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DepoliticisationandthePoliticsofImperialismAlexSuttonPublishedinBritishPolitics2016[onlinefirst]WordCount:9792

AbstractApproachestodepoliticisationhavetendedtofocusonitsuseasadomesticstrategy.Thepurposeofdepoliticisation, whether discourse-, rule-, or institution-based, is to distance or limit the politicalcharacterofaparticularissueorpolicy.Wheretheliteratureondepoliticisationtendstobelackingisinitsinternationalrole.Thispaperseekstoexplorehowimperialistpolicies,thatispoliciesintendedtodominateonestatebyanother,havebeendepoliticizedbybeingchanneledthroughtechnically-managed or apparently economic institutions. The paper situates an account of depoliticisation interms of the nature of global capitalist society, and seeks to explore how imperial strategy wasdepoliticizedthroughtheSterlingArea.ThepaperlooksatanepisodeinBritish-Malayanrelationsinwhich the apolitical character of the Sterling Area is brought into question. The purpose of thisstrategy of depoliticisation, aswith its domestic instances, is to remove accountability from statemanagers,providethemwithgreatergoverningautonomyandtolimitsocialinstability,whileatthesametimetryingtoremovebarriersforcapitalaccumulationonaglobalscale.Keywords:imperialismdepoliticisationstatesterlingareaIntroductionTheconceptofdepoliticisationhasfoundconsiderabletractioninrecentyears,especially inthestudyofBritishdomestic politics. This hasgenerally beenplaced in termsof the contradictorynexuswithinwhichstatemanagementexists:betweenaccumulationandlegitimation.Moreover,it has been further categorised into institutional, rules-based and discourse depoliticisations(Flinders&Buller2006).Authorshavelookedathistoricalmomentsofdepoliticisation,fromthereturntotheGoldStandard(Kettell2004)toIMFconditionality in1976(Rogers2012)uptothepresent day, including the ERM (Kettell 2009), the operational independence of the Bank ofEngland (Burnham 2001), the discourse of globalization (Hay & Watson 1999) and even thegendereddiscoursesurroundingtheGovernoroftheBankofEngland(Clarke&Roberts2014).i The impetus that drives a depoliticized form of state management has focused onchanges in international finance (Burnham 2001) as well as the perceptions of both statemanagersandtheiraudience(Flinders&Buller2006).Generallyspeaking,thisaudiencehasbeenthe electorate of the state in question, and their perception of the national interest (Burnham2001, 128; Kettell 2008, 631). This way of understanding depoliticizing moves, focusing ondomesticpolicy,hastotallydominatedtheliteratureonthesubject. Lacking from the existing scholarship on depoliticisation is an appreciation of how thetarget audience of a depoliticizingmovemay not be a domestic one butmay instead be thepopulationofotherstates,orevenotherstatemanagers. Inotherwords,what ismissing fromthisliteratureisanappreciationofhowdepoliticisationisusedasatoolininternationaleconomicpolicy.Whileallauthorsonthissubjecthavehighlightedtheinternationaldimensionandoriginsofadepoliticizedformofstatemanagement,iitheyhavenotattemptedtounderstandhowstates

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considertheimpactoftheirownpoliciesonanaudienceoutsidetheirownterritories.Itisthisgapthatthispaperwillseektoaddress. Thepaper,offeringanopenMarxistaccountofthestate,willbeginwithananalysisofthenatureoftheglobaleconomywithinwhichstatesformulatepolicyandconductthemselves.Thissection will seek to emphasise how this context gives rise not only to the tendency towardsdepoliticisationbutalsoimperialism.Thispapertakestheviewthatdepoliticisationisameansbywhich the state is able to displace the political character of government policy or socialconditions, therebydiminishingthepossibility thatstatemanagerswillbeheldaccountable forunpopulardecisions.Imperialism,ontheotherhand,istakenasastrategythroughwhichastateisabletomanagethecontradictionsofcapitalistsocietythroughcommandeeringthecapacityofanotherstatetoactintheinterestsofcapital-in-general.

The next section seeks to provide a space within the existing scholarship ondepoliticisation to incorporate a non-domestic public as an audience, and to explainwhy statemanagers would seek to depoliticise a strategy of imperialism. The same basis applies todepoliticisation internationally as domestically and so the state, in its perpetual quest foreconomic growth, which is always conducted on an international scale, must consider theconsequencesthishasforitsownlegitimacyalsoonaninternationalscale. Thepaper’spenultimatesectionprovidesabriefoverviewofthestructuresoftheSterlingAreaasabasisforBritishinternationaleconomicpolicy.Thefinalsectionoffersananalysisofanincident in British-Malayan relations in 1955. This episode revolves around an attempt by theChiefMinisterofSingaporetousetherenewalofexchangecontrollawsasapoliticalweaponinfutureindependencenegotiations.ThesourcesderivefromNationalandBankofEnglandArchivedocuments, includingdocumentsfromtheso-called ‘MigratedArchives’thathaveonlyrecentlybeenmadepublic.

ThesefinaltwosectionswillarguethattheSterlingAreanotonlyactedasamechanismfor Britain to achieve its international economic and political goals but also provided ameansthroughwhichBritishimperialeconomicpolicycouldbepresentedasanapparentlyneutralandtechnocratic institution. In other words, it was a method through which Britain sought tolegitimize its own strategy for accumulation. As such, this paper will argue that this incidentrevealshowtheBritishstatewasabletodepoliticiseimperialism.AccumulationandLegitimationAbriefglanceattheliteratureondepoliticisationprovidesanimpressionofabeleagueredstate.Indeed, the common understanding of depoliticisation derives from seeing the state as theovertlypolitical formofan inherentlycontradictorysociety (Burnham2001,2006;Kettell2004,2006,2008;Rogers2009a,2009b,2012).Inessence,thestate,asSimonClarke(1983,118)notes,isaregulatoryagencyrequiredtosustaincapitalistsociety inthefaceof itscrisis-pronenature.Thishasbeendescribedasfunctionalistbutneednotnecessarilybeseenassuch.iiiAsBurnham(1994,6;2006,75)pointsout,theorganizationalapproachtothestate,fromwhichthisviewofdepoliticisation derives, focuses instead on the social origins of the state fromwhich its socialfunctioncanthenbeunderstood.It isfromunderstandingthestateasaformofsocialrelationswecanthenshedlightonhowandwhythestatebehavesinthewaythatitappearsto.ThisviewofthestatederivesfromMarx’sownemphasisonthematerialbasisofsociety.

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‘Neither legal relations nor political forms [can] be comprehended whether bythemselvesoron thebasisof a so-calledgeneral developmentof thehumanmind,butthatonthecontrarytheyoriginateinthematerialconditionsoflife…theanatomyof this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy.’ (Marx [1859]1971,20)

