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7 EmotionalClimate:SocialStructure nd EmotionalDvnamicsJOSEPH DE RIVERADepartmentof Psychology,Clark University,Worcester,MA 01610,USA

The basic dea of emotional cl imate s relativelyeasy o grasp. have n mindlan objective group phenomenon that can be palpably sensed-as when on e Ienters a party or a city and feels an atmosphere of gaiety or depression, Iopenness r fear-only, as he term "cl imate" implies, am less nterested nltemporary moods than in more pervasive emotional phenomena that are Irelated o underlying socialstructuresan d poli tical programs. have n mindJfor example, he cl imate of fear which existed n Chile during the Pinochetregime and which has ecentlychanged o a cl imate of hope (see, or example,Becker et al., \990).THE CONCEPT OF EMOTIONAL CLIMATEWhile emotional cl imate is an appealing dea, t is an idea that is relativelyldifficult to make into a preciseconcept ha t can be objectivelymeasured.Ho w )does one distinguishbetween emporary moods and pervasive l imates? s anemotional cl imate objective or subjective?How does a national mood differfrom an individual 'semotion? How can climatesbe described?An d ho w ca non e measurean emotional cl imate when people n different neighborhoods, Iregions or social classesmay feel quite differently? How does emotionalJcl imate function, an d how does t relate to underlying social-pol i ticalstruc-tures? I shall attempt to deal with these issuesbu t they are inextricablyinterwoven and this paper is a heuristicenterprise ather than an attempt toanswerdefinitely he problems that ar e posed.Emotional atmosphere,climate, and cultureAn emotional atmosphere or col lective moocl-as opposed to an emotional Icl imate-pertains to th e coliectivebehavior ha t a group or societyma y mani- jfest when it is fbcused on a common event, rather than to the emotional frelationships betlveen members of the society.Park (1967) describessuchemotional moods,when a crowd becomesa mob, or when a group attendsa ifuneral or a wedding, or when an entire societydevelopsa collectiveatti tudf,*r,


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Elv{OTIONALCLIMATESpeakingof the developmentof a mob, he notes that the attention of everyindlv;duat s focusedon someexciting objector incidentan d then' "1heexcite-ment of every individual is intensified by the responseeach unconsciouslvmakes to th e manifest nterest of every other individual.Th e crowd assumesunder these circumstanceshe characterof a closed circuit, each ndividualresponding o hi s ow n exciternentas he sees t reflectedvia the atti tudesan demtionsof hi s neighbor . . unti l the crowd is a col lectiveunit'" (Park, 1967.p.257.) In an analogousway, a society ma y become mobil ized. In fact, Parknotes hat every society, faces n the direction from which th e newscomes,"an d alters i ts atti tude to conform to rvhat is reported in the press.This, ofcourse,ma y be manipuiated by th e poli tical leadership.Thus' Park quotesWil l iam Schirer'sBerl in Diary, "the purpose of al l th e ceremonyand ri tual ofth e Nazis is it createsan atmosphere.a tension. an expectancy,which, infocusingattention upon the things hopecl or. wil l effectively nhibit an y con-sideration ha t runs counter o those hopes." (p.259)Emotional atmospheresar e important in their own right an d ma y blendinto some of the cl imates I shall discussand be reflected in attempts tomeasurecl imate.Furthermore,a shift in emotional atmospheremay herald achange n climate.Thus, Park mentions ho w Franklin D. Roosevelt's amousfireside talk of March 72, 1933began to turn a climate of depression nto one

'' of conhdence, estoredmorale, and promoted unification.However, an emo-tional cl imate s more lasting han a local emotional atmosphereand doesno tsimply refer to collective eeling and behavior bu t to how the peopie of asocieiyemotionallylglgte to on e atthe_i-for example,whether hey care orI one another or are afraid of eachother. Thus, an atmosphereof joy, or on e of'-fear, might "i i i t if th e people of a nation focusedon a common victory, or onan impending nvasion,whereasa cl imate of joy, or on e of fear,might exist fth e personsof a nation met each other's needsor if a repressive overnmentI planted spiesamong th e people so that no trust could exist.*' Whiie an emotional cl imate may often be labeled by usingnames or emo-tions, such as oy an d fear, we may also us e abels hat directly refer to th eemotional relationships hat are involved, such as hosti l i ty or sol idarity.Suchlabelsmisht also be used o refer to quali tiesof a society'semotionalculture.{. Hower, an-Sd'.liolna] ilr"i is dynamically stable. It is usually held inplace by a network of social i iationpracticesand ordinari ly only-changes he n culture is transformed over generationsof people..Qli l lattl3l 'onth e otherhand, are more dependent on poli tical, rel igious,economic an d educational

Lfactors an d ma y changewithin the courseof a singlegeneration.f- it is mportant to distinguishbetweenemotional atmospheres, l imatesan dr cultures.Fo r erample, while a people may be united in sharing a common* patriotic atmosphere, he y ma y or may not enjoy the mutual caring an dsharecl deals that are characteristicof a cl imate of sol idarity,and, in eithercase, the culture ma y promote emotional independenceor dependence.i Ho*"u.., emotional atmospheres, l imatesan d culturesclearly nteract an d

