaboutallthepresumptivejustificationsforbelievingintheexis-tenceofotherminds,includingourjustificationsforbelievinginthemindednessofthebodiesrightinfrontofus.

Themoraltodrawfromthislastclaimisthatanadequatereconstruc-tionofSOM’soriginsintheseventeenthcenturymustbetiedtoacon-ceptionofthehumanbodyasafunctioninglivingthing,theexistenceofwhichneitherdependsonnornecessarily implicatestheexistenceofamind.17Putsimply,itisasimportanttohavetherightconceptionofthehumanbodytoaccountfortheemergenceofSOMintheseven-teenthcenturyasitistohavetherightconceptionofthemind.18

17. ThesubsequenthistoryofSOMconfirms this fact. InMill’s formulationofSOM,heasks,by“whatevidencedoIknow,orbywhatconsiderationsamIledtobelieve,thatthereexistothersentientcreatures;thatthewalkingandspeakingfigureswhichIseeandhear,havesensationsandthoughts,orinotherwords,possessMinds?”(Mill1865,243).Millisalsointerestedinonlycertainbodies,andIbelievehemeanslivinghumanbodiesthatare, inallrespects,fullyfunctioning.

Wecandrawasimilarconclusion fromBertrandRussell’sappeal to theargumentfromanalogy:

We observe in ourselves such occurrences as remembering, rea-soning, feeling pleasure, and feeling pain. We think that sticksand stones do not have these experiences, but that other peo-ple do….It is clear that belief in the minds of others requires…something that may be vaguely called “analogy.” The behaviorof other people is inmany ways analogous to our own, and wesuppose that it must have analogous causes. What people sayiswhatwe should say ifwehada certain thought, and sowe in-fer that they probably have these thoughts. (Russell 1948, 433)

Beginningwithother“people”,Russell’sconceptionofhumanbodiesdisplay-ingbehavior,thoughnotnecessarilymindedness,motivatesSOM.Forade-taileddiscussionoftheneedforaspecificconceptionofthebodyinordertogeneratetheproblemofotherminds,seeLong1964.

18. IrefrainfromarguingthatthisisaconditionforthegeneralpossibilityofSOM,becauselaterintheeighteenthcenturySOMwasrecastwithoutreferencetobodies.Specifically,“egoism”cametobeidentifiedwithSOM,testifiedtoby



Inthespecificcaseoflivingbodies,ofwhichthehumanbodyisjustoneexample,scholasticAristoteliansidentifiedformswithsouls—theLatin for “soul” isanima, fromwhichtheEnglish“animated”derives.Souls,inturn,weredifferentiatedfromoneanotheraccordingtothefunctions they introduced intomatter.So, forexample,avegetativesoulistheformofabodythatcangrowandtakeinnutrition.Plantshavevegetativesouls.Animalsthatmoveandinteractwiththeworldthroughsenseexperiencehavemotiveorsensitivesouls.Humanbe-ings,whocancontemplateuniversals,have rational soulsorminds.Thus,roughlyspeaking,whereasplantshaveonekindofsoulinform-ingtheirmatteraccordingtothescholasticAristotelian,animalshaveanotherkindofsoulthatincludesthefunctionsofthevegetativesoul,andhumanshaveyetanotherkindofsoulthatincludesthefunctionsof theothertwo. Ineachcase, itwouldbewrongtosimply identitythesoulwithmatterbutitwouldalsobewrongtobelievethatlivingplants,animalsorhumanbodiesexistwithouttheirappropriatesouls.

TheAristoteliantradition’sconceptionofalivingbodyisclearlyhos-tiletothepossibilitythattherecouldexistwhatIdubbedearlier“amerehumanbody”—orreallyanymerebody,ifthatmeansabodywithoutaform.Justasthehumanbody’smatterdependsonoursoul,sotoodoesour soul dependonour body’smatter.23With living things generally,thismeansthatthesoulcannotbeactiveorpresentunlessthematterisstructuredororganizedintherightway.Inalivinghumanbody,allthematerialconditionsnecessaryfortheoperationofarationalsoulwillbepresent.Whenthesematerialconditionsarepresent,therationalsoul

corpseisabodynolongerfittohavesuchaform.FurtherdiscussionofDes-cartes’viewsonembryologyappearsbelowinsectionfiveandinnote61.

23. Althoughtherationalorintellectualsoulisuniqueinnotrequiringaspecificorgan,accordingtoscholasticslikeAquinas,itwouldstillnotbeabletoexistinitsnaturalstate—thatis,inunionwithmatterasthesoulofahumanbeing—withoutsomedependenceonmatter.ThethornyissueofChristianimmortal-ityisinthebackgroundhereforscholastics,asisthepressinginterpretativequestionofwhetherornotthesoulisstudiedbythemetaphysicianorthenaturalphilosopher.Fordiscussion,seePasnau2002,45ff.;Pasnau2007;andBakker2007.ForhowtheseissuesimpactourinterpretationofDescartes,seeManning(forthcoming).

bustontologicaldualisminscholasticaccountsofmatterandformcanbedetectedinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies—andtherearehighlytechnicalcomplicationsintroducedifweconsiderThomistandScotistdisputesovertheexistenceofprimematterandthepluralityofforms—yettheviewthatmatterandformarenotseparateentitiesbutelementsofasinglewhole,distinguishablebyconceptualanalysisalone,wasthenorm.21Thismeansthatmatterandformwillbepres-entinanynaturalorartificialbody,whetheritbearock;achair;oreventheembryo,thefullyfunctioninghumanbodyorthebodyofacorpse.22Tobeabodyofanykindwastobeamatter-formcomposite.

21. AlternativeviewsofmatterandformamongtheScholasticsaredetailedinAriew1998.

22.Ananonymous refereepointedout that in the initialversionof thispaperthereweretwoclaimsthatneededtobeconsideredmoreexplicitly:first,theclaimthatalivinghumanbodyhasaformand,second,theclaimthatahu-mancorpsehasaform.Sincereceivingthereferee’scomments,itoccurredtomethattobecomplete,thispaperneedstoconsiderathirdclaimaswell:thatthehumanembryomusthaveaform.Thereferee’squestionwas:Giventheseseparateclaims,whichdoesDescartesreject?Thatis,doesDescartesrejectthat(1)thelivinghumanbodyhasanAristotelianscholasticform,(2)thehumanembryohasanAristotelianscholastic formand,(3) thehumancorpse has anAristotelian scholastic form?Descartes’ substance-mode on-tology is purposefully hostile to his predecessors’ use ofmatter and form,whichimpliesherejects(1)–(3),yet,inanumberofplaces,Descartesreferstothehumansoulasanelementina“substantialunion”withthebodyorasa “substantial form”(e. g.,ATVII228,CSMII160andATIII505,CSMK208;fordiscussionofDescartes’rejectionofscholasticAristotelianforms,seeGarber1992,94–116;DesChene1998;Pasnau2004;andespeciallyHattab2009).ThereremainsaheatedscholarlydiscussionabouthowtointerpretDescartes’useof“form”inconnectionwiththesoulsofhumanbeings—formoreonwhich,seenote71below—butIprovideevidenceinsectionfivethatDescartesdoesnotreject(1)butratheracceptssomethingverymuchlikeit,becauseherejectsthenaturalexistenceofa“merehumanbody”.Whatabout(2)and(3)?ThisquestioniscomplicatedbyDescartes’promiscuoususeof“substance”torefertotheparticularbodiesstudiedbythephysicist,afactthatobscures theontologicalstatusofparticularbodieswithout forms,which Iwouldarguearenotsubstancesstrictlyspeaking(fordiscussionoftheonto-logicalstatusofparticularbodiesthatlacksubstantialforms,seeSlowik2001,Sowall2004,Normore2009,Hatfield2009andManning2012b). I cannotgive thisquestion its fulldue,but, roughly, Iwould claim that thehumanembryoisnotalivinghuman body, strictlyspeaking,andneitheristhehumancorpse(cf.ATXI330–331,CSMI329–330).TheembryoisabodythatisnotyetfittoreceivetheonlyformremaininginDescartes’philosophy,andthe



entirecorpusthatappearrelevant toSOM.Anumberofcommenta-torshaveworked thesepassagesover,using themtodoeverythingfromidentifyingananswertotheother-mindsskeptictosupportingtheclaimthatDescartesrecognizedandinventedtheproblem.Iwillbeusingthesepassagesoncemore,butthistimetosupporttheclaimthatDescartesneverconsideredSOMofhisownaccord.26Morethanmere blindness to what you may still think an inevitable problem,however,Descarteshadgoodreasontolimithisattentiontotheskep-ticalproblemof theexternalworld,because thesamestrategies foracquiringknowledge in thatcaseapply ineveryothercontext.ThissectionbuildstothisconclusionbyexaminingDescartes’correspon-dence andespecially theMeditationsmore closely.Thenext sectionexaminesDescartes’Discourse and thepotential role of language inassessingwhodoesanddoesnothaveamind.OncemakingclearthatDescartesneverconsideredSOMinanyofhispublishedworks,Iturn,insectionfive,tohisactualresponsetoSOM.