Thestate,inthisview,isindistinguishablefromcapitalistsociety.Itisamanifestationofcapitalism’sowncontradictions,whichcannotbesolvedbutonlymanaged.AsBurnham(2014,190)notes, theoriginsof thecapitaliststateultimately lie in theseparationof thepoliticalandeconomic spheres of human social life, which distinguishes it from states in other epochs ofhistory. The most fundamental contradiction for the capitalist state to manage is to seek animpossible reconciliation between two goals: accumulation and legitimation (Offe 1975, 26;Rogers 2009b, 636). These two contradictory functions derive from the crisis-prone nature ofcapitalistsocialrelationsthemselves.Ontheonehand,thestatemustseektomaintainthecircuitofcapital, forthis isnot justhowtherichbecomericherbuthowsocietyasawhole isclothed,fed, sheltered and so forth.However, capitalist production relies on the exploitationof labour.Thecircuitofcapitaldoesnotsimplyprovide, italso immiserates.Evergreater levelsofsurplusvaluearesoughtandextractedfromworkers,wagesarepusheddown,overproductiondevelopsand crises occur. In other words, the very basis of capitalist production and accumulationunderminesitself,delegitimizingthestateandimperilingtheorderofsocietyitself.However,thestate’s capacity to remedy this also undermines capitalist accumulation: by raising taxes,regulating the labourmarket, expandingwelfareprovision, etc. all go someway to imposingalimitonthecapacityofcapitaltoself-valorise. Thecontradictorynexuswithinandthroughwhichthestateexistsprovidesthecontextforunderstandinghow statemanagers formulatepolicy. Imperialism, aswithdepoliticisation, alsoemerges directly from these conditions; however, this is always under specific and highlycontingent historical circumstances. It is no surprise, then, that accounts of imperialism havevaried substantially since the beginning of the 20th Century. The earlier ‘Classical’ approachesunderstood imperialism as a seizure of the state apparatus by a particular fraction of capital,usuallyfinancecapital,inordertocompelterritorialconquest.ivTheseaccountscanbe,andhavebeen,criticizedfortheirrelianceontheir instrumentalisationofthestateasakindof ‘capitalisttrust’(Burnham1998,190;Sutton2013,221-225).Theseaccountsalsosuggestthatimperialismisa distinct periodof capitalist development,which lays themopen to criticismasdeterministic,ahistoricalandwith littleaccount for social change (Clarke1992, 149;Sutton2013,225).vMorerecentapproachesofferedthe‘sociological’ideathatimperialismisonlyconductedbyadistinct‘core’-typeofstateinordertoexploitthe‘periphery’-typeofstate(Burnham1998,190);however,theseaccountsremainproblematicinthattheirtypologyofstatesfetishizesthestate-formalongthenationallinesthroughwhichitappearsthusdiminishingtheneedforconcreteandhistoricalanalysisofinter-staterelations(Burnham1998,196;Sutton2013,226).vi

Instead, this paper situates both its approach to depoliticisation and imperialism in anopenMarxistunderstandingofcapitalist social relations.Thisapproach ‘sees relationsbetweennational states in termsof the social relationshipswhich constitutes states asmoments of theglobalcompositionofclassrelations’(Burnham1998,194-5).Assuch,thepaperadoptstheviewthat imperialism is not an essential or pre-determined characteristic or stage of capitalism, a

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unitaryentityorinstitution,orevenofatypeofstate,butisastrategyavailable,underparticularcircumstances,tostatemanagersinordertomanagethosecontradictionsinherenttocapitalistsociety(Sutton2013).

Thestrategyofimperialismnotonlyprovidesameansforthestatetopursuetheinterestsof capital-in-general, and to sustain the national and global circuit of capital, but it also takesadvantage of the appearance of a domestic/international split that characterizes capitalistsociety.Ratherthantakingplaceinthedomesticsphereofpoliticsapparently‘within’thestate,imperialismcreatesaparticular relationshipbetween states. It isalsoessentiallypolitical. In theparlance of political economists, economic historians and public policy researchers, it can beconsidereda formof internationaleconomicpolicy (Schenk1994;Krozewski2001;Hinds2001;Strange;Burnham2000;2006;Sutton2015).Thisinternationaleconomicpolicyisformulatedinthe exact same nexus as all other policy and asmuch for domestic reasons as international –whateverthatdistinctionmaymean(Burnham1998,191;Kettell&Sutton2013). Thisshifttoaninternationalarena,however,appearstotranscendtheboundariesofmeredomesticpolitics,shiftingpolicytoanapparentlyapoliticalrealm.Whilestatemanagersarestillprone to the problems of statecraft, as identified by Bulpitt (1986, 21), of achieving ‘somenecessarydegreeofgoverningcompetence’,itdoesnotsummontheproblemsofdelegitimationthatasimilardomesticpolicymight.Thisistrueforthesimplereasonthat,whileaccumulationistothebenefitofthestateconductingtheimperialpolicy,theensuingcontradictionsthemselvesaretransposedtoanotherstate’sterritory. To see a strategy of imperialism as having the potential to be depoliticised isstraightforwardenough–therolethattheinternationalrealmasanapparentsourceofexternaldiscipline plays in the legitimation of state policy has beenwell studied (Hay &Watson 1999;Rogers2009a,2009b).However,aswithanystatepolicy,thecontradictionsofcapitalhavenotbeen solved, they have only been temporarilymanaged. In the case of imperialism, they havemerelybeengeographicallyshifted(Harvey2003;2007).

Ineffect,onestate,A,hascooptedthecapacityofanotherstate,B,toactintheinterestsof capital-in-general and toensure that conditions for valorizationaremore suitable in itsownterritorythaninB’s.ExploitationandimmiserationarethereforeshiftedtostateBwhilesurplusvalue pours into A. State B, therefore, find its governing autonomy and potential for actionincreasingly limitedas all the contradictionsof capitalismcoalesce in its territory, endangeringtheverybasisofthisunequalrelationship. There are two aspects of how imperialism can generate undesirable consequences forstatemanagers. Firstly, not only can stateB find itself prone to allmannerof fallout from theimperialistpoliciesofstateA,thestatemanagersofstateBcanbeawareofthis.ThiscancausesevereobstaclesfortheactionsofstateAinconductingitsinternationaleconomicpolicyasthestatemanagersofstateBwillseektoredeveloptheirownautonomyofactionoverstatepolicy.Secondly,thepeopleofstateB,awareofstateA’sactionsandtheconsequencesofsuchintheirown territory, may become aggravated or aggrieved, leading to social unrest, governmentalchange,anddemandafundamentalchangeintherelationshipbetweenthetwostates.Assuch,state Amight find it prudent to present this policy as not just inevitable but as in some wayneutral, a technocraticdecisionor evenbenign.This can transform theappearanceof imperialpolicy into something much more palatable. This, then, is the basis through which state

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managerswould seek todepoliticise imperialism.However, it also reveals theaudiences thatadepoliticisationof imperialismwouldtargetas, inbothcases,a link isbeingmadebetweenthepolicyofstateAandtheconsequencesinstateB.Inordertobesuccessful,adepoliticizingmovewouldhavetoconvincethestatemanagersandpublicofstateBthatthepolicyof imperialismundertakenbystateA,andtherelationshipbetweenthetwostates,isnotaquestionforpoliticalcontestation.

