deployment performance and headquarters staffing …...deployment performance and headquarters...

Deployment Performance and Headquarters

Staffing Adequacy Study

2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630 (916) 458-5100 Fax: (916) 983-2090

Management Consultants Folsom (Sacramento), CA

East Contra Costa Fire Protection

District, CA Volume 2 of 3 –

Technical Report

June 15, 2016

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East Contra Costa FPD—Deployment Performance and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy Study

Volume 2—Technical Report

Table of Contents page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

VOLUME 1 of 3 – Executive Summary (separately bound)

VOLUME 2 of 3 – Standards of Response Cover and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy

Study Technical Report (this volume)

Section 1—Introduction and Background ...................................................................................1

1.1 Report Organization .........................................................................................1

1.2 Project Scope of Work .....................................................................................2

Section 2—Standards of Response Coverage Introduction .......................................................3

2.1 Standards of Coverage Study Processes ...........................................................3

Section 3—Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment ................................................7

3.1 Why Does the District’s Fire Department Exist and How Does it

Deliver the Existing Fire Crew Deployment Services? ....................................7

3.2 Community Risk Assessment Overview ..........................................................9

3.3 Existing District Deployment .........................................................................46

Section 4—Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis .......................................................................49

4.1 Critical Task Time Measures—What Must be Done Over What Time

Frame to Achieve the Stated Outcome Expectation? .....................................49

4.2 Distribution and Concentration Studies—How the Location of First-

Due and First Alarm Resources Affects the Outcome ...................................54

4.3 Deployment Scenarios with Added and Relocated Fire Stations ...................60

Section 5—Response Statistical Analysis ...................................................................................65

5.1 Historical Effectiveness and Reliability of Response—What Statistics

Say About Existing System Performance ......................................................65

5.2 Service Demand .............................................................................................65

5.3 Response Time Analysis ................................................................................72

5.4 Simultaneous Incident Activity ......................................................................78



Table of Contents page ii

5.5 Hourly Demand Percentage – Unit-Hour Utilization .....................................79

5.6 Response Time Impacts of Station Closures ..................................................81

Section 6—SOC Evaluation and Recommendation ..................................................................87

6.1 Overall Evaluation ..........................................................................................87

Section 7—Headquarters and Support Functions Staffing Adequacy Review ......................93

7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................93

7.2 Management Organization .............................................................................93

7.3 Fleet Management ..........................................................................................97

7.4 Headquarters Services Findings and Recommendations ................................98

Section 8—Next Steps ................................................................................................................103

8.1 Next Steps .....................................................................................................103

Table of Tables

Table 1—Standards of Response Coverage Process Elements ....................................................... 4

Table 2—Fire Department Deployment Simplified ....................................................................... 5

Table 3—Probability of Occurrence Criteria ................................................................................ 10

Table 4—Impact Severity Factor Score Criteria .......................................................................... 11

Table 5—Overall Risk Categories ................................................................................................ 11

Table 6—Overall Risk Summary.................................................................................................. 13

Table 7—Population Density in the District ................................................................................. 16

Table 8—Probability of Occurrence Criteria ................................................................................ 17

Table 9—Unincorporated Building Inventory by Assessor Use Code ......................................... 22

Table 10—City of Brentwood Building Inventory by Assessor Use Code .................................. 23

Table 11—City of Oakley building Inventory by Assessor Use Code ......................................... 25

Table 12—District Building Inventory by Risk Category ............................................................ 26

Table 13—Building Fire Risk Service Demand ........................................................................... 27

Table 14—Building Fire Risk Analysis Summary ....................................................................... 28

Table 15—Wildland Risk Service Demand .................................................................................. 33



Table of Contents page iii

Table 16—Wildland Fire Risk Analysis Summary ...................................................................... 33

Table 17—EMS Risk Service Demand ........................................................................................ 35

Table 18—EMS Risk Analysis Summary .................................................................................... 36

Table 19—Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand ................................................................. 37

Table 20—Hazardous Materials Risk Analysis Summary ........................................................... 37

Table 21—Technical Rescue Risk Service Demand .................................................................... 38

Table 22—Technical Rescue Risk Impact Severity Summary ..................................................... 39

Table 23—Average Annual Daily Highway Traffic Volume....................................................... 39

Table 24—Transportation Risk Service Demand ......................................................................... 40

Table 25—Transportation Risk Analysis Summary ..................................................................... 40

Table 26—Daily Minimum Staffing per Unit for the District – 2016 .......................................... 46

Table 27—Resources Sent to Common Risk Types ..................................................................... 47

Table 28—First Alarm Structure Fire – 17 Personnel .................................................................. 50

Table 29—Cardiac Arrest – 3 Firefighters plus an Ambulance ................................................... 52

Table 30—Public Road Miles Covered in the 3- and 9-Station Models ...................................... 62

Table 31—Incidents: Quantity – Year by Incident Type .............................................................. 69

Table 32—Incidents: Quantity – Year by Property Use ............................................................... 71

Table 33—Call to Arrival Total Response Time (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance .......... 73

Table 34—Call Processing Time (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance .................................. 74

Table 35—Turnout Time Performance (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance ......................... 74

Table 36—Travel Time Performance (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance ........................... 75

Table 37—District Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Engine per Year/Month .......................... 76

Table 38—Travel Time for Effective Response Force Incidents by Year (Minutes/Seconds) –

90% Performance .......................................................................................................................... 78

Table 39—Simultaneous Incident Activity – 3 Years .................................................................. 79

Table 40—Unit-Hour Utilization for 2015 ................................................................................... 80

Table 41—Travel Times Before and After Closure of Stations 57 and 58 .................................. 82

Table 42—Travel Times Before and After Closure of Stations 54, 94, and 95 ........................... 82



Table of Contents page iv

Table 43—Travel Times Before and After Opening of Station 94 .............................................. 83

Table 44—Travel Times Before and After Opening of Station 54 .............................................. 83

Table 45—Travel Times Before and After Station 54 Closure .................................................... 83

Table 46—Travel Times Before and After Station 94 Closure .................................................... 84

Table 47—Apparatus: 90% Travel Time Performance Minutes – Arrival Sequence per Year ... 84

Table 48—Deployment Recommendations .................................................................................. 88

Table 49—Increasing Staffing to the Minimum Headquarters Model ......................................... 99

Table 50—Increasing Staffing from the Minimum Headquarters Model .................................. 100

Table 51—Increasing Staffing to the Nine-Station Model ......................................................... 101

Table of Figures

Figure 1—Overall Risk Calculation Flowchart ............................................................................ 11

Figure 2—CFAI Fire and Non-Fire Hazards ................................................................................ 18

Figure 3—Building Fire Probability/Consequence Matrix ........................................................... 20

Figure 4—Building Fire Progression Timeline ............................................................................ 21

Figure 5—Wildland Fire LRA Hazard Severity Zones ................................................................ 29

Figure 6—Wildland Fire SRA Fire Hazard Severity Zone Map .................................................. 30

Figure 7—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation ..................................................................... 34

Figure 8—Number of Incidents by Year ...................................................................................... 66

Figure 9—Number of Incidents by Year by Incident Type .......................................................... 66

Figure 10—Number of Incidents by Month by Year.................................................................... 67

Figure 11—Number of Incidents by Day of Week by Year ......................................................... 67

Figure 12—Number of Incidents by Hour of Day by Year .......................................................... 68

Figure 13—Number of Incidents by Station by Year ................................................................... 68

Figure 14—Number of Simultaneous Incidents Within a Station Area by Year ......................... 79

Figure 15—Stations Open vs. Response Time ............................................................................. 85

VOLUME 3 of 3 – Map Atlas (separately bound)



Section 1—Introduction and Background page 1

SECTION 1—INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Citygate’s Associates, LLC’s detailed work product for a Standards of Response Cover

(deployment) and headquarters staffing adequacy study for the East Contra Costa Fire Protection

District (District) presented in this volume. Citygate’s scope of work and corresponding Work

Plan was developed consistent with Citygate’s Project Team members’ experience in fire

administration. Citygate’s utilizes various National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

publications as best practice guidelines, along with the self-assessment criteria of the

Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI).

1.1 REPORT ORGANIZATION

This report volume is structured into the following sections. Volumes 1 (Executive Summary)

and 3 (Map Atlas) are separately bound.

Section 1 Introduction and Background: An introduction to the study and background facts

about the District.

Section 2 Standards of Response Coverage Introduction: An introduction to the Standards of

Coverage (SOC) process and methodology used by Citygate in this review.

Section 3 Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment: An in-depth examination of the

District’s deployment ability to meet the community’s risks, expectations, and

emergency needs.

Section 4 Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis: A review of: (1) the critical tasks that must be

performed to achieve the District’s desired outcome; and (2) the District’s existing

fire station locations and future locations.

Section 5 Response Statistical Analysis: A statistical data analysis of the District’s incident

responses and an overall deployment evaluation.

Section 6 SOC Evaluation and Deployment Recommendation: A summary of deployment

priorities and an overall deployment recommendation.

Section 7 Headquarters and Support Services Staffing Adequacy Review: An analysis of the

headquarters functions.

Section 8 Next Steps: A summary of short-term next steps.

1.1.1 Goals of Report

As each of the sections mentioned above imparts information, this report will cite findings and

make recommendations, if appropriate, that relate to each finding. There is a sequential

numbering of all of the findings and recommendations throughout Sections 3 through 7 of this



Table of Contents page 2

report. To provide a comprehensive summary, a complete listing of all these same findings and

recommendations, in order, is found in the Executive Summary (Volume 1). Section 8 of this

report brings attention to the highest priority needs and recommended next steps.

This document provides technical information about how fire services are provided, legally

regulated, and how the District currently operates. This information is presented in the form of

recommendations and policy choices for the District leadership to discuss.

1.2 PROJECT SCOPE OF WORK

1.2.1 Standards of Response Coverage Review

The scope of the Standards of Response Coverage review included the following elements:

Modeling the response time ability of the current fire station locations. Although

this is not a study of fire departments adjacent to the District, the study does

consider the impacts of the District’s automatic and mutual aid agreements

common throughout the County.

Establishing performance goals for the District consistent with best practices and

national guidelines from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the

Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI).

Using an incident response time analysis program called StatsFD™ to review the

statistics of prior historical performance.

Using a geographic mapping response time measurement tool called FireView™

to measure fire unit driving coverages from the District’s fire stations.

SOC Study Questions

Our study addresses the following questions:

1. Is the type and quantity of apparatus and personnel adequate for the District’s

deployment to emergencies?

2. What is the recommended deployment to maintain adequate emergency response

times as growth continues to occur?



Section 2—Standards of Response Coverage Introduction page 3

SECTION 2—STANDARDS OF RESPONSE COVERAGE INTRODUCTION

2.1 STANDARDS OF COVERAGE STUDY PROCESSES

The core methodology used by Citygate in the scope of its deployment analysis work is the

“Standards of Cover,” which is a systems-based approach to fire department deployment, as

published by the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI). This approach uses

local risk and demographics to determine the level of protection best fitting the District’s needs.

The Standards of Response Coverage method evaluates deployment as part of the self-

assessment process of a fire agency. Citygate has adopted this methodology as a comprehensive

tool to evaluate fire station locations. Depending on the needs of the study, the depth of the

components may vary.

There are no federal or state government requirements for a minimum level of fire services in the

United States. It is a local choice issue for each community to consider and fund as it deems

necessary. The Accreditation SOC systems approach to deployment, rather than a one-size-fits-

all prescriptive formula, allows for local determination. In this comprehensive approach, each

agency can match local needs (risks and expectations) with the costs of various levels of service.

In an informed public policy debate, a governing board “purchases” the fire and emergency

medical service levels the community needs and can afford.

While working with multiple components to conduct a deployment analysis is admittedly more

work, it yields a much better result than using only a singular component. For instance, if only

travel time is considered, and frequency of multiple calls is not considered, the analysis could

miss over-worked companies. If a risk assessment for deployment is not considered, and

deployment is based only on travel time, a community could under-deploy to incidents.




The Standards of Response Coverage process consists of the following eight parts:

Table 1—Standards of Response Coverage Process Elements

Element Meaning

1. Existing Deployment Policies Reviewing the deployment goals the agency has in place today.

2. Community Outcome Expectations Reviewing the expectations of the community for response to emergencies.

3. Community Risk Assessment Reviewing the assets at risk in the community. (In this Citygate’s study, see Section 3.2 Community Risk Assessment.)

4. Critical Task Study

Reviewing the tasks that must be performed and the personnel required to deliver the stated outcome expectation for the Effective Response Force.

5. Distribution Study Reviewing the spacing of first-due resources (typically engines) to control routine emergencies.

6. Concentration Study

Reviewing the spacing of fire stations so that building fires can receive sufficient resources in a timely manner (First Alarm assignment or the Effective Response Force).

7. Reliability and Historical Response Effectiveness Studies

Using prior response statistics to determine the percent of compliance the existing system delivers.

8. Overall Evaluation Proposing Standard of Cover statements by risk type as necessary.

Fire department deployment, simply stated, is about the speed and weight of the attack. Speed

calls for first-due, all-risk intervention units (engines, trucks, and/or rescue ambulances)

strategically located across a department responding within an effective travel time. These units

are tasked with controlling moderate emergencies, preventing the incident from escalating to a

second alarm or greater size, which unnecessarily depletes department resources as multiple

requests for service occur. Weight is about multiple-unit response for serious emergencies, such

as a room-and-contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a vehicle accident with

extrication required, or a heavy rescue incident. In these situations, enough firefighters must be

assembled within a reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency, thereby keeping it

from escalating to greater alarms.




This deployment design paradigm is reiterated in the following table:

Table 2—Fire Department Deployment Simplified

Meaning Purpose

Speed of Attack Travel time of first-due, all-risk intervention units strategically located across a department.

Controlling moderate emergencies, preventing the incident from escalating to second alarm or greater size.

Weight of Attack Number of firefighters in a multiple-unit response for serious emergencies.

Assembling enough firefighters within a reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency.

Thus, small fires and medical emergencies require a single- or two-unit response (engine and

specialty unit) with a quick response time. Larger incidents require more crews. In either case, if

the crews arrive too late, or the total personnel sent to the emergency are too few for the

emergency type, they are drawn into a losing and more dangerous battle. The science of fire crew

deployment is to spread crews out across a community for quick response to keep emergencies

small with positive outcomes, without spreading the crews so far apart that they cannot amass

together quickly enough to be effective in major emergencies.



Section 3—Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment page 7

SECTION 3—DEPLOYMENT GOALS/MEASURES AND RISK

ASSESSMENT

3.1 WHY DOES THE DISTRICT’S FIRE DEPARTMENT EXIST AND HOW DOES IT DELIVER THE

EXISTING FIRE CREW DEPLOYMENT SERVICES?

3.1.1 Existing Response Time Policies or Goals—Why Does the Fire Department

Exist?

The Fire District has not adopted best-practice-based,

formal response time policies by type of risks. However,

the District has a long history of striving to provide the

best level of service that it can fund.

The lack of specific response time goals by type of risk is

not congruent with best practices for emergency response

time tracking. Nationally recognized standards and best

practices call for a time line with several important time measurements that include a definition

of response time.

The District also has not identified response goals for technical rescue and hazardous material

responses; in addition to firefighting and EMS, response time goals for these incident types also

are required to meet the Standards of Response Coverage model for the Commission on Fire

Accreditation International (CFAI). In this Standards of Response Coverage study, Citygate will

recommend response time goals to include all risks including fire, EMS, hazardous materials,

and technical rescue responses. The goals will be consistent with the CFAI systems approach to

response.

3.1.2 Existing Outcome Expectations

The Standards of Response Cover process begins by

reviewing existing emergency services outcome

expectations. This can be restated as follows: for what

purpose does the response system exist? Has the

governing body adopted any response performance

measures? If so, the time measures used must be understood, and good data must be collected.

SOC ELEMENT 2 OF 8

COMMUNITY OUTCOME

EXPECTATIONS

SOC ELEMENT 1 OF 8*

EXISTING DEPLOYMENT

POLICIES

*Note: This is an overview of Element 1.

The detail is provided on page 46.




Current national best practice is to measure percent completion of a goal (e.g., 90% of responses)

instead of an average measure. Mathematically, this is called a “fractile” measure.1 This is

because the measure of average only identifies the central or middle point of response time

performance for all calls for service in the data set. Using an average makes it impossible to

know how many incidents had response times that were way over the average, or just over. For

example, if a department had an average response time of 5 minutes for 5,000 calls for service, it

cannot be determined how many calls past the average point of 5 minutes were answered in the

6th

minute, or way out at 10 minutes. This is a significant issue if hundreds or thousands of calls

are answered far beyond the average point. Fractile measures identify, per minute, the number of

incidents that are reached up to 100%.

More importantly, within the Standards of Response Coverage process, positive outcomes are the

goal and, from that, crew size and response time can be calculated to allow efficient fire station

spacing (distribution and concentrations). Emergency medical incidents involve situations with

the most severe time constraints. The brain can only live 8-10 minutes without oxygen. Heart

attacks are commonly known to deprive the brain of oxygen; however, heart attacks make up a

small percentage of oxygen-depriving events. Drowning, choking, trauma constrictions, or other

similar events have the same effect. In a building fire, a small incipient fire can grow to involve

the entire room in an 8- to 10-minute timeframe. If fire service response is to achieve positive

outcomes in severe emergency medical situations and incipient fire situations, all responding

crews must arrive, assess the situation, and deploy effective measures before brain death occurs

or the fire leaves the room of origin.