198 INTERNATIONAL tlVIEw OFSTUDIES NEMOTION 199influenceeach other. Emotional climatesdependon underlyingemotional'7culture, and both influence,and are affectedby, emotionalatmosphere.nfact,Durkheim argued hat a society tselfwasunifiedby culturalceremoniesthat nvoked ntenseemotionalatmospheressee he nteresting iscussion y ,Fishcr& Chon.1989).The concept of climateTh e concept of cl imate has been used extensively n organizationalpsychol-ogy in an attempt to capture mportant differences n organizationalenviron-ments. n his analysisof the concept,Tagiuri (1968)notes rhar i t is a molarconcept l ike personali ty)but that t is experiencedas external o the actor (a spart of the environment),although he actor may feel he or she contributes oits nature, an d that i t has a connotation of continuity but is not as astingasculture.After surveyingdisparateusesof the term he concludes hat i t alwaysrefers o some eature of the environment that has behaviouralconsequencesan d to which people ar e sensitive.Noting that it is a source of behavioralvarianceoutsideof th e personhe defines t as. th e relativelyenduringquali tyof the total environment that (a ) is experiencedby the occupanrs, b) influ-ences heir behavior, an d (c ) ca n be described n terms of the values of aparticular set of characteristicsor attributes) of the environment.." Tagiuri,1968, p. 25). When applied to an organizarion,Tagiuri notes that cl imarerefers to the quali ty of the organization's nternai environment,especial ly sexperiencedby th e insider,but as also reievant o outsiders.There has beena greatdeal of work on organizational l imate n an attemptto find variables that can be used to capture important differences n theenvironments of different organizations.unfortunately, much of t his workseems o have been guided by an attempt to focus either on objective actors(such as size, eadershippatterns,communication procedures)or subjectivefactors (perception of the environment as riendly, as having high work stand-ards,as recognizinggood work, etc).The reason or th e dichotomization ntoobjective and subjectiveseems clear. Some investigators, uch as Forehandan d Gilmer (1964),wanted to focus on objective measurable eatures ha tinfluenced behavior in important ways and could be used to clistinguish dif-ferent organizations.others, such as Tagiuri, wanted to stress hat the en-vironment wa s interpretedby members of the organizationsan d that theresulting perceptionswould affect their atti tudes,motivation an d behavior.From their perspective,objective factors such as size or decision-ma king pro-cedureswere no t as ruitful descriptorsof cl imate as perceived riendliness ropenness o suggestions. agiuri clearly felt that something objective wasbeing interpreted.He states, It cannot be a common delusion since t mustbe vertical ly basedon external real i ty." (p . 25). However, since hi s externalreal i ty wa s defined primari ly as something to be perceived, he subsequentoperational definitions of investigators spli t the idea of cl imate into an


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2OO EMOTIONAL CLIMATEobjective or a perceived (subjective) climate (see, or example, the review ofresearchby James& Jones,1974).Neither of these paths has proved particularly fruitful, and organizationalpsychologistsnow seem to be pursuing the idea of organizational "culture."Fortunately, he concept of culture s more resistant o being spli t into objec-tive and subjective measures,but there is a price to be paid if the concept issubstituted or that of cl imate.A government s no t responsible or it s nation'sculture. Rather, i t grows out of the culture. On the other hand, governmentsdo have some responsibi l i ty or emotional cl imate, and this cl imate, ratherthan culture, is a quality of the environment which surrounds people andaffects heir behavior within any given culture.Fortunately, i t is possible o define environment in a way that does notseparate ts objective and subjectiveattributes. sidor Chein (1954;deRivera,1986)doesprecisely ha t when he defrnes he "objective-behavioral"environ-ment as a description of the environment that would interest a psychologistwho wanted to comprehendand predict behavior (rather than a descriptionfor a geographer, ol i tician or auto driver). In Chein'senvironment here are,for example, behavioral nstigators hat encouragespeciflcactivities such ashand guns,pornographicpictures, nvitations o cultural events),goal objectsthat satisfy different needs(cars,books, sexualpartners),noxients (unpleas-ant noise, smog levels), means-endpaths (e g what a person needs o do tobecome a physician),behavioral supports and constraints such as th e pres-ence or absence f training schools)an d socialnorms an d atti tudinal cl imatesthat steerbehavior n certain directions ather than others toward violenceorcompassion).f In this paper I shall focus on the emotional climate o@-q4ig*lj5tfiElBy anation's emotional cl imate I mean an aspectof it s objective-behavioralen -vironment. It , necessarily, affects everyone in the environmen! and is a char-acteristic of the society is*orpsed "oi int"ttlng" p"it*r. It may beobserved{i-dEh1@the behavior of its citizens and others subjected to its! gouernmeiill- If emotions ere in" a persont wouldbe hard o conceive ow heycouldalsobe "in" a nationalenvironment.However,!!-q-:!t!rst$Bl-tbge{L*sf_-c-q-tions de Rivera,7917l-e Rivera& Grinkis,1986) hows ow emotionsmayG*conceiveOorlt$:l'g-@q"ZE6pQ, as varioussortsof attractionsandrepulsionsUet*ile"--p-"opfewtricfr a.rstorm their bo


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20 2 EMOTIONAL CLIMATEacceptance f the official truth and a submission o the established rder. He,himself. wa s particularly concerned about the role whrch rel igion played inthis process,whether it encouragedsubmissionor strengtheneda faith inacting or justice.While the use of fear n order to attain or keep poli tical contactma y appearto be a human aberration, error ha s ong been recognizedas an instrumentfor controlling alien populations. In fact, Walter (1964) has suggested hat it isa fairly common method for maintaining political unity within cultures. Heargues hat poli tical theoristshave ailed to acknowledge he fact that numer-ous cultures have used (and are using) random violence as a means of pre-venting the development of poli tical opposition,and that such practicesar eoften sanctionedby the culture. Certainly most authoritarian regimesmakeuse of a certain amount of fear in order to control opposition movements,althougirwe shall see ater that other emotional forces may also come intopiay. However, Walter meanssomethingmore than this. He states:

Th e practicen authoritarian tates f punishing efinite ct sof resistancendbreakingup organizat ions uspected f seditionmay be compared o a surgicalprocedure.n contrast,he process f terror, n ts deal orm,ma ybe comparedto a chemical rocedure.ndependentocial lusters nd unauthorizedoli ticalassociationsend to dissoven the mediumof extreme ear.More than that,horvever, n emotional nvironmentmy italics] s created n whichcertainkindsof interaction annot ak eplace. he first efforts ro m whichorganized ppo-sitionmightemerge resimply ot made. . . thepeople n such nenvironmentar edeprived . . of a capacityhat natural ly elongso th e members f othersystems-thepowerof resistance.p. 27)Walter is clearly concernedabout the fact that an y human civi l izationmightregress o the use of terror as a substitute or real unity. He notes:Terror doesnot often staywithin boundaries, nd t is rarely provincial n itsimpact.Now, somewriters ronically nsist, t is a truly international ocialpro-cess,and it has helped to universalize n emotionalclimate my italics]-anirrternationaltmosphereominated y right. p. 11).While th e cl imate of fear describedabove s deliberatelycreated n order tomaintain poli tical control, there may also be cl imatesof fear createdby com-plete poli tical chaos.For example, n Lebanon in recent years here ha s beena fear of violence that stems from so many different sources hat it is corn-pletely senseless.he important invariant n thesedifferent typesof situationsof fear is that people feel solated rom on e another.Is there an opposite to a cl imate of fear? If we imagine such a climate, twould be one where peoplewould feel free to speak o on e another, o gatherinto groups to publicly discuss ssues, o organize poli tical meetings an dral l ies.More.general ly, t would be a cl imate where people would trust eachother and could easi lycooperatewith one another, a cl imate of security.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIESON EMOTION 203A climate of security could, conceivably, be measured by simply askingpeople how much they trust each other and their government. n fact, ques-tions on ho w much people rust others were askedas part of a comprehensivestudy on the quali ty of l i fe in th e United States n 1977 Campbell,Converse& Rodgers, 1976).Using a national probabil i ty sample of over 2000 people,the investigators asked (among many other questions) the following:General ly peaking, ouldyo u say hatmostpeople anbe rusted r thatyo ucan'tbe oocarefuln dealing i th people?Wouldyo usay hat mostof the imepeople ry to be helpful, r that he yar emostlyus t ooking ut or themselves'?Do yo u hink hat mostpeoplewould ry to takeadvantagef yo u f theygo tthe chance r would hev rv to be air'?