Aswithanystatepolicy,imperialismiscontradictory.Imperialismcannotbesustainedinperpetuity;ittoomustbemanagedbecauseofitsconsequences.Itisinthiscontradictorynature,pervading all state policy, fromwhichdepoliticisationderives. Thenext sectionwill provide anoverviewofdepoliticisationasapolicyitself,coveringthekeydebatesandissuesinthesubject,anddevelopsfurtheritssignificancetoimperialism.DepoliticisationandImperialismDepoliticisation,asthenearobligatoryquotationgoes,‘asagoverningstrategyistheprocessofplacingatoneremovethepoliticalcharacterofdecision-making’(Burnham2001,128).It is,putsimply, a means by which state managers can pursue policies of accumulation whilesimultaneously insulatingthemselvesfromthedelegitimationthat inherentlyfollowsfromsuchpolicies. This can also be understood as a way for state managers to court credibility, andcompetence, but still protect themselves from having made unpopular decisions. Theunexpected, and apparently paradoxical, consequenceof thismove is that it actually increasesthepoliticalcontrolofstatemanagers,andtheirautonomytoact.Burnham(2014,195)furtherclarifieshisseminaldefinitionby, first,pointingout that that it isonly thepoliticalcharacterofdecision-making that is placed at one remove; politics can never truly be absent from themanagementofthestate,oranyaspectofsociety.Secondly,depoliticisationactuallyenhancespoliticalcontrolandautonomy,whilstgivingtheappearanceofthetransferofthatcontroltoanapparently ‘external’ entity. Finally, the success of a strategy of depoliticisation depends onachievingtheappearanceoftransferringthatcontrol. AsbothBurnham(2014)andWoodandFlinders(2014)note,thestudyofdepoliticisationhas grown considerably in recent years; however, its usage has been analytically limited.Examplesofdepoliticisationhavebeennoted throughout the20th centuryand theprocesshasfounditselfcategorisedbyanumberofscholars.FlindersandBuller(2006)offerahelpfulmeansofcategorizingdifferentiterationsofdepoliticisation.Theiraccountoffersthreedistinctformsofthestrategy:institutional,rule-,anddiscourse-baseddepoliticisation.WoodandFlinders(2014),alternatively, offer three different forms of depoliticisation: governmental, societal anddiscursive.Burnham(2014,190),ontheotherhand,offersthreeseparatewaysinwhichacriticalMarxistaccountofdepoliticisationcanbedeveloped:as ‘arm’s-lengthmanagement’, ‘anentireregimeofgoverning’,and ‘anaccountof themethodschosenbystatemanagerstoexternalizetheimpositionofdiscipline/austerityonsocialrelations’.vii Traditionally, the role that the international realm has played in the scholarship ondepoliticisation has focused on how changes in the international order have provided statemanagers the tools to depoliticize economic policy. Hay & Watson (1999) offer an excellentaccount of how ‘globalisation’ was presented as a non-negotiable aspect of the internationaleconomybyNewLabourinthelate-1990s,providingthemsimultaneouslywithmarketcredibility

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whilealsoshieldingthemfromanyfalloutfromunpopularpolicies.Burnham(2001),too,pointsout the importance of understanding the international basis behind the operationalindependence of the Bank of England. Rogers (2009a, 2009b) gives an account of IMFconditionalityundertheCallaghangovernment.WhiletheCallaghangovernmentwaspresentedasgoing ‘cap inhand’ to the IMFtoseekabridging loan–a loan that the IMFwasunsurewasnecessary.Thisallowedthegovernmenttointroducestricteconomicpoliciesthatwereboundtobeunpopular.Kettell(2008;2004a;2004b),meanwhile,providesuswiththreehistoricalepisodesof depoliticisation: the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the Gold Standard, and NewLabour’sdesire for theEuro.All three reveal the reasonsandvalueof seekingan internationalinstitutiontomanagemonetaryandeconomicpolicy,andthustodepoliticizeit.

The open Marxist approach to depoliticisation stresses the fantastical nature of theinternationalrealmandhighlightthatcapitalismis,byitsnature,aglobalsocialform.Thismeansthatastrategyofdepoliticisationfollowsthefantasticalformofcapitalistsocialrelations:whilenothingcaneverbetrulydepoliticized,itcanbesuccessfulinsofarasitisabletoexploitthebasicideological structures of capitalist society. In our society, politics and economics are seen asseparable,ifnotalwaysseparate,spheresofsociallife.Similarly,thenationalstate-formisseenastheessenceofdailypoliticallife,transforminginternationalpoliticsintoacompletelyseparaterealm of political life that is outside the normal channels of political contestation. This is theideological conceit thatallows strategiesofdepoliticisation in these instances to succeed: theyareseenas‘external’institutionsthatconstrainandlimitpossibilityindomesticpolitics. Theseexamplesofdepoliticisation,however,all focusonadomestic,nationalaudience.The state managers in these examples, understanding the depoliticizing nature of theinternationalrealmanditsinstitutions,havesoughttomanipulatethemfortheirownends.WiththeexceptionoftheHay&Watson(1999)piece,whichcoversadiscourse-baseddepoliticisation,the above examples offer studies of institution-based depoliticisation. Rules-baseddepoliticisation can be found quite readily in the 1990s, with both the Major and Blairgovernments use of inflation targets, Gordon Brown’s so-called ‘Golden’ and sustainableinvestmentrules,aswellasthe‘FiveEconomicTests’forBritishadoptionoftheEuro. Kettell (2008, 635), in assessing the effectiveness of a strategy of depoliticisation,identifies two key areas for study: thematerial effects and the impact on perceptions of thatstrategy.Materialeffectsaretheactualgoalsandobjectivesofthepolicy.Forexample,cuttingofgovernmentspending,controlofinflation,reducingearningsgrowth,etc.Thesecond,theimpactonperceptions, ismuchmoreproblematic tostudy.Thisconcernsthecapacityofastrategyofdepoliticisationtoredirectaccountability,orpublicattention,awayfromstatemanagers. However,Kettell(2008,637)makesanimportantpointthat‘analysingtheactualeffectsofa depoliticisation policy can only be achieved through a process of considered debate andreasoneddiscussionof the empirical evidence as it relates to the specific context of thepolicyitself’. The theoretical foundations for an account of the depoliticisation of imperialism canalready be found in the extant scholarship on depoliticisation. By the very fact that statemanagerscanappealto‘theinternational’eitherasinternationalinstitutionsorphenomena,thisfantastical realm has had the potential to depoliticize even the most nefarious of state-ledschemes.However, thetoolsavailable to thoseauthorswhohavetraceddomestic instancesofdepoliticisationarenotasreadilyavailabletothosestudyingitsinternationaliterations.

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Asnotedearlier,classrelationsarethestartingpointofaMarxistapproach:thestudyofclass analytically precedes the political and economic forms that society takes but has noexistenceindependentofthoseforms(Clarke1972,42;Bonefeldetal1996,11).Thestate,totheopenMarxistview,isaconcentrationofthepoliticalcharacterofsociety,thusrenderingtherestofsocietyoutsideofpoliticalcontestation.Assuch,peoplelivewhatMarx([1843]2010,13)calleda ‘twofold life’ between the state and society: a political realm, and an apolitical realm ofeconomic, or civil, intercourse. Apparently separated, the state and society appear asautonomousentitieswhilstactuallybeingessentiallyunitedascapitalistsociety.

It is in fact that capitalism appears different to reality that enables a strategy ofdepoliticisation to function. However, the state is regularly forced to intervene visibly in therunningofsocietytomanageclassrelations.AsBurnham(2014,197)notes,

‘Although a central aim of depoliticisation strategies is to convince key actors thatstatemanagers are, to an extent, disengaged frompolicymaking and delivery, thereorganisation of class relations periodically calls for the substantive and publicinterventionofthestate’

A strategyof imperialism is suchadirect interventionofone state into the runningof anotherstate.Whilebotharereifiedandfetishizedformsofcapitalistsociety,bothstatesexist,at leastfantastically, as essentially political entities and so their actions are perceived as politicallycontestable.

Since the justification for the existence of states is as apparently autonomous entitiesfrom the global economy and each other, the use of a strategy of imperialism imperils thisjustification, thus undermining the political justification for the existence of the state. AsBonefeld (2014, 203) notes, ‘every state is an entrepreneur ofmemory to legitimize itself andjustify its policies in the name of the nation and the national interest.’ However, through theimperialistactionsofonestate, theparticularnationalcharacterofanotherstate, justifiedwithvarious patriotic and nationalist ideologies, is also undermined, thereby not only causingproblemsforstatemanagersofthedominatedstate,butalso itspeople,whoseexploitationbycapital is obfuscated by nationalist ideologies and manifest as an anti-imperial and anti-government sentiment. Indeed, this is the process through which imperialism, the directintervention of one state into the workings of another, politicizes economic conditions andpolicymaking.