Thus, from the time of 9-1-1 receiving the call, an effective deployment system is beginning to

manage the problem within a 7- to 8-minute total response time. This is right at the point that

brain death is becoming irreversible, or that an incipient fire has grown beyond the room of

origin and become very serious. Thus, the District needs a first-due response goal that is within a

range to give the situation hope for a positive outcome. It is important to note the fire or medical

emergency continues to deteriorate from the time of inception, not from the time the fire engine

actually starts to drive the response route. Ideally, the emergency is noticed immediately and the

9-1-1 system is activated promptly. This step of awareness—calling 9-1-1 and giving the

dispatcher accurate information—takes, in the best of circumstances, 90 seconds. Crew

notification and travel time then take additional minutes. Once arrived, the crew must walk to the

patient or emergency, assess the situation, and deploy its skills and tools. Even in easy-to-access

1 A fractile is that point below which a stated fraction of the values lie. The fraction is often given in percent; the

term percentile may then be used.




situations, this step can take two or more minutes. This time frame may be increased

considerably due to long driveways, apartment buildings with limited access, multi-storied

apartments or office complexes, or shopping center buildings such as those found in parts of the

District.

Unfortunately, there are situations in which an emergency has become too severe, even before

9-1-1 notification and/or fire department response, for the responding crew to reverse; however,

when an appropriate response time policy is combined with a well-designed system, then only

issues like bad weather, poor traffic conditions, or multiple emergencies will slow the response

system down. Consequently, a properly designed system will give citizens the hope of a positive

outcome for their tax dollar expenditure.

For this report, “total” response time is the sum of the alarm procession, dispatch, crew turnout,

and road travel time steps. This is consistent with the recommendations of the CFAI.

Finding #1: The District has not adopted a complete and best practices-based

deployment measure or set of specialty response measures for all-

risk emergency responses that includes the beginning time measure

from the point of the County’s regional Fire Communications

Center receiving the 9-1-1 phone call, nor a goal statement tied to

risks and outcome expectations. The deployment measure should

have a second measurement statement to define multiple-unit

response coverage for serious emergencies. Making these

deployment goal changes will meet the best practice

recommendations of the Commission on Fire Accreditation

International.

3.2 COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

The third element of the SOC process is a community risk

assessment or analysis. The objective of a community risk

assessment is to:

1. Identify the hazards with potential to

adversely impact the community or

jurisdiction

2. Quantify the probability of occurrence for each identified hazard

3. Determine overall risk by hazard.

SOC ELEMENT 3 OF 8

COMMUNITY RISK

ASSESSMENT




A Hazard is broadly defined as a situation or condition that can cause or contribute to harm.

Hazard examples include fire, medical emergency, vehicle collision, earthquake, flood, etc.

Probability is the likelihood of occurrence of a particular hazard, and impacts or consequences

are the adverse effects that a hazard occurrence has on people, property, and/or the community as

a whole. Risk is broadly defined as the probability of hazard occurrence in combination with the

likely severity of resultant impacts, and Risk Vulnerability is a measure of the probability of the

existing deployment model’s ability to protect against or mitigate a specific hazard.

3.2.1 Risk Assessment Methodology

The methodology employed by Citygate to assess and quantify community risk as an integral

element of an SOC study incorporates the following elements:

1. Identification of geographic risk assessment sub-zones (risk zones) appropriate

for the community or jurisdiction

2. Identification of the fire and non-fire natural and human-caused hazards with

potential to adversely impact the community or jurisdiction

3. Determination of probability of future occurrence for each hazard by risk zone

considering historical service demand and the probability of occurrence described

in Table 3.

Table 3—Probability of Occurrence Criteria

Probability Score Description Criteria

1 Very

Unlikely Less than 5% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

2 Unlikely 5%-10% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

3 Possible 11%-50% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

4 Probable 51%-95% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

5 Highly

Probable Greater than 95% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

4. Identification and evaluation of appropriate impact severity factors for each

hazard by risk zone using agency/jurisdiction-specific data, and the impact

severity factor score criteria described in Table 4.




Table 4—Impact Severity Factor Score Criteria

Risk Factor Score Description

1 Factor negligibly contributes to increased overall hazard impact

2 Factor minimally contributes to increased overall hazard impact

3 Factor moderately contributes to increased overall hazard impact

4 Factor significantly contributes to increased overall hazard impact

5 Factor seriously contributes to increased overall hazard impact

5. Calculation of overall risk score for each hazard by multiplying the sum of impact

factor scores by the probability of occurrence score for each risk zone.

6. Determination of overall Risk Category by risk zone based on overall risk score as

described in Table 5.

Table 5—Overall Risk Categories

Overall Risk Score Overall Risk Rating

0-31 Low

32-62 Moderate

63-94 High

95-125 Very High

Figure 1 illustrates the methodology used to quantify overall risk for each hazard by risk zone.

Figure 1—Overall Risk Calculation Flowchart

Probability of

Occurrence

Score

Total Impact

Factors Score

(Range = 0-25)

Overall Risk

Score

(Range = 0–125)

Overall Risk

Category X = =

Low

Moderate

High

Very High




Citygate used multiple data sources for this study to understand the risks to be protected in the

District as follows:

U.S. Census Bureau population data and demographics

Insurance Services Office (ISO) building fire flow and construction data

Contra Costa County Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data

Contra Costa County General Plan and Zoning documents

2012 Contra County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) 2012 update

City of Brentwood General Plan and Zoning documents

City of Oakley General Plan and Zoning documents

California Department of Transportation road traffic data

3.2.2 Risk Assessment Summary

Citygate’s evaluation of the various risks likely to adversely impact the District yields the

following conclusions:

1. The District has very diverse urban, suburban, and rural population densities.

2. The District has a mix of residential, commercial, open space, and industrial

buildings.

3. The District has a transportation network, including highways and other primary

vehicle transportation routes, rail lines, and a small airport.

4. The majority of the risks in the District pose a moderate risk, as follows:




Table 6—Overall Risk Summary

Risk Risk Type

Building Fire Moderate

Wildland Fire High

EMS High

Hazardous Material

Moderate

Technical Rescue

Moderate

Transportation Moderate

Earthquake

Seismic Activity Moderate

Flood High

Dam Failure Moderate

Landslide Low

Severe Weather Moderate

Drought Low

The following sections will describe the analysis process and risk factors used to determine

overall risk as shown in Table 6 in more detail.

3.2.3 Growth and Development

City of Brentwood

Overview

The City’s General Plan2 will continue to play its traditional role in the City as the primary

center of government, employment, and culture. Brentwood is projected to be the fastest-

growing city in Contra Costa County.

The General Plan further envisions the following themes:

The City of Brentwood General Plan identifies the community’s vision for the

future and provides a framework that will guide decisions on growth,

2 Brentwood Zoning Plan and General Plan (2012)




development, and conservation of open space and resources in a manner that is

consistent with the quality of life desired by the City’s residents and businesses.

Land Use and Future Development

The City’s General Plan, Safety Element’s policies include:

Regulating population and building;

Promoting and facilitating infill development;

Preserving and enhancing neighborhoods as a basic unit;

Protecting established neighborhoods;

Promoting complete and well-structured neighborhoods that promote livability

and safety for residents of all ages and cultures.

City of Oakley

Overview

The City’s General Plan3 will continue to play its traditional role in the city as the primary center

of government, employment, and culture. Downtown Oakley will be vibrant with arts, culture,

entertainment, and the City’s economy will continue to strengthen, diversify, and play a larger

role with a broad range of jobs in all industry sectors, including those related to small and local

businesses. Growth in Oakley is projected to be on par with neighboring Antioch and Pittsburg.

The General Plan further envisions the following themes:

Every neighborhood will be a desirable place to live because of its walkable

streets, extensive tree canopy, range of housing choices, mixed use neighborhood

centers, great schools, parks and recreation facilities, and easy access to

Downtown and jobs.

Projected Growth

Growth projections in the City of Oakley’s General Plan show a very small growth of .3% from

2020-2030, and .2% from 2010-2020.

3 City of Oakley General Plan (2012)





The City’s and County’s General Plan land use policies include:

Regulating population and building;

Promoting and facilitating infill development;

Preserving and enhancing neighborhoods as a basic unit;

Protecting established neighborhoods;

Promoting complete and well-structured neighborhoods that promote livability

and safety for residents of all ages and cultures.

District (Unincorporated Areas)

Overview

Unincorporated residential growth areas include Trilogy at the Vineyards, Rose Garden,

Palmilla, Cypress Corridor, the Lakes and Cecchini Ranch in Discovery Bay, Byron Airport, and

Delta Coves in Bethel Island. In the long-term, growth is expected to increase the population

from 106,386 in 2008 to 158,515 in 2030. Commercial growth is also projected to be

significantly faster in the District than the countywide average. Oakley and Brentwood are

projected to have the highest job creation rates in the County, outpacing neighboring Antioch

and Pittsburg. In the long-term, growth is expected to increase the job base from 17,480 in 2008

to 34,251 in 2030.

3.2.4 District Profile

Political Boundaries

The District was formed in 2002 as a county-dependent district through the consolidation of the

Bethel Island, East Diablo, and Oakley fire districts. Included in the District are the cities of

Oakley, Brentwood, a portion of Antioch and Clayton, the unincorporated communities of Bethel

Island, Byron, Discovery Bay, Knightsen, and other areas of unincorporated Contra Costa

County.

The District contracts with Contra Costa Fire Protection District for dispatch, radio, information

and fire prevention services. The District contracts with CAL FIRE to provide fire protection

service to the Marsh Creek area of the District.




Area and Land Use

The District covers approximately 249 square miles. East Contra Costa County Fire District land

use is comprised of:

Residential: 67%

Commercial: 2%

Industrial: 1%

Open/Undeveloped: 30%


Land use within the District is predominantly rural/wilderness residential, urban/suburban

residential, and commercial, with some industrial uses in the City of Oakley and Brentwood. The

District has vast areas of open space and some areas zoned for possible future development. The

City of Oakley has open space for development in the northeast corner, as does the Bethel Island

community.

Population Densities

Population density is defined by CFAI as the population divided by the square miles of an area.

After population density is determined, a deployment recommendation can be made based on

best practices, such as CFAI and NFPA documents.

Table 7—Population Density in the District

Community Population Square Miles Population Density

Brentwood 51,481 14.7 Urban

Oakley 35,342 16 Urban

Discovery Bay (CDP2) 13,352 7 Suburban

Bethel Island (CDP2) 2,137 5.5 Rural

Byron (CDP2) 1,237 6.5 Rural

Unincorporated Area 105,000 ~200 Rural 1 Population Density as defined by CFAI

2 CDP: Census Designated Place

3.2.5 Prior Risk Studies

Citygate utilizes prior risk studies where available, fire and non-fire hazards as identified by the

CFAI, and agency/jurisdiction-specific data and information to identify the hazards to be

evaluated for this study.




In 2012, the Contra Costa County Department of Emergency Management published its update

to the Multi-Jurisdictional Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (MJLHMP) for the County and its

cities.

3.2.6 Probability of Occurrence

Probability of occurrence refers to the likely future occurrence of a hazard or risk over a specific

time period. Since the CFAI Agency Accreditation process requires annual review of an

agency’s risk assessment and baseline performance measures, Citygate recommends using the 12

months following completion of an SOC study as an appropriate period for the probability of

occurrence evaluation. Table 8 describes the criteria used in evaluating the probability of future

occurrence for each hazard or risk.

Table 8—Probability of Occurrence Criteria

Probability Score Description Criteria

1 Very

Unlikely Less than 5% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

2 Unlikely 5%-10% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

3 Possible 11%-50% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

4 Probable 51%-95% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

5 Highly

Probable Greater than 95% probability of occurrence within the next 12 months

3.2.9 Risk Factors

Elements to be considered in a community risk assessment include factors that influence service

demand, service capacity, probability of hazard occurrence, and severity of impacts or

consequences of a hazard occurrence relative to life, property, the environment, and overall

community resilience.

In conducting a community risk assessment, Citygate examines prior risk studies, community

demographics including current and projected population, land use, future development

potential, employment, and building occupancy data as available, and prior service demand data.




Figure 2 summarizes the fire and non-fire hazards established by CFAI.

Figure 2—CFAI Fire and Non-Fire Hazards

3.2.10 Building Fire Risk

One of the primary hazards in any community is building fire. Citygate used available data from

the District, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Insurance Services Office (ISO) to assist in

identifying and quantifying the District’s building fire risk.

Building Risk Categories

CFAI identifies five building risk categories as follows:

Low Risk Occupancies – includes detached garages, storage sheds, outbuildings, and similar

buildings that pose a relatively low risk of harm to humans or the community if damaged or

destroyed by fire.

Moderate Risk Occupancies – includes detached single-family or two-family dwellings, mobile

homes, commercial and industrial buildings less than 10,000 square feet without a high hazard

fire load, aircraft, railroad facilities, and similar buildings where loss of life or property damage

is limited to the single building.

High Risk Occupancies – includes apartment/condominium buildings, commercial and

industrial buildings more than 10,000 square feet without a high hazard fire load, low-occupant




load buildings with high fuel loading or hazardous materials, and similar occupancies with

potential for substantial loss of life or unusual property damage or financial impact.

Special Risk Occupancies – includes single or multiple buildings that require an Effective

Response Force (ERF) greater than what is appropriate for the risk which predominates the

surrounding area such as apartment/condominium complexes more than 25,000 square feet,

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CIKR) facilities, commercial/industrial occupancies with

fire flows greater than 3,500 GPM, vacant/abandoned buildings, buildings with required fire

flow exceeding available water supply, and similar occupancies with high-life hazard or large

fire loss potential.

Maximum Risk Occupancies – includes buildings or facilities with unusually high risk

requiring an ERF involving a significant augmentation of resources and personnel, and where a

fire would pose the potential for a catastrophic event involving large loss of life and/or

significant economic impact to the community.

Building Fire Risk Factors

Figure 3 illustrates the probability and consequences for each of the building fire risk categories.

Probability is the likelihood of a fire occurring in a particular occupancy type, and consequences

are the probable adverse impacts that the fire will have on people, property, and the community.




Figure 3—Building Fire Probability/Consequence Matrix

Low Consequence High Consequence

Hig

h P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Moderate Risk

(High Probability)

(Low Consequence)

Maximum Risk

(High Probability)

(High Consequence)

Lo

w P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Low Risk

(Low Probability)

(Low Consequence)

High/Special Risk

(Low Probability)

(High Consequence)

Source: CFAI Standards of Cover, 5th Edition

Resource deployment (distribution/concentration), staffing, and response time are three critical

factors influencing favorable outcomes for building fire risk.

Figure 4 illustrates the progression timeline of a building fire, and shows that a response time4 of

7:30 minutes or less is necessary to stop a building fire before it reaches flashover, which is the

point at which the entire room erupts into fire after all of the combustible objects in that room

have reached their ignition temperature. Survivability of a human in a room after flashover is

extremely unlikely.

4 Time interval from time of receipt of 9-1-1 call to initiation of suppression actions




Figure 4—Building Fire Progression Timeline

Source: http://www.firesprinklerassoc.org

http://www.firesprinklerassoc.org/




Building Inventory

The District has a mix of building occupancies typical of a suburban population density as shown

in Tables 9-12.

Table 9—Unincorporated Building Inventory by Assessor Use Code

Use Code Use Code Category Use Code Description

Number of Parcels Risk Class

11 Residential Single family (SF) 5120 Moderate

12 Residential SF 1 res on 2 or more sites 30 Moderate

13 Residential SF 2 or more res on 1 or more site 56 Moderate

14 Residential SF res on other than single family land

28 Moderate

16 Residential SF attached res, townhouse, duet 102 Moderate

17 Residential Vacant SF 992 Moderate

18 Residential Vacant SF, more than one site 11 Moderate

19 Residential SF detached w/common area 1453 Moderate

20 Multifamily Vacant multifamily 1 Moderate

21 Multifamily Duplex 14 Moderate

22 Multifamily Triplex 1 Moderate

24 Multifamily Multifamily combinations 1 Moderate

25 Multifamily Apartments 5-12 units 1 Moderate

29 Multifamily Condos, co-op housing 284 Moderate

30 Commercial Vacant commercial 58 Moderate

31 Commercial Commercial stores 19 Moderate

32 Commercial Small grocery stores 4 Moderate

33 Commercial Office buildings 8 Moderate

35 Commercial Service station, car wash, etc. 1 Moderate

36 Commercial Auto repair 12 High

37 Commercial Recreational 5 Moderate

38 Commercial Golf course 8 Moderate

40 Commercial Boat harbor or private dock 157 Moderate

42 Commercial Shopping center 8 Moderate

44 Commercial Motel, hotel or mobile home pk 14 Moderate

46 Commercial Drive up/thru restaurant 1 Moderate

47 Commercial Restaurant (inside service) 7 Moderate

48 Commercial Miscellaneous multiple and commercial

11 Moderate






50 Industrial Vacant industrial 8 Moderate

53 Industrial Light industrial 7 Moderate

54 Industrial Heavy industrial 2 Moderate

55 Industrial Mini-warehouse (public storage) 2 Moderate

56 Industrial Miscellaneous Industrial 5 Moderate

71 Institutional Church 8 Moderate

72 Institutional School, public or private 1 Special

74 Institutional Cemetery or mortuary 1 Moderate

75 Institutional Service organization, group home, shelter

4 Special

77 Institutional Cultural use 2 Moderate

78 Institutional Parks, playgrounds 3 Low

79 Institutional Government Owned 421 Moderate

Total Unincorporated Parcels 8,871

Table 10—City of Brentwood Building Inventory by Assessor Use Code



11 Residential Single family (SF) 13,295 Moderate



14 Residential SF res on other than single family land 87 Moderate

16 Residential SF attached res, townhouse, duet 226 Moderate



19 Residential SF detached w/common area 3,546 Moderate



22 Multifamily Triplex 5 Moderate

23 Multifamily Fourplex 12 Moderate










28 Multifamily Apartments 60+ units 8 High

29 Multifamily Condos, co-op housing 117 High





35 Commercial Service station, car wash, etc. 17 Moderate



39 Commercial Bowling Alley 1 High

42 Commercial Shopping center 58 High

43 Commercial Financial buildings 5 High

44 Commercial Motel, hotel or mobile home park 7 High

45 Commercial Theaters 1 High



48 Commercial Miscellaneous multiple and commercial

11 Moderate

49 Commercial Auto Agency 4 Moderate


51 Industrial Industrial Park 21 Moderate

53 Industrial Light industrial 9 High





74 Institutional Cemetery or mortuary 1 Moderate


2 Special

76 Institutional Residential Care Facility 5 Special


Total Brentwood Parcels 19,606




Table 11—City of Oakley building Inventory by Assessor Use Code



11 Residential Single family (SF) 9,519 Moderate



14 Residential SF res on other than single family land

58 Moderate



19 Residential SF detached w/common area 1,144 Moderate



23 Multifamily Fourplex 1 Moderate




27 Multifamily Apartments 25-59 6 Moderate

28 Multifamily Apartments 60+ units 3 High

29 Multifamily Condos, co-op housing 12 Moderate





34 Commercial Medical- Dental 2 Moderate

35 Commercial Service station, car wash, etc. 7 High



40 Commercial Boat harbor or private dock 4 High

42 Commercial Shopping center 12 High

44 Commercial Motel, hotel or mobile home park 10 High



48 Commercial Miscellaneous commercial 6 Moderate


51 Industrial Industrial Park 1 Moderate






53 Industrial Light industrial 11 High






3 High

78 Institutional Parks/Playgrounds 3 Low


Total Oakley Parcels 12,100

Table 12—District Building Inventory by Risk Category

Building Risk Category

Number of Buildings

Moderate 40,121

High 423

Special 27

Low 6

Maximum 0

Total 40,577

Data Source: East CCC Fire Department

Based on Tables 9-12, the predominant risk class for the District is Moderate.

