department of labor: 99 1848

8/14/2019 Department of Labor: 99 1848

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2000 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v.Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, IN C., ETAL. v.WEST VIRGIN IA DEPARTMENT OF H EALTH AND

HUMAN RESOURCES ETAL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 991848. Argued Febru ar y 27, 2001Decided May 29, 2001

Buckhan non Board an d Care H ome, Inc., which opera tes assisted living

residences, failed an inspection by the West Virginia fire m arsh als

office because some residents were incapable of self-preservation asdefined by sta te law. After r eceiving order s to close its facilities,

Buckhannon and others (hereinafter petitioners) brought suit in Fed-eral District Court against the State and state agencies and officials

(hereinafter respondents), seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefthat the self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing

Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabili-

ties Act of 1990 (ADA). Respond ent s agreed t o sta y the order s pend -ing the cases resolution. The state legislatur e then eliminated th e

self-preservation requirement, and the District Court granted re-spondents motion to dismiss the case as moot. Petitioners request ed

att orneys fees as th e prevailing pa rty under the FHAA and ADA,basing their entitlement on the catalyst theory, which posits that a

plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result be-

cause the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defen-dan ts conduct. As the Fourt h Circuit had pr eviously rejected the

catalyst theory, the District Court denied the motion, and theFourth Circuit affirmed .

Held: The catalyst theory is not a permissible basis for the award of

att orneys fees under t he FHAA and ADA. Under the American

Rule, par ties are ordina rily required to bear t heir own a ttorneys

fees, and courts follow a general practice of not awarding fees to aprevailing party absent explicit statutory authority, Key Tronic Corp.


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2 BU CK HAN NON BO ARD & CARE HOME , I NC. v. WEST

VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HE ALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Syllabus

v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 819. Congress h as em ployed the legalterm of art prevailing party in numerous statutes authorizing

awar ds of at tor ne ys fees. A preva iling party is one who ha s beenawarded some relief by a court . See, e.g.,Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446

U. S. 754, 758. Both judgments on t he m erits and court -ordered consent

decrees creat e a m ater ial alteration of the p art ies legal relationsh ip and

thu s permit an a ward. The catalyst theory, however, allows an awar d

where ther e is no judicially sanctioned change in the part ies legal rela-tionship. A defendan ts volunta ry change in condu ct, although per hap s

accomplishing wh at the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsu it, lacksthe necessary judicial imprimatur on the chan ge. The legislative his-

tory cited by pet itioners is at best ambiguous as to the availability of the

catalyst theory; and, particularly in view of the American Rule, such

history is clearly insufficient to alter the clear meaning of prevailingpart y in the fee-shifting stat utes. Given th is meaning, this Cour t neednot determ ine which way petitioners various policy argum ents cut. Pp.

312.

203 F. 3d 819, affirm ed.

REHNQUIST, C. J ., delivered t he opinion of the Cour t, in which

OCONNOR, S CALIA, K ENNEDY, and THOMAS, J J ., joined. SCALIA, J ., fileda concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J ., joined. G INSBURG, J ., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, S OUTER, and BREYER, J J ., joined.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE : Th is opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of an y typograp hical or other formal er rors, in ord erthat corrections may be mad e before th e preliminary pr int goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________

No. 991848

_________________

BUCKH ANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME , INC.,

ETAL., PE TITIONERS v. WEST VIRGINI A

DEPARTMEN T OF HEALTH AND


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE U NITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOU RTH CIRCUIT

[May 29, 2001]

CHIEF J USTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award attor-

ne ys fees and costs to th e pr evailing par ty. The qu es-

tion presented here is whether this term includes a party

that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a

court-ordered consent decree, but has nonethelessachieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought

about a volunta ry cha nge in the defendan ts conduct. We

hold th at it does not.

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which oper-

ates care homes that provide assisted living to their resi-

dents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of

the Sta te Fire Marsh al becau se some of the r esidents were

incapable of self-preserva tion as defined un der stat e law.

See W. Va. Code 165H 1, 165H 2 (1998) (requ iring

that all residents of residential board and care homes be

capable of self-preservation, or capable of moving them-

selves from situations involving imminent danger, such

as fire); W. Va. Code of Stat e Ru les, tit. 87, ser . 1,


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2 BU CKH AN NON BOARD & CARE HOME , IN C. v. WEST

VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HE ALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCE S


14.07(1) (1995) (sam e). On October 28, 1997, afte r r e-

ceiving cease and desist orders requiring the closure of its

residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon

Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other

similarly situated homes and residents (hereinafter peti-

tioners), brought suit in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia against the

Sta te of West Virginia, two of its a gencies, an d 18 ind i-

vidua ls (her einafter r esponden ts), seeking declaratory a nd

injunctive relief1 that the self-preservation requirement

violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988

(FHAA), 102 Sta t. 1619, 42 U. S. C. 3601 et seq., and theAmericans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat.

327, 42 U. S. C. 12101 et seq.

Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease

and desist orders pending resolution of the case and the

par ties began d iscovery. In 1998, th e West Virginia Leg-

islature enacted two bills eliminating the self-

preservation requirement, see H. R. 4200, I 1998 W. Va.

Acts 983986 (amending regulations); S. 627, II 1998

W. Va. Acts 11981199 (amen ding sta tu te), and respon -

den ts moved to dismiss th e case as moot. The Distr ict

Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legisla-tion had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and

that there was no indication that the West Virginia Leg-

islature would r epeal the am endments.2

Pet itioner s reque sted a ttorn eys fees as the pre vailing

pa r ty u nd er th e FH AA, 42 U. S. C. 3613(c)(2) ([T]h e

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . .

1The original complaint also sought money damages, but petitioners

relinquished th is claim on Ja nu ary 2, 1998. See App. to Pet. for Cert.

A11.2

The District Court sanctioned respondents under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11 for failing to timely provide notice of the legislativeamen dmen t. App. 147.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 3


a reasonable attorneys fee and costs), and ADA, 42

U. S. C. 12205 ([T]he cour t . . . , in its discret ion, ma y

allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorneys fee,

includ ing litigation expen ses, an d costs). Pet itioner s

ar gued th at th ey were entitled to att orneys fees under t he

catalyst t heory, which posits th at a p laintiff is a pr e-

vailing party if it achieves the desired result because the

lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defen-

dan ts condu ct. Alth ough most Court s of Appeals recog-

nize the catalyst theory,3 the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit rejected it in S1 and S2 v. State Bd. of

Ed. of N. C., 21 F. 3d 49, 51 (1994) (en banc) (A personma y n ot be a pr evailing p ar ty . . . except by virt ue of

ha ving obtained a n en forceable judgmen t, consent decree,

or settleme nt giving some of th e legal relief sought). The

District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the

same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpub-

lished, per curiam opinion. J udgt. order reported at 203

F. 3d 819 (CA4 2000).

To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of

Appeals, we gran ted certiorar i, 530 U. S. 1304 (2000), and

now affirm .

In the United States, parties are ordinarily required tobear t heir own at torn eys feesthe pr evailing par ty is not

ent itled to collect from the loser. See Alyeska Pipeline

Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975).

Un der th is American Rule, we follow a gen er al pr actice

3See, e.g., Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional School Dist., 197

F. 3d 574, 577, n. 2 (CA1 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234(CA2 1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F. 3d

541, 546550 (CA3 1994);Payne v.Board of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392, 397 (CA6

1996); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F. 3d 273, 276 (CA7 1994); Little Rock School

Dist. v.Pulaski Cty. School Dist., #1, 17 F. 3d 260, 263, n. 2 (CA8 1994);

Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F. 3d 1007, 1010 (CA9 1995); Beard v. Teska,

31 F. 3d 942, 951952 (CA10 1994); Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11 1999).


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of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit

statutory authority. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,511 U. S. 809, 819 (1994). Congress, however, has au th or-

ized the a war d of at torn eys fees to the prevailing par ty in

nu mer ous statu tes in addition t o those at issue here, such as

th e Civil Right s Act of 1964, 78 S ta t. 259, 42 U . S. C.

2000e5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89

Sta t. 402, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(e), and the Civil Rights Attor-

neys Fees Awar ds Act of 1976, 90 Sta t. 2641, 42 U. S. C.

1988. See gener ally Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 4351

(1985) (Appendix to opinion of Bren na n, J ., dissent ing).4

In designating those parties eligible for an award oflitigation costs, Congress employed the term prevailing

par ty, a legal term of ar t. Blacks Law Dictionar y 1145

(7th ed. 1999) defines prevailing party as [a] party in

whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the

amount of damages awarded .