The interventionofonestate intotheterritoryofanother,byanactof imperialism, isadeeply and, importantly, overtly political act. Not only does it undermine the governingautonomyofstatemanagersinstateB,subordinatingtheparticularandhistorically-conditionedpoliticalcircumstancestothoseinstateA,butitalsounderminestheveryideologicalbasisuponwhichstatesdepend:politicalautonomy,sovereigntyandnationalself-determination.Assuch,astrategy of imperialism can cause significant unrest in the territory of the state that has beensubordinated, as well as leaving state managers in the subordinated state vulnerable to thisunrest. It is easy to see, then, how depoliticisation can be a useful addition to a strategy ofimperialism.

Therefore, the use of depoliticisation may be helpful in transforming a strategy ofimperialism intoanapparentlynecessaryor incontestableevent.The institutionof theSterlingArea,aswellasthediscoursesurroundingexchangecontrollawsintheArea,arethereforegood

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examples of such an attempt to externalise the imposition of British international economicpolicyonotherstatesintheArea.ItisinthisnextsectionthattheSterlingAreaanditsoriginswillbetracedthroughhistoricalanalysis.TheSterlingAreaTheideathattheinternationalrealmcandepoliticizegovernmentpolicyisclearfromtheexistingscholarshipondepoliticisation.TheveryfactthattheGoldStandard,theIMF,theERM,etc.areallcapableofplacingatoneremovethepoliticalcharacterofdecision-makingmeansthattheseentitiesareallcapableofdoingsobyvirtueoftheirapparentlyextra-nationalexistence.Indeed,as Burnham (2001, 134) notes, ‘the stronger (and more distant) the set of ‘rules’, the greatermaneuverabilitythestatewillachieve,increasingthelikelihoodofattainingobjectives.’Burnham(ibid., 131) also identifies the shift from nebulous international cooperation to a more fixedregionalintegrationintheearly1990skeycharacteristicsofdepoliticizedmanagement. AsbothKettell (2004; 2008) andRogers (2009a; 2009b) show, international institutionswere able to depoliticize economic policy far before the 1990s. However, while these authorsaccountforthedepoliticizingeffecttheseinstitutionsprovidedfordomesticeconomicpolicy,thispaper contends that these institutions can also depoliticize international economic policy. Thissection of the paper will look at the depoliticizing capacity of the Sterling Area, which ischallengedduringadebacleoverexchangecontrol laws inSingapore in late1955.TheSterlingArea, this sectionwill argue,was able to distance the political character of British imperialismwhilealsoenhancingmarketcredibility. The official history of the Sterling Area, as recorded in an unpublished Foreign OfficepaperwrittenbyAllenChristelow,under-secretarytotheTreasuryatthetime,declaresthat itsexistencewasconcomitantwiththeextensionofBritishsovereigntythroughoutthe19thcentury(TNAFO371/82915,TheSterlingArea,24th January1950). Itwasa regionwithinwhichSterlingwas used as a means of exchange, and within which UK banks operated. This official historymaintained that theSterlingAreagrewnaturally as a result ofBritain’s political and economicexpansion, and subsequent lawspertaining to theSterlingAreaweremerelyofficial stampsofexistence,ratherthanthegenuineinceptionoftheArea.(ibid.)

Thereisanelementoftruthtothisperspective,asBritainexpandedothercountrieswereincorporatedintoBritain’spoliticalandeconomicinfluence.However,theactualdevelopmentoftheSterlingAreaoccurredinthe1930sand1940s,owingtoaseriesoflawspassedbytheBritishstate.WiththeabandonmentoftheGoldStandardin1931,Britainadoptedamanagedexchangerate. This led to the creation of the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA). The EEA was themeansbywhichtheBritishstatewasabletomanagetherateofSterling,whichwasstill freelyconvertibleandtherewerenoexchangecontrols.

In1932,theBritishgovernmentpassedthe ImportDutiesAct,which imposedaflatratetariffonallimportstotheUK,exceptonrawmaterialsandfoodstuffs(McKay1932).Thisresultedin a trading area approximating the British Empire and Dominions, which would have low,reciprocaltariffsforinternaltradeandhightariffsforanyexternaltradeoutsideofthearea,thepurpose of which was to ensure access to markets for British produce and to stimulateCommonwealthtrade(Eichengreen&Irwin1995,2-7).

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TheDefence(Finance)RegulationsinAugust1939sawthelegalemergenceoftheSterlingArea as a means of exchange control. These exchange controls were copied throughout theSterlingAreaandresultedintheTreasurymaintainingamonopolyofallgoldandforeignreserveswithin the Sterling Area. These controls prohibited payments to all non-residents withoutpermission of the Treasury, and allowed the Treasury ‘to exercise control over all securitiesmarketable abroad and to compel their registration with a view to compulsory requisition byHMG’.Thiswasthecreationofthe‘dollarpool’andtheexactnatureoftheSterlingAreaaftertheSecondWorldWar until its demise in 1972 (TNAFO371/82915, TheSterlingArea, 24th January1950). ExchangecontrolsweregenerallydesignedtomanagehowSterlingwastransferredintoUSdollars,duetothedollar’sgreatvalueduringthewar.Schenk(1994,8)suggeststheSterlingAreaafter thewarcouldbecharacterisedby three features: ‘memberspegged theirexchangerates to sterling, maintained a common exchange control against the rest of the world whileenjoying free current and capital transactions with the UK and, thirdly, maintained nationalreserves insterlingwhichrequiredpoolingforeignexchangeearnings.’Theprincipalpurposeoftheexchangecontrols,however,shouldbeseenintermsofthepost-wardollarshortage:thesecontrols were intended to restrict convertibility of Sterling into dollars. Due to the tradeimbalancebetweentheUSandtherestoftheworld,andwithoutthesecontrols,Britishgoldandcurrency reserveswould have swiftly dwindled. Britain and the SterlingAreawould have beenunabletoimportanygoodsfromtheUS,exacerbatingthefundamentalproblem:theinabilityofBritishgoodstocompetewithUSexports.Furthermore,thepost-warsettlementrequiredlarge-scaledollarimportstoforthereconstructionandrestructuringoftheBritisheconomy(Burnham1990). As such, the Sterling Area was essential to Britain’s continued economic vitality andwithout it, harsh austeritymeasures would have been necessary, bringing the entire post-warconsensusintodoubt. However, this system was prone to regular crisis. British reserves, in the EEA, thoughsupportedbythewholeSterlingArea,werenotsufficienttosupportthedemandfordollargoods.AsthedraftannouncementofOperationROBOT,thoughnevergiven,suggests,thiswasaverydelicatesystemandneededtobesupportedinordertosustainBritain’seconomyafterthewar.

‘TheUKisthebankeroftheSterlingArea.Weholdthegoldanddollarreservesuponwhichthewholesterlingsystemdepends.Itisanimportantsystem,foritfinanceshalfthetotaltradeoftheworld.Itsstrengthandcontinuityarenecessarynotonlyforusbutforthewholeworld. If thereservesaretoosmallorsubjecttotoogreatstrains,then the strength and continuity of the system are endangered. Yet our existingexternalfinancialsysteminfactputsthemaximumstrainwhereitcanleastbeborneandwhereitcancausethegreatestdamage...Ourreservesarenotcapableoftakingthesamestrainasbeforethewar.’(BEG1/123,DraftofROBOTannouncement,25thJune1952)

Indeed, the systemwas so delicate and needed somuch support that plans like ROBOTwereseriouslyconsidered.viiiTheSterlingArea,then,canbeunderstoodasameansthroughwhichtheBritish state was able to support its reserve position through the pooling of foreign currency,particularlyUSdollars,andgold.ThesereserveswereusedtosupportthevalueofSterlingandthe imports that were necessary to enable Britain’s postwar reconstruction (Burnham 1990).