Buildings with Fire Sprinkler Systems

The District has approximately 228 buildings protected by automatic fire sprinkler systems,

although no data was available to quantify these by risk type or zone.

High Fire Flow Requirements

One of the factors used by ISO is “Needed Fire Flow” (NFF), which is the amount of water that

would be required in gallons-per-minute (GPM) if the building were seriously involved in fire.

The ISO database identifies buildings evaluated, of which 23 buildings in the District have a

NFF flow of 1,000-2,250 GPM and 11 buildings have a NFF of 2250-4,000 GPM, and one

building has a NFF of 5,000 GPM or more.




This is a significant amount of firefighting water to deploy, and a major fire at any one of these

buildings would overwhelm the Department’s on-duty force of nine personnel. Using a generally

accepted figure of 50 gallons GPM per firefighter on large building fires, a fire in a building

requiring 2,000 GPM would require 40 firefighters, which is much more than the Department’s

current initial multiple-unit response of 17 (District + mutual aid) firefighters for structure fires,

which includes automatic aid units.

Historic Buildings

There is one designated historical building in the District, listed in the National Register of

Historic Places. The City of Brentwood, where the facility is, has a very progressive preservation

ordinance.

Building Fire Risk Service Capacity

The District’s service capacity for building fire risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty

response force of nine personnel staffing three apparatus from three fire stations. As of late

Spring 2016, a temporary funding agreement was reached with the cities and County to fund a 4th

fire crew while the research was conducted on a permanent funding solution. In addition, the

Department has mutual aid agreements with adjacent fire agencies, and is also a participant in the

Contra Costa County Auto Aid Agreement. This agreement also has defined first- and closest-

unit dispatch criteria. This service capacity, with automatic and mutual aid, is appropriate to

mitigate the District’s building fire risk exclusive of a disaster event.

Building Fire Risk Service Demand

Over the past three years, there were a total of 167 building fires comprising 0.01% of total

service demand over the same time period, and resulting in estimated property damage/loss of

$84.53 million. These numbers reflect the actual incident type found upon arrival, not as

dispatched.

Table 13 illustrates the number of structure fires in the District over the last three years.

Table 13—Building Fire Risk Service Demand

2013 2014 2015 Total

62 48 57 167




Building Fire Risk Analysis

Table 14 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s building fire risk.

Table 14—Building Fire Risk Analysis Summary

Probability of Occurrence

RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Building

Construction Occupant

Load

Fire Protection Systems Installed

Water Supply

Response Capability

3 4 1 4 2 0 11 44 Moderate

3.2.11 Wildland Fire Risk

Fire Hazard Severity Zones

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) designates Moderate,

High, and Very High Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) throughout the state based on

analysis of multiple wildland fire hazard factors and modeling of potential wildland fire behavior

for State Responsibility areas (SRA) where CAL FIRE has fiscal responsibility for wildland fire

protection. CAL FIRE also identifies recommended Moderate, High, and Very High FHSZs for

Local Responsibility Areas (LRA) where a local jurisdiction bears the fiscal responsibility for

wildland fire protection, including cities. CAL FIRE has identified the following areas of the

District as having a Moderate Risk (16,000 acres), High Risk (30,000 acres), and a smaller

portion of Very High Risk (1,300 acres). Wildland fire hazard severity risk areas are shown in

Figures 5 and 6.




Figure 5—Wildland Fire LRA Hazard Severity Zones




Figure 6—Wildland Fire SRA Fire Hazard Severity Zone Map




Wildland Fire Risk Factors

Wildland fire behavior is influenced by fuel, weather, and topography. Wildland fuels in Contra

Costa County consist of a mix of annual grasses and weeds, brush, and trees. These fuels, when

ignited, can burn intensely and contribute to rapid fire spread in the right weather and

topographic conditions.

Weather elements such as temperature, relative humidity, wind, and lightning also affect

wildland fire potential and behavior. High temperatures and low relative humidity dry out

wildland fuels creating a situation where fuel will more readily ignite and burn more intensely.

Wind is the most significant weather factor influencing wildland fire behavior; higher wind

speeds increase fire spread and intensity. The annual wildland fire season in Contra Costa

County, when wildland fires are most likely to occur due to fuel and weather conditions, is

generally from late spring through fall due to a predominant climate pattern of low annual

rainfall, hot, dry summers, and moderate winds through the County.

Climate5

Contra Costa County is an area of relatively mild temperatures and moderate precipitation.

Average temperatures near San Pablo Bay vary only about 15ºF from summer to winter,

although a greater temperature range is found over inland areas. Coastal temperatures near

Richmond average 58ºF and range from about 50ºF during winter to the low 70s in summer.

Annual average temperatures near Antioch are about 60ºF, with average summer temperatures in

the mid-70s, although the mean daily maximum temperature in July reaches 90ºF. Higher inland

elevations near Mount Diablo average 58ºF. Temperatures typically range from 39ºF in January

to 85ºF in July. Rainfall is experienced during each month of the year in Contra Costa County,

with the majority of precipitation occurring during the winter. Most of this is associated with

storm fronts that move in from the Pacific Ocean. A few thunder showers develop in the

mountains during the summer, but they are infrequent. Annual precipitation near Richmond

exceeds 23 inches, while Antioch experiences drier conditions, with rainfall totals around 13

inches. Mount Diablo’s slopes and foothills experience about 24 inches of precipitation, most of

it in the form of winter snowfall.

The average relative humidity near the coastal communities is higher due to the moist air

influence of the Pacific Ocean and San Pablo Bay. The adjoining coastal area has a moderate,

stable temperature regime.

5 Contra Costa County Hazard Mitigation Plan Update, July 2011




With increasing distance from the ocean, the marine influence is less pronounced, so inland areas

experience wider variations of temperature and lower humidity. The heat produced by inland

temperatures, combined with the cool waters of the Bay and Pacific Ocean and the winds coming

in from the water, provide suitable conditions for East Bay area fog. Fog tends to creep into

lowlands at night to cool down hot summer temperatures.

Fuels

Fuel may include living and dead vegetation on the ground, along the surface as brush and small

trees, and above the ground in tree canopies. Lighter fuels such as grasses, leaves and needles

quickly expel moisture and burn rapidly, while heavier fuels such as tree branches, logs and

trunks take longer to warm and ignite. Trees killed or defoliated by forest insects and diseases

are more susceptible to wildfire.

Weather

Relevant weather conditions include temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction,

cloud cover, precipitation amount and duration, and the stability of the atmosphere. Of particular

importance for wildfire activity are wind and thunderstorms:

Strong, dry winds produce extreme fire conditions. Such winds generally reach

peak velocities during the night and early morning hours.

The thunderstorm season typically begins in June with wet storms, and turns dry

with little or no precipitation reaching the ground as the season progresses into

July and August.

Wildland Fire Risk Service Capacity

The Department’s Response Plan for wildland fires includes three, Type-1 structural engines,

and a Battalion Chief. Any additional resources will be an Intra-County Strike Team or Task

Force.

This service capacity is appropriate to mitigate the District’s current and anticipated near-future

wildland fire risk.

Wildland Fire Risk Service Demand

Over the most recent 3-year period evaluated by Citygate for this study, there were a total of 272

vegetation-related fires in the District comprising, 0.02% of total service demand over the same

time period as shown in Table 15.




Table 15—Wildland Risk Service Demand

Incident Type 2013 2014 2015 Total

Natural vegetation 14 7 6 27

Brush or brush/grass 21 24 15 60

Grass 67 61 53 181

Forest, woods, or wildland 0 3 1 4

Total 102 95 75 272

Source: Fire Department incident records

Wildland Fire Risk Analysis

Table 16 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the wildland fire risk for the District based on

evaluation of five wildland fire risk factors for each risk assessment zone.

Table 16—Wildland Fire Risk Analysis Summary


RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk Score

Risk Rating Fuel Weather Topog.

Water Supply

Service Capacity

4 5 5 2 5 3 20 80 High

The District’s wildland fire risk is High in the District boundaries as shown in Table 16. Typical

late spring through fall weather patterns, vegetative fuel types and condition, and the topography

of the wildland FHSZs in and around the District contribute to an increased probability of

wildland fires with potential for erratic fire behavior and major destruction.

3.2.12 Emergency Medical Services Risk

EMS Risk Factors

Emergency medical services (EMS) risk in most communities is predominantly a function of

population demographics, violence, and vehicle traffic. Relative to population demographics,

EMS risk tends to be higher among poorer, older, less educated, and uninsured populations. As

would be expected, EMS risk is also higher in communities or segments of communities with

higher rates of violence. EMS risk is also higher in those areas of a community with high vehicle

traffic loads, particularly those areas with high traffic volume travelling at higher speeds.

EMS risk can also be categorized as either a medical emergency resulting from a health-related

condition or event, or traumatic injury. One serious medical emergency is cardiac arrest or some

other emergency where there is an interruption or blockage of oxygen to the brain. Figure 7




illustrates the reduced survivability of a cardiac arrest victim as time to defibrillation increases.

While early defibrillation is one factor in cardiac arrest survivability, other factors can influence

survivability as well, such as early CPR and pre-hospital advanced life support interventions.

Figure 7—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation

Source: www.suddencardiacarrest.org

According to the 2010 U.S. Census, 13.4% of the County’s population is 65 or older, and 22% is

at poverty level or below. The District has a street network of urban to wilderness unpaved roads

contributing to its EMS risk.

EMS Risk Service Capacity

The District’s service capacity for EMS risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty response force

of nine personnel staffing three apparatus from three fire stations. In the District, all calls for

medical assistance are delivered by the level of the incident as determined by the communication

center. For a low acuity medical complaint, a private ambulance provider will be the only

responder unless they request assistance from the District. The closest Fire Department unit




response for other levels or EMS calls receive a private-sector contract paramedic transportation

ambulance and one District engine company. This level of response provides a minimum of two

personnel to every low acuity EMS-related call for service and a minimum of five personnel on

other levels or EMS calls. All Department response personnel are trained to either the

Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) level enhanced capable of providing Basic Life Support

(BLS) pre-hospital emergency medical care. American Medical Response (AMR) Ambulance,

under an exclusive operating area contract with Contra Costa County Fire Department, provides

ambulance transportation with a minimum staffing of two personnel per ambulance, at least one

of which is a licensed Paramedic and the other an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT).

The District has access to three hospitals with emergency room facilities, including Contra Costa

County Regional Medical Center, Concord, John Muir Medical Center in Concord, and Antioch

Hospital. The John Muir Medical Center in Walnut Creek is the Level 1 Trauma Center.

This service capacity is appropriate to mitigate the District’s current and anticipated near-future

EMS risk exclusive of a disaster event.

EMS Risk Service Demand

Table 17 shows annual EMS risk service demand for the District over the previous three years,

which is 81% of total service demand over the same period.

Table 17—EMS Risk Service Demand


EMS call excluding vehicle accident with injury 3,306 3,635 3,933 10,874

EMS call cancelled prior to arrival 957 1,012 1,193 3,162

Assist EMS crew 767 651 577 1,995

Vehicle accident with injuries 222 211 250 683

Vehicle accident w/o injuries 85 93 101 279

Vehicle/pedestrian accident 30 21 31 82

EMS - Other 15 9 22 46

Total 5,382 5,632 6,107 17,121





EMS Risk Analysis

Table 18 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of EMS risk for the District.

Table 18—EMS Risk Analysis Summary

Probability of

Occurrence

RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Density Population

Demography

Vehicle Traffic Volume

Pre-Hospital Service

Capacity

Hospital Emergency

Service Capacity

5 2 2 2 4 5 15 75 High

3.2.13 Hazardous Materials Risk

Hazardous Materials Risk Factors

Hazardous material risk factors include fixed facilities that store, use, or produce hazardous

chemicals, or produce hazardous waste; underground pipeline(s) that transport hazardous

materials; and aircraft railroad, and vehicle transportation of hazardous materials.

Other hazardous material risk factors include at-risk populations and related demographics,

response capacity, historic service demand, emergency evacuation planning and effectiveness,

and presence and effectiveness of mass emergency notifications system(s).

The Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Area Plan (HMAP) 2016 revision is a very

detailed, well-written guideline for the County and responding agencies.

Hazardous Materials Risk Response Capacity

The County’s HMAP identifies the three regional Hazardous Materials Response Teams: Contra

Costa County Environmental Health Department personnel, San Ramon Valley Fire, and

Richmond Fire Departments.




Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand

Table 19 summarizes annual hazardous material risk service demand for the District over the

previous three years, which is 0.61% of total service demand over the same period.

Table 19—Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand


Gas leak 45 26 32 103

Flammable liquid spill 7 11 7 25

Combustible liquid spill 1 3 1 5

Other flammable gas or liquid condition 3 1 1 5

Chemical spill or leak 1 1 0 2

Chemical hazard (no spill or leak) 0 1 0 1

Other toxic condition 40 72 53 165

Total 97 115 94 306

Source: Fire Department NFIRS incident records

Hazardous Materials Risk Analysis

Due to the District’s size and related businesses, hazardous materials are present throughout the

area. There are 53 buildings/facilities classified as a hazardous occupancy within the District

according to the Building Code. For the Certified Unified Program Agencies (CUPA), there are

324 facilities listed.

With the low number of hazardous material risk factors present in the District, the probability of

a significant hazardous materials-related incident is based on historical service demand.

Table 20—Hazardous Materials Risk Analysis Summary


RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Demography

Fixed HazMat

Sites

Transp. HazMat Volume

Service Capacity

Emergency Evacuation Capability

3 2 3 5 3 1 14 42 Moderate

3.2.14 Technical Rescue Risk

Technical Rescue Risk Factors

Technical rescue risk factors include construction work, structural collapse, confined spaces such

as tanks and underground vaults, bodies of water and rivers or streams, urban flooding,




machinery, transportation accidents, and other factors that may create a need for technical rescue

skills and/or equipment.

Technical Rescue Risk Response Capacity

The Department’s personnel are trained to the First Responder Operations level. There are two

regional Technical Rescue response teams that have at least a 60-minute travel time. Both teams

are Type 1 designated. The two agencies are San Ramon Valley and Richmond Fire

Departments.

Technical Rescue Risk Service Demand

Over the most recent 3-year period evaluated for this study, there were 10 technical rescue

incidents in the District.

Table 21—Technical Rescue Risk Service Demand

Incident Type FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

Elevator rescue 2 1 1 4

Vehicle extrication 1 1 1 3

Extrication from building 1 0 0 1

Water/ice related rescue, other 1 0 0 1

Swift water rescue 1 0 0 1

Total 6 2 2 10




Technical Rescue Risk Analysis

Table 22 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of technical rescue risk for the District.

Table 22—Technical Rescue Risk Impact Severity Summary


RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating

Aircraft/ Railway Traffic

Volume

Commercial/ Industrial

Activity Risk Water Risk

Construction Risk

Service Capacity

2 4 3 4 3 3 17 36 Moderate

3.2.15 Transportation Risk

Transportation Risk Factors

Transportation risk factors include motor vehicle, railway, watercraft, and aircraft use in and

through the District.

Primary Transportation Routes

There are 20 miles of railroad lines carrying freight cars and Amtrak passengers in the District.

There are also 710 miles of paved surface streets. There is a functioning pre-emption system to

clear traffic for emergency vehicles during an emergent response at all intersections.

Table 23—Average Annual Daily Highway Traffic Volume

Highway Crossing Peak Hour Traffic

Lone Tree Way Mile Post 32 3650

Sand Creek Rd Mile Post 34 3250

Balfour Rd. Mile Post 36 2600

Marsh Creek Rd Mile Post 44 1850

Source: California Department of Transportation

Mass Transportation

The District has approximately 20 miles of rail lines transecting the District from the East to the

Northwest. The rail line enters the District from the east/west and just north of Fire Station 59.

There are approximately 20 daily trains, of which four are passenger rail trains for Amtrak. The

freight rail cars carry a mixture of materials and products, including hazardous materials,

flammables, and gases.




Transportation Risk Service Capacity

The District’s response capacity for transportation risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty

response force of nine personnel staffing three apparatus from the three District fire stations. In

addition, the Department has automatic aid and mutual aid agreements with adjacent fire

agencies. The response capability of the District, on its own, is insufficient; thus automatic and

mutual aid are required.

Transportation Risk Service Demand

Over the most recent 3-year period evaluated for this study, there were 1,159 transportation-

related incidents in the District comprising less than 1% of total service demand over the same

period as shown in Table 24.

Table 24—Transportation Risk Service Demand


322 Vehicle accident with injuries 222 211 250 683

324 Vehicle accident w/o injuries 85 93 101 279

323 Vehicle/pedestrian accidents 30 21 31 82

131 Passenger vehicle fires 40 21 32 93

130 Mobile property fire, other 4 1 4 9

132 Road freight/transport vehicle fire 43 4 1 9

137 Camper/RV fire 2 1 0 3

136 Motor home/RV fire 1 0 0 1

Total 388 352 419 1,159


Transportation Risk Analysis

Citygate’s analysis of the District’s transportation risk is summarized in Table 25.