Ina late letter toHenryMore,Descartesmadehismostexplicitclaimaboutouraccesstothemindsofothers.Thesubjectunderdis-cussionwastheattributesacorporealsubstancemusthaveinorderto exist.OpposingDescartes’ view from thePrinciples of Philosophy (Principles)thattheprimaryattributeofextensionalonesecurestheexistenceofcorporealsubstance,Moresuggestedthat“someproper-tiesarepriortoothers/proprietates alias alijs esse priores”.27Inparticular,as Descartes summarized his correspondent’s views,More claimed

26.FrederickCoplestonisright that“neither intheMeditationsnor inthePrin-ciples of Philosophy does…[Descartes] treat specifically the problem of ourknowledgeof theexistenceofotherminds”.Coplestonadds that “if calledup,[Descartes]woulddoubtlessproducean…argument…[appealing]tothedivineveracity, toexistence, [to] theexistenceofotherminds” (Copleston1960,Volume4,117).AnitaAvramidesalsorecognizes thatDescartesdoesnotconsiderSOM.HerreconstructionofwhatDescartes’responsetoSOMmighthavebeenappearsinAvramides2001,59ff.AvramidesdoesnotcitethetextsIdiscussbelowinsectionfive,however,whichrendersheraccountmorespeculativethanitneededtobe.IamunsureifshewouldacceptthereconstructionIofferbeyondsectionthree.

27. ATV299.

mustalsobepresent.Anyotherview is ananathema toAristotelianhylomorphism.As a result, scholasticAristotelianismdenies the pos-sibilityofamerehumanbodyandimmunizesitselffromSOM.24

Cordemoy appears to have believed that Descartes’ Meditations andthephysicsthatitsupportsdelivertheinnovationnecessarytoac-ceptthatamerehumanbodymayexist.Specifically,inMeditationSix,oncetherealdistinctionbetweenmindandbodyisestablishedsuchthatmindsandbodiescanexistseparatefromoneanother,itisaneasysteptothepossibleexistenceofmerehumanbodies.25ThisexplainswhyCordemoywroteaSeventhDiscourse intheDiscours,aprover-bialMeditationSeven.ItalsoexplainswhyconsiderationsaboutthenatureofthemindandsubjectivityalonedidnotcreateaconsciousrecognitionofSOMintheseventeenthcenturyorbefore.Yet,asIwillgoon toargue, in spiteofprivileging self-knowledge inMeditationTwoandinspiteofadvocatingtherealdistinctionbetweenmindandbodyinMeditationSix,Descartesseveraltimesrefrainsfromdescrib-ingthelivinghumanbodyasabodythatexistswithoutamind.Thus,contrarytohowCordemoyunderstandsDescartes’position,Descartesdoesnotaccepttheexistenceofmerehumanbodies,andDescarteshadgoodreasonnottoengagewithSOM.Insectionsthreeandfour,IsupportthisclaimbyexplainingawaythosetextswhereDescartesappearstobeactivelyconsideringSOM.

3. No SOM in Descartes’ Meditations

BeyondthetwosentencesalreadycitedfromtheMeditations andtheObjections and Replies,thereareonlyahandfulofpassagesinDescartes’

24. FormoreonAristotleandSOM,seetheconcludingpagesofSorabji1974.

25. Infact,thereisanadditionalpremiseneededtomakethistransition.Specifi-cally,oneneedsamonisticaccountoflifeintermsofextendedmatter—i. e.,amechanicalaccountoflife.ThisispreciselywhatPlatonicdualismlackedandmayexplaintheemergenceofSOMonlyintheseventeenthcentury(cf.Tsouna1998fordiscussionofancientphilosophers’viewsregardingSOM).Inanycase,oncemindandbodycanexistseparatefromoneanotherandma-terialexplanationsexistforlivingfunctions,thenmerehumanbodieslooktobearealpossibility.



Indeed,theanalogyimpliesthatknowingabouttheexistenceofothermindsfacesnoobstaclesdistinctfromthoserelatedtoknowingthatsubvisiblebodiesexist.Wearenotimmediatelyawareofeithersub-visibleparticlesorotherminds,yettoDescartesthisdoesnotregisterasaskepticalproblem.Tothecontrary,whathisremarktoMoreindi-cates,quiteinnocently, isthatwecannotimaginehavingimmediateaccesstoothermindsbecausethefactthattheyareothermindsjustmeans that they arenot immediately available tous. It is the samewithsubvisibleparticles.ThewholepointofDescartes’ response toMoreisthattheexistenceofthesethingsandourknowledgeoftheirattributeshasnothingtodowiththeirbeingimmediatelyperceivable.

Butthenhowdoweknowsubvisibleparticlesorothermindsex-ist if theyarenotimmediatelyperceivable?Theanswerwillhavetobethatweinfertheirexistence,and,infact,thisisDescartes’answerwhenever the existence of anything is in question besides the exis-tenceofthe“I”and“God”,bothofwhichcanbeknowntoexistwithouttheneed foran inference.Descartesdoesnotsayanyof this in thepassageaddressedtoMore.ButinasequenceofpassagesrelatedtothefamouswaxexamplefromMeditationTwo,hebeginstogivepre-ciselythisanswer.Descartesevenseemstodrawananalogytoothermindswhenemphasizingthatwedonotordinarily“see”thetruthofanythingwiththesensesalone.Hewrites:

Wesaythatweseethewaxitself,ifitistherebeforeus,notthatwejudgeittobetherefromitscolourorshape;and thismight leadme to concludewithoutmore adothat knowledge of the wax comes from what the eyesees, andnot from the scrutinyof themindalone.Butthen if I lookoutof thewindowandseemencrossingthesquare,asIhappentohavedone,InormallysaythatIseethementhemselves,justasIsaythatIseethewax.YetdoIseeanymorethanhatsandcoatswhichcouldconceal automatons. I judge that they aremen.And sosomethingwhichIthoughtIwasseeingwithmyeyesis

that“beingperceivablebythesenses”comesbeforeextension.28Des-cartes responds by encouraging More to consider whether “beingperceivable”couldeverbeanythingbutan“extrinsicdenomination/denominatio extrinseca”.WiththistechnicaltermofscholasticAristote-lianlogic,allDescartesissayingisthatwhetheragivensubstanceisperceivedisafactaboutperceivers.Itisnotafactaboutthesubstanceitself.Inotherwords,Descartesispointingoutthat“beingperceivable”isarelationalpropertyandassuchitshouldnotbethoughtanessen-tialpropertyofcorporealsubstance.

Forgoodmeasure,Descartesaddsthat“beingperceivable”couldnever be an attribute of the subvisible bodies that we know to ex-ist,because“sensorynervessofinethattheycouldbemovedbythesmallestparticlesofmatterarenomoreintelligibletomethanafac-ultyenablingourmindtosenseorperceiveothermindsimmediately[immediatè]”.29Thefactthatwehavenodifficultyrecognizingthatsuchbodiesexist,however,eventhoughtheyarenotperceivable,ismeantto tip the scales inDescartes’ favor.More is supposed toagree thatsubvisiblebodiesexistandareextendedandthatqualifyingtheirex-istenceorourconceptionof thembycitingtheneedfor “beingper-ceivable”denieswhatweotherwiseunderstandquiteclearly—that,asbodies,theyneedonlytobeextendedtoexist.

SomuchforthetopicunderdiscussionwithMore.ButwhatshouldwemakeofDescartes’ analogybetweenourknowledgeof theexis-tenceofsubvisibleparticlesandourknowledgeofotherminds?Doesourlackofafacultycomparabletosight—whichisgoingproxyforper-ceptionofcorporealsubstanceintheexchangewithMore—implythattheexistenceofothermindsissomehowdoubtful?30Theanswerisno.

28.ATV341,CSMK372.

29.ATV341,CSMK372;modified.