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Exchangecontrol law in theUKand theSterlingAreawas crucial to theoperationof theAreaevenbythemid-1950ssinceitprovided‘thepowerswhicharenecessarytorestrictcurrencyandfinancialtransactionssolongasthesterlingareacannotmaintainabalanceofpaymentswiththerestoftheworldwithoutsuchrestrictions.Theneedtomaintaintherestrictionscontinues’(TNAFCO141/7437, Treasury Memorandum from the Financial Secretary of the Federation, 25November1955).

TheSterlingArea’sexistenceafter1939,then,tooktheformofaformalizedcurrencyandtradingzone,whichreliedprincipallyontheexistenceoftheexchangecontrollawsinitsmemberstates.WhiletheSterlingAreawasneverconceivedof,normanaged,asapermanentaspectofBritish policy, these laws prevented the convertibility of Sterling without the approval of theBritish state, as well as required the pooling of foreign currency earned by the sale ofcommoditiesandservicesfrommemberstates,bytheBankofEnglandintheEEA(Schenk1994,130).Oncepooled in theEEA, this foreign currencypool became, for all intents andpurposes,Britain’s foreign currency reserves.As such, it is generallywell accepted that theSterlingAreawasnotjustamechanismforimperialeconomicpolicybutthatitwasaninternationalinstitution(Schenk 1994, 135). Indeed,muchof the literatureonBritish imperial economicpolicy and theSterlingArea treats theempireand theAreaasamonolithic institution (Bell 1958;Hinds1987,1999,2001;Krozewski1993,2001;Schenk1994,1996);however,thisremainsaproblematicviewinthatitfetishesBritishimperialism,makingit‘thing-like’–an‘empire’–andthusside-linestheneed for critical analysis of relations between specific states (Sutton 2015, 9-15). In effect, intreating the Sterling Area, or the British Empire, as things themselves obfuscates the socialrelations that created them, and is manifested through them. Moreover, as has been notedelsewhere (Krozewski 1997, 850; Darwin 2002; Sutton 2015, 15), this kind of analysis has theunfortunateconsequenceofacceptingadichotomybetweenpoliticsandeconomics.

Considering the specific imperial relationships between Britain and other states revealsconsiderablevariation.MalayawasoneoftheprincipaldollarearnersfortheSterlingArea’sdollarpool, and hence one of the main supports for Britain’s post-war economy. Malaya was theSterlingArea’slargestdollarearnerthroughitssaleofnaturalrubberandtintotheUS,withanetsurplus of US$120m in 1954: greater than the rest of the colonies’ earnings combined (TNACO1030/100,ExchangeControlProblems inMalaya,16September1955).CoupledwiththefactthatBritainitselfwasanetdollarspenderofUS$250min1954,MalayastillremainedextremelyimportanttothemaintenanceoftheSterlingArea,whichwasstillvitaltoBritisheconomicandmonetarystrategy(ibid.).ItwasthiscapacitytocontributetotheSterlingArea’sdollarpoolthatwaschallengedinanincidentin1955.Thenextsectionwillfocusonthisincident.Marshall’sLawTheexchangecontrolsoftheSterlingAreabecamethecentreofapoliticaldisputeinSingaporeattheendof1955.ThenewlyelectedChiefMinisterofSingapore,SaulMarshall,decidedtousethe collective dollar earnings of Malaya as a bargaining chip in any future constitutionalsettlementbydeliberatelypoliticisingSingapore’sexchangecontrollaws.Giventhenatureoftheconstitutional arrangementbetween thegovernmentsofSingaporeandMalaya,whateveronegovernmentchosetodohadenormousrepercussionsontheother.Asa resultof this, too, theBankofEnglandconsideredboththeireconomiesandexternaltradeasonlyfullycomprehensible

11

as a single whole (BE OV65/5, Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, Trade and Balance ofPayments,24January1957).

At the upcoming Constitutional Talks in 1956, he intended to press Britain for earlyindependence for Singapore in 1957 (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.143, 9 November 1955).However,Marshall expected this to be dismissed out of hand and thatwaswhy hewished tomakeanissueoftheexchangecontrolordinance.

‘TheonlyweapontohandwastheMalayandollarsurplusandsoheproposedtousethat by deliberately and openly threatening to deny its use to the SterlingCommonwealthby theabandonmentofexchangecontrol ifhedidnotgetwhathewantedonthepoliticalfront.’(TNACO1030/100,Telegramno.687,7November1955)

Marshall stated his intention to renew Singapore’s exchange control ordinance for sixmonthsonly,whichwashalf theusual time (TNACO1030/100,ExchangeControl, 9November1955). In fact,Marshall explicitly stated to theGovernorofSingapore that ‘hewanted toputaloadedpistolonthetableknowingthattheSecretaryofStateandsterlingCommonwealthcouldnever let him use it’ (TNA FCO141/7437, Telegram from High Commissioner of Federation toColonial Office, 7 November 1955). Marshall’s demand then, as understood by the HighCommissioneroftheFederation,waseithertoreceiveearlyself-governmentorforcetheBritishto renew exchange controls by fiat and to dismiss him, thereby strengthening his politicalpositioninSingaporeintermsofhis‘fightfor[Singapore’s]freedom’(ibid.).ThePrimeMinister,AnthonyEden,declaredMarshall’smoveas‘blackmail’(TNACO1030/100,PhilipdeZuluetatoJBJohnston, 10November 1955).However, indoing so, theBritishgovernmentwould visibly anddirectlyinterveneintheeverydayrunningoftheSterlingArea,thusrevealingtheextenttowhichSingaporeangoverningautonomywassubordinatedtotheBritishstate,therebypoliticisingtheroleoftheSterlingArea.

Marshall had formedonlyaminoritygovernment inSingaporeandhispoliticalpositionwasweak.OnemeansofestablishinghiscredentialsasatrueleaderofSingapore,withthecity’sinterests at heart, was by seeking an economics adviser from the IMF to replace the Bank ofEngland’sappointee,JBLoynes.MarshallarguedthatLoyneswouldneveractinMalaya’sinterestunless it was also in Britain’s or, particularly, the Bank’s interests. It was widely believed inMalayanpoliticalcirclesthat,whiletheColonialOfficehadMalaya’sbest interestsatheart,theBank had sectional interests and was not committed to the development of the Malayaneconomy(BEOV65/4,Malaya,28thApril1950).SirRobertBlack,GovernorofSingapore,feltthat,indoingso,MarshallwascontinuingtopresenthimselfasatrulyMalayanpolitician,independentofLondon(TNACO1030/100,Telegramno.142,8thNovember1955).

The British state, in response toMarshall’s position, tried to convince him of the goodreasons to retain exchange controls, aswell as the value of the SterlingArea.MacGillivray, inconversationwithMarshall, told him that this course of actionwas very dangerous toMalayaeconomicallyandevena fully independentMalayawouldneedsomekindofexchangecontrol.HefurtheremphasisedtoMarshallthattheBritishwouldcallhisbluffandseriousdamagecouldbedonetotheMalayaneconomyinthemeantime.MarshallrespondedbysayingthatitwouldbeimpossiblefortheUKtocallhisbluffastheindependentSterlingAreawouldinterveneandforceBritaintoaccepttheterms.However,MarshallacknowledgedtoMacGillivraythatthisbargainingstrategywasuselesswithoutthesupportoftheFederation,astheFederationwasthesourceof

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thevastmajorityofMalaya’sdollarearnings(ibid.).BothMarshallandtheBritishthensoughttheFederation’ssupport.