Table 25—Transportation Risk Analysis Summary


RISK FACTORS

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Density Traffic

Volume

Transp. HazMat Volume

Service Capacity

Emergency Evacuation Capability

3 1 1 4 3 3 12 36 Moderate




3.2.16 Disaster Risk

The District’s annex to the County’s 2011 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies and describes

the hazards likely to impact the District. The identified hazards in order are: Earthquake, Severe

Weather, Flooding, Wildland Fires, Dam Failure, and Drought. Disruption of lifeline utility

infrastructure systems, which also ranked high, could be caused by either a natural-occurring

event such as an earthquake, landslide/mudslide, and flood, or a human-caused condition or

event.

Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR) owned by the District are:

Station 50, 134 Oak Street Brentwood, CA 94513

Station 51, 1240 Marsh Creek Road Clayton, CA 94517

Station 52, 201 John Muir Parkway Brentwood, CA 94513

Station 53, 16711 Marsh Creek Road Brentwood, CA 94513

Station 54, 739 First Street Brentwood, CA 94513

Station 57, 3024 First Street Byron, CA 94514

Station 58, 1535 Discovery Bay Blvd. Discovery Bay, CA 94505

Station 59, 1681 Bixler Road Discovery Bay, CA 94561

Station 93, 212 2nd Street Oakley, CA 94561

Station 94, 15 A-Street Knightsen, CA 94548

Station 95, 3045 Ranch Lane, Bethel Island, CA 94511

The total value of critical facilities owned by the District is estimated at $15 million. The

majority of the fire stations are over 20 years old and in need of major repair or refurbishing.

The Contra Costa County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan further identified 778 locations as

Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources (CIKR) in the area protected by the District.

Earthquake

Faults and Probabilities

The numerous fault lines traverse Contra Costa County running north and south in the western

quarter of the County. The Hayward, Calaveras, Green Valley, Clayton, Mt. Diablo, Concord

and Greenville fault lines all cross the District from North to South.




According to a 2007 study of earthquake probabilities prepared by the Working Group on

California Earthquake Probabilities (a multi-disciplinary collaboration of scientists and

engineers) and published by the U.S. Geological Survey, the chance of a major (6.7 or greater

magnitude) earthquake occurring in the Bay Area during the period of 2007 to 2037 is 63%. For

the State of California at large, the chance of a major earthquake occurring is 99.7% during the

period of 2007 to 2037.

The Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities study further states that other faults

in the area (including the Rodgers Creek Fault and the Hayward Fault) pose a major threat. The

group also identified the eastern portion of the County, where the District is located, has a

Moderate potential for an earthquake of a 100-year timespan.

An earthquake occurring in or near area faults could result in significant casualties, damage to

property and environment, and disruption of normal government and community services and

activities. Ground failures (fissuring, settlement, and permanent horizontal and vertical shifting

of the ground such as surface breaks caused by faulting) that often accompany earthquakes could

cause significant damage to network infrastructure such as water, power, communication, and

transportation lines in Contra Costa County. These effects could be aggravated by secondary

emergencies such as fires, floods, hazardous material spills, utility disruptions, landslides,

automobile accidents, transportation emergencies, and dam failures.

Flood Risk

Waterways

The major floods in Contra Costa County have resulted from intense weather rainstorms between

November and March. The flooding that has occurred in portions of the County has been

extensively documented by gage records, high water marks, damage surveys, and personal

accounts.

Floods are generally classed as either slow-rise or flash floods. Slow-rise floods may be preceded

by limited warning time. Evacuation, sandbagging, and other preventative measures for a slow-

rise flood may lessen flood-related damage. Conversely, flash floods are difficult to prepare for

due to extremely short warning time. Flash flood warnings usually require immediate action

within the hour. Flood waters can cause road closures and sweep away objects and people.

Areas that experience occasional flooding are found in various locations throughout the County,

mainly affecting roads. The County’s floods historically have caused road closures, landslides,

debris flows, erosion, and sewer problems. Creeks often overflow in low lying areas when heavy

rainfall is combined with high tide conditions.

The flood risk for the District for a 100-year flood is primarily in the far eastern portion of the

District and County. The risk for flooding in the District is High.




Dam Failure

The County Hazzard Mitigation Plan identifies several potential dam failures for the District:

Los Vaqueros Reservoir, Clifton Court, Forebay and Bethany, Marsh Creek, and Dry Creek

dams.

The largest potential cause of a dam failure would be an earthquake within the region leading to

liquefaction of soils around a dam. This could occur without warning during any time of the day.

A human-caused failure, such as a terrorist attack, also could trigger a catastrophic failure of a

dam that impacts the planning area. While the probability of dam failure is very low, the

probability of flooding associated with changes to dam operational parameters in response to

climate change is higher. Dam designs and operations are developed based on hydrographs with

historical record. If these hydrographs experience significant changes over time due to the

impacts of climate change, the design and operations may no longer be valid for the changed

condition. This could have significant impacts on dams that provide flood control. Specified

release rates and impound thresholds may have to be changed. This would result in increased

discharges downstream of these facilities, thus increasing the probability and severity of

flooding.

Impacts, should there be a failure or leakage, would affect critical infrastructures in Brentwood

and the unincorporated area of the District. Dollar loss projected for Brentwood is in excess of

$150,000,000 in property and structure damage. Unincorporated areas of the County would

exceed 1.5 billion dollars in losses.

The potential for dam failure is Moderate based on the earthquake potential, the primary cause

for dam failure.

Landslides – Earth Movement

A landslide is a mass of rock, earth, or debris moving down a slope. Landslides may be minor or

very large, and can move at slow to very high speeds. They can be initiated by storms,

earthquakes, fires, volcanic eruptions, or human modification of the land. Mudslides (or

mudflows or debris flows) are rivers of rock, earth, organic matter and other soil materials

saturated with water. They develop in the soil overlying bedrock on sloping surfaces when water

rapidly accumulates in the ground, such as during heavy rainfall or rapid snowmelt. Water

pressure in the pore spaces of the material increases to the point that the internal strength of the

soil is drastically weakened. The soil’s reduced resistance can then easily be overcome by

gravity, changing the earth into a flowing river of mud or “slurry.” A debris flow or mudflow can

move rapidly down slopes or through channels, and can strike with little or no warning at

avalanche speeds. The slurry can travel miles from its source, growing as it descends, picking up

trees, boulders, cars and anything else in its path. Although these slides behave as fluids, they




pack many times the hydraulic force of water due to the mass of material included in them.

Locally, they can be some of the most destructive events in nature.

Landslides and debris flow in the District’s eastern portion are unlikely. Portions of the SW

corner of the District have a designation of mostly landslide area. The potential for landslides has

been determined to be Low.

Severe Weather

Severe weather refers to any dangerous meteorological phenomena with the potential to cause

damage, serious social disruption, or loss of human life. It includes thunderstorms, downbursts,

tornadoes, waterspouts, snowstorms, ice storms, and dust storms. Severe weather can be

categorized into two groups: those that form over wide geographic areas are classified as general

severe weather; those with a more limited geographic area are classified as localized severe

weather. Severe weather, technically, is not the same as extreme weather, which refers to unusual

weather events are at the extremes of the historical distribution for a given area. Four types of

severe weather events typically impact Contra Costa County: thunderstorms, damaging winds,

hail storms, and flash flooding. There have been two recorded tornado/funnel cloud events

within the County since 1950. However, these were F0-rated events that caused no damages, and

tornados are not considered a high risk for the County. The potential for severe weather has been

determined to be Moderate.

Drought

Most of California’s precipitation comes from storms moving across the Pacific Ocean. The path

followed by the storms is determined by the position of an atmospheric high pressure belt that

normally shifts southward during the winter, allowing low pressure systems to move into the

state. On average, 75% of California’s annual precipitation occurs between November and

March, with 50% occurring between December and February. If a persistent Pacific high

pressure zone takes hold over California mid-winter, there is a tendency for the water year to be

dry.

Defining when drought begins is a function of the impacts of drought on water users, and

includes consideration of the supplies available to local water users as well as the stored water

they may have available in surface reservoirs or groundwater basins. Different local water

agencies have different criteria for defining drought conditions in their jurisdictions. Some

agencies issue drought watch or drought warning announcements to their customers.

Determinations of regional or statewide drought conditions are usually based on a combination

of hydrologic and water supply factors.

The eastern portion of the County is within the jurisdiction of the Central Valley Regional Water

Quality Control Board (RWQCB), whose jurisdiction encompasses Antioch, Brentwood, Oakley,




and surrounding areas whose surface water drains northward into the Sacramento‐San Joaquin

Delta. Drainage flowing from the East Bay Hills includes Marsh Creek Reservoir, numerous

unnamed intermittent streams, Marsh Creek, Deer Creek, and several others. The low‐lying,

easternmost portion of Contra Costa is drained by a network of man‐made canals which

primarily discharge into Old River. Located on the Contra Costa‐San Joaquin County line, Old

River empties into the San Joaquin River near Franks Tract.

All people, property, and environments in the Contra Costa County planning area would be

exposed to some degree to the impacts of moderate to extreme drought conditions.

No significant life or health impacts are anticipated as a result of drought within the planning

area. The potential risk is Low.

3.2.17 Risk Assessment Summary

Citygate’s evaluation of the various risks likely to adversely impact the District yields the

following conclusions:

1. The District has very diverse urban, suburban, and rural population densities.

2. The District has a mix of residential, commercial, open space, and industrial

buildings.

3. The District has a transportation network, including highways and other primary

vehicle transportation routes, rail lines, and a small airport.

4. The majority of the risks in the District pose a moderate risk.




3.3 EXISTING DISTRICT DEPLOYMENT

3.3.1 Existing Deployment Situation—What the District Has in Place Currently

As the District has not adopted a best practices-based

response time policy, this study will benchmark the

District against the response time recommendations of

both urban and rural population density areas. Two best

practices guidelines are National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) Standard 1710 and NFPA 1720. In

urban areas, NFPA 1710 recommends:

Four minutes travel time for the first-due unit to all types of emergencies.

Eight minutes travel time for multiple units needed at serious emergencies (First

Alarm).

In suburban and rural areas, NFPA 1720 recommends:

Suburban area – 10 minutes from crew notification for the first-due unit, thus 8

minutes travel.

Rural area – 14 minutes from crew notification for the first-due unit, thus 12

minutes travel.

The District’s current daily staffing plan is:

Table 26—Daily Minimum Staffing per Unit for the District – 2016

Per Unit Minimum Staff Extended Minimum

3 Engines 3 Firefighters/day 9

1 Battalion Chief (BC) 1 Per day for command 1

Subtotal firefighters and BC 10

1 Engine with temporary funding 3 13

The District’s daily staffing of 9 to 12 line firefighters is inadequate for the immediate response

fire risk needs presented in most of the built-up, urban areas of the District. This also assumes for

a building fire, that the closest crews are available and not already operating on another

emergency medical call or fire, which does occur. For example, if one engine is committed to an

emergency medical services call, then an adjacent engine company or auto-aid unit must

respond, which in the District’s case have to come from a considerable distance.

SOC ELEMENT 1 OF 8*

EXISTING DEPLOYMENT

POLICIES

*Note: Continued from page 7.




Services Provided

The District is an “all-risk” fire department, providing the people it protects with services that

include structure fire, technical rescue, and first-responder hazardous materials response, as well

as other services.

Given these risks, and its limited resources, the District must respond using from one to all of its

unit’s apparatus to each incident type, based on severity. The regional fire dispatch system

selects the closest and most appropriate resource types and handles this function. As an example,

here are the resources dispatched to common risk types:

Table 27—Resources Sent to Common Risk Types

Risk Type Minimum Type of Resources Sent Total Firefighters Sent

1-Patient EMS 1 Engine, 1 Ambulance 3 FF

Auto Fire 1 Engine 3 FF

Building Fire 5 Engines, 2 Battalion Chiefs 17 FF

Wildland Fire 2 Engines, 1 Battalion Chief 7 FF

Technical Rescue 1 Engine, 1 Ambulance, 1 Battalion Chief 9 FF



Section 4—Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis page 49

SECTION 4—STAFFING AND GEO-MAPPING ANALYSIS

4.1 CRITICAL TASK TIME MEASURES—WHAT MUST BE DONE OVER WHAT TIME FRAME TO

ACHIEVE THE STATED OUTCOME EXPECTATION?

Standards of Response Coverage (SOC) studies use task

time information to determine the firefighters needed

within a timeframe to accomplish the desired fire control

objective on moderate residential fires and modest

emergency medical rescues.

4.1.1 Firefighting Critical Tasks

The District’s Effective Response Force (ERF) to structure fires in built-up, urban areas includes

five engines (1-2 from mutual aid), and two chief officers, for a minimum ERF force of 17

personnel. The District does not operate a ladder truck and, if one is needed, it must respond

from Contra Costa County Fire Department from the west of the District.

The following table shows what a minimum force of 17 can accomplish. The larger the force

(weight of attack), the faster the tasks are completed.

Scenario: The following is a simulated one-story residential structure fire with no rescue

situation. Responding companies received dispatch information as typical for a witnessed fire.

Upon arrival they were told approximately 1,000 square feet of the home was involved in fire.

SOC ELEMENT 4 OF 8

CRITICAL TASK TIME

STUDY




Table 28—First Alarm Structure Fire – 17 Personnel

Company Level Tasks

1st-Due Engine

1. Lay in a hydrant supply line.

2. Stretch the 150-foot, 1¾-inch hose line to the point of access for search and rescue.

3. Operate the pump to supply water and attach hydrant supply line.

4. Assume command of initial operations.

5. Establish the Initial Rapid Intervention Crew.

2nd

-Due Engine

1. If necessary, lay in a hydrant supply line.

2. Stretch a 2nd 200-foot hose line as a back-up line and for fire attack.

3. Establish treatment (EMS) sector if needed.

3rd

-Due Engine

1. If necessary, lay in a hydrant supply line.

2. Pump 1st Engine’s supply line if needed.

3. Stretch 3rd 1¾-inch hose line if needed.

4th-Due Engine

3. Establish a dedicated Rapid Intervention Crew.

5th Engine

1. Perform positive pressure and/or limited vertical ventilation from ground ladders.

2. Secure utilities.

3. Raise ladders, open concealed spaces, and force entry as needed.

4. Provide salvage and overhaul.

1st-Due Chief Officer/Incident Commander

1. Establish exterior command.

The duties in Table 28, grouped together, form an Effective Response Force or First Alarm

assignment. These tasks must be performed simultaneously and effectively to achieve the desired

outcome; arriving on-scene does not stop the escalation of the emergency. While firefighters

accomplish the above tasks, the incident progression clock keeps running.

Fire spread in a structure can double in size during its free-burn period before firefighting is

started. Many studies have shown that a small fire can spread to engulf an entire room in less

than 4 to 5 minutes after free burning has started. Once the room is completely superheated and

involved in fire (known as flashover), the fire will spread quickly throughout the structure and




into the attic and walls. For this reason, it is imperative that fire attack and search commence

before the flashover point occurs if the outcome goal is to keep the fire damage in or near the

room of origin. In addition, flashover presents a serious danger to both firefighters and any

occupants of the building.

4.1.2 Emergency Medical Services Critical Tasks

The District’s Fire Department responds to nearly 6,100 EMS incidents per year. These incidents

include car accidents, childbirths, strokes, heart attacks, difficulty breathing, and many other

medical emergencies. The wide variety and circumstances of EMS calls makes it difficult and

impractical to chart the critical tasks for each call type.

The American Heart Association (AHA) recommends a minimum of two emergency medical

technicians and one to two certified paramedics to adequately operate an emergency cardiac

scene. A 2010 EMS study conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST) clearly demonstrates a crew of four first responders on-scene, including two paramedics,

is the most expedient and efficient means of delivering advanced emergency medical care.

The Department routinely responds to EMS calls that require treatment for more than one

patient. These calls include vehicle accidents, chemical exposures, construction or industrial

accidents, and any other event that occurs with several people in close proximity. Patient

conditions can range from minor cuts and bruises to life-threatening injuries.

Dispatchers are responsible for screening calls to establish the correct initial response. The first

Fire Department officer on-scene amends the response once conditions have been assessed.

Standard operating procedures are used to request adequate personnel and resources.

For comparison purposes, the following critical task table reviews the tasks needed on a typical

cardiac arrest.




Table 29—Cardiac Arrest – 3 Firefighters plus an Ambulance

Task Personnel Required Type of Treatment Administered

Compressions 1-2 Compression of chest to circulate blood

Ventilate/oxygenate 1-2 Mouth-to-mouth, bag-valve-mask, apply O2

Airway control 1-2 Manual techniques/intubation/cricothyroidomy

Defibrillate 1-2 Electrical defibrillation of dysrhythmia

Establish I.V. 1-2 Peripheral or central intravenous access

Control hemorrhage 1-2 Direct pressure, pressure bandage, tourniquet

Splint fractures 2-3 Manual, board splint, HARE traction, spine

Interpret ECG 2 Identify type and treat dysrhythmia

Administer drugs 2 Administer appropriate pharmacological agents

Spinal immobilization 3-5 Prevent or limit paralysis to extremities

Extricate patient 3-4 Remove patient from vehicle, entrapment

Patient charting 1-2 Record vitals, treatments administered, etc.

Hosp. communication 1-2 Receive treatment orders from physician

Treat en-route 2-4 Continue to treat/monitor/transport patient

Total 5 Personnel required per patient

4.1.3 Critical Task Analysis and Effective Response Force Size

What does a deployment study derive from a company task analysis? The total task needs (as

displayed in Table 28 and Table 29) to stop the escalation of an emergency must be compared to

outcomes. We know from nationally-published fire service “time vs. temperature” tables that

after about 4 to 5 minutes of free burning, a room fire will grow to the point of flashover. At this

point, the entire room is engulfed, the structure becomes threatened, and human survival near or

in the fire room becomes impossible. Additionally, we know that brain death begins to occur

within 4 to 6 minutes of the heart having stopped. Thus, the Effective Response Force must

arrive in time to stop these catastrophic events from becoming worse.