Finding intercorrelates anging from .49 o .53, he questions which wereansweredon a 5-point scale) were combined into a single score. While rawscores are not reported, the percentagesof people in four categories io m"high trust" to "low trust" ar e presented,and I bel ieve we may consider"trust" to mean a score of 10 or over on the above tems. f so, we find that inI971in the United States5'7%of the people reported more trust than distrusr.This suggestshe existence f a generalcl imateof security n 1971. t would beinteresting o know what the percentages re today. I suspect hey may havefal len. While Campbeli, Converseand Rodgers (I976) did not as k quesrionsabout trust in government, they refer to a "progressivean d substantialde -cl ine," from 1958 to 1912, in the Insti tute fo r Social Research's rust-in-government ndex (Campbell, Converse& Rodgers, 1976,p.284; and seep.30).Ruth Benedict (1970) an d Abraham Maslow (1971) argue that some cul-turesare much more secure ha n others.Thev describe he secureculturesasmuch pleasanterplaces o l ive that are characterized y a spiri t of goodwil lwhich is manifested by kindly people who engage n a lot of cooperativeactivity.On the other hand, the nsecure ulturesseem ull of surly,aggressivepeoplewh o eneage n destructive, ombativebehavior and feel a good deal ofanxietv.Of particular interest is a structural factor which appears o underl ie thedifferencesbetweencultures.A comparison Benedict1970,Maslow 1971)offour secure and four insecure cultures (which were matched along othervariables) revealed one clear structural difference. The secure cultures hadcustoms which ensured that actions and ski l ls that benefited the individualalso benefited he group. In th e insecurecultures,actions ha t benefited heindividual were at the expense of others. Benedict termed the congruencebetween advantages o the individual an d advantages o the society "syn-ergy." She points out that a state may be organized and run so that itsaccumulation of power is used for the benefit of both those in power and thegeneral population (high synergy)or for the exclusiveadvantageof those n


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l204 EMOTIONAL CLIMATEpower at the expenseof most of its citizenry (low synelgy). Likewise, econom-ic systems may be arranged in ways that create low or high synergy. In theinsecuresocieties he economic systemswere "funneling systems" arrangedso that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. On the other hand, thesecure societies used "siphoning" systems hat channeled wealth away frompoints of high concentration (often by awarding prestigeto personswho madepublic distributionsof their wealth).

Both Benedict and Maslow appear to believe that people are natural lysomewhat selfish and that wealth and power will tend to accumulate in thehands of those who already have wealth and power unless some societalmechanism prevents this. Without such a mechanism the people of a societywill become involved in intense competition or hostile envy and this willcreate an insecurecl imate. (Inversely,we might argue that i f the people of asocietyare accustomed o envy rather than honor thosewith more wealth andpower, then the society may resist economic changes hat encourage privateinitiative.)Even if we assume as I do) that people ar e motivated, at least to somedegree, by their caring for others, we arrive at a similar conclusion. Clearly if asociety is arranged so that caring people lose power and prestige, then lesscaring and, hence, esssecurityseems nevitable.It should be relatively easy o measurewhether the people of a society eelthat public-spiri tedacts are rewarded or punished. f one invests capital inone'scountry, wil l one receive nterest or lose one's capital? f one works forhuman rights, may one receive a prize or be assassinated?f on e speaksou tagainstan injustice or hazard,wil l on e be honored or loseone's ob ?Note that a cl imate of fear that is fostered by the governmentof a nation norder to isolatepeople from one another is related to the cultural insecuritydescribed by Benedict and Maslow which atomizes a society. Both may alsobe related to a cl imate that may tend to polarize a people-a cl imate ofinstability.A climate of instability is evidenced whenever the people of a nation cannotpredict what wil l happen either poli tical ly or economically n the near future.The situation n the Soviet Union during 1990provides an excellentexample.People had no idea if money would retain i ts worth, i f there would ever begoods n the stores, f the Communist party would retain power or disappear.Such situationsmake it impossible or a person to know what to expect orwhat to do. In this cl imate one suspects here is a danger that people wil labandon reedom n order to decrease nxiety,an d that people's hinking wil lbecome igidified as he y grasp or somesolution.Hence, here would seem obe a danger of increased olarizationas people ose openness o other pointsof views and become ixated on particular solutions.Conversely, f a cl imateof stabi l i ty exists, he people of a nation may be more able to tolerate diverseviews an d not run any real danger of fragmentation.While there may well be empirical studies of the effects of cl imates of

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW oF STUDIES oN EMOTION 205instability or stability, I am not aware of them. However, there have been anumber of attempts to measure a related variable, he degree of economicuncertainty among the public of the United States.Some investigators haveasked people about the economy and then calculated the extent of disagree-ment about whether one should be optimistic or pessimistic.Others haveexamined he amount of variance n expectedprice changes.Such ndices ofuncertainty on a macro level show that the amount of economic uncertainty inth e United Statesevidences onsiderable luctuation,an d predicts he rate ofprivate saving. Uncertainty became notably higher in the period 1969-1918,perhaps eflectinga disorientationabout economicpolicy (seeKatona,l9l9).A climate of confidence or optimism (and its inverse, lack of confidence,pessimism, or "depression") is often believed to underlie economic marketsand the recovery or depression of these markets. Katona (1979) presentsevidence hat this belief has some validity. His index of consumersentimentaskspeople whether they personally,and whether the country as a whole, wil lbe having good or bad times financially in the coming year. Drops in this indexsuccessfully orecast economic recessions which occur six-nine months afterdownturns in the index). It is important to note that this predictive abil i ty isnot due to the successful rediction of individual consumption (which wemight expect to be better predicted by questionsabout intentions to buyspecific onsumer tems).Rather i t is an aggregatemacro-measure, robably ameasureof generalatmosphereor cl imate. t is interesting hat this measureof generalmood is a better predictor than questionsabout specific ntentionsto purchase.While the latter are better predictors of individual behavior,these ndividual intentions occur too late in the decision-makingprocess ohavemuch forecastingpower.Confidence n the economy as measuredby Katona is probably more anatmosphere han a cl imate. A cl imate of confidencemight be said to existwhen the overal l economy s growing.Thus, Bensmanand Vidich (1971)notethat when capital s accumulatingat an accelerating ate, a society s probablyto be expansive n many different areas, o that al l of it s groupswill share nthe expanding opportunities. n this situation, hey believe hat members of