30.Descartes sometimesclaims that theparticular configurationsof impercep-tiblemattercannotbeknownwithabsolutecertainty(e. g.,ATVIIIB327,CSMI289).Tothisextent,ourlackofdirectperceptionmaylooktobeahandicap.Somethingsimilarappliestothecaseofotherminds.Althoughweknowthatsuchmindsexist,ourlackofdirectperceptionentailsthatwedonotalwaysknowwhatsomeoneelseisthinking.



justsuchanaccountinMeditationThree,withthederivationofthe“generalrule”thatwecantrustourclearanddistinctperceptions.33ThisclaimiscarriedfurtherinMeditationFour,wheretheintellectandwillaredescribedasthetwoelementsor“concurrentcauses”injudgment.Welearntherethatourerrors“dependonboththeintellectandthewillsimultaneously”.Specifically,“allthattheintellectdoesistoenablemetoperceivetheideaswhicharesubjectsforpossiblejudgments”.34 By contrast, thewill “simply consists in our ability to do or not dosomething….Itconsistssimplyinthefactthatwhentheintellectputssomethingforwardforaffirmationordenial”,noexternalforcemakesusaffirmordenythecontentbeforeus.35ThepurposeofthetheodicyinMeditationFouristoshowthatitiswithinourpowertocoordinatethe two elements of judgment so as to avoid error.We are respon-sibleforourerroneousbeliefs,becauseweshouldaffirmonlythoseofourideaswecannothelpbutimmediatelyjudgetobetrue,whicharenoneotherthanourclearanddistinctperceptions.Inotherwords,whileallknowledgewillinvolvejudgment,therearesomeideasthatweimmediatelyaffirmandothersthataremediatelyaffirmedafterar-gumentandinferencesfromclearanddistinctperceptions.

Descartes’one-size-fits-allstrategyforsecuringknowledgegavehim good reason not to dowhatwe sawCordemoy doing in sec-tion two—namely, offer a specific response toSOM.ForDescartes,the important distinction among our various knowledge claims isdrawnbetweenthosethatwecanknowimmediately—the“I”(Medi-tationTwo)and“God”(MeditationFive)—andeverythingelse,whichrequiresan inference.Theexistenceofapieceofwax is somethingwemust infer. So, too, an inferencewas required to know that thefiguresweseeinthedistancearegenuinehumanbeings.Recallthat,forCordemoy,theimplicitjustificationforafurthermeditationafterMeditationSixisthatSOMposesauniquechallengedistinctfromthe

33. ATVII35,CSMII24.

34.ATVII56,CSMII39.


infactgraspedsolelybythefacultyofjudgmentwhichisinmymind.31

Just as the “scrutinyof themind” and the “facultyof judgment” areneededtoknowthe“waxitself”,whichsomeclaimthe“eyesees”,the“scrutinyofthemind”isneededtoknowthatwhatwe“see”fromourwindowaremenandnotautomatons.Descartesisnotsuggestingthatseeingmen,andthereforebodieswithminds,requiresaspecialkindofjudgmentorinferenceonourpart.Thereisnotadistinctiveepiste-mologicalproblemherethatmightsupportCordemoy’seffortsintheDiscours. Instead, asGarethMatthews tells uswhen explaining thispassagefromMeditationTwo,to“gettheproblemofothermindsgo-ing[here],onewouldneedtointroducethesuggestionthat,evenifwewentdownintothestreetanddisrobedthosefigures,wecouldnotruleout”thattheyweremachines.32Or,asIlaboredtoputthepointinSectionTwo,onlyiftheliving,functioninghumanbodiesrightinfrontofusbearacontingentrelationtomindscould thispassagedeliverusintoSOM.Whatthe“hatsandcoats”passageillustratesisthatwedeploythepowersofthemindinjudgingandinferringwhatweoth-erwisestillfreelydescribeas“seeing”,eventhough“seeing”isneveramatterofsimpleandimmediatevisualperception.Thus,inanswertothequestionthatinitiallyledusbacktoMediationTwo,weknowsubvisiblebodiesandothermindsexist inprecisely thesameway—throughajudgmentorinference.Thisisthepointofthewaxexampleitself:eveninwhatappearsthesimplestcaseofknowing—thatIseethispieceofwax—thesensesplayarelativelyminorroleascomparedtoour“facultyofjudgment”.

Accepting that the sensesby themselvesdonot justify claims toimmediatelyknowanything, theMeditations stilloweusanaccountofhowtoeffectivelyexerciseourjudgmentsoastoavoidfalsebeliefsabout things likepiecesofwaxandotherminds.Descartesdelivers


32.Matthews1986,142.



reallyisaworld,andthathumanbeingshavebodiesandsoon—sincenosanepersonhaseverseriouslydoubtedthesethings.Thepointisthatinconsideringtheseargu-mentswecometorealizethattheyarenotassolidorastransparent[perspicaus]as theargumentswhich leadustoknowledgeofourownmindsandofGod,sothatthelatterarethemostcertainandevidentofall possible objects of knowledgeforthehumanintellect.38

“[O]urownminds”and“God”areprivilegedinstancesofknowledge.Everythingelse,the“andsoon”referredtoamong“allpossibleobjectsofknowledge”, isclassedtogetherandseparate fromtheprivilegedclass. ButDescartesdoesnotmean to imply that these lesser “pos-sibleobjectsof knowledge” cannotbeprovenor established.Theycanbe, andMeditationSix illustrateshow. ForDescartes, thewayinwhichwecometoknowtheexternalworldexistsisemblematicofhowwecometoknoweverythingoutsideoftheprivilegedclass.Cordemoybelievedotherwise.ForCordemoy,theknowledgethatahumanbodyexistswas,atmost,defeasibleevidenceforthefurtherjudgmentthatothermindsexist.This,however,isaclaimthatDes-cartesimplicitlyandexplicitlyrejects,aswewillseeinsectionsfourandfivebelow.

Tosumupmyclaims to thispoint: Ihavearguedboth thatDes-cartesdoesnotconsiderSOMintheMeditationsandthatthereisnopressingneed thathe should.Further, Ihaveargued thatDescarteshasreasontothinkSOMposesnospecialproblemdistinctfromtheproblemoftheexternalworld.ButtomanyofDescartes’readers,partfiveoftheDiscoursesuggestsadifferentstory.Inparticular,passingtheso-called“languagetest”isoftenreadasananswertoSOM.ThiswasCordemoy’sview,butinthenextsection,IwillshowthatansweringtheskepticwasnotamongDescartes’goalsintheDiscourse andthatnoanswertoSOMistobefoundthere.

38.ATVII15–16,CSMII11;emphasisadded.

problemoftheexternalworld.AccordingtoCordemoy,wecanstopatourknowledgethatbodiesexistandthenaskwhetherthosebodieshaveminds.Descartes’position,however,isthat,withthesoleexcep-tionofourknowledgeofourselvesandGod’snecessaryexistence,wearealwaysinferringordrawingonimplicitargumentswheneverwemovebeyondourownideas.Asaresult,thereisnotadistinctiveepis-temologicalproblemofotherminds,becauseaffirmingonlyourclearanddistinctperceptionsprovidesuseverythingweneedforresolvingtheepistemicdifficultieswithwhichwemayfindourselves.Theman-nerinwhichwecometoknowthatthereareothermindsisthesamemannerinwhichwecometoknowthattheexternalworldexistsandthatthisisapieceofwax.36

Descartesstipulatestothisconclusionwhenhereflectsonhisownepistemologicalsuccess. IntheSynopsistotheMeditations,whichhewroteafterfinishingtherestofthework,Descartesemphasizedthathismainaccomplishmentwasnothisresponsetotheskeptic.Instead,itwasthedivisionimpliedbetween,ontheonehand,knowledgethattheselfandGodexistand,ontheotherhand,knowledgethatanythingelseexists.Theformerareknowntoexistdirectlyorimmediatelybe-causetheyareinstancesofclearanddistinctperception.Knowledgethatanythingelseexistscallsforpremisesandaninferencetoacon-clusion.ReferringspecificallytotheresultsofMeditationSix,wherehefinallyinferstheexistenceof“materialthings”,Descartesclaimedtoproduce“alltheargumentsfromwhichwemayinfer[possit concludi] theexistenceofmaterialthings”.37Yet,hecontinued:

[The]greatbenefitoftheseargumentsisnot,inmyview,that theyprovewhat they establish—namely that there

36.Thefactthatwemustmakeaninferenceinbothcasesdoesnotmeanthetwojudgmentsareexactly thesame.Theonlybasisonwhichsuch judgmentscouldbemade forDescartes,however, is eitherpracticed introspectionorsensory experience. Both are parasitic on our own ideas, and both are in-volvedinourknowledgeoftheexternalworldandotherminds.ThisrobsSOMofitsuniqueness.FredDretskemakespreciselythesamepointinhiseffortto“demote”theproblemofothermindsinDretske1973.