The on-scene tasks discussed show that the residents of the District could expect positive

outcomes, and have a good chance of survival, in a serious fire or medical emergency if they

live close enough to the staffed fire stations. The District is not staffed per day with enough

firefighters to deliver one Effective Response Forces without assistance from other agencies.

Mitigating an emergency event is a team effort once the units have arrived. This refers back to

the “weight” of response analogy; if too few personnel arrive too slowly, then the emergency




will worsen instead of improve. The outcome times, of course, will be longer, with less desirable

results, if the arriving force is later or smaller.

The quantity of staffing and the arrival time frame can be critical in a serious fire. Fires in older

and/or multi-story buildings could well require the initial firefighters needing to rescue trapped

or immobile occupants. If a lightly-staffed force arrives, it cannot simultaneously conduct rescue

and firefighting operations.

Fires and complex medical incidents require that the other units arrive in time to complete an

effective intervention. Time is one factor that comes from proper station placement. Good

performance also comes from adequate staffing and training. In the critical tasks identified

previously, the District Fire Department can perform well in terms of time. If fire stations are

spaced too far apart, then when one unit has to cover another unit’s area, or multiple units are

needed, these units can be too far away and the emergency will worsen.

Previous critical task studies conducted by Citygate’s, the Standard of Response Cover

documents reviewed from accredited fire departments, and NFPA 1710 in urban area

recommends the need for 15+ firefighters arriving within 11 minutes (from the time of call) at a

room and contents structure fire to be able to simultaneously and effectively perform the tasks of

rescue, fire attack, and ventilation. Given that the District sends 17 personnel with mutual aid

forces to an incident involving a working First Alarm building fire, it is clear that the District and

its leaders understand that firefighting crews arriving closely together are needed to deliver a

positive outcome that protects lives and property by stopping the escalation of the emergency as

found by the arriving force.

A question one might ask is, “If fewer firefighters arrive, what from the list of tasks mentioned

would not be completed?” Most likely, the search team would be delayed, as would ventilation.

The attack lines would only consist of two firefighters, which does not allow for rapid movement

above the first-floor deployment. Rescue is conducted with only two-person teams; thus, when

rescue is essential, other tasks are not completed in a simultaneous, timely manner. It must

always be remembered: effective deployment is about the speed (travel time) and the weight

(firefighters) of the attack.

Seventeen initial firefighters could handle a moderate-risk house fire; however, even a

department-based Effective Response Force of 17 will be seriously slowed if the fire is above the

first floor, in a low-rise apartment building, or commercial/industrial building. This is where the

capability to add alarms to the standard response becomes important.

Given the fact that District’s First Alarm (Effective Response Force) delivers 17 personnel

(using mutual aid) to a moderate risk building fire, it reflects the District’s goal to confine

serious building fires to or near the room of origin, and to prevent the spread of fire to adjoining

buildings. This is a typical desired outcome in built-out areas and requires more firefighters more




quickly than the typical rural outcome of keeping the fire contained to the building, not room, of

origin.

Given that there is not a current District response time policy, the District’s current physical

response to building fires is, in effect, the District’s de-facto deployment measure to built-up

urban/suburban areas. Thus, this becomes the baseline policy for the deployment of firefighters.

4.2 DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION STUDIES—HOW THE LOCATION OF FIRST-DUE

AND FIRST ALARM RESOURCES AFFECTS THE OUTCOME

The District is served today by three to four staffed fire

stations. It is appropriate to understand what the existing

stations do and do not cover, if there are any coverage

gaps needing one or more stations, and what, if anything,

to do about them.

In brief, there are two geographic perspectives to fire

station deployment:

Distribution – the spacing of first-due fire units to stop routine emergencies.

Concentration – the clustering of fire stations close enough together so that

building fires can receive sufficient resources from multiple fire stations quickly.

As indicated, this is known as the Effective Response Force, or, more

commonly, the “First Alarm assignment”—the collection of a sufficient number

of firefighters on scene, delivered within the concentration time goal to stop the

escalation of the problem.

To analyze first-due fire unit travel time coverage, Citygate’s used a geographic mapping tool

called FireViewTM

that can measure theoretical travel time over the street network. For this time

calculation, Citygate’s staff uses the base map and street travel speeds calibrated to actual fire

company travel times from previous responses to simulate real-world coverage. Using these

tools, Citygate’s ran several deployment tests and measured their impact on various parts of the

District. The travel time measure used was 4 minutes over the road network, which is consistent

with the “benchmark” recommendation in NFPA 1710 and desirable outcomes in critical

emergencies. When up to a total of 3:30 minutes/seconds is added for dispatch processing and

crew turnout times, then the maps effectively show the area covered within 7:30 minutes/seconds

of the regional fire Communications Center receiving the request for the first-due unit, and 11:30

minutes/seconds (8 minutes travel) for a First Alarm assignment.

SOC ELEMENT 5 OF 8

DISTRIBUTION STUDY

SOC ELEMENT 6 OF 8

CONCENTRATION STUDY




Map #1 – General Geography and Station Locations

Map #1 shows the existing District fire station locations with the District boundaries. This is a

reference map for the other map displays that follow.

Map #2a – Risk Assessment: High-Fire Flow Occupancies and Larger Quantity Hazardous

Materials Businesses

Risk assessment is an effort by the District to classify properties by potential impact on service

demand levels. The higher risk building locations shown require more firefighters in fewer

minutes should a serious fire emerge due to the presence of hazardous materials or at-risk

populations, such as those found in hospitals.

Most of these buildings are along the major road corridors where zoning has placed the District’s

commercial buildings. The important finding from this geographic-based assessment is that these

risks are spread throughout the District, and as such, the District needs a strong, multiple-unit

response capability for serious emergencies in the urban, built-up sections of the District.

Map #2b – Risk Assessment: Critical Facilities and All Types of Hazardous Materials Sites

As another perspective of risk, the locations of critical facilities essential to the safe operation of

the District are displayed here. Most of these sites are in the urban areas of the District.

Map #2c – Risk Assessment: Wildfire Threat

This map displays the more serious wildfire threat sections of the District as identified by CAL

FIRE criteria.

Map #2d – Risk Assessment: Population Density

The District diversity of risks to be protected is best described by measuring the resident

population density separated into urban, suburban, and rural densities. The urban areas are where

zoning allows the most buildings and people to settle.

Map #3a – First-Due Unit Distribution: 4-Minute Engine Travel District Plus Mutual Aid

This map shows, using green street segments, the distribution of District core stations that were

staffed at the beginning of 2016, plus mutual aid stations. Four minutes travel time is a best-

practice recommended response goal. Therefore, green indicates the locations an engine could

reach within this time, assuming it is in-station and encounters no unusual traffic delays. In

addition, the computer mapping tool uses actual fire company speed limits per roadway type.

Thus, the green projection is realistic for fire trucks with normal traffic present.

The purpose of computer response mapping is to determine and balance station locations. This

geo-mapping design is then checked in the study against actual dispatch time data, which reflects




the real world. There also should be some overlap between station areas so that a second-due unit

can have a chance of an adequate response time when it covers a call in another fire company’s

first-due area.

Finding #2: When the District can only staff three fire stations, even with

mutual aid, it cannot begin to cover the urban population areas

within 4 minutes fire unit travel time.

Map #3b – District Only Staffed Stations at 4 Minutes Travel

When only the District’s three staffed “core” stations are measured for 4-minute travel coverage,

they do not cover all of the highest population density areas.

Map #3c – 4-Minute Engine Travel – Station 94 Open

Map #3c shows the added 4-minute coverage with Station 94 staffed and, while it provides some

coverage to suburban and rural areas, due to location, it adds very little coverage to urban areas.

Map #3d – All Existing Fire Stations Staffed – 4-Minute Travel

Maps #3d measures the 4-minute urban travel time coverage from all of the existing fire stations

locations if they were all appropriately staffed. The result is that only the areas close to fire

stations receive urban response time coverage and that much of the urban areas in Brentwood

and Oakley do not, as there is an insufficient number of fire stations.

Finding #3: Even if all of the existing District fire stations were appropriately

staffed, much of the urban population density areas are not covered

within a best outcomes goal of 4 minutes travel time from a fire

station. There are just an insufficient number of fire stations, and

the mutual aid fire stations to the west are too far away to be of

primary help.

Map #4a&b – ISO Coverage Areas

This map displays the Insurance Service Office (ISO) requirement that stations cover a 1.5-mile

distance response area. Depending on the road network in a department, the 1.5-mile measure

usually equates to a 3.5- to 4.5-minute travel time. However, a 1.5-mile measure is a reasonable

indicator of station spacing and overlap. As can be seen, from staffed core stations or from all

fire stations, much of the urban areas are not within and ISO goal of a fire station.




Map #5a-c – Concentration (First Alarm) Coverage Time – Core Staffed Stations

This series of three maps shows the concentration or massing of fire crews for serious fire or

rescue calls. Building fires, in particular, require 15+ firefighters (per NFPA 1710) arriving

within a reasonable time frame to work together and effectively to stop the escalation of an

emergency. Otherwise, if too few firefighters arrive, or arrive too late in the fire’s progress, the

result is a greater alarm fire, which is more dangerous to the public and the firefighters.

The concentration map exhibits look at the District’s ability to send a minimum of five engine

companies and one Chief Officer to serious building fires within 8 minutes travel time (11

minutes from crew notify time) to urban areas, 10 minutes travel for suburban areas, and 14

minutes travel for rural areas. These test measures ensure that a minimum of 16 firefighters (three

firefighters per engine, plus at least one command chief) can arrive on-scene to work

simultaneously and effectively to stop the spread of a serious building fire.

These maps thus show in green where the District’s core fire stations should deliver the initial

Effective Response Force.

As can be seen, almost none of the District is covered at 8 minutes with only three staffed

stations and two mutual aid stations; the mutual aid stations are too far away and the three core

stations too spread apart to all arrive together in urban areas within a best practices advised 8

minutes of travel.

At a suburban travel time test goal of 10 minutes, while there is improved five-unit coverage, not

even all of Brentwood and Oakley are covered.

At a rural travel time test goal of 14 minutes, all of the western and central areas are covered, but

not the eastern neighborhoods.

Finding #4: The entire District, except for a tiny area in west Brentwood, is not

within 8 minutes travel time of an Effective Response Force

assignment of five engines and one Battalion Chief for sufficient

urban area fire protection.

Finding #5: At a suburban multiple-unit test goal of 10 minutes travel, even all

of Bentwood and Oakley are not covered with five units.

Finding #6: At a rural multiple-unit test goal of 14 minutes travel time, only the

western two-thirds of the District are covered.




Finding #7: Given only three staffed core fire stations and two units from

mutual aid for serious building fires, the District can only provide a

rural level of response time, which means the likely outcome of a

serious building fire will be total destruction of the building of

origin and a large possibility of fire spread to adjoining buildings,

particularly on windy days.

Map #6 – Four Engines at 8-Minute Travel – Four District Stations Plus Mutual Aid

This map shows a different view of concentration by only showing the 8-minute urban coverage

goal of four engine companies, even with a fourth District station staffed at Station 94. The only

improvement in coverage is a modest area in far west Brentwood and Oakley.

Map #7a-c – One Battalion Chief Travel at 8, 10, and 14 minutes

This map displays the coverage for one Battalion Chief at 8 minutes travel time for urban area

fires. The small and slightly faster command chief vehicle can cover the most populated areas,

except for Discovery Bay, within 8 minutes travel. The Battalion Chief has to be located in

central Brentwood for this coverage to occur.

At a suburban outcome test measure of 10 minutes, there is small added coverage in western

Discovery Bay and at a rural test measure of 14 minutes, all but the extreme northeast corner of

the District is within rural travel time coverage for a Battalion Chief.

Finding #8: One Battalion Chief located in Brentwood can only cover two-

thirds of the District in an urban travel time goal. The remaining

District is reached by the single Battalion Chief in suburban to

rural travel times. The District is too large for a single Battalion

Chief to cover at anything better than a 14-minute, rural level of

coverage.

Map #8 – One Ladder Truck at 8-Minute Travel

Map #8 shows the coverage for one ladder truck at 8 minutes travel time for urban area building

fires. The District does not staff a ladder truck and the mutual aid ladder truck is too far outside

the District to be of primary response time assistance. Only two small areas just inside Oakley

are reached within 8 minutes travel of the mutual aid ladder truck.




Finding #9: The District does not have any ladder truck coverage in the urban,

suburban, or even the rural areas. Mutual aid ladder truck coverage

is not an adequate replacement. The District needs to staff at least

one ladder truck in the urban areas to provide coverage to serious

building fires in Brentwood and Oakley.

Map #9 – All Incident Locations

Maps #9 shows, across a five-year period, the exact location for all incident types. It is apparent

that there is a need for fire services on almost every street segment of the District. The greatest

concentration of calls is in the most populated areas and along the most heavily traveled roads.

Map #10 – Emergency Medical Services and Rescue Incident Locations

This map further breaks out only the emergency medical and rescue call locations. With the

majority of all calls for service being emergency medical, virtually all areas of the District need

emergency medical services.

Map #11 – All Fire Type Locations

This map identifies the location of all fires in the District for five years. All fires include any

type of fire call, from auto to dumpster to building. There are obviously fewer fires than medical

or rescue calls. Even given this, it is evident that all areas in the District experience fires; the

fires are more concentrated where the population is higher.

Map #12 – Structure Fire Locations

Displayed in this map are the structure fire locations. While the structure fire count is a smaller

subset of the total fire count, there are two meaningful findings from this map. First, there are

still structure fires in every first-due fire company in the District. However, there are many more

fires in the urban population areas of the District where more significant risk exists. These areas

and buildings are of significant fire and life loss risk to the District. Second, fires in the more

complicated building types must be controlled quickly or the losses will be very large.

Map #13 – Emergency Medical Services and Rescue Incident Location Densities

This map examines, by mathematical density, where clusters of emergency medical services

incident activity occurred. In this set, the darker density color plots the highest concentration of

all incidents. This type of map makes the location of frequent workload more meaningful than

just mapping the dots of all locations, as done in Map #10.

This perspective is important because the deployment system needs an overlap of units to ensure

the delivery of multiple units when needed for serious incidents, or to handle simultaneous calls




for service. For the District, this is true in the highest population density areas, where the

incident demand has been the highest.

Map #14 – All Fire Location Densities

This map is similar to Map #13, but shows the hot spots of activity for all types of fires. The

most populated areas of the District experience a more frequent occurrence of all types of fires.

Map #15 – Structure Fire Densities

This map shows only the building fire workload by density. The density is most focused in the

most populated areas of the District.

4.3 DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS WITH ADDED AND RELOCATED FIRE STATIONS

Given the growth in the District since it was established, and that even at that time it inherited

older fire station locations, this section addresses what the District should have both in the near

term, and at buildout, of at least the current city and County General Plans.

Citygate reviewed the growth and current population densities to first determine how many fire

stations the District needs and which, if any, over time should be moved or added. This analysis

was done by adding or moving stations one or two at a time seeking to fill in coverage slowly as

to find the most effective solution while balancing cost.

Map #16a – First Engine Coverage – Stations 52, 93, and 94, Plus Station 54 Relocated at

Proposed #1

This scenario begins with using the four “core” staffed stations, assuming the funding for Station

94 can be made permanent. Then the District and Brentwood had identified a site to relocate

Station 54 northwesterly, desiring to improve coverage to western Brentwood. Old Station 54

would not be used in this scenario. As can be seen in Map 16a, this move does fill in coverage at

4-minute travel to western Brentwood. However, the City is too large for only two fire stations,

and the movement of Station 54 northerly leaves a coverage gap in southeast Brentwood for

those urban population density areas.

Map #16b – First Alarm Multiple-Unit Coverage – Stations 52, 93, and 94, Plus Station 54

Relocated at Proposed #1

This map measures the multiple-unit, First Alarm coverage with the four stations modeled,

including relocated Station 54. Even with the relocation and mutual aid, the added station only

slightly increases multiple-unit coverage in northwest Brentwood, and the majority of the urban

population density areas still do not receive adequate multiple-unit coverage at 8 minutes travel.




Map #17a – First Engine Coverage – Stations 52 and 93 Plus Two Proposed Urban Area

Stations and Station 94 Relocated into East Oakley

Given the results of the prior station scenario, this test moves Station 94 into east Oakley to

provide better 4-minute coverage for Oakley areas. Then an additional station was tested at test

site Proposed Three (P3) to test a three-station model for Brentwood.

The theory in this test is to use the cost of P3’s coverage to help the most populated areas within

4 minutes, and then extend suburban coverage out to the less populated areas. At its current

location, prior Station 94 is in a mostly rural population density area and can hardly reach any

urban areas within 4 minutes (see Map #3c).

As can be seen, Brentwood is too large for an effective three-station coverage model.

Map #17b – First Alarm Multiple-Unit Coverage – Stations 52 and 93 Plus Two Proposed

Urban Area Stations and Station 94 Relocated into East Oakley

As with the Map 16 scenario, the added station at site P3 does not add a significant amount of 5-

engine travel time coverage to the two cities in the western District.

Map #18 – First Engine Coverage – Seven Fire Station Model Coverage

This scenario tests the 4-minute travel time coverage for urban areas, 8-minute coverage for

suburban areas, and 12-minute coverage for rural areas. This test uses a total of seven present

and future stations. This test shows what happens at various travel times if Stations 94 and 95

are not moved, and only two stations are used in Brentwood. Given the agreement with CAL

FIRE for the rural Sunshine area, that coverage is not modeled in this map.

The result is when Stations 94 and 95 are used at their present locations, the eastern sides of both

Brentwood and Oakley that contain urban population densities do not receive 4-minute travel

time coverage, they receive 8-minute suburban coverage. The sparsely populated area around

and north of Station 95 receives urban coverage, where it is not needed, and with two stations,

Discovery Bay receives urban coverage for a suburban population density area.