groupswil l be more apt to compare heir relative success i th their own pastthan to make invidious comparisonswith other groups. Thus, tensions be-tween groupswill be minimized,and there wil l be a cl imate of self-confidenceand optimism, with stressplacedon individualismand the success f individ-ua l initiative. When an economy is not expanding there wil l be much lessemphasison individual initiative, and this may eventually affect he society'sculture.Note, for example,an observationby McClel land (1965): In India atthe present ime the cl imate of opinion is not particularlyconfident . . news-papersan d public speeches o not yield much that can be coded as ndicatingthe existenceof a strong cl imate of achievement." p.24)Of course, a cl imate of confidencemay not only be a function of capitalaccumulation. t might also depend on societal structures that reward or


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206 EMOTIL,TaL CLIMATEpunish capitalaccumulation.Fo r example,confidencema y depend' n part, onwhether it is safe o invest n the economy of one's ow n nation or whether i twould be more advantageous o sendmoney out of th e country. More gener-al ly, confidence n one'snation may depend on the extent to which the publicbelieves ha t people n general,an d their government n particular,careaboutth e nation and ts welfare rather than simply being nterested n the welfare ofthemselves nd their famil iesor gloups. Regardless f the underlying causes,it is clear that i t is possible to measure an d compare cl imates of relativeconfidencean d depression. hus, Oettingen an d Seligman 1990)were able odemonstrate hat in 1985 people in bars in East Berl in behaved in a moredepressedmanner than their counterparts n West Berl in.A cl imateof sat isfact ion ight be inferredwhen there ar e high rat ingsonthe aspirationscales sed by Cantri l (1965).Cantri l an d his associates, se daself-anchored adder scale.They asked people to imagine the best possiblefuture they could for themselves, nd then imagine th e wolst state of affairsthat could occur. Then they asked their respondents o imagine a 1O-rungladder where the top rung of th e ladder represented he best possrble uturean d th e bottom rung the worst. Final ly, the respondentwa s askedwhere he orsh e currently was on the ladder. Thus, while aspirationsare relative an d ma ychange, he person'scurrent state of satisfactions ndicatedas relative o th efuture he or she can actually magine. f we average he scoresof a randomsample of people within different nations, these aggregatemeasurescouldconceivablybe viewed as ndicating an atmosphereor a cl imate of satisfactionor dissatisfaction.f we assume hat reasonable amplingwa s achieved, uch ameasure howsdistinctdifferences n different nations.Fo r example,basedondata col lected n 14 different nations between 1959and 1962,Cantri l reportssatisfaction ates ranging from 6.6 n the United States, hrough 5.3 n WestGermany,5.2 n Japan,4. 8 n Nigeria, 4.6 n Brazi l and4. 4 n Poland, o 1.6 nth e Dominican Republic (with an average of 5.0). Th e rank order of theratings n Cantri l 's total sampleof 14 nationscorrelates 67 with an objectivesocioeconomicndex he independentlyconstructed.Within th e Untied States,measureswhich have been aken over th e courseof years(i n 1959, 964,7971, 1912an d 1974)do not show significant luctua-tions n these atings(seeCampbell, Converse& Rodgers,1976).It might be argued hat the cl imate of a nation s better measuredby askingpeople about their aspirations or their nation than for their personal aspira-tions. Cantri l an d hi s associates id that. They fol lowed their questionsaboutpersonal aspirationsby asking people about their wishes and fears for theirnation and where they saw their nation standing on a ladder representingthese aspirations.Using this measure,we again find considerablenationalvariation, anging ro m 6. 7 n th e United States, hrough 6.2 n West Germanyan d Nigeria, 5.3 in Japan, 5.1 in Brazi l and 2.7 in the Dominican Republic(with an averageof 5.6). The rank order correlation with personal atings s.55.Th e correlationwith the socioeconomic ndex is .47.

INTERNATIONAL RcVIEW OF STUDIESON EMOTION 207In contrast to the measuresof personalsatisfaction,averagesof nationalsatisfactionwithin the United Statesdeclined .rom6.1 n 1959, o 5.4 n 1971,and to 4.8inI914. (I am not aware of more recent data, or data from othernations,although they may well exist.)A climate of disstrtisfaclion arises when concrete realities have not keptpace with rising expectations or when a fall in the economy hasnot yet led toan adjustment of aspirationsso that people experience hemselves o be on alow rung of Cantri l 's adder scale.One might expect hat this senseof relative