37. ATVII15,CSMII11;modified.



falsifythebeliefthatbeasts(andmachines)havemindsandgenuineintelligence.Thus,thetargetoftheDiscourse isnottheskepticabouttheexistenceofothermindsbuttheoverlycredulouswhoacceptthatliving thingsbesideshumanbeingshavemindsor separate souls.41 UnlessthesubsequentpassagesfromtheDiscoursesuggestotherwise,allweshouldexpecttofindis:(1)aclarificationofthelimitsofma-chineintelligencethatwillallowustoconcludethat(2)weareinthepresenceofameremachine.

TheDiscourse proceedstooffertwo“meansofrecognizing”amind-lessmachine.Firstcomesthe“languagetest”:

We can certainly conceiveof amachine so constructedthat itutterswords,andevenutterswordswhichcorre-spond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs(e. g.ifyoutouchitinonespotitaskswhatyouwantofit,ifyoutouchitinanotheritcriesoutthatyouarehurtingit,andsoon).Butitisnotconceivablethatsuchamachineshouldproducedifferentarrangementsofwordssoastogiveanappropriatelymeaningfulanswertowhateverissaidinitspresence,asthedullestofmencando.42

ReminiscentoftheTuringTest—thoughwiththeverydifferentfocusofdeterminingwhodoesnothaveamind—herethemachineundercon-siderationsimulatesourappearanceandbehaviorsoexactlythatnotonlydoesitlooklikeus,itsoundslikeusanditevenrespondstoexter-nalstimuliinthesameway.43But,saysDescartes,thelatterispossible

41. WesawinthelastsectionthattheAristotelianscholastics,withtheirhylo-morphicviewofnaturalbodies,werecommittedtoanimalshavingamotiveor sensitive soul. Theywere amongDescartes’ likely targets inDiscourse partfive.

42. ATVI56–7,CSMI140.

43. SimilaritiesbetweenDescartes’claimsintheDiscourse andTuring’sfamoussimulation test have been noted and discussed by several scholars. Mostrecently, Darren Abramson has even suggested that Turing was directlyinfluenced by Descartes (Abramson 2011, which also summarizes the lit-erature linkingDescartes andTuring). Iwould note, however, that Turing

4. No SOM in Descartes’ Discourse

Inpartfiveof theDiscourse,Descartes synthesizes the resultsofhisearlywork inphysics.Drawingon the then-unpublishedWorld andTreatise on Man,hepresentshiscosmologyandmechanicalaccountoflifebeforeventuringintothe“differencebetweenoursoulandthatofbeasts[la difference qui est entre nostre ame & celle des bestes]”.39Hewriteslaterinpartfiveofhavingmade

specialeffortstoshow[intheTreatise on Man]thatifanysuch[purelyphysical]machineshadtheorgansandout-wardshapeofamonkeyorofsomeotheranimalthatlacksreason,weshouldhavenomeansofknowing that theydidnotpossessentirelythesamenatureastheseanimals;whereasifanysuchmachinesborearesemblancetoourbodiesandimitatedouractionsascloselyaspossibleforallpracticalpurposes,weshouldstillhave twoverycer-tainmeansofrecognizingthattheywerenotrealmen.40

Therearetwoimportantclaimsworthnoticinginthispassage.First,Descartes ispreparingus to considermachines thatbearonly “a re-semblancetoourbodies”.Hetakesthistomeanthattheyareindistin-guishablefromourbodiesquabodiesfor“allpracticalpurposes”.Byhypothesis,then,thesebodieslackmindsanddifferfromusonlyinthisrespect.Itmaylookasthoughwearebeingaskedtocontemplatetheexistenceofmerehumanbodies,butwearenot.Iexplainwhythisissoinmoredetailbelow,butnotethatDescartesistakingforgrantedthatourphysicalduplicates aremachineswithoutminds, andhe isseekingtoshowwhatmachinescannotdo.Heisabouttodescribethelimitsofanimalandmechanicalintelligence.

Relatedtothisisasecondpoint.Descartesisseekinga“means”ofknowingnotthatamindispresentinagivenbodybutratherthatamindisnotpresentinagivenbody.Inotherwords,heisseekingto

39.ATVI1,CSMI111.

40.ATVI56,CSMI139–40.



However unsatisfying the “language test”may seem if we intro-duceamorerobustmattertheory,intheDiscourse, Descartesproceedsimmediatelytothesecondofhistwotests:

[E]ven thoughsuchmachinesmightdosome thingsaswellaswedothem,orperhapsevenbetter,theywouldinevitably fail in others, which would reveal that theywere acting not through understanding but only fromthedispositionof theirorgans.Forwhereas reason isauniversal instrumentwhich canbeused in all kinds ofsituations,theirorgansneedsomeparticulardispositionforeachparticularaction;henceitismorallyimpossible[moralement impossible]foramachinetohaveenoughdif-ferentorganstomakeitactinallthecontingenciesoflifeinthewayinwhichourreasonmakesusact.46

Thisisthe“adaptabilitytest”.Machinesarequitesuccessfulatperform-ing actions their organs and parts are disposed to perform.Wheremachinesarenotsuccessfulisinperformingactionsoutsideoftheirpre-setordesignedperformance range.Put anotherway:Descartesis remindingus that thearrangementsand rearrangementsoffinitematerialpartshavealimit.Bycontrast,wewhohavemindsareabletoadapt toan infinitenumberofsituationswelloutsideourbodies’designspecifications.ThisisallDescartesmeanswhenhecallsreasona“universalinstrument”incontrasttotheparticularinstrumentswefindinmachines.

IntheDiscourse, Descartesissegregatingmachinelook-alikesfromrealhumanbeingsonthebasisofwhatweknowandcaninferfromtheir observed behavior. By providing ameans of falsifying our be-liefthatthelivingthingsthatlooklikeushaveminds,however,Des-cartesisnotfalsifyingthebeliefthattheyaremerehumanbodies.Heisnotshowingthatcertainbodieshaveminds.NorisheshowingthatthereexistwhatIcalledinsectiontwo“merehumanbodies”.Rather,

46.ATVI56–7,CSMI140.

onlybecauseofspecificchanges“initsorgans”,somethingweknowtobethecasebecause,byhypothesis,wearedealingwithamachine,andamachineismerelyacollectionoforgansandmaterialparts.44Inotherwords,arrangementsofitsmaterialpartsandchangesinthesearrangementsarethesolebasisonwhichtoconceiveofthemachine’sbehavior.Descartesconcludesthattheresemblancebetweenusandthemachineendswheremeaningfullanguageusebegins.45

ItisessentialtoDescartes’firsttestthatmeaningfullanguageusecannot be conceived on the basis of arrangements and rearrange-ments ofmaterial parts alone. The specific limitationsDescartes as-signstomachinesderivefromhisviewthatmatterismereextension,andIthinkheisrightthathismattertheorydoesnotequipustoex-plainmeaningfullanguageuse.ButevenifwedonotacceptDescartes’physicsofextendedmatter,thelanguagetestdrawsontheplausibledistinctionbetween respondingappropriatelybecauseof amaterialchangeandrespondingappropriatelybecauseoneknowswhatanap-propriate response is. Ifwe know that something is amachine,wecanknowthatitisnotcapableofusinglanguageinameaningfulway.Whatmachinescando,atbest,isappeartousemeaningfullanguage.

misunderstandsDescartes—asleastasIinterpretthelatter—andfurtherthattheproblemposedbyMoreinalatelettertoDescartesaboutthemindednessofchildrenposesasmuchaproblemforTuringasitdoesforstandardread-ingsofDescartes’languagetest.

44. Descartesalsobelievedthatahumanbeing’sbehaviorismadepossiblebyitsorgans,althoughtheorgansdonotsufficetoexplaineveryhumanaction.IntheDescription of the Human Body,Descarteswritesthat“thesoulcannotpro-duceanymovementinthebodywithouttheappropriatedispositionofthebodilyorganswhicharerequiredformakingthemovement”.Descartesevengoesontosay,“[W]henallthebodilyorgansareappropriatelydisposedforsomemovement,thebodyhasnoneedofthesoulinordertoproducethatmovement”(ATXI225,CSMI315).