This scenario shows that the urban population density areas in southeastern Brentwood and

Oakley cannot receive best outcomes-based 4-minute coverage from only three fire stations

located in the central areas of the cities.

Map #19a – First Engine Coverage – Nine Fire Station Model Coverage

After several more incremental tests, this scenario proves to be the best fit to meet the current

and expected population densities allowed by current plans and zoning. This scenario includes

nine District stations and one CAL FIRE station:

Use of the existing station sites 52, 54, and 93;




Use of both stations 59 and 58 in Discovery Bay;

Continued use of the CAL FIRE crew in the wintertime in the Sunshine area;

A relocated Station 94 in east Oakley;

An additional fire station in west Oakley at Proposed 2;

Two additional fire stations in Brentwood at Proposed 1 and 3.

This station plan provides 4-minute travel time coverage to almost all of the population density

areas and suburban 8-minute travel time coverage to the balance of the District, eliminating 12-

or 14-minute travel time coverage to the most populated rural areas and roadways. This nine-

station model is the most efficient possible given the current zoning and road layout of the

District. In addition to maps, another way to see improved coverage is to measure the public

street miles covered between the models. This data table is for all of the public road miles in the

District, and as such, is understating the improvements in the core of Brentwood and Oakley. As

can be seen, the nine-station model more than doubles the 4-minute coverage, but more

importantly, the single-unit coverage at 8 minutes approaches 90%, which is excellent given the

rural areas in the District:

Table 30—Public Road Miles Covered in the 3- and 9-Station Models

Station Count (703 total road

miles in District)

Road Miles Covered @ 4 Minutes Percent

Road Miles Covered @ 8 Minutes Percent

4-Minute Percent

Difference

3 165 23% 556 80% --

9 375 53% 609 87% 30%

Finding #10: The District will need nine District-staffed fire stations plus the

CAL FIRE Sunshine station agreement if it sets a goal of a 4-

minute travel time for urban population density areas and 8-minute

travel time for suburban and rural population densities.

Map #19b – First Alarm Multiple-Unit Coverage – Nine Fire Station Model Coverage

The results of a nine-fire station model are measured in this map for 5-engine multiple-unit First

Alarm coverage at 8 minutes travel. As can be seen, the First Alarm coverage is finally effective

in most of the urban population density areas. All of the urban areas would receive 4 units within

the 8 minutes, which is still 12 firefighters, more than double what can be provided at present.




The final result is that Oakley needs three fire stations and Brentwood needs four to deliver more

than a suburban to rural level of response time service.

Map #19c – First Engine Coverage – Without Reuse of Existing Station 54

As a final “check” test, this map uses a relocated Station 54 instead of the old Station 54 in

downtown Brentwood. The road network and development patterns in southeast Brentwood are

too difficult to cover at 4 minutes from a relocated Station 54 that is north by northeast of the

current site. This map shows a negative result of not continuing to use the current Station 54

location.



Section 5—Response Statistical Analysis page 65

SECTION 5—RESPONSE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

5.1 HISTORICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND RELIABILITY OF RESPONSE—WHAT STATISTICS SAY

ABOUT EXISTING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

The maps described in Section 4 show the GIS-projected

response times given perfect conditions with no

competing calls, with and without traffic congestion, and

units all in place. Examination of the actual response

time data provides a picture of how response times are in

the “real” world of simultaneous calls, rush hour traffic

conditions, units out of position, and delayed travel time for events such as periods of severe

weather.

5.1.1 Data Set Identification

The District provided continuous NFIRS 5 incident and CAD apparatus response data for the

time period 1/1/2013 through 12/31/2015. NFIRS 5 data was loaded for the three years and

resulted in 21,093 incidents and 55,406 apparatus response records.

5.2 SERVICE DEMAND

In 2015, the District responded to 7,348 incidents. The District had a daily demand of more than

20.13 incidents, of which 4.7% were fire incidents, 67.07% were EMS incidents, and 28.23%

were “Other” incident types.

During this same period, there were 19,629 apparatus responses. This means there was an

average of 2.67 apparatus responses per incident.

SOC ELEMENT 7 OF 8

RELIABILITY & HISTORICAL

RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS

STUDIES




The Department experienced a small but persistent growth in the number of incidents from year

to year. The following graph illustrates incident demand by reporting year:

Figure 8—Number of Incidents by Year

The following graph depicts the number of incidents by incident type by reporting year. The

number of EMS incidents is rising year to year. The number of fires is declining slightly from

year to year:

Figure 9—Number of Incidents by Year by Incident Type




5.2.1 Breakdown of Incident Demand Over Time

The number of incidents by month is fairly steady year to year, but it appears an increased

number of incidents in 2015 occurred in March, April, and July.

Figure 10—Number of Incidents by Month by Year

When broken down by day of week, incident activity is fairly flat. There was, however, a

significant increase in 2015 incidents occurring on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday.

Figure 11—Number of Incidents by Day of Week by Year




The following is the breakdown of incidents by hour of the day by year. Notice that the increase

in the number of incidents in 2015 occurs from 2:00pm-4:00pm:

Figure 12—Number of Incidents by Hour of Day by Year

5.2.2 Breakdown of Incident Demand by Station Area

The following graph illustrates the number of incidents by station area even if the station was not

staffed. Station 93 and 52 had the highest volume of activity. Station 94 had the lowest activity

volume.

Figure 13—Number of Incidents by Station by Year




Finding #11: The District’s time-of-day, day-of-week, and month-of-year calls

for service demands are consistent. This means the District needs

to operate a fairly consistent 24/7/365 response system.

5.2.3 Breakdown of Incident Demand by Type

The following table shows the activity rankings of incidents by incident quantity. Notice the

strong ranking for EMS incidents and incidents that are cancelled before the apparatus reaches

the scene. Building fires rank tenth by volume.

Only the incident types with greater than 21 total occurrences are listed.

Table 31—Incidents: Quantity – Year by Incident Type


321 EMS call, excluding vehicle accident with injury 3,306 3,635 3,933 10,874

611 Dispatched & canceled en route 957 1,012 1,193 3,162

311 Medical assist, assist EMS crew 767 651 577 1,995

322 Vehicle accident with injuries 222 211 250 683

700 False alarm or false call, other 85 101 96 282

324 Motor vehicle accident no injuries 85 93 101 279

554 Assist invalid 93 99 74 266

622 No incident found on arrival of incident address 56 64 71 191

143 Grass fire 67 61 53 181

111 Building fire 62 48 57 167

400 Hazardous condition, other 40 72 53 165

651 Smoke scare, odor of smoke 58 56 45 159

553 Public service 54 48 45 147

100 Fire, other 55 30 41 126

900 Special type of incident, other 48 23 45 116

151 Outside rubbish, trash or waste fire 36 35 38 109

740 Unintentional transmission of alarm, other 26 42 39 107

412 Gas leak (natural gas or LPG) 45 26 32 103

733 Smoke detector activation due to malfunction 40 19 41 100

150 Outside rubbish fire, other 28 25 41 94

131 Passenger vehicle fire 40 21 32 93





323 Motor vehicle/pedestrian accident (MV Ped) 30 21 31 82

550 Public service assistance, other 34 25 19 78

735 Alarm system sounded due to malfunction 26 26 23 75

745 Alarm system sounded, no fire - unintentional 17 20 30 67

551 Assist police or other governmental agency 22 24 20 66

511 Lock-out 15 24 24 63

118 Trash or rubbish fire, contained 26 20 16 62

142 Brush, or brush and grass mixture fire 21 24 15 60

440 Electrical wiring/equipment problem, other 15 26 9 50

113 Cooking fire, confined to container 18 17 15 50

743 Smoke detector activation, no fire - unintentional 17 9 23 49

320 Emergency Medical Service, other 15 9 22 46

715 Local alarm system, malicious false alarm 9 19 14 42

160 Special outside fire, other 12 21 8 41

736 CO detector activation due to malfunction 18 12 8 38

500 Service Call, other 12 14 12 38

561 Unauthorized burning 11 13 12 36

531 Smoke or odor removal 11 11 14 36

444 Power line down 7 13 13 33

600 Good intent call, other 9 11 10 30

522 Water or steam leak 8 15 7 30

711 Municipal alarm system, malicious false alarm 11 12 4 27

140 Natural vegetation fire, other 14 7 6 27

520 Water problem, other 10 10 6 26

445 Arcing, shorted electrical equipment 7 8 11 26

300 Rescue, emergency medical call (EMS) call, other 16 8 2 26

710 Malicious, mischievous false call, other 14 8 3 25

411 Gasoline or other flammable liquid spill 7 11 7 25

The next table illustrates the ranking of incidents by property type. The highest rankings for

incidents by property type are residential dwellings. Streets and roads also account for a top

number of incidents. Properties with occurrences greater than 22 total incidents in the study

period are listed:




Table 32—Incidents: Quantity – Year by Property Use

Property Use 2013 2014 2015 Total

419 1 or 2 family dwelling 3,380 3,487 3,682 10,549

429 Multifamily dwellings 307 348 345 1,000

311 24-hour care Nursing homes, 4 or more persons 181 213 191 585

459 Residential board and care 154 182 207 543

960 Street, other 169 177 168 514

962 Residential street, road or residential driveway 177 164 152 493

961 Highway or divided highway 151 153 143 447

931 Open land or field 147 110 124 381

963 Street or road in commercial area 116 109 131 356

215 High school/junior high school/middle school 133 115 90 338

965 Vehicle parking area 103 102 85 290

519 Food and beverage sales, grocery store 50 63 57 170

161 Restaurant or cafeteria 51 57 57 165

213 Elementary school, including kindergarten 43 46 60 149

900 Outside or special property, other 39 32 48 119

938 Graded and cared-for plots of land 20 28 35 83

439 Boarding/rooming house, residential hotels 44 18 21 83

599 Business office 18 28 25 71

400 Residential, other 27 16 27 70

340 Clinics, Doctors offices, hemodialysis centers 24 25 19 68

131 Church, mosque, synagogue, temple, chapel 22 24 22 68

888 Fire station 20 31 15 66

342 Doctor, dentist or oral surgeon's office 18 12 26 56

341 Clinic, clinic-type infirmary 18 16 20 54

655 Crops or orchard 22 17 9 48

124 Playground 20 16 11 47

500 Mercantile, business, other 17 15 11 43

322 Alcohol or substance abuse recovery center 11 17 15 43

946 Lake, river, stream 16 16 7 39

141 Athletic/health club 8 13 18 39

898 Dock, marina, pier, wharf 9 15 14 38

571 Service station, gas station 12 16 10 38




Property Use 2013 2014 2015 Total

936 Vacant lot 17 11 8 36

580 General retail, other 11 11 12 34

579 Motor vehicle or boat sales, services, repair 5 16 12 33

449 Hotel/motel, commercial 11 16 6 33

142 Clubhouse 15 8 9 32

940 Water area, other 14 5 11 30

539 Household goods, sales, repairs 15 7 8 30

951 Railroad right of way 6 9 7 22

5.3 RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS

Once the types of incidents are quantified, incident analysis shifts to the time required to respond

to those incidents. Fractile breakdowns track the percentage (and count the number) of incidents

meeting defined criteria, such as the first apparatus to reach the scene within progressive time

segments.

5.3.1 Districtwide Response Time Performance

The District provides both fire and EMS service utilizing engine companies responding from

fixed fire stations. Paramedic service is provided by contract and provides ambulances and

hospital transportation services for EMS incidents, which are the most dominant incident type in

the District.

This section tracks performance for BOTH the first engine or contract ambulance to arrive first

on the scene of fire and EMS incidents. Measurements are the number of minutes and seconds

necessary for 90% completion of:

1. Call Processing

2. Turnout

3. Travel

4. Dispatch to Arrival

5. Call to Arrival

A resident or visitor of the District measures the speed of fire department response from the time

assistance is requested until the assistance arrives. This measurement is called “Call to 1st

Apparatus Arrival” (or “Call to Arrival”). Police and sheriff’s departments, under state law, act

as a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for 9-1-1 calls. All 9-1-1 calls for fire service in the




District are received at the County Sheriff’s 9-1-1 center and transferred for dispatching to the

Contra Costa County Fire Department Communications Center.

Based on national recommendations, Citygate’s response time test goal is for the 90% Call to

Arrival to be 7:30 minutes/seconds (or 450 seconds). This is comprised of three component

parts:

Call Processing Time: 1:30 minute/seconds (receive, determine need, alert crew)

Turnout Time: 2 minutes (notify, don required protective gear, get moving)

Travel Time: 4 minutes (travel time)

The following table shows the breakdown of fire dispatch call received to First Apparatus

Arrival for the overall District and by station area by year for fire and emergency medical

incidents for either a District fire engine arriving or a regional ambulance. In some instances, the

ambulance arrives first due to the luck of its location when dispatched. Call to arrival measures

the time to from receipt of the request for assistance at regional fire dispatch until the apparatus

arrives on the scene.

Table 33—Call to Arrival Total Response Time (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance

Station 2013 2014 2015

Department-Wide 11:01 10:54 11:49

Station 52 09:34 09:19 09:48

Station 54 09:44 09:31 08:48

Station 59 12:10 11:37 12:24

Station 93 09:31 10:10 12:19

Station 94 14:06 14:06 14:55

Call to arrival includes dispatch, turnout, and travel times. In urban setting 7:30 minutes would

be a desirable level of performance

While all of the 9-1-1 call to arrival times to 90% of the emergent incidents in the table above are

just past the Citygate’s recommended 7:30 minutes, the next set of tables will present the

individual segments of total response time—dispatch, crew turnout, and travel—to understand

which measure(s) are responsible for the total time being longer than 7:30 minutes.




5.3.2 Call Processing Time

This measure is the time it takes to answer the 9-1-1 call, determine the emergency, enter

information into the computer-aided-dispatch system, and alert the closet crew. Best practices

advice is for 90% of the calls to be dispatched in 90 seconds. The performance of the Contra

Costa County Fire District communications center is:

Table 34—Call Processing Time (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance

Station 2013 2014 2015


Station 52 02:22 02:30 02:23

Station 54 02:19 02:20 01:48

Station 59 02:49 02:54 02:40

Station 93 02:16 02:14 02:19

Station 94 02:38 02:26 02:27

Finding #12: The performance of the Contra Costa Fire Communications

Center, at 2:26 minutes/seconds to 90% of the EMS and fire

emergencies, is almost a full minute slower than a best practices

expectation that 90% of the routine type incidents be dispatched

within 90 seconds.

5.3.3 Turnout Time

Turnout time: This measure is the time it takes for all crews to hear the dispatch message, don

safety clothing, and begin moving the assigned apparatus.

Table 35—Turnout Time Performance (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance

Station 2013 2014 2015


Station 52 02:23 02:19 02:16

Station 54 02:32 02:25 02:07

Station 59 02:36 02:29 02:21

Station 93 02:39 02:33 02:30

Station 94 02:30 02:25 02:38




While the NFPA recommends 60-80 seconds for turnout time, it has long been recognized as a

standard rarely met in practical experience. Crews must not just hear the dispatch message; they

must also don the OSHA-mandated personal protective clothing for the type of emergency.

Citygate’s has long recommended that, due to this and the floor plan design of some stations,

agencies can reasonably make a 2-minute crew turnout time to 90% of the emergency incidents.

Finding #13: The District’s turnout times are consistently over 2 minutes, and a

focused effort needs to be made to improve this measure to 2

minutes.

5.3.4 Travel Time

Travel time: The District-wide travel time measures to all emergency incidents are shown

hereafter. Travel time is defined as the time element between when the dispatch center is

notified, either verbally or electronically, that the unit is en route to the call, and when it arrives

at the address or location street front (not the patient’s side).

Table 36—Travel Time Performance (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance

Station 2013 2014 2015


Station 52 06:31 06:18 07:00

Station 54 06:41 06:41 04:53

Station 59 08:30 08:37 09:04

Station 93 06:23 06:58 09:03

Station 94 11:01 11:05 11:47

NFPA Standard 1710 recommends a 4-minute travel time goal in urban areas. As seen in Table

36, most travel times exceed this goal. There are several reasons for slower travel time, not all of

which can be cost-effectively improved. Traffic congestion variation, non-grid road network

areas, open spaces, and limited cross access boulevards all affect travel time. Having said this,

the District is just too large for three to four fire stations to provide 4 or even 5-minute travel

time coverage to urban population density areas.

5.3.5 District Fire Engine Only Travel Time

The District closed, reopened, and then closed again fire stations. During this time, the County-

provided regional paramedic ambulance system tried to keep units in the District to provide

ambulance coverage in the timeliest manner possible. Normally, fire departments have fire




stations spaced across all major neighborhoods and the ambulances can be deployed to arrive

well after the fire unit does. In this way, one ambulance can serve several fire engine areas.

During the last five years about a third of the time, the ambulance arrived first. This blend of

ambulance and fire engine “first arrivals” was shown in the response time tables above.

Table 37 shows the travel times of just the District’s fire engines so that the impact of not enough

fire stations can be seen for the firefighting response aspect of the District’s system, not just the

EMS portion.

