descartes and the ontology of subjectivity - b.c. flynn

8/12/2019 Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity - B.C. Flynn

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Man and Wold 16:003-023 (1983).1983, Martinus Nijhoff Publishes Pinted in he Nehelands.

DESCARTES AND THE ONTOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY

BERNARDCHARLSFYNN

Empie State Colege, SUNY

"Descartes begins the completion and consummation of Western metaphysics1In the same essay Heidegger writes: "The whole o modern metaphysics takentogether Nietzsche included, maintains itsel within the interpretation o hat isto be and o truth that was prepared by Descartes2 The llowing essay ill bean exploration o these remarks of Heidegger Without riting an history of modernphosophy wl attempt to see in what sense Descartes prepares the completiono onto-theology completion in the Heideggerian sense that it has gone through

the sphere o pregured possibilties3 O course the problem upon hich my relection will focus is Subjectivity. However subectivity will not be conceived of asan idea that occurred to Descartes and which subsequently "inluenced otherthinkers; rather it ll be described as a path which once embarked upon takes usin its own direction. The force o this problematic its poer to lead in one direction will not be vieed as an immanent teleology; rather it will be shown to havemore in common with the frce o a conversation which once begun reses to beended on anythg less than its own terms

In his essay "Eye and Mind4 erleauPonty speaks o looking at a pebble at

the bottom of a pool He tells us that what one sees is not a distorted pebble nor apebble in spite of the water One does not think the water away in order to imaginehat the pebble is "really like apart om the distortions that the ater imposeson one's vision, rather the pebble is seen through the water Analogously in thisessay on Descartes no attempt wll be made to discover the "true Descartes thatis Descartes as seen apart om the tradition o phosophy based upon his texts a tradition of three hundred years o philosophical reection hich separates usom Descartes as the ater separates the pebble om ones eyes It is Descartes asseen through this tradition as founding it and as being made intelligible by itthat l be of interest to us. Our aim il be neither to discover hich of his textsare "sincere and which are "dissembling nor to think through his texts back tohat he meant what he really had in mind. Such a reading ould be a profundly Cartesian reading of Descartes.

What Descartes "had in mind is of less interest than hat became of his textsas they entered in to an intertexuality a network of interwined texts and interpre


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tatins Fr xampl, H. Catn in his bk Oin of Sbjtiity An ayon Dart5 has rigrusy and fairly cnvncingy argud that at last arg sc

tins f Dscarts Mditation of Firt Philoophy wr writtn t bambzth clrics n th Facuty f Thgy at th Srbnn. Taking n psitin n thaccuracy f Catn's argumnt, lt us supps that it is tru. Nvrthss, it is thMditation that Hidggr cals th ndamnta txt f mdrn philsphy. t isthis txt that Hussrl uss in bth ii of Eropan Sin and Tranndntal Philoophy 7 and vidnty in th Cartian Mditation8 nt nly t intrprtDscarts, but t situat his wn phnmnlgica prt in rfrnc t Cartsianism rthrmr, it is prcisy t an asp f th Mdiation which Catnprcivs as a mask th hyprblic dubt that Hussr rlats his wn practic

f th pch Hg maks xtnsiv us f th Mditation in his Ltr on thHitory of Philoophy9 and it is t thMditation that Kant turns in itiqof Pr Raon 10 On culd g n Th pint is nt t dny th histrica and bi-graphica intrst f th typ f argumnt mad by Catn, it is simply this If it isth cas, as Catn maintains, that th philsphy which Dscarts blivd, had inmind," was a frm f mtaphysical matriaism with a bit f subctivity thrwn in(quit inchrntly accrding t Catn1 ); thn n must ask, which is th ralCartsianism, is it th psitin which ntrd int th intrtxuality f Wstrnthught, a psitin which MrauPnty has argud in Phnomnolo ofPrtion2 has bcm an institutin in th Wst, r is it th n that Dscarts

scrtly bivd, vn n th assumptin that n cud nd ut what h blivd.Fr ur argumnt it must b th frmr As Drrida has shwn,13 a txt vn at thmmnt f its inscriptin scaps th authrity f its authr. A txt is nt a ciphrthrugh which n culd arriv at what th authr mans t say (oloir dir) tsmaning is gnratd thrugh its ratinship t thr txts. Th maning f a txtis nt nly cmpatibl with th absnc f its authr, it dmands it.

In gnral, this ssay wl pps itsf t any kind f hrmnutical ntrpriswhich nvisins th task f intrprtatin as bing th prductin f chrnc.This viw f intrprtatin attmpts t rad Cartsian phlsphy as a chrnt

statmnt f what Dscarts might hav raly blivd ths apparnt" cntradic-tins ar rslvd in th drctin f chrnc, f what n prsn Dscarts cud hav bivd withut ntrtaining blatant cntradictins Th chrncy fmind bcms a mdl fr th chrncy f th txt. In his Arhaoloy of Knowld Fucault dscribs this hrmnutical styl:

Th histry f idas usually crdits th discurs that it analyzs with c-hrnc. If it happns t ntc an rrguarty in th us wrds, svraincmpatib prpsitins, a st f manings that d nt adust t n an-thr, cncpts that cannt b systmatizd tgthr, thn it rgards it as

its duty t fnd, at a dpr lv, a princip f chsin that rganizs thdiscurs and rstrs t it its hiddn uty. This law f chrnc is ahuristic rul a prcdura bligatin, ast a mra cnstraint f r-sarch nt t multiply cntradictins uslssy ..14


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Aalyss mst sppress ctradct as best t ca. I ppst t ts ermeetc etc calt presets a type f aalyss wc ctradcts

are eter appearaces t be vercme r secret prcples t be cveredTey are bjects t be descrbed fr temselves wtt ay attempt beg madet dscver fm wat pt f vew tey ca be dsspated . .15 Wle ts essaymaes cmmtmet t eter te calta ccept f a arcaelgy fwledge wt ts sccessve bt radcally dsjctve pistm r t te geealgcal aalyss as elabrated History o[ Sxality 16 t eteless s agreemet wt calt ccerg te treatmet f ctradct Or aalysswll t sress ctradcts bt exacerbate tem t t be sre becase ebeleves Descartes t ave bee a partclarly rratal pers w csstetlyeld ctradctry psts bt becase r terest s t te ces fDescartes md bt te dspers mltplcty ad ctradcts f s textDescartes' texts sall be vewed less as a testamet f s tgts ta as a placebrstlg wt tess a place were prblems verw ad eve ctradct sstated tets

Descartes bega s plspcal eterprse amdst te debrs f late Sclastcplspy. Te degeerat f Sclastcsm t dalectcs cceved f as a setf lgcal gaes reaced tat pt at wc t let tself t te pardy f Erasmsw wrte s Enomim moria

Cld tere be severa! ssps f Crst? Is te prpst pssble tatGd te ater ates te S? Mgt Gd t ave als take te frm fa wma r ave passed t te devl? Mgt He t als ave appeared te rm f a ass r f a pmp? I wat maer wld te pmpave ?reaced ad wrgt mracles ad w wld t ave bee crced?