45. Theoriginalityofthisfirsttestwaschallengedbythelate-seventeenth-cen-turyanti-CartesianPierre-DanielHuet:“When[Descartes]…taughtthatmanisdistinguished from theanimalsby speech, thishadalreadybeen taughtbyPythagoras,Plato,Cicero,Quintilian,Galen,andothers”(Huet2003,221).For discussion of the earlymodern interest in language and the languagecapacitiesofanimals,seeSerjeantson2001.



juxtaposingthelettertoMorewithDescartes’Meditationsandhistech-nicaluseoftheLatin complexio inhisdescriptionofour“nature”.Bytheendof this section,wewill see thatDescartescontinued toassumethathumanbodieswillhavemindsuntilprovenotherwise,justashehaddoneintheDiscourse,onlythatinresponsetoMoreheiswillingtoaddthatappealstotheoriginsofourspecies,God’simmutablenatureandthehumanbodyinparticularcananswerSOM.Inotherwords,itisDescartes’beliefthatallhumanbodiesmusthaveminds,whichispreciselywhatCordemoyfailedtoappreciate.

Justpriortotheletterweareinterestedin,DescarteswritesboldlytoMoreaboutthelinkbetweenmindednessandlanguageuse:

…speech is theonlycertainsignof thoughthidden inabody.Allhumanbeingsuseit,howeverstupidandinsanetheymaybe,eventhoughtheymayhavenotongueandorgans of voice; but no animals do. Consequently thiscanbetakenasarealspecificdifferencebetweenhumansandanimals.48

ThisisnotquitethepositionfromtheDiscourse.DescartesisheretellingMorethatweneverencounterahumanbeingwhofailstoshowgenu-inelanguageuse.Morerespondswithadevastatingcounterexample:

Butneitherdo infants, at least formanymonths,whileduring that time they cry, laugh, havefits of anger, etc.Nevertheless,Iassumeyouwouldnotdenythatinfantsarealiveandpossessathinkingsoul.49

Morecutstothequickonthelanguagetestifitistakenasevidencefortheexistenceofotherminds.Ifthe“onlycertainsign”thatamindispresentinabodyisthatthelivingbodyusesspeech,whatarewe

48.ATV278,CSMK366.

49. “Nec infantes ulli, per aliquam multa saltem mensium spatia, quamvis plorent, ride-ant, irascantur &c. Nec diffidis tamen, opinor, quin infantes sint animati, animamque habeant cogitantem”(ATV311).

thedefaultbelief forDescartes(andhisAristoteliancontemporaries,thoughfordifferentreasonsthantheonesgivenintheDiscourse) isthatalllivinghumanbodieshaveminds,andnowhereintheDiscourse doesDescartestakethestepofwonderingwhyhethinksthisorwheth-erhe should.As a result, theDiscourse is hardly a startingpoint forSOM.AsIindicatedwhendiscussingtheopeningpassagetothetwotests, the “meansof recognizing” arebestunderstoodasclarifications ofsomethingwealreadyknow.Thetwotestssimplyofferanillustra-tionofwhatmachinescanandcannotdo.Infact,bothtestsseemtoreducetotheideathatthebehaviorofmachinesandanimalsislimitedtothediversearrangementoftheirmanyparts.Thisistheadvertiseddifferencebetweenoursouls,whicharenotsolimited,andthesoulsofbeasts,which,notbeingimmaterial,arelimitedinjustthisway.47

5. Descartes’ answer to SOM

Having now dispatched the most prominent texts associated withSOMinDescartes’workandshownthattheyfailtoengagewithSOM,IhopetohaveatleastmadeplausiblemysuggestionthatDescartesdoesnotshareCordemoy’sassumptionthatthehumanbodycanexistwithoutamind.Weareleftwithonlyoneadditionalpassagetocon-sider.ItcomesfromthesamelateletterfromDescartestoHenryMorecitedintheprevioussection,althoughthistimetheissueisnotaboutthe attributes of corporeal substance. Rather, the subject under dis-cussionispartfiveoftheDiscourse.Quickly,however,thetopicturnstoSOM.Inthissection,Iwilltracethismovementfromadiscussionofanimalsouls tootherminds,and Iwill reconstructDescartes’an-swertotheversionofSOMpresentedbyMore.Doingsowillrequire

47. AmoretypicaldescriptionofDescartes’finalpositionisthatwehavesoulsandanimalsdonot.However tempting thisdescriptionmaybe—andDes-cartesdoesmostlyequate“soul”with“rationalsoul”or“mind”,therebydeny-ingtheexistenceofanysoulsaveourown(fordiscussion,seeCottingham1992,236;cf.Fowler1999,chapter5)—thequalificationthatanimalslackim-materialorimmortalsoulsisthekeypoint,andonseveraloccasionsoutsideoftheDiscourse, Descartesreferstothematerialsoulsofanimals(e. g.,ATI414–15,CSMK62).Alsorecalltheinitialdescriptionofwhatwearetoldtoexpectfromthetwotests(ATVI1,CSMI111).



Interpretationandreconstructionisrequiredhere.First,wemustshowthatDescartesisnotbeggingthequestion.Second,weneedtoprovideanalternativewaytounderstandthelanguagetestfromtheDiscourse soas toavoidbeing cornered intoaccepting that infantseitheruselanguageorlackminds.TheinterpretationIofferedintheprevious section for those passages inwhichDescartes first intro-ducedthelanguagetestsuggestsawayofsatisfyingthesecondneed.Ifheisnotinterested,intheDiscourse, inshowingwhichbodieshavemindsbutonlywhichbodiesdonot,thenthelanguagetestcannotbeusedinthewaythecorrespondencewithMoresuggests.52Alter-natively,onecouldlikenthecaseofinfantstothatofadultswhoarenotusinglanguageatthepresenttime—e. g.,theyaredaydreaming,theyarenotlistening,nooneistalkingtothem,etc.Insuchcases,wepresumethattheyhaveacapacityorabilitytospeak,andthereforewejudgethattheyhaveminds.Perhapsinthecaseofinfants,Des-cartesistellingusthatinfantshavethepotentialtodeveloptheca-pacitytospeakandthat,byvirtueofthisfact,theymusthaveminds.

Moreinteresting,Ithink,isthepossibilityoffindingadefensibleanswertoSOMbyshowingthatDescartesisnotarguinginacircle.53

bytheexampleof infants is justthatthereisnostrictcorrelationbetweenevident linguistic competence, and ascriptions ofmentality thatDescarteshimselfwouldendorse.Descartes’answerdoesnotaddressthisimplication” (Wilson1999,498).

52.WhenDescarteswritesthatlanguageistheonly“suresign”ofthought,inhisearliercorrespondencewithMore,hepresentsaviewinconsistentwithmyinterpretationoftheDiscourse.ThebeststrategyIcanimaginehereistointerpretDescartes’appeal to“suresigns”as tantamounttoassumingthatgenuinelanguageusecannotoccurwithoutamindbeingpresent.Ergo,ifthisisaninstanceofgenuinelanguageuse,thenwehavea“suresign”thatamindispresent.Thisaffirmstherelationshipbetweengenuinelanguageuseandmindedness,butithardlyeliminatesthedifficultyofdecidingwhetherweareencounteringgenuinelanguageuseinaspecifiedcase.NotwantingtoconfrontthisdifficultycharacterizesDescartes’useof the languagetest,however,andsuggestsagainthatthetestisactuallydirectedtofalsifyingabeliefthatamindispresentinagivenbody.

53.With the sole exception ofAlanGabbey, I knowof no commentatorwhohas taken the response toMore to hold any promise (Gabbey 1990). TheargumentIreconstructisindebtedtoGabbey’swork,althoughwemarshal

tosayofinfants?Howdoweknowthatothermindsexistinthiscase?More’s question challenges Descartes to deal with an instance inwhich,byhypothesis,amindispresentbuthiddenbyvirtueoffailingthelanguagetest.

UnlikeanythingwehaveencounteredsofarinDescartes,thisisanexpressionofSOMpreciselybecauseDescartes ischallengedtoconfirmabelief in theexistenceofothermindsbyarticulating theinferencewemakeinthecourseofformingourbelief.Heisnotcalledupontodescribethegeneralmannerinwhichwecancometoknowanything—aswashistopicinthe Meditations—butratherhemustex-plainspecificallyhowhejustifieshisbeliefintheexistenceofotherminds. Ineffect,More is askinghowDescartesknows that agivenhumanbodyhasamindifwecannotinferanythingonthebasisofitsbehavior.