deprivation might be expressed n changes n poli tical leadershipor in out-breaks of violence.With this in mind, Gurr (1970)correlatedCantri l 's scoreson degreeof personalsatisfaction n different nationswith hi s own measureofmagnitude of turmoil in different nations. (His measure was based on theproportion of the population participating in demonstrations and riots, andthe duration and intensity of such events.) He found a strong relationshipbetween climate of dissatisfaction (my terminology) and magnitude of tur-moil. (rho = .59,N = 13.) I wondered f magnitudeof turmoil could be us t aseasiiy elated to objective socio-economic tatusbu t calculateda rho of only.30.)Does a cl imate of dissatisfaction eally predict pol i tical turmoil? There arethree important qualifications which must be kept in mind. First, we arespeakingof a col lective cl imate and not an individual dissatisfaction. hat is,many studiesdo not indicate a strong reiationshipbetween ndividual dissatis-faction and participation n poli tical violence(seeMuller, 1980).Second,adequatesampling s crucial. t should be noted that Gurr doesno tinclude Cantri l 's data for the United States n his study on the grounds ha t it srelatively high tevels of turmoil in the 1960 were due to the relatively highlevel of dissatisfaction n black Americans (who he stateswere not sufficientlyincluded n Cantri l 's sample).Third, dissatisfaction hould be measuredwith regard o different standardsof comparison. Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976;see Chapter 6 inparticular) contrast a number of such standards. n this regard, Walker andPettigrew (1984)have argued hat relative deprivation s particularly mport-an t when th e discrepancys basedon a comparisonwith another group in thesociety, ather than simply on what oneself or one's ow n group had in thepast. t was he senseof relative deprivation relative o other groups ha t wa srelated to support for Quebec nationalism in Canada (Guimond & Dube-Simond,1983).Together, thesequali ficationssuggest hat studiesshould be conducted onthe climates of dissatisfaction in different groups of people within the samenation. It may also be important to distinguishbetween aspirationsan d en -ti tlements,between what one would l ike lo have and what one ought to have.It may be argued hat i t is whenpeople ai l to ge t what they believe hey oughtto ge t that a cl imate of dissatisfactionurns to hosti l i ty.A climate of hostilit;t appears to occur when segmentsof a population are


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2I O EMOTIONAL CLIMATEabil i ty to maintain a tension between hoped-for idealsand actual real i ty. Ifpeople simply think in terms of what is ideai, or expect that thesehopes areabout to be realized, hey are out of touch with the grit of real poli tical an deconomic real i ty, with difficult compromisesan d with work that needs o bedone. Hence,while feel ingsmay be optimistic, he high morale s only appar-ent. If peopie abandon he ideal an d live only on th e plane of current real i ty,they become too resigned o work for the ideal, or too cynical to care, andsimply ook out for themselves. ro m Lewin's perspective, he extremely highfigure ratings given by the Nigerian people might be taken to indicate lowtension ancl, hence, a type of low morale. Of course, a drop in poli ticalparticipation may also ndicatedecreasingmorale and a cl imate of al ienation.However, i t should be possible o develop a positive nleasure of morale, amore direct measureof the tension between deal and real. I wi l l not attemptto do that in this paper because here are more generalproblems of measure-ment that must be examined.PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENTOtrtaining objective measuresWe conceiveof emotional cl imate as an objective act. Hence, t may be bestto as k questions hat encourage espondents o focus out on the socialworldrather than in upon their feel ings. Even so, in attempting to measure anobjective emotional cl imate we must deal with the fact that people withdifTerentpersonali ties optimists an d pessimists, epressorsand sensitizers,etc) and people n different positionswithin a society th e eli te, he upwardlymobile, the poor, members of a minority group, etc) may well perceive heclimate differently.Furthermore,peoplemay be afraid to saywhat they reallythink, or may saywhat they believe he other wants o hear,particularly whena cl imate of fear exists.It should be relativelyeasy o control for personali tydifferencesby averag-ing scoresand usingadequatesamplingprocedures,an d it may be possible osamplesegments f the populationwho are expected o tel l the truth. Journal-ists, or example,although hey might hesitate o be identified, occupy a rolewhere honest reporting is expected (b y contrast with poli ticians). An dmothers may openly speak of fears or their chi ldren without threatening heunity of the state,sincesuch ears are understood o be part of the motheringrole.However, control l ing for the perceptionsof people n different socialposi-tions posesa challengingproblem. For eXample,Payne and Mansfield (1973)show that persons who ar e higher in an organization'shierarchy tend toperceive th e organization as more equali tarian, open-minded an d friendlythan personswh o ar e ower. We could, of course, ake strati fiedsamplesan duse aggregatemeasures, ut we are not necessari ly nterested n an average

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIESON EMOTION 2I1perceptionso much as he best estimationof what we take to be an objectivephenomenon. If, for example, one group within a society was feel ing verysatisfiedan d perceivedan emotional cl imate of increasedopportunity, whileanother group was feel ing despondentand increasingly rustrated, we wouldno t be interested n averaging heir scoresbut in estimating he degreeof thepolarization ha t wa s obviously developing.Becauseof al l these actors, t seemsdesirable o develop observationalaswell as survey measures.On th e individual evel, here are several nterestingbehavioral ndicators of emotional state.Generosity ncreaseswith happiness;size of handwriting an d speed of talking decreasewith depression,etc. Itwould be interesting to see if we could construct behavioral indicators ofemotional cl imate. For example, a cl imate of fear should be reflected n anincreased solation of people.Within an y given nation this might be relativelyeasy to measure. In Spain, for instance, people gather outside to talk;however, during the Franco dictatorship his custom notably diminished.If at al l possible t would be desirable o have some sort of standardmea-sures hat could be used n different nations,an d this suggestsha t th e surveysituation tself might be used.For example,when a cl imate of fear s pervasiveit has been noted that people fai l to answermore questions, articularlyonesthat might reflect on the government. n repressive l imatespeoplemay evenavoid taiking about schools-or anything that may have to do with govern-menta l po l i cy . By a r rang ing uest ions o tha t they increase n sens i t i v i ty .patterns of avoidance might be easily noted and rated. Triandis (personalcommunication) has suggested hat response atency might also be used toindicate he presenceof fear in sensitiveareas.Journalists now what issues re off-l imits and cannot be discussedn printwithin their ow n country. In Turkey in 1989one could not mention the factthat a Kurdish ethnic group existed; n Mexico one could not cri ticize anyPresidentwho was in office. These imits to free speech n the pressalwaysindicatesensitivepoli tical problems ha t bound the region of freedom withinany given nation. Such restrictions, ogether with records of the ki l l ing ofjournalists,provide objective data that can be correlated with th e perceptionof an emotional cl imateof fear.Conversely,an increase n a cl imate of mutual caringmight be reflected n agreateropennesswith a stranger ike a pollster. f, for example,an interviewergavean opportunity for a respondent o volunteer an opinion about the headof the national government,or to sign a petition in favor of improving prisonconditions,on e might adducebehavior that would indicate a caring cl imate.National vs local climatesIs there really an emotional cl imate n a nation or are there actually many-differing from neighborhood to neighborhood, rom class o class, rom on eethnic group to another? Certainly, there are important local cl imates.