Hegel caracterzed te plspy f te late Mddle Ages terms f te cm-plete dsct f lgc r dalectc m ccrete ctet ad by ts lmtedbarbars" extes t everytg ad aytg ma r dve: Regardg

te apple Paradse te derstadg ass t wat speces f apple t belged 18As a respse t sc lgcal gaes te cmedy f te ger acy as Erasmsrerred t t Septcsm arse It arse tw frms. Te st type f septcsmwc Pp as dscssed s History o[ Skptiism From Erasms toDsarts9 wse crse wll t be develped ay detal ere prpsedreased argmets fr te ltat f te ma tellect It rcestrated tselfprmarly terms f a rebrt f Gree septcsm eter ts Academc r Pyr-ra rm Academc septcsm ssted te ttal pssblty f wledge wle Pyrra septcsm arged r a essetally agstc pst It

based ts agstc cclss te argmets f Sexts Emprcs wse wrsresrced sxteetcetry Erpe I ts mst smpled frm Pyrraseptcsm cssts f te argmet tat every statemet mag a cla t trtwld ave t satsfy a crter by wc trt cld be dstgsed fm lsty.If ts crter were stated as a trt t s tre tat e ca dstgs te tre


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om the lse by such and such qualities, etc - it would also have to eet a criterion by wich its truth could be distinguished om flsity. Thus an innite re

gress is opened indicating the incapacity of the human mind to nd a criterion bywhich to separate the true om the lse, a criteron which would not in its turnrequire a rther justication For this rm of skepticism certainty the ustication of a truth claim by a criterion is asserted as a necessay condition fortruth but in ct the possibility of attaining this certainty is denied

The second type of skepticis arse as a response of piety to the "barbarousor even blasphemous anipulation of divinely revealed truth Clealy this piousskepticis did not extend to the truts of religion but only to the farftchedteological speculations that erected themselves on the basis of scripture and thetraditional teachngs of the Church This type of skepticism did not advance argents to support the incapacity of the huan mind to arve at truth. t wasrather a moral response, a protest to the depth of lunacy into which late Scholasticis had llen, or indeed once loc becae completely detached om contentquite literaly anything could be said The theological sopistication itself whicherected barbarous speculations, was already, without relationship to the veracityof such speculations, an aont to Chistian piety This pious skepticism did notoppose to Scholasticism a theory according to which the mind would be llsuitedfor theological speculations; rater it cononted Scholasticism with a bas Christian attitude of belief in the scripture and the traditional teachings of the Church

Erasus was willing to adit that he could not te with certainty what wastru but he was per o sequitur willing to accept the decisions of theChurch Since he was unable to distingish truth om falsehood witcertitude, he wanted to let the institution that had been making this istinction for centuries take the responsiblity 20

What is of nterest in this pious frm of skepticism is that it did not erectcertainty as a criterion fr belief it was possible to believe without certainty certain type of skepticism was not incompatible with belief The justicationof one's beief, if one can even use this language, consisted not in an experience ofcertaty but i the inherence in a tradition in a "or of li t was throughones relationship to tradition an institutions the Church that ones salvationwas insure This skeptical credulity was not based on a subective experience.or it, to believe was not to have a subjective experience of what one beievedrather it was to live n the truth to participate in institutions whose truth was notof the predica tive order The teachings of the Church were not true because thereexisted somewhere an intricate arguent by which a propositions could be justied or proven They were true because the Church was true that is because it

was created by God Truth was neither the evidence of selfcertainty, nor a qualityof a proposition Truth was a quality of beng in terms of its relationship to God,which is to say its character as created by God The teachings of the councils ofthe Church were true because it was the true Church which promulgated themReaity being was true in its relationship to God Truth was not ndamentaly a


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character f rsitins but f beng; hwever nt as it was fr the Grees, frwhm accrding t Heidegger, trut is aehe the uncncealment f Being.

r the medievals, truth as a transcendental uality f being. Being was true inthat it was resent t the Divine Intellect As Heidegger writes What is truly realis Gd"2 f what was really true was Gd and if Gd in the ersn f Jesus instituted a Church which cmes t have a traditin and a histry, then ne can seethat the truth f nes ith is nt funded n an eerience f certainty thusseticism and belief wuld nt be necessarily mutually eclusive.

Nevertheless if this belief divrced rm certainty were t cntinue, it wuld benecessary that the rm f f t which it was attached wuld cntinue t eist ina mre r less untrubled and unselfcnscius manner This, hwever, was nt tbe the fte f either the institutin f the medieval Church r f the ech inwhich the truth f being was given as created beng that ech f metahysicsin which, accrding t Heidegger the relatin f being t Being was cncetualizedas the relatinshi f creature t Creatr. The die as already cast when Lutherculd write:

. . saw that the Thst inins, whether they be arved by e r bycuncil, remain inins and d nt becme articles f fith, even if an angelm heaven shuld decide therwise r that which is asserted withut theauthrity f Scriture r f rven revelatin may be held as an inin,

but there is n bligatin t beeve it."22t was nt simly the sitin f the Thmists that had becme inins," sincein anther wr Luther wrte I ut n trust in the unsurted authrity f thePe r f cuncils, since it is lan that they have ften erred and ften cntra-dicted themselves."2 In ct all f the traditinal teachings f the Church had tbe submitted t the law f cntradictin and if they were fund lacing in thisresect, r nt based n rven revelatins," they wuld becme inins."But ne must as, what is an inin? It is a rsitin, a belief, smething in"smenes mind fr which there is n certain edece. r Luther, it is the -

sitin which is rerly true r flse, and the lace f the rsitin and thus ftruth and flsity is the mind subectivity Indeed Heidegger has argued that lngbefre Luther Weste hilshy had reared the sitin accrding t whichtruth is the crrectness f a rsitin whse lace is in the subject. In his essayPlat's Dctrine f Tru"24 Heidegger situates the tung nt in the histryf the cncet f Truth aehea uncncealment t crrectness agreementf an idea wit its bect adeuatin f ntellect and thng in the allegry fthe cave in Plat's Repubc 25