InrespondingtoMore’sversionofSOM,Descartesisnotconsider-ingaquestionthatheraisedhimself.Heshouldnotbeseenassome-howcreatingSOM.Still,Descartes’answershouldbeinstructive,anditisunfortunatethatitlookstobeanythingbutresponsive:

Infantsareinadifferentcasefromanimals:IshouldnotjudgethatinfantswereendowedwithmindsunlessI saw that they were of the same nature as adults [eiusdem naturae cum adultis];butanimalsneverdeveloptoapointwhereanycertainsignofthoughtcanbedetectedinthem.50

This reply is especially unhelpful because it fails to elaboratewhatDescartes means by “the same nature”. If we interpret having “thesamenature”assharinganessence,whichwouldbethemostnaturalreading,DescartesistellingMorethatinfantsarethesameasadultsandthatthereforetheyhaveminds.Clearlythisbegsthequestionofwhetherinfantshaveminds.51

50.ATV345,CSMK374;emphasisadded.

51. Gabbey 1990 offers a similar analysis, althoughMargaretWilson puts thetroublewithDescartes’answerbest:“TheclaimthatMoremeanttosupport



…forby“nature,”takengenerally,IunderstandonlyGodhimselforthecoordination,institutedbyGod,ofcreatedthings.Iunderstandnothingelsebymynatureinparticu-larthanthetotalityofallthethings[complexionem eorum omnium] bestowed on me by God. (Meditations, Cresstrans.,emphasisadded)

WhereasCottinghamtranslates“eorum omnium”as“totalityofthings”,Cressreserves“totality”for“complexionem”anduses“ofallthethings”asatranslationof“eorum omnium”.Cress’choiceiscertainlybetter,butourcomplexioisnotsimplya“totality”.56

To seewhyCress’ translation is inadequate, consider two seven-teenth-centurytranslationsoftheMeditations intoFrenchandEnglish.Inhis1647Frenchtranslation,Louis-Charlesd’Albert,DucdeLuynes,renders“complexionem”as“complexion”,effectivelypreservingitbyleav-ingituntranslated.WilliamMolyneux’s1680Englishtranslationoptsforthesamestrategy,rendering“complexionem”as“complexion”.57TheprecedentsetbytheseearliertranslationssuggeststhatanappropriateamendmenttotheCottinghamtranslationmaybethefollowing:“bymyownnatureinparticularIunderstandnothingotherthanthecom-plexioofallthosethings[complexionem eorum omnium]bestowedonmebyGod”.Yetthisdoesnothelpmodernreaders,becausewestillneedtoknowwhatour complexioisifnotatotality.

Thesenseof“nature”atstakeinthepassagefromtheMeditations, andinthelettertoMore,istiedtotheresurgenceofGreekandLatinlearningatSalernoduringtheeleventhcentury.58Toresolveinterpreta-

56.DesmondClarke’s translationof theMeditations renders complexio as “com-plex”,whereasMichaelMoriartyrendersitas“combination”(Descartes1998and2008,respectively).Thesemaybebetterchoicesthan“totality”,buttheyaremisleadingforthesamereasonsIamabouttoofferagainst“totality”.

57. AnumberofEnglisheditionsofMolyneux’stranslationcanbefoundonlineatEarlyEnglishBooksOnline,butacopyisalsocontainedintheappendixtoGaukroger2006,237.

58.At least tworeasons toquestionmyparticularemphasisoncomplexio areadduced in note 63 below.My account of the term’s origins relies upon

ThekeytoDescartes’salvationliesinhisclaimthatherecognizedin-fants“wereofthesamenatureasadults[eiusdem naturae cum adultis].”Butwhatconceptionof “nature” isDescartesworkingwithhere? Inordertoanswerthisquestion,weshouldlooktoMeditationVIwhereDescartesdiscussedthevariousmeaningsof“nature”:54

Forifnatureisconsideredinitsgeneralaspect,thenIun-derstandbytheterm[1]nothingotherthanGodhimself,or[2]theorderedsystemofcreatedthingsestablishedbyGod.Andbymyownnature inparticular Iunderstand[3]nothingotherthanthetotalityofthings[complexionem eorum omnium]bestowedonmebyGod.55

Thesenseof“nature”broughttobearinthelettertoMoreissurelythethirdofthesethree,whichistheonlyonethatpertainsdirectlytous.Thekeyphraseis“complexionem eorum omnium”.Andthequestionnowis:Whatisourcomplexio?

There is no explicit answer to this question in the secondary lit-erature related toDescartes, and currentEnglish translationsof theMeditations areof littlehelp,asareseventeenth-century translations,thoughforadifferentreason.Intheexcellentandnowstandardtrans-lationdonebyJohnCottingham,etal.,thatIhavecitedupuntilnow,thewordcomplexionem isleftout,whichdeprivesusofneededguid-ance.DonaldCressattemptsatranslationthatincludescomplexionem:

slightlydifferentevidenceforourclaims.Someof thedifferencesbetweenourviewsarethese:(1)Ithinkbetteroftheprospectsfora“substantialunion”ofmindandbodyinDescartes;(2)Idonotbelieve“divinelight”,intheformof biblical evidence thatGodwants to savehumanbeings—plural—entersintoDescartes’response;and(3)Iendorsethepurelyphysicalcharacterofourcomplexioornature(onthislastdifference,seenote63below).

54. Fordiscussionofthevarioussignificationsof“nature”inthelatescholasticAristoteliantradition,seeDesChene1996,212ff.

55. “…per naturam enim, generaliter spectatam, nihil nunc aliud quam vel Deum ip-sum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam intelligo; nec aliud per naturam meam in particulari, quam complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tribute”(ATVII80,CSMII56).



tradition, andhewould surelyhave expectedhis readers to recog-nizetheimportofcomplexio.59

Toreturn,then,totheissuethatsetusgoinginthecorrespondencewithMore—what“nature”dowesharewithinfants—theansweristhatweshare thesamecomplexio.Weshare thesamebodily constitution.If this is right, then theappropriate follow-up toMore’s initialques-tionis:Howcouldcitingasharedphysicalconstitutionhelpusjudgethatinfantshavemindseventhoughtheydisplaynoapparentsignsofmentality?How,inotherwords,couldthemerepresenceofabody,evenofaveryspecifickind,tellusanythingabouttheexistenceofamind?ThisquestionwillseemallthemorepressingwhenwerecallDescartes’realdistinctionargument,soimportanttoCordemoy’sdis-cussionofSOM,andDescartes’advicetoHenricusRegiusthat“whenwe consider the body alone we perceive nothing in it demandingunionwiththesoul,andnothinginthesoulobligingittobeunitedtothebody”.60DescartesappearstobetellingRegiusthattheexistenceofabodywillimplynothingabouttheexistenceofamind.Sincethemindandbodyarereallydistinctsubstances,howcould identifyingtherightcomplexioserveasaresponsetoMore?

To be as clear as possible about the stakes in answering thesequestions,Descartes’unwillingnesstoengagewithSOM,andhisin-sistence thatwewillnotfindahumanbody,evenan infant’sbody,thatlacksamind,strikeablowagainstthosewhointerprethisprivi-leging of self-knowledge and his dualismbetweenmind and bodyassetting thestage forSOM.All the textualevidencecanvassed to

59. Fora thoroughaccountofDescartes’knowledgeofmedicine, seeAucante2006a.

60.Descartes’ remark toRegiusoccurs ina letter thathasbeen thesubjectofdisputeamongcommentators(ATIII461,CSMK200).DescartesisadvisingRegiushowtodealwithcolleaguesatUtrechtwhomightobjecttoDescartes’philosophy.Asaresult,tosomereaders,itseemsthatDescartesisofferingpracticaladviceabouthowtoavoidcontroversyratherthanaclarificationofhisactualviews.ThefactthatDescartes’adviceisconsistentwiththeposi-tionhetakesagainstMoresuggests,however,thatthelettertoRegiusshouldbetakenasagenuineexpressionofhisconsideredview(forfurtherdiscus-sionandadifferentconclusion,seeChappell1994;cf.Hoffman2009,15–32).

tiveandterminologicaldifficultiescomingfromthenewlydiscoveredworkofGalenandthecompetingtranslationsof,andcommentarieson,hisandAristotle’snaturalphilosophy,professorsatSalernohadtomakedefinitive choices to achieve terminological clarity. Inonecaseinparticular,theyturnedtothePantegni,atranslationdonebyConstantineofAfricaofanextensiveArabicmedicalencyclopediaofthetenthcentury.AsfarasIhavebeenabletodetermine,complexio appearsforthefirsttimeinthePantegni,andtheprofessorsatSalernoembracedittorefertothetemperaments,i. e.,themixturesofquali-ties that characterize the temperaments of species and individuals;itcorresponds to theArabicmizāj, which isa translationofGalen’sGreekcrasis.