Also termed successful party. This view th at a pre vail-

ing par ty is one wh o has been a warded some r elief by the

cour t can be distilled from our p rior cases.5

4 We have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently, seeHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983), and so approach the

nea rly identical provisions at issue h ere.5

We have never had occasion to decide whether the term prevailing

party allows an award of fees under the catalyst theory describedabove. Dicta in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987), alluded to the

possibility of attorneys fees where voluntary action by the defendant. . . afford s th e p laint iff all or s ome of th e r elief . . . sough t, but we

expressly reserved th e question, see id., at 763 (We need not decide thecircumst an ces, if an y, unde r wh ich this cata lyst th eory could ju stify a

fee awar d). And though th e Cour t of Appeals for the Fourt h Circuit

relied upon our decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U . S. 103 (1992), in

rejecting the catalyst theory, Farrar involved no catalytic effect.

Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528

U. S. 167, 194 (2000). Thus, t her e is langu age in our cases su pportingboth petitioners and respondents, and last Term we observed that it


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 5


In Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758 (1980) (per

curiam), we reviewed the legislative history of 1988 and

found that Congress intended to permit the interim

awar d of counsel fees only when a par ty ha s prevailed on

th e me rits of at least some of his claims. Our [r]espect

for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at

least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can

be said to prevail. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760

(1987). We ha ve held that even an awa rd of nominal

dam ages suffices un der this test. See Farrar v. Hobby,506 U . S. 103 (1992).6

In addition to judgments on the merits, we have heldthat settlement agreements enforced through a consent

decree ma y serve as th e basis for an awar d of att orneys

fees. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980). Alth ough

a consent decree does not always include an admission of

liability by the defendant, see, e.g., id., at 126, n. 8, it

nonetheless is a court-ordered chang[e] [in] the legal

relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.

Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School

Dist., 489 U . S. 782, 792 (1989) (citin g Hewitt, supra, a t

760761, and Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 34 (1988)

(per curiam)).7

These decisions, taken together, establish

was an open question her e. See ibid.6

However, in some circumstances such a prevailing party shouldstill not receive an awa rd of at torn eys fees. See Farrar v. Hobby,supra,

at 115116.7

We have subsequently characterized th e Maher opinion as also al-

lowing for an awa rd of att orneys fees for private settlemen ts. See

Farrar v. Hobby,supra, at 111; Hewitt v. Helms,supra, at 760. But this

dicta ignores that Maher only held th at fees may be assessed . . . after a

case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree. Evans v. Jeff D.,

475 U. S. 717, 720 (1986). Private set tlement s do not ent ail the jud icial

app roval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And feder al jur isdic-

tion to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lackingunless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of


8/51




that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-

ordered consent decrees create the material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit

an awa rd of attorn eys fees. 489 U. S., at 792793; see

also Hanrahan, supra, at 757 ([I]t seems clearly to have

been the intent of Congress to permit . . . an interlocutory

awar d only to a par ty who has established his entitlement to

some relief on the merits of his claims, either in the trial

court or on appeal (emp ha sis added)).

We think, however, the catalyst theory falls on the

other side of th e line from th ese examp les. It allows an

award where there is no judicially sanctioned change inthe legal relationship of the pa rties. Even un der a limited

form of the catalyst theory, a plaintiff could recover

attorneys fees if it established that the complaint had

sufficient merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief

ma y be gran ted. Brief for Un ited States as Amicus Cu-

riae 27. This is not the type of legal mer it tha t our prior

decisions, based upon plain language and congressional

intent, have found necessary. Indeed, we held in Hewitt

that an interlocutory ruling that reverses a dismissal for

failure to state a claim is not the stuff of which legalvictories ar e made . 482 U. S., at 760. See also Hanra-

han, supra, at 754 (rever sal of a dir ected verd ict for d efen-

dan t does not make plaintiff a pr evailing pa rt y). A

defenda nt s volun ta ry cha nge in cond uct, alth ough per-

haps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by

the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on

the change. Our pr ecedents thu s counsel against holding

that the term prevailing party authorizes an award of

attorneys fees without a corresponding alteration in the

dismissal. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S.375 (1994).


9/51


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Petitioners nonetheless argue that the legislative his-

tory of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act sup-

ports a broad reading of prevailing party which includes

th e catalyst theory. We doubt tha t legislat ive history

could overcome wh at we th ink is the r ath er clear mea ning

of prevailing partythe term actually used in the stat-

ut e. Since we resort ed to such history in Garland, 489

U. S., at 790, Maher, 448 U. S., at 129, and Hanrahan, 446

U. S., at 756 757, however, we do likewise her e.

The House Report to 1988 states that [t]he phrase

pr evailing pa rt y is not inte nde d t o be limited to th e victor

only after en tr y of a final judgm ent following a full trial onthe m erits, H. R. Rep. No. 941558, p. 7 (1976), wh ile th e

Senat e Report explains tha t par ties may be considered to

fees. [B]y the long established pra ctice an d un iversally recognized ru le ofthe common law . . . the p revailing party is entitled to recover a judgm ent

for costs, id., at 387, but the r ule has long been tha t a ttorn eys fees arenot ordinarily recoverable, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. WildernessSociety, 421 U. S. 240, 257 (1975) (quotin g Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.

Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 717 (1967)). Court s gener ally, and th isCourt in particular, then and now, have a presumptive rule for costs

which the Cour t in its discretion may vary. See, e.g., this Courts Rule

43.2 (If the Court r everses or vacates a judgment, the responden t orappellee shall pay costs unless the Court otherwise orders). In Mans-

field, the defendants had successfully removed the case to federal court,

successfully opposed the plaintiffs motion to remand the case to state

cour t, lost on th e mer its of the case, and then reversed course an d success-fully argued in this Court that the lower federal court had no jurisdiction.

The Court awarded costs to the plaintiffs, even though they had lost andthe defendants won on the jurisdictional issue, which was the only ques-

tion this Court decided. In n o ordina ry sense of the word can the plaint iffshave been said to be the preva iling part y herethey lost an d th eir oppo-

nen ts won on the only litigated issueso the Cour ts use of the term mu stbe regarded as a figurative rather than a literal one, justifying the depar-

ture from the presumptive rule allowing costs to the prevailing party

because of th e obvious equit ies favoring the plain tiffs. The Court em-

ployed its discretion t o recognize tha t t he plaintiffs ha d been the victims ofthe defendants legally successful whipsawing tactics.


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10 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, I NC.v. WEST



Petitioners finally assert that the catalyst theory is

necessary t o prevent defendan ts from u nilatera lly mooting

an action before judgm ent in an effort to avoid an a ward of

at torn eys fees. They also claim th at th e rejection of th e

catalyst theory will deter plaintiffs with meritorious but

expensive cases from bringing suit. We ar e skeptical of

these assertions, which are entirely speculative and un-

supported by any empirical evidence (e.g., whether the

number of suits brought in the Fourth Circuit has de-

clined, in relation to other Circuits, since the decision in

S1 and S2).

Petitioners discount the disincentive that the catalysttheory may have upon a defendants decision to voluntar-

ily change its conduct, conduct that may not be illegal.

The defenda nt s potent ial liability for fees in th is kind of

litigation can be as significant as, and sometimes even

more significant than, their potential liability on the

merits, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U. S. 717, 734 (1986), andthe possibility of being assessed attorneys fees may welldeter a d efendant from a ltering its conduct.

And petitioners fear of mischievous defendants only

materializes in claims for equitable relief, for so long as

the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defen-dants change in conduct will not moot the case.10 Even

then, it is not clear how often courts will find a case

mooted: It is well settled that a defendants voluntary

cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a fed-

eral court of its power to determine the legality of the

practice unless it is absolutely clear that the allegedly

10Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are

immun e from suits for damages in federa l court. See, e.g., Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Plain tiffs ma y bring su it for da ma ges

against all others, including municipalities and other political subdivi-

sions of a Sta te, see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274(1977).


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 11


wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to

recur. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental

Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000) (int er na l

quotat ion ma rk s an d citations omitt ed). If a case is not

found to be moot, and the plaintiff later procures an en-

forceable judgment, the court may of course award attor-

ne ys fees. Given this possibility, a defend an t ha s a strong

incentive to enter a settlement agreement, where it can

ne gotiate att orn eys fees and costs. Cf. Marek v. Chesny,

473 U. S., at 7 ([M]any a defenda nt would be un willing t o

make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it ex-

posed to liability for attorneys fees in whatever amountthe court might fix on motion of the plaintiff (internal

quotation ma rks an d citation omitted)).