It is in the ech in which Luther wrte that the idea f truth as crrectness

became elicit What des Luther rse as evidence? Pin writes: Luther setfth s new critern f religius nwledge, that what cnscience is cmelledt believe n reading Scriture is true."26 Evidence here is subjective certainty,but this subectivity is hrased in a language f cmulsin an evdential rsitin is a truth t which ne is cmelled t give accent. Luther must be taen uite


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literaly when he states at the Diet of Worms: I cao and will not recant anything, fr to act against or conscience is neither sa fr s nor ope o us. On this

take my stand ca do no other God hep me men emphasis ne] "27 Thisnew sphere of nwardness - of sbjectivity represented, in relationship to theathority and power of the Chrch, a realm of absolte eedom. The new Christianaone with his Bible constitted a sphere om which all external complsion wasexclded Bt this nwardness did not constitte a sphere n which being andknowedge coincide, since inner persasion - conscience - was a complsion,exercised by God throgh grace, to believe Grace existed as an opacity withinthe heart of sbjectivity, a moment of compsion within the realm of eedomA absolte ct remained within the heart of sbjectivity namely that one hadbeen chosen by God to have grace and therere cold read the scriptre correctlyLther wrote against Erasms The Hoy Ghost is not a Skeptic and He has notinscribed in or hearts ncertain opinins, bt rather, armations of the strongestsort gainst Erasms skeptical credity Lther insisted on certainty, an inward certainty - a compsion to believe Cavin contined and in a certain senseextended Lthers doctrine In the Isues of he Chsa Rego he worte:

Sch, then, is a conviction that reqres no reasons sch a knowledge withwhich the best reason agrees - in which the mind trly reposes more secrelyand constanty than in any reasons sch, naly a feeg that can be bo

only of heavenly revelation speak of nong other than wha each beeeexpeeces wh hmsef - thogh my words fal fr beneath a jst explanation of the matter [ emphasis mine] 9

It wold be possible to develop a nmber of similarities between the theoogical positions whch gave rise to Protestantism and the phiosophical position ofDescartes They both wished to annl the power of tradition: Lther by disrptingthe tradition of the Chrch as a so rce of reigios knowedge, Descartes by thedobt which he beieved destroyed the power of his former edcation and all frmsof historica inherence They both insisted on certainty as a criterion of trth,

both attacked skepticism - sacred and prone Nevertheless, it is not these simiarities that wil be particlarly emphasized in this essay It is rather the presence ofthe Divine withn sbjectivity that will be stressed Indeed r Lther, the sbjectvity of the believer was radicaly nite - ct o om tradition and ecclesiastical nstittions, aone with the Bible; nonetheless, it was the place where theDvine spoke, where God compeled beief It was God Himsef who eicited omthe elect the correct reading of he texts of scriptre Bt one might ask, if theelects beef his eperience of himself believing, is compeled by God, in whatsense is it his? In this doctrine is there not a tendency for the sbjectivity, at least

the sbjectivity of the eect, to become innite or to be inhabited by God? ForDescartes as wel, certainty is what one cannot help bt believe Nevertheless thereis a dfrence between them; sing the angage of another centry, one cold saythat thers conception of certainty psychologstic - certainty is the fctalinability t do anything other than believe This ctal inability to disbelieve is


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npd by Lu as a si of lcon by God. Hussl caaczd concp of cany in Mils ogc as psycologsc in a smla mann on coud

cal Lus concp of cany ologsic sinc im Dvn and mundan a bo lodgd wn subciviy On o and, aoug Ds-cas dos no manain suc an aional viw concnng Divn cion, andaoug is concp of cainy canno b cald psycologsc o o-logsic, nonlss as is ssay will dmonsa la, f m also bcaus of na convgnc of s concpion of subcviy and God, Dvn ulimaly sids wn a of subcivy.

Subcviy bon in svnn cnuy mus b oug bo in is ds-uncon om and is connuiy wi adiion of Wsn piosopy. ny con-cpion of pnnial plosopy wic viws divs piosops as diffnsponss o sam poblms s of poblms bng us an nvaian mus b cd. Poblms as wll as soluions mus b sn as aking placwin a cain opnnss of Bing and y wll no b inligbl ousd of conguaion T claim a Dscas plosopy nias a gnun novymig b callngd by concivng of Casianism as a spons o bon skpi-csm indd mpoanc of sufcng of xs of Sxus Empiicusas alady bn indicad Nvlss ou posion wil b a bi ofan ins in Gk skpicsm n svnn cnuy is no in fac a nac-mn of Gk skpcism T skpicism of svnn cnuy mans som-

ng din an i dd in Gc. Hidgg agus in T Ag of WoldPcu a Gk sopsm, and on coud nclud also Gk skpcism waspossbl ony wn a wold w Tu was vald as aehea unconcal-mn H connds a wn Poagoas sas a ac man s masu ofall ngs wa mans is a Bing vals slf diffny f ac man avlaon would b u ac man bu no communicabl o o mn Tconsqunc of is is a ac man would b pofoundly spaad om vyo man bu no spaad fom u of Bng Tis is qu a dinma om posiing possbliy a ac man s su up w is own -

psnaons and opinions, non of wic cospond o anyng o anmsvs. T modn pobm a psnaions in ou subciviymig no cospond o anying o an mslvs. Acknowldging foc of is yp of skpicism, Kan makd a scandal of pilosopy iss nabiy o pov xisnc of an ousd wold T aiss possibiy of bing sandd in subcvsm subciv idaism bu can bno possibiy of subciv daism bf advn of subc.