Theideabehindtemperamentorcomplexio wasthattheelementsoffire,air,waterandeartheachpossessuniquequalities—fireishotanddry,airishotandmoist,etc.—andthemixtureoftheseelementsresults inamixtureof fundamentalqualities.Sinceallnaturalbod-iesaremixturesofpureelements,knowingthecomplexioofabodyamounts to knowing its natural balance of fundamental qualities.Such knowledgewas central toGalen’s scientificmedicine,whichproceeded on the assumption that the natural balance of primaryqualitieswasthehealthystateofanindividual.Aslateastheseven-teenthcentury,complexioanditsvulgarlanguagederivativesstillcar-riedthesameconnotation,withaclearemphasisonourmixedbodi-lyconstitution.ThefirstdefinitionoftheFrench“complexion”intheDictionnaire de l’Académie française(1694)readsimply,“temperament,constitution du corps”. Similarly, RandleCotgrave’sA Dictionary of French and English Tongues (1632)renderedtheFrenchcomplexion inthefirstinstanceas“Thecomplexion,making,temper,constitutionofthebody.”Thisispersuasiveevidencethatcomplexiostillcarriedaspecificmeaningintheseventeenthcenturystemmingfromitsplacein the medical tradition. Descartes was well acquainted with this

Jacquart1988.



doubts“thatthemindbeginstothinkassoonasitisinfused [infusa est] inthebodyofaninfant”.62

The answer toMore that Descartes left almost entirely undevel-opedreliesonGodhavingprivilegedthehumancomplexioinhisinitialactofcreationontheSixthDay.63Thisactstillresonatesforthesimplereasonthat,inspiteofGod’sinfinitepower,hiswillingneverchang-es.64AsDescartessaysinnumerousplaces,includingThe World,“itiseasytoacceptthatGod…aseveryonemustknow”is“immutable[and]alwaysactsinthesameway”.65Descartestookitasobviousthatitis

62.ATVII246,CSMII171;modifiedandemphasisadded.

63.ThisistheanswerAlanGabbeywantstoendorseaswell.ForGabbey,how-ever, our complexio is ablendingofmaterial elementswith themind.HisreadingissupportedbyDescartes’claimlaterinMeditationSixtolimithisdiscussionofourcomplexiotojust“whatGodhasbestowedonmeasacom-binationofmindandbody[ut composito ex mente & corpore]”(ATVII82,CSMII 57). It arguably alsogains support from theoriginalpassage citing com-plexio—“complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tribute[sic]”—wheretherelativeclausegoeswith“eorum omnium”.ThismakesitseemthatGod’sbestowing “all the things” is emphasized and not the complexio that Godgivesus.Imakethecaseformyinterpretationinthetextabove.RegardlessofwhetherGabbey’s interpretation is to be preferred, there is someprec-edentinAugustineforthegeneralclaimthatGabbeyandIfindDescartesmaking.BothAugustineandDescartestreatknowledgeofourownbodiesandofAdam’sbodyasawayofknowingourspeciesgenerally.Theytheninferthatothermembersofourbiologicalspeciesmusthavemindstoo,justlikewedo(seeMatthews1998and1999foraninterpretationofAugustinealongtheselines).Interestingly,thismakestheargumentakindofargumentbyanalogywherewetreatourselvesorAdamasanexemplarcase.Idonotexplorethispointinthepaper,butitisdiscussedintheessaysbyMatthews.

64.Descartes’accountofGod’sactofcreationandsubsequentactsofwillhaveunusualmodalimplicationsintheso-called“doctrineofeternaltruths”,ac-cordingtowhich,asIunderstandit,anythingcreatedisatmostcontingentlynecessarybutnotnecessarilynecessary(see,e. g.,ATI145–146,CSMK23).God’s immutable nature is necessarily necessary. Sidestepping these con-tentious issues,whatmatters formyargument is that, after the initial actof creation,Descartes insists thatGod’s relationship tohis creationneverchanges.ThiscapturesthenecessityDescartesattributestothelawsofna-turederivingfromGod’simmutablenatureand,Ibelieve,thesamekindofnecessityprecludes thepossiblyofmerehumanbodies (fordiscussionofDescartes’laws,seeGabbey1980;Garber1992,197ff;Gaukroger1995,241ff;andMachamerandMcGuire2009).

65.ATX38,CSMI93.SeealsoATVIIIA61,CSMI240andATI145–146,CSMK23.

thispoint,wherethequestionofthehumanbody’spossibleexistencewithoutamindoughttohavebeenraised,pointstoDescartesnothav-ingtherightconceptionofthehumanbodytogenerateSOM.Earlier,insectiontwo,IarguedthatinordertoaccountfortheemergenceofSOM,itisnotenoughtoadmittoanasymmetrybetweenthewayinwhichIcometoknowIexistasathinkingthingandthewayinwhichIcometoknowyouexist.Cordemoytooktherelevantquestiontobewhetherthebodies“thatareinallthingslikemine”haveminds,andthispresumesaconceptionofhumanbodiesnotdependingonor,bytheirnature, implicatingtheexistenceofamind.SuchaconceptionwaslackingintheAristoteliantraditionaswellasDescartes’answertoMore,andultimatelythesignificanceofourhumancomplexiosuggeststhatDescarteslackssuchaconceptionofthehumanbody.ThisentailsthatDescartes’breakwiththescholasticAristoteliantraditionisnotasstarkinthecaseoflivinghumanbodiesasisnormallythought,apointtowhichIwillreturntoinmyconclusionbelow.

ButnowforDescartes’responsetoMoreandSOM.Thefirstpointto notice about the human complexio is that there is nothing super-naturalaboutit.Wederiveourbodilyconstitutionfromourparents,whoderiveditfromtheirparents,andsoon,asaresultofthenaturalpropagationofmembersofourspecies.61Inthis,wearenodifferentfromanyotherlivingthingnotspontaneouslygenerated.Whatdistin-guishesusisthatourcomplexioisuniquetoourspeciesand,morethanthis,Descartesiscommittedtomembersofourbiologicalspeciesallhavingmindsfor,inthebeginning,Godordainedthatbeingswithourcomplexiowouldbegivenminds.AccordingtoDescartes,itisourcom-plexio that linksustoourforebearsandultimatelytoAdamandEve.Startingwiththemandcontinuingtothepresentday,membersofourspecieshavehadminds(tosaynothingofsin),andDescartesnever

61. That our parents are the proximate cause of our physical existence is inti-matedatATVII49,CSMII34andstatedexplicitlyatATXI253ff.FormoreonDescartes’embryology,where thecausalcontributionofeachparent isemphasized,seeDescartes2000;DesChene2001,32ff.;andAucante2006b.



growfromseedsthantoconsiderhowtheywerecreatedbyGodattheverybeginningoftheworld.66

Once we confirm a shared complexio through natural propagation,whichisamatterofnaturalgrowth“fromseeds”,SOMcanbeputtorest.67Allthisisasimplematterofconfirminganaturalfact,justlikeconfirminganyothernaturalfactaboutthematerialworld.ItisforthisreasonthatDescartesdidnotneedtodowhatCordemoythoughtwasrequired,namelyofferanadditionalprooffortheexistenceofotherminds.Unlesswestillhavedoubtsabout theexistenceof themate-rialworld,wecanproceedtodisposeofSOMinthesamewaywegoaboutdisposingofdoubtsrelatedtotheexistenceofthesky,Earthoranyotherparticularbody.FromDescartes’pointofview,weareen-titledtobeasconfidentabouttheexistenceofothermindsasweareabouttheexistenceofotherhumanbodies.

This reconstruction of Descartes’ response to More avoids bur-deningDescarteswithbeggingthequestionofwhetherinfantshaveminds.Emphasizingoursharedcomplexiois,Ithink,ourbestprospectforsavingDescartes.BeyonditssavinggracesaspartofaresponsetoMore,however,emphasizingourcomplexioisconsistentwithotherofDescartes’ textswherehe indicates that thehumanbodymustexisttogetherwith a humanmind.Consider just one example.68WritingtoRegius,Descartesexplains:“…ifthebodyhasallthedispositionsrequiredtoreceiveasoul,andwithoutwhichitisnotstrictlyahumanbody [& sine quibus non est propriè humanum corpus], then short of amiracleitmustbeunitedtoasoul”.69ThisispreciselywhatDescartesistryingtoconveyinhisreplytoMore.Byvirtueoftheircomplexio, in-

66.ATVIIIA100,CSMI256.