Table 37—District Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Engine per Year/Month

Year-Month E152 E154 E159 E193 E194 Travel

2013 01 07:46

09:18 07:14 11:41 09:18

2013 02 07:45

09:33 07:42 13:25 09:37

2013 03 06:31

10:26 07:01 11:45 08:51

2013 04 07:50

09:59 07:08 13:17 09:02

2013 05 10:01 09:23 10:56 09:08 12:46 10:56

2013 06 07:50 09:07 12:35 08:25 12:39 10:18

2013 07 10:04 09:33 09:07 06:41 11:03 10:04

2013 08 10:57 07:56 12:11 07:41 11:26 10:26

2013 09 06:25 07:06 08:39 07:36 11:41 09:01

2013 10 07:07 10:12 09:50 06:28 17:15 09:59

2013 11 07:53 08:35 10:54 08:03 11:36 09:32

2013 12 07:14 11:45 11:28 08:08 10:50 09:56

2014 01 05:58) 08:34 08:50 06:44 11:22 08:50

2014 02 09:22 09:21 08:39 05:55 09:54 08:55

2014 03 07:54 06:17 08:38 10:57 11:24 08:39

2014 04 06:12 13:10 10:50 06:18 13:18 10:03

2014 05 08:25 06:43 09:29 07:16 12:44 09:12

2014 06 08:22 07:10 08:48 06:54 10:33 09:05

2014 07 06:50 09:58 12:29 07:28 11:15 09:55

2014 08 10:14 06:33 09:40 07:04 10:45 09:40

2014 09 07:37

14:40 07:52 10:50 09:19

2014 10 07:24 10:07 11:40 08:42 10:58 09:22

2014 11 06:50 10:33 09:55 11:46

10:17

2014 12 15:45 13:09 14:24 10:50

12:24




Year-Month E152 E154 E159 E193 E194 Travel

2015 01 08:43 05:47 10:40 08:07 12:14 10:01

2015 02 12:08

12:01 08:18 11:33 10:57

2015 03 09:06

10:40 07:48 13:48 10:36

2015 04 08:19

11:23 09:17 12:38 11:06

2015 05 08:45

12:33 10:26 13:28 11:21

2015 06 09:42

12:19 09:57

10:06

2015 07 11:20

12:20 11:40

11:40

2015 08 07:38

10:49 10:21

10:07

2015 09 10:28

10:06 10:46

10:30

2015 10 10:10

11:45 12:14

11:55

2015 11 09:50

15:21 12:26

11:58

2015 12 10:14

13:27 12:46

12:30

In the combined ambulance and engine travel times in Table 36, the overall District travel time

was 8:35 minutes/seconds in 2015.

Finding #14: In 2015, with just three fire stations opened, fire engine travel

times ranged from a low of 10:01 to a high of 12:30

minutes/seconds. There are no national best practice sources that

would recommend travel time coverage this slow in urban areas

with the associated risks to be protected.

5.3.6 First Alarm (Effective Response Force) Performance to Building Fires

First Alarm or Effective Response Force Performance to Building Fires: The Department

responds to building fires with five engines, and two Battalion Chiefs. The 4th

and 5th

engines

and the 2nd

Battalion Chief have to come from mutual aid over a greater distance.

In a given year, there are few building fires in every station area where the entire force of the

five engines are needed at the incident location. Therefore, the following response time samples

size are very small.

The best representation for the First Alarm or Effective Response Force units is travel time

across the District’s street network. The NFPA 1710 recommendation is for all units needed at a

serious building fire to arrive within 8 minutes travel time. The numbers in parentheses next to

the arrival time of the last due unit in the following table is the number of occurrences for that

year per station area. The reader is cautioned that some of these sample sizes are very small and




can readily change year-to-year depending on the exact locations of serious fires and the various

units’ availability.

A “no occurrence” (designated by a blank cell) simply means that there were no building fires in

the station areas listed where all of the units were needed at the emergency:

Table 38—Travel Time for Effective Response Force Incidents by Year (Minutes/Seconds)

– 90% Performance

Arrival Sequence 2013 2014 2015

1st 09:59 (5,498) 09:53 (5,659) 11:01 (5,825)

2nd 15:52 (213) 16:14 (205) 20:13 (186)

3rd 17:05 (94) 20:22 (56) 17:45 (51)

4th 18:03 (61) 19:38 (33) 21:36 (31)

5th 19:21 (43) 21:27 (21) 19:46 (20)

6th 28:51 (12) 21:18 (6) 21:02 (6)

7th 27:32 (5)

26:51 (2)

8th 28:02 (4)

Finding #15: The District’s travel time response time for five engines to serious

fires, known as the Effective Response Force (ERF or First

Alarm), ranges from 19:21 to 21:27 minutes/seconds and far

exceeds an urban area coverage goal of 8 minutes, and even

exceeds recommendations for rural areas. The District does not

have an adequate multiple-unit response to serious fires anywhere

in the District.

5.4 SIMULTANEOUS INCIDENT ACTIVITY

Simultaneous incidents occur when other incidents are already underway at the time a new

incident begins. The following is the percentage of simultaneous incidents broken down by

number of simultaneous incidents:




Table 39—Simultaneous Incident Activity – 3 Years

Number of Incidents Underway Proportion of Occurrences

1 or more simultaneous incidents 41.14%




In a department with all its fire stations open and strong mutual aid partners, simultaneous

incidents all in different station areas have very little operational consequence. But with only

three fire stations open in 2015, simultaneous incidents can have a great impact on response

times.

As Figure 14 below shows, the simultaneous incident locations are more focused in Brentwood

and Oakley. With the closing of Station 54, the increased geographic area of Stations 52 and 93

caused a dramatic increase in station-specific simultaneous incidents.

Figure 14—Number of Simultaneous Incidents Within a Station Area by Year

5.5 HOURLY DEMAND PERCENTAGE – UNIT-HOUR UTILIZATION

Due to the simultaneous incident rates measured in the previous table, this section of incident

measures presents the impact on individual fire units as demand occurs, the hour of day it occurs,

and determines if the peak hour demand is so high that response times suffer because units must

cross the District to cover for overly busy units.




In the tables to follow, the different colors illustrate the variation in demand; the lowest rates of

activity are green, progressing up to yellow, and finally red which indicates the greatest quantity

The following table summarizes overall activity percentages for 2015 when only three fire

stations were open. The percentage listed suggests the percentage likelihood a particular station

is involved in an incident at any given hour. This number considers not only the number of

incidents, but also the duration of incidents. The busiest units are listed first.

Table 40—Unit-Hour Utilization for 2015

Hour E152 E193 E159 BC5 E1676

00:00 7.11% 9.20% 4.02% 1.93% 1.32%

01:00 6.43% 7.33% 3.01% 1.36% 0.57%

02:00 8.63% 8.41% 4.42% 3.19% 3.10%

03:00 5.80% 5.66% 2.61% 2.02% 2.14%

04:00 5.80% 5.66% 2.44% 2.98% 3.48%

05:00 6.87% 6.69% 3.82% 1.97% 1.36%

06:00 8.30% 6.97% 3.12% 1.88% 0.88%

07:00 11.32% 8.70% 7.10% 2.01% 0.72%

08:00 15.37% 13.54% 5.05% 2.69% 1.40%

09:00 14.47% 13.22% 6.41% 3.03% 5.42%

10:00 17.26% 14.33% 6.25% 4.87% 10.34%

11:00 16.85% 14.83% 4.55% 4.32% 1.95%

12:00 14.61% 13.91% 6.97% 3.29% 1.31%

13:00 15.65% 17.09% 8.51% 5.98% 1.93%

14:00 19.18% 14.64% 7.09% 5.65% 5.36%

15:00 16.42% 16.27% 8.39% 6.16% 3.77%

16:00 17.65% 15.30% 9.52% 6.08% 7.73%

17:00 17.51% 18.42% 8.47% 5.96% 1.63%

18:00 21.53% 16.56% 8.93% 6.79% 2.97%

19:00 14.97% 15.42% 6.79% 4.29% 2.35%

20:00 17.51% 14.83% 7.46% 4.99% 7.08%

21:00 13.97% 14.36% 5.98% 3.51% 1.92%

22:00 11.23% 11.94% 5.48% 3.29% 1.52%

23:00 9.45% 11.09% 3.25% 2.84% 1.39%

Overall 13.08% 12.27% 5.82% 3.79% 2.98%

Responses 2,993 2,948 1,190 562 275

What should be the maximum utilization percentage on a firefighting unit? During the 9-hour

daytime work period, when crews on a 24-hour shift need to also pay attention to apparatus




checkout, station duties, training, public education, and paperwork, plus required physical

training and meal breaks, Citygate’s believes the maximum commitment UHU per hour should

not exceed 30%. Beyond that, the most important element to suffer will be training hours.

However, while it appears the District’s units have UHU rates below 30%, and would be

expected to be able to carry more calls per hour, that is not the case in the District.

With only three staffed units, and at peak hours of the day at least two units on incidents,

response times greatly suffer as units “chase” incidents across a very large geography. This is

another reason the District’s travel times are long, as at peak hours of the day, there are just not

enough units available for a timely response to every neighborhood.

For a dedicated unit, such as an ambulance or EMS squad working less than a 24-hour shift, such

as an 8- to 12-hour shift, then UHU can rise to 40-50% at a maximum. At that UHU level, peak

hour squad crews must then have additional duty days for training only, and not responding to

incidents, in order to meet their annual continuing education and training hours requirements.

Finding #16: Operating only three to four units, given hourly and simultaneous

incident demand at peak hours of the day, results in the District not

being able to provide positive outcome-based service to EMS and

fire incidents, even in the urban population centers of Brentwood

and Oakley.

5.6 RESPONSE TIME IMPACTS OF STATION CLOSURES

Station closures can greatly extend the travel distance from stations to the scene of the

emergency. Therefore, travel time to the scene will be the focus of this report section. Over the

past six years station boundaries have been redrawn, making it impossible to measure

performance changes over the time frame station by station. However, it is possible to measure

travel time performance for the District as a whole.

Only District fire apparatus responding to fire and EMS (emergencies) incidents will be

measured in this analysis. Both first-due and multiple-unit (First Alarm) unit demand has been

measured. Travel times are expressed as minutes and seconds to 90% compliance. The numbers

in parenthesis are the number of apparatus responses used to measure compliance. Travel times

of zero seconds, and greater than 1800 seconds, were eliminated as outliers.

Some station openings and closures may overlap and affect measurements. Each closure or

opening is measured separately, with generally the same period before and after closure used for

the travel time measurement.




5.6.1 Station Status and Operational Assessments

Stations 57 and 58 were closed on July 11, 2010. In order to measure the District-wide impact of

those station closures, the following travel time assessment have been made:

1. 2010 travel time prior to July 11, 2010.

2. 2010 travel time after July 11, 2010.

Table 41—Travel Times Before and After Closure of Stations 57 and 58

Station 57 & 58 Closure Before After

1st 06:55 (2,545) 08:00 (2,165)

2nd 13:25 (164) 13:47 (84)

3rd 13:39 (49) 15:09 (33)

4th 19:24 (21) 17:26 (15)

Stations 54, 94, and 95 were closed on July 1, 2012. Station 94 was opened in November 2012.

In order to measure the District-wide impact of those station closures the following travel time

assessments have been made:

1. 2012 travel time prior to July 1, 2012.

2. 2012 travel time from July 2, 2012 to October 31, 2012.

Table 42—Travel Times Before and After Closure of Stations 54, 94, and 95

Stations 54, 94, & 95 Closure Before After

1st 07:38 (2,328) 09:43 (1,430)

2nd 12:32 (82) 17:16 (44)

3rd 12:18 (25) 18:48 (18)

4th 17:18 (20) 18:44 (7)

Station 94 was opened with a SAFER grant in November 2012. In order to measure the District-

wide impact of this station opening, the following travel time assessments have been made:

1. Travel time from July 2, 2012 to October 31, 2012.

2. Travel time from December 1, 2012 to May 1, 2013.




Table 43—Travel Times Before and After Opening of Station 94

Station 94 Opening Before After

1st 09:43 (1,430) 09:04 (1,865)

2nd 17:16 (44) 13:03 (52)

3rd 18:48 (18) 18:33 (27)

4th 18:44 (7) 29:17 (15)

Station 54 opened in May 2013. In order to measure the District-wide impact of this station

opening, the following travel time assessment has been made:

1. Travel time from December 1, 2012 to April 30, 2013.

2. Travel time from June 1, 2013 to November 30, 2013.

Table 44—Travel Times Before and After Opening of Station 54

Station 54 Opened Before After

1st 09:02 (1,850) 09:34 (2,258)

2nd 12:39 (51) 13:58 (113)

3rd 13:18 (26) 17:49 (54)

4th 26:08 (14) 18:32 (31)

Station 54 closed in September 2014. In order to measure the department-wide impact of this

station closing, the following travel time assessment has been made:

1. Travel time from April 1, 2014 to August 31, 2014.

2. Travel time from October 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015.

Table 45—Travel Times Before and After Station 54 Closure

Station 54 Closed Before After

1st 09:28 (1,994) 10:13 (2,326)

2nd 17:27 (79) 17:54 (63)

3rd 18:44 (28) 20:43 (24)

4th 16:15 (14) 19:37 (17)

Station 94 closed on May 11, 2015. In order to measure the department-wide impact of this

station closing, the following travel time assessment has been made:




1. Travel time from December 11, 2014 to May 10, 2015.

2. Travel time from May 12, 2015 to November 11, 2015.

Table 46—Travel Times Before and After Station 94 Closure

Station 94 Closed Before After

1st 10:40 (2,013) 10:33 (2,391)

2nd 18:19 (51) 20:46 (97)

3rd 20:43 (23) 22:29 (33)

4th 21:25 (15) 21:04 (16)

5.6.2 Station Closure Calculations by Year – Overall District

The following table illustrates 90% travel time compliance for District apparatus by arrival by

year:

Table 47—Apparatus: 90% Travel Time Performance Minutes – Arrival Sequence per

Year

Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th

2010 07:24 (4,722) 13:25 (250) 15:09 (84) 19:16 (37)

2011 07:45 (4,555) 14:13 (179) 18:30 (78) 18:18 (45)

2012 08:45 (4,520) 13:02 (146) 16:19 (52) 17:55 (31)

2013 09:28 (4,492) 15:38 (192) 19:14 (94) 19:51 (54)

2014 09:28 (4,618) 14:55 (161) 18:44 (51) 19:37 (31)

2015 10:39 (4,870) 20:13 (162) 21:13 (58) 21:04 (30)




The decay in first arrival times over the closures can be visualized in this graph:

Figure 15—Stations Open vs. Response Time

During the three-year study period, District resources varied from 3-5 on-duty engine companies.

The boundaries of station areas were changed. During some periods, only contract ambulances

were sent to low acuity emergencies. Other times, a 2-medic squad was in service, but did not

transport.

The number of incidents in the District has grown year to year. The steadiest and most persistent

growth in EMS incidents occurred in 2015 and accounted for two-thirds of all incidents.

EMS incidents receive resources from both the District and a contract ambulance service. As

stations close, District travel times increased marginally, but not as consistently or dramatically

as would be expected. In theory, the closure of fire stations does not affect the contract

ambulance travel times. The closure of engine resources causes the number of contract

ambulance first arrivals to increase. Since EMS first arrivals occur either by an engine or by an

ambulance, the impact of engine closures is somewhat mitigated by contract ambulance EMS.

This may mask the serious delay of resources to fire events.

In the last half of 2015, there has been a more dramatic increase in travel times.



Section 6—SOC Evaluation and Recommendation page 87

SECTION 6—SOC EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 OVERALL EVALUATION

The District serves a diverse land use pattern that, in

some locations, is geographically challenged with open

spaces, and limited cross access streets due to open space

and waterways, which limit quick response times.

Population drives service demand, and development brings population. The incident volumes in

the District are modest, and reflective in location of the higher population density areas.

For the foreseeable future, the District will need both a first-due firefighting unit and Effective

Response Force (First Alarm) coverage in all parts of the District, consistent with current best

practices, if the risk of fire is to be limited to only part of the inside of an affected building.

While residential fire sprinklers are now included in the national model fire codes, it will be

decades before the existing housing stock will be upgraded or replaced, even if these codes were

to be adopted for all new construction.

While the volume and response times to EMS incidents consume much of the District’s

attention, all communities need a “stand-by and readily available” firefighting force for when

fires break out. The Fire Department does not provide ambulance care and, even if it did, would

still require resources in addition to EMS hourly demand for an effective response to emerging

fires.

If the District wants to continue in providing the three elements below, the District will need to

increase its deployment plan and operate nine career staffed fire stations and continue the CAL

FIRE agreement for wintertime staffing in the Sunshine District:

Provide equitable response times to all similar risk and population density

neighborhoods

Provide for depth of single unit response when multiple incidents occur

Provide for a concentration of response units for high-risk incidents that require a

timely multiple-unit response.

Given current revenues that only allow three permanent staffed fire stations and a fourth with a

temporary staffing agreement, the District is only delivering a rural level of service even to the

most urban population density areas.

Based on the deployment analysis contained in this study, Citygate’s makes the following

recommendations to strengthen deployment performance and ensure quality coverage as

incidents slowly increase year to year.

SOC ELEMENT 8 OF 8

OVERALL EVALUATION




Additionally, the District does not operate a ladder truck and makes do with one Incident

Command chief officer available on a 24/7/365 basis. Both of these issues need to be addressed

within a permanent funding plan.

Citygate’s specific deployment recommendations are listed below. The first deployment step for

the District in the near term is to adopt updated and complete performance measures from which

to set forth service expectations and, on an annual budget basis, monitor and fund Fire

Department performance.

6.1.1 Deployment Recommendation

Based on the technical analysis and findings contained in this Standards of Response Coverage

study, Citygate’s offers the following overall deployment recommendations:

Recommendation #1: Adopt District Board of Directors Deployment

Measures Policies: The District elected officials should

adopt updated, complete performance measures to direct

fire crew planning and to monitor the operation of the

Department. The measures of time should be designed to

save patients where medically possible and to keep

small but serious fires from becoming greater alarm

fires. With this is mind, Citygate recommends tiered

deployment measures based on population densities as

outlined in the following table:

Table 48—Deployment Recommendations

Response Time Component Structure Fire Urban Areas

Structure Fire Suburban Areas Rural Areas

>3,000 people/sq. mi.

500-3,000 people/sq. mi.

<500 people/sq. mi.

1st Due Travel Time (min/seconds) 4:00 8:00 12:00

Total Response Time 7:30 11:30 15:30

1st Alarm Travel Time 8:00 12:00 16:00

1st Alarm Total Response 11:30 15:30 19:30




Sub-recommendations 1.1 through 1.5 explain these

recommended deployment measures specifically for

urban areas. The District should adopt similar measures

for suburban and rural areas with response times

consistent with the table above.