We have also stated that [a] request for attorneys fees

should not result in a second major litigation, Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 437 (1983), and have accordinglyavoided an interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that

would have spawn[ed] a second litigation of significant

dimension, Garland, 489 U. S., at 791. Among oth er

things, a cata lyst th eory hea ring would require an alysis

of the defendants subjective motivations in changing its

conduct, an analysis that will likely depend on a highlyfactbound inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences

from th e na tur e an d timing of the defendant s cha nge in

condu ct. Brief for United Stat es as Amicus Curiae 28 .

Although we do not doubt the ability of district courts to

perform the nuanced three thresholds test required by

the catalyst theorywhether the claim was colorable

rather than groundless; whether the lawsuit was a sub-

stantial rather than an insubstantial cause of the defen-

dan ts change in condu ct; wheth er the defendant s chan ge

in conduct was motivated by the plaintiffs threat of vic-

tory ra ther than threa t of expense, seepost, at 67it is

clearly not a formula for ready administrability. Bur-lington v.Dague, 505 U . S. 557, 566 (1992).


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Given the clear meaning of prevailing party in the fee-

shifting statutes, we need not determine which way these

various policy ar gumen ts cut. In Alyeska, 421 U. S., at

260, we said that Congress had not extended any roving

authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or

otherwise whenever the courts might deem them war-

ra nted. To disregard the clear legislative lan guage and

the holdings of our prior cases on the basis of such policy

arguments would be a similar assumption of a roving

au th ority. For the rea sons stated above, we hold tha t the

catalyst t heor y is not a per missible basis for th e awa rd of

at tor ne ys fees un der th e F HAA, 42 U. S. C. 3613(c)(2),an d ADA, 42 U. S. C. 12205.

The judgm ent of th e Court of Appea ls is

Affirmed.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 1

SCALIA, J., concurr ing

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 991848

_________________





ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE U NITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOU RTH CIRCUIT

[May 29, 2001]

J USTICE SCALIA, with whom J USTICE THOMAS joins,concurring.

I join th e opinion of the Court in its entirety, an d wr ite

to respond at greater length to the contentions of the

dissent.

I

Prevailing party is not some newfangled legal term

invented for use in late-20th-centu ry fee-shifting sta tut es.

[B]y the long established practice and universally recog-

nized rule of the common law, in actions at law, the pre-

vailing party is entitled to recover a judgment for costs

. . . . Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379,

387 (1884).

Costs have usually been allowed to the prevailing

par ty, as incident to the judgmen t, since the stat ute 6

Edw. I, c. 1, 2, and the same rule was acknowledged

in the cour ts of the St ates, at th e time th e judicial sy s-

tem of the United St ates wa s organized. . . .

Weighed in the light of these several provisions inthe Judiciary Act [of 1789], the conclusion appears to


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2 BU CKH AN NON BOARD & CARE H OME , IN C. v. WEST



be clear that Congress intended to allow costs to the

prevailing party, as incident to the judgment . . . .

The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 388, 390 (1869) .

The term has been found within the United States Stat-

utes at Large since at least the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,

which provided that [t]he party prevailing in the suit

sha ll be entitled to costs aga inst th e adver se part y. Act of

Mar . 2, 1867, ch. 176, 24, 14 Sta t. 528. See a lso Act of

Mar . 3, 1887, ch. 359, 15, 24 Stat. 508 (If th e Gover n-

ment of the United States shall put in issue the right of

the plaintiff to recover the court may, in its discretion,allow costs to th e pr evailing pa rt y from t he t ime of joining

such issue). A comp ut er search shows th at the term

prevailing par ty appea rs at least 70 times in th e curren t

United Sta tes Code; it is no stran ger to the law.

At the t ime 42 U. S. C. 1988 was en acted, I kn ow of no

case, state or federal, in whicheither under a statutory

invocation of prevailing party, or under the common-law

rulethe catalyst theory was enunciated as the basis for

awa rd ing costs. Ind eed, the dissent cites only one case in

which (although the catalyst theory was not expressed)

costs were awarded for a reason that the catalyst theory

would support , but toda ys holding of the Court would not:Baldwin v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 156 Md. 552,

557, 144 A. 703, 705 (1929), where costs were awarded

because th e gra nt ing of [appellees] motion to dismiss the

appeal has made it unnecessary to inquire into the merits

of th e suit, an d th e dismissal is based on an act of app ellee

performed after both the institution of the suit and the

entr y of the appea l. And th at case is irr elevan t to the

meaning of prevailing party, because it was a case in

equity. While, as Mansfield observed, costs were awarded

in actions at law to th e pre vailing pa rt y, see 111 U. S., at

387, an equity court could award costs as the equities ofthe case might require, Getz v. Johnston, 145 Md. 426,


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 3


433, 125 A. 689, 691 (1924). See a lso Horn v. Bohn, 96

Md. 8, 1213, 53 A. 576, 577 (1902) (The question of costs

in equity cases is a m atter resting in th e sound discretion

of th e Cour t, from t he exercise of which no a ppea l will lie)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1 Th e

other sta te or stat e-law cases the dissent cites as a warding

costs despite the absence of a judgment all involve a judi-

cial findin gor its equivalent , an ackn owledgem ent by the

defenda nt of th e m erits of plaint iffs case.2 Moreover, the

1The jurisdiction that issued Baldwin has used the phrase prevail-

ing party frequently (including in equity cases) to mean the partyacquiring a judgmen t. See Getz v. Johnston, 145 Md. 426, 434, 125 A.

689, 691692 (1924) (an equity decision noting that [O]n reversal,

following the usual rule, the costs will generally go to the prevailing

party, that is, to the appellant (internal quotation marks and citationomitted )). See also, e.g., Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md. App. 284, 293, 315

A. 2d 551, 557 (1974) (Md. Ru le 604a provides: Un less other wiseprovided by law, or ordered by the court, the prevailing party shall be

entitled to the allowance of court costs, which shall be taxed by theclerk and embraced in the judgment); Fritts v. Fritts, 11 Md. App.

195, 197, 273 A. 2d 648, 649 (1971) (We have viewed the evidence, as

we must, in a light most favorable to appellee as the prevailing partybelow); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire- Dept., Inc. v. Button & Goode,

Inc., 242 Md. App. 509, 516, 219 A. 2d 801, 805 (1966) (At comm on

law, an arbitration award became a cause of action in favor of theprevailing party);Burch v. Scott, 1829 WL 1006, *15 (Md. Ct. App.,Dec. 1829) ([T]he demurrer being set down to be argued, the court

proceeds to affirm or reverse the decree, and the prevailing party takes

the deposite).2

Our decision to awar d costs in Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan,

111 U. S. 379 (1884), does not tu[g] against the restrictive rule todaysdecision installs, post, at 9. Defendants had removed the case to

federal court, and after losing on the merits, sought to have us vacatethe judgment because the basis for removal (diversity of citizenship)

was absent. We concluded that because defendant s were responsible

for the improper removal in the first place, our judgments effect [was]

to defeat the en tire pr oceeding which they originated a nd h ave prose-

cuted, id., at 388. In other words, plain tiffs pre vailed becau se

defendan ts original position as to jurisdiction was defeated. In Ficklenv. Danville, 146 Va. 426, 438439 132 S. E . 705, 706 (1926), ap pella nt s


18/51




dissent cites not a single case in which this Courtor even

any other federal court applying federal law prior to en-

actment of the fee-shifting statutes at issue herehas

regarded as the prevailing party a litigant who left

the courth ouse emptyhanded. If the term means what

the dissent contends, that is a remarkable absence of

authority.

That a judicial finding of liability was an understood

requirement of prevailing is confirmed by many statutes

that use the phrase in a context that presumes the exis-

were deem ed to have substant ially prevail[ed] on their a ppeal becauseappellees abandoned their contention made before the lower court,

i.e., abandoned their intention and desire to rely upon the correctness

of th e tria l court s decree. In Talmage v. Monroe, 119 P. 526 (Cal. App.1911), costs were awarded after the defendant complied with an alter-

native writ of mandamus; it was the writ, not the mere petition, whichled to defendants action.

Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53 (CA6 1908), Wagner v. Wagner, 9 Pa. 214(1848), and oth er cases cited by the dissent rep resent a r ule adopted in

some States that by settling a defendant acknowledged his liability,

Scatcherd, supra, at 56; see also Wagner, supra, at 215. That rule washa rdly uniform a mong the St ates. Compare 15 C. J . 89, 167 (1918)

(citing cases from 13 States wh ich h old th at a settlemen t is equ ivalent

to a confession of judgment), with id., at 8990, 168, and n. a (citingcases from 11 States which hold that under a settlement plaintiffcann ot recover costs, becau se [c]osts . . . can only follow a judgm ent

or final determination of the action (internal quotation marks and

citat ion omitted)). I do not think th ese state cases (an d Scatcherd, afederal case applying state law) justify expanding the federal meaning

of prevailing party (based on a confession of judgment fiction) toinclude the party accepting an out-of-court settlementmuch less to

expand it beyond set tlement s, to the d omain of the cata lyst theory.The only case cited by the dissent in which the conclusion of

acknowledgment of liability was rested on something other than a

settlement is Board of Ed. of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14

S. E. 2d 478 (1941), which, in one of the states that considered settle-

men t a n a cknowledgmen t of liability, analogized compliance with wh at

had been sought by a man damus suit to a settlement. This is a slimreed u pon which to rest t he broad conclusion of a catalyst th eory.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 5


ten ce of a judicial ru ling. See, e.g., 5 U. S. C. 1221(g)(2)

([i]f an employee . . . is the prevailing party . . . and the

decision is based on a finding of a prohibited personnel

practice); 1221(g)(3) (providing for an award of attor-

ne ys fees to the pre vailing p ar ty, rega rdless of th e ba sis

of the decision); 7701(b)(2)(A) (allowing the prevailing

party to obtain an interlocutory award of the relief pro-

vided in t he decision); 8 U . S. C. 1324b(h) (pe rm ittin g

the a dministrat ive law judge to awar d an att orneys fee to

the prevailing pa rty if the losing pa rtys ar gumen t is

without reasonable foundation in law and fact); 18

U. S. C. 1864(e) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (allowing the districtcour t to awar d th e preva iling par ty its attorn eys fee in

addition to monetary damages).

The dissent points out, post, at 89, that the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limits attorneys fees to an

am ount proportionately related t o the court order ed

re lief for th e violation. This shows th at sometimes Con-

gress does explicitly tight ly bind fees to judgm en ts,post,

at 8, inviting (the dissent believes) the conclusion that

pr evailing pa rt y does not fasten fees to judgment s. That

conclusion does not follow from the pr em ise. What t his

statutory provision demonstrates, at most, is that use ofthe phr ase prevailing pa rty is not the only way t o impose

a requirem ent of court-order ed relief. That is assur edly

tru e. But it would be no more rational to reject the n ormal

meaning of prevailing party because some statutes

produce the same result with different language, than it

would be to conclude th at, since th ere a re m an y synonyms

for the word jump, the word jump must mean some-

thing else.

It is undoubtedly true, as the dissent points out by

quoting a nonlegal dictionary, seepost, at 1213, that the

word pr evailing can h ave oth er m ean ings in other con-

texts: prevailing winds are the winds tha t pr edomina te,and the prevailing party in an election is the party that


20/51




wins the election. But wh en pr evailing par ty is used by

courts or legislatures in the context of a lawsuit, it is a

term of art . It has tra ditionallyan d to my knowledge,

prior t o enactment of the first of the statu tes at issue her e,

invariablymeant th e party th at wins the suit or obtains

a findin g (or an a dm ission) of liability. Not th e par ty th at

ultimately gets his way because h is adversar y dies before

the suit comes to judgment; not the party that gets his

way because circum stan ces so cha nge th at a victory on the

legal point for the other side turns out to be a practical

victory for him; and not the party that gets his way be-

cause th e other side ceases (for wha tever rea son) its offen-sive cond uct. If a nu isance suit is mooted becau se th e

defendant asphalt plant has gone bankrupt and ceased

operations, one would not normally call the plaintiff the

pre vailing par ty. And it would ma ke no difference, as far

as the propriety of that characterization is concerned, if

the plant d id not go bankr upt but m oved to a n ew location

to avoid the expense of litigation. In one sense th e plain-

tiff would have prevailed; but he would not be the pre-

vailing party in th e lawsuit. Words tha t have acquired a

specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded

their legal meaning.[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are

accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of cen-

tur ies of practice, it presum ably knows an d adopts th e

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed

word in the body of learning from which it was taken

and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial

mind un less other wise instr ucted. In such case, a b-

sence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfac-

tion with widely accepted definitions, not as a depar-

ture from them. Morissette v. United States, 342

U. S. 246, 263 (1952).

The cases cited by the dissent in which we have not


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 7


tr eat ed Blacks Law Dictiona ry a s pr eclusively definitive,

post, at 8, ar e inapposite. I n both Pioneer Investment

Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507

U. S. 380 (1993), a nd United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S.

475 (1984), we rejected Blacks definition because it con-

flicted with our precedent. See Pioneer, supra, at 395396

n. 14; Rodgers, supra, at 480. We did not, as the dissent

would do here, simply reject a relevant definition of a word

ta ilored to judicial sett ings in favor of a m ore gene ra l defini-

tion from an other dictionar y.

IIThe dissent distorts the term prevailing par ty beyond

its normal meaning for policy reasons, but even those

seem to me misguided. They rest upon the presumpt ion

that the catalyst theory applies when the suits merit led

the defendant t o abandon the fray, to switch r ather than

fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the

principal redr ess sought in th e complaint,post, at 1 (em-

ph asis added). As th e dissen t would ha ve it, by giving the

term its normal meaning the Court today approves the

practice of denying attorneys fees to a plaintiff with a

proven claim of discrimination, simply because the very

merit of his claim led the defendant to capitulate before

judgment . That is not the case. To the contra ry, the

Court approves the r esult in Parham v. Southwestern Bell

Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d 421 (CA8 1970), where attorneys fees

were awarded after [a] finding that the defendant had

acted unlawfully, ante, at 9, and n . 9.3 What the dissents

3The dissent in correctly chara cterizesParham as involving a n u ndif-

ferentiat ed finding or reten tion of jur isdiction,post, at 17, n. 11. In

fact, Parham involved a finding that defendant had discriminated, and

jurisdiction was retained so that that finding could be given effect, in

the form of injunctive relief, should th e defendan t ever backslide in its

volun tar y provision of relief to plaintiffs. J ur isdiction was not r etain edto determine whether t here h ad been discrimination, and I do not read


22/51




stretching of the term produces is something more, and

something far less reasonable: an award of attorneys fees

when the merits of plaintiffs case remain unresolved

when, for all one knows, the defendant only abandon[ed]

th e fra y because t he cost of litigationeith er fina ncial or

in term s of pu blic relat ionswould be too grea t. In su ch a

case, the plaintiff may have prevailed as Websters

defines that termgain[ed] victory by virtue of strength

or su per iority, seepost, at 12. But I doubt it was greater

strength in financial resources, or superiority in media

manipulation, rather than superiority in legal merit, that

Congress intended t o rewar d.It could be argued, perhaps, that insofar as abstract

justice is concerned, there is little to choose between the

dissents outcome an d th e Court s: If the form er sometimes

rewar ds the plaintiff with a ph ony claim (ther e is no way

of knowing), the latter sometimes denies fees to the plain-

the Courts opinion as suggesting a fee award would be appropriate in

those circumstances.

The dissent notes that two other cases were cited in Senate legisla-

tive history (Parham is cited in legislative history from both th e Sena te

an d House) which it claims support t he catalyst th eory. If legislative

history in general is a risky interpretive tool, legislative history fromonly one legislative cham berand consisting of the citat ion of Court ofAppeals cases that surely few if any Members of Congress readis

virtua lly worthless. In an y event, Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523

F. 2d 1005 (CA2 1975), does not su pport the catalyst th eory becausedefendan ts volunt ary compliance was not at issue. Fees were awar ded

on the dubious premise that discovery uncovered some documents ofpotential use in other litigation, making this more a case of an awa rd of

interim fees. Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, 428 F . 2d 981 (CA3 1970),is also inapposite. There, the quest ion was whet her counsel for union

members whose fruitless efforts to sue the union had nonethelessspurred the union to sue the employer, should be paid out of a fund

established by the un ions victory. Whether t he un ion mem bers were

prevailing parties in the union suit, or whether they were entitled to

att orneys fees as prevailing par ties in th e ear lier suit against theun ion, was not even at issue.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 9


tiff with a solid case whose adversary slinks away on the

eve of judgm ent . But it seem s to me th e evil of th e forme r

far outweighs th e evil of th e lat ter . Ther e is all th e differ-

ence in the world between a rule that denies the extraor-

dina ry boon of at torn eys fees to some plaintiffs who ar e n o

less deserving of them than others who receive them,

and a rule that causes the law to be the very instrument of

wron gexacting th e paym ent of at torn eys fees to the

extortionist.