67. Fordiscussionofthenatureof“seeds”duringDescartes’time,includingtheirpurelyphysicalormaterialcharacter,seeRoger1963andHirai2005.Forthepresenceofseeminglyanti-dualistviewsaboutseedsandembryologywithintheearlierNeo-Platonicdualisttradition,seeWilberding2008.

68.SeealsoATIV166–170.

69.ATIII460–461,CSMK200;modified.

partofGod’snatureandamarkofGod’sperfectionthatGodisimmu-table.OnemightsayGodissoperfecthenevermakesamistake,andnevermakingamistake,Godneverhastochangeoralterhisways.Asaresult,wheneverwegainspecificknowledgeofGod’sinitialactofcreation,thesourceofwhichistheBibleinthiscase,wecanusethisknowledgetoinferfromwhatGoddidinthebeginningtowhatGodwillalwayscontinuetodo. InDescartes’physics, theseclaimscometogethertosupportthelawsofnaturethatcontrolmotion,whichisthecontextforthepassagejustcited.InthelettertoMore,God’sim-mutabilityhelpsexplainwhyDescartesfailstoseeaninfant’sbodyasanunthinkingmachineoramerehumanbody.RecallwhathewrotetoMore:“IshouldnotjudgethatinfantswereendowedwithmindsunlessIsawthattheywereofthesamenatureasadults.”MorewantedtoknowabouttheviabilityofthelanguagetestasawaytorespondtoSOM.Descartes,however,wasmoreinterestedinwhattheoriginofabodytellsusaboutitsnature.

To be clear: I am suggesting that our general understanding ofGod’s immutablenaturecoupledwiththe infant’shavingbeennatu-rallypropagatediswhatassuresusthattheinfanthasamind.Doesthe infant have the right complexio connecting it to the progeny ofAdamandEve?AccordingtoDescartes,thisistheonlyquestionweneedtoanswerwhenconfrontedwithSOM,andthereisnospecialepistemologicalchallengelurkinginthisquestion.

Descartes’interestintheoriginofabody,anybody,isaprominentfeatureofhisphysicsgenerallyandnotuniquetothehumanbody.InthePrinciples, hewrites:

AdamandEvewerenotbornasbabiesbutwerecreatedasfullygrownpeople.ThisisthedoctrineoftheChristianfaith,andournaturalreasonconvincesusthatitwasso….Nevertheless, if wewant to understand the nature of…men,itismuchbettertoconsiderhowtheycangradually



“perfectlysolidbody”.72TheintroductionofmotionintothisbodyisaseparateactinThe World,thoughitisalsosaidtobepartofthefirst“actofcreation”ofthesolidbody.ConceivingasolidbodyandthenonlysubsequentlytheintroductionofmotionimpliesthatDescarteswouldacceptthatmotionisnotamongtheessentialpropertiesofacorporeal substancebut, to thecontrary,he repeatedly listsmotionamong themodes of a corporeal substance.73Descartes’ substance-modeontologyisnoteasilyappliedtothecaseof thehumanbodyandthehumanmind,yet,perhaps,somethingsimilarcanbeinferredabout the creationof ahumanbody thathas amind subsequently“infused”intoitbyGod.MyclaimsinthispaperhavegivenusreasontobelievethatwhatappearasconceptuallydistinctactsbyGodmayresult inanessentialcombination.This issuggestivebutobviouslynotdefinitive.

Whatisdefinitive,however,isthatwhenitcomestofindingmerehumanbodies,Descartes’position isnot sodifferent from thescho-lasticAristotelian’sposition.BothDescartesandtheAristotelianstakethe human body to implicate the existence of the human soul. Butwhy,then,arewesooftentold,especiallybyDescarteshimself,thatitwasoneofDescartes’goalsinphysicstoreplacethescholasticviewofbodiesasmatter-formcompositeswithaviewofbodiesasmereextension?74Howdoesthisgoalfitwithhisviewsaboutthehumanbody?Andspecifically, if thehumanbody isnotabody likeall theothers,whatkindofbodyisit?Whatistherelationbetweentheliv-inghumanbody,theembryo’sbodyandthehumancorpse?Doesthephysicistgettostudythehumanbody,orisitreservedforthemeta-physician or, possibly, the physician?75 These questions gain added

72.ATXI33;CSMI91.

73. See,e. g.,ATVIIIB32,CSMI216.

74. See,e. g.,ATXI31ff.,CSMI90ff.

75. Thisquestionrunsparallel tothequestionofwhostudiesthehumansoul,whichweknowmustbeembodied,becauseof theuniquecharacterof itssensory experience.GaryHatfieldhas addressed this parallel questiononseveral occasions, and, if I understand him correctly, his view is that the

fantshave“allofthedispositionsrequiredtoreceiveasoul”.And,bar-ringamiracle,theymusthaveasoulormind.70Inotherwords,humanbodieswithoutamindareimpossiblehumanbodies.

6. Conclusion

Onceourdoubtsabouttheexistenceoftheexternalworldareputtorest,Descartesnevershowsanysignsofbeingwillingtoacceptthatafullyfunctioning,livinghumanbodywillexistwithoutamind.Ourownexistenceasacompositeofmindandbodyispartofapattern,theprecedent forwhichGodestablishedwithAdam.Whether thismeans that the essenceof thehumanbody somehow includes themind forDescartes isapossibility inneedof further study, thoughthereisnospacetopursueithere.71Butthereisaparallelcasethatsuggestsitisapossibility.Intheinitialactofcreationrelatedtocor-porealsubstanceinThe World,DescartesdescribesGodascreatinga70.InanotherlettertoRegius,Descarteshypothesizesthat“ifanangelwerein

ahumanbody,hewouldnothavesensationsaswedo,butwouldsimplyperceivethemotionswhicharecausedbyexternalobjects,andinthiswaywoulddifferfromarealman”(ATIII493,CSMK206).ThismayappeartocontradictwhatIhavetriedtoshowDescartesfindsimpossible—thatahu-manbodycouldexistinthenaturalworldwithoutamind—butthatwouldbeamisreading.First,itoverlooksthefactthat,inthiscase,too,wherethereisahumanbodythereisamind,albeitanangel’smind.Second,therearehistori-calreasonstodoubtwhetheranyonethoughtademonicorangelicpresenceinthehumanbodycouldoccurwithoutahumansoulalsobeingpresent;thedemonicsoultakingpossessionofthehumanbodywasreferredtoasan“as-sistingform[forma assistens]”(fordiscussion,seevanRuler1995,187ff.).Andfinally,onewouldcertainlybejustifiedincallingangelicordemonicposses-sionmiraculous.

71. Differingviewsonthenatureoftheunionbetweenmindandbodyappearin,e. g.,Chappell1994,Hoffman2009,Cottingham1985,Schmaltz1992,Voss1994,Rozemond 1998 and2010, Skirry 2005 andMachamer andMcGuire2009.RegardlessofhowmuchoneemphasizesthatDescartesisadualistoraproponentofquasi-Aristotelianhylomorphism,thefactthatIhavelaboredtobringoutisthatDescartesiscommittedtolivinghumanbodiesalwaysex-istingwithminds.MyownviewonthenatureoftheunionisthatDescartes’positiontendedtowardviewingtheunionasthehumanbodyitself,whichis,ontologicallyspeaking,amorecomplicatedbodythananyoftheothersthatappearinthenaturalworld.Questionsabouttheunionthenbecomeques-tionsabouttheontologyofthehumanbody.Ihopetodefendandelaboratethisviewinfuturework.



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historicalsignificancegiventhatCordemoy,oneofDescartes’earliestandmostinnovativereaders,failedentirelytonoticethattheymightbeworthasking.ForCordemoyand themajorityoffirst-generationCartesians,thehumanbodywasamerehumanbody.Itwasmarkedlydistinct fromthehumanbodyanalyzedasamatter-formcompositeintheAristotelianscholasticstyle.TheseearlyCartesiansunderstoodDescartesasmaintainingthesameposition.However,wenowknowthatDescarteswasnotontheirside.Recognizingasmuch,wecanaddtoourlistofquestions:WhendidDescartes’actualviewfadeintothebackground?IhopethispaperwillencourageotherstoconsiderthisandthepreviousquestionsasItoohavenowbeguntodo.76

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