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EMOTIONAL CLIMATEConsider this, fo r example, variations in th e general feel ing of trust thatexisted n the United States n7917. Previously,we noted that the level washigh 57%. However, Campbell, Converse,and Rodgers (1976) report that,while 630loof white respondents reported trust, this was true of only 28% ofblack respondents.In a similarvein,Chein's data (seede Rivera, 1986)demonstrated ha t 83 %of New York City's heroin addictscame from only 15% of i ts census racts.His analysisconvincingly demonstrates hat some neighborhoods have farmore anomie (i n Durkheim's sense) han others. Likewise, Bensman andVidich's (I9l l) analysisof the effects of economic fluctuations shows howcertain economicexpansions nd contractionsmay have a different mpact ondifferent social groups, leading some to become self-assuredand future-oriented, while others become depressedor resentful.Given differences nemotional cl imate within a nation, are we justi fied in speakingof a nationalcl imate?In one sensewe clearlyare not. In fact,peopleneed o be made more awareof cl imatic differences and governmentsneed to address hem. In anothersense,however, the very existenceof a national government organizes anational cl imate that impinges, or good or i l l , on local cl imates. The realquestion appears o be how to distinguish t from local cl imate and how tomeasure the extent of it s impact. At least three possibi l i tiesseem worthexploring.(1 ) Questionscould be asked specifical lyabout the nation, and answerscould then be compared to questionswhich focus on the person'sneighbor-hood or on personal i fe. In fact this was done in Cantri l 's (1965)studywhenpeople rvere irst asked for their personal hopes and fears and then, sepa-rately,asked or their hopes and fears or the nation. When this s done, mostpeopleseem o evidence elatively ittle connectionbetween he personalan dnational.Thus, in Cantri l 's study correlations between personalsatisfactionan d satisfactionwith the nation ranged rom .08 n the United States o .40 nNigeria. Reflectingupon the United Statesdata, we note that internalwarfarehas not occurred n over 100 years, hat a large-scale conomic upheavalha s

no t occurred n over 50, and that violent crime and unemployment have beenfairly well isolated from most people's l ives. Hence. many people ma y beunaware of how much their personal welfare dependson the welfare of thenation.Certainly a iack of connectionseemsdemonstratedwhenever measures retaken separately. n Cantri l 's study, the 1959 U.S. sample shows 48% ofpeoplementioningpeaceas a hope and 51% mentioningwar as a fear for th enation. but only 10% mentioning an improved international situation as apersonal hope, and only 24"/" mentioning th e international situation as apersonal fear. (Health an d the state of the economy ar e much moreimportant-mentioned by over 50%.) Compare this with the Polish data in1962 where peacewas mentioned as a personctlhope by 20 % an d wa r as a

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIESON EMOTION L T Jpersonal ear by 62"/oof the sample. One might be tempted to use the com-parison betweennational an d personalas a measure n i ts own right, exceptthat in the Yugoslaviansample only 7"/" mentioned peaceas a personalhope(i n spite of the fact that Yugoslavia, ike Poland,ha d recentlysufferedwar).In the Campbell, Converse& Rodgers 1976)study on the quali ty of Amer-ican l i fe, when people were asked to rate the importance of 12 differentdomains of l i fe, 627" rated "a good country to l ive in-a country with a goodgovernment" as extremely mportant. This proportion is larger than for mostdomains and is exceededonly by health, marriage and having a good familyl i fe. However, when people rated how satisfied hey were with their l i fe as awhole, their general ratings were not highly predicted by their satisfactionwith national government. (They were predicted by satisfactionwith familyl i fe, marriage and financial situation.) Since satisfactionwith health was alsonot very predictive, he nvestigators ote that ". . . thesedomains are hard torate as unimportant when attention is drawn to them in a hypothetical orabstractsense.Yet when no malfunctionson either domain are vital ly intrud-ing on the daily l ives of most of our respondents, hey are easy o take forgrantedand hence show very l i ttle impact on the senseof well being" (p 86 )In l ine with this relative separation of national an d personal l i fe, we sa wearl ier hat people n the United Statesevidence essand lessoptimism aboutthe nation but continue to feel optimistic about their personal ives.Thus, when we ask separatequestionsabout the nation and personal i fe,there s relatively i ttle connection.The emotional cl imate of the nation seemsfa r less nfluential han the emotional cl imateof one's home.(2 ) Questionsmight be designedwhich ask a person to relate his or he rpersonal i fe to the national atmosphere.Answers could then be comparedfrom one region to another. By designing questionswhich specifical lyaskpeople o relate their personal if e to the national cl imate n concreteways.wemight raise the ievel of awarenessabout how national cl imate impacts thecl imate of one's neighborhood, family or personal l i fe. We might, for ex-ample, ask a question such as "When yo u think of yourself as a person wholives n (o r is a citizen of)-what are your wishesand hopes or the future of

yourself an d your country?" We could then empirical ly ascertain he perce -tage of people who mention nationai as well as personal concerns.This iscertainly an aspectof the emotional cl imate of responsibi l i tyor al ienation nit s own right. If desirable,we could distinguishbetween economic,poli ticaland social cl imatesby inquiring, for example, When yo u think of your eco-nomic future in Iname of nation] and the economic uture of [nameof nationl,what ar e your wishesand hopes or yourself and the nation'?"Alternatively, on e could begin by askingdirect questionswhich reflect onth e emotional cl imerte f one's neighborhood(eg, "Would yo u say hat mostpeople n your neighborhoodcan be trusted,or is t better to be very careful ndealing with them'?"; "What are the opportunities or work around here?")and then inquire into th e perceived elationshipbetween hat cl imate and the


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21 4 EMoTIOI.,IALCLIMATEnationalcl imate and government(e g "Does th e governmenteffect hat in anyway'/"). It would then be interesting o compare the perceptionsof people ndifferent regions.(3) Questionsmight be askedabout horv people perceive he cl imatesofdifferent areasor groups. Usualiy, problematic regions-ghetto areas,pris-ons, refugee camps-are hidden, an d distinct ethnic or classneighborhoodsare isolated ro m one another by almost invisible boundaries.An importantaspectof national cl imate may be the extent to which groups are isolatedorintegrated an d how aware lnost people are of the emotionetlcl imate of tl iedifferent groups,how accurate heir perceptionsare, and the extent to rvhichthey ca n empathizewith the viewpoint of other groups.While i t would appeardifficult to designquestions hat could separateknowledge from stereotypes,a good beginningmight be made by simply askingpeople to drarrv rude mapsof their own city an d note districtswithin which they would feel uncomfort-able, nsecureor atiaid, an d then comparing heir descriptions f the emotion-ai cl irnate n these egionswith th e actualdescriptionsof the inhabitants.Types or dimensionsof cl imate?while I have describeddifferent typesof cl imates, t might be desirable o usethese ypes to anchor th e ends of different dimensions,which could then beused to characterize l imate. we might, for example, describea nation's cl i-mate by using dimensionssuchas thoseshown n Table 1, where the first twodimensionsdescribeho w the people of a society elate o one another and thelatter describeho w th e people relate to their ideals.Possiblysuchdimensionsshould be treated as underlyingstructural factors hat influencewhat type ofemotional cl imate will prevzri lat a given time. In any case hey ma y providethe flexibi l i ty necessaryor the descriptionof complex cl imaticconditionsan dchanges.Whi le thesedimensions re no t complete ly ndependent f one another,bel ieve they cannot be col lapsedwithout losing descriptive power. For ex-ample,hosti l i ty and fear often co-exist,but intergroup hosti l i ty may exist