Marshall had already sought Abdul Rahman’s, the Chief Minister of the Federation,supportattheJointMinistersConferenceand,indeed,therewassupportintheFederationduetothe widespread belief that Malaya would do well out of leaving the Sterling Area (TNACO1030/100, Exchange Control Problems in Malaya, 16 September 1955). However, his planrequiredthesupportoftheentireAlliancePartyintheFederationandthiswasnotforthcoming(TNACO1030/100,Telegramno.143,9November1955). AttheJointFederation-SingaporeMinistersConference,MarshallputforwardaseriesofargumentsinfavourofhisproposalforusingExchangeControlOrdinanceasabargainingchipintheConstitutionalTalkswithLondon:

• Malayaasawholelostmorebyexchangecontrolthanitgained;• The Central Bank proposed by the IBRD mission would give Malaya further financial

independence and, following formal independence, this might help in finding a futureawayfromtheSterlingArea;

• TherulingpartiesinbothSingaporeandtheFederationwerecommittedtoindependencein1957;

• A six-month extensionwould seeOrdinance expire in June 1956, bywhich timeBritainwouldhavetorespondtodemandsforacceleratedself-government;

• Takingahard linewiththeBritishgovernmentwouldpoliticallystrengthentheMalayanChiefMinistersandgovernments;

• Singaporecouldnotactalone.TheFederation’sandSingapore’sinterestswereconjoinedandAbdulRahman’ssupportwasvital(TNACO1030/100,ExchangeControl,9November1955)

TheseargumentswerecompletelydismissedbySingapore’sownMinisterforEconomicAffairs;however,Marshallwas uninterested in the technical considerations of his arguments – hewassolely concerned with the political success of his gamble (ibid.). The Colonial Office was wellawarethatasenseofinjusticesurroundingMalaya’snetdollarcontributiontotheSterlingAreahadbeguntopoliticisetheSterlingArea,andcouldnotsimplybedismissedaspurepropagandaorignorance.ThisideaofcolonialexploitationhadbecomedeeplyembeddedinthebeliefsofthecommercialandindustrialsectorsinMalayaandtheColonialOfficewereworriedthattheissueofMalaya’s membership in the Sterling Area would shift entirely from an economic issue into apoliticalone (TNACO1030/100, ‘MalayaandtheSterlingArea’,27September1955).Assuch, itcouldbecomeawidelyheldpublicviewthattheAreawassynonymouswithcolonialexploitationanddominationbyaforeignpower,whichwouldbeextraordinarilydifficulttorespondto,otherthantoarguetheeconomicbenefitstoallofMalaya’scontinuedmembershipoftheArea(ibid.).In other words, the British state continued to see the key basis for maintaining Malaya’smembershipof theSterlingAreawas topersist in theclaimthat itwasasolelyeconomic issue,thustoremovemembershipfromtherealmofpoliticalcontestation.

Theirony,however,wasthatMarshallsawthesetechnicalargumentsasfurthersupportforhisownposition.AsSirRobertBlackreportedtoLennox-Boyd,

‘Themoreweattempttoargueonfinancialandeconomicgroundsthatitisessentialfor Malaya to stay in the Sterling Area, the more convinced, of course, the Chief

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Ministermay become that he has a powerful weapon and therefore hewill be themore determined to use it politically.’ (TNA CO1030/100, Exchange Control, 9

November1955)This meant that Marshall himself could not be persuaded to retreat from his position,

leavingonlylimitedoptionsforBritishstatemanagerstodealwiththisdilemma.SirRobertBlackoutlinedtheproblemwiththeavailableoptionsincorrespondencewiththeColonialOffice:

‘IfIaccept…thattheOrdinanceshouldbeextendedfor6monthsonly,thentheChiefMinisterhashispoliticalweaponfornextAprilandbusinessisunsettledbythefutureuncertainty. If I… prolong the Ordinance for one year, then there is the strongpossibility of a constitutional crisis. Such a crisis would also, of course, arise if theOrdinance were extended for 6 months now, and has to be extended without theMinisters’ agreement after June next year.MrMarshall could obviouslymake greatpolitical play with the “British government’s greater regard for sterling than forSingapore’s self-government”, etc. etc.’ (TNA FCO141/7437, From Governor ofSingaporetoColonialSecretary,9November1955)

InBlack’swords, this comes across as a dilemmaof politicisation: either theBritish statedoesinterveneandpoliticisethewholesystemofexchangecontrols,andthusthebasisoftheSterlingArea itself, or do nothing and reduce the state’s market credibility quite substantially. Blackfurtherelaboratedonthepointofmarketcredibilitybypointingout that ‘absenceofexchangecontrol in the present climate of political and economic uncertainty of the areawould put thelocal economy at the mercy of local and external speculators in the Malayan currency. TheFederationwouldalmostcertainlybeunableinsuchcircumstancestopreventaflightofcapital’(ibid.).Clearlyunderstoodandarticulatedhere,then,byBritishstatemanagersarethenegativeconsequences associated with the failure to depoliticise the imperial character of the SterlingArea,whichwouldhavebeensevere.

Sir Hilton Poynton, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, underlined theimportanceofthewholesituation,toLeslieRowan,theheadoftheOverseasFinancedivisionattheTreasury.

‘I think you will agree that refusal by Singapore and the Federation to continueexchangecontrolamounts ineffecttothewithdrawal (orexpulsion)ofMalayafromthe Sterling Area. However alarming this may be to the UK and the [rest of theSterling Area] I think it would be tactically unwise to let Marshall think we werealarmedonthisgroundsinceitwouldenhancethevalueofthismanoeuvreinhiseyesas a form of political blackmail. Moreover if the price asked is early full self-governmenttherewouldbenothingtostopMarshallandhisfriendsdoingwhatevertheywantwhentheyhavegotfullself-government.’(TNACO1030/100,AHPoyntontoSirLeslieRowan(SECRET),16November1955)

ItwasconsideredveryunlikelybytheColonialOfficethathewouldagreetoSingapore’ssuggestion,thoughtheColonialOfficewasawareofthepossibility.SirRobertBlackadvisedtheColonialOfficethat, ifworsecametoworst,hecouldrejectthesix-monthextension,orforceafurther extension after the sixmonths; however, hewarned that both courses of actionwouldlead to a constitutional crisis, thus politicising the SterlingArea and exchange controls and be

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usedbyMarshalltofurtherhisownagenda(TNACO1030/100, ‘ExchangeControl’,9November1955). TheonlyavailableoptionwastostopMarshallgaininganysupportfromtheFederation.ThiscouldonlyrestonthefactthatBritainwouldconsenttoacceptingthelapsingofexchangecontrolordinance,andthattheconsequencestoMalaya’seconomywouldbecatastrophic.Theadvice sought by the ColonialOffice from the Bankwas clarification as towhether the Britishgovernment could afford to call Marshall’s bluff, or if Britain was required to stop it as thedominantstateoftheSterlingArea.TheColonialOfficealsoaskedforadocumentdetailingthemerits of the Sterling Area, and the demerits of leaving to join another currency bloc (TNACO1030/100,AHPoyntontoSirLeslieRowan(SECRET),16November1955).

‘Whatseemstoustobeneededisapaperwritteninsimplelanguageforthelayman,dividedperhaps into twoparts: the firstwould setout the verymeagreadvantageswhichwouldaccruetoMalayaifsheweretoallyherselfwiththeUSdollar;thesecondwould show the immediate and formidable disadvantage which would follow onseverancefromthesterlingarea.Thiscould…bepitchedfairlystrongandincludetheblockingofthe£300mMalayanSterlingBalances.’(ibid.)