1.1 Distribution of Fire Stations – Urban Areas: To treat

medical patients and control small fires, the first-due

unit should arrive within 7:30 minutes, 90% of the time

from the receipt of the call in the Fire Communications

Center. This equates to a 1:30-minute dispatch time, a 2-

minute company turnout time, and a 4-minute drive time

in the most populated areas.

1.2 Multiple-Unit Effective Response Force for Serious

Emergencies – Urban Areas: To confine fires near the

room of origin, to stop wildland fires to under three

acres when noticed promptly, and to treat up to five

medical patients at once, a multiple-unit response of a

minimum of five engines, one ladder truck, and two

Battalion Chiefs totaling 20 personnel should arrive

within 11:30 minutes from the time of fire dispatch call

receipt, 90% of the time. This equates to 1:30-minute

dispatch time, 2 minutes company turnout time, and 8

minutes drive time spacing for multiple units in the

urban areas.




1.3 Hazardous Materials Response – Urban Areas: Provide

hazardous materials response designed to protect the

community from the hazards associated with

uncontrolled release of hazardous and toxic materials.

The fundamental mission of the District response is to

minimize or halt the release of a hazardous substance so

it has minimal impact on the community. It can achieve

this with a travel time for the first company capable of

investigating a HazMat release at the operations level

within 6 minutes travel time or less than 90% of the

time. After size-up and scene evaluation is completed, a

determination will be made whether to request additional

resources from the District’s multi-agency hazardous

materials response partnership.

1.4 Technical Rescue – Urban Areas: Respond to technical

rescue emergencies as efficiently and effectively as

possible with enough trained personnel to facilitate a

successful rescue. Achieve a travel time for the first

company in for size-up of the rescue within 6 minutes

travel time or less 90% of the time. Assemble additional

resources for technical rescue capable of initiating a

rescue within a total response time of 11 minutes, 90%

of the time. Safely complete rescue/extrication to ensure

delivery of patient to a definitive care facility.

1.5 Emergency Medical Services – Urban Areas: The

District should continue to provide first responder EMT

services to urban neighborhoods to 90% of the higher

priority medical incidents within at least 7:30

minutes/seconds from fire dispatch receipt.

Recommendation #2: The Fire Dispatch Center and Fire District need to lower

dispatch processing and fire crew turnout times to best

practices recommendation of 3:30 minutes.

Recommendation #3: When a fourth fire station is staffed inside Brentwood,

the District should staff and operate a ladder truck and

engine from that station.




Recommendation #4: The District should work for funding to operate a nine-

fire-station model, along with continuing the CAL FIRE

agreement for the Sunshine area. This includes the

ongoing use, relocation, and addition of stations to

achieve three stations in Oakley, four in Brentwood, and

two in Discovery Bay.



Section 7—Headquarters and Support Functions Staffing Adequacy Review page 93

SECTION 7—HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS STAFFING

ADEQUACY REVIEW

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In addition to an in-depth review of the District’s deployment needs, Citygate’s Associates was

asked to review the headquarters and support functions of the Department. The methodology that

Citygate’s used consisted of two steps: a review of the Department’s supporting documents for

each of the headquarters and support sections, as well as interviews to corroborate the interview

findings. Upon completion of these three research activities, Citygate developed tentative

findings and recommendations. These findings and recommendations were then fact-checked by

the Department to ensure that Citygate’s understood the facts correctly. Once these steps were

completed, the Draft Report was developed to give context to the findings and recommendations.

7.2 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 12016 states in part, “the [department] shall have a

leader and organizational structure that facilitates efficient and effective management of its

resources to carry out its mandate as required [in its mission statement].” A fire department

needs a management organization that is properly sized, adequately trained, and appropriately

supported. There are increasing regulations to comply with in operating fire services, and the

proper hiring, training, and supervision of response employees requires an equally serious

commitment to leadership and general management functions.

The District Fire Department management organization consists of:

1 Fire Chief

1 Administration Assistant for business and fiscal affairs

3 Battalion Chiefs on a firefighter shift schedule for 24/7/365 incident command

and direct crew supervision

If fire services are to be provided at all, they must be done so following safety laws and a

multitude of other federal and state government regulations. There are a variety of internal and

6 NFPA 1201 – Standard for Providing Emergency Services to the Public (2015 Edition)




external services that a fire headquarters team need to provide, and it would take a dozen pages

to begin to list them all. The major management and services to be provided are:

Fiscal and personnel administration

Budget – operating and capital

Expense control

Payroll

Workers compensation

Vendor contracts

Coordination of the Board of Directors functions

Master planning

Intra-agency coordination with other fire departments and the cities

Fire prevention

Fire code adoption and enforcement

New construction plan review and inspection

Coordination of plan review and permits with two cities and the county

building departments

Public education

Provision of dispatch services

Employee training

Employee career development for promotion and succession planning

Emergency medical services employee training and quality of care assurance

Fire apparatus maintenance, repair, and replacement

Fire station maintenance, repair, and replacement

Small tool and specialty equipment maintenance, repair, and replacement.

In the current headquarters design, the Fire Chief must additionally handle Fire Prevention

services typical of an urban fire department, including development/building plan review and

related construction/occupancy inspections; fire protection systems plan review and related




construction inspections; and state-mandated fire and life safety inspections in non-residential

occupancies.

For all other services and needs listed in Section 7.2, the three shift Battalion Chiefs and crew

Captains, time permitting, must handle them. There are no Training and EMS personnel

responsible for all departmental education and training. There is no training center with indoor

and outdoor spaces for props and hand on training. Such functions must be “squeezed in” at fire

stations or borrowed commercial parking lots.

Each of the three Battalion Chiefs has a major management area of responsibility: Field

Operations, Support Services, and Training/EMS/Safety. The administrative and technical

burden of these management specializations in addition to being certified and qualified for

emergency incident command is immense.

For example, here is a partial list of best-practice guidelines for just fire crew training and

professional development:

NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications—This

standard establishes the basic qualifications for Firefighter I and II.

NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver Operator Professional

Qualifications—The standard sets forth the performance objectives for

driver/operators of all types of fire apparatus and emergency vehicles.

NFPA 1006 Standard for Rescue Technician Professional Qualifications—This

standard delineates the performance objectives for firefighters who perform

technical rescue.

NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications—This standard

covers the four levels of fire officer progression: Fire Officer I, II, III, and IV.

NFPA 1031 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan

Examiner—This standard describes the professional performances of the fire

inspector and plan examiner.

NFPA 1041 Standard for Fire Service Instructor Professional Qualifications—

This standard guides the development of the fire-service training instructor

through the three levels of advancement: Instructor I, II, and III.

NFPA 1401 Recommended Practice for Fire Service Training Reports and

Records—This standard includes all aspects of training documentation such as

training schedules, reports, records, legal characteristics of training records,

record management systems (RMS), and means to evaluate the RMS.




NFPA 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions—This standard outlines

the procedures required for safe live fire training.

NFPA 1404 Standard for Fire Service Respiratory Protection Training—This

standard covers the proper use, inspection, maintenance, and program

administration of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs).

NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program—

This standard covers the minimum requirements of a vehicle operations training

program.

This is but a tiny sample of the regulations covering the fire service, its personnel, fire apparatus,

tools, and stations.

Unlike other aspects of firefighting, EMS care is heavily regulated and burdened with mandated

oversight requirements. All of these requirements, while medically necessary, add to the

Department’s overhead cost to provide EMS. The Department has no choice but to follow laws

and regulations related to training, clinical oversight, data for tracking trends in care and skills,

shelf-life of medical supplies, biomedical equipment certification, etc. If these issues are not

addressed, eventually patient care will be negatively affected.

The concept of providing focus and emphasis on Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) in

patient care delivery became a top priority in EMS in the early 1990s. EMS providers and EMS

oversight agencies across the United States developed systems that guaranteed objective

feedback about performance both internally (to support CQI efforts) and externally (to

demonstrate accountability to partners and oversight agencies).

An effective CQI program must be consistent and systematic, must be based on evidence, and

must be free of any perceived or real punitive involvement. It will include a fact-based decision-

making process that involves industry-accepted performance measures and comparison of

treatment to standard protocols for patient conditions. It will foster learning and knowledge

sharing, and will motivate care providers to be the best possible clinicians with each and every

patient contact.

Clinical training, oversight, and command staff in the EMS program supports the field personnel.

In turn, these technical positions must have office support professionals to support them.

Functions such as recordkeeping, notifications, filing, internal communications, budgeting,

purchase requests, telephone inquiries, scheduling, and a multitude of other assignments must be

provided by the EMS oversight team.




7.3 FLEET MANAGEMENT

There are basic standards that the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has disseminated

that apply to the fleet management program. It is not necessary for the jurisdiction to formally

adopt these standards; simply referring to them and using them as the basis for the program

fulfills the definition of “adopted;” using them just for reference fulfills the definition of

“partially adopted.” The standards are as follows:

NFPA 1901 Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus—This standard defines the

requirements for new automotive fire apparatus and trailers designed to be used

under emergency conditions to transport personnel and equipment and to support

the suppression of fires and mitigation of other hazardous situations.

NFPA 1906 Standard for Wildland Fire Apparatus—This standard defines the

requirements for new automotive fire apparatus, including apparatus equipped

with a slip-on fire-fighting module, designed primarily to support wildland fire

suppression operations.

NFPA 1911 Standard for the Inspection, Maintenance, Testing, and Retirement of

In-Service Automotive Fire Apparatus—This standard defines the minimum

requirements for establishing an inspection, maintenance, and testing program for

in-service fire apparatus. This standard also includes guidelines for fire apparatus

refurbishment and retirement; it identifies the systems and items on a fire

apparatus that are to be inspected and maintained, the frequency of such

inspections and maintenance, and the requirements and procedures for conducting

performance tests on components; and provides sample forms for collecting

inspection and test data.

NFPA 1912 Standard for Fire Apparatus Refurbishing—This standard specifies

the minimum requirements for the refurbishing of automotive fire apparatus

utilized for firefighting and rescue operations, whether the refurbishing is done at

the fire agency or municipal maintenance facilities, or at the facilities of private

contractors or apparatus manufacturers.

NFPA 1071 Standard for Emergency Vehicle Technician Professional

Qualifications—This standard shall identify and define the minimum job

performance requirements (JPRs) for a person to be considered qualified as an

emergency vehicle technician (EVT) and shall apply to personnel who are

engaged in the inspection, diagnosis, maintenance, repair, and testing of

emergency response vehicles.




The average front-line service life of a fire engine (pumper) is fifteen years with another five

years in reserve service. Often the mileage on fire apparatus will not be as high as might be

expected from a similar commercial vehicle. However, after fifteen years, replacement parts

become scarce and the wear and tear from fast starts and stops over the years is significant.

Currently the District has a total of 26 units in its fleet of all types from fire engines to specialty

brush fire and water tenders to command vehicles. There is no fleet maintenance facility or repair

shop for internal needs, everything has to be contracted out to vendors if it cannot or due to

regulations should not be done by on-duty firefighters.

The District’s fire engines range in age from one at 15 years old to two at 14 years old, and three

at 9 years old. Up to now the District has not been able to save in advance for replacements,

when an apparatus or two get in dire need of replacement, the District has to use a combination

of limited savings and borrowing to replace a unit. The current total replacement value of the feet

in current dollars is $9.4M. An average new structure fire pumper costs $650,000. The District

does not own a ladder and if it did, current costs are approximately $1.1M.

Given the oldest reserve pumper is already 15 years old, in the near term the District needs to

replace it and be ready to replace two more right after that. Thus, in less than five years from

now, the District should be replacing three structure fire engines totaling at least $1.9M.

Small tools, EMS equipment, radios and buildings all need periodic repair and replacement. In

just buildings the District has nine facilities ranging from 66-years old to 14-years old. There are

no savings dedicated to capital repairs or replacement in the unincorporated areas.

In the cities, the City of Brentwood has a proposed site to replace fire station 54 within

Brentwood located on Sand Creek road near Garin Parkway. The City of Oakley has an

agreement with Shea homes to build a new fire station located on E. Cypress Rd. near Bethel

island road. This station would replace station 94 Knightsen.

7.4 HEADQUARTERS SERVICES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In a fire department of the District’s size, at Citygate’s recommendation of nine fire stations with

ten staffed units (nine engines and one ladder truck), the District would have a minimum of 90

line firefighters plus command and headquarters staff.

Even currently with 30 line personnel plus the management team of five, a typically-funded fire

department with a minimum staffed fire department headquarters would have a larger

headquarters team.

Currently in the District, it is amazing that the operation has continued so long on such a small

leadership team. It is due to their attitude and dedication to work above and beyond to keep the




District firefighting staff safe while also supporting a nine-member Board of Directors, two

cities, and an interested County and LAFCO Agency.

However, the staff have no backup, no succession plan, and are becoming tired of the struggle to

do everything, which means not everything can get done, even to regulatory satisfaction. District

operations would be crippled if either of the key figures—the Fire Chief or Administration

Assistant—left or were ill or injured for a significant period of time.

Finding #17: The current District headquarters position of five personnel is

totally inadequate to continue to provide safe and regulatory-

compliant supervision for a fire department as it exists today, much

less expand the agency if additional funds are identified.

For fire departments of two to four stations, Citygate recommends what we call a “Minimum

Headquarters Model” to ensure safe operations within regulatory and fiscal standards. The

positions needed for this model are as follows. Positions currently staffed at the District are

indicated as such in the status column. New positions are highlighted in green.

Table 49—Increasing Staffing to the Minimum Headquarters Model

Status Position

Current 1 Fire Chief

New 1 Deputy Chief/Fire Marshal (Interim Fire Prevention Program coordination)

Current 1 Administration Assistant for Business and Fiscal affairs

New 1 Office Support Specialist (support to all staff and fire prevention transactions)

New 1 Training Officer (Fire Captain or Battalion Chief on 40-hr schedule)

Current 3 Battalion Chiefs on a shift schedule for 24/7/365 incident command and crew supervision

Thus the current five-person headquarters staff at District would increase to eight. The three

added positions in green do not exist today. If funds are identified to open and operate more

fire stations, who will perform the following without adding these three positions?

Entry-level firefighter recruitment, testing, and training.

The promotional training and exams for future Fire Captains and Engineers.

The specification and purchasing of additional tools and apparatus.

The adding or capital maintenance of facilities.

EMS Quality Assurance.




As the Department begins to operate five or more fire stations, the headquarters team should be

increased by another three positions, totaling twelve full-time and part-time positions. Positions

staffed for the Minimum Headquarters Model are so indicated in the status column. New

positions are highlighted in green.

Table 50—Increasing Staffing from the Minimum Headquarters Model

Status Position

Minimum Headquarters Model 1 Fire Chief

Minimum Headquarters Model 1 Deputy Chief for field operations and second-in-command functions

New 1 Fire Marshal (could be a non-sworn civilian specialist)

New 1 Fire Inspector (2 FTE provides full internal prevention program)

Minimum Headquarters Model 1 Administration Assistant for business and fiscal affairs

Minimum Headquarters Model 1 Office Support Specialist (support to all staff and fire prevention transactions)

Minimum Headquarters Model 1 Training Officer (Fire Captain or Battalion Chief on 40-hr schedule)

New .5 EMS Quality Assurance and training coordinator

New .5 Entry-level Office Support Specialist

Minimum Headquarters Model 3 Battalion Chiefs on a shift schedule for 24/7/365 incident command and crew supervision




If the District were to operate nine fire stations, the headquarters time would expand again by

increasing the two .5 positions to full-time and adding two others to operate the final quantity of

fire stations, totaling 13 full-time equivalents. Positions already staffed for the Five-Station

Model are so indicated in the status column. New or increased positions are highlighted in green.

Table 51—Increasing Staffing to the Nine-Station Model

Status Position

Five-Station Model 1 Fire Chief

Five-Station Model 1 Deputy Fire Chief

Five-Station Model 1 Fire Marshal

Five-Station Model 1 Fire Inspector

Five-Station Model 1 Administration Assistant for business and fiscal affairs

Five-Station Model 1 Office Support Specialist (support to all staff and fire prevention transactions)

Five-Station Model 1 Training Officer (Fire Captain or Battalion Chief on 40-hr schedule)

Increased 1 EMS Quality Assurance and training coordinator

Increased 1 Entry-level Office Support Specialist

New 1 Fire Apparatus Mechanic

Five-Station Model 3 Battalion Chiefs on a shift schedule for 24/7/365 incident command and crew supervision

Recommendation #5: The District should, as soon as funding permits, increase

the headquarters staff by three full-time positions as

identified in this study.

Recommendation #6: When the Department operates five fire stations, the

headquarters team should be expanded with an

additional two full-time and two part-time positions.

Recommendation #7: When the District operates nine fire stations, the

headquarters team should be expanded again to make

two part-time positions full time, and add a full-time

position, for a total minimum headquarters team of 13

full-time personnel.




Recommendation #8: The District must start long range fiscal strategic

planning to identify the funding sources and annual

capital reserves saving to repair and replace fire

apparatus and fire stations.



Section 8—Next Steps page 103

SECTION 8—NEXT STEPS

8.1 NEXT STEPS

The purpose of this assessment is to compare the District’s current performance against the local

risks to be protected, as well as to compare against nationally-recognized best practices. This

analysis of performance forms the base from which to make recommendations for changes, if

any, in fire station locations, equipment types, staffing, and headquarters programs.

As one step, the District should adopt updated and best-practices-based response time goals for

the three population density areas served in the District, and provide accountability for the

Department personnel to meet those standards. The goals identified in Recommendation #1 meet

national best practices advice. Measurement and planning as the District continues to evolve will

be necessary to meet these goals.

Additional revenue sources and planning as the District continues to evolve, will be necessary

for the District to meet these goals. Citygate’s recommends that the District’s next steps be to

work through the issues identified in this study over the near term:

8.1.1 Short-Term Steps

Absorb the policy recommendations of this fire services study and adopt updated

District performance measures to drive the deployment of firefighting and

emergency medical resources.

Identify the funding sources to re-grow the agency to the community’s desired

level.

Fund and hire the immediate needed fire headquarters positions.

Replace the needed front-line fire apparatus over the next five years.

deployment performance and headquarters staffing …...deployment performance and headquarters...

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