Table 7.1. Dimensionsof emotional c l imateRelat ion to others

INTERNATIONAL RE " rEW OF STUDIESON EN4OTION 2I 5without there being an overal l fear of the nation's government.Conversely,an overal l cl imate of fear ma y prevent intergroup hosti l i ty from coming intoexistence.Likewise, security (i n the senseof poii tical freedom) often goesalong with solidarity, but there are situationswhere one is present bu t th eother is absent.EMOTIONAL CLIMATE AN D POLITICAL UNITYWhile sirnplesocietiesma y be heid togetherby emotional dynamics hat unifya singlegroup of people, t ma y be argued hat most modern nation-states,an d certainly al l complex civi l izations,are only possiblewhen diversegroupsof people ar e held together.That is,modern civi l izationdependson groupsofdifferent peoplesworking together, rather than fighting each other out ofmutual distrust,an d while suchgroups can be arti ficial ly held together by th eforce of conquest, hey wil l spl i t into fragments unless here is some innercoherence, eeling of unity.E,xamining istory wi th th is idea in mind, Dennison (1928) d ist inguishesbetween wo major sorts of civi l izations: atriarchaland fratriarchal. Earl ier,matriarchal orms did not developbeyond he tribal ievelof organization.)Heargues hat each of these ypes requires a different sort of emotional culturean d if this cr"rl tures ne-9lected, r no t cultivatedby appropriatesocietalmech-anisms, he unity will disappearand the civi l ization rvi l l disintegrate. Thereare, of course nterestingmixtures of these orms.Fo r example,Dennison sawthe Chineseclan systemas having a strong fratriarchal unity but th e Chinesenationalgovernment spatr iarchalwi th a tenuousemotionaiuni ty.)Th e uni ty of a nat ion state may be related o the var iousdimensions femotionalcl imatepreviously r t icu lated:When a cl imate of sol idarity exists because he peopie of a nation sharease t of ideals, espect a common authority or are fighting a common enemy,there s a clearsense f nat ionaluni ty.However, h ismay or may not involvethe security which permits a tolerance or diversity.To the extent that sol i-darity is basedon enmity or on a respect or authority that is mingled withfear, there wil l be strong conformity pressuresha t wil l hinder expressions fethnic d iversi ty and true individual i ty.Becker 's (1968) deal of maximumindivic lual i tywi th in maximum communi ty can only exist to the extent hatthere is also a ci imate of security which permits the expressionof both groupan d individual differences.An d this can coincidewith a cl imate of sol idarityonly to th e extent that people care about one another and share some similarnat ional deals seede Rivera, 1989).In the absence f this caring,and of societalstructures hat reward personswho contribute to the welfare of the nation, a government wil l resort tovarying degreesof intimidation in order to maintain control. Then, somedegreeof fear vi l l be present,often masking ntergroup confl ict.Intergroup confl ir:t s alwzrys potential threat to unification regardless f

Fear (isolat ion)Hos t i l i t v po lar i za t ion) Security trust)Solidarity wil l ingnesso sacrifice)Relat ion to ideals

DissatisfactionDespai rDepressionInstabi l i tySatisfact ionHopeConfidenceSrab i l i ty


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21 6 EMOTIONAL CLIMATEwhether ethnic. amil iai or slass onfl ict s nvolved. If a cl imate of dissatisfac-tion exists and there is enough security, a poli tical group wil l organize toaddress he problem. This wil l be relatively easy to accomplish f there isconfidence n the societyan d th e poli tical group addressesheir dissatisfactionas a systemic problem that requires some structl lral change. Holvever, ifcircumstances ead the poii tical group to portray the problem as caLsetlbysome other group, a cl imate of hosti i i ty wii l arise an d polarizationwil l beginto occur. Then civi l war may ensue,or one group may seizecontrol of th egovernment and createa cl imateof fear n order to isolatepeopiean d preventpoli tical opposition.The latter chain of events s preciselywhat happened n Chile during th eperiod 1970-1990 se eSilva. 19t11). ortunately,enough solidarity an d caringpersisted n the Chileanclimate o permit a changeof government n 1990an dthe beginning of a new ciirnateof hope and confidence. n 1991 his cl imatecould be contrastedwith the cl imate of despair n Argentina or Guatemala,orwith the cl imate of hope without confidence n Mexico.I hope that we can begin to measure hese emotional cl imateswith objec-tive precision, hat thesemeasurements il l prove to have a certain predictivepower, and that they may aid th e peoplean d governmentsof different nationsto choosepolicies ha t wil l resr-rl tn ideal cl imates ather than thosedangerousto our human potentia l .ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSA preliminary raft of thischapterwa sdiscussedt a rvorkshop n emotional l imatesponsoredy heCtarkE,uropeanentern LuxembourgnJuly12-14,1991.1ouldl ike o thank he participantsor theirhelpful ornmentlrv.REFERENCESBecker, . , L i ra, E., Cost i l lo , l. ,Gomez, . & K ovalskys,. (1990). ' fherapyvi thvictims i pol i tical epressionn Chile:The challenge f social eparation.c.turnttlof SociaLsstres,6, 133-149.Becker,E. (t908). l-heStntcture JEvil .New York: The FreePress'Benedict, . (1970). ynergy: atterns f thegoodcultr-rre.mericttn nthropologist,72.320-333.Bensman..& Vidich, . (1971). usinessycles,lass ndpersonal i tv.n J. Bensman& A. Vidich (Ecls),ZfteNew AntericanSociety: heRevolution f the uliddleClass.Chicago: uadrangle ooks, haP. .Braunde Dtrnayevich.. & Puget, . (1989). tate errorism ndpsychoanalysis.nrcr-nationtrl ournttlof MentalHeulth,18,No. 2,98-112.Campbell, .. Converse, . E. & Rodgers. . L. (1976). heQtnli tl tof American ife;Perceptiorts,t'olutions,ntl Satisluctioirs.ew York:Russell age oundatton.Cantri l ,H. (1965).The Pattern tf Humttn Concerns. ew Brunswick,NJ : RutgersUniversitvPress.Chein. . (195.1).he environnrent s a determinant f behavior. ournsL J SocialPsy ho o gv,39. 115-127.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIESON EN,IOTIONDenison, J. H. (1928). Emotions as the Basisof Civ i l izut ion. New York: CharlesScribner'sSons.de Rivera, J.H. (1977).A StructuralTheoryof the Emotiorzs. ew York: InternationalUniversi t iesPress.de Rivera , . H. (1984). he s t ruc ture f emot iona l e la t ionsh ips .n P. Shaver Ed. ) ,Review oJ'Personality and Socittl Psvchologlt, Vol. 5: Emotions, Relationsltips, untlHea l th .Bever l vHi l l s ,CA: Sage, p. 116-145.de Rivera . J . H. (1986).The "ob jec t i ve-behav iora l " nv i ronmentof Is idor Chein .