Marshallwasawarethathecouldnotuseexchangecontrolasabargainingchipunlesshisministers supported it, and, crucially, the Federation government supported it. Poynton thensuggestedtoRowanthatMacGillivrayandBlackshouldbepressedtoconvincetheministers inbothgovernmentstorejectMarshall’sproposal(ibid.).However,iftheywereunabletopersuadeMarshalltogiveuphisideabeforeheleftSingaporeforLondon,thenitwouldbemadeanissueinLondonattheConstitutionalTalks.ThelineagreedbetweenPoyntonandRowanwasthattheColonialSecretarywoulddiscussitbutonlyasaneconomicmatter.

Given the determination of Lennox-Boyd to only discuss the situation as an economicmatter, and tomaintain therewould be no alternative but for Singapore to leave the SterlingArea, there was a strong desire by British statemanagers to prevent thismatter becoming acontestablepoliticalissue.Again,thepoliticisationofexchangecontrolswassomethingthatAlanLennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, was explicitly eager to avoid. In a telegram to the HighCommissionerof theFederation,SirDonaldMacGillivray, and toSirRobertBlack,heexplicitlystatesthat.

‘Itisclearthatsuchmeasureswouldhavetheregrettableeffectofbringingexchangecontrolintothearenaofpoliticaldisputeundercircumstanceswhichwouldbewhollyinimical to a cool and dispassionate examination of such technical aspects of thesystem as might require modification.’ (TNA FCO141/7437, Exchange Control, 23

November1955)NotonlyisLennox-Boyd’slanguagequiteindicativeofwhatBurnham(2001,144)referstoasthe‘guiseoftechnicalefficiency’butisalsoredolentofNormanLamont’sconcernthatthefailureoftheERMwouldleadtodecision-makingbeing‘seenasentirelypolitical’(Lamont1996,275,citedin Kettell 2008, 644). Indeed, thismoment reveals the core goal of British statemanagers: bytreatingexchangecontrolasapurelytechnicalissue,theunequalbasisoftherelationshipsintheSterlingArearemainsuncontested.However,duetotheir inherentlypoliticalnature,theywerenotcertaintoremainsoforever.AsBurnham(2014,202)notes‘itwouldbenaivetoassertthatbydepoliticisingeconomicpolicystatemanagerscanavoidtheemergenceofpoliticalunrest’.Inthis

15

case,Marshall’sdesireforpoliticalaggrandizementandincreasinggoverningautonomydirectlyledtoastruggleoverthepoliticizationofexchangecontrolsinSingapore;theoutcomeofwhichwasfarfrompredetermined.

Lennox-Boyd remained hopeful that MacGillivray would see success in his efforts topersuade ministers not to pursue threats to abandon exchange controls in Singapore, or theFederation. Lennox-Boyd telegrammed MacGillivray that he should remind ministers inSingaporeandtheFederationthateconomicsetbackswouldmeanpoliticalsetbacks,referringtoindependence.HealsoemphasisedthattheexchangecontrolsoftheFederationandSingaporewere‘ofvitalsignificancetotheeconomiclifeoftheArea’(TNACO1030/100,Telegramno.164,23 November 1955). However, he also asked MacGillivray to emphasise that linking the twosubjects for political or constitutional progress could lead to catastrophe economically andpolitically (ibid.). Indeed, Lennox-Boyd told MacGillivray that even the minimummeasures toprotectBritainand theSterlingArea fromapotentialMalayan free-exchangeareawouldhaveenormousconsequencesforMalaya.Outliningthesemeasures,hetoldMacGillivraythatcontrolswouldhavetobesetupbetweentheSterlingAreaandMalaya,aswellasarestrictiononMalayandevelopmentcapital,andtheseverehindranceofthetraditionalbankingrelationshipenjoyedbyAreamembers(ibid.;BEOV65/4,SterlingArea:AbandonmentofExchangeControlinSingapore(SECRET), 29 November 1955). In essence, it would have consequences that were almostsynonymouswithMalaya’swithdrawal fromtheSterlingArea;however,Britishstatemanagerswereadamantthatthisoutcomewouldnotoccur.

Above all, Lennox-Boyd was hopeful that Federation Ministers were deterred fromMarshall’s proposed course of action by the economic argumentsmade, and that they wouldtherefore not support Marshall’s proposal. MacGillivray wrote back to Lennox-Boyd two dayslatertotellhimthathehadmetwithAbdulRahman.RahmanhadtoldhimthattheFederationwasextremelyunlikelytosupportMarshall’sproposal,thoughMarshallwascomingtoseehimonthe 26thNovember to discuss the issuewith Rahman (TNACO1030/100, ExchangeControl, 25

November1955). MacGillivray also relayed that the members of the Singapore Executive Council hadinformed him they intended to renew exchange controls for another year due to theoverwhelming economic argument (ibid.). Four days later, exchange control ordinances wererenewedbyoneyear,ratherthansixmonths.BlacktoldLennox-BoydthatMarshalljustifiedhisclimb-downbysayingthat‘hisbargainingposition[was]sufficientlystrongnottohavetomakeuseoftheexchangecontrolweapon.Inthecircumstanceshehadnooptionbuttoabandontheidea’ (TNACO1030/100,Telegramno.156, 29November 1955; FCO141/7437, FromGovernorofSingaporetoSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,29November1955). Despite the eventual climb-down from Marshall’s initial position, Britain’s strategicinterests,theroleoftheSterlingArea,andthefearofBritishstatemanagersthatitbepoliticisedare all highlighted by this episode. Marshall’s goal was to ‘weaponise’ Singapore’s exchangecontrols as a political tool for the constitutional talks for Singapore’s eventual independence.However,hadthisbeensuccessful, itwouldhavebroughttheexchangecontrolsintoarealmofpoliticaldispute,politicisingnotonlytheir role in theSterlingAreaandtheArea itself,butalsocreatinganatmosphereofeconomicuncertaintyandunderminingmarketcredibility.

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Ultimately,Marshall’sgamble failedduetohis relianceontheFederationtosupporthisposition.Britishstatemanagers,knowingthisweakness inhisposition, realised itwas theonlyreasonableoptiontounderminehim.However,bythistime,BritishstatemanagershadrevealedhowconcernedtheywerethatMalaya’sdollarearningsmightbemightbebroughtintoquestion,generating a numberof arguments forMalaya to remain committed to theArea.This episodealsorevealsthatBritishstatemanagersreliedonthetechnicalnatureoftheArea’sstructuretodepoliticise the Sterling Area, which was, in effect, a long-term aspect of imperial economicpolicy.

WhileWoodandFlinders(2014,153)arecriticalofa‘narrowstate-centric’approach,theirownperspective, followingHay (2007) and Flinders (2008),makes a goodpoint in highlightingthatrepoliticisationisanever-presentdangerinanydepoliticisation.However,thisisalsoapointmadebymore‘state-centric’approaches,suchasbyBurnham(2001;2007;2014),Kettell(2008;2009)andRogers(2009a;2009b).

Inthesecircumstances,Marshall,inhisroleastheChiefMinisterofSingapore,soughttotransform exchange control from a depoliticized aspect of economic policy to a much morediscretionary tool. This was a political gamble in order to develop an even greater level ofgoverning autonomy and to preserve his own political position. Indeed, after the Londonnegotiations,MarshallwasforcedtoresignhispositionasChiefMinister,declaringthathehadfailedinhismissiontoachieveindependenceforSingapore.