It is tru e that m onetary settlements an d consent decrees

can be extorted as well, and we have approved the award

of attorneys fees in cases resolved through such mecha-nisms. See ante, at 5 6 (citing cases). Our decision th at

the sta tut e ma kes plaintiff a prevailing par ty un der su ch

circum stances was based ent irely on lan guage in a House

Report, see Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980), and

if this issue were to arise for the first time today, I doubt

wheth er I would agree with that result. See Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987) (SCALIA, J.) (opining that

[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff

receive at least some reliefon the merits of his claim before

he can be said to prevail (empha sis add ed)). But in th e

case of court-approved settlements and consent decrees,even if there has been no judicial determination of the

mer its, the outcome is at least t he pr oduct of, and bear s the

sanction of, judicial action in the lawsuit. Ther e is at least

some basis for saying that the party favored by the settle-

men t or decree prevailed in the suit. Extend ing the holding

ofMaher to a case in which no judicial action whatever has

been taken stretches the term prevailing party (and the

potential injustice that Maher produces) beyond what the

normal meaning of that term in the litigation context can

conceivably supp ort.

The dissent points out t ha t pet itioner s object in br inging

their suit was not to obtain a judges approbation, but tostop enforcement of a [West Virginia] rule, post, at 13;


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10 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, I NC. v. WEST



see also Hewitt, supra, at 761. True enough. But not even

the dissent claims that if a petitioner accumulated attor-

neys fees in prepa ring a thr eaten ed complaint, but never

filed it prior to the defendants voluntary cessation of its

offending behavior, the wannabe-but-never-was plaintiff

could recover fees; that would be countertextual, since the

fee-shifting statutes require that there be an action or

proceeding, see 42 U. S. C. 3613(d); 1988(b) (1994 ed.,

Supp. V)which in legal parlance (though not in more

general usage) means a lawsuit. See post, at 23 (conclud-

ing that a pa rty should be deemed preva iling as a result of

a postcomplaint paym ent or chan ge in cond uct). Doesthat not leave achievement of the broad congressional

purpose identified by the dissent just as unsatisfactorily

incomplete as the failure to award fees when there is no

decree? J ust as the dissent rhet orically asks why (never

mind th e langua ge of the statu te) Congress would wan t to

award fees when there is a judgment, but deny fees when

the defendant capitulates on the eve of judgmen t; so also it

is fair for us to ask why Congress would want to award

fees when suit has been filed, but deny fees when the

about-to-be defendant capitulates under the threat of

filing. Sur ely, it cann ot be because determ inat ion ofwhether suit was actually contemplated and threatened is

too difficult. All th e proof ta kes is a th rea ten ing lett er a nd

a batch of timesheets. Surely that obstacle would not

deter the Congress that (according to the dissent) was

willing to let district judges pursue that much more eva-

sive will-o-the-wisp called catalyst. (Is this not why we

have district courts?, asks the dissent, post, at 19.) My

point is not th at it would take n o more twisting of la n-

guage t o produce prelitigation att orneys fees tha n to

produ ce th e decreeless attorn eys fees tha t th e dissent

favors (though th at m ay well be true). My point is that

the departure from normal usage that the dissent favorscannot be justified on the ground that it establishes a


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 11


regim e of logical even ha nd edn ess. Ther e must be a cutoff

of seemingly equivalent entitlements to feeseither the

failure to file suit in time or the failure to obtain a judg-

men t in time. The term prevailing part y suggests the

latter ra ther th an th e form er. One does not prevail in a

suit th at is never determ ined.

The dissent's ultimate worry is that todays opinion will

impede access to court for the less well-heeled,post, at 1.

But, of course, the catalyst theory also harms the less

well-heeled, putting pressure on them to avoid the risk of

massive fees by abandoning a solidly defensible case early

in litigation. Since th e fee-shifting statu tes at issue her eallow defendants as well as plaintiffs to receive a fee

awar d, we know tha t Congress did not intend t o maximize

the quantity of the enforcement of federal law by private

attorneys general, ibid. Rather , Congress desired an

appropriate level of enforcementwhich is more likely to

be produced by limiting fee awards to plaintiffs who pre-

vail on the merits, or at least to those who achieve an

enforceable alteration of the legal relationship of the

parties, than by permitting the open-ended inquiry ap-

pr oved by the dissent.4

4Even the legislative history relied upon by the dissent supports the

conclusion th at some m erit is necessary to justify a fee award. See post,at 15, n. 9 (citing a House Report for the proposition that fee-shifting

statutes are designed to give [victims of civil rights violation] accessto the judicial process (emphasis added)); ibid. (citing a Senate

Report: [I]f those who violate the Nations fundamental laws are not to

proceed with impunity, fee awards are necessary (emphasis added)).

And for the reasons given by the Court, see ante at 67, the catalyst

theorys purported merit testthe ability to survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, or the absence of frivolousnessisscant pr otection for th e innocent.


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12 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, I NC. v. WEST



II I

The dissent points out t ha t th e cata lyst theory ha s been

accepted by the clear majority of Federal Circuits,post,

at 2. But our disagreeing with a clear majority of the

Circuits is not at all a rar e phenomenon. Indeed, our

opinions sometimes contradict the unanimous and long-

stan ding inter pre ta tion of lower feder al cour ts. See, e.g.,

McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 365 (1987)

(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (the Courts decision contra-

dicted [e]very court to consider the quest ion).

The dissents insisten ce th at we de fer to the clear m a-

jority of Circuit opinion is particularly peculiar in thepresent case, since that majority has been nurtured and

preserved by our own misleading dicta (to which I, unfor-

tu na tely, cont ribut ed). Most of th e Circuit Court cases

cited by the dissent, post, at 6, and n . 5, as reaffirming the

catalyst theory after our decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506

U. S. 103 (1992), relied on our earlier opinion in Hewitt. See

Marbley v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995) (relying on

Hewitt to support cata lyst th eory); Payne v. Board of Ed.,

88 F . 3d 392, 397 (CA6 1996) (same); Baumgartner v.

Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F. 3d 541, 548 (CA3 1994)

(explicitly rejecting Farrar in favor of Hewitt); Zinn v.Shalala, 35 F. 3d 273, 274276 (CA7 1994) (same); Beardv. Teska, 31 F. 3d 942, 950952 (CA10 1994) (same); Mor-

ris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11 1999)

(same). Deferring to our colleagues own error is bad

enough; but enshrining the error that we ourselves have

improvidently suggested and blaming it on the near-

unanimous judgment of our colleagues would surely be

unworthy.5 Informing the Courts of Appeals that our ill-

5That a few cases adopting the catalyst theory predate Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), see post, at 5, and n. 4, is irrelevant to my

point. Absent our dicta in Hewitt, and in light of everything else wehave said on t his topic, see ante, at 56, it is unlikely that the catalyst


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 13


considered dicta have misled them displays, it seems to

me, not disrespect, but a most becoming (and well-

deser ved) hu mility.

* * *

The Court today concludes that a party cannot be

deemed to have prevailed, for purposes of fee-shifting

stat ut es such as 42 U . S. C. 1988, 3613(c)(2), un less

there has been an enforceable alteration of the legal

relationship of the par ties. That is the norma l mea ning

of prevailing party in litigation, and there is no proper

basis for depar ting from tha t normal mean ing. Congressis free, of course, to revise these provisionsbut it is my

guess th at if it does so it will not crea te th e sort of inequity

that the catalyst theory invites, but will require the court

to determine tha t ther e was at least a substan tial likel i-

hood th at t he pa rty r equesting fees would ha ve prevailed.

theory would have achieved that universality of acceptance by theCourts of Appeals up on which the dissent r elies.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissent ing

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________

No. 991848

_________________





ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE U NITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FOU RTH CIRCUIT

[May 29, 2001]

J USTICE GINSBURG, with whom J USTICE STEVENS,J USTICE SOUTER, and J USTICE BREYERjoin, dissenting.