Environnrcntan d Behavior, 18, 95-i08.de Rivera,J. H. (i989). Love, fear, and ustice:Transforming selves or the new world.Soc al J us ce Res trch. 3. 387 26.de Rivera. J. H. & Crinkis, C. (1986).Emotionsas social elat ionships.Motivat ion andEmotion, 10.351-369.Fisher .C. A. & Chon.K. -K. ( i989) .Durkhe iman d he soc iz r lons t ruc t ion f emot ions .Soc ul Psy' to ogl' Quarte rlv, | -r).Forehand,G. A. & Gi lmer, B . (1964). nv i ronmenta l z r r ia t ionn s tud ies f o rgan iza-t ional behavior. Ps;tchological ul let in,62. 361-381.Guimond,S. & Dube-S imond, . (1983).Rela t i ve epr i va t ion heoryan d he Ouebecnational ist movement: the cogni t ion-emotiondist inct ion and the personal-groupdeprivation isste. Journul of Per sonttlity and Sociul Psychology, 44,526-535.Gurr, T. R. ( 1970).Why fuIenRebe1. rinceton:PrincetorrUniverst iy Press.Heelas .P. (1989).Res tor ing he us t i f i edorder : Emot ions , n jus t i ce . nd the ro le oIcul ture.Soctal . l tLst iceesearch. . 375-386.James.L. R. & Jones.A. P. (1974).Organizat ional l imate.P.s;tchologicalul let in,Sl .I 096-1 12.Katona. G. (1979).Towarcla macropsychology. ntericuttPsl tchologlst,4, 118-126.Kelly. G. A. (1965). ' fhe threat of aggression.ournal of Llunnnist ic Ps1,chology,5,1 5-201.Kennon, G. F. (1960).rr. is izr nt l r l rc Westunder Leni t t t tnd Stal iz . Boston: Li t t le,Brown.Lewin , K . (1948). i rne perspec t i ve nd nr t ) ra le . n K. Lerv in Ed. ) , Rrsoh, ingSoc in lCotrf l icrs. ew York: Harper. pp. 103-12:1.Mart in-Barcr, I . (1981). La guerra civil en El Salvador. ECA. EstudiL>s entro-ttmericantts, o. 377-388,pp . 17-32.Mart in -Baro, . (1990).Rel ig ionas an ins t rument f psycho log ica l ar fare . ournn loJSocial Issues,46, 93-107.Maslow, A. H. (197i). The Fart l rcr Reuches J lunun Nature.Ne w York: Vik ing.McCle l land,D. (1965). ch ievenrentmot i va t ion an be c leve loped. urvarc lBus inessReview, 43. 178.Moore, B. (197u). njust ice: Tlrc Social BasesoJ Obedienceantl RevLtLt. ondon:Macmi l l an .Mul ler, E.N. (1980).The psychologyol pol i t ic :r lprotest and violence. n T. R. Gurr(Ed.). Hantlbook oJ Pol i t icalCortf l icr.New York: Free Press, p. 69-99.Oet t ingen,G. & Sel igman. I . E . P . (1990). ess imism nd behav iora l i gns f depres-sion in E,ast ersusWest Berl in. EuropeanJournal of SocialPs1'chology,2l l ,207-220.Park, R. E. (1967).On SocfulControl uttd C'ol lect ive ehut ' ior.Chicago:Universi ty ofChicago Press.Payne,R. L . & Mans f ie ld ,R . (1973).Rela t ionsh ips f percept ions f o rgan izat iona lc l imate to organizat ional tructure,context,and hierarchicalposi t ion.Adnti t t is tra-t iveScienceQuarterly,18 ,515-526.

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218 EMOTIONAL CLI]VIATESilva, P. (1991).State,pol i t ical changeand social ust ice n chile. paper presenrecl tthe 3rd Internationl l Conferenceon SocialJusticeResearch. l t rechr.The Nether-lands.Staub,E. (1990).Roots of EviL New York: CanibridgeUniversi ty Press.Tag iur i ,R. ( i968) .The concepr f organ izat iona ll imate . n R. Tag iur i& G. H. L i t rv in(Eds),Or.gcni iot ionalCl imate:E.rplort tr ions f a Concept.Boston: Harvard Univer-s i ty,Graduate Schoolof BusinessAdministrat ion, pp. I l -32.walker, I . & Pett igrerv,T. F. (1984).Relat ive deprivat ion rheory: An overview anclconceptual critique. British J ournal oJ'SctcialPsyclnlogy, 23, 30 -310.Walter, E. V. (1964).Terror ant l Resistante. xford: Oxford Universi tv press.wi l l i amson,B. (1989).Rev iewart i c le :Senr iment nd soc ia l hange. oc io log ica lRe -v i e . 37 .128 -141 .

I Emotion andNarrative:The Agonyandthe EcstasyJEANNETTE M. HAVILANDRUTH B. GOLDSTONDepttrnnentofPsychoktgy, Rutgers state {Jniversity,New Brtutstvick, NJ 0g903,USA

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