In this instance, however, that governing autonomy related not only to a domesticaudiencebutalso to theBritish state.Marshallalso sought tobringattention to the inherentlyunequalnatureoftheSterlingArea’sorganizationandpurpose.Thegoalofthispoliticizationwasto leverage speedier independence for Singapore, aswell as to sure up his ownweak politicalposition, but the consequences of thiswould have been far broader, endangering the SterlingArea’sapparentapoliticalnatureingeneral,thusbringingthewholeorganizationofBritishpost-warexternaleconomicpolicyintoquestion.ConclusionThestudyofthevariousstrategiesofdepoliticisationhavesofarfocusedondomesticpoliticsandhow either international institutions or the phenomenon of globalization can be introduced todepoliticize economic policy-making at the domestic level. Absent, however, is how thedepoliticisationofinternationaleconomicpolicycanbeusedtolimitthechallengestolegitimacybroughtaboutbythesepolicies.Challengestolegitimacycanbebroughtaboutby,forexample,ahighlystringentimportpolicyorcurrencyrationing,ortheopposite:forcedopeningofmarketstointernational competition. The consequences of these actions can be ill will from other statemanagers,orunrestfromthepopulationofanotherstate.

This article adopted an open Marxist approach to the state, upon which it based anunderstandingofdepoliticisation.The fantasticalnatureof social relations,aspresented in thispaper,hasbeenakeytargetforopenMarxistsandthosewhostudydepoliticisation(Bonefeldetal.1992a,xii).Thisapproachseekstodemystifythefetishizednatureofsocialrelationsas‘thing-like’.Thepaperengagedwithamatrioshka-likeseriesoffetishizedsocialrelations:itarguedthat‘Empire’ isnotamonolithicentitybutastrategybornoutofthecontradictorysocietyofwhichthestateisaform;theSterlingAreaisnotaninstitutionbutatoolthroughwhichtheBritishstate

17

managedanumberofimperialrelationships;politicsandeconomicsarenotseparatecategoriesbutanideologicalconceitthroughwhichclassstruggleischanneled.

Thepaperhighlightedtheimportanceofunderstandingtheinherentandconstanttensionbetweenpoliticizationanddepoliticizationandhowitmanifestsintherelationsbetweenstates.SaulMarshall’splanto‘weaponise’Singapore’sexchangecontrolsmightaswellreadashisplanto politicize them, showing that a strategy of depoliticisation is not a holy grail for statemanagers. On the contrary, it needs to be understood in historically specific and conditionedcircumstances.AsnotedbyBurnham(2014,204)‘depoliticisationstrategiesremainanimportant,yet inherently contradictory, element in the armoury of state managers both in terms of thepreservationofindividualgovernmentsand,inprinciple,ofthecapitalistformofthestateitself.’

ForBritishstatemanagers,akeyaspectofsuccessfullymanagingtheSterlingAreaafterthe Second World War was through placing its political character at one remove from theinternationaleconomicpoliciesthatcraftedit.ThisbecomesapparentfromthereactionofBritishstatemanagers toMarshall’sattempt topoliticise theexchangecontrol laws thatprovided thelegalbasis for theSterlingAreaasa currencybloc.Marshall, despite realizinghispositionasarelative non-entity in imperial politics, was still able to highlight the political character of theSterlingAreathroughhisactions.

WhilethispaperhasfocusedmainlyonBritishstatemanagersintheireffortstomaintaina historic strategy of imperialism through its depoliticisation, there is another story to be toldaboutthegoalsofMalayanandSingaporeanstatemanagers.StatemanagersintheFederationof Malaya were eager to maintain the status quo; however, whether this was because theyaccepted the argumentsmadebyBritish statemanagersor if they toowanted todisplace thepolitical character of British imperial is unclear from National Archives documents. Certainly,however,SaulMarshall’sconsideredgoalwastopoliticiseBritishimperialism.Thispointstothedynamic nature of imperial relations and how important historical enquiry is to the study ofimperialism. As Marx ([1867] 1975, 179) famously remarked, though talking about the capitalrelation, imperialism is not a necessary or transhistorical phenomenon but one that is highlycontingent andhistorically specific.Historical study of such episodes inBritish imperial historyreveals the contested nature of imperial relations: they are fraughtwith tension, contradictionandconflictbutalsocollaborationandcooperation.WhileFederationstatemanagerswerehappyto accept Britain’s arguments, Saul Marshall was only made more determined by them.Understandingtheirrespectivepositionscannotbeintuitedsolelybyreferencetocapitalistsocialrelations but through the detailed historical study of the internal politics of these states, theirrelationshipswitheachotherandwiththeglobaleconomy. AsGallagher&Robinson(1953,15)note,thepoliticsofempireisnotjustaboutexpansionorconquestbutalsothemanagementandassimilationofexistingterritoriesintomaintainingthecircuitofcapital.Gallagher&Robinson(ibid.,3)alsonotetheimplicationsoftheirargumentforrejecting a substantial distinction between formal and informal empire. This point hasconsequences for two further groups of literature: Global Governance ix , and the NewImperialismx.Bothmaintainthatthestatehasreducedconsiderablyitsscopein,respectively,themanagement of the global economy, and the business of empire. This paper has made theargumentthattheroleofonestateinthemanagementoftheeconomyofanotherstatecanbeobfuscatedthroughtheuseofastrategyofdepoliticisation.Undoubtedlythen,intwogroupsof

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literaturewhichdealwiththisveryphenomenon,itisworthreconsideringtherolethestateplaysinboth.

1

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CO1030 Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: Far Eastern Department andsuccessors:RegisteredFilesFO371ForeignOffice:PoliticalDepartments:GeneralCorrespondencefrom1906-1966FCO141ForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandpredecessors:RecordsofFormerColonialAdministrations:MigratedArchives

Tsolakis A (2010) Opening Up Open Marxist Theories Of The State: A Historical MaterialistCritiqueBritishJournalofPoliticsandInternationalRelations12:3WallersteinI(1975)WorldInequality:OriginsandPerspectivesontheWorldSystemNottingham:SpokesmanWoodEM(2005)EmpireofCapitalLondon:VersoWood M & Flinders M (2014) Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental Policy &Politics42:2iIt is alsoworth noting that depoliticisationhas even entered the cultural lexicon,with it beingdirectlysatirised in the BBC television show The Thick of It special ‘Rise of the Nutters’, in which the PrimeMinister’s legacy project is to create a technocratic body to manage immigration, thus removingimmigrationfrompoliticaldebate.iiSee, for example,Hay&Watson (1999), Burnham (2001), Kettell (2004, 2009), Rogers (2009a; 2009b;2012)iiiA common criticism of the open Marxist approach to the state has been that it offers a de factofunctionalistanalysis.SeeBieler&Morton(2003),Bieleretal.(2010)andTsolakis(2010)forexamplesofthis criticism. The criticism originates from Barker’s (1978) response to Holloway & Picciotto’s (1977)articulationofform-analysis.ivSee,forexample,Hobson([1902]1968)Hilferding([1910]1981),Kautsky(1916),Bukharin([1917]2003),Lenin([1917]2010),Luxemburg([1951]1963)vSeealloftheabove,aswellasMcDonough(1995),andHarvey(2003)viSee,forexample,Amin(1977)andWallerstein(1975)

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viiBurnhamactuallyusestheterm ‘ConferenceofSocialistEconomists (CSE)statetheorytradition’.Thispapertreatstheterm‘openMarxism’assynonymouswithBurnham’sapproach.Forfurtherclarityonthispoint,andfurtherelucidationoftheopenMarxist/CSEstatetheorytradition,seeBonefeldetal. (1992a,1992b,1995)viiiOperationROBOTwouldhavebeenaradicalbreakwiththepost-warconsensus,floatingthepoundandbreaking the government’s international and domestic economic commitments. It was named after itsmainproponents intheTreasuryandBank:LeslieRowan,GeorgeBoltonandOttoClarke.SeeBulpitt&Burnham(1999)andBurnham(2003)forfurtherinformationonROBOT.ixSee,forexample,Finkelstein(1995),Strange(1996),Scholte(2002),Stone(2008)xSee,forexample,Hardt&Negri(2000),Harvey(2007),Wood(2005)