A subcvism s impossibl n Gk sopsm, f man can nv bsubecum; canno bcom subecum bcaus Bing s psncingand u is unconcalmn30

T advn of subciviy is iducibl o pCasian posopy Nonlss i wl b agud a by a sis of dsplacmns and ansposiions Dscas


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thoht contines the histor of metaphsics conceived of as ontotheoo I ctas was stated above Descartes not on contines bt bens the competion and

consmation of Western metaphsics" - with Descartes man becomes Sbject Inhs ch Af Tuh he has Edoxs cear the voice of the athor sa:We mst commence with the hman so becase a or knowede depends onit "31 It is Descartes reections on the so" that mst be investiated. In hisMdos as is wel known he arrives at the thnkin sef b a process of niversa dobt This dobt has staes At the beinnin the data of the senses is sbjectedto dobt b means of the principe that one sha not trst entire to an thinb which we have once been deceived"32 In ct one mst treat as se anthinthat emanates om a sorce which has once deceived s Isions madness and

dreams a attest to the ct that there are instances in which what one perceives ormore proper what one thinks one perceives is not there n trth In order torender dbios the trths of mathematics which seem to be tre even if one is mador dreamn Descartes evokes the hpothesis of an e enis as power as odwho has empoed his whoe eneries in deceivin me "33 iven this hpothesiseven the cacations of arithmetic and eometr are dbios since the ev enispower to deceive is nnite In the Second Meditation Descartes asks hsefwhether he has b his strate of dobt - his extravaant hpothesis of an evenis - perhaps conviced hsef that he does not exist?

Not at a of a sret I msef did exist since I persaded msef of somethn (or mere becase I thoht of somethin) Bt there is soe deceiveror other ver power and ver cnnn who ever empos his inenitin deceivn me Then withot dobt I exist aso if he deceives me and eth deceive me as mch as he w he can never case me to be nothin soon as I think that I am somethn So that after havin reected we andcarel examned al thns we mst come to the denite concsion thatthis proposition I am I exst is necessarl tre each time that I prononceit or that I menta conceive it34

Ths Descartes discovers the Archedean point b which with his ever hismethod he wi move the word Bt one mst ask in what does the certain ofthe coto consist The idea that it is a soistic nrence of the sort "lthn that thnk are I thnk therere I am" mst be rejected snce the majorpremise wod simp be asserted and therefre the concsion wod remainprobematic. Rather it mst be ared that the certaint of the coito rests on theabsote correspondence of bein and thoht M existence is absote certaineach tme that I prononce it or that menta conceive it. The coito is thatpace where ben and thoht concide a pace where to exist and to think I existis the same thn Descartes extends this certant to what miht be caed sin

an anachronistic phrase the whoe phenomena ed consdered as a ed of representations in" consciosess In the Second editation he writes


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ine in truth ee lght hear noie fel heat But it will be aid thatthee phenomena are fle and that am dreaming Let it be o till it i atleat uite ertain that it eem to me that ee light that hear noie andthat el heat hat annot be fle properly peaking it i what i in mealed elng and ued in thi preie ene that i no other thing thanthinkng

Apropo to the thinking ubjet and all it repreentation one an apply - with athoroughly altered meanng the line of Parmenide For thinking and Being arethe ame he ondition fr doubt and unertainty i the nononidene ofthought and being the ontingeny whih ituate itelf between to be and tobe thought A ubjet who exit without thi pae of ontingeny of nonoinidene i a ubjet who exit abolutely In the etion of the Ideas: /oduco o e Pheomeoo36 entitled the hypothetial detrution of thewod Huerl how that the Ego and al it ntentional objet withtand thedetrution of the ontingent world; he all thi mode of being proper to the Egoabolute In hi Lecues o he Hsoy of Phosophy Hegel write of Dearteogito he thinkng ubjet a the imple immediay of beingathomewithme ithe very ame thing a what i alled Being and it i quite eay to pereive thiidentty 7 In the thinking ubjet there i an identity between the thought that exit and the t that ext

Havng etablhed the etene of the thkg elf Dearte then preent

proof fr the exitene of God thee proof are wel known One of them i the apoteriori argument for God extene: om the ft that have an idea of Godin my mind - an idea having more ormal reaity than have objetive reality Dearte nvoking what will later be aled the prinipe of uient reaon onlude that annot be the aue of thi idea that it requre a aue with a muhformal ralty a the idea ha objetive realty thu God Himelf Another proofrepeat St Anelm argument fr God exitene t proeed a priori from theidea of a mot perfet being the exitene of uh a beg folow beaue extenei a perfetion and a mot innitely) peret being mut have all perftion in

luding exitene thu God exit Hegel note that what i arrived at n the onluion of both the a poteror and the a priori argument i a beng God the ideaof whih involve exitene He write:

In the orm of God no other oneption i thu here given than that ontained n Cogo ego sum wheren Beng and thought are ineparablybound up though now n the for of a oneption whih poe withnme he whole ontent of thi oneption the Almighty llwie et areprediate whih do not make ther appearane untl later the ontent imply the ontent of the Idea bound up with exitene8

What i extremely triking n the Medaos and in Hegel reetion on themi that fr Dearte the denition of the thkng ubjet and the denition ofGod onverge Of oure thi i not to ugget for a moment that Dearte wihedto identify the thinkng ubjet and God On the ontrary Dearte goe to great


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lengths t shw tht the thinking sel is nite In ct he rgues the hird Medidtin tht i I culd hve rduced the ide n innitel erct being, I wuld

nt suer m dubt r m the grdul ccumultin knwledge - bth indictins limited knwledge nd I wuld in ct be erect, llknwing, etc,this hwever is nt the cse, thus I m nite subject. But let us recll Hegel'scntentin tht wht rell fllws m this rgument is siml the cntent the Ide bund u with existence nd tht the Almight, Allwise, etc .d ntmke their ernce until lter. Wht escrtes hs shwn b his ssertin cntingenc nd limittin is tht the thinking subject is nt the JudehristinGd. Indeed s Pscl hs inted ut, the Gd the hlshers is nt the Gd Abrhm, Isc, nd Jb escrtes' Gd is siml being in whm being ndthught cincide, n innite being. One ntes here n equivc! sense the wrdGd As ws stted bve, Heidegger hs shwn tht the reltinshi beings tBeing in the Middle Ages ws reltinshi cretures t retr. he rimrnctin escrtes' Gd, hwever, is nt t hve creted the wrld. In LeMode s escrtes tells us in the Dscourse39 he shrtcircuits the rblem thecretin the wrld b rsing t exlin the rigin nd nctining htheticl wrld nt necessril the rel wrld in which we live. Althugh escrtesends b sing dctrine cntinuus cretin it seems cler tht the rimrrle Gd is nt t crete the universe but t gurntee the vercit urknwledge. Gd hs been dislced m beng the ruth r Being things nd