The Court today holds that a plaintiff whose suit

promp ts th e pr ecise relief she seek s does not pr evail, an d

hen ce cann ot obtain a n aw ar d of at torn eys fees, unless

she also secures a court entry memorializing her victory.

The entry need not be a judgment on th e merits . Nor need

th ere be an y find ing of wrongdoing. A cour t-appr oved

settlem ent will do.

The Cour ts insisten ce th at t her e be a docum ent filed in

courta litigated judgment or court-endorsed settle-

mentupsets long-prevailing Circuit precedent applicable

to scores of feder al fee-shifting sta tu te s. The decision

allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay

a plaintiffs counsel fees, even though the suits merit led

the defendant t o abandon the fray, to switch r ather than

fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the

pr incipal red ress sough t in th e comp laint. Concomita nt ly,

th e Cour ts constr icted definition of pr evailing pa rt y, an d

consequent rejection of the catalyst theory, impede ac-

cess to court for th e less well-heeled, an d shr ink th e incen-

tive Congr ess crea ted for th e enforcement of federa l law byprivate attorneys general.


29/51




In my view, the catalyst rule, as applied by the clear

ma jority of Fede ra l Circuits, is a key comp onent of th e fee-

shifting statutes Congress adopted to advance enforce-

men t of civil right s. Nothin g in history, pr ecedent, or

plain English warrants the anemic construction of the

term prevailing pa rty the Court today imposes.

I

Petitioner Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc.

(Buckhan non), opera tes r esidential care homes for elderly

persons who need assisted living, but not nursing services.

Among Buckhannons residents in October 1996 was 102-year-old Dorsey Pierce. Pierce had resided at Buckhan non

for some four year s. Her da ughter lived nearby, an d the

car e provided at Buckhan non met Pierces needs. Unt il

1998, West Virginia ha d a self-preserva tion ru le pr ohib-

iting homes like Buckhannon from accommodating per-

sons u na ble to exit th e prem ises without assistance in t he

event of a fire. Pierce and t wo other Buckhan non resi-

den ts could not get to a fire exit with out aid. Inform ed of

th ese r esidents limita tions, West Virginia officials pr o-

ceeded against Buckhannon for noncompliance with the

self-preser vation rule. On October 18, 1996, th ree order s

issued, each comm an ding Buckhann on to cease operating

. . . an d t o effect r elocat ion of [its] exist ing popu lat ion

within t hirt y (30) da ys. App. 4653.

Ten days later, Buckhannon and Pierce, together with

an organization of resident ial homes and an other Bu ck-

hannon resident (hereinafter plaintiffs), commenced litiga-

tion in Federal District Court to overturn the cease-and-

desist orders an d th e self-preservation r ule on which t hey

rested. They sued the Stat e, stat e agencies, an d 18 offi-

cials (hereinafter defendants) alleging that the rule dis-

criminated against persons with disabilities in violation of

the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42U. S. C . 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 3


Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U . S. C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiffs

sought an immediate order stopping defendants from

closing Buckhannons facilities, injunctive relief perma-

nently barring enforcement of the self-preservation re-

quiremen t, dam ages, and att orneys fees.

On N ovember 1, 1996, at a h ear ing on plaintiffs re quest

for a temporary restraining order, defendants agreed to

the entry of an interim order allowing Buckhannon to

remain open without changing the individual plaintiffs

housing an d care. Discover y followed. On J an ua ry 2,

1998, facing the state defendants sovereign immunity

pleas, plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of their demandsfor dam ages. In Febru ar y 1998, in response to defenda nts

motion to dispose of the remainder of the case summarily,

the District Court determined that plaintiffs had pre-

sented t riable claims und er t he F HAA an d ADA.

Less than a month after the District Court found that

plaintiffs were entitled to a trial, the West Virginia Leg-

islat ur e rep ealed the self-preser vation rule. Plaint iffs still

allege, and seek to prove, that their suit triggered the

statu tory repea l. After the ru les demise, defendan ts

moved to dismiss the case as moot, and plaintiffs sought

at torn eys fees as pre vailing pa rt ies un der th e FH AA, 42U. S. C . 3613(c)(2), and th e ADA, 42 U. S. C. 12205.1

1The F HAA provides: In a civil action . . . , the court , in its discr e-

tion, may allow the preva iling pa rty . . . a reasonable att orneys fee an d

costs. 42 U. S. C. 3613(c)(2). Similar ly, th e ADA provides: In an yaction . . . , the court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

par ty . . . a reasonable at torneys fee, including litigation e xpenses, an dcosts . . . . 42 U. S. C. 12205. These ADA an d FH AA provisions ar e

modeled on other prevailing party statutes, notably the Civil RightsAttorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. 1988 (1994 ed. and

Supp . IV). See H . R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 2, p. 140 (1991) (ADA); H. R.

Rep. No. 100711, pp . 1617, n. 20 (1988) (FHAA). Section 1988 was

patterned upon the attorneys fees provisions contained in Titles II andVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 2000a3(b) and 2000e


31/51




Finding no likelihood that West Virginia would reenact

the self-preservation rule, the District Court agreed that

the Stat es action ha d render ed the case moot. Turn ing to

plaintiffs application for attorneys fees, the District Court

followed Fourth Circuit precedent requiring the denial of

fees unless termination of the action was accompanied by

a judgmen t, consent decree, or settlement.2 Plaintiffs did

not appeal the mootness determination, and the Fourth

Circuit affirm ed the denial of at torn eys fees. In sum ,

plaintiffs were denied fees not because they failed to

achieve the relief they sought . On the contra ry, they

gained the very change they sought through their lawsuitwhen West Virginia repealed the self-preservation rule

that would have stopped Buckhannon from caring for

people like Dorsey Pierce.3

Prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals (except

the Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue)

concluded that plaintiffs in situations like Buckhannons

5(k), and 402 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U. S. C.

1973l(e). Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983) (citing

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758, n. 4 (1980) (per curiam)). In

accord with congressional intent, we have interpreted these fee-shifting

provisions consist ent ly across sta tu tes. The Cour t so observes. See ante,at 4, n. 4. Notably, the sta tut es do not man date fees, but provide for theirawa rd in [the court s] discret ion.

2On plaint iffs motion, th e District Cour t san ctioned defendan ts u n-

der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for failing timely to notifyplaintiffs that the proposed [repeal of the self-preservation rule] was

progressing successfully at several stages . . . during the pendency of[the ] litigat ion. App. 144. In th eir Rule 11 motion, plaintiffs requ este d

fees and costs totaling $62,459 to cover the expense of litigating afterdefendants became aware, but did not disclose, that elimination of the

ru le was likely. In th e altern ative, plaintiffs sought $3,252 to offsetfees an d expenses incurr ed in litigating the Rule 11 motion. The

District Court, stating that the primary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter

and n ot to compen sate, awar ded the sma ller sum. App. 147.

3 Pierce remained a Buckhannon resident until her death on January3, 1999.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 5


and Pierces could obtain a fee award if their suit acted as

a catalyst for the change they sought, even if they did

not obtain a judgment or consent decree.4 The Courts of

Appeals foun d it clear t ha t a par ty ma y be considered to

have prevailed even when the legal action stops short of

fina l . . . judgm ent due to . . . inter vening mootness.

Grano v. Barry, 783 F. 2d 1104, 1108 (CADC 1986). I n-

terpreting the term prevailing party in a practical

sense, Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1982)

(citation omitted), federal courts across the country held

that a party prevails for fee-shifting purposes when its

ends are accomplished as a result of the litigation, Asso-ciated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish School

Bd., 919 F. 2d 374, 378 (CA5 1990) (citation and internal

quotation m ar ks omitt ed).

In 1994, the Fourth Circuit en banc, dividing 6-to-5,

broke ra nks with its sister court s. The court declar ed

4Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d 275, 279281 (CA1 1978); Gerena-

Valentin v. Koch, 739 F. 2d 755, 758759 (CA2 1984); Institutionalized

Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F. 2d 897, 910917 (CA31985); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F. 2d 1316, 1319 (CA4 1979); Robinson v.