hs becme the gurntr the certint the truth subjectivitescrtes' texts cn be viewed s the lce tensins nd sitins tht

rnished the mtr rce mdern hlsh he mst ndmentl sitin is tht between nite nd innite - cntingent nd bslute In his imrtntrticle n Husserl, Husserl's ncet the Abslute' , Rudl Behm mkes distinctin between tw senses the bslute He writes, he bslute methsics is tht which exists bslutel (das absou Seede) Phenmenlg'sbslute is tht which is bslutel given. Behm cntends tht Husserl, theuthr the Caesa Medaos distinguishes between, n the ne hnd, b

slute givenness - the te exerience ened b the henmenlgicl epochnd intrduced, s ws nted bve, b the hthesis the destructin thetrnscendent wrld which leves intct the trnscendentl eg nd its entire eld exeriences - nd, n the ther hnd being whse existence is bslute Itculd be climed tht the rst sense the bslute is rduced b certin methdlgicl ertins, nd tkes n sitin cncerning existence s it might be rtfm the methdlgicl rcedures the henmenlgicl reductin I thiswere the nl sense in which Husserl emled the cncet the bslute, thenthere wuld be n idelism in his thught, in ct there wuld be n methsicsr Fs hosophy Behm rges eectivel tht this is nt the cse nd tht

inct the being tht is given t itsel bslutel - trnscendentl subectivit -cmes ls t be thuht s the being which exists bslutel thus situting Husserls n bslute idelist Fr ur rgument, it is nt the rle tht this distinctinls in Husserl's thught which is interest, but rther the distinctin itsel.


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A Hegel h ned f Dece he cg nd Gd he uly he medenn beng n whm de nd exence cncde. Of cue Dece de

n deny hnkng ubec nd Gd nce hee beng whch e ndeed bhbue e blue n dffeen wy. he c bue n he ene h exence en elf bluely whu ny cnngency neenng beween exence nd hu f elf ndubbl nd cen. On he he hndGd' exence blue n he ene h nhng m . Gd cnn n be. Dece' Gd n ny de h wn exence nd elfknwedge pecludecnngency bu h elnp wh ll beng l peclude ny cnngency nhe ene h eeyhng h ex ex n ue f h cnnuu cenhu nhng mply hee gen. (One cn ee h hee ene n whchf Dece Gd eeyhng cnngen becue f Dece he lw f nuend een f lgc nd mhemc ex hugh n c f Gd wll whch cnnbu be clled by by n he ene h hey fllw fm nhng nceGd n een cnned by he lw f lgc T h nl unee Sp-nz wl ke ng becn) Behm gue h n pble f Hue keep hee w ene f he blue epe h he bluey elfgen becme he bluely exng We mgh k f h epn pble f Dece. O pehp nce cenly n u nenn clm h Decehmef ee becme n blue de bee k hw Dece' cncep-ul eld he cncepul feld he bequehed mden phphy ucued

n em f he elnhp beween hee w blue n emkbleh he w ge del Hegel nd Huel bh clm dce n Decehugh enn whch led hem he wn pn Huel emked hphenmenlgcl dem w he ece lngng mden phlphy. een le kng h he l ge Cen JenPul Se cmmed hew phphy f dcl nude cncepn f he ued ubec n cc f Huel delm fm he ey begnnng nnehele ccdng MeeuPny n e Vbe and he nbe41 end up wh cncepn fn blue ubec ubec whch lhugh de n cnue cee

beng ll he me cexene wh beng pene de uo ( hghludehnkng) beng eeywhee nd nwheen he fwng pge wl be gued h he cncep f ubecy fm

bh n he ex f Dece nheeny lnked eculzed en f heChn Gd Subecy wl hw elf cncep whch e hed nude nd ece Dne u u uly chee n he phphy f Hegel. Wh ubecy Dece Explcly Dece pek f ubecy he knd f beng h m whch ng wh he he knd f beng exended me n mn nd Gd exhu he ype f beng h ex.

Accdng Hedegge edng f Dece ubecy n mply ne ype beng mng he he den nl new epch f Beng h need elnhp beween Beng nd beng new eln beween beng ndhe hzn ed n whch cn ppe beng n he Mddle Age he el-nhp beween beng nd Beng w eln f ceue Ce be w


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Ony here thnkng thnks tsef s t absote atheata e a takngognzane of that hh e aready have Insor as thnkng and ostngdirets tsef toard tsef t nds the foong: hatever an n ateversense anything ay be asserted the assertng and thnkng s aays an /thnk hnkng s aays an / thk ego oo heren es I a su.Cogo sum - ths s the hghest ertanty yng edatey in the rooston as sh In I ost the I as the ostor s o and reosted as thathh s aready resent as hat s he beng of hat s s deterned otof the I a as the ertanty of the ostng.

Seen o ths ont of ve Desartes aoshent s not the transforatonof ontoogy nto esteoogy as Rhard Rorty ontends hereby the robeat of reresentaton beoes an esteooga robe nash as the on

tooga robeat hh sbtends t s oted aay As an esteoogasse the robeat of reresentaton od be osed n the ong annerf hat the sbjet the ego has ts nd s a reresentaton of the eterorord - a reresentaton hh at east n soe resets ams to orresond to

the eteror ord - then the robe no dobt nsobe resents tsef as anattet to nd soe ay to jstfy ths aeged orresondene. he robes nsobe bease there s no oon easre beteen the nteror reresentaton and the eteror ord hh t aegedy reresents. Veed o thsersetve the hstory of odern hosohy s a hrone of the varos attets

to dsover a soton to ths robe or to ve thot a soton or to dssovethe robe Fro or ont of ve ths readng s not fse the esteoogantentons of a Kant or a Hme are ndbtabe Rather e od say that t s aetahysa readng of a etahysa tet