Kimbrough, 652 F. 2d 458, 465467 (CA5 1981); Citizens Against Tax

Waste v. Westerville City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 985 F. 2d 255, 257258(CA6 1993); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1982); Wil-liams v. Miller, 620 F. 2d 199, 202 (CA8 1980); American Constitutional

Party v. Munro, 650 F. 2d 184, 187188 (CA9 1981); J & J Anderson,

Inc. v. Erie, 767 F. 2d 1469, 14741475 (CA10 1985);Doe v. Busbee, 684F. 2d 1375, 1379 (CA11 1982); Grano v. Barry, 783 F. 2d 1104, 1108

1110 (CADC 1986). All twelve of these decisions antedate Hewitt v.Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987). But cf. ante, at 12, and n. 5 (SCALIA, J.,

concurring) (maintaining that this Courts decision in Hewittimprovidently suggested the catalyst ru le, and a sserting t hat only a few

cases adopting the catalyst theory predate Hewitt). Hewitt said it wassettled law that when a lawsuit prompts a defendants voluntary

action . . . tha t r edr esses th e plain tiffs gr ievan ces, th e plain tiff is

deemed to have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in

his favor. 482 U. S., at 760761. That statem ent accura tely conveyedthe u na nimous view then held by the Feder al Circuits.


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that, in light ofFarrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), a

plaintiff could n ot become a pr evailing pa rt y without an

enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement. S1

and S2v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C., 21 F. 3d 49, 51 (1994).

As the Court today acknowledges, see ante, at 45, n. 5,

and as we have previously observed, the language on

which the Fourth Circuit relied was dictum: Farrar in-

volved no catalytic effect; the issue plainly was not pre-

sented for this Courts decision in Farrar. Friends of

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,528 U. S. 167, 194 (2000).

After th e Fourt h Circuits en banc ru ling, nine Cour ts ofAppeals rea ffirm ed t heir own consistently held inter preta-

tion of the term prevail.5 On this predominant view,

[s]ecurin g an enforceable decree or a greem ent ma y evi-

dence prevailing party status, but the judgment or agree-

ment simply embodies and enforces what is sought in

bringing t he lawsuit . . . . Victory can be achieved well

short of a final judgm ent (or its equ ivalent) . . . . Marbleyv.Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995) (J acobs, J.).

The array of federal court decisions applying the cata-

lyst rule suggested three conditions necessary to a partys

qualification as prevailing short of a favorable final judgm ent or consen t decree. A plaint iff first h ad to show

tha t the defendan t provided some of the benefit sought

by the lawsuit. Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950

F. 2d 128, 131 (CA3 1991). Un der most Circuits pr ece-

5Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional School Dist., 197 F. 3d 574,

577, n. 2 (CA1 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995);

Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F. 3d 541, 546550 (CA3

1994); Payne v. Board of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392, 397 (CA6 1996); Zinn v.

Shalala, 35 F . 3d 273, 276 (CA7 1994); Little Rock School Dist. v.

Pulaski Cty. School Dist., #1, 17 F. 3d 260, 263, n. 2 (CA8 1994);

Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F. 3d 1007, 1010 (CA9 1995); Beard v. Teska,

31 F. 3d 942, 951952 (CA10 1994); Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11 1999).


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a pa rt y in whose favor a judgment is render ed prevails,

and at the same time resist, as most Courts of Appeals

ha ve, any implication th at only such a party may prevail.

In prior cases, we have not treated Blacks Law Dictionary

as pr eclusively definitive; instea d, we ha ve accorded sta tu-

tory terms, including legal term[s] of art, ante, at 4

(opinion of the Court); ante, at 6 (SCALIA, J., concurr ing), a

contextua l rea ding. See, e.g., Pioneer Investment Services

Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S.

380, 395396, n. 14 (1993) (defining excu sable n eglect, as

used in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1),

more broadly than Blacks defines that term); UnitedStates v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 479480 (1984) (ad optin g

natural, nontechnical definition of word jurisdiction, as

tha t t erm is used in 18 U. S. C. 1001, and declining t o

confine definition to narrower, more technical meanings,

citin g Blacks). Nota bly, th is Cour t did not r efer to Blacks

Law Dictionary in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980),

which held that a consent decree could qualify a plaintiff

as pr evailing. Th e Cour t explained:

The fact that [plaintiff] prevailed through a settle-

ment rath er t han thr ough l i t igation does not weaken

her claim to fees. Noth ing in th e lan gua ge of [42U. S. C.] 1988 conditions the District Courts power

to awa rd fees on full litigat ion of the issues or on a ju-

dicial determ ination tha t the plaintiffs r ight s h ave

been violat ed. Id., at 129.

The spare prevailing party language of the fee-shifting

provision applicable in Maher, an d th e similar wording of

the fee-shifting provisions now before the Court, contrast

with prescriptions that so tightly bind fees to judgments

as to exclude t he ap plicat ion of a catalyst concept. The

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, for example, directs

that fee awards to prisoners under 1988 be proportion-ately related to the court ordered relief for the violation.


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 9


110 Stat. 132172, as am ended, 42 U. S. C.

1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added).

That statu te, by its express term s, forecloses an a ward to

a prisoner on a catalyst theory. But th e FHAA an d ADA

fee-shifting p re scriptions, mode led on 42 U . S. C. 1988

un modified, see supra, at 3 4, n. 1, do not similarly sta ple

fee awa rds to cour t orde red re lief. Their very ter ms do

not foreclose a cata lyst the ory.

B

It is altogether true, as the concurring opinion points

out, ante, at 12, that litigation costs other than attorneysfees traditionally have been allowed to the prevailing

party, and that a judgment winner ordinarily fits that

description. It is not true, however, tha t precedent on

costs calls for the judgment requirement the Court ironly

adopts t oday for a tt orneys fees. Ind eed, the first decision

cited in the concurring opinion, Mansfield, C. & L. M. R.

Co. v. Swan, 111 U . S. 379 (1884), see ante, at 1, tugs

aga inst t he re str ictive ru le todays decision in stalls.

In Mansfield, plaintiffs commenced a contract action in

stat e court . Over plaintiffs objections, defenda nt s suc-

cessfully rem oved the suit to federa l cour t. Plaint iffs

prevailed on the merits there, and defendants obtainedreview here . See 111 U. S., at 380381. This Court d e-

termined, on its own motion, that federal subject-matter

jurisdiction was absent from the star t. Based on tha t

dete rm inat ion, th e Cour t re versed th e lower cour ts judg-

men t for plaintiffs. Worse tha n ent ering and leaving this

Cour thouse equa lly emptyh an ded,ante, at 4 (concurring

opinion), the plaintiffs in Mansfield were stripped of the

judgment they had won, including the judicial finding .. .

of the merits in their favor, ante, at 3 (concurring opin-

ion). The Mansfield plaintiffs did, however, achieve this

small consolation: The Court awar ded th em costs h ere aswell as below. Recognizing th at defenda nt s ha d pre-


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vail[ed] in a formal and nominal sense, the Mansfield

Court nonetheless concluded that [i]n a true and proper

sense defendants were the losing an d n ot the prevailing

par ty. 111 U. S., at 388.

While Mansfield casts doubt on the present majoritys

formal and nominal approach, that decision does not

consider whether costs would be in order for the plaintiff

who obtains substan tial relief, but no fina l judgment . Nor

does a single case on which the concurring opinion today

relies, ante, at 4.6 Ther e are , however, enlighten ing ana lo-

gies. In m ultiple instances, state high cour ts have regar ded

plaintiffs as prevailing, for costs taxation purposes, whendefendants voluntary conduct, mooting the suit, provided

the relief that plaintiffs sought.7 The concurring opinion

6 The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377 (1869), featured in the concurring opinion,

see ante, at 12, does not run the distance to which that opinion would

take it. In The Baltimore, there was a judgment in one partys favor. See8 Wall., at 384. The Court did not address th e question whet her costs are

available absent such a judgment. The Baltimores incident to the

judgment language, which the concurrence emphasizes,ante, at 1, 2(citing 8 Wall., at 388, 390), likely relat ed t o the once-main tained ru le th at

a court without jurisdiction may not awar d costs. See Mayor v. Cooper, 6

Wall. 247, 250251 (1868). Tha t ancient ru le figur ed some year s lat er inMansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884); the Courtnoted the universally recognized rule of the common law that, absent

jurisdiction, a court can render no judgment for or against either party,

[and therefore] cannot render a judgment even for costs. Id., at 387.Receding from tha t ru le, the Court a warded costs, even upon dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction, because there is a judgment or final order in thecause dismissing it for want of jurisdiction. Ibid.; see U. S. Bancorp

Mortgage Co. v.Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21 (1994).7

See, e.g.,Board of Ed. of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 36,