What s fr Hedegger a etahysa tet or a etahysa readng of a tetOn the one hand etahyss s generated aordng to h by the ontoogadferene on the other hand etahyss s dened by hm n ters of ts nabty to thnk the ontooga dfferene. o t t sy the ontooga dfrene s the derene beteen bengs and Beng At ths ont one hoes that

ts no onger neessary to dend Hedegger aganst harges of ysts regos

obsrants et Indeed Beng even th a ata etter s not God or the objet of soe obsre ysta ntton granted ony to those ho ve n the BakForest Beng r Hedegger s the horzon n hh bengs - thngs ersonsanimas sybos et - reve theseves as thngs ersons anmas syboset In the reedng ages e have soken of objets and egos as bengs and reresentaton as ther Being hs Beng as veed as the roess by hh objetsand egos are osed as bengs. he noton of Beng s n no ay ntrnsay onneted to ysts or regon he ontooga dfferene s the dfferene beteen the Beng roess and the bengs hh are osed as bengs n ths roess

Hedegger onsders the ontooga derene as onstttve of etahyssroery soaed hie at the same tme etahyss s onsttted by the foretness of Beng and aso by the frgetness of the ontooga dfferene IfBeng the Beng roess Beng as horzon - s forgotten then the ontooga


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phy the Discourse i the Meditations, thi diilliomet with cotittedciece led Decrte to the el oe dy ormed the reoltio o lo

mig myel obect o tdy49 Th ed the rt prt o the Discourse;prt two begi i eplicitly tobiogrphicl mer w i Germy towhich cotry hd bee ttrcted by the wr which re ot yet t ed50t itte Decrte i time d plce it tee ddree cotemporry rederWht llow i ttempt to give tobiogrphicl dicore. t begi byelbortig chroicle o the deciio mde the oitio te by Decrte deciio d poitio which ltmtely will detroy the very poibility otobiogrphicl dicore. A tobiogrphy i mog other thig hitoryo the e g the circmtce i which od myel how trormedthee circmtce d w trormed by them etc The poitio te byDecrte i prt two o the Discourse re vrio trtegie by which the diegge itel rom ll rm o hitoricl iherece Fr om beg recotrctio o the hitory o the i i rther chroicle o the proce by whichthe i dehitoricized

Decrte beg hi chroicle by tellig o hi preerece or thig pledby oe m.

Oe o the rt o the coidertio tht occrred to me w tht there ivery ote le perctio i wor compoed o ever portio d cr-

ried ot by the hd o vrio mter th i thoe i which oe -dividl loe h wored the me wy lo thoe ciet citie whichorigily mere villge hve become in the process of time gret tow relly bdly cotrcted i comprio with thoe which re reglrly lidot o pli by rveyor who i ree to llow hi ow ide mphimie]51

Which i to y tht Decrte d more perctio i citie which rchitectrllyhve o hitory Net he tr to the bect o politicl cotittio.

Th imged tht thoe people who were oce hlvge d who hvebecome civlized oly by low degree merely rmig their lw the di-greeble eceitie o their crime d qrrel cotried them cold otcceed i etblihig o good ytem o govermet thoe who omthe time they rt ce together commitie crried ito eect thecotittio lid dow by oe prdet legiltor 52

For Decrte the cotittio o Sprt i prieworthy eve thogh my o itlw coidered dividlly were trge d cotrry to good morl TheSprt cotittio dmirble bece beig drw p by oe idividl

they the lw ll teded towrd the me ed.53

All o which i to y thtDecrte prer ocietie which hve o cotittiol or ridicl hitory. At theed o hi chroicle Decrte reect o the mirte o hvig hd childhood.


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gan thoght that ince we have all been chldren befre being men andnce it ha fr long fllen to to be governed by or appetite and by or

teacher (who often enogh contradicted one another and none of whomperhap conelled away fr the bet) it i almo impoible that orjdent hold be o excellent or olid a they hold have been had wehad complete e of or reaon ince or birth and had we been gided by itmean aone54

Decarte wold prer to be a man withot a peronal hitory Of core itwl be aid that ch a deire i impoible, bt i it? It hall be arged that atleat fr Decarte it i not impoible Methodoogical dobt i hi trategy frannlling the eect of hi inherence in hitory - natral edcational and peron

- namely, hi opinion. Bt a regard all the opinion which p to thi time hadembraced 1 thoght I cold not do better than endeavor once and or all to weepthem completely away.. "55 i well nown methodological dobt lead Decarte to hi mo I thin therefre I a56 Remembering the rt entenceof the econd part of the Disourse which read I wa in Germenay .." one mta whether the I" of the I thin" or of the I am" i the ame I who wa inGermany? It i or contention that they are not the ame. The I" of the I thin"or the I am" i an I" emptied of all nite determination; it i the I in whicha Hegel noted the identification of being and thoght parallel the definition ofGod Thi I" i not imply an ego or a bject it i rather the bjectne of the

bject throgh which both ego and extended thing come to be poed a object. Heidegger ha hown thi I" i propoing a ch. Therefore it cannot havebeen in Germany ince thi I" the bjectne of the bject i the very proce of propoing of repreenting by which both Germany and the I" whoviited there are poed a obect egen san). Moreover it i not poibe toreconcile thi apparent dijnction in term of a imple proce of epitemologicalabtraction whereby all apect of the exitence of the I" other than it capacityto repreent have been abtracted - the I" inor a it thin ha never been toGermany Thi i an important objection ince indeed it ha been claimed that

with Decarte phloophy ha been tranformed into epitemologyThi claim ha been made mot recenty by Richard Rorty in hi Philosophy an

the Mirror of Naure57 In fct Rorty characterize Carteian and potCarteianphiloophy a one prolonged and tortred effrt to contrct and jtify the natreof mind a a mirror of natre - the real. It i not poible to contet the epitemological character of modern phoophy however there i reaon to pectthat thi epitemology i fnded on a deeper level by an ontology. the pychoanalytical theory of acan ha hown mirror are very crio thing. he mirrorwhich i of no interet r the frmothold chld become an object of delight

and fcination r the eight or ninemonth old ccording to acan the beingof the child ha been tranfrmed dring thi interval. In a lie manner it i thetranfrmation within the hitory of being that change the tat of the mirror. i well nown the mind in latonic philoophy i not conceptalized a amirror which ha or deire to have a correct copy of reality Of core neither


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does Prossor Rorty suggest that this is the case. Nonetheless, it is not as thoughthe metaphor of a mirror never entered Plato's phlosophy. It did, and as one re

cals om the Republic there are soe people who dea exclusively in copies; however these people who trac in correct copies of reality are not philosophers,rather they are artisans or visual artists. Then the mitator, I said, is a long wayo the truth, and can do al things because he lightly touches on a small part ofthem, and that part an image."58 The problematic of truth, or wisdom, does notenter Plato's discourse in terms of correctness, or accuracy, of the copy but interms of the distance separating the cop fom that which is most properly real.The plastic artist is denounced not because he distorts or ies, as were Homer andthe tragic poets, but because what he produces is so r om the true reaityTruth does not exist in the reationship between the copy and the real, rather itis the rea itself.

It is on the basis of a transfrmation of what it is to be in a transfrmed on-tology, that epistemology, and in particular an epistemology organized around theconcept of representation becomes the centra focus of modern philosophy ForPlato, the problematic of truth cannot take the frm of a discourse on the accuracy of copies because the ancient Greek notion of Being as presencing truthas alethe (unconceament), still operates within his texts This is the case eventhough, as Heidegger argued in Pato's Doctrine of Truth, the archaic conceptionof Being and Truth coexists with the seeds of what will become the modern con-

cepton of Truth as correctness It is in terms of Descartes' implicit ontology thatone must read his transfrmation of philosophy into epistemology.

Returning to the question of the intertwining of the ego and what Heideggercals the subectness of the subject, the probematic of the empirica ego and thetranscendental ego, Descartes tes us in the Discourse59 that his text may be readas a fable. Prossor Daia Judovitz in her artice Autobiographical Discourseand Critica! Praxis in Descartes reects on the meaning of the able as a literarygenre and what its use implies in Descartes' texts

As literary genres (fbe or tableau) they both present a conict of thedidactic vs. the narrative nction: they represent or exemplify a subjectwithin an historica context only to suggest that the true intuition of thatcontext transcends its narrative dimension.... The Discourse as a fble bothconcretizes the I' as thinking substance through narrative which must in theend be aboished. The moral of the ble aspres through the particularityof its example to reect on the nature of the transcendental subject, therebytranscending its own narrative (representative description) as a specicinstance.60

Indeed after one has discovered the mora of the be, the litte fx or the rabbit

who communicated it to us may be frgotten The story was merey the occasionthrough which the moral in its universality emerged The ego who went to Germany, is not the same ego whose sef presence serves as the focal poin t of Car-tesian philosophy The rmer is a real being, the latter is the being process


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the ontological difeence as conceived ithin metaphysics, the place hee thepoposing by hich obects become obects takes place Wheeas the subectness

of the subect is the poposing as such the empiical ego is an obect poposedThis elationip of obect, includng ego, to the pocess of poposing is not fomuated as such ithin the texts of Descates It is opeative thee ut cannot beindicated as such this s because, as Heidegge agues, ithin metaphysics thequestion of the elationship of Being to eings is fogotten," only to e eplacedby the question of the hieachical elationship eteen dieent types of eing.

In the itings of Descates it is the ole played by God and His elationshipto nite being both thinking and extended, hich occults the suectness of thesuect Within this hieachical ay of thinking, the place of coincidence beteen

being and thought asolute being - is shaed amiguously y oth the Cgtoand God Likeise the ole of oect that hich is pesented, is shaed ambiguously y oth the nite ego and extended opaque things. The ego of the ego cogto,hose selfepesentation is the condition the pesentation of all oects61 is,in its elation to God, itself a nite obect The ambiguity of the ole of the subectin Descates as seen in the contast eteen the suect hose selfepesentation is the condition f all epesentation and the suect consideed as an oect,aleit as ego an oect of a diffeent kind om extended obects, as a thinking nonextended sustance - is geneated and sustained y the equally ambiguous elationship beteen the suect and God. As as noted above ith efence to thethought of Hegel, the thinkng ego shaes ith the God of the ontological poofthe status of a being in hich thought and eing ae united; on the othe hand,this ego is to God as a ceatue - a fnite being - is to its innite ceato. In hisCartan Mdtaton Hussel emaks that Descates comes to the vey thesholdof tanscendental phiosophy ut


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presetatio ad objet It is lear om Desartes' reetio o the wax i theSeod Meditatio that oly ertai types o represetatios have real outer-

parts i the objetive world Havig made a distitio betwee what later wilbe alled by Loe primary ad seodary qualities Desartes oteds that olyour represetatio o extesio orrespods to what exists i the real world Whatis sigiat or our argumet is that, at least, this privileged domai o represetatio orrespods to the world as it exists iitsel; this orrespodee is guara-teed by God's ow veraity Thus or Desartes there is i a ertai sese a plaeor the distitio betwee realty ad appearae The tasty, sweetsmelligwax is a appearae, reality beig simply matter exteded i spae The relatio-ship betwee reality" ad appearae" must be stritly o a ausal ature ex-teded beig, the real world, must ause our subjetive appearaes The oep-tio o subjetivity as ostitutig is exluded The egos ative ertaity o itspresee to itsel i reetio, its selrepresetatio is the basis o the represeta-tio o all other objets; however, its trasedetal tio must ed here allother" owledge must be obtaied by a objetive" sieti method For ourargumet it appears that this is the oly role that subjetivity a play i Cartesiathought The subjet must remai passive i God is to guaratee nowledge othigs as they are ithemselves; it may ot impose its orm o our judgmets adrepresetatios, or as Kat saw learly, the oeptio o a ative subjetivityis attaied oy at the expese o orgoig the laim that our owledge is a owl

edge o thigs as they are ithemselves Thus it has beome evidet that the mod-e oept o subjetivity is both istaed ad arrested i the texts o Desartes

For the subjet to regai its absolute status it is eessary r that whih isother tha the ite" subjet to be oeived o as i t a alieatio o thissubjet the subjet itsel i otheress om itsel A trasrmatio o the rela-tioship betwee subjet ad objet must be eeted. Withi the absurd positio o trasedetal realism, the relatioship betwee subjet ad objet isausal, sie both the ite subjet ad the exteded objet are posed as objetsby God. The metaphor o owledge as a mirror o ature is thus geerated; ad

the auray o this mirror is guarateed by the veraity o God This epistemolo-gial" cu-deac is resolved i the histoy o moder philosophy by the maigexpliit o the impit otology o the subjet This meas that the subjet willo loger be viewed as a beig surrouded by other beigs whh it must represetto itsel, rather the subjet wil ome to be idetied expliitly with what we havealled, olowing Heidegger, the subjetess o the subjet proposig as suh

i the phosophy o Kat the problemati o represetig ad truth as orrespodee are retaied the metaphor o subjetivity as miror is displaed bythat o subjetivity as a proess; the ative positig role o subjetivity has beome

explit The prie exated by this expiitatio o the subjetess o the subjet isa agostiism oerig our owledge o the real," the thigiitsel Fiallyit is within Germa idealism that the positig harater o subjetivity beomesly expiit, ad it is withi Germa idealis that the problemati o epistemology is expitly rejeted


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For Descartes the sbects presence to itsel is absoltely certain bt the trtho its knowledge o obects mst be garanteed by the veracity o God The aim o

the Hegeian dialectic is to ascend to a position o selcertaty However, rHegel the sel is no longer the nmdiated presence o the sel to itsel rather thesel is mediated throgh the process o the dialectic It is a sel retrned om itsodyssey otheess t the end o e Phenmengy f Spr63 what natralconsciosness perceived as the other than itsel, appears r s as the sel i otherness Certainty has come to eqal rth and the Sbect has become bsolteSprit

NOTES

l . Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the Word Picture, The Question Conceing Technoloand Other Essays, trans. Wii Lowitt (New York: Harper Row, 1977) p 140.

2. lbid, p 127 3 Martin Heidegger, Overcomng Metaphysics, e End of Philsophy trans. oan Stam

baugh (New York: Harper Row, 1973) p 95 .4. Maurice Mereau-Ponty, Eye and Mnd, The Primacy of Perception trans. Careton

Daery (Evanston, I Northwestern Univ Press, 1 964) p. 1 82 .5 . Hiram Caton, e in of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (New Haven, Conn.:

Yae Univ. Press, 1973 )

6 Rene Descartes, Meditations o Fst Philsophy Philosophical Works of Descartestrans. Hadane & Ross (New York: Dover Pubications, Inc., 1931)

7. Edmund Husser, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenolorans. David Carr (Evanston, I Northwestern Univ. Press, 1 970)

8. Edmund Husser, Cartesn Meditations trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague Martinus Nijho, 1960).

9. G.W.F Hege, Hegel Lectures on e Histo of Philosophy trans. Hadane Smson(New York: The Humanities Press, 1974).

10 mmanue Kant, Critique of re Reason trans Norma Kemp Smith (New York St.Martin 's Pess, 1 965 ).

1 1 e Orin of Subjectivity An Essay o n Descartes pp. 197199.12. Maurice MereauPonty, The Phenomenolo of Perception trans. Coi Smith (New

York: The Humanities Pess, 1967) p. 369.13 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena A nd Other Essays on Husserls eory of

Signs trans. David Aison (Evanston, I : Northweste Univ. Press, 1973).14. Miche Foucaut, e Archeolo of Knowledge trans. Sheridan Smith (New York

Panheon Books, 197 2) p . 149 .15 Ibid., p . 15 1.

16. Miche Foucaut, e Histo of Sexuali Vo. I , tras Robert Hurey (New ork:Pantheon Books, 1 978 )

17 Hegel's Lectures o n e History of Philosophy o. III, op .cit, pp 9 90.1 8 . I bi d., p 1 0 1 .

19. Richard Popkin, The Histo of Skepticism From Erasmus to Descartes (New York

Harper Row, 1964).20 Ibid, p 7.

2 1 Martin Heideer, "Metaphysics a s History o Being, The End of Philosophy, trans. oanStambau (New York: Harper Row 1973) p. 23.

22. e History of Skepticism op.cit., p . 2 .23 Ibid.


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4 Min Heidegge Pa Dine f uh an. hn Baw Phlosophy n heTeneh Cenuy . New Yk: Randm Hue 96.

5. Pa e Repulc in e Daloues o Po an. B we New Yk Randm

Hue6. e Hsoy o kepcsm pi. p . id. p. id. p. .

9 . id. p. . 0 . he Age f he Wd Piue The Quesn Conceng Technolo an Ohe Essays

p.i. p. 4 .. Ren Deae e each Ae uh in Phsophcal Woks o Descaes . 1 ,

an. Hadane & R New Yk: Dve Puiain n. 9 p . 0 . . Meaons p.i. p 45 . . id. p. 4.

4 id p. 50. 5 id. p . 5 . 6 . Edmund Hue Ieas Geneal Inoucon o Pue Phenomenology an. W.R. Be

Gin New Yk Ce Bk 96. . Hegel Lecues on e Hsoy of Phlosophy . p.i. p. 9. . id. p . 9 Ren Deae Dcouse o n Meho in Phlosophcal Woks of Descaes . 1 an.

Hdane & R (New Yk Dve Puiain n. 9.4 0 Rudf Behm Hue Cnep f he Aue The Phenomenolo of Hussel

ed R.O Even Chiag Quadange Bk 9 0 p. 6 .

4 Mauie MeeauPn e Vsle an he Insle an. Aphn ingi Evann

. Nhween niv. Pe 964 . he Age f he Wd Piue The Queson Conceng Technolo an Ohe Essays

p.i. p 4 .4 id. p. 49 .44 . Wiam . Rihadn Heegge ough Phenomenolo o Though e Hague

Mainu Nijhf 96 p. 4

45. id p . 5.46 . Main Heidegge Wha s a ng? an. WB. Ban & ea Deuh Chiag Hen

Regne C. 96 p . 04

4. Rihad R Phlosophy an he M"o o Naue Pnen N.. Pinen niv.Pe 90 pp 9.

4. Ren Deae Dscouse on Meho in Phlosophcal Woks of Descaes 1 an.Hadane & R New Yk Dve Puain n. 9 p .

4 9 . id. p . .50. id.5 id . p p .5. id. p. .5. id.

54 id.

55 id. p. 956 Meaons pi p . 0 .5 . Phosophy an he M" o Naue p.i. pp. 9 .

5 . e Repulc p.i. p. 55 59 Dscouse o n Meho p.i. p . 6 0 . Daia Judvz Auigaphia Diue and Cia! Paxi in Deae unpu

ihed manuip6 . Wha s a ng? pi p. 04.6 . Caesn Meaons p.i p 46 G.WF. Hege e Phenomenolo of Mn an. .B. Baie ndn: Gege Aen &

nwin d. 964.

descartes and the ontology of subjectivity - b.c. flynn

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