14 S. E. 2d 478, 479 (1941) (mandamus action dismissed as moot, but

costs awarded to plaintiffs where the purposes of the mandamus

petition were accomplished by the subsequent acts of the defendants,

thu s obviating the necessity for furth er p roceeding);Baldwin v. Chesa-

peake & Potomac Tel. Co., 156 Md. 552, 557, 144 A. 703, 705 (1929) (costsawarded to plaintiff after trial court granted defendants demurrer and


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 11


labors unconvincingly to distinguish these state law cases. 8

A similar federal practice has been observed in cases gov-

plaintiffs appeal was dismissed based on an act of [defendant] performed

after . . . entr y of the appea l; dismissal rend ered it u nn ecessary toinquire into th e mer its of the suit); Ficklen v.Danville, 146 Va. 426, 438,

132 S. E. 705, 706 (1926) (costs on appeal awarded to plaintiffs, eventhough trial court denied injunctive relief and high court dismissed

appeal due to mootness, because plaintiffs achieved the equivalent to

. . . substa ntia lly prevailing in gain[ing] all they sought by th eappeal); cf. Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53, 55, 56 (CA6 1908) (although

there was no judgment against the defendant upon the merits,

defendan t acknowledged its liability . . . by paying t o the plaintiff thesum of $5,000, rendering plaintiff the successful party entitled to

costs); Talmage v. Monroe, 119 P. 526 (Cal. App. 1911) (fees awa rd ed t o

petitioner after court issued alternative writ directing respondent

either to take specified action or to show cause for not doing so, andresponden t chose to take t he a ction).

8The concurrence urges th atBaldwin is inapposite because it was a n

action in equity, and equity courts could award costs as the equities

required. Ante, at 2 . The cata lyst rule becomes r elevant, however, onlywhen a party seeks relief of a sort traditionally typed equitable, i.e., a

change of condu ct, not dam ages. There is no such thing as an injunc-

tion at law, and therefore one cannot expect to find long-ago plaintiffswho quested after that mythical remedy and received voluntary relief.

By the concurrences reasoning, the paucity of precedent applying the

catalyst rule to prevailing parties is an artifact of nothing moreremarkable, ante, at 4, tha n th e historic law-equity separ ation.

The concur ren ce notes tha t th e other cited cases all involve a judicial

findingor its equivalent, an acknowledgment by the defendantof the

merits of plaintiffs case. Ante, at 3 (emphasis added). I agree. InFowler and Scatcherd, however, the acknowledgment consisted of

nothing m ore tha n th e defendan ts volunt ary pr ovision to the p laintiffof the r elief that th e plaintiff sought. See also, e.g., Jefferson R. R. Co.

v. Weinman, 39 Ind. 231 (1872) (costs awar ded wh ere d efendan t volun-tarily paid damages; no admission or merits judgment); Wagner v.

Wagner, 9 Pa. 214 (1848) (same); Hudson v. Johnson, 1 Va. 10 (1791)

(same). Common-law courts thus regarded a defenda nts volunt ar y

compliance, by settlemen t or other wise, as a n acknowledgment . . . of

the merits sufficient to warrant treatment of a plaintiff as prevailing.

But cf. ante, at 5, n. 7 (opinion of the Cour t). One can only wonder whythe concurr ing opinion would n ot follow th e sam e pr actice today.


39/51




erned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), the default

rule allowing costs to the prevailing party unless the court

otherwise directs. See 10 C. Wrigh t, A. Miller, & M. Kan e,

Fede ra l Pra ctice an d Pr ocedu re 2667, pp. 187188 (2d ed.

1983) (When th e defenda nt alters its condu ct so th at

plaintiffs claim [for injunctive relief] becomes moot before

judgment is reached, costs may be allowed [under Rule

54(d)] if the court finds that the changes were the result,

at least in part, of plaintiffs litigation.) (citing, inter alia,

Black Hills Alliance v. Regional Forester, 526 F. Su pp. 257

(ND 1981)).

In sh ort, there is substant ial support, both old and n ew,federal and state, for a costs award, in [the courts] dis-

cretion, supra, at 3, n. 1, to th e p laintiff whose su it

promp ts the de fendan t to provide th e relief plaintiff seeks.

C

Recognizing that no practice set in stone, statute, rule,

or precedent, see infra, at 2122, dictates the proper con-

str uction of moder n civil rights fee-shifting p rescriptions, I

would assume . . . that Congress intends the words in its

enactments to carry their ordinary, contemporary, com-

mon meaning. Pioneer, 507 U. S., at 388 (defining ex-

cusable ne glect) (quotingPerrin v. United States, 444 U. S.37, 42 (1979) (defining bribery)); see also, e.g., Sutton v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U . S. 471, 491 (1999) (definin g

substantially in light of ordinary usage); Rutledge v.

United States, 517 U . S. 292, 299300, n. 10 (1996) (simi-

larly defining in concert ). In ever yda y use, pr evail

means gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority:

win ma stery: trium ph. Websters Third New Int ern a-

tional Dictionar y 1797 (1976). Ther e ar e un doubted ly

situations in which an individuals goal is to obtain ap-

proval of a judge, and in those situations, one cannot

pr evail short of a judges forma l declara tion. In a pian ocompetition or a figure skating contest, for example, the


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Cite as: 532 U. S. ____ (2001) 13


person who prevails is the person declared winner by the

judges. However, where th e ultimate goal is not an a rbi-

ters approval, but a favorable alteration of actual circum-

stan ces, a forma l declar at ion is not essent ial. Western

democracies, for instance, prevailed in the Cold War

even though t he Soviet Union n ever form ally surr ender ed.

Among television viewers, John F. Kennedy prevailed in

the first debate with Richard M. Nixon during the 1960

Presidential contest, even though moderator Howard K.

Smith n ever declared a winner . See T. White, The Making

of the President 1960, pp. 293294 (1961).

A lawsuits ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relieffrom an opponent. Favorable judgment ma y be instru-

men tal in gaining tha t relief. Genera lly, however, th e

judicial decree is not th e end but th e mea ns. At the en d of

th e ra inbow lies not a judgm ent , but some a ction (or cessa-

tion of action) by th e defend an t . . . . Hewitt v. Helms, 482

U. S. 755, 761 (1987). On t his comm on un der stan ding, if a

party reaches the sought-after destination, then the

party prevails regardless of the route taken. Hennigan

v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F. 2d 1148, 1153 (CA5

1985).

Under a fair reading of the FHAA and ADA provisionsin point, I would hold that a pa rty prevails in a tru e a nd

proper sense, Mansfield, 111 U. S., at 388, when she

achieves, by instituting litigation, the practical relief

sought in h er complaint. The Cour t misreads Congress, as

I see it, by insisting that, invariably, relief must be dis-

played in a judgment, and correspondingly that a defen-

dan ts volun ta ry action n ever suffices. In th is case, Buck-

hannons purpose in suing West Virginia officials was not

na rr owly to obtain a jud ges approbation. The plaintiffs

objective was to stop enforcement of a rule requiring

Buckhannon to evict residents like centenarian Dorsey

Pierce as the pr ice of rem aining in business. If Buckhan-non achieved that objective on account of the strength of


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its case, see supra, at 7if it succeeded in keeping its

doors open while housing and caring for Ms. Pierce and

others similarly situatedthen Buckhannon is properly

judged a pa rty wh o prevailed.

II I

As the Courts of Appeals have long recognized, the

cata lyst r ule suitably advan ces Congress endea vor to

place privat e a ctions, in civil right s an d other legislatively

defined area s, secur ely within the federa l law enforcement

arsenal.

The catalyst rule stemmed from modern legislationextending civil rights protections and enforcement meas-

ur es. The Civil Right s Act of 1964 includ ed pr ovisions for

fee awards to prevailing parties in Title II (public ac-

comm odat ions ), 42 U . S. C. 2000a3(b), a n d Title VII

(employment), 42 U. S. C. 2000e5(k), but not in Title VI

(feder al pr ogra ms). The provisions centr al pur pose was

to promote vigorous enforcement of the laws by private

plaintiffs; although using the two-way term prevailing

party, Congress did not make fees available to plaintiffs

and defendants on equal terms. Christiansburg Garment

Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 417, 421 (1978) (un der Title

VII, prevailing plaintiff qualifies for fee award absent spe-

cial circumsta nces, but p reva iling defenda nt ma y obtain fee

award only if plaintiffs suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or

without founda tion).

Once th e 1964 Act came in to force, court s comm enced t o

award fees regularly under the statutory auth

department of labor: 99